THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

TRANSLATED FROM THE TEXT OF F. HULTSCH

BY

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TO

F. M. S.

IN GRATITUDE FOR MUCH PATIENT HELP

PREFACE

THIS is the first English translation of the complete works of Polybius as far as they are now known. In attempting such a task I feel that I ought to state distinctly the limits which I have proposed to myself in carrying it out. I have desired to present to English readers a faithful copy of what Polybius wrote, which should at the same time be a readable English book. I have not been careful to follow the Greek idiom; and have not hesitated to break up and curtail or enlarge his sentences, when I thought that, by doing so, I could present his meaning in more idiomatic English. Polybius is not an author likely to be studied for the sake of his Greek, except by a few technical scholars; and the modern complexion of much of his thought makes such a plan of translation both possible and desirable. How far I have succeeded I must leave my readers to decide. Again, I have not undertaken to write a commentary on Polybius, nor to discuss at length the many questions of interest which arise from his text. Such an undertaking would have required much more space than I was able to give: and happily, while my translation was passing through the press, two books have appeared, which will supply English students with much that I might have felt bound to endeavour to give — the Achaean league

by Mr. Capes, and the sumptuous Oxford edition of extracts by Mr. Strachan-Davidson.

The translation is made from the text of Hultsch and follows his arrangement of the fragments. If this causes some inconvenience to those who use the older texts, I hope that such inconvenience will be minimised by the full index which I have placed at the end of the second volume.

I have not, I repeat, undertaken to write a commentary. I propose rather to give the materials for commentary to those who, for various reasons, do not care to use the Greek of Polybius. I have therefore in the first five complete books left him to speak for himself, with the minimum of notes which seemed necessary for the understanding of his text. The case of the fragments was different. In giving a translation of them I have tried, when possible, to indicate the part of the history to which they belong, and to connect them by brief sketches of intermediate events, with full references to those authors who supply the missing links.

Imperfect as the performance of such a task must, I fear, be, it has been one of no ordinary labour, and has occupied every hour that could be spared during several years of a not unlaborious life. And though I cannot hope to have escaped errors, either of ignorance or human infirmity, I trust that I may have produced what will be found of use to some historical students, in giving them a fairly faithful representation of the works of an historian who is, in fact, our sole authority for some most interesting portions of the world's history.

It remains to give a brief account of the gradual formation of the text of Polybius, as we now have it.

The revival of interest in the study of Polybius was

due to Pope Nicholas V (1447-1455), the founder of the Vatican Library. Soon after his election he seems to have urged Cardinal Perotti to undertake a Latin translation of the five books then known to exist. When Perotti sent him his translation of the first book, the Pope thus acknowledges it in a letter dated 28th August 1452 :—[1]

"*Primus Polybii liber, quem ad nos misisti, nuper a te de Graeca in Latinam translatus, gratissimus etiam fuit et jucundissimus : quippe in ea translatione nobis cumulatissime satisfacis. Tanta enim facilitate et eloquentia transfers, ut Historia ipsa nunquam Graeca, sed prorsus Latina semper fuisse videatur. Optimum igitur ingenium tuum valde commendamus atque probamus, teque hortamur ut velis pro laude et gloria tua, et pro voluptate nimia singulare opus inchoatum perficere, nec labori parcas. Nam et rem ingenio et doctrina tua dignam, et nobis omnium gratissimam efficies ; qui laborum et studiorum tuorum aliquando memores erimus. . . . Tu vero, si nobis rem gratam efficere cupis, nihil negligentiae committas in hoc opere traducendo. Nihil enim nobis gratius efficere poteris. Librum primum a vertice ad calcem legimus, in cujus translatione voluntati nostrae amplissime satisfactum est.*"

On the 3d of January 1454 the Pope writes again to Perotti thanking him for the third book ; and in a letter to Torelli, dated 13th November 1453, Perotti says that he had finished his translation of Polybius in the preceding September. This translation was first printed in 1473. The Greek text was not printed till 1530, when an edition of the first five books in Greek, along with Perotti's translation, was published at the

[1] Vita Nicolai V. a *Dominico Georgio*, Rome, 1742, p. 206.

Hague, *opera Vincentii Obsopaei*, dedicated to George, Marquess of Brandenburg. Perotti's translation was again printed at Basle in 1549, accompanied by a Latin translation of the fragments of books 6 to 17 by Wolfgan Musculus, and reprinted at the Hague in 1598.

The chief fragments of Polybius fall into two classes; (1) those made by some unknown epitomator, who Casaubon even supposed might be Marcus Brutus, who, according to Plutarch, was engaged in this work in his tent the night before the battle of Pharsalus. The printing of these began with two insignificant fragments on the battle between the Rhodians and Attalus against Philip, Paris, 1536; and another *de re navali*, Basle, 1537. These fragments have continually accumulated by fresh discoveries. (2) The other class of fragments are those made by the order of Constantinus Porphyrogenitus (911-959), among similar ones from other historians, which were to be digested under fifty-three heads or tituli; one of which (the 27th) has come down to us, discovered in the sixteenth century, containing the *selecta de legationibus*; and another (the 50th) *de virtute et vitio*. The printing of the first of these begins with the edition of Fulvius Ursinus, published at Antwerp in 1582. This was supplemented in 1634 (Paris) by an edition by Valesius of *excerpta ex collectaneis Constantini Augusti Porphyrogeneti*. The first edition of something like a complete text of Polybius, containing the five entire books, the *excerptae legationes*, and fragments of the other books, was that of Isaac Casaubon, Paris, 1609, fo. It was accompanied by a new and very brilliant Latin translation, and a preface which has been famous among such works. It contains also a Latin translation of Aeneas Tacticus. Altogether it is a splendid book. Some additional *annotationes* of

Casaubon's were published after his death in 1617, Paris.[1] Other editions followed; that of Gronovius, Amsterdam, 1670: of Ernesti, Leipsic, 1764, containing Casaubon's translation more or less emended, and additional fragments. But the next important step in the bibliography of Polybius was the publication of the great edition of Schweighaeuser, Leipsic, 1789-1795, in nine volumes, with a new Latin translation,—founded, however, to a great extent on Casaubon,—a new recension of the text, and still farther additions to the fragments; accompanied also by an excellent Lexicon and Onomasticon. This great work has been the foundation from which all modern commentaries on Polybius must spring. Considerable additions to the fragments, collected from MSS. in the Vatican by Cardinal Mai, were published in 1827 at Rome. The chief modern texts are those of Bekker, 1844; Duebner (with Latin translation), 1839 and 1865; Dindorf, 1866-1868, 1882 (Teubner). A new recension of the five books and all the known fragments—founded on a collation of some twelve MSS. and all previous editions, as well as all the numerous works of importance on our Author that have appeared in Germany and elsewhere—was published by F. Hultsch, Berlin, 1867-1872, in four volumes. This must now be considered the standard text. A second edition of the first volume appeared in 1888, but after that part of my translation had passed through the press.

Of English translations the earliest was by Ch. Watson, 1568, of the first five books. It is entitled

[1] Casaubon mentions in his preface several partial editions and translations which had appeared by Greeks, Spaniards, Italians, and Belgians. But he says all such translations were founded on the faulty Latin translation of Perotti; and none were of any value. The only fairly good one was a German translation.

The Hystories of the most famous Cronographer Polybios; Discoursing of the warres betwixt the Romanes and Carthaginenses, a rich and goodly work, conteining holsome counsels and wonderful devices against the inconstances of fickle Fortune. Englished by C[hristopher] W[atson] whereunto is annexed an Abstract, compendiously coarcted out of the life and worthy Acts perpetrate by oure puissant Prince King Henry the fift. London, Imprinted by Henry Byneman for Tho. Hacket, 1568, 8vo. See Herbert's *Ames*, p. 895. Another translation of the five books was published by Edward Grimestone, London, 1634, of which a second and third edition appeared in 1648 and 1673. A translation of the Mercenary War from the first book was made by Sir Walter Raleigh, and published after his death in 1647 (London, 4to). Next, a new translation of the five books was published in London, 1693 (2 vols. 8vo), by Sir H[enry] S[hears], with a preface by Dryden. In 1741 (London, 4to) appeared "A fragment of the 6th book containing a dissertation on government, translated from the Greek of Polybius, with notes, etc., by A Gentleman." This was followed by the first English translation, which contained any part of the fragments, as well as the five books, by the Rev. James Hampton, London, 4to, 1756-1761, which between that date and 1823 (2 vols., Oxford) went through at least seven editions. Lastly, a translation of Polybius's account of Hannibal's passage of the Alps is appended by Messrs. Church and Brodribb to their translation of Livy, 21-22. There is a German translation by A. Haakh and Kraz, Stuttgart, 1858-1875. And a French translation by J. A. C. Buchon, Paris, 1842, Orléans, 1875. For the numerous German essays and dissertations on the text, and particular questions arising from the history, I must

refer my readers to Engelmann's *Bibliotheca.* In England such studies are rare. Mr. Strachan-Davidson published an essay on Polybius in Hellenica; and his edition of extracts of the text (Oxford, 1888) contains several dissertations of value. Mr. Capes (London, 1888) has published an edition of extracts referring to the Achaean league, with an introductory essay on the author and his work. And a very admirable article on Polybius appears in the recent edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* by Mr. H. F. Pelham. There is also a good paper on Polybius in the *Quarterly Review* for 1879, No. 296. Criticisms on Polybius, and estimates of his value as an historian, will be found in Thirlwall's *History of Greece*, vol. viii.; Arnold's *History of Rome;* Mommsen's *History of Rome*, book iv. c. xiii.; Freeman's *History of Federal Government* and *Essays;* Bunbury's *Ancient Geography*, vol. ii. p. 16; Law's *Alps of Hannibal.* For the Roman side of his history, besides the works mentioned by Mr. Strachan-Davidson, a good list of the literature on the 2d Punic war is given by Mr. W. T. Arnold in his edition of Dr. Arnold's history of that period [London, Macmillan, 1886].

Finally, I have to express my warm thanks to Dr. Warre, Head Master of Eton, for aiding me with his unique knowledge of ancient and modern tactics in clearing up many points very puzzling to a civilian. To Mr. W. Chawner, Fellow and Tutor of Emmanuel College, for reading part of the translation in proof, and making valuable corrections and suggestions. And to Professor Ridgway, of Queen's College, Cork, for corrections in the geographical fragments of book 34.

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INTRODUCTION

I. POLYBIUS

FORTUNE cast the life of Polybius in stirring times. His special claim to our admiration is that he understood the importance in the history of the world of the changes which were passing under his eyes, and exerted himself to trace the events which immediately preceded them, and from which they sprang, while it was yet possible to see and question surviving participators in them; to examine places, before they had lost all marks of the great events of which they had been the scene; and records or monuments before time had cast a doubt upon their meaning or authenticity. Nor is this ordinary praise. Men are apt to turn their eyes upon the past, as holding all that is worthy of contemplation, while they fail to take note of history "in the making," or to grasp the importance of the transactions of their own day. But as every year has its decisive influence on the years which succeed it, the greatest benefactor of posterity is the man who understands and records events as they pass with care and sincerity. Laborious compilation, from the study and comparison of ancient records and monuments, has its value: it may often be all that it is possible to obtain; it may not unfrequently even serve to correct statements of contemporaries which have been deformed by carelessness or coloured by prejudice. But the best compilation is infinitely inferior in interest and instructiveness to the barest report of a contemporary. And when such a man is also an eye-witness of much that he relates; when he knew and conversed with many of the chief actors in the great events which he records;

when again he tells us of transactions so remote in time, that all written documents have necessarily perished, and those in more durable bronze and stone all but followed in their train, then indeed the interest rises to the highest pitch. Like Herodotus and Thucydides, then, Polybius tells us of his own times, and of the generations immediately preceding them. It is true that the part of his work which has survived in a complete form deals with a period before his own day, just as the greater part of the history of Herodotus does, but in the larger part of the fragments he is writing with even more complete personal knowledge than Thucydides. He had, again, neither the faculty for story-telling possessed by Herodotus nor the literary and dramatic force of Thucydides. The language which he spoke and wrote had lost the magic of style; had lost the lucidity and grace of Sophocles, and the rugged vigour and terseness of Thucydides. Nor had he apparently acquired any of those artifices which, while they sometimes weary us in the later rhetoricians, yet generally serve to make their writings the easiest and pleasantest of reading. Equally remote again is his style from the elaborate and involved manner of Plutarch, with its huge compound words built up of intricate sentences, more like difficult German than Greek. Polybius had no tricks of this sort;[1] but his style lacks logical order and clearness. It seems rather the language of a man of affairs, who had had neither leisure to study style, nor taste to read widely with a view to literature as such. But after all it is Greek, and Greek that still retained its marvellous adaptability to every purpose, to every shade of thought, and every form of literature. Nor is his style in the purely narrative parts of his work wanting in a certain force, derived from singleness and directness of purpose. He "speaks right on," and turns neither to the right hand nor

[1] Unless the avoidance of the hiatus be counted one, which has been pointed out by Hultsch. I cannot forbear from quoting here the admirable words of Casaubon on the style of Polybius:—*Non deest sed non eminet in Polybio facundia. Nihil vero est iniquius illis, qui nullam putant esse eloquutionem nisi ubi nihil est praeter eloquentiam. Semper mihi apprime placuit [illegible] sententia, vehementius in historico eloquentiae studium improbantis. Verborum enim curam nimiam veri fere par sequitur incuria. Oratio vultus animi est, ut hic fuerit gravis aut solutus, ita etiam illa vel severa erit vel mollis.* The nearest Greek to that of Polybius is II. Maccabees.

the left. It is when he reflects and argues and moralises, that his want of literary skill sometimes makes him difficult and involved; and though the thought is essentially just, and his point of view wonderfully modern, we continually feel the want of that nameless charm which the Greeks called χάρις.

His bent for historical composition was fortunately encouraged by the circumstances of his life, which gave Polybius special opportunities of satisfying his curiosity and completing his knowledge. Not only was he the son of a man who had held the highest office in the league, and so must have heard the politics and history of Achaia discussed from his earliest youth; not only from early manhood was he himself in the thick of political business; but he knew the sovereigns of Egypt and Pergamus, of Macedonia and Syria, and the Roman generals who conquered the latter. He had visited a Roman camp and witnessed its practical arrangements and discipline. And his enforced residence of sixteen years in Italy and Rome was, by the good fortune of his introduction to Aemilius Paullus and his sons, turned into an opportunity of unrivalled advantage for studying the laws, military discipline, and character of the imperial people whose world-conquest he chronicles. Unlike his fellow-exiles, he did not allow his depressing circumstances to numb his faculties, exasperate his temper, or deaden his curiosity. He won the confidence of the leading men at Rome; and seems, while pushing on his inquiries with untiring vigour, to have used his influence for the benefit of his countrymen, and of all Greek subjects of Rome.

But, like so many of the writers of antiquity, he has had no one to perform for him the service he had done for others in rescuing their achievements and the particulars of their career from oblivion. Of the many *testimonia* collected by Schweighaeuser and others from ancient writers, scarcely one gives us any details or anecdotes of the writer, whose work they briefly describe or praise. We are reduced as usual to pick out from his own writings the scattered allusions or statements which help us to picture his character and career.

Polybius of Megalopolis was the son of Lycortas, the friend and partisan of Philopoemen, who had served the Achaean league in several capacities: as ambassador to Rome in B.C.

189, along with Diophanes, on the question of the war with Sparta,[1] and to Ptolemy Epiphanes in B.C. 186,[2] and finally as Strategus in B.C. 184-183. Of the year of his birth we cannot be certain. He tells us that he was elected to go on embassy from the league to Ptolemy Epiphanes in the year of the death of that monarch (B.C. 181), although he was below the legal age.[3] But we do not know for certain what that age was; although it seems likely that it was thirty, that apparently being the age at which a member of the league exercised his full privileges.[4] But assuming this, we do not know how much under that age he was. Two years previously (B.C. 183) he had carried the urn at Philopoemen's funeral. This was an office usually performed by quite young men (*νεανίσκοι*),[5] probably not much over twenty years old. As we know that he lived to write a history of the Numantine war, which ended B.C. 133,[6] and that he was eighty-two at the time of his death,[7] we shall not, I think, be probably far wrong if we place his birth in B.C. 203 and his death in B.C. 121, as Casaubon does, who notes that the latter is just sixteen years before the birth of Cicero. But though this is a good working hypothesis, it is very far from being a demonstrated fact.

Birth of Polybius.

Between B.C. 181-168 he was closely allied with his father in politics; and if we wish to have any conception of what he was doing, it is necessary to form some idea of the state of parties in the Peloponnese at the time.

The crowning achievement of Philopoemen's career had been the uniting of Sparta to the Achaean league, after the murder of the tyrant Nabis by the Aetolians who had come to Sparta as his allies (B.C. 192). In B.C. 191 the Achaeans were allowed to add Messene and Elis to their league, as a reward for their services to Rome in the war against Antiochus. The Aetolian league, the chief enemy and opponent of Achaia, was reduced to a state of humble dependence on Rome in B.C. 189, after the defeat of Antiochus at Thermopylae (B.C. 191) and the Aetolian war (B.C. 191-189). From B.C.

[1] Livy, 38, 30-34. [2] Polyb. 23, 1, 7, 9. [3] Polyb. 24, 6.
[4] Polyb. 29, 24. [5] Plutarch, *Timol* ch. 39; Plato, *Laws*, 947.
[6] Cicero, *Ep. ad Fam.* 5, 12. [7] Lucian, *Macrobii*, § 22

190 then begins the time during which Polybius says that the "name of the Achaeans became the universal one for all the inhabitants of the Peloponnese" (2, 42). But though Sparta was included in the league she was always a restive and dissatisfied member; and the people of Elis and Messene, who were not very willing members either, were told by Flamininus that if they had any reason to complain of the federal government they were to appeal to him.[1] Now, by a treaty of alliance with Rome, decreed at Sikyon in B.C. 198, it was provided that Rome should receive no envoys from separate states of the league, but only from the league itself.[2] Flamininus, therefore, if he said what Livy reports him to have said, was violating this treaty. And this will be a good instance to illustrate the divisions of parties existing during the period of Polybius's active political life (B.C. 181-169). We have seen that in B.C. 198 the Achaean league became an ally of Rome as a complete and independent state; that this state was consolidated by the addition of Sparta (192) and Elis and Messene (191) so as to embrace the whole of the Peloponnese; that its chief enemy in Greece, the Aetolian league, was rendered powerless in B.C. 189. The Macedonian influence in the Peloponnese had been abolished after the battle of Cynoscephalae (197) by the proclamation of Greek freedom by Flamininus (196). But all this seeming liberty and growth in power really depended upon the favour of Rome; and was continually endangered not only by the appeals to the Senate from separate states in the league, who conceived themselves wronged, but by treasonable representations of her own envoys, who preferred a party triumph to the welfare and independence of their country.[3] In these circumstances, there were naturally differences of opinion as to the proper attitude for the league government to assume towards a state, which was nominally an equal ally, but really an absolute master. There was one party who were for submissively carrying out the will of the Roman officers who from time to time visited the Peloponnese; and for conciliating the Senate by displaying a perpetual readiness to carry out its

[1] Livy, 36, 31. [2] Pausan. 7, 9, 4.
[3] As Callicrates in B.C. 179, Polyb. 36, 2.

wishes, without putting forward in any way the rights which the treaty of 198 had secured to them. The leaders of this party, in the time of Philopoemen, were Aristaenos and Diophanes. The other party, headed till his death by Philopoemen, equally admitting that the Roman government could not be safely defied, were yet for aiming at preserving their country's independence by strictly carrying out the terms of the Roman alliance, and respectfully but firmly resisting any encroachment upon those terms by the officers representing the Roman government. On Philopoemen's death (B.C. 183) Lycortas, who had been his most devoted follower, took, along with Archon, the lead of the party which were for carrying out his policy; while Callicrates became the most prominent of the Romanising party. Lycortas was supported by his son Polybius when about B.C. 181 he began to take part in politics. Polybius seems always to have consistently maintained this policy. His view seems to have been that Rome, having crushed Philip and Antiochus, was necessarily the supreme power. The Greeks must recognise facts; must avoid offending Rome; but must do so by keeping to a position of strict legality, maintaining their rights, and neither flattering nor defying the victorious Commonwealth. He believed that the Romans meant fairly by Greece, and that Greek freedom was safe in their hands.[1] But the straightforward policy of the Senate, if it was ever sincere, was altered by the traitor Callicrates in B.C. 179; who, being sent to Rome to oppose what the league thought the unconstitutional restitution of certain Spartan exiles, advised the Senate to use the Romanising party in each state to secure a direct control in Achaia.[2] Acting on this insidious advice, the Roman government began to view with suspicion the legal and independent attitude of the other party, and to believe or affect to believe that they were enemies of the Roman supremacy. Lycortas, Archon, and Polybius, finding themselves the objects of a suspicion, not less dangerous because undeserved, to the Roman government, appear to have

[1] 25, 9.

[2] 26, 3. Callicrates at the same time secured a party in his favour, during his year of office B.C. 179, by restoring the Spartan and Messenian exiles; in return for which the former set up his statue at Olympia, the base of which is preserved. Hicks's *Greek Inscriptions*, p. 330.

adopted an attitude of reserve, abstaining from taking an active or prominent part in the business of the assemblies. This, however, did not succeed in averting Roman jealousy; and the commissioners, Gaius Popilius and Gnaeus Octavius, who visited the Peloponnese in B.C. 169, gave out that those who held aloof were as displeasing to the Senate as those who openly opposed it. They were said to have resolved on formally impeaching the three statesmen before the Achaean assembly as being enemies of Rome; but when the assembly met at Aegium, they had failed to obtain any reasonable handle against them, and contented themselves with a speech of general exhortation.[1] This was during the war with Perseus, when the Romans kept a vigilant eye on all parts of Greece, and closely inquired which politicians in the several states ventured to display the least sympathy with the Macedonian king, or were believed to secretly nourish any wish for his success. It speaks strongly both for the independent spirit still surviving in the league, as well as for the character of Archon and Polybius, that they were elected, apparently in the same assembly, the one Strategus and the other Hipparch for the year B.C. 169-168.[2] In this office Polybius doubtless hoped to carry out the principles and discipline of Philopoemen, under whom he had probably served in the cavalry, and whose management of this branch of the service he had at any rate minutely studied.[3] But there was little occasion for the use of the Achaean cavalry in his year. Being sent on a mission to Q. Marcius Philippus at Heracleia to offer the league's assistance in the war with Perseus, when their help was declined, he remained behind after the other ambassadors had returned, to witness the campaign.[4] After spending some time in the Roman camp, he was sent by Q. Marcius to prevent the Achaeans from consenting to supply five thousand men to Appius Claudius Cento in Epirus. This was a matter of considerable delicacy. He had to choose between offending one or the other powerful Roman. But he conducted the affair with prudence, and on the lines he had always laid down, those, namely, of strict legality. He found the Achaean assembly in session at Sicyon; and he carried

[1] 28, 3. [2] 28, 6. [3] See 11, 8. [4] 28, 12.

his point by representing that the demand of Appius Claudius did not bear on the face of it the order of the Senate, without which they were prohibited from supplying the requisitions of Roman commanders.[1] He thus did not betray that he was acting on the instigation of Quintus Marcius, and put himself and the league in an attitude of loyalty toward the Senate.[2] In the same cautious spirit he avoided another complication. Certain complimentary statues or inscriptions had been put up in various cities of the league in honour of Eumenes, king of Pergamus, and on some offence arising had been taken down. This seems to have annoyed Eumenes exceedingly; and Polybius persuaded the people that it had been ordered by Sosigenes and Diopeithes, as judges, from feelings of personal spite, and without any act of Eumenes unfriendly to the league. He carried his point, and thus avoided offending a king who at that time was on very friendly terms with Rome.[3] But while thus minded to avoid unnecessary offence, Polybius and his party were in favour of strengthening the league by alliances which could be entered upon with safety. Egypt at this time was under the joint government of two Ptolemies, Philometor and Physcon, who were being threatened with an invasion by Antiochus Epiphanes. The friendship of the league with the kings of Egypt had been of long standing, as far back as the time of Aratus; and though that friendship had been afterwards interrupted by the Macedonian policy of Aratus, just before his death the father of these kings had presented the league with ten ships and a sum of money. The two kings now sent to beg for aid; and asked that Lycortas should come as commander-in-chief, and Polybius as hipparch. Lycortas and Polybius were in favour of supplying the assistance asked.[4] But the measure was opposed by Callicrates and his partisans, on the specious ground that their whole efforts should be directed to aid the Romans against Perseus. Lycortas and Polybius replied that the Romans did not require their help; and that they were bound, by gratitude,

[1] The decree was brought into the Peloponnese by C. Popilius and Cn. Octavius in B.C. 171. See Livy, 43, 17, *ne quis ullam rem in bellum magistratibus Romanis conferret præter quam quod Senatus censuisset.* Cp. Polyb. 28, 3. [2] 28, 13-14. [3] 28, 7. [4] 29, 23.

as well as by treaty, to help the Ptolemies. They carried with them the popular feeling: but Callicrates outwitted them by obtaining a dispatch from Q. Marcius, urging the league to join the Senate in effecting a reconciliation between Antiochus and the kings of Egypt. Polybius gave in, and advised compliance. Ambassadors were appointed to aid in the pacification; and the envoys from Alexandria were obliged to depart without effecting their object. They contented themselves with handing in to the magistrates the Royal letters, in which Lycortas and Polybius were invited by name to come to Alexandria.[1]

Careful, however, as he had ever been to avoid giving just offence to Rome, he and his party had long been marked by the Senate as opponents of B.C. 167. that more complete interference in the details of Achaean politics which it wished to exercise. This was partly owing to the machinations of Callicrates; but it was also the result of the deliberate policy of the Senate: and it was doubtless helped by the report of every Roman officer who had found himself thwarted by the appeal to legality, under the influence of the party in the league with which Polybius was connected.[2] Accordingly, soon after the final defeat of Perseus by Aemilius Paulus in B.C. 168, and the consequent dismemberment of Macedonia, the Senate proceeded to execute its vengeance upon those citizens in every state in Greece who were believed to have been opposed to the Roman interests. The commissioners entrusted with the settlement and division of Macedonia were directed to hold an inquiry into this matter also. From every city the extreme partisans of Rome were summoned to assist them, men who were only too ready to sacrifice their political opponents to the vengeance of the power to which

[1] *29, 25, 26.*

[2] Thus Appius Claudius Cento would be hostile from the rejection of his illegal demand for 5000 men. One of the common grounds of offence had long been the refusal of Philopoemen and other Strategi to summon an assembly to meet a Roman officer unless he came duly authorised with a definite communication from the Senate. On this ground Quintus Caecilius was refused in B.C. 185 (Polyb. 23, 19), and also Titus Flamininus in B.C. 183 (Polyb. 24, 5). See Freeman's *Federal Government*, pp. 652-655. And no doubt other cases of a similar nature would occur, generally leading to an unfavourable report at Rome.

they had long been paying a servile and treacherous court. From Boeotia came Mnasippus; from Acarnania, Chremes; from Epirus, Charops and Nicias; from Aetolia, Lyciscus and Tisippus; and from Achaia, Callicrates, Agesias, and Philippus.[1] Instigated by these advisers, the commissioners ordered the supposed covert enemies of Rome in the several states to proceed to Italy to take their trial. To Achaia two commissioners, Gaius Claudius and Gnaeus Domitius, were sent. An Achaean assembly being summoned to meet them, they announced that there were certain men of influence in the league who had helped Perseus by money and other support. They required that a vote should be passed condemning them all to death; and said that, when that was done, they would publish the names. Such a monstrous perversion of justice was too much for the assembly, who refused to vote until they knew the names. The commissioners then said that all the Strategi who had been in office since the beginning of the war were involved. One of them, Xeno, came forward, declared his innocence, and asserted that he was ready to plead his cause before any tribunal, Achaean or Roman. Upon this the commissioners required that all the accused persons should go to Rome. A list of one thousand names was drawn up, under the guidance of Callicrates, of those who were at once to proceed to Italy[2] (B.C. 167). The court of inquiry, before which they were to appear, was never held. They were not allowed even to stay in Rome, but were quartered in various cities of Italy, which were made responsible for their safe custody: and there they remained until B.C. 151, when such of them as were still alive, numbering then somewhat less than three hundred, were contemptuously allowed to return.[3] Among these detenus was Polybius. We do not hear that Lycortas was also one, from which it has been with some probability supposed that he was dead. More fortunate than the rest, Polybius was allowed to remain at Rome. He had made, it seems, the acquaintance of Aemilius Paulus and his two sons in Macedonia, and during

[1] Polyb. 30, 13. Thirlwall, vol. viii. p. 419.

[2] Pausanias, 7, 10, 7-12.

[3] Some few, it appears, had managed to escape, though at the risk of certain execution if caught.

the tour of Amelius through Greece after the Macedonian war.[1] And on their return to Italy he was allowed by their influence to remain in Rome; and, acting as tutor to the two boys,[2] became well acquainted with all the best society in the city. The charming account which he gives[3] of the mutual affection existing between him and the younger son of Aemilius (by adoption now called Publius Scipio Africanus Aemilianus) bears all the marks of sincerity, and is highly to the credit of both. To it we may add the anecdote of Plutarch, that "Scipio, in observance of the precept of Polybius, endeavoured never to leave the forum without having made a close friend of some one he met there."

But much as he owed to the friendship of the sons of Aemilius, he owed it also to his own energy and cheerful vigour that these sixteen years of exile were not lost time in his life. He employed them, not in fruitless indulgence in home-sickness, or in gloomy brooding over his wrongs, but in a careful and industrious study of the history and institutions of the people among whom he was compelled to reside[4]; in ingratiating himself with those members of the Senate who he thought might be useful to his countrymen; and in forming and maturing his judgment as to the course of policy they ought to pursue. Nor was he without means of gratifying lighter tastes. He was an active sportsman: and the boar-hunting in the district of Laurentum not only diverted his attention from the distressing circumstances of his exile, and kept his body in vigorous health, but obtained for him the acquaintance of many men of rank and influence. Thus for instance his intimacy with the Syrian prince Demetrius, afterwards king Demetrius Soter, was made in the hunting-field[5]: and the value which this young man attached to his advice and support is some measure of the opinion entertained generally of his wisdom, moderation, and good judgment. We have no further details

[1] Polyb. 29, 21. Plutarch, *Aemilius*, ch 28.

[2] Diodorus Sic. *fr. lib.* 31, Plutarch, *Apophth. Scip. min.* 2.

[3] 32, 8-16.

[4] Thus he seems to have searched the Archives of the Pontifices. Dionys. Halicarn. 1, 73. And he observed and criticised all Roman customs, as, for instance, the provision for boys' education at Rome. Cic. *de Rep.* 4, 3.

[5] 31, 19-21.

of his life in Rome; but we have what is better,—its fruits, in the luminous account of its polity, the constitution of its army, and the aims of its statesmen.

B.C. 151. Release of the detenus.

At last the time came when he was once more free to visit his own country, or to extend his knowledge by visiting the countries which he wished to describe. After repeated applications to the Senate by embassies from Achaia, made without avail, in B.C. 151 Polybius appeared in person to plead the cause before the Fathers. There was now, it was thought, no reason for retaining these unfortunate men. The original thousand had shrunk to less than three hundred; middle-aged men had become in sixteen years old and decrepit; they had lost connexions and influence in the Peloponnese; they had learnt by bitter experience the impossibility of resisting the power of Rome, and were no longer likely to venture on organising any opposition. Their longer detention could only be a measure of vengeance, and useless vengeance. Still the debate in the Senate was long and doubtful, until it was brought to a conclusion by the contemptuous exclamation of Cato: "Are we to sit here all day discussing whether some old Greek dotards are to be buried by Italian or Achaean undertakers?" Polybius, elated by a concession thus ungraciously accorded, wished to enter the Senate once more with a further request for a restitution of their property in Achaia. But Cato bluntly bade him "remember Ulysses, who wanted to go back into the cave of the Cyclops to fetch his cap and belt." [1]

Coss. L. Marcius Censorinus, Manius Manilius, B.C. 149. Polybius sent for to Lilybaeum.

Polybius seems to have returned to the Peloponnese at once, and to have remained there until B.C. 149, when he was suddenly summoned to serve the government whose enforced guest he had been so long. It was the year in which the Senate had determined to commence their proceedings against Carthage, which were not to be stayed until she was levelled with the ground. In B.C. 150 the victory of Massanissa had restored the oligarchs, who had been superseded by the popular anti-Roman party in Carthage. These men hastened to make every possible offer of submission to

[1] 35, 6.

Rome. The Senate had made up its mind for war; and yet did not at once say so. After demanding that full satisfaction should be made to Massanissa, it next decreed that the Carthaginians must at once give three hundred of their noblest youths as hostages to the Roman consuls Manilius and Censorinus, who had sailed to Lilybaeum with secret orders to let no concession induce them to stop the war until Carthage was destroyed.[1] There was naturally some hesitation in obeying this demand at Carthage; for the hostages were to be given to the Romans absolutely without any terms, and without any security. They felt that it was practically a surrender of their city. To overcome this hesitation Manilius sent for Polybius, perhaps because he had known and respected him at Rome, and believed that he could trust him; perhaps because his well-known opinion, as to the safety in trusting the Roman *fides*, might make him a useful agent. But also probably because he was known to many influential Carthaginians, and perhaps spoke their language.[2] He started for Lilybaeum at once. But when he reached Corcyra he was met with the news that the hostages had been given up to the consul: he thought, therefore, that the chance of war was at an end, and he returned to the Peloponnese.[3]

He must soon have learnt his mistake. The Consul, in accordance with his secret instructions,—first to secure the arms in Carthage, and then to insist on the destruction of the town,—gradually let the wretched people know the extent of the submission required of them. These outrageous demands resulted in the Carthaginians taking the desperate resolution of standing a siege. Censorinus and his colleague accordingly began operations; but they were not capable of so great an undertaking. The eyes of the whole army were turned upon Scipio Aemilianus, who was serving as a military tribune. The siege lingered through the summer of B.C. 148 without any result; and when in the autumn Scipio left for Rome, to stand for the Aedileship, he started amidst loud expressions of hope that he might return as Consul, though below the legal age.[4]

[1] Livy, *Ep.* 49, Appian, *Pun.* 74-77.
[2] I infer this, not very confidently, from 9, 25.
[3] 37, 3
[4] Scipio was born B C. 185.

The loss of so much of Polybius's narrative at this point leaves us uncertain when he arrived in Africa: but as he met and conversed with Massanissa,[1] who died in B.C. 148, it seems likely that he did join the army after all in B.C. 149. At any rate he was in Scipio's train in B.C. 147-146, when he was in chief command of the army first as consul, and then as proconsul; advised him on sundry points in the formation of his siege works; stood by his side when Carthage was burning; and heard him, as he watched the dreadful sight, utter with tearful eyes the foreboding of what might one day befall Rome.[2] Scipio is also said to have supplied him with ships for an exploring expedition round the coast of Africa;[3] and it seems most likely that this was in his year of consulship (147), as after the fall of Carthage Polybius went home.

The destruction of Carthage took place in the spring of B.C. 146. When Scipio went back to celebrate his triumph, Polybius seems to have returned to the Peloponnese, there to witness another act of vengeance on the part of Rome, and to do what he could to lighten the blow to his countrymen, and to preserve the fragments of their shattered liberties.

Among the restored Achaean exiles were Diaeus, Damocritus, Alcamenes, Theodectes, and Archicrates. They had returned with feelings embittered by their exile; and without any of the experience of active life, which might have taught them to subordinate their private thirst for revenge to the safety of their country. Callicrates died in B.C. 148, and Diaeus was Strategus in B.C. 149-148, 147-146. The appearance of the pseudo-Philip (Andriscus) in Macedonia, and the continued resistance of Carthage during his first year of office (148), encouraged him perhaps to venture on a course, and to recommend the people to adopt a policy, on which he would otherwise not have ventured. Troubles arising out of a disgraceful money transaction between the Spartan Menalchidas, Achaean Strategus, and the Oropians, who had bribed him to aid them against the Athenians, had led to a violent quarrel with Callicrates, who threatened to impeach him for treason to the league in the course of an embassy to Rome. To save himself he gave half the Oropian money to Diaeus, his successor as Strategus

[1] 9, 25. [2] 39, 3. [3] Pliny, *N. H.* 5, § 9.

(B.C. 149-148). This led to a popular clamour against Diaeus: who, to save himself, falsely reported that the Senate had granted the Achaeans leave to try and condemn certain Spartans for the offence of occupying a disputed territory. Sparta was prepared to resist in arms, and a war seemed to be on the point of breaking out. Callicrates and Diaeus, however, were sent early in B.C. 148 to place the Achaean case before the Senate, while the Spartans sent Menalchidas. Callicrates died on the road. The Senate heard, therefore, the two sides from Diaeus and Menalchidas, and answered that they would send commissioners to inquire into the case. The commissioners, however, were slow in coming; so that both Diaeus and Menalchidas had time to misrepresent the Senate's answer to their respective peoples. The Achaeans believed that they had full leave to proceed according to the league law against the Spartans; the Spartans believed that they had permission to break off from the league. Once more, therefore, war was on the point of breaking out.[1] B.C. 148. Just at this time Q. Caecilius Metellus was in Macedonia with an army to crush Andriscus. He was sending some commissioners to Asia, and ordered them to visit the Peloponnese on their way and give a friendly warning. It was neglected, and the Spartans sustained a defeat, which irritated them without crushing their revolt. When Diaeus succeeded Damocritus as Strategus in B.C. 147, he answered a second embassy from Metellus by a promise not to take any hostile steps until the Roman commissioners arrived. B.C. 147. But he irritated the Spartans by putting garrisons into some forts which commanded Laconia; and they actually elected Menalchidas as a Strategus in opposition to Diaeus. But finding that he had no chance of success Menalchidas poisoned himself.[2]

Then followed the riot at Corinth.[3] Marcus Aurelius Orestes at the head of a commission arrived at last at Corinth, and there informed the magistrates in council that the league must give up Argos, Corinth, and Sparta. The magistrates hastily summoned an assembly and announced the message from the Senate; a furious riot followed, every man in

[1] Pausanias, 7, 11-12. [2] *Ib.* 13 [3] *Ib.* 14, Polyb. 38, 7-8.

Corinth suspected of being a Spartan was seized and thrown into prison; the very residence of the Roman commissioners was not able to afford such persons any protection, and even the persons of Orestes and his colleagues were in imminent danger.

Some months afterwards a second commission arrived headed by Sextus Julius Caesar, and demanded, without any express menace, that the authors of the riot should be given up. The demand was evaded; and when Caesar returned to Rome with his report, war was at once declared.

The new Strategus, elected in the autumn of B.C. 147, was Critolaus. He was a bitter anti-Romanist like Diaeus: and these statesmen and their party fancied that the Romans, having already two wars on hand, at Carthage and in Spain, would make any sacrifice to keep peace with Achaia. They had not indeed openly declined the demands of Sextus, but, to use Polybius's expressive phrase, "they accepted with the left hand what the Romans offered with the right."[1] While pretending to be preparing to submit their case to the Senate, they were collecting an army from the cities of the league. Inspired with an inexplicable infatuation, which does not deserve the name of courage, Critolaus even advanced northwards towards Thermopylae, as if he could with his petty force bar the road to the Romans and free Greece. He was encouraged, it was said, by a party at Thebes which had suffered from Rome for its Macedonising policy. But, rash as the march was, it was managed with at least equal imprudence. Instead of occupying Thermopylae, they stopped short of it to besiege Trachinian Heracleia, an old Spartan colony,[2] which refused to join the league. While engaged in this, Critolaus heard that Metellus (who wished to anticipate his successor Mummius) was on the march from Macedonia. He beat a hasty retreat to Scarpheia in Locris,[3] which was on the road leading to Elateia and the south; here he was overtaken and defeated with considerable slaughter. Critolaus appears not to

B.C. 147-146

[1] 38, 7-10.

[2] Thucyd. 3, 92.

[3] Livy says that the battle was at Thermopylae. This was near enough for a general statement, but Scarpheia is some miles to the south. Livy, *Ep.* 52. Pausan. 7, 15.

have fallen on the field; but he was never seen again. He was either lost in some marshes over which he attempted to escape, as Pausanias suggests, or poisoned himself, as Livy says. Diaeus, as his predecessor, became Strategus, and was elected for the following year also. Diaeus exerted himself to collect troops for the defence of Corinth, nominally as being at war with Sparta. He succeeded in getting as many as fourteen thousand infantry and six hundred cavalry, consisting partly of citizens and partly of slaves; and sent four thousand picked men under Alcamenes to hold Megara, while he himself occupied Corinth. When Metellus approached, however, this outpost at Megara hastily retreated into Corinth. Metellus took up his position in the Isthmus, and offered the Achaeans the fairest terms. Diaeus, however, induced them to reject all offers; and Metellus was kept some time encamped before Corinth.

B.C 146. Arrival of Mummius.

It was now late in the spring of B.C. 146, and the new Consul, Lucius Mummius, arrived at the Roman camp. He at once sent Metellus back to Macedonia, and quietly awaited the arrival of fresh troops, which he had sent for from Crete and Pergamum, as well as from Italy.[1] He eventually had an army of about thirty thousand men, nearly double of the Greek army in Corinth. Nothing apparently was done till the late summer, or autumn. But then the final catastrophe was rapid and complete. The Roman officers regarded the Achaean force with such contempt, that they did not take proper precautions, so that Diaeus won a slight advantage against one of the Roman outposts. Flushed with this success, he drew out for a pitched battle, in which he was totally defeated. He made his way to Megalopolis, where, after killing his wife, he poisoned himself.

Thus by a series of imprudent measures, which Polybius denounces, but was not at home to oppose, the Achaean league had drifted into downright war with Rome; and, almost without a struggle, had fallen helplessly at her feet, forced to accept whatever her mercy or contempt might grant. Mercy, however, was to be preceded by stern punishment. Corinth was given up to plunder and to fire, and Polybius returned from Africa in

[1] 39,-8 *sq.* Pausan. 7, 12 *sq.*

time to witness it.[1] The destruction or deportation of works of art, of pictures, statues, and costly furniture, he could not prevent; but he spoke a successful word to preserve the statues of Philopoemen in the various cities from destruction; and also begged successfully for the restoration of some of the Eponymous hero Achaeus, and of Philopoemen and Aratus, which had already been transported as far as Acarnania on their way to Italy.[2] He also dissuaded his friends from rushing to take their share in the plunder by purchasing the confiscated goods of Diaeus, which were put to auction and could be bought at low rates; and he refused to accept any of them himself.[3]

Polybius saves some statues of national interest.

The settlement of the territories of the league was put into the hands of a commission of ten men who were sent out after the sack of Corinth; while Mummius, after seeing that such towns in the Peloponnese as had joined in the war were deprived of their fortifications and arms, and after inflicting punishment upon other towns in Greece which had shown active sympathy with Perseus, especially Thebes and Chalcis, returned home to celebrate his triumph, which was adorned with marble and bronze statues and pictures from Corinth.[4] The commissioners who had been sent out to make a final settlement of Greece, or Achaia, as it was henceforth to be called in official language, settled the general plan in conjunction with Mummius; but the commissioners continued their labours for six months, at the end of which time they departed, leaving Polybius to settle with each town the details of their local legislation. The general principles which the commissioners laid down were, first, the entire abolition of all the leagues, and consequently of the league assemblies; each town, with its surrounding district, which had once formed a canton in the league, was to be separate and independent: its magistrates, secondly, were to be selected according to a fixed assessment of property, the old equality or democracy being abolished:

The new settlement of the Peloponnese, B C 146-145

[1] This has been much disputed. See Thirlwall's note, vol. viii. p. 455. If the fragment, 29, 13 (40, 7) is given correctly by Strabo, it seems certain that he must have arrived either before or immediately after the fall of Corinth.

[2] 39, 13-14. [3] 39, 15. [4] Livy, *Ep.* 52.

thirdly, no member of one canton might own property in another: fourthly, the Boeotians were ordered to pay a heavy compensation to the Heracleots and Euboeans, and the Achaeans to the Spartans: lastly, a fixed tribute to Rome was imposed on all states in Greece.[1] Some of these measures were in a few years' time relaxed, the fines were mitigated, the rule against inter-possession of property was abolished, and the league assemblies were again allowed for certain local purposes. But this was the end of the league as a free federation. It is often said that "Greece was now reduced to the form of a Roman province under the name of Achaia." This is true in a sense, and yet is misleading. Achaia did not become a province like the other provinces, yearly allotted to a proconsul or propraetor or legatus, until the time of Augustus. Such direct interference from a Roman magistrate as was thought necessary was left to the governor of Macedonia.[2] Yet in a certain sense Achaia was treated as a separate entity, and had a "formula," or constitution, founded on the separate local laws which the commissioners found existing, or imposed, with the help of Polybius, on the several states; it paid tribute like other provinces, and was in fact, though called free, subject to Rome.

Polybius performed his task of visiting the various towns in the Peloponnese, explaining when necessary the meaning of the new arrangements, and advising them, when they had to make others for themselves, so much to the satisfaction of every one, that there was a universal feeling that he had been a benefactor to his country, and had made the best of their situation that could be made. Statues of him are mentioned by Pausanias in several places in the Peloponnese: in Mantinea[3] and at Megalopolis,[4] with an inscription in elegiacs to the effect that "he had travelled over every land and sea; was an ally of the Romans, and mitigated their wrath against Greece." Another in the temple of Persephone, near Acacesium,[5] under

[1] Pausan. 7, 16, 9. Polyb. 39, 16

[2] Thus in B.C. 44 Brutus going out as propraetor to take the province of Macedonia, goes first to Athens, and there, as well as in the rest of Greece, collects troops and money. See the note in Mommsen's *History of Rome*, vol. III. p. 50 (book IV. c. 1.)

[3] Pausan. 8, 9, 1 [4] *Id.* 8, 30, 8. [5] *Id.* 8, 37, 2

which was a legend stating that "Greece would not have erred at all if she had obeyed Polybius; and that when she did err, he alone proved of any help to her." There were others also at Pallantium,[1] Tegea,[2] and Olympia.[3]

In these services to his country Polybius was occupied in B.C. 145. Of his life after that we have no detailed record. He is believed to have visited Scipio while engaged on the siege of Numantia (B.C. 134-132), on which he wrote a separate treatise.[4] We know also that he visited Alexandria in the reign of Ptolemy Physcon (B.C. 146-117), and expressed his contempt for the state of the people and their rulers.[5] These years must have been also much occupied with the extension of his history, which he originally intended should end with the fall of the Macedonian kingdom (B.C. 168),[6] but which was afterwards continued to the fall of Carthage and Greece (B.C. 146):[7] for even if the history had been completed up to its originally intended limit, and the notice of extension afterwards inserted, there still was enough to do to occupy some years of a busy life; especially as he seems to have carried out his principle that an historian ought to be a traveller, visiting the localities of which he speaks, and testing by personal inspection the possibility of the military evolutions which he undertakes to describe. His travels appear certainly to have embraced the greater part of Gaul, and it even seems possible from one passage that he visited Britain.[8] His explorations on the African coast were doubtless extensive, and he appears to have visited Phoenicia, Cilicia, and Asia Minor. We hear of him at Sardis, though we cannot fix the date of the visit.[9] Lastly, Lucian tells us that, "returning from the

[1] *Id.* 8, 44, 5. [2] *Id.* 8, 48, 8.

[3] The base of this has been discovered with its inscription—

Ἡ πόλις τῶν Ἠλείων Πολύβιον
Λυκόρτα Μεγαλοπολείτην.

[4] Cicero, *Ep. ad Fam.* 5, 12. For the Numantine war (B.C. 134-132) the authorities are Appian, *Hisp.* 48-98; Eutrop. 4, 17; Cicero *de Off.* 1, 11; Strabo, 3, p. 162. [5] 34, 14. Strabo, p. 677. [6] 1, 1.

[7] 3, 4. It is clear that such passages, as for instance the beginning of 2,42, must have been written before B.C. 146, and perhaps published, and therefore not altered. Cp. the answer of Zeno of Rhodes to corrections sent by Polybius, that he could not make alterations, as his work was already published (16, 20). [8] 3, 57, cp. 34, 5. [9] 21, 38.

country, he had a fall from his horse, from the effects of which he died at the age of eighty-two. No place is given, and no clue which may help us to be certain of the date.[1] Polybius, besides the general history, had written a treatise on Tactics,[2] a panegyric on Philopoemen,[3] a history of the Numantine war,[4] and perhaps a treatise on public speaking (*δημηγορία*).[5]

§ 2.—THE SOURCES OF POLYBIUS'S HISTORY

Polybius always maintains that the study of documents is only one, and not the most important, element in the equipment of an historian. The best is personal experience and personal inquiry.

Of the sources of his own history, then, the first and best may be set down as knowledge acquired by being actually present at great events, such as the destruction of Carthage and the sack of Corinth; visits to the Roman army in camp; assisting at actual debates in his own country; personal knowledge of and service under men of the first position in Achaia; personal visits to famous localities; voyages and tours undertaken for the definite object of inspection and inquiry; and, lastly, seeing and questioning the survivors of great battles, or the men who had played a leading part in conspicuous political transactions.

Personal knowledge.

From his earliest youth Polybius had enjoyed some special advantages in these respects. As he himself says, "the events in Greece fell within his own generation, or that immediately preceding his own,—and he therefore could relate what he had seen, or what he had heard from eye-witnesses" (4, 2). And of the later period he "was not only an eye-witness, but in some cases an actor, and in others the chief actor" (3, 4). When he was probably under twenty we hear of his being present at an important interview between Philopoemen and Archon;[6] and his election as hipparch in B.C. 169, soon after he reached the legal age, was in consequence of his having thrown himself with vigour into the practical working of the cavalry under Philopoemen. In regard to Roman history and polity, we

[1] Lucian, *Macrobii*, § 22 [2] 9, 20. [3] 10, 21.
[4] Cicero, *Epist. ad Fam.* 5, 12. [5] 29, 10 [6] 22, 14.

have Cicero's testimony that he was *bonus auctor in primis*,[1] and more particularly in regard to chronology, *quo nemo fuit in exquirendis temporibus diligentius*.[2] Nor is this praise undeserved, as is shown by his energy in pushing minute and personal inquiries. Thus he learnt the details of the Hannibalic war from some of the survivors of those actually engaged; visited the localities, and made the pass of the Alps used by Hannibal;[3] studied and transcribed the stele or bronze tablet placed by Hannibal on the Lacinian promontory;[4] travelled through Libya, Spain, Gaul, and the seas which washed their shores (perhaps even as far as Britain), in order to give a true account of them.[5] Conversed with Massanissa on the character of the Carthaginians, as well as with many of the Carthaginians themselves.[6] Carefully observed Carthagena.[7] Inspected the records at Rhodes,[8] and the Archives at Rome;[9] and studied and transcribed the treaties preserved there.[10] Visited Sardis,[11] Alexandria,[12] and Locri Epizephyrii.[13] To this, which is by no means an exhaustive account of his travels and inquiries, may be added the fact that his intimacy with the younger Africanus, grandson by adoption and nephew by marriage of the elder Scipio, must have placed at his disposal a considerable mass of information contained in the family archives of the Scipios, as to the Hannibalian war, and especially as to the campaigns in Spain.[14]

Such were some of the means by which Polybius was enabled to obtain accurate and trustworthy information.

Use of previous writers by Polybius.

It remains to inquire how far Polybius availed himself of the writings of others. He looks upon the study of books as an important part of an historian's work, but, as we have seen, not the most important. His practice appears to have been conformable to his theory. The greater part of his information he gained from personal observation and personal inquiry. Nevertheless, some of his history must have been learnt from books, and very little of it could have been entirely independ-

[1] *Off.* 3, 32. [2] Republ. 2, 14, § 27. [3] 3, 48. [4] 3, 33.
[5] 3, 59. [6] 9, 25. [7] 10, 11. [8] 16, 15.
[9] Dionys. Halic. 1, 17. [10] 3, 22 *sqq.* [11] 31, 38. [12] 34, 14.
[13] 12, 5. [14] The elder Africanus died in B.C. 183.

ent of them. Still, as far as we have the means of judging from the fragments of his work that have come down to us, his obligations to his predecessors are not as extensive as that of most of those who wrote after him; nor is the number of those to whom he refers great [1]

Of his preliminary sketch contained in books 1 and 2, the first book, containing the account of the first Punic war and the Mercenary war, appears to have been derived mainly from the writings of Fabius Pictor (b. circ. B.C. 260), and Philinus of Agrigentum (contemporary and secretary of Hannibal). He complains that they were violent partisans, the one of Rome, the other of Carthage.[2] But by comparing the two, and checking both by documents and inscriptions at Rome, he, no doubt, found sufficient material for his purpose. The Punic wars.

The second book contains an account of the origin of the war between Rome and Illyricum; of the Gallic or Celtic wars from the earliest times; and a sketch of Achaean history to the end of the Cleomenic war. The first two of these must have been compiled with great labour from various public documents and family records, as well as in part from Pictor. The sketch of Achaean history rested mainly, as far as it depends on books, on the Memoirs of Aratus; while he studied only to refute the writings of Phylarchus the panegyrist of Cleomenes. He complains of the partiality of Phylarchus: but in this part of the history it was perhaps inevitable that his own views should have been coloured by the prejudices and prepossessions of a politician, and one who had been closely connected from boyhood with the patriotic Achaean party, led by Philopoemen, which was ever at enmity with all that Cleomenes did his utmost to establish. Illyrians and Gauls. Achaia.

[1] I append a list of all writers referred to by Polybius, the index will show the places where they are mentioned Aeneas Tacticus, Alcaeus a grammarian, Antiphanes of Berga, Antisthenes of Rhodes, Aratus of Sicyon, Archedicus, Aristotle, Callisthenes, Demetrius of Phalerum, Demosthenes, Dicaearchus, Echecrates, Ephorus of Cumae, Epicharmus of Cos, Eratosthenes, Eudoxus, Euemerus, Euripides, Fabius Pictor, Hesiod, Homer, Philinus, Phylarchus, Pindar, Plato, Pytheas, Simonides of Ceos, Stasinus, Strato, Theophrastus of Lesbos, Theopompus of Chios, Thucydides, Timaeus, Xenophon, Zaleucus, Zeno of Rhodes.

[2] 1, 14, 15.

Sicilian history.

For his account of Sicilian affairs he had studied the works of Timaeus of Tauromeniun. Although he accuses him bitterly, and at excessive length,[1] of all the faults of which an historian can be guilty, he yet confesses that he found in his books much that was of assistance to him[2] in regard both to Magna Graecia and Sicily; for which he also consulted the writings of Aristotle, especially it appears the now lost works on Polities (πολιτείαι), and Founding of Cities (κτίσεις). The severity of his criticism of Timaeus is supported by later authors. He was nicknamed ἐπιτίμαιος, in allusion to the petulance of his criticism of others;[3] and Plutarch attacks him for his perversion of truth and his foolish and self-satisfied attempts to rival the best of the ancient writers, and to diminish the credit of the most famous philosophers.[4]

Greek history.

As far as we possess his writings, we find little trace in Polybius of a reference to the earliest historians. Herodotus is not mentioned, though there may be some indications of acquaintance with his work;[5] nor the Sicilian Philistus who flourished about B.C. 430. Thucydides is mentioned once, and Xenophon three times. Polybius was engaged in the history of a definite period, and had not much occasion to refer to earlier times; and perhaps the epitomator, in extracting what seemed of value, chose those parts especially where he was the sole or best authority.

Macedonia.

For the early history of Macedonia, he seems to have relied mostly on two pupils of Isocrates, Ephorus of Cumae and Theopompus of Chios; though the malignity of the latter deprived his authority of much weight.[6] He also studied the work of Alexander's friend and victim, Callisthenes; and vehemently assailed his veracity, as others have done. More important to him perhaps were the writings of his own contemporaries, the Rhodians Antisthenes and Zeno; though he detects them in some inaccuracies, which in the case of Zeno he took the trouble to correct:

[1] See bk. 12.
[2] 12, 15.
[3] Athenaeus, vi *272 b.*
[4] Plutarch, *Nicias*, 1, *Arat.* 38.
[5] In the reference to the Seven Magi (5, 43), and to the story of Cleobis and Bito (22, 20).
[6] Cornelius Nepos, *Alcib.* 11. Plutarch, *Lys.* 30. Lucian, *Quomodo hist. conscr.* § 59.

and of Demetrius of Phalerum, whose writings he seems to have greatly admired.

For the contemporary history of Egypt and Syria he seems to have trusted principally to personal inquiry. Egypt and Syria. He expressly (2, 37) declines entering on the early history of Egypt on the ground of its having been fully done by others (referring, perhaps, to Herodotus, Manetho, and Ptolemy of Megalopolis). For the Seleucid dynasty of Syria he quotes no authorities.

On no subject does Polybius seem to have read so widely as on geography: doubtless as preparing himself not only for writing, but for being able to travel with the knowledge and intelligence necessary to enable him to observe rightly. Geography. He had studied minutely and criticised freely the writings of Dicaearchus, Pytheas, Eudoxus, and Eratosthenes. He was quick to detect fallacies in these writers, and to reject their dogmatising on the possibilities of nature; yet he does not seem to have had in an eminent degree the topographical faculty, or the power of giving a graphic picture of a locality. Modern research has tended rather to strengthen than weaken our belief in the accuracy of his descriptions, as in the case of Carthagena and the site of the battle of Cannae; still it cannot be asserted that he is to be classed high in the list of topographers, whether scientific or picturesque.

He appears to have been fairly well acquainted with the poets; but his occasions for quoting them, as far as we have his work, are not very frequent. General literature. He seems to have known his Homer, as every Greek was bound to do. He quotes the Cypria of Stasinus, who, according to tradition, was son-in-law of Homer; Hesiod, Simonides of Ceos, Pindar, Euripides, and Epicharmus of Cos. He quotes or refers to Plato, whom he appears chiefly to have studied for his political theories; and certain technical writers, such as Aeneas Tacticus, and Cleoxenos and Democlitus, inventors of a new system of telegraphy, if they wrote it rather than taught it practically.

Even allowing for the loss of so great a part of his work, the list of authors is not a long one: and it suggests the

remark, which his style as well as his own professions tend to confirm, that he was not primarily a man of letters, but a man of affairs and action, who loved the stir of political agitation, and unbent his mind by the excitement of travel and the chase. Nothing moves his contempt more than the idea of Timaeus living peaceably for fifty years at Athens, holding aloof from all active life, and poring over the books in the Athenian libraries as a preparation for writing history; which, according to him, can only be worth reading when it springs, not from rummaging Record offices, but from taking a personal share in the political strife of the day; studying military tactics in the camp and field; witnessing battles; questioning the actors in great events; and visiting the sites of battles, the cities and lands which are to be described.

§ 3. THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE[1]

To the student of politics the history of Greece is chiefly interesting as offering examples of numerous small states enjoying complete local autonomy, yet retaining a feeling of a larger nationality founded in a community of blood, language, and religion; a community, that is, in the sense that, fundamentally united in these three particulars, they yet acknowledged variations even in them, which distinguished without entirely separating them. From some points of view the experiment may be regarded as having been successful. From others it was a signal failure. Local jealousies and mutual provocations not only continually set city against city, clan against clan, but perpetually suggested invitations sent by one city, or even one party in a city, to foreign potentates or peoples to interfere in their behalf against another city or party, which

[1] The History of the Achaean league is given with unrivalled learning, clearness, and impartiality by Bishop Thirlwall in the eighth volume of his *History of Greece*. Its constitution has been discussed with great fulness by Professor E. A. Freeman in his *History of Federal Government*. Recently Mr. Capes has published an edition of the parts of Polybius referring to it which will be found useful; and Mr. Strachan-Davidson has an able essay upon it in his edition of Extracts from Polybius. Still some brief statement of the main features of this remarkable attempt to construct a durable Hellenic Federation could not be altogether omitted here.

they hated or feared, but were too weak to resist. Thus we find the Persians, Macedonians, Syrians, and Romans successively induced to interfere in Greek politics, with the assurance that there were always some states, or some party in each state, who would welcome them. From time to time men of larger views had conceived the idea of creating a united Empire of Hellas, which might present an unbroken front to the foreigner. From time to time philosophers had preached the impossibility of combining complete local independence with the idea of a strong and vigorous nationality. But the true solution of the problem had never been successfully hit upon: and after various abortive attempts at combination, Greece was left, a helpless collection of disjointed fragments, to fall under the intrigues of Macedonia and Rome.

The Achaean league was not the first attempt at such a formation; though it was the first that ever arrived at anything like a complete scheme of federalism (unless the Aetolian preceded it); and was in many respects a fresh departure in Hellenic policy, and the first experiment in federation which seemed to contain the elements of success. From the earliest times certain Greek states had combined more or less closely, or loosely, for certain specific purposes. Such were the various Amphictyonies, and especially the Amphictyonic league of Thermopylae and Delphi. The object of these was primarily religious: the worship of a particular deity, the care of a particular temple; the first condition of membership being therefore community of blood. But though this was the origin of their being, there were elements in their constitution which might have developed into some form of federalism, had it not been for the centrifugal forces that always tended to keep Greek states apart. Thus we can conceive the idea of the Pylagorae from the various states gradually giving rise to the notion of a central parliament of elected representatives; and the sphere of its activity gradually extending to matters purely political, beginning with those which were on the borderland of religion and politics. And, indeed, the action of the great Amphictyonic league at times seemed to be approaching this.[1]

[1] Take for instance the oath of the Pylagorae (Aeschin. *de Fal. L.* 121). "We will destroy no city of the Amphictyony, nor cut off its streams in peace

But the forces tending to decentralisation were always the stronger: and though the league continued to exist for many centuries, it became less and less political, and less and less influential in Greece. So too with other combinations in Greece. The community (τὸ κοινὸν) of the Ionians, beginning with a common meeting for worship at the Panionium, on one memorable occasion at least seemed for a brief space to promise to develop into a federation for mutual succour and defence. In the Ionian revolt in B.C. 500, the deputies (πρόβουλοι) of the Ionian states met and determined to combine against the enemy; they even went so far as to appoint a common general or admiral. But the instinct of separation was too strong; at the first touch of difficulty and hardship the union was resolved into its elements.[1]

The constitution of the Boeotian league was somewhat more regular and permanent. The Boeotarchs appear to have met at regular intervals, and now and again to have succeeded in mustering a national levy. There were also four regularly constituted "Senates" to control them, though we know nothing of their constitution.[2] But the league had come to nothing; partly from the resistance of the towns to the overweening pretensions of Thebes, and later from the severity of the treatment experienced by it at the hands of Alexander and his successors.

Thessaly, again, was a loose confederacy of towns or cantons, in which certain great families, such as the Aleuadae and Scopadae, held the direction of their local affairs; or some tyrannus, as Alexander of Pherae, obtained sovereign powers. Still, for certain purposes, a connexion was acknowledged, and a Tagus of Thessaly was appointed, with the power of summoning a general levy of men. For a short time prior to the Roman conquest these officers appear to have gained addi-

or war; if any shall do so, we will march against him and destroy his cities; should any pillage the property of the god, or be privy to or plan anything against what is in his temple, we will take vengeance on him with hand and foot and voice and all our might." This is indeed the language rather of a Militant Church than a state, but it is easily conceivable that, had these principles been carried out (which they were not), something nearer a central and sovereign parliament might have arisen.

[1] Herodotus, vi. 7, 11-12.

[2] See Herod. 9, 15, Thucyd. 2, 2, 4, 91; 5, 37; Xenophon, *Hellen.* 3, 4, 4. Boeckh, *C. I. G.* vol. i. p. 726.

tional importance; but Thessaly never was united enough to be of importance, in spite of its famous cavalry, even among Greek nations, far less to be capable of presenting a firm front to the foreigner.

One other early attempt at forming something like a Panhellenic union ought to be noticed. When the Persian invasion of B.C. 480 was threatening, deputies (*πρόβουλοι*) met at the Isthmus, sat there in council for some months, and endeavoured to unite Greece against the foreigner.[1] But the one expedition which was sent solely by their instigation proved a failure.[2] And when the danger was over, principally by the combined exertion of Athens and Sparta, this council seems to have died a natural death. Still for a time it acted as a supreme parliament of Greece, and assumed the power to punish with fine or death those Greeks who had medised.[3]

Besides these rudimentary leagues, which might, but did not, issue in some form of Panhellenic government, there were periods in Greek history in which the Hegemone of one state did something towards presenting the appearance of union. Thus Polycrates of Samos seemed at one time to be likely to succeed in forming a great Ionian Empire. And in continental Greece, before the Persian wars, we find Sparta occupying the position of an acknowledged court of reference in international questions,[4]—a position in which she probably had been preceded by Argos. And after those wars, by means of the confederacy of Delos, formed at first for one specific purpose—that of keeping the Aegean free of the Persians—Athens gradually rose to the position of an imperial city, claiming active control over the external politics of a considerable portion of Greece and nearly all the islands (B.C. 478-404). But this proved after all but a passing episode in Greek history. Athens perhaps misused her power; and Sparta took up the task with great professions, but in a spirit even less acceptable to the Greek world than that of Athens; and by the peace of Antalcidas (B.C. 387) the issue of the hundred

[1] Herod. 7, 145-169. [2] *Id* 7, 172-174

[3] Herod. 9, 88; Polyb. 9, 39. Equally abortive proved another attempt at combination in B.C. 377, when the *ξύνεδροι* from the islands met for a time at Athens. Grote, vol. ix. p. 319. [4] Herod. 6, 49.

years' struggle with Persia left one of the fairest portions of Hellas permanently separated from the main body. Asiatic Greece never became Hellenic again. The fall of the Persian empire before the invasion of Alexander for a while reunited it to a semi-Greek power; but Alexander's death left it a prey to warring tyrants. It lost its prosperity and its commerce; and whatever else it became, it was never independent, or really Hellenic again.

For a few years more Sparta and then Thebes assumed to be head of Greece, but the Macedonian supremacy secured at Chaeronea (B.C. 338), still more fully after the abortive Lamian war (B.C. 323), left Greece only a nominal freedom, again and again assured to it by various Macedonian monarchs, but really held only on sufferance. The country seemed to settle down without farther struggle into political insignificance. The games and festivals went on, and there was still some high talk of Hellenic glories. But one after another of the towns submitted to receive Macedonian garrisons and governors; and Athens, once the brilliant leader in national aspirations, practically abandoned politics, and was content to enjoy a reputation partly founded on her past, and partly on the fame of the philosophers who still taught in her gardens and porches, and attracted young men from all parts of the world to listen to their discourses, and to sharpen their wits by the acute if not very useful discussions which they promoted.[1] Sparta, far from retaining her old ascendency, had been losing with it her ancient constitution, which had been the foundation of her glory, as well perhaps as in some respects the source of her weakness; and for good or evil had ceased to count for much in Hellenic politics.

In the midst of this general collapse two portions of the Hellenic race gradually formed or recovered some sort of united government, which enabled them to play a conspicuous part in the later history of Greece, and which was essentially different from any of the combinations of earlier times of

[1] Polybius (12, 26 *c.*) says that in his time the schools were generally in disrepute. But is not this generally the verdict of "practical" men on universities? The excitement at Rome at the visit of the philosophers (B.C. 155) seems to show that they still enjoyed a world-wide reputation.

which I have been speaking. These were the Aetolians and Achaeans.

With regard to the former our information is exceedingly scanty. They were said to have been an emigration from Elis originally;[1] but they were little known to the rest of Greece. Strange stories were told of them, of their savage mode of life, their scarcely intelligible language, their feeding on raw flesh, and their fierceness as soldiers. They were said to live in open villages, widely removed from each other, and without effective means of combination for mutual protection. Their piracies, which were chiefly directed to the coasts of Messenia, caused the Messenians to seize the opportunity of Demosthenes being in their neighbourhood in B.C. 426, with a considerable Athenian army, to persuade him to invade the Aetolians, who were always on the lookout to attack Naupactus, a town which the Athenians had held since B.C. 455,[2] and which was naturally an object of envy to them as commanding the entrance to the Corinthian gulf. But when Demosthenes attempted the invasion, he found to his cost that the Aetolians knew how to combine, and he had to retire beaten with severe loss.[3] The separate tribes in Aetolia seem soon afterwards to have had, if they had not already, some form of central government; for we find them negotiating with Agesilaus in B.C. 390, with the same object of obtaining Naupactus,[4] when the Athenians had lost it, and it had fallen into the hands of the Locrians.[5] The Aetolians appear to have gradually increased in importance: for we find Philip making terms with them and giving them the coveted Naupactus in B.C. 341, which had at some time previous come into the possession of the Achaeans.[6] But their most conspicuous achievement, which caused them to take a position of importance in Greece, was their brilliant defeat of the invading Gauls at Delphi in B.C. 279.[7] By this time their federal constitution must in some shape have been formed. The people elected a Strategus in a general meeting, usually held at Thermus, at the autumn equinox,

Aetolian league.

[1] Herod. 8, 73. [2] Thucy. 1, 103. [3] *Id.* 3, 94-98.
[4] Xen. *Hellen.* 4, 6, 13, 14. [5] Pausan. 10, 38, 10.
[6] Demosth. 3 *Phil.* 120. [7] Pausan. 1. 4, 4.

to which apparently all Aetolians were at liberty to come, and at which questions of peace and war and external politics generally were brought forward; though meanwhile the Strategus appears to have had the right of declaring and carrying on war as he chose. There was also a hipparch and a secretary (21, 32); and a senate called Apocleti (20, 1); and a body called *Synedri* (*C. I. G.* 2350), which seem to have been judicial; and another called *Nomographi* (13, 1, *C. I. G.* 3046), who were apparently an occasional board for legislation. They produced some writers, but their works are lost. Accordingly, as Professor Mahaffy observes, "we know them entirely from their enemies." Still the acknowledged principle on which they acted, ἄγειν λάφυρον ἀπὸ λαφύρου[1]—that is, that where spoils were going, whether from friend or foe, they were justified in taking a part, speaks for itself, and is enough to stamp them as at least dangerous and unpleasant neighbours.

Achaean league

The Achaeans have a different and more interesting history.

The original Achaean league consisted of a federation of twelve cities and their respective territory (μέρος): Pellene, Aegira, Aegae, Bura, Helice, Aegium, Rhypes, Patrae, Pharae, Olenus, Dyme, Tritaea.[2] This league was of great antiquity, but we know nothing of its history, or how it differed from other leagues, such as I have already mentioned, in adding political to religious unity. In B.C. 454 it submitted to Athens; but was restored to its original position in the same year on the signing of the thirty years' truce between Sparta and Athens:[3] and though the Athenians demanded that their authority over it should be restored to them in B.C. 425, when they had caught the Spartan army at Sphacteria, no change appears to have been made.[4] Thucydides certainly seems to speak of it, not as entirely free, but as in some special manner subject to the supremacy of Sparta. Polybius, however, claims for them, at an early period, a peculiar and honourable

[1] 18, 4 and 5.

[2] Herod. 1. 145 Instead of Rhypes and Aegae, the first of which seems to have been burnt, and the other to have for some reason been deserted, Polybius (2, 41) mentions Leontium and Caryneia.

[3] Thucyd. 1, 111, 115.

[4] Thucyd 4, 21.

place in Greek politics, as being distinguished for probity and honour. Thus they were chosen as arbitrators in the intestine disputes of Magna Graecia (about B.C. 400-390); and again, after the battle of Leuctra (B.C. 371) to mediate between Sparta and Thebes.[1] They must therefore, between B.C. 425-390, have obtained a virtual independence. They shared, however, in the universal decline of Hellenic activity during the Macedonian period (B.C. 359 to about B.C. 285), and Polybius complains that they were systematically depressed by the intrigues of Sparta and Macedonia; both which powers took care to prevent any Achaean of promising ability from attaining influence in the Peloponnese.[2] The same influence was exerted to estrange the Achaean cities from each other. They were garrisoned by Macedonian troops, or fell under the power of tyrants; and to all appearance the league had fared as other such combinations had fared before, and had been resolved into its original elements.

But the tradition of the old union did not die out entirely. Eight of the old cities still existed in a state of more or less vigour. Olenus and Helice had long ago disappeared by encroachments of the sea (before B.C. 371), and their places had not been filled up by others. Two other towns, Rhypes and Aegae, had from various causes ceased to be inhabited, and their places had been taken in the league (before the dissolution) by Leontium and Caryneia. There were therefore ten cities which had once known the advantages and disadvantages of some sort of federal union; as well as the misfortunes which attached to disunion, aggravated by constant interference from without.

Revival of the league, B.C. 284-280.

The first step in an attempt to resuscitate the league was taken in the 124th Olympiad (B.C. 284-280). Macedonia was at the time weakened by the troubles of a disputed succession: Pyrrhus was absorbed in his futile Italian expedition: a change in the sovereign of Egypt opened a way to a possible change of policy at Alexandria: and the death of Lysimachus gave the monarchs something else to do than to trouble themselves about the Peloponnese. At this period four of the Achaean

B.C. 284 First union of Dyme, Patrae, Tritaea, Pharae.

[1] 2, 38, 39. [2] 2, 39, 40.

towns, Dyme, Patrae, Tritaea, and Pharae, formed a league for mutual help. This proving, after a trial of five years, to have some stability, it was joined by Aegium, from which the Macedonian garrison was expelled. At intervals, of which we are not informed, this was again joined by Bura and Caryneia. These seven cities continued to constitute the entire league for twenty-five years; the federal magistrates consisting of two Strategi, elected by each city in turns, and a secretary. As to the doings of the league during this period we are entirely in the dark. The next step that we hear of is the abolition of the dual presidency and the election of Margos of Caryneia as sole Strategus. We are not told the reasons of the change; but it is clear that a divided command might often give room for delay, when delay was fatal; and for the conflict of local interests, where the interests of the community should be the paramount consideration. At any rate the change was made: and Margos, who had been a loyal servant of the league, was the first sole Strategus. His immediate successors we do not know. The next fact in the history of the league was the adherence of Sicyon, a powerful town and the first of any, not in the number of the old Achaean federation, to join. This therefore was a great step in the direction of extending the federation over the Peloponnese; and it was the work of the man destined to do much in moulding the league into the shape in which it attained its greatest effectiveness, Aratus of Sicyon. He found it weak; its cities poor and insignificant; with no aid from rich soil or good harbourage to increase its wealth or property;[1] he left it, not indeed free from serious dangers and difficulties,—in part the result of his own policy in calling in the aid of the Macedonians, in part created by the persistent hostility of Aetolia and Sparta,—but yet possessed of great vitality, and fast becoming the most powerful and influential of all the Greek governments; although at no time can it be spoken of as Panhellenic without very considerable exaggeration. Aratus had been brought up in exile at Argos, after the murder of his

Adherence of Aegium, B C. 279.

B.C. 279-255.

Margos of Caryneia first sole Strategus, B.C 255.

[1] Plutarch, *Arat.* ch. 9.

father Cleinias (B.C. 271); and, when twenty years of age, by a gallant and romantic adventure, had driven out the tyrant Nicocles from Sicyon (B.C. 251). He became the chief magistrate of his native town, which he induced to join the Achaean league, thus causing, as I have said, the league to take its first step towards embracing all the Peloponnese. It seems that for five years Aratus remained chief magistrate of Sicyon, but a private citizen of the league. In B.C. 245 (though of the exact year we have no positive information), he appears to have been first elected Strategus of the league. But it was not until his second year of office, B.C 243-242, that he began putting in practice the policy which he proposed to himself,—the expulsion of the Macedonian garrisons and the despots from the cities of the Peloponnese, with the view of their joining the league. He began with the Acrocorinthus. Corinth, freed from the foreign garrison, joined the league, and was followed soon after by Megara[1] (B.C. 240). From this time Aratus was Strategus of the league in alternate years to the time of his death, the federal law not allowing two consecutive years of office.[2]

The death of Antigonus Gonatas (B.C. 239) led to a new departure. Hitherto the Aetolians had been in league with the Macedonians to vex and harry the Achaeans. The two leagues now made peace, and the Aetolians aided the Achaeans in their resistance to Gonatas's successor, Demetrius (B.C. 239-229). Still the despots in many of the Peloponnesian towns held out, trusting to the support of Demetrius. When he died (B.C. 229) there was a general movement among them to abdicate and join their cities to the league. Lydiades of Megalopolis had done so during Demetrius's lifetime; and now Aristomachus of Argos, Xeno of Hermione, and Cleonymus of Phlius did the same. The rapid extension of the Achaean league, however, could not fail to excite the jealousy of the Aetolians, to whose league belonged certain Arcadian cities such as Mantinea, Tegea, and Orchomenus. These they

[1] Plutarch, *Arat* ch. 22.

[2] Though this law was several times broken, certainly in the case of Philopoemen, and probably in that of Aratus also. It is very difficult to arrive at a satisfactory arrangement of Aratus's seventeen generalships if the strict alternation is preserved. See Freeman's *Federal Government*, p. 601.

imagined to be threatened by the policy of Aratus, which was apt to proceed on the line that even a forcible attachment of a Peloponnesian town to the league was in reality a liberation of its people from a constraining power. The Spartan jealousy was aroused by the same fear. And then, as Polybius puts it, the Aetolians connived at the extension of Spartan power, even at the expense of cities in league with themselves, in order to strengthen Cleomenes in his attitude of opposition to the Achaeans.[1] Aratus, however, resolved to wait for some definite act of hostility before moving. This was supplied by Cleomenes building a fort (the Athenaeum) at Belbina, in the territory of Megalopolis, a league city. Upon this the league necessarily proclaimed war with Sparta. Thus does Polybius, a warm friend of the league, state the case in its behalf. The league, he argues, had been growing by the voluntary adherence of independent towns: it had shown no sign of an intention to attack Laconian territory, or towns in league with Aetolia: while Cleomenes had committed an act of wanton aggression and provocation by building a hostile fort in its territory. But what the other side had to say may be gathered from Plutarch's life of Cleomenes, founded principally on the work of Phylarchus the panegyrist of Cleomenes.[2] Here the case is put very differently. Aratus, according to him, had made up his mind that a union of the Peloponnesus was the one thing necessary for the safety of the league. In a great measure he had been already successful; but the parts which still stood aloof were Elis, Laconia, and the cities of Arcadia which were under the influence of Sparta.[3] He therefore harassed these last by every means in his power; and the erection or fortification of the Athenaeum at Belbina by Cleomenes was in truth only a measure of necessary defence. Aratus, indeed, held that some of these Arcadian cities had been unfairly seized by Cleomenes, with the con-

Cleomenic war, B.C. 227-221.

[1] 2, 46.

[2] Plutarch, *Cleomenes*, 3-16.

[3] Plutarch, *Cleom.* 3. Messenia had been free from the Spartans since the battle of Leuctra (B.C. 371). Epaminondas had meant by the foundation of Megalopolis and Messene (B.C. 371-370) to form a united Messenian and Arcadian state as a counterpoise to Sparta. The Messenians had drifted away from this arrangement, but were now members of the Achaean league Polyb. 4, 32.

nivance of the Aetolians;[1] but to this Cleomenes might reply that, if the league claimed the right of extending its connexion with the assent, often extorted, of the various cities annexed, the same right could not justly be denied to himself. A series of military operations took place during the next five years, in which Cleomenes nearly always got the better of Aratus; who, able and courageous in plots and surprises, was timid and ineffective in the field. The one important blow struck by Aratus, that of seizing Mantinea, was afterwards nullified by a counter-occupation of it by the Lacedaemonians; and in spite of troubles at home, caused by his great scheme of reform, Cleomenes was by B.C. 224 in so superior a position that he could with dignity propose terms to the league. He asked to be elected Strategus, therefore.[2] At first sight this seemed a means of effecting the desired union of the Peloponnese; and as such the Achaeans were inclined to accept the proposal. Aratus, however, exerted all his influence to defeat the measure: and, in spite of all his failures, his services to the league enabled him to convince his countrymen that they should reject the offer; and he was himself elected Strategus for the twelfth time in the spring of B.C. 223. Aratus has been loudly condemned for allowing a selfish jealousy to override his care for the true interests of his country, in thus refusing a prospect of a united Achaia, in which some one besides himself should be the leading man.[3] But I think there is something to be said on the other side. What Aratus had been working for with a passionate eagerness was a union of free democratic states. Cleomenes, in spite of his liberal reforms at home, was a Spartan to the back bone. Aratus would have no manner of doubt that a league, with Sparta supreme in it, would inevitably become a Spartan kingdom. The forces of Sparta would be used to crush dissenting cities; and soon to put down the free institution which would always be disliked and feared by the Spartan government. Security from Macedonian influence, if it were really obtained,—and that was far from certain,—would be dearly purchased at the price of submission to Spartan tyranny, which would be more

B.C. 226-221.

[1] 2, 46.

[2] Plutarch, *Cleom.* 15.

[3] See the remarks of Plutarch, *Arat.* 38.

galling and oppressive in proportion as it was nearer and more unremitting. With these views Aratus began to turn his eyes to the Macedonian court, as the only possible means of resisting the encroaching policy of Cleomenes. The character of Antigonus Doson, who was then administering Macedonia, gave some encouragement to hope for honest and honourable conduct on his part; and after some hesitation Aratus took the final step of asking for his aid.[1] I do not expect to carry the assent of many readers when I express the opinion that he was right; and that the Greek policy towards Macedonia had been from the first a grievous error,—fostered originally by the patriotic eloquence of Demosthenes, and continued ever since by that ineradicable sentiment for local autonomy which makes Greek history so interesting, but inevitably tended to the political annihilation of Greece. Had some *modus vivendi* been found with the series of very able sovereigns who ruled Macedonia, a strong Greek nation might have been the result, with a central government able to hold its own even in the face of the great "cloud in the West," which was surely overshadowing Greek freedom. But this was not to be. The taste for local freedom was too strong; and showed itself by constant appeals to an outside power against neighbours, which yet the very men who appealed to it would not recognise or obey. The Greeks had to learn that nations cannot, any more than individuals, eat their cake and have it too. Local autonomy, and the complete liberty of every state to war with its neighbours as it chooses, and of every one to speak and act as he pleases, have their charms; but they are not compatible with a united resistance to a great centralised and law-abiding power. And all the eloquence of all the Greek orators rolled into one could not make up for the lack of unity, or enable the distracted Greeks to raise an army which might stand before a volley of Roman pila or a charge of Roman legionaries.

The help asked of Antigonus Doson was given with fatal readiness; but it had to be purchased by the admission of a Macedonian garrison into the Acrocorinthus, one of those "fetters of Greece," the recovery of which had been among

[1] He was believed to have been long in secret communication with Antigonus. Plutarch, *l.c.*

Aratus's earliest and most glorious triumphs. The battle of Sellasia (B.C. 221) settled the question of Spartan influence. Cleomenes fled to Alexandria and never returned. Sparta was not enslaved by Antigonus; who on the contrary professed to restore her ancient constitution,—probably meaning that the Ephoralty destroyed by Cleomenes was to be reconstituted, and the exiles banished by him recalled. Practically she was left a prey to a series of unscrupulous tyrants who one after the other managed to obtain absolute power, Lycurgus (B.C. 220-210), Machanidas, B.C. 210-207; Nabis, B.C. 207-192; who, though differing in their home administrations, all agreed in using the enmity of the Aetolians in order to harass and oppress the Achaeans in every possible way.

Aratus died in B.C. 213. The last seven years of his life were embittered by much ill success in his struggles with the Aetolians; and by seeing Philip V., of whose presence in the Peloponnese he was the main cause, after rendering some brilliant services to the league, both in the Peloponnese and the invasion of Aetolia, develop some of the worst vices of the tyrant; and he believed himself, whether rightly or wrongly, to be poisoned by Philip's order: "This is the reward," he said to an attendant when he felt himself dying, "of my friendship for Philip." [1]

B.C. 213 Death of Aratus.

The history of the league after his death followed the same course for some years. The war with the Aetolians went on, sometimes slackly, sometimes vigorously, as Philip V. was or was not diverted by contests with his barbarian neighbours, or by schemes for joining the Carthaginian assaults upon the Roman power.

The next phase of vigorous action on the part of the league is that which corresponds with the career of Philopoemen, who had already shown his energy and skill at the battle of Sellasia. He was elected Hipparch in B.C. 210, and Strategus in B.C. 209. In his first office he did much to reorganise the Achaean cavalry and restore them to some discipline,[2] and he extended this as Strategus to the whole army.[3] His life's

B.C. 208-183. Philopoemen.

[1] Polyb. 8, 14; Plutarch, *Arat.* 52. [2] 10, 22, 24. [3] 11, 9-10.

work, however, was the defeating and either killing or confining to their frontier the tyrants of Sparta. But while he was absent from the country after B.C. 200 a new element appeared in the Peloponnese. In 197 the battle of Cynoscephalae put an end for ever to Macedonian influence, and Flamininus proclaimed the liberty of all Greece in B.C. 195 at the Nemean festival. But Nabis was not deposed; he was secured in his power by a treaty with Rome; and when Philopoemen returned from Crete (B.C. 193), he found a fresh war on the point of breaking out owing to intrigues between that tyrant and the Aetolians. They suggested, and he eagerly undertook to make, an attempt to recover the maritime towns of which he had been deprived by the Roman settlement.[1] Nabis at once attacked Gythium: and seemed on the point of taking it and the whole of the coast towns, which would thus have been lost to the league. Philopoemen, now again Strategus (B.C. 192), failed to relieve Gythium; but by a skilful piece of generalship inflicted so severe a defeat on Nabis, as he was returning to Sparta, that he did not venture on further movements beyond Laconia; and shortly afterwards was assassinated by some Aetolians whom he had summoned to his aid.

B.C. 195-194.

B.C. 193.

193-192.

But the comparative peace in the Peloponnese was again broken in B.C. 189 by the Spartans seizing a maritime town called Las; the object being to relieve themselves of the restraint which shut them from the sea, and the possible attacks of the exiles who had been banished by Nabis, and who were always watching an opportunity to effect their return. Philopoemen (Strategus both 189 and 188 B.C.) led an army to the Laconian frontier in the spring of B.C. 188, and after the execution of eighty Spartans, who had been surrendered on account of the seizure of Las, and of the murder of thirty citizens who were supposed to have Achaean proclivities—Sparta submitted to his demand to raze the fortifications, dismiss the mercenaries, send away the new citizens enrolled by the tyrants, and abolish the Lycurgean laws, accepting the Achaean institutions instead. This was

189-187.

[1] Plutarch, *Philop.* 12, 13.

afterwards supplemented by a demand for the restoration of the exiles banished by the tyrants. Such of the new citizens (three thousand) as did not leave the country by the day named were seized and sold as slaves.[1]

Sparta was now part of the Achaean league, which at this time reached its highest point of power; and its alliance was solicited by the most powerful princes of the east. It is this period which Polybius seems to have in mind in his description of the league at its best, as embracing the whole of the Peloponnese.[2] And it was in this third period of the existence of the renewed league that his father Lycortas came to the front, and he himself at an early age began taking part in politics.

B.C. 188.

188-183.

Lycortas Strategus, B.C. 184-182.

But the terms imposed on Sparta were essentially violent and unjust, and, as it turned out, impolitic. Cowed into submission, she proved a thorn in the side of the league. The exiles continually appealed to Rome; and after Philopoemen's death (B.C. 183) the affairs of the league began more and more to come before the Roman Senate. As usual, traitors were at hand ready to sell their country for the sake of the triumph of their party; and Callicrates, sent to Rome to plead the cause of the league,[3] employed the opportunity to support himself and his party by advising the Senate to give support to "the Romanisers" in every state. This Polybius regards as the beginning of the decline of the league. And the party of moderation, to which he and his father Lycortas belonged, and which wished to assert the dignity and legal rights of their country while offering no provocation to the Romans, were eventually included under the sweeping decree which caused them, to the number of a thousand, to be deported to Italy. We have already seen, in tracing the life of Polybius, how the poor remnants of these exiles returned in B.C. 151, embittered against Rome, and having learnt nothing and forgotten nothing. And how the old quarrels were renewed, until an armed interference of Rome was brought upon them; and how the victory of

B.C. 179.

[1] Plutarch, *Philop.* 16, Livy, 38, 32-34.

[2] 2, 38.

[3] 26, 3 *sq.*

Mummius at Corinth (B.C. 146), and the consequent settlement of the commissioners, finally dissolved the league into separate cantons, nominally autonomous, but really entirely subject to Rome.[1]

The constitution of the league presents many points of interest to the student of politics, and has been elaborately discussed by more than one English scholar. I shall content myself here with pointing out some of the main features as they are mentioned by Polybius.[2]

The league was a federation of free towns, all retaining full local autonomy of some form or other of democracy, which for certain purposes were under federal laws and federal magistrates, elected in a federal assembly which all citizens of the league towns might if they chose attend. All towns of the league also used the same standards in coinage and weights and measures (2, 37). The assembly of the league (σύνοδος) met for election of the chief magistrate in May of each year, at first always at Aegium, but later at the other towns of the league in turn (29, 23); and a second time in the autumn.[3] And besides these annual meetings, the Strategus, acting with his council of magistrates, could summon a meeting at any time for three days (*e.g.* at Sicyon, 23, 17); and on one occasion we find the assembly delegating its powers to the armed levy of league troops, who for the nonce were to act as an assembly (4, 7). Side by side with this general assembly was a council (βουλή), the functions and powers of which we cannot clearly ascertain. It seems to have acted as representing the general assembly in foreign affairs (4, 26; 22, 12); and, being a working committee of the whole assembly, it sometimes hap-

[1] The title of Achaean Strategus seems to have been revived under the Empire. *C. I. G.* 1124. The principal authorities for the history of the last hundred years of Greek Independence, including that of the Achaean league, are Polybius, beginning with book 2, and in its turn going on throughout the rest of his work which remains; scattered notices in Livy from 27, 29 to the end of his extant work, and the epitomes of the last books, mostly translated directly from Polybius, Plutarch's Lives of Agis, Cleomenes, Aratus, Philopoemen, Flamininus, Aemilius; Pausanias, 7, 6-16; parts of Diodorus; Justinus (epitome of Trogus), and some fragments of Greek historians collected by Muller.

[2] I speak of course of the restored league after the election of one Strategus began, B.C. 255.

[3] For the change of time of the election see note on 5, 1.

pened that when an assembly was summoned on some subject which did not rouse popular interest, it practically was the assembly (29, 24). Its numbers have been assumed to be one hundred and twenty, from the fact that Eumenes offered them a present of one hundred and twenty talents, the interest of which was to pay their expenses. But this, after all, is not a certain deduction (22, 10).

The officers of the league were: First, a President or Strategus who kept the seal of the league (4, 7), ordered the levy of federal troops, and commanded it in the field. He also summoned the assemblies, and brought the business to be done before them, which was in the form of a proposal to be accepted or rejected, not amended. He was not chairman of the assembly, but like an English minister or a Roman consul brought on the proposals. He was assisted by a kind of cabinet of ten magistrates from the several towns, who were called Demiurgi (δημιουργοὶ 23, 5).[1] This was their technical name. but Polybius also speaks of them under the more general appellation of οἱ ἄρχοντες (5, 1), οἱ συνάρχοντες (23, 16), αἱ ἀρχαὶ (22, 13), αἱ συναρχίαι (27, 2). Whether the number ten had reference to the ten old towns of the league or not, it was not increased with the number of the towns; and, though we are not informed how they were elected, it seems reasonable to suppose that they were freely selected without reference to the towns from which they came, as the Strategus himself was. There was also a vice-president or hypo-strategus, whose position was, I think, wholly military. He did not rule in absence of the Strategus, or succeed him in case of death, that being reserved for the Strategus of the previous year; but he took a certain command in war next the Strategus (5, 94; 4, 59). Besides these we hear of a Hipparch to command the league cavalry (5, 95; 7, 22), an office which seems to have been regarded as stepping-stone to that of Strategus. This proved a bad arrangement, as its holder was tempted to seek popularity by winking at derelictions of duty among the cavalry who were voters.[2] There was

[1] We hear nothing of a secretary under the new league after the abolition of the dual presidency. But he probably still existed (2, 43).

[2] 10, 22.

also a Navarch to command the regular squadron of federal ships (5, 94), who does not seem to have been so important a person. There are also mentioned certain judges (δίκασται) to administer the federal law. We hear of them, however, performing duties closely bordering on politics; for they decided whether certain honorary inscriptions, statues, or other marks of respect to king Eumenes should be allowed to remain in the Achaean cities (28, 7).

The Strategus, on the order of the assembly, raised the federal army (4, 7). The number of men raised differed according to circumstances. A fairly full levy seems to have been five thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry (4, 15). But the league also used mercenaries to a great extent. And we hear of one army which was to consist of eight thousand mercenary infantry, with five hundred mercenary cavalry; and in this case the Achaean levy was only to be three thousand infantry, with three hundred cavalry (5, 91).

The pay of the mercenaries and other league expenses were provided for by an εἰσφορά or contribution from all the states (5, 31, 91). The contributing towns appear to have been able to recover their payments as an indemnification for damage which the federal forces had failed to avert (4, 60).

The regular federal squadron of ships for guarding the sea-coasts appears to have consisted of ten triremes (2, 9; δεκαναῦα μακρῶν πλοίων 22, 10).

Such was the organisation of the Federal Government. It was in form purely democratic, all members of thirty years old being eligible for office, as well as possessing a vote in the assemblies. But a mass assembly where the members are widely scattered inevitably becomes oligarchic. Only the well-to-do and the energetic will be able or will care to come a long journey to attend. And as the votes in the assembly were given by towns, it must often have happened that the votes of many towns were decided by a very small number of their citizens who were there. No doubt, in times of great excitement, the attendance would be large and the vote a popular one. But the general policy of the league must have been directed by a small number of energetic men, who made politics their profession and could afford to do so.

ROMAN CAMP FOR TWO LEGIONS

CONTAINING 4,068,289 SQUARE FEET



P*. Praetorium.
T T′. Tents of the Tribuni Militum of two legions.
E E′. Equites of two legions.
P P′. Principes ,, ,,
H H′. Hastati ,, ,,
T T′. Triarii ,, ,,
ES ES′. Equites of Socii of two legions.
PS PS′. Pedites ,, ,, ,,
PE PE′. Equites of the Praetorian Cohort of two legions.
PP PP′. Pedites ,, ,, ,, ,, ,,
EP EP′. Pedites extraordinarii of two legions.
EE EE′. Equites ,, ,, ,,
Q. Quaestorium.
F. Forum or market-place.
V V′. Foreigners or volunteers.

THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

BOOK I

1. HAD the praise of History been passed over by former Chroniclers it would perhaps have been incumbent upon me to urge the choice and special study of records of this sort, as the readiest means men can have of correcting their knowledge of the past. But my predecessors have not been sparing in this respect. They have all begun and ended, so to speak, by enlarging on this theme: asserting again and again that the study of History is in the truest sense an education, and a training for political life; and that the most instructive, or rather the only, method of learning to bear with dignity the vicissitudes of fortune is to recall the catastrophes of others. It is evident, therefore, that no one need think it his duty to repeat what has been said by many, and said well. Least of all myself: for the surprising nature of the events which I have undertaken to relate is in itself sufficient to challenge and stimulate the attention of every one, old or young, to the study of my work. Can any one be so indifferent or idle as not to care to know by what means, and under what kind of polity, almost the whole inhabited world was conquered and brought under the dominion of the single city of Rome, and that too within a period of not quite fifty-three years? Or who again can be so completely absorbed in other subjects of contemplation or study, as to think any of them superior in importance to the accurate understanding of an event for which the past affords no precedent.

Introduction
The importance and magnitude of the subject.

B C 219-167.

2. We shall best show how marvellous and vast our subject is by comparing the most famous Empires which preceded, and which have been the favourite themes of historians, and measuring them with the superior greatness of Rome. There are but three that deserve even to be so compared and measured: and they are these. The Persians for a certain length of time were possessed of a great empire and dominion. But every time they ventured beyond the limits of Asia, they found not only their empire, but their own existence also in danger. The Lacedaemonians, after contending for supremacy in Greece for many generations, when they did get it, held it without dispute for barely twelve years. The Macedonians obtained dominion in Europe from the lands bordering on the Adriatic to the Danube,—which after all is but a small fraction of this continent,—and, by the destruction of the Persian Empire, they afterwards added to that the dominion of Asia. And yet, though they had the credit of having made themselves masters of a larger number of countries and states than any people had ever done, they still left the greater half of the inhabited world in the hands of others. They never so much as thought of attempting Sicily, Sardinia, or Libya: and as to Europe, to speak the plain truth, they never even knew of the most warlike tribes of the West. The Roman conquest, on the other hand, was not partial. Nearly the whole inhabited world was reduced by them to obedience: and they left behind them an empire not to be paralleled in the past or rivalled in the future. Students will gain from my narrative a clearer view of the whole story, and of the numerous and important advantages which such exact record of events offers.

Immensity of the Roman Empire shown by comparison with Persia, Sparta, Macedonia.

1. Persia.

2. Sparta.

B.C. 405-394.

3. Macedonia.

3. My History begins in the 140th Olympiad. The events from which it starts are these. In Greece, what is called the Social war: the first waged by Philip, son of Demetrius and father of Perseus, in league with the Achaeans against the Aetolians. In Asia, the war for the possession of

B.C. 220-217. The History starts from the 140th Olympiad, when the tendency towards

Coele-Syria which Antiochus and Ptolemy Philopator carried on against each other. In Italy, Libya, and their neighbourhood, the conflict between Rome and Carthage, generally called the Hannibalian war. My work thus begins where that of Aratus of Sicyon leaves off. Now up to this time the world's history had been, so to speak, a series of disconnected transactions, as widely separated in their origin and results as in their localities. But from this time forth History becomes a connected whole: the affairs of Italy and Libya are involved with those of Asia and Greece, and the tendency of all is to unity. This is why I have fixed upon this era as the starting-point of my work. For it was their victory over the Carthaginians in this war, and their conviction that thereby the most difficult and most essential step towards universal empire had been taken, which encouraged the Romans for the first time to stretch out their hands upon the rest, and to cross with an army into Greece and Asia.

unity first shows itself.

Now, had the states that were rivals for universal empire been familiarly known to us, no reference perhaps to their previous history would have been necessary, to show the purpose and the forces with which they approached an undertaking of this nature and magnitude. But the fact is that the majority of the Greeks have no knowledge of the previous constitution, power, or achievements either of Rome or Carthage. I therefore concluded that it was necessary to prefix this and the next book to my History. I was anxious that no one, when fairly embarked upon my actual narrative, should feel at a loss, and have to ask what were the designs entertained by the Romans, or the forces and means at their disposal, that they entered upon those undertakings, which did in fact lead to their becoming masters of land and sea everywhere in our part of the world. I wished, on the contrary, that these books of mine, and the prefatory sketch which they contained, might make it clear that the resources they started with justified their original idea, and sufficiently explained their final success in grasping universal empire and dominion.

A sketch of their previous history necessary to explain the success of the Romans.

The need of a comprehensive view of history as well as a close study of an epoch.

4. There is this analogy between the plan of my History and the marvellous spirit of the age with which I have to deal. Just as Fortune made almost all the affairs of the world incline in one direction, and forced them to converge upon one and the same point; so it is my task as an historian to put before my readers a compendious view of the part played by Fortune in bringing about the general catastrophe. It was this peculiarity which originally challenged my attention, and determined me on undertaking this work. And combined with this was the fact that no writer of our time has undertaken a general history. Had any one done so my ambition in this direction would have been much diminished. But, in point of fact, I notice that by far the greater number of historians concern themselves with isolated wars and the incidents that accompany them: while as to a general and comprehensive scheme of events, their date, origin, and catastrophe, no one as far as I know has undertaken to examine it. I thought it, therefore, distinctly my duty neither to pass by myself, nor allow any one else to pass by, without full study, a characteristic specimen of the dealings of Fortune at once brilliant and instructive in the highest degree. For fruitful as Fortune is in change, and constantly as she is producing dramas in the life of men, yet never assuredly before this did she work such a marvel, or act such a drama, as that which we have witnessed. And of this we cannot obtain a comprehensive view from writers of mere episodes. It would be as absurd to expect to do so as for a man to imagine that he has learnt the shape of the whole world, its entire arrangement and order, because he has visited one after the other the most famous cities in it; or perhaps merely examined them in separate pictures. That would be indeed absurd: and it has always seemed to me that men, who are persuaded that they get a competent view of universal from episodical history, are very like persons who should see the limbs of some body, which had once been living and beautiful, scattered and remote; and should imagine that to be quite as good as actually beholding the activity and beauty of the living creature itself. But if some one could there and then

reconstruct the animal once more, in the perfection of its beauty and the charm of its vitality, and could display it to the same people, they would beyond doubt confess that they had been far from conceiving the truth, and had been little better than dreamers. For indeed some idea of a whole may be got from a part, but an accurate knowledge and clear comprehension cannot. Wherefore we must conclude that episodical history contributes exceedingly little to the familiar knowledge and secure grasp of universal history. While it is only by the combination and comparison of the separate parts of the whole,—by observing their likeness and their difference,—that a man can attain his object: can obtain a view at once clear and complete; and thus secure both the profit and the delight of History.

5. I shall adopt as the starting-point of this book the first occasion on which the Romans crossed the sea from Italy. This is just where the History of Timaeus left off; and it falls in the 129th Olympiad. I shall accordingly have to describe what the state of their affairs in Italy was, how long that settlement had lasted, and on what resources they reckoned, when they resolved to invade Sicily. For this was the first place outside Italy in which they set foot. The precise cause of their thus crossing I must state without comment; for if I let one cause lead me back to another, my point of departure will always elude my grasp, and I shall never arrive at the view of my subject which I wish to present. As to dates, then, I must fix on some era agreed upon and recognised by all: and as to events, one that admits of distinctly separate treatment; even though I may be obliged to go back some short way in point of time, and take a summary review of the intermediate transactions. For if the facts with which one starts are unknown, or even open to controversy, all that comes after will fail of approval and belief. But opinion being once formed on that point, and a general assent obtained, all the succeeding narrative becomes intelligible.

B C. 264-261. I begin my preliminary account in the 129th Olympiad, and with the circumstances which took the Romans to Sicily.

6. It was in the nineteenth year after the sea-fight at Aegospotami, and the sixteenth before the battle at Leuctra; the year in which the Lacedaemonians made what is called the Peace of Antalcidas with the King of Persia; the year in which the elder Dionysius was besieging Rhegium after beating the Italian Greeks on the River Elleporus; and in which the Gauls took Rome itself by storm and were occupying the whole of it except the Capitol. With these Gauls the Romans made a treaty and settlement which they were content to accept: and having thus become beyond all expectation once more masters of their own country, they made a start in their career of expansion; and in the succeeding period engaged in various wars with their neighbours. First, by dint of valour, and the good fortune which attended them in the field, they mastered all the Latini; then they went to war with the Etruscans; then with the Celts; and next with the Samnites, who lived on the eastern and northern frontiers of Latium. Some time after this the Tarentines insulted the ambassadors of Rome, and, in fear of the consequences, invited and obtained the assistance of Pyrrhus. This happened in the year before the Gauls invaded Greece, some of whom perished near Delphi, while others crossed into Asia. Then it was that the Romans—having reduced the Etruscans and Samnites to obedience, and conquered the Italian Celts in many battles—attempted for the first time the reduction of the rest of Italy. The nations for whose possessions they were about to fight they affected to regard, not in the light of foreigners, but as already for the most part belonging and pertaining to themselves. The experience gained from their contests with the Samnites and the Celts had served as a genuine training in the art of war. Accordingly, they entered upon the war with spirit, drove Pyrrhus from Italy, and then undertook to fight with and subdue those who had taken part with him. They succeeded every-

B.C. 387-386. The rise of the Roman dominion may be traced from the retirement of the Gauls from the city. From that time one nation after another in Italy fell into their hands

The Latini.

The Etruscans, Gauls, and Samnites.

Pyrrhus, B.C. 280.

Southern Italy.

Pyrrhus finally quits Italy, B.C. 274.

where to a marvel, and reduced to obedience all the tribes inhabiting Italy except the Celts; after which they undertook to besiege some of their own citizens, who at that time were occupying Rhegium.

7. For misfortunes befell Messene and Rhegium, the cities built on either side of the Strait, peculiar in their nature and alike in their circumstances.

The story of the Mamertines at Messene, and the Roman garrison at Rhegium, Dio. Cassius *fr*

Not long before the period we are now describing some Campanian mercenaries of Agathocles, having for some time cast greedy eyes upon Messene, owing to its beauty and wealth, no sooner got an opportunity than they made a treacherous attempt upon that city. They entered the town under guise of friendship, and, having once got possession of it, they drove out some of the citizens and put others to the sword. This done, they seized promiscuously the wives and children of the dispossessed citizens, each keeping those which fortune had assigned him at the very moment of the lawless deed. All other property and the land they took possession of by a subsequent division and retained.

1 Messene.

Agathocles died, B C. 289.

The speed with which they became masters of a fair territory and city found ready imitators of their conduct. The people of Rhegium, when Pyrrhus was crossing to Italy, felt a double anxiety. They were dismayed at the thought of his approach, and at the same time were afraid of the Carthaginians as being masters of the sea. They accordingly asked and obtained a force from Rome to guard and support them. The garrison, four thousand in number, under the command of a Campanian named Decius Jubellius, entered the city, and for a time preserved it, as well as their own faith. But at last, conceiving the idea of imitating the Mamertines, and having at the same time obtained their co-operation, they broke faith with the people of Rhegium, enamoured of the pleasant site of the town and the private wealth of the citizens, and seized the city after having, in imitation of the Mamertines, first driven out some of the people and put others to the sword. Now, though the Romans were much annoyed at this transac-

2. Rhegium, Livy Ep. 12.

Pyrrhus in Sicily, B C. 278-275.

tion, they could take no active steps, because they were deeply engaged in the wars I have mentioned above. But having got free from them they invested and besieged the troops. They presently took the place and killed the greater number in the assault,—for the men resisted desperately, knowing what must follow,—but took more than three hundred alive. These were sent to Rome, and there the Consuls brought them into the forum, where they were scourged and beheaded according to custom: for they wished as far as they could to vindicate their good faith in the eyes of the allies. The territory and town they at once handed over to the people of Rhegium.

B.C. 271. C. Quintus Claudus, L. Genucius Clepsina, Coss.

8. But the Mamertines (for this was the name which the Campanians gave themselves after they became masters of Messene), as long as they enjoyed the alliance of the Roman captors of Rhegium, not only exercised absolute control over their own town and district undisturbed, but about the neighbouring territory also gave no little trouble to the Carthaginians and Syracusans, and levied tribute from many parts of Sicily. But when they were deprived of this support, the captors of Rhegium being now invested and besieged, they were themselves promptly forced back into the town again by the Syracusans, under circumstances which I will now detail.

Effect of the fall of the rebellious garrison of Rhegium on the Mamertines.

Not long before this the military forces of the Syracusans had quarrelled with the citizens, and while stationed near Mergane elected commanders from their own body. These were Artemidorus and Hiero, the latter of whom afterwards became King of Syracuse. At this time he was quite a young man, but had a certain natural aptitude for kingcraft and the politic conduct of affairs. Having taken over the command, and having by means of some of his connexions made his way into the city, he got his political opponents into his hands; but conducted the government with such mildness, and in so lofty a spirit, that the Syracusans, though by no means usually acquiescing in the election of officers by the soldiers, did on this occasion

The rise of Hiero. He is elected General by the army, B.C. 275-274.

unanimously approve of Hiero as their general. His first step made it evident to close observers that his hopes soared above the position of a mere general.

9. He noticed that among the Syracusans the despatch of troops, and of magistrates in command of them, was always the signal for revolutionary movements of some sort or another. He knew, too, that of all the citizens Leptines enjoyed the highest position and credit, and that among the common people especially he was by far the most influential man existing. He accordingly contracted a relationship by marriage with him, that he might have a representative of his interests left at home at such times as he should be himself bound to go abroad with the troops for a campaign. After marrying the daughter of this man, his next step was in regard to the old mercenaries. He observed that they were disaffected and mutinous: and he accordingly led out an expedition, with the ostensible purpose of attacking the foreigners who were in occupation of Messene. He pitched a camp against the enemy near Centuripa, and drew up his line resting on the River Cyamosorus. But the cavalry and infantry, which consisted of citizens, he kept together under his personal command at some distance, on pretence of intending to attack the enemy on another quarter: the mercenaries he thrust to the front and allowed them to be completely cut to pieces by the foreigners; while he seized the moment of their rout to affect a safe retreat for himself and the citizens into Syracuse. This stroke of policy was skilful and successful. He had got rid of the mutinous and seditious element in the army; and after enlisting on his own account a sufficient body of mercenaries, he thenceforth carried on the business of the government in security. But seeing that the Mamertines were encouraged by their success to greater confidence and recklessness in their excursions, he fully armed and energetically drilled the citizen levies, led them out, and engaged the enemy on the Mylaean plain near the River Longanus. He inflicted a severe defeat upon them:

Secures support of Leptines by marrying his daughter.

His device for getting rid of mutinous mercenaries.

Fiume Salso.

Hiero next attacks the Mamertines and defeats them near Mylae, B.C. 268.

took their leaders prisoners: put a complete end to their audacious proceedings: and on his return to Syracuse was himself greeted by all the allies with the title of King.

Some of the conquered Mamertines appeal to Rome for help.

10. Thus were the Mamertines first deprived of support from Rhegium, and then subjected, from causes which I have just stated, to a complete defeat on their own account. Thereupon some of them betook themselves to the protection of the Carthaginians, and were for putting themselves and their citadel into their hands; while others set about sending an embassy to Rome to offer a surrender of their city, and to beg assistance on the ground of the ties of race which united them. The Romans were long in doubt. The inconsistency of sending such aid seemed manifest. A little while ago they had put some of their own citizens to death, with the extreme penalties of the law, for having broken faith with the people of Rhegium: and now so soon afterwards to assist the Mamertines, who had done precisely the same to Messene as well as Rhegium, involved a breach of equity very hard to justify. But while fully alive to these points, they yet saw that Carthaginian aggrandisement was not confined to Libya, but had embraced many districts in Iberia as well; and that Carthage was, besides, mistress of all the islands in the Sardinian and Tyrrhenian seas: they were beginning, therefore, to be exceedingly anxious lest, if the Carthaginians became masters of Sicily also, they should find them very dangerous and formidable neighbours, surrounding them as they would on every side, and occupying a position which commanded all the coasts of Italy. Now it was clear that, if the Mamertines did not obtain the assistance they asked for, the Carthaginians would very soon reduce Sicily. For should they avail themselves of the voluntary offer of Messene and become masters of it, they were certain before long to crush Syracuse also, since they were already lords of nearly the whole of the rest of Sicily. The Romans saw all this, and felt that it was absolutely necessary not to let Messene slip, or allow the Carthaginians to secure what would be like a bridge to enable them to cross into Italy.

The motives of the Romans in acceding to this prayer,—jealousy of the growing power of Carthage.

11. In spite of protracted deliberations, the conflict of motives proved too strong, after all, to allow of the Senate coming to any decision; for the inconsistency of aiding the Messenians appeared to them to be evenly balanced by the advantages to be gained by doing so. The people, however, had suffered much from the previous wars, and wanted some means of repairing the losses which they had sustained in every department. Besides these national advantages to be gained by the war, the military commanders suggested that individually they would get manifest and important benefits from it. They accordingly voted in favour of giving the aid. The decree having thus been passed by the people, they elected one of the consuls, Appius Claudius, to the command, and sent him out with instructions to cross to Messene and relieve the Mamertines. These latter managed, between threats and false representations, to oust the Carthaginian commander who was already in possession of the citadel, invited Appius in, and offered to deliver the city into his hands. The Carthaginians crucified their commander for what they considered to be his cowardice and folly in thus losing the citadel; stationed their fleet near Pelorus; their land forces at a place called Synes; and laid vigorous siege to Messene. Now at this juncture Hiero, thinking it a favourable opportunity for totally expelling from Sicily the foreigners who were in occupation of Messene, made a treaty with the Carthaginians. Having done this, he started from Syracuse upon an expedition against that city. He pitched his camp on the opposite side to the Carthaginians, near what was called the Chalcidian Mount, whereby the garrison were cut off from that way out as well as from the other. The Roman Consul Appius, for his part, gallantly crossed the strait by night and got into Messene. But he found that the enemy had completely surrounded the town and were vigorously pressing on the attack; and he concluded on reflection that the siege could bring him neither credit nor security so long as the enemy commanded land as well as sea. He accordingly first endea-

The Senate shirk the responsibility of decision.

The people vote for helping the Mamertines.

B.C. 264 Appius Claudius Caudex. M. Fulvius Flaccus, Coss.

Hiero joins Carthage in laying siege to the Mamertines in Messene Appius comes to the relief of the besieged, B.C. 264.

voured to relieve the Mamertines from the contest altogether by sending embassies to both of the attacking forces. Neither of them received his proposals, and at last, from sheer necessity, he made up his mind to hazard an engagement, and that he would begin with the Syracusans. So he led out his forces and drew them up for the fight: nor was the Syracusan backward in accepting the challenge, but descended simultaneously to give him battle. After a prolonged struggle, Appius got the better of the enemy, and chased the opposing forces right up to their entrenchments. The result of this was that Appius, after stripping the dead, retired into Messene again, while Hiero, with a foreboding of the final result, only waited for nightfall to beat a hasty retreat to Syracuse.

After vain attempts at negotiation, Appius determines to attack Hiero.

Hiero is defeated, and returns to Syracuse.

12. Next morning, when Appius was assured of their flight, his confidence was strengthened, and he made up his mind to attack the Carthaginians without delay. Accordingly, he issued orders to the soldiers to despatch their preparations early, and at daybreak commenced his sally. Having succeeded in engaging the enemy, he killed a large number of them, and forced the rest to fly precipitately to the neighbouring towns. These successes sufficed to raise the siege of Messene: and thenceforth he scoured the territory of Syracuse and her allies with impunity, and laid it waste without finding any one to dispute the possession of the open country with him; and finally he sat down before Syracuse itself and laid siege to it.

Encouraged by this success, he attacks and drives off the Carthaginians.

Such was the nature and motive of the first warlike expedition of the Romans beyond the shores of Italy; and this was the period at which it took place. I thought this expedition the most suitable starting-point for my whole narrative, and accordingly adopted it as a basis; though I have made a rapid survey of some anterior events, that in setting forth its causes no point should be left obscure. I thought it necessary, if we were to get an adequate and comprehensive view of

Such preliminary sketches are necessary for clearness, and my readers must not be surprised if I follow the same system in the case of other towns.

their present supreme position, to trace clearly how and when the Romans, after the disaster which they sustained in the loss of their own city, began their upward career; and how and when, once more, after possessing themselves of Italy, they conceived the idea of attempting conquests external to it. This must account in future parts of my work for my taking, when treating of the most important states, a preliminary survey of their previous history. In doing so my object will be to secure such a vantage-ground as will enable us to see with clearness from what origin, at what period, and in what circumstances they severally started and arrived at their present position. This is exactly what I have just done with regard to the Romans.

13. It is time to have done with these explanations, and to come to my subject, after a brief and summary statement of the events of which my introductory books are to treat. Of these the first in order of time are those which befell the Romans and Carthaginians in their war for the possession of Sicily. Next comes the Libyan or Mercenary war; immediately following on which are the Carthaginian achievements in Spain, first under Hamilcar, and then under Hasdrubal. In the course of these events, again, occurred the first expedition of the Romans into Illyria and the Greek side of Europe; and, besides that, their struggles within Italy with the Celts. In Greece at the same time the war called after Cleomenes was in full action. With this war I design to conclude my prefatory sketch and my second book.

Subjects of the two first books of the Histories
1. War in Sicily or first Punic war, B.C. 264-241
2. The Mercenary or "inexpiable" war, B.C. 240-237.
3. Carthaginian movements in Spain, B.C. 241-218.
4. Illyrian war, B.C. 229-228.
5. Gallic war, B.C. 225-221.
6. Cleomenic war, B.C. 227-221.

To enter into minute details of these events is unnecessary, and would be of no advantage to my readers. It is not part of my plan to write a history of them: my sole object is to recapitulate them in a summary manner by way of introduction to the narrative I have in hand. I will, therefore, touch lightly upon the leading events of this period in a comprehensive sketch, and will endeavour to make the end of it dovetail with the commencement of my main history. In this

way the narrative will acquire a continuity; and I shall be shown to have had good reason for touching on points already treated by others: while by such an arrangement the studiously inclined will find the approach to the story which has to be told made intelligible and easy for them. I shall, however, endeavour to describe with somewhat more care the first war which arose between the Romans and Carthaginians for the possession of Sicily. For it would not be easy to mention any war that lasted longer than this one; nor one in which the preparations made were on a larger scale, or the efforts made more sustained, or the actual engagements more numerous, or the reverses sustained on either side more signal. Moreover, the two states themselves were at the precise period of their history when their institutions were as yet in their original integrity, their fortunes still at a moderate level, and their forces on an equal footing. So that those who wish to gain a fair view of the national characteristics and resources of the two had better base their comparison upon this war rather than upon those which came after.

The first Punic war deserves more detailed treatment, as furnishing a better basis for comparing Rome and Carthage than subsequent wars

14. But it was not these considerations only which induced me to undertake the history of this war. I was influenced quite as much by the fact that Philinus and Fabius, who have the reputation of writing with the most complete knowledge about it, have given us an inadequate representation of the truth. Now, judging from their lives and principles, I do not suppose that these writers have intentionally stated what was false; but I think that they are much in the same state of mind as men in love. Partisanship and complete prepossession made Philinus think that all the actions of the Carthaginians were characterised by wisdom, honour, and courage: those of the Romans by the reverse. Fabius thought the exact opposite. Now in other relations of life one would hesitate to exclude such warmth of sentiment: for a good man ought to be loyal to his friends and patriotic to his country; ought to be at one with his friends in their hatreds and likings. But directly a man

This is rendered more necessary by the partisan misrepresentations of Philinus and Fabius Pictor.

assumes the moral attitude of an historian he ought to forget all considerations of that kind. There will be many occasions on which he will be bound to speak well of his enemies, and even to praise them in the highest terms if the facts demand it: and on the other hand many occasions on which it will be his duty to criticise and denounce his own side, however dear to him, if their errors of conduct suggest that course. For as a living creature is rendered wholly useless if deprived of its eyes, so if you take truth from History what is left is but an idle unprofitable tale. Therefore, one must not shrink either from blaming one's friends or praising one's enemies; nor be afraid of finding fault with and commending the same persons at different times. For it is impossible that men engaged in public affairs should always be right, and unlikely that they should always be wrong. Holding ourselves, therefore, entirely aloof from the actors, we must as historians make statements and pronounce judgment in accordance with the actions themselves.

15. The writers whom I have named exemplify the truth of these remarks. Philinus, for instance, commencing the narrative with his second book, says that the "Carthaginians and Syracusans engaged in the war and sat down before Messene; that the Romans arriving by sea entered the town, and immediately sallied out from it to attack the Syracusans; but that after suffering severely in the engagement they retired into Messene; and that on a second occasion, having issued forth to attack the Carthaginians, they not only suffered severely but lost a considerable number of their men captured by the enemy." But while making this statement, he represents Hiero as so destitute of sense as, after this engagement, not only to have promptly burnt his stockade and tents and fled under cover of night to Syracuse, but to have abandoned all the forts which had been established to overawe the Messenian territory. Similarly he asserts that "the Carthaginians immediately after their battle evacuated their entrenchment and dispersed into various towns, without venturing any longer even to dispute the possession of the open country; and that, accordingly, their leaders seeing that their troops were utterly demoralised

Philinus's misrepresentations.

determined in consideration not to risk a battle: that the Romans followed them, and not only laid waste the territory of the Carthaginians and Syracusans, but actually sat down before Syracuse itself and began to lay siege to it." These statements appear to me to be full of glaring inconsistency, and to call for no refutation at all. The very men whom he describes to begin with as besieging Messene, and as victorious in the engagements, he afterwards represents as running away, abandoning the open country, and utterly demoralised: while those whom he starts by saying were defeated and besieged, he concludes by describing as engaging in a pursuit, as promptly seizing the open places, and finally as besieging Syracuse. Nothing can reconcile these statements. It is impossible. Either his initial statement, or his account of the subsequent events, must be false. In point of fact the latter part of his story is the true one. The Syracusans and Carthaginians *did* abandon the open country, and the Romans *did* immediately afterwards commence a siege of Syracuse and of Echetla, which lies in the district between the Syracusan and Carthaginian pales. For the rest it must necessarily be acknowledged that the first part of his account is false; and that whereas the Romans were victorious in the engagements under Messene, they have been represented by this historian as defeated. Through the whole of this work we shall find Philinus acting in a similar spirit: and much the same may be said of Fabius, as I shall show when the several points arise.

I have now said what was proper on the subject of this digression. Returning to the matter in hand I will endeavour by a continuous narrative of moderate dimensions to guide my readers to a true knowledge of this war.

16. When news came to Rome of the successes of Appius and his legions, the people elected Manius Otacilius and Manius Valerius Consuls, and despatched their whole army to Sicily, and both Consuls in command. Now the Romans have in all, as distinct from allies, four legions of Roman citizens, which they enrol every year, each of which consists of four thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry: and on their arrival most

B.C. 264

(Continuing from chap XII), B.C. 263, Manius Valerius Maximus, Manius Otacilius Crassus,

of the cities revolted from Syracuse as well as from Carthage, and joined the Romans. And when he saw the terror and dismay of the Sicilians, and compared with them the number and crushing strength of the legions of Rome, Hiero began, from a review of all these points, to conclude that the prospects of the Romans were brighter than those of the Carthaginians. Inclining therefore from these considerations to the side of the former, he began sending messages to the Consuls, proposing peace and friendship with them. The Romans accepted his offer, their chief motive being the consideration of provisions: for as the Carthaginians had command of the sea, they were afraid of being cut off at every point from their supplies, warned by the fact that the legions which had previously crossed had run very short in that respect. They therefore gladly accepted Hiero's offers of friendship, supposing that he would be of signal service to them in this particular. The king engaged to restore his prisoners without ransom, and to pay besides an indemnity of a hundred talents of silver. The treaty being arranged on these terms, the Romans thenceforth regarded the Syracusans as friends and allies: while King Hiero, having thus placed himself under the protection of the Romans, never failed to supply their needs in times of difficulty; and for the rest of his life reigned securely in Syracuse, devoting his energies to gaining the gratitude and good opinion of the Greeks. And in point of fact no monarch ever acquired a greater reputation, or enjoyed for a longer period the fruits of his prudent policy in private as well as in public affairs.

Coss. The Consuls with four legions are sent to Sicily. A general move of the Sicilian cities to join them. Hiero submits.

17. When the text of this treaty reached Rome, and the people had approved and confirmed the terms made with Hiero, the Roman government thereupon decided not to send all their forces, as they had intended doing, but only two legions. For they thought that the gravity of the war was lessened by the adhesion of the king, and at the same time that the army would thus be better off for provisions. But when the Carthaginian government saw that Hiero had become their enemy, and that the

The Carthaginians alarmed at Hiero's defection make great efforts to increase their army in Sicily.

Romans were taking a more decided part in Sicilian politics, they conceived that they must have a more formidable force to enable them to confront their enemy and maintain their own interests in Sicily. Accordingly, they enlisted mercenaries from over sea —a large number of Ligurians and Celts, and a still larger number of Iberians—and despatched them to Sicily. And perceiving that Agrigentum possessed the greatest natural advantages as a place of arms, and was the most powerful city in their province, they collected their supplies and their forces into it, deciding to use this city as their headquarters for the war.

They select Agrigentum as their headquarters.

On the Roman side a change of commanders had now taken place. The Consuls who made the treaty with Hiero had gone home, and their successors, Lucius Postumius and Quintus Mamilius, were come to Sicily with their legions. Observing the measure which the Carthaginians were taking, and the forces they were concentrating at Agrigentum, they made up their minds to take that matter in hand and strike a bold blow. Accordingly they suspended every other department of the war, and bearing down upon Agrigentum itself with their whole army, attacked it in force; pitched their camp within a distance of eight stades from the city; and confined the Carthaginians within the walls. Now it was just harvest-time, and the siege was evidently destined to be a long one: the soldiers, therefore, went out to collect the corn with greater hardihood than they ought to have done. Accordingly the Carthaginians, seeing the enemy scattered about the fields, sallied out and attacked the harvesting-parties. They easily routed these; and then one portion of them made a rush to destroy the Roman entrenchment, the other to attack the pickets. But the peculiarity of their institutions saved the Roman fortunes, as it had often done before. Among them it is death for a man to desert his post, or to fly from his station on any pretext whatever. Accordingly on this, as on other occasions, they gallantly held their ground against opponents many times their own number; and though they lost many of

B.C. 262.

The new Consuls, Lucius Postumius Megellus and Quintus Mamilius Vitulus, determine to lay siege to Agrigentum.

The Carthaginians make an unsuccessful sally.

their own men, they killed still more of the enemy, and at last outflanked the foes just as they were on the point of demolishing the palisade of the camp. Some they put to the sword, and the rest they pursued with slaughter into the city.

18. The result was that thenceforth the Carthaginians were somewhat less forward in making such attacks, and the Romans more cautious in foraging.

Finding that the Carthaginians would not come out to meet them at close quarters any more, the Roman generals divided their forces: with one division they occupied the ground round the temple of Asclepius outside the town; with the other they encamped in the outskirts of the city on the side which looks towards Heracleia. The space between the camps on either side of the city they secured by two trenches, —the inner one to protect themselves against sallies from the city, the outer as a precaution against attacks from without, and to intercept those persons or supplies which always make their way surreptitiously into cities that are sustaining a siege. The spaces between the trenches uniting the camps they secured by pickets, taking care in their disposition to strengthen the several accessible points. As for food and other war material, the other allied cities all joined in collecting and bringing these to Herbesus for them: and thus they supplied themselves in abundance with necessaries, by continually getting provisions living and dead from this town, which was conveniently near. For about five months then they remained in the same position, without being able to obtain any decided advantage over each other beyond the casualties which occurred in the skirmishes. But the Carthaginians were beginning to be hard pressed by hunger, owing to the number of men shut up in the city, who amounted to no less than fifty thousand: and Hannibal, who had been appointed commander of the besieged forces, beginning by this time to be seriously alarmed at the state of things, kept perpetually sending messages to Carthage explaining their critical state, and begging for assistance. Thereupon the Carthaginian government put on board ship the fresh troops and elephants which they had col-

The Romans form two strongly-entrenched camps.

A relief comes from Carthage to Agrigentum.

lected, and despatched them to Sicily, with orders to join the other commander Hanno. This officer collected all his war material and forces into Heracleia, and as a first step possessed himself by a stratagem of Herbesus, thus depriving the enemy of their provisions and supply of necessaries. The result of this was that the Romans found themselves in the position of besieged as much as in that of besiegers; for they were reduced by short supplies of food and scarcity of necessaries to such a condition that they more than once contemplated raising the siege. And they would have done so at last had not Hiero, by using every effort and contrivance imaginable, succeeded in keeping them supplied with what satisfied, to a tolerable extent, their most pressing wants. This was Hanno's first step. His next was as follows.

Hanno seizes Herbesus.

The Romans faithfully supported by Hiero.

19. He saw that the Romans were reduced by disease and want, owing to an epidemic that had broken out among them, and he believed that his own forces were strong enough to give them battle: he accordingly collected his elephants, of which he had about fifty, and the whole of the rest of his army, and advanced at a rapid pace from Heracleia; having previously issued orders to the Numidian cavalry to precede him, and to endeavour, when they came near the enemies' stockade, to provoke them and draw their cavalry out; and, having done so, to wheel round and retire until they met him. The Numidians did as they were ordered, and advanced up to one of the camps. Immediately the Roman cavalry poured out and boldly charged the Numidians: the Libyans retired, according to their orders, until they reached Hanno's division: then they wheeled round; surrounded, and repeatedly charged the enemy; killed a great number of them, and chased the rest up to their stockade. After this affair Hanno's force encamped over against the Romans, having seized the hill called Torus, at a distance of about a mile and a quarter from their opponents. For two months they remained in position without any decisive action, though skirmishes took place daily. But as

Hanno tempts the Roman cavalry out and defeats them.

After two months, Hanno is forced to

Hannibal all this time kept signalling and sending messages from the town to Hanno,— telling him that his men were impatient of the famine, and that many were even deserting to the enemy owing to the distress for food,—the Carthaginian general determined to risk a battle, the Romans being equally ready, for the reasons I have mentioned. So both parties advanced into the space between the camps and engaged. The battle lasted a long time, but at last the Romans turned the advanced guard of Carthaginian mercenaries. The latter fell back upon the elephants and the other divisions posted in their rear; and thus the whole Punic army was thrown into confusion. The retreat became general: the larger number of the men were killed, while some effected their escape into Heracleia; and the Romans became masters of most of the elephants and all the baggage. Now night came on, and the victors, partly from joy at their success, partly from fatigue, kept their watches somewhat more carelessly than usual; accordingly Hannibal, having given up hope of holding out, made up his mind that this state of things afforded him a good opportunity of escape. He started about midnight from the town with his mercenary troops, and having choked up the trenches with baskets stuffed full of chaff, led off his force in safety, without being detected by the enemy. When day dawned the Romans discovered what had happened, and indeed for a short time were engaged with Hannibal's rear; but eventually they all made for the town gates. There they found no one to oppose them: they therefore threw themselves into the town, plundered it, and secured a large number of captives, besides a great booty of every sort and description.

try to relieve Agrigentum,

but is defeated in a pitched battle, and his army cut to pieces.

Hannibal escapes by night; and the Romans enter and plunder Agrigentum.

20. Great was the joy of the Roman Senate when the news of what had taken place at Agrigentum arrived. Their ideas too were so raised that they no longer confined themselves to their original designs. They were not content with having saved the Mamertines, nor with the advantages gained in the course of the war; but conceived the

This success inspires the Senate with the idea of expelling the Carthaginians from Sicily.

idea that it was possible to expel the Carthaginians entirely from the island, and that if that were done their own power would receive a great increase: they accordingly engaged in this policy and directed their whole thoughts to this subject. As to their land forces they saw that things were going on as well as they could wish. For the Consuls elected in succession to those who had besieged Agrigentum, Lucius Valerius Flaccus and Titus Otacilius Crassus, appeared to be managing the Sicilian business as well as circumstances admitted. Yet so long as the Carthaginians were in undisturbed command of the sea, the balance of success could not incline decisively in their favour. For instance, in the period which followed, though they were now in possession of Agrigentum, and though consequently many of the inland towns joined the Romans from dread of their land forces, yet a still larger number of seaboard towns held aloof from them in terror of the Carthaginian fleet. Seeing therefore that it was ever more and more the case that the balance of success oscillated from one side to the other from these causes; and, moreover, that while Italy was repeatedly ravaged by the naval force, Libya remained permanently uninjured; they became eager to get upon the sea and meet the Carthaginians there.

B.C. 261.

It was this branch of the subject that more than anything else induced me to give an account of this war at somewhat greater length than I otherwise should have done. I was unwilling that a first step of this kind should be unknown,—namely how, and when, and why the Romans first started a navy.

The Romans boldly determine to build ships and meet the Carthaginians at sea.

It was, then, because they saw that the war they had undertaken lingered to a weary length, that they first thought of getting a fleet built, consisting of a hundred quinqueremes and twenty triremes. But one part of their undertaking caused them much difficulty. Their shipbuilders were entirely unacquainted with the construction of quinqueremes, because no one in Italy had at that time employed vessels of that description. There could be no more signal proof of the courage, or rather the extraordinary audacity of the Roman enterprise. Not only had they no resources for it

of reasonable sufficiency; but without any resources for it at all, and without having ever entertained an idea of naval war,—for it was the first time they had thought of it,—they nevertheless handled the enterprise with such extraordinary audacity, that, without so much as a preliminary trial, they took upon themselves there and then to meet the Carthaginians at sea, on which they had for generations held undisputed supremacy. Proof of what I say, and of their surprising audacity, may be found in this. When they first took in hand to send troops across to Messene they not only had no decked vessels but no war-ships at all, not so much as a single galley: but they borrowed quinqueremes and triremes from Tarentum and Locri, and even from Elea and Neapolis; and having thus collected a fleet, boldly sent their men across upon it. It was on this occasion that, the Carthaginians having put to sea in the Strait to attack them, a decked vessel of theirs charged so furiously that it ran aground, and falling into the hands of the Romans served them as a model on which they constructed their whole fleet. And if this had not happened it is clear that they would have been completely hindered from carrying out their design by want of constructive knowledge.

A Carthaginian ship used as a model.

21. Meanwhile, however, those who were charged with the shipbuilding were busied with the construction of the vessels; while others collected crews and were engaged in teaching them to row on dry land: which they contrived to do in the following manner. They made the men sit on rower's benches on dry land, in the same order as they would sit on the benches in actual vessels: in the midst of them they stationed the Celeustes, and trained them to get back and draw in their hands all together in time, and then to swing forward and throw them out again, and to begin and cease these movements at the word of the Celeustes. By the time these preparations were completed the ships were built. They therefore launched them, and, after a brief preliminary practice of real sea-rowing, started on their coasting voyage along the shore of Italy, in accordance with the Consul's order. For Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio, who had been appointed by the

B.C 260. Cn. Cornelius Scipio Asina, C. Duilius, Coss.

Roman people a few days before to command the fleet, after giving the ship captains orders that as soon as they had fitted out the fleet they should sail to the Straits, had put to sea himself with seventeen ships and sailed in advance to Messene; for he was very eager to secure all pressing necessaries for the naval force. While there some negotiation was suggested to him for the surrender of the town of Lipara. Snatching at the prospect somewhat too eagerly, he sailed with the above-mentioned ships and anchored off the town. But having been informed in Panormus of what had taken place, the Carthaginian general Hannibal despatched Boödes, a member of the Senate, with a squadron of twenty ships. He accomplished the voyage at night and shut up Gnaeus and his men within the harbour. When day dawned the crews made for the shore and ran away, while Gnaeus, in utter dismay, and not knowing in the least what to do, eventually surrendered to the enemy. The Carthaginians having thus possessed themselves of the ships as well as the commander of their enemies, started to rejoin Hannibal. Yet a few days afterwards, though the disaster of Gnaeus was so signal and recent, Hannibal himself was within an ace of falling into the same glaring mistake. For having been informed that the Roman fleet in its voyage along the coast of Italy was close at hand, he conceived a wish to get a clear view of the enemy's number and disposition. He accordingly set sail with fifty ships, and just as he was rounding the "Italian Headland" he fell in with the enemy, who were sailing in good order and disposition. He lost most of his ships, and with the rest effected his own escape in a manner beyond hope or expectation.

Cornelius captured with the loss of his ships

The rest of the Roman fleet arrive and nearly capture Hannibal

22. When the Romans had neared the coasts of Sicily and learnt the disaster which had befallen Gnaeus, their first step was to send for Gaius Duilius, who was in command of the land forces. Until he should come they stayed where they were; but at the same time, hearing that the enemy's fleet was no great way off, they busied themselves with preparations for a sea-fight. Now their ships were badly fitted out and not easy to manage, and so some one suggested to them as

likely to serve their turn in a fight the construction of what were afterwards called "crows" Their mechanism was this. A round pole was placed in the prow, about twenty-four feet high, and with a diameter of four palms. The pole itself had a pulley on the top, and a gangway made with cross planks nailed together, four feet wide and thirty-six feet long, was made to swing round it. Now the hole in the gangway was oval shaped, and went round the pole twelve feet from one end of the gangway, which had also a wooden railing running down each side of it to the height of a man's knee. At the extremity of this gangway was fastened an iron spike like a miller's pestle, sharpened at its lower end and fitted with a ring at its upper end. The whole thing looked like the machines for braising corn. To this ring the rope was fastened with which, when the ships collided, they hauled up the "crows," by means of the pulley at the top of the pole, and dropped them down upon the deck of the enemy's ship, sometimes over the prow, sometimes swinging them round when the ships collided broadsides. And as soon as the "crows" were fixed in the planks of the decks and grappled the ships together, if the ships were alongside of each other, the men leaped on board anywhere along the side, but if they were prow to prow, they used the "crow" itself for boarding, and advanced over it two abreast. The first two protected their front by holding up before them their shields, while those who came after them secured their sides by placing the rims of their shields upon the top of the railing. Such were the preparations which they made; and having completed them they watched an opportunity of engaging at sea.

The "corvi" or "crows," for boarding.

23. As for Gaius Duilius, he no sooner heard of the disaster which had befallen the commander of the navy than handing over his legions to the military Tribunes he transferred himself to the fleet. There he learnt that the enemy was plundering the territory of Mylae, and at once sailed to attack him with the whole fleet. No sooner did the Carthaginians sight him than with joy and alacrity they put to sea with a hundred and thirty sail, feeling supreme contempt for the

Victory of Duilius at Mylae, B.C. 260.

Roman ignorance of seamanship. Accordingly they all sailed with their prows directed straight at their enemy: they did not think the engagement worth even the trouble of ranging their ships in any order, but advanced as though to seize a booty exposed for their acceptance. Their commander was that same Hannibal who had withdrawn his forces from Agrigentum by a secret night movement, and he was on board a galley with seven banks of oars which had once belonged to King Pyrrhus. When they neared the enemy, and saw the "crows" raised aloft on the prows of the several ships, the Carthaginians were for a time in a state of perplexity; for they were quite strangers to such contrivances as these engines. Feeling, however, a complete contempt for their opponents, those on board the ships that were in the van of the squadron charged without flinching. But as soon as they came to close quarters their ships were invariably tightly grappled by these machines; the enemy boarded by means of the "crows," and engaged them on their decks; and in the end some of the Carthaginians were cut down, while others surrendered in bewildered terror at the battle in which they found themselves engaged, which eventually became exactly like a land fight. The result was that they lost the first thirty ships engaged, crews and all. Among them was captured the commander's ship also, though Hannibal himself by an unexpected piece of luck and an act of great daring effected his escape in the ship's boat. The rest of the Carthaginian squadron were sailing up with the view of charging; but as they were coming near they saw what had happened to the ships which were sailing in the front, and accordingly sheered off and avoided the blows of the engines. Yet trusting to their speed, they managed by a manœuvre to sail round and charge the enemy, some on their broadside and others on their stern, expecting by that method to avoid danger. But the engines swung round to meet them in every direction, and dropped down upon them so infallibly, that no ships could come to close quarters without being grappled. Eventually the Carthaginians turned and fled, bewildered at the novelty of the occurrence, and with a loss of fifty ships.

24. Having in this unlooked-for manner made good their maritime hopes the Romans were doubly encouraged in their enthusiasm for the war. For the present they put in upon the coast of Sicily, raised the siege of Segesta when it was reduced to the last extremity, and on their way back from Segesta carried the town Macella by assault. But Hamilcar, the commander of the Carthaginian land forces happened, after the naval battle, to be informed as he lay encamped near Panormus that the allies were engaged in a dispute with the Romans about the post of honour in the battles: and ascertaining that the allies were encamped by themselves between Paropus and Himeraean Thermae, he made a sudden attack in force as they were in the act of moving camp and killed almost four thousand of them. After this action Hannibal sailed across to Carthage with such ships as he had left; and thence before very long crossed to Sardinia, with a reinforcement of ships, and accompanied by some of those whose reputation as naval commanders stood high. But before very long he was blockaded in a certain harbour by the Romans, and lost a large number of ships; and was thereupon summarily arrested by the surviving Carthaginians and crucified. This came about because the first thing the Romans did upon getting a navy was to try to become masters of Sardinia.

Further operations in Sicily.

Segesta and Macella.

Hamilcar.

Hannibal in Sardinia.

During the next year the Roman legions in Sicily did nothing worthy of mention. In the next, after the arrival of the new Consuls, Aulus Atilius and Gaius Sulpicius, they started to attack Panormus because the Carthaginian forces were wintering there. The Consuls advanced close up to the city with their whole force, and drew up in order of battle. But the enemy refusing to come out to meet them, they marched away and attacked the town of Hippana. This they carried by assault: but though they also took Myttistratum it was only after it had stood a lengthened siege owing to the strength of its situation. It

B.C. 259.

B.C. 258. Coss. A. Atilius, Calatinus, C. Sulpicius, Paterculus.

Hippana and Myttistratum.

was at this time, too, that they recovered Camarina, which had revolted a short time previously. They threw up works against it, and captured it after making a breach in its walls. They treated Henna, and sundry other strong places which had been in the hands of the Carthaginians, in the same way; and when they had finished these operations they undertook to lay siege to Lipara.

Camarina.

25. Next year Gaius Atilius, the Consul, happened to be at anchor off Tyndaris, when he observed the Carthaginian fleet sailing by in a straggling manner. He passed the word to the crews of his own ships to follow the advanced squadron, and started himself before the rest with ten ships of equal sailing powers. When the Carthaginians became aware that while some of the enemy were still embarking, others were already putting out to sea, and that the advanced squadron were considerably ahead of the rest, they stood round and went to meet them. They succeeded in surrounding and destroying all of them except the Consul's ship, and that they all but captured with its crew. This last, however, by the perfection of its rowers and its consequent speed, effected a desperate escape. Meanwhile the remaining ships of the Romans were sailing up and gradually drawing close together. Having got into line, they charged the enemy, took ten ships with their crews, and sunk eight. The rest of the Carthaginian ships retired to the Liparean Islands.

Coss. C. Atilius Regulus, Cn. Cornelius, Blasio II. B.C. 257.

Fighting off Tyndaris.

The result of this battle was that both sides concluded that they were now fairly matched, and accordingly made more systematic efforts to secure a naval force, and to dispute the supremacy at sea. While these things were going on, the land forces effected nothing worth recording; but wasted all their time in such petty operations as chance threw in their way. Therefore, after making the preparations I have mentioned for the approaching summer, the Romans, with three hundred and thirty decked ships of war, touched at Messene; thence put to sea, keeping Sicily on their right; and after doubling the headland Pachynus

Winter of B.C. 257-256.

B.C. 256. Coss L. Manlius, Vulso Longus, M. Atilius Regulus II (Suff.).

passed on to Ecnomus, because the land force was also in that district. The Carthaginians on their part put to sea again with three hundred and fifty decked ships, touched at Lilybaeum, and thence dropped anchor at Heracleia Minoa.

26. Now it was the purpose of the Romans to sail across to Libya and transfer the war there, in order that the Carthaginians might find the danger affecting themselves and their own country rather than Sicily. But the Carthaginians were determined to prevent this. They knew that Libya was easily invaded, and that the invaders if they once effected a landing would meet with little resistance from the inhabitants; and they therefore made up their minds not to allow it, and were eager rather to bring the matter to a decisive issue by a battle at sea. The one side was determined to cross, the other to prevent their crossing; and their enthusiastic rivalry gave promise of a desperate struggle. The preparations of the Romans were made to suit either contingency, an engagement at sea or a disembarkation on the enemy's soil. Accordingly they picked out the best hands from the land army and divided the whole force which they meant to take on board into four divisions. Each division had alternative titles; the first was called the "First Legion" or the "First Squadron,"—and so on with the others. The fourth had a third title besides. They were called "Triarii," on the analogy of land armies. The total number of men thus making up the naval force amounted to nearly one hundred and forty thousand, reckoning each ship as carrying three hundred rowers and one hundred and twenty soldiers. The Carthaginians, on the other hand, made their preparations almost exclusively with a view to a naval engagement. Their numbers, if we reckon by the number of their ships, were over one hundred and fifty thousand men. The mere recital of these figures must, I should imagine, strike any one with astonishment at the magnitude of the struggle, and the vast resources of the contending states. An actual view of them itself could hardly be more impressive than the bare statement of the number of men and ships.

Preparations for the Battle of Ecnomus.

Roman forces. 330 ships, with average of 420 men (300 rowers + 120 marines) = 138,600 men.

Carthaginian numbers, 150,000 men.

Now the Romans had two facts to consider: First, that circumstances compelled them to face the open sea; and, secondly, that their enemies had the advantage of fast sailing vessels. They therefore took every precaution for keeping their line unbroken and difficult to attack. They had only two ships with six banks of oars, those, namely, on which the Consuls Marcus Atilius and Lucius Manlius respectively were sailing. These they stationed side by side in front and in a line with each other. Behind each of these they stationed ships one behind the other in single file—the first squadron behind the one, and the second squadron behind the other. These were so arranged that, as each ship came to its place, the two files diverged farther and farther from each other; the vessels being also stationed one behind the other with their prows inclining outwards. Having thus arranged the first and second squadrons in single file so as to form a wedge, they stationed the third division in a single line at its base; so that the whole finally presented the appearance of a triangle. Behind this base they stationed the horse-transports, attaching them by towing-ropes to the ships of the third squadron. And to the rear of them they placed the fourth squadron, called the Triarii, in a single line, so extended as to overlap the line in front of them at both extremities. When these dispositions were complete the general appearance was that of a beak or wedge, the apex of which was open, the base compact and strong; while the whole was easy to work and serviceable, and at the same time difficult to break up.

The Roman order at Ecnomus.

27. Meanwhile the Carthaginian commanders had briefly addressed their men. They pointed out to them that victory in this battle would ensure the war in the future being confined to the question of the possession of Sicily; while if they were beaten they would have hereafter to fight for their native land and for all that they held dear. With these words they passed the word to embark. The order was obeyed with universal enthusiasm, for what had been said brought home to them the issues at stake; and they put to sea in the full fervour of excited gallantry, which might well have

The disposition of the Carthaginian fleet.

struck terror into all who saw it. When their commanders saw the arrangement of the enemies' ships they adapted their own to match it. Three-fourths of their force they posted in a single line, extending their right wing towards the open sea with a view of outflanking their opponents, and placing their ships with prows facing the enemy; while the other fourth part was posted to form a left wing of the whole, the vessels being at right angles to the others and close to the shore. The two Carthaginian commanders were Hanno and Hamilcar The former was the general who had been defeated in the engagement at Agrigentum. He ch 19. now commanded the right wing, supported by beaked vessels for charging, and the fastest sailing quinqueremes for outflanking, the enemy. The latter, who had been in the engagement off Tyndaris, had charge of ch 25. the left wing. This officer, occupying the central position of the entire line, on this occasion employed a stratagem which I will now describe. The battle began by the Romans charging the centre of the Carthaginians, because they observed that it was weakened by their great extension. The ships in the Carthaginian centre, in accordance with their orders, at once turned and fled with a view of breaking up the Roman close order. They began to retire with all speed, and the Romans pursued them with exultation. The consequence was that, while the first and second Roman squadrons were pressing the flying enemy, the third and fourth "legions" had become detached and were left behind, —the former because they had to tow the horse-transports, and the "Triarii" because they kept their station with them and helped them to form a reserve. But when the Carthaginians thought that they had drawn the first and second squadron a sufficient distance from the main body a signal was hoisted on board Hamilcar's ship, and they all simultaneously swung their ships round and engaged their pursuers. The contest was a severe one. The Carthaginians had a great superiority in the rapidity with which they manœuvred their ships. They darted out from their line and rowed round the enemy: they approached them with ease, and retired with despatch. But the Romans, no less than the Carthaginians, had their reasons

The battle.

for entertaining hopes of victory: for when the vessels go locked together the contest became one of sheer strength their engines, the "crows," grappled all that once came to close quarters: and, finally, both the Consuls were present in person and were witnesses of their behaviour in battle.

28. This was the state of affairs on the centre. But meanwhile Hanno with the right wing, which had held aloof when the first encounter took place, crossing the open sea charged the ships of the Triarii and caused them great difficulty and embarrassment: while those of the Carthaginians who had been posted near the land manœuvred into line and getting their ships straight, charged the men who were towing the horse-transports. These latter let go the towing ropes, grappled with the enemy, and kept up a desperate struggle.

So that the engagement was in three separate divisions or rather there were three sea-fights going on at wide intervals from each other. Now in these three engagements the opposing parties were in each case fairly matched, thanks to the original disposition of the ships, and therefore the victory was in each case closely contested. However the result in the several cases was very much what was to be expected where forces were so equal

Three separate battles.

The first to engage were the first to separate for Hamilcar's division at last were overpowered and fled. But while Lucius was engaged in securing his prizes, Marcus observing the struggle in which the Triarii and horse-transports were involved, went with all speed to their assistance, taking with him all the ships of the second squadron which were undamaged. As soon as he had reached and engaged Hanno's division, the Triarii quickly picked up courage, though they were then getting much the worst of it, and returned with renewed spirits to the fight. It was now the turn for the Carthaginians to be in difficulties. They were charged in front and on the rear and found to their surprise that they were being surrounded by the relieving squadron. They at once gave way and retreated in the direction of the open sea.

First with Hamilcar's squadron.

Second squadron under Regulus.

While this was going on, Lucius, who was sailing back to rejoin his colleague, observed that the third squadron had got wedged in by the Carthaginians close in shore. Accordingly he and Marcus, who had by this time secured the safety of the transports and Triarii, started together to relieve their imperilled comrades, who were now sustaining something very like a blockade. And the fact is that they would long before this have been utterly destroyed had not the Carthaginians been afraid of the "crows," and confined themselves to surrounding and penning them in close to land, without attempting to charge for fear of being caught by the grappling-irons. The Consuls came up rapidly, and surrounding the Carthaginians captured fifty of their ships with their crews, while some few of them managed to slip away and escape by keeping close to the shore.

Third squadron relieved by Reguluis and Manlius.

Such was the result of the separate engagements. But the general upshot of the whole battle was in favour of the Romans. Twenty-four of their vessels were destroyed; over thirty of the Carthaginians. Not a single Roman ship was captured with its crew; sixty-four of the Carthaginians were so taken.

General result.

29. After the battle the Romans took in a fresh supply of victual, repaired and refitted the ships they had captured, bestowed upon the crews the attention which they had deserved by their victory, and then put to sea with a view of continuing their voyage to Libya. Their leading ships made the shore just under the headland called the Hermaeum, which is the extreme point on the east of the Gulf of Carthage, and runs out into the open sea in the direction of Sicily. There they waited for the rest of the ships to come up, and having got the entire fleet together coasted along until they came to the city called Aspis. Here they disembarked, beached their ships, dug a trench, and constructed a stockade round them; and on the inhabitants of the city refusing to submit without compulsion, they set to work to besiege the town. Presently those of the Carthaginians who had survived the sea-fight came to land also; and feeling sure that the enemy, in the flush of their

Siege of Aspis. (Clupea.)

victory, intended to sail straight against Carthage itself, they began by keeping a chain of advanced guards at outlying points to protect the capital with their military and naval forces. But when they ascertained that the Romans had disembarked without resistance and were engaged in besieging Aspis, they gave up the idea of watching for the descent of the fleet; but concentrated their forces, and devoted themselves to the protection of the capital and its environs.

Aspis taken.

Meanwhile the Romans had taken Aspis, had placed in it a garrison to hold it and its territory, and had besides sent home to Rome to announce the events which had taken place and to ask for instructions as to the future,—what they were to do, and what arrangements they were to make. Having done this they made active preparations for a general advance and set about plundering the country. They met with no opposition in this: they destroyed numerous dwelling houses of remarkably fine construction, possessed themselves of a great number of cattle; and captured more than twenty thousand slaves whom they took to their ships. In the midst of these proceedings the messengers arrived from Rome with orders that one Consul was to remain with an adequate force, the other was to bring the fleet to Rome. Accordingly Marcus was left behind with forty ships, fifteen thousand infantry, and five hundred cavalry; while Lucius put the crowd of captives on board, and having embarked his men, sailed along the coast of Sicily without encountering any danger, and reached Rome.

M Atilius Regulus remains in Africa, winter of B C 256-255.

30. The Carthaginians now saw that their enemies contemplated a lengthened occupation of the country. They therefore proceeded first of all to elect two of their own citizens, Hasdrubal son of Hanno, and Bostarus, to the office of general; and next sent to Heracleia a pressing summons to Hamilcar. He obeyed immediately, and arrived at Carthage with five hundred cavalry and five thousand infantry. He was forthwith appointed general in conjunction with the other two, and entered into consultation with Hasdrubal and his colleague as to the measures necessary to be taken in the present crisis.

They decided to defend the country and not to allow it to be devastated without resistance.

A few days afterwards Marcus sallied forth on one of his marauding expeditions. Such towns as were unwalled he carried by assault and plundered, and such as were walled he besieged. Among others he came to the considerable town of Adys, and having placed his troops round it was beginning with all speed to raise siege works. The Carthaginians were both eager to relieve the town and determined to dispute the possession of the open country. They therefore led out their army; but their operations were not skilfully conducted. They indeed seized and encamped upon a piece of rising ground which commanded the enemy; but it was unsuitable to themselves. Their best hopes rested on their cavalry and their elephants, and yet they abandoned the level plain and cooped themselves up in a position at once steep and difficult of access. The enemy, as might have been expected, were not slow to take advantage of this mistake. The Roman commanders were skilful enough to understand that the best and most formidable part of the forces opposed to them was rendered useless by the nature of the ground. They did not therefore wait for them to come down to the plain and offer battle, but choosing the time which suited themselves, began at daybreak a forward movement on both sides of the hill. In the battle which followed the Carthaginians could not use their cavalry or elephants at all; but their mercenary troops made a really gallant and spirited sally. They even forced the first division of the Romans to give way and fly: but they advanced too far, and were surrounded and routed by the division which was advancing from the other direction. This was immediately followed by the whole force being dislodged from their encampment. The elephants and cavalry as soon as they gained level ground made good their retreat without loss; but the infantry were pursued by the Romans. The latter however soon desisted from the pursuit. They presently returned, dismantled the enemy's entrenchment, and destroyed the stockade; and from thenceforth overran the whole country-side and sacked the towns without opposition

B.C. 256-255. The operations of Regulus in Libya.

Defeat of the Carthaginians near Adys

Among others they seized the town called Tunes. This place had many natural advantages for expeditions such as those in which they were engaged, and was so situated as to form a convenient base of operations against the capital and its immediate neighbourhood. They accordingly fixed their headquarters in it.

Tunes.

31. The Carthaginians were now indeed in evil case. It was not long since they had sustained a disaster at sea: and now they had met with one on land, not from any failure of courage on the part of their soldiers, but from the incompetency of their commanders. Simultaneously with these misfortunes, they were suffering from an inroad of the Numidians, who were doing even more damage to the country than the Romans. The terror which they inspired drove the country folk to flock for safety into the city; and the city itself had to face a serious famine as well as a panic, the former from the numbers that crowded into it, the latter from the hourly expectation of a siege. But Regulus had different views. The double defeat sustained by the Carthaginians, by land as well as by sea, convinced him that the capture of Carthage was a question of a very short time; and he was in a state of great anxiety lest his successor in the Consulship should arrive from Rome in time to rob him of the glory of the achievement. He therefore invited the Carthaginians to make terms. They were only too glad of the proposal, and sent their leading citizens to meet him. The meeting took place: but the commissioners could not bring their minds to entertain his proposals; they were so severe that it was almost more than they could bear to listen to them at all. Regulus regarded himself as practically master of the city, and considered that they ought to regard any concession on his part as a matter of favour and pure grace. The Carthaginians on the other hand concluded that nothing worse could be imposed on them if they suffered capture than was now enjoined. They therefore returned home without accepting the offers of Regulus, and extremely exasperated by his unreasonable harshness. When the Carthaginian Senate

Distress at Carthage, which is heightened by an inroad of Numidians.

Spring of B.C. 255. Regulus proposes harsh terms.

The terms rejected.

heard the conditions offered by the Roman general, though they had almost relinquished every hope of safety, they came to the gallant and noble resolution that they would brave anything, that they would try every possible means and endure every extremity, rather than submit to terms so dishonourable and so unworthy of their past history.

32. Now it happened that just about this time one of their recruiting agents, who had some time before been despatched to Greece, arrived home. He brought a large number of men with him, and among them a certain Lacedaemonian named Xanthippus, a man trained in the Spartan discipline, and of large experience in war. When this man was informed of their defeat, and of how it had taken place, and when he had reviewed the military resources still left to the Carthaginians, and the number of their cavalry and elephants, he did not take long to come to a decided conclusion. He expressed his opinion to his friends that the Carthaginians had owed their defeat, not to the superiority of the Romans, but to the unskilfulness of their own commanders. The dangerous state of their affairs caused the words of Xanthippus to get abroad quickly among the people and to reach the ears of the generals; and the men in authority determined to summon and question him. He appeared, and laid his views before the magistrates; in which he showed to what they owed their present disasters, and that if they would take his advice and keep to the flat parts of the country alike in marching, encamping, and giving battle, they would be able with perfect ease to secure safety for themselves and to defeat their opponents in the field. The generals accepted the suggestion, resolved to follow his advice, and there and then put their forces at his command. Among the multitude the observation of Xanthippus was passed from mouth to mouth, and gave rise, as was to be expected, to a good deal of popular rumour and sanguine talk. This was confirmed when he had once handled the troops. The way in which he got them into order when he had led them outside the town; the skill with which he manœuvred the separate detachments, and passed the word of command down the ranks in due conformity to the rules of tactics, at

Arrival of the Spartan Xanthippus in Carthage.

once impressed every one with the contrast to the blundering of their former generals. The multitude expressed their approbation by loud cheers, and were for engaging the enemy without delay, convinced that no harm could happen to them as long as Xanthippus was their leader. The generals took advantage of this circumstance, and of the extraordinary recovery which they saw had taken place in the spirits of the people. They addressed them some exhortations befitting the occasion, and after a few days' delay got their forces on foot and started. Their army consisted of twelve thousand infantry, four thousand cavalry, and nearly a hundred elephants.

33. The Romans at once noticed a change. They saw that the Carthaginians chose level country for their line of march, and flat places for their encampments. This novelty puzzled and rather alarmed them, yet their prevailing feeling was an eager desire to come to close quarters with the enemy. They therefore advanced to a position about ten stades from them and employed the first day in pitching a camp there. Next day, while the chief officers of the Carthaginians were discussing in a council of war what dispositions were called for, and what line of strategy they were to adopt, the common soldiers, in their eagerness for the engagement, collected in groups, shouted out the name of Xanthippus, and showed that their opinion was in favour of an immediate forward movement. Influenced by the evident enthusiasm and eagerness of the army, and by the appeals of Xanthippus that they should not let the opportunity slip, the generals gave orders to the men to get ready, and resigned to Xanthippus the entire direction of affairs, with full authority to act as he thought most advantageous. He at once acted upon this authority. He ordered out the elephants, and placed them in a single line in front of the whole army. The heavy phalanx of the Carthaginians he stationed at a moderate interval in the rear of these. He divided the mercenaries into three corps. One he stationed on the right wing; while the other two, which consisted of the most active, he placed with the cavalry on both wings. When the Romans

The new strategy of the Carthaginians.

The dispositions for the battle.

saw that the enemy were drawn up to offer them battle they readily advanced to accept it. They were however alarmed at the elephants, and made special arrangements with a view to resist their charge. They stationed the velites in the van, and behind them the legionaries, many maniples deep, while they divided the cavalry between the two wings. Their line of battle was thus less extended than usual, but deeper. And though they had thereby made a sufficient provision against the elephants, yet being far out-numbered in cavalry, their provision in that part of the field was altogether inadequate. At length both sides had made their dispositions according to their respective plans of operation, and had placed their several men in the posts assigned to them: and now they were standing drawn up in order, and were each of them watching for the right moment for beginning the attack.

34. No sooner had Xanthippus given the order to the men on the elephants to advance and disperse the lines in front of them, and to his cavalry to outflank both wings and charge the enemy, than the Roman army—clashing their shields and spears together after their usual custom, and simultaneously raising their battle-cry—charged the enemy. The Roman cavalry being far outnumbered by the Carthaginians were soon in full retreat on both wings. But the fortune of the several divisions of the infantry was various. Those stationed on the left wing—partly because they could avoid the elephants and partly because they thought contemptuously of the mercenaries—charged the right wing of the Carthaginians, succeeded in driving them from their ground, and pursued them as far as their entrenchment. Those stationed in front of the elephants were less fortunate. The maniples in front were thrown into utter confusion by the crushing weight of the animals: knocked down and trampled upon by them they perished in heaps upon the field; yet owing to its great depth the main body remained for a time unbroken. But it was not for long. The maniples on the rear found themselves outflanked by the cavalry, and were forced to face round and resist them: those on the other hand who forced their way to the front through the ele-

The battle.

The Romans are beaten and annihilated.

phants, and had now those beasts on their rear, found themselves confronted by the phalanx of Carthaginians, which had not yet been in action and was still in close unbroken order, and so were cut to pieces. This was followed by a general rout. Most of the Romans were trampled to death by the enormous weight of the elephants; the rest were shot down in their ranks by the numerous cavalry: and there were only a very few who attempted to save themselves by flight. But the flatness of the country was unfavourable to escape in this manner. Some of the fugitives were destroyed by the elephants and cavalry; while only those who fled with the general Regulus, amounting perhaps to five hundred, were after a short pursuit made prisoners with him to a man.

Regulus made prisoner.

On the Carthaginian side there fell about eight hundred of the mercenaries, those namely who had been stationed opposite the left wing of the Romans. On the part of the Romans about two thousand survived. These were those whom I have already described as having chased the Carthaginian right wing to their entrenchment, and who were thus not involved in the general engagement. The rest were entirely destroyed with the exception of those who fled with Regulus. The surviving maniples escaped with considerable difficulty to the town of Aspis. The Carthaginians stripped the dead, and taking with them the Roman general and the rest of their prisoners, returned to the capital in a high state of exultation at the turn their affairs had now taken.

35. This event conveys many useful lessons to a thoughtful observer. Above all, the disaster of Regulus gives the clearest possible warning that no one should feel too confident of the favours of Fortune, especially in the hour of success. Here we see one, who a short time before refused all pity or consideration to the fallen, brought incontinently to beg them for his own life. Again, we are taught the truth of that saying of Euripides—

Eurip. fr.

> One wise man's skill is worth a world in arms.

For it was one man, one brain, that defeated the numbers which were believed to be invincible and able to accomplish

anything; and restored to confidence a whole city that was unmistakably and utterly ruined, and the spirits of its army which had sunk to the lowest depths of despair. I record these things in the hope of benefiting my readers. There are two roads to reformation for mankind—one through misfortunes of their own, the other through those of others: the former is the most unmistakable, the latter the less painful. One should never therefore voluntarily choose the former, for it makes reformation a matter of great difficulty and danger; but we should always look out for the latter, for thereby we can without hurt to ourselves gain a clear view of the best course to pursue. It is this which forces us to consider that the knowledge gained from the study of true history is the best of all educations for practical life. For it is history, and history alone, which, without involving us in actual danger, will mature our judgment and prepare us to take right views, whatever may be the crisis or the posture of affairs.

36. To return to our narrative. Having obtained this complete success the Carthaginians indulged in every sign of exultation. Thanksgivings were poured out to God, and joyful congratulations interchanged among themselves. But Xanthippus, by whose means such a happy change had been brought about and such an impulse been given to the fortunes of Carthage, did not remain there long, but took ship for home again. In this he showed his wisdom and discernment. For it is the nature of extraordinary and conspicuous achievements to exasperate jealousies and envenom slander; against which a native may perhaps stand with the support of kinsfolk and friends, but a foreigner when exposed to one or the other of them is inevitably overpowered before long and put in danger. There is however another account sometimes given of the departure of Xanthippus, which I will endeavour at a more suitable opportunity to set forth.

Xanthippus quits Carthage.

Upon this unlooked-for catastrophe in the Libyan campaign, the Roman government at once set to work to fit out a fleet to take off the men who were still surviving there; while the Carthaginians followed up their success by sitting

The Romans prepare a fleet to relieve their beaten army.

down before Aspis, and besieging it, being anxious to get the survivors of the battle into their hands. But failing to capture the place, owing to the gallantry and determined courage of these men, they eventually raised the siege. When they heard that the Romans were preparing their fleet, and were intending to sail once more against Libya, they set about shipbuilding also, partly repairing old vessels and partly constructing new. Before very long they had manned and launched two hundred ships, and were on the watch for the coming of their enemies. By the beginning of the summer the Romans had launched three hundred and fifty vessels. They put them under the command of the Consuls Marcus Aemilius and Servius Fulvius, and despatched them. This fleet coasted along Sicily; made for Libya; and having fallen in with the Carthaginian squadron off Hermaeum, at once charged and easily turned them to flight; captured a hundred and fourteen with their crews, and having taken on board their men who had maintained themselves in Libya, started from Aspis on their return voyage to Sicily.

B.C. 255. Coss. Ser. Fulvius Paetinus Nobilior, M. Aemilius Paullus.

37. The passage was effected in safety, and the coast of Camarina was reached. but there they experienced so terrible a storm, and suffered so dreadfully, as almost to beggar description. The disaster was indeed extreme: for out of their three hundred and sixty-four vessels eighty only remained. The rest were either swamped or driven by the surf upon the rocks and headlands, where they went to pieces and filled all the seaboard with corpses and wreckage. No greater catastrophe is to be found in all history as befalling a fleet at one time. And for this Fortune was not so much to blame as the commanders themselves. They had been warned again and again by the pilots not to steer along the southern coast of Sicily facing the Libyan sea, because it was exposed and yielded no safe anchorage; and because, of the two dangerous constellations, one had not yet set and the other was on the point of rising (for their voyage fell between the rising of Orion and that of the Dog Star). Yet they

The fleet is lost in a storm.

Between June 28 and July 26.

attended to none of these warnings; but, intoxicated by their recent success, were anxious to capture certain cities as they coasted along, and in pursuance of this idea thoughtlessly exposed themselves to the full fury of the open sea. As far as these particular men were concerned, the disaster which they brought upon themselves in the pursuit of trivial advantages convinced them of the folly of their conduct. But it is a peculiarity of the Roman people as a whole to treat everything as a question of main strength; to consider that they must of course accomplish whatever they have proposed to themselves; and that nothing is impossible that they have once determined upon. The result of such self-confidence is that in many things they do succeed, while in some few they conspicuously fail, and especially at sea. On land it is against men only and their works that they have to direct their efforts: and as the forces against which they exert their strength do not differ intrinsically from their own, as a general rule they succeed; while their failures are exceptional and rare. But to contend with the sea and sky is to fight against a force immeasurably superior to their own: and when they trust to an exertion of sheer strength in such a contest the disasters which they meet with are signal. This is what they experienced on the present occasion: they have often experienced it since; and will continue to do so, as long as they maintain their headstrong and foolhardy notion that any season of the year admits of sailing as well as marching.

38. When the Carthaginians heard of the destruction which had befallen the Roman fleet, they made up their minds that as their late victory had made them a match for their enemy on land, so now the Roman catastrophe had made them a match for him at sea. Accordingly they devoted themselves with still greater eagerness than before to their naval and military preparations. And first, they lost no time in despatching Hasdrubal to Sicily, and with him not only the soldiers that they had already collected, but those also whom they had recalled from Heracleia; and along with them they sent also a hundred and forty elephants. And next, after despatching him, they began fitting out two hundred ships and making all other

The Carthaginians renew operations in Sicily.

preparations necessary for a naval expedition. Hasdrubal reached Lilybaeum safely, and immediately set to work to train his elephants and drill his men, and showed his intention of striking a blow for the possession of the open country.

The Roman government, when they heard of this from the survivors of the wreck on their arrival home, felt it to be a grievous misfortune: but being absolutely resolved not to give in, they determined once more to put two hundred and twenty vessels on the stocks and build afresh. These were finished in three months, an almost incredibly short time, and the new Consuls Aulus Atilius and Gnaeus Cornelius fitted out the fleet and put to sea. As they passed through the straits they took up from Messene those of the vessels which had been saved from the wreck; and having thus arrived with three hundred ships off Panormus, which is the strongest town of all the Carthaginian province in Sicily, they began to besiege it. They threw up works in two distinct places, and after other necessary preparations brought up their battering rams. The tower next the sea was destroyed with ease, and the soldiers forced their way in through the breach: and so what is called the New Town was carried by assault; while what is called the Old Town being placed by this event in imminent danger, its inhabitants made haste to surrender it. Having thus made themselves masters of the place, the army sailed back to Rome, leaving a garrison in the town.

B.C. 254 Coss. Gn. Cornelius Scipio Asina II., Aulus Atilius, Calatinus II.

39. But next summer the new Consuls Gnaeus Servilius and Gaius Sempronius put again to sea with their full strength, and after touching at Sicily started thence for Libya. There, as they coasted along the shore, they made a great number of descents upon the country without accomplishing anything of importance in any of them. At length they came to the island of the Lotophagi called Mēnix, which is not far from the Lesser Syrtis. There, from ignorance of the waters, they ran upon some shallows; the tide receded, their ships went aground, and they were in extreme peril. However,

B.C. 253. Coss. Gn. Servilius Caepio G. Sempronius Blaesus.

after a while the tide unexpectedly flowed back again, and by dint of throwing overboard all their heavy goods they just managed to float the ships. After this their return voyage was more like a flight than anything else. When they reached Sicily and had made the promontory of Lilybaeum they cast anchor at Panormus. Thence they weighed anchor for Rome, and rashly ventured upon the open sea-line as the shortest; but while on their voyage they once more encountered so terrible a storm that they lost more than a hundred and fifty ships.

The Romans after this misfortune, though they are eminently persistent in carrying out their undertakings, yet owing to the severity and frequency of their disasters, now yielded to the force of circumstances and refrained from constructing another fleet. All the hopes still left to them they rested upon their land forces: and, accordingly, they despatched the Consuls Lucius Caecilius and Gaius Furius with their legions to Sicily; but they only manned sixty ships to carry provisions for the legions. The fortunes of the Carthaginians had in their turn considerably improved owing to the catastrophes I have described. They now commanded the sea without let or hindrance, since the Romans had abandoned it; while in their land forces their hopes were high. Nor was it unreasonable that it should be so. The account of the battle in Libya had reached the ears of the Romans: they had heard that the elephants had broken their ranks and had killed the large part of those that fell: and they were in such terror of them, that though during two years running after that time they had on many occasions, in the territory either of Lilybaeum or Selinus, found themselves in order of battle within five or six stades of the enemy, they never plucked up courage to begin an attack, or in fact to come down upon level ground at all, all because of their fear of an elephant charge. And in these two seasons all they did was to reduce Therma and Lipara by siege, keeping close all the while to mountainous districts and such as were difficult to cross. The timidity and want of confidence thus displayed

B.C. 252.

B.C. 251 Coss. Lucius Caecilius Metellus, G. Furius Pacilus.

B.C 252-251

by their land forces induced the Roman government to change their minds and once more to attempt success at sea. Accordingly, in the second consulship of Caius Atilius and Lucius Manlius, we find them ordering fifty ships to be built, enrolling sailors and energetically collecting a naval armament.

B.C. 250.

40. Meanwhile Hasdrubal noticed the terror displayed by the Romans whenever they had lately found themselves in the presence of the enemy. He learnt also that one of the Consuls had departed and gone to Italy, and that Caecilius was lingering in Panormus with the other half of the army, with the view of protecting the corn-crops of the allies just then ripe for the harvest. He therefore got his troops in motion, marched out, and encamped on the frontier of the territory of Panormus. Caecilius saw well enough that the enemy had become supremely confident, and he was anxious to draw him on; he therefore kept his men within the walls. Hasdrubal imagined that Caecilius dared not come out to give him battle. Elated with this idea, he pushed boldly forward with his whole army and marched over the pass into the territory of Panormus. But though he was destroying all the standing crops up to the very walls of the town, Caecilius was not shaken from his resolution, but kept persistently to it, until he had induced him to cross the river which lay between him and the town. But no sooner had the Carthaginians got their elephants and men across, than Caecilius commenced sending out his light-armed troops to harass them, until he had forced them to get their whole army into fighting order. When he saw that everything was happening as he designed it, he placed some of his light troops to line the wall and moat, with instructions that if the elephants came within range they should pour volleys of their missiles upon them; but that whenever they found themselves being forced from their ground by them, they should retreat into the moat, rush out of it again, and hurl darts at the elephants which happened to be nearest. At the same time he gave orders to the armourers in the market-place to carry the missiles and heap them up outside at the foot of the wall.

B.C. 251.

Skirmishing at Panormus.

Meanwhile he took up his own position with his maniples at the gate which was opposite the enemy's left wing, and kept despatching detachment after detachment to reinforce his skirmishers. The engagement commenced by them becoming more and more general, a feeling of emulation took possession of the officers in charge of the elephants. They wished to distinguish themselves in the eyes of Hasdrubal, and they desired that the credit of the victory should be theirs: they therefore, with one accord, charged the advanced skirmishing parties of the enemy, routed them with ease, and pursued them up to the moat. But no sooner did the elephants thus come to close quarters than they were wounded by the archers on the wall, and overwhelmed with volleys of pila and javelins which poured thick and fast upon them from the men stationed on the outer edge of the moat, and who had not yet been engaged,—and thus, studded all over with darts, and wounded past all bearing, they soon got beyond control. They turned and bore down upon their own masters, trampling men to death, and throwing their own lines into utter disorder and confusion. When Caecilius saw this he led out his men with promptitude. His troops were fresh; the enemy were in disorder; and he charged them diagonally on the flank: the result was that he inflicted a severe defeat upon them, killed a large number, and forced the rest into precipitate flight. Of the elephants he captured ten along with their Indian riders: the rest which had thrown their Indians he managed to drive into a herd after the battle, and secured every one of them. This achievement gained him the credit on all hands of having substantially benefited the Roman cause, by once more restoring confidence to the army, and giving them the command of the open country.

41. The announcement of this success at Rome was received with extreme delight; not so much at the blow inflicted on the enemy by the loss of their elephants, as at the confidence inspired in their own troops by a victory over these animals. With their confidence thus restored, the Roman government recurred to their original plan of sending out the Consuls upon this service with a fleet and naval forces; for they were eager, by all means in their power, to put a period to the war. Accordingly, in

the fourteenth year of the war, the supplies necessary for the despatch of the expedition were got ready, and the Consuls set sail for Sicily with two hundred ships. They dropped anchor at Lilybaeum; and the army having met them there, they began to besiege it by sea and land. Their view was that if they could obtain possession of this town they would have no difficulty in transferring the seat of war to Libya. The Carthaginian leaders were of the same opinion, and entirely agreed with the Roman view of the value of the place. They accordingly subordinated everything else to this; devoted themselves to the relief of the place at all hazards; and resolved to retain this town at any sacrifice: for now that the Romans were masters of all the rest of Sicily, except Drepana, it was the only foothold they had left in the island.

B.C. 250. C. Caecilius Regulus II., L. Manlius Vulso II.

To understand my story a knowledge of the topography of the district is necessary. I will therefore endeavour in a few words to convey a comprehension to my readers of its geographical position and its peculiar advantages.

42. Sicily, then, lies towards Southern Italy very much in the same relative position as the Peloponnese does to the rest of Greece. The only difference is that the one is an island, the other a peninsula; and consequently in the former case there is no communication except by sea, in the latter there is a land communication also. The shape of Sicily is a triangle, of which the several angles are represented by promontories: that to the south jutting out into the Sicilian Sea is called Pachynus; that which looks to the north forms the western extremity of the Straits of Messene and is about twelve stades from Italy, its name is Pelorus; while the third projects in the direction of Libya itself, and is conveniently situated opposite the promontories which cover Carthage, at a distance of about a thousand stades: it looks somewhat south of due west, dividing the Libyan from the Sardinian Sea, and is called Lilybaeum. On this last there is a city of the same name. It was this city that the Romans were now besieging. It was exceedingly strongly fortified: for besides its walls there was a deep ditch running all round it, and on the side of the

sea it was protected by lagoons, to steer through which into the harbour was a task requiring much skill and practice.

Siege of Lilybaeum, B.C. 250

The Romans made two camps, one on each side of the town, and connected them with a ditch, stockade, and wall. Having done this, they began the assault by advancing their siege-works in the direction of the tower nearest the sea, which commands a view of the Libyan main. They did this gradually, always adding something to what they had already constructed; and thus bit by bit pushed their works forward and extended them laterally, till at last they had brought down not only this tower, but the six next to it also; and at the same time began battering all the others with battering-rams. The siege was carried on with vigour and terrific energy: every day some of the towers were shaken and others reduced to ruins; every day too the siege-works advanced farther and farther, and more and more towards the heart of the city. And though there were in the town, besides the ordinary inhabitants, as many as ten thousand hired soldiers, the consternation and despondency became overwhelming. Yet their commander Himilco omitted no measure within his power. As fast as the enemy demolished a fortification he threw up a new one; he also countermined them, and reduced the assailants to straits of no ordinary difficulty. Moreover, he made daily sallies, attempted to carry or throw fire into the siege-works, and with this end in view fought many desperate engagements by night as well as by day: so determined was the fighting in these struggles, that sometimes the number of the dead was greater than it ordinarily is in a pitched battle.

Attempted treason in Lilybaeum.

43. But about this time some of the officers of highest rank in the mercenary army discussed among themselves a project for surrendering the town to the Romans, being fully persuaded that the men under their command would obey their orders. They got out of the city at night, went to the enemy's camp, and held a parley with the Roman commander on the subject. But Alexon the Achaean, who on a former occasion had saved Agrigentum from destruction when the mercenary troops of Syracuse made a plot to betray it, was on this occasion

once more the first to detect this treason, and to report it to the general of the Carthaginians. The latter no sooner heard it than he at once summoned a meeting of those officers who were still in their quarters; and exhorted them to loyalty with prayers and promises of liberal bounties and favours, if they would only remain faithful to him, and not join in the treason of the officers who had left the town. They received his speech with enthusiasm, and were there and then commissioned by him, some to go to the Celts accompanied by Hannibal, who was the son of the Hannibal killed in Sardinia, and who had a previous acquaintance with that people gained in the expedition against them; others to fetch the rest of the mercenary troops, accompanied by Alexon, because he was liked and trusted by them. These officers then proceeded to summon a meeting of their men and address them. They pledged their own credit for the bounties promised them severally by the General, and without difficulty persuaded the men to remain staunch. The result was that when the officers, who had joined in the secret mission, returned to the walls and tried to address their men, and communicate the terms offered by the Romans, so far from finding any adherents, they could not even obtain a hearing, but were driven from the wall with volleys of stones and darts. But this treason among their mercenaries constituted a serious danger: the Carthaginians had a narrow escape from absolute ruin, and they owed their preservation from it to that same Alexon whose fidelity had on a former occasion preserved for Agrigentum her territory, constitution, and freedom.

Hannibal relieves Lilybaeum.

44. Meanwhile the Carthaginians at home knew nothing of what was going on. But they could calculate the requirements of a besieged garrison; and they accordingly filled fifty vessels with soldiers, furnished their commander Hannibal, a son of Hamilcar, and an officer and prime favourite of Adherbal's, with instructions suitable to the business in hand, and despatched him with all speed: charging him to be guilty of no delay, to omit no opportunity, and to shrink from no attempt however venturesome to relieve the besieged. He put to sea with his ten thousand men, and dropped anchor at the islands called

Aegusae, which lie in the course between Lilybaeum and Carthage, and there looked out for an opportunity of making Lilybaeum. At last a strong breeze sprang up in exactly the right quarter: he crowded all sail and bore down before the wind right upon the entrance of the harbour, with his men upon the decks fully armed and ready for battle. Partly from astonishment at this sudden appearance, partly from dread of being carried along with the enemy by the violence of the gale into the harbour of their opponents, the Romans did not venture to obstruct the entrance of the reinforcement; but stood out at sea overpowered with amazement at the audacity of the enemy.

The town population crowded to the walls, in an agony of anxiety as to what would happen, no less than in an excess of joy at the unlooked-for appearance of hope, and cheered on the crews as they sailed into the harbour, with clapping hands and cries of gladness. To sail into the harbour was an achievement of great danger; but Hannibal accomplished it gallantly, and, dropping anchor there, safely disembarked his soldiers. The exultation of all who were in the city was not caused so much by the presence of the reinforcement, though they had thereby gained a strong revival of hope, and a large addition to their strength, as by the fact that the Romans had not dared to intercept the course of the Carthaginians.

A sally from Lilybaeum.

45. Himilco, the general in command at Lilybaeum, now saw that both divisions of his troops were in high spirits and eager for service,—the original garrison owing to the presence of the reinforcement, the newly arrived because they had as yet had no experience of the hardships of the situation. He wished to take advantage of the excited feelings of both parties, before they cooled, in order to organise an attempt to set fire to the works of the besiegers. He therefore summoned the whole army to a meeting, and dwelt upon the themes suitable to the occasion at somewhat greater length than usual. He raised their zeal to an enthusiastic height by the magnitude of his promises for individual acts of courage, and by declaring the favours and rewards which awaited them as an army at the hands of the Carthaginians. His speech was received with lively marks of

satisfaction; and the men with loud shouts bade him delay no more, but lead them into the field. For the present, however, he contented himself with thanking them and expressing his delight at their excellent spirit, and bidding them go early to rest and obey their officers, dismissed them. But shortly afterwards he summoned the officers; assigned to them severally the posts best calculated for the success of the undertaking; communicated to them the watchword and the exact moment the movement was to be made; and issued orders to the commanders to be at the posts assigned with their men at the morning watch. His orders were punctually obeyed: and at daybreak he led out his forces and made attempts upon the siege-works at several points. But the Romans had not been blind to what was coming, and were neither idle nor unprepared. Wherever help was required it was promptly rendered; and at every point they made a stout resistance to the enemy. Before long there was fighting all along the line, and an obstinate struggle round the entire circuit of the wall; for the sallying party were not less than twenty thousand strong, and their opponents more numerous still. The contest was all the hotter from the fact that the men were not fighting in their regular ranks, but indiscriminately, and as their own judgment directed; the result of which was that a spirit of personal emulation arose among the combatants, because, though the numbers engaged were so great, there was a series of single combats between man and man, or company and company. However, it was at the siege-works themselves that the shouting was loudest and the throng of combatants the densest. At these troops had been massed deliberately for attack and defence. The assailants strove their utmost to dislodge the defenders, the defenders exerted all their courage to hold their ground and not yield an inch to the assailants,—and with such emulation and fury on both sides, that they ended by falling at their posts rather than yield. But there were others mingled with these, carrying torchwood and tow and fire, who made a simultaneous attack upon the battering-rams at every point: hurling these fiery missiles against them with such audacity, that the Romans were reduced to the last extremity of danger, being quite unable to overpower the

attack of the enemy. But the general of the Carthaginians, seeing that he was losing large numbers in the engagement, without being able to gain the object of the sortie, which was to take the siege-works, ordered his trumpeters to sound a recall. So the Romans, after coming within an ace of losing all their siege-gear, finally kept possession of the works, and were able to maintain them all without dispute.

It fails.

46. After this affair Hannibal eluded the enemy's watch, and sailed out of the harbour by night with his ships to Drepana, to join the Carthaginian Commander-in-Chief, Adherbal. Drepana is about one hundred and twenty stades from Lilybaeum, and was always an object of special care to the Carthaginians from the convenience of its position and the excellence of its harbour.

Now the Carthaginian government were anxious to learn the state of affairs at Lilybaeum, but could not do so because the garrison was strictly blockaded, and the Romans were exceedingly vigilant. In this difficulty a nobleman, called Hannibal the Rhodian, came to them, and offered to run the blockade, to see what was going on in Lilybaeum with his own eyes, and to report. The offer delighted them, but they did not believe in the possibility of its fulfilment with the Roman fleet lying at the very entrance of the channel. However, the man fitted out his own private vessel and put to sea. He first crossed to one of the islands lying off Lilybaeum. Next day he obtained a wind in the right quarter, and about ten o'clock in the morning actually sailed into the harbour in the full view of the enemy, who looked on with amazement at his audacity. Next day he lost no time in setting about a return voyage. The Roman Consul had determined on taking extra precautions for watching the sea near the channel: with this view he had during the night got ready his ten fastest-sailing vessels, and taking up a position on shore close to the harbour mouth, was watching with his own eyes what would happen. The whole army was watching also; while the ships on both sides of the mouth of the channel got as close to the shallows as it was possible to approach, and there rested with their oars

Hannibal the Rhodian offers to run the blockade.

out, and ready to run down and capture the ship that was about to sail out. The Rhodian, on his side, attempted no concealment. He put boldly to sea, and so confounded the enemy by his audacity, and the speed of his vessel, that he not only sailed out without receiving any damage to ship or crew, scudding along the bows of the enemy as though they were fixed in their places, but even brought his ship to, after running a short way ahead, and, with his oars out and ready, seemed to challenge the foe to a contest. When none of them ventured to put out to attack him, because of the speed of his rowing, he sailed away: having thus with his one ship successfully defied the entire fleet of the enemy. From this time he frequently performed the same feat, and proved exceedingly serviceable both to the government at Carthage and the besieged garrison. To the former by informing them from time to time of what was pressingly necessary; and to the latter by inspiring them with confidence, and dismaying the Romans by his audacity.

47. What contributed most to encourage him to a repetition of the feat was the fact that by frequent experience he had marked out the course for himself by clear land marks. As soon as he had crossed the open sea, and was coming into sight, he used to steer as though he were coming from Italy, keeping the seaward tower exactly on his bows, in such a way as to be in a line with the city towers which faced towards Libya; and this is the only possible course to hit the mouth of the channel with the wind astern.

His example is followed by others.

The successful boldness of the Rhodian inspired several of those who were acquainted with these waters to make similar attempts. The Romans felt themselves to be in a great difficulty; and what was taking place determined them to attempt blocking up the mouth of the harbour. The greater part of the attempted work was a failure: the sea was too deep, and none of the material which they threw into it would hold, or in fact keep in the least compact. The breakers and the force of the current dislodged and scattered everything that was thrown in, before it could even reach the bottom. But there was one point where the water was shallow, at which a mole was with infinite labour

made to hold together; and upon it a vessel with four banks of oars and of unusually fine build stuck fast as it was making the outward passage at night, and thus fell into the hands of the enemy. The Romans took possession of it, manned it with a picked crew, and used it for keeping a look out for all who should try to enter the harbour, and especially for the Rhodian. He had sailed in, as it happened, that very night, and was afterwards putting out to sea again in his usual open manner. He was, however, startled to see the four-banked vessel put out to sea again simultaneously with himself. He recognised what ship it was, and his first impulse was to escape her by his superior speed. But finding himself getting overhauled by the excellence of her rowers, he was finally compelled to bring to and engage at close quarters. But in a struggle of marines he was at a complete disadvantage: the enemy were superior in numbers, and their soldiers were picked men; and he was made prisoner. The possession of this ship of superior build enabled the Romans, by equipping her with whatever was wanted for the service she had to perform, to intercept all who were adventurous enough to try running the blockade of Lilybaeum.

The Rhodian is at length captured.

48. Meanwhile, the besieged were energetically carrying on counterworks, having abandoned the hope of damaging or destroying the constructions of the enemy. But in the midst of these proceedings a storm of wind, of such tremendous violence and fury, blew upon the machinery of the engines, that it wrecked the pent-houses, and carried away by its force the towers erected to cover them. Some of the Greek mercenaries perceived the advantage such a state of things offered for the destruction of the siege-works, and communicated their idea to the commander. He caught at the suggestion, and lost no time in making every preparation suitable to the undertaking. Then the young men mustered at three several points, and threw lighted brands into the enemy's works. The length of time during which these works had been standing made them exactly in the proper state to catch fire easily; and when to this was added a violent wind,

A storm having damaged the siege-works, the Lilybaeans succeed in burning them

blowing right upon the engines and towers, the natural result was that the spreading of the fire became rapid and destructive, while all attempts on the Roman side to master it, and rescue their works, had to be abandoned as difficult or wholly impracticable. Those who tried to come to the rescue were so appalled at the scene, that they could neither fully grasp nor clearly see what was going on. Flames, sparks, and volumes of smoke blew right in their faces and blinded them; and not a few dropped down and perished without ever getting near enough to attempt to combat the fire. The same circumstances, which caused these overwhelming difficulties to the besiegers, favoured those who were throwing the fire-brands in exactly the same proportion. Everything that could obscure their vision or hurt them was blown clean away and carried into the faces of the enemy; while their being able to see the intervening space enabled the shooters to take a good aim at those of the enemy who came to the rescue, and the throwers of the fire-brands to lodge them at the proper places for the destruction of the works. The violence of the wind, too, contributed to the deadly effect of the missiles by increasing the force of their blows. Eventually the destruction was so complete, that the foundations of the siege-towers and the blocks of the battering-rams were rendered unusable by the fire. In spite of this disaster, though they gave up the idea of assaulting the place any longer by means of their works, the Romans still persisted. They surrounded the town with a ditch and stockade, threw up an additional wall to secure their own encampment, and left the completion of their purpose to time. Nor were the besieged less determined. They repaired the part of their walls which had been thrown down, and prepared to endure the siege with good courage.

The Roman army is reinforced.

49. When the announcement of these events at Rome was followed by reiterated tidings that the larger part of the crews of the fleet had been destroyed, either at the works, or in the general conduct of the siege, the Roman government set zealously to work to enlist sailors; and, having collected as many as ten thousand, sent them to Sicily. They crossed the straits, and reached the camp on foot; and when they had joined, Publius Claudius,

the Consul, assembled his tribunes, and said that it was just the time to sail to the attack of Drepana with the whole squadron: for that Adherbal,[1] who was in command there, was quite unprepared for such an event, because he as yet knew nothing of the new crews having arrived; and was fully persuaded that their fleet could not sail, owing to their loss of men in the siege. His proposition met with a ready assent from the council of officers, and he immediately set about getting his men on board, the old crews as well as those who had recently joined. As for marines, he selected the best men from the whole army, who were ready enough to join an expedition which involved so short a voyage and so immediate and certain an advantage. Having completed these preparations, he set sail about midnight, without being detected by the enemy; and for the first part of the day he sailed in close order, keeping the land on his right. By daybreak the leading ships could be seen coming towards Drepana; and at the first sight of them Adherbal was overwhelmed with surprise. He quickly recovered his self-possession however: and, fully appreciating the significance of the enemy's attack, he determined to try every manœuvre, and hazard every danger, rather than allow himself and his men to be shut up in the blockade which threatened them. He lost no time in collecting his rowing-crews upon the beach, and summoning the mercenary soldiers who were in the town by proclamation. When the muster had taken place, he endeavoured to impress upon them in a few words what good hopes of victory they had, if they were bold enough to fight at sea; and what hardships they would have to endure in a blockade, if they hesitated from any fear of danger and played the coward. The men showed a ready enthusiasm for the sea-fight, and demanded with shouts that he would lead them to it without delay. He thanked them, praised their zeal, and gave the order to embark with all speed, to keep their eyes upon his ship, and follow in its wake. Having made these instructions clear as quickly as he could, he got under weigh himself

B C. 249. Coss. P. Claudius Pulcher L. Junius Pullus.

Claudius sails to attack Drepana.

[1] See ch. 46.

first, and guided his fleet close under the rocks, on the opposite side of the harbour to that by which the enemy were entering.

Unexpected resistance of Adherbal. The Roman fleet checked.

50. When the Consul Publius saw, to his surprise, that the enemy, so far from giving in or being dismayed at his approach, were determined upon fighting him at sea: while of his own ships some were already within the harbour, others just in the very entrance channel, and others still on their way towards it; he at once issued orders to all the ships to turn round and make the best of their way out again. The result of this was that, as some of the ships were in the harbour, and others at the entrance, they fouled each other when they began reversing their course; and not only did a great confusion arise among the men, but the ships got their oars broken also in the collisions which occurred. However, the captains exerted themselves to get the ships into line close under the shore, as they successively cleared the harbour, and with their prows directed towards the enemy. Publius himself was originally bringing up the rear of the entire squadron; but he now, while the movement was actually in execution, turned towards the open sea and transferred himself to a position on the left wing of the fleet. At the same moment Adherbal succeeded in outflanking the left of his opponents with five vessels furnished with charging beaks. He turned his own ship with its prow towards the enemy, and brought to. As each of the others came up, and fell into line with him, he sent orders to them by his staff officers to do the same as he had done. Thus they all fell in and formed a complete line. The signal which had been agreed upon before was given, and an advance was begun, which was made at first without disarranging the line. The Romans were still close in-shore, waiting for the coming out of their ships from the harbour; and this proximity to the land proved of infinite disadvantage to them in the engagement.

The battle.

51. And now the fleets were within a short distance of each other: the signals were raised from the ships of the respective commanders; the charge was made; and ship grappled with ship. At first the engagement was evenly balanced, because each fleet had the pick of their

land forces serving as marines on board. But as it went on the many advantages which, taking it as a whole, the Carthaginians possessed, gave them a continually increasing superiority. Owing to the better construction of their ships they had much the advantage in point of speed, while their position with the open sea behind them materially contributed to their success, by giving them freer space for their manœuvres. Were any of them hard pressed by the enemy? Their speed secured them a sure escape, and a wide expanse of water was open to their flight. There they would swing round and attack the leading ships which were pursuing them: sometimes rowing round them and charging their broadsides, at other times running alongside them as they lurched awkwardly round, from the weight of the vessels and the unskilfulness of the crews. In this way they were charging perpetually, and managed to sink a large number of the ships. Or was one of their number in danger? They were ready to come to the rescue, being out of danger themselves, and being able to effect a movement to right or left, by steering along the sterns of their own ships and through the open sea unmolested. The case of the Romans was exactly the reverse. If any of them were hard pressed, there was nowhere for them to retreat, for they were fighting close to the shore; and any ship of theirs that was hard driven by the enemy either backed into shallow water and stuck fast, or ran ashore and was stranded. Moreover, that most effective of all manœuvres in sea fights,—sailing through the enemy's line and appearing on their stern while they are engaged with others,—was rendered impossible for them, owing to the bulk of their vessels; and still more so by the unskilfulness of their crews. Nor, again, were they able to bring help from behind to those who wanted it, because they were hemmed in so close to the shore that there was not the smallest space left in which those who wished to render such help might move. When the Consul saw how ill things were going for him all along the line; when he saw some of his ships sticking fast in the shallows, and others cast ashore; he took to flight. Thirty other ships which happened to be near him followed him as he sailed from the left, and coasted along the shore. But the

The Romans beaten.

remaining vessels, which amounted to ninety-three, the Carthaginians captured with their crews, except in the case of those who ran their ships ashore and got away.

52. The result of this sea fight gave Adherbal a high reputation at Carthage; for his success was looked upon as wholly due to himself, and his own foresight and courage: while at Rome Publius fell into great disrepute, and was loudly censured as having acted without due caution or calculation, and as having during his administration, as far as a single man could, involved Rome in serious disasters. He was accordingly some time afterwards brought to trial, was heavily fined, and exposed to considerable danger. Not that the Romans gave way in consequence of these events. On the contrary, they omitted nothing that was within their power to do, and continued resolute to prosecute the campaign. It was now the time for the Consular elections: as soon as they were over and two Consuls appointed; one of them, Lucius Junius,[1] was immediately sent to convey corn to the besiegers of Lilybaeum, and other provisions and supplies necessary for the army, sixty ships being also manned to convoy them. Upon his arrival at Messene, Junius took over such ships as he found there to meet him, whether from the army or from the other parts of Sicily, and coasted along with all speed to Syracuse, with a hundred and twenty ships, and his supplies on board about eight hundred transports. Arrived there, he handed over to the Quaestors half his transports and some of his war-ships, and sent them off, being very anxious that what the army needed should reach them promptly. He remained at Syracuse himself, waiting for such of his ships as had not yet arrived from Messene, and collecting additional

The Romans not discouraged send the Consul L. Junius with a large supply of provisions in 800 transports, convoyed by 60 ships of war to Lilybaeum.

[1] This is certainly the meaning of the words of Polybius. But he has confused matters. The two new Consuls designated at the comitia of 249 were C. Aurelius Cotta II and P. Servilius Geminus II, whereas Lucius Junius Pullus was the existing Consul with the disgraced P. Claudius Pulcher. What really happened is made clear by Livy, Ep. 19. The Senate sent Junius with these supplies, recalled Claudius, and forced him to name a Dictator. Claudius retaliated by naming an obscure person, who was compelled to abdicate, and then Atilius Calatinus was nominated.

supplies of corn from the allies in the central districts of the island.

53. Meanwhile Adherbal sent the prisoners he had taken in the sea fight, and the captured vessels, to Carthage; and giving Carthalo his colleague thirty vessels, in addition to the seventy in command of which he had come, despatched him with instructions to make a sudden attack upon the enemy's ships that were at anchor off Lilybaeum, capture all he could, and set fire to the rest. In obedience to these instructions Carthalo accomplished his passage just before daybreak, fired some of the vessels, and towed off others. Great was the commotion at the quarters of the Romans. For as they hurried to the rescue of the ships, the attention of Himilco, the commander of the garrison, was aroused by their shouts; and as the day was now beginning to break, he could see what was happening, and despatched the mercenary troops who were in the town. Thus the Romans found themselves surrounded by danger on every side, and fell into a state of consternation more than usually profound and serious. The Carthaginian admiral contented himself with either towing off or breaking up some few of their vessels, and shortly afterwards coasted along under the pretence of making for Heracleia: though he was really lying in wait, with the view of intercepting those who were coming by sea to the Roman army. When his look-out men brought him word that a considerable number of vessels of all sorts were bearing down upon him, and were now getting close, he stood out to sea and started to meet them: for the success just obtained over the Romans inspired him with such contempt for them, that he was eager to come to an engagement. The vessels in question were those which had been despatched in advance under the charge of the Quaestors from Syracuse. And they too had warning of their danger. Light boats were accustomed to sail in advance of a squadron, and these announced the approach of the enemy to the Quaestors; who being convinced that they were not strong enough to stand a battle at sea, dropped anchor under a small fortified town which was subject to Rome, and which, though it had no regular harbour, yet possessed roadsteads, and head-

Carthalo tries to intercept the transports.

lands projecting from the mainland, and surrounding the roadsteads, so as to form a convenient refuge. There they disembarked; and having set up some catapults and balistae, which they got from the town, awaited the approach of the enemy. When the Carthaginians arrived, their first idea was to blockade them: for they supposed that the men would be terrified and retreat to the fortified town, leaving them to take possession of the vessels without resistance. Their expectations, however, were not fulfilled; and finding that the men on the contrary resisted with spirit, and that the situation of the spot presented many difficulties of every description, they sailed away again after towing off some few of the transports laden with provisions, and retired to a certain river, in which they anchored and kept a look out for the enemy to renew their voyage.

54. In complete ignorance of what had happened to his advanced squadron, the Consul, who had remained behind at Syracuse, after completing all he meant to do there, put to sea; and, after rounding Pachynus, was proceeding on his voyage to Lilybaeum. The appearance of the enemy was once more signalled to the Carthaginian admiral by his look-out men, and he at once put out to sea, with the view of engaging them as far as possible away from their comrades. Junius saw the Carthaginian fleet from a considerable distance, and observing their great numbers did not dare to engage them, and yet found it impossible to avoid them by flight because they were now too close. He therefore steered towards land, and anchored under a rocky and altogether dangerous part of the shore; for he judged it better to run all risks rather than allow his squadron, with all its men, to fall into the hands of the enemy. The Carthaginian admiral saw what he had done, and determined that it was unadvisable for him to engage the enemy, or bring his ships near such a dangerous place. He therefore made for a certain headland between the two squadrons of the enemy, and there kept a look out upon both with equal vigilance. Presently, however, the weather became rough, and there was an appearance of an unusually dangerous disturbance setting in from the sea. The Carthaginian pilots, from their knowledge of the particular local-

ities, and of seamanship generally, foresaw what was coming; and persuaded Carthalo to avoid the storm and round the promontory of Pachynus.[1] He had the good sense to take their advice: and accordingly these men, with great exertions and extreme difficulty, did get round the promontory and anchored in safety; while the Romans, being exposed to the storm in places entirely destitute of harbours, suffered such complete destruction, that not one of the wrecks even was left in a state available for use. Both of their squadrons in fact were completely disabled to a degree past belief.

The Roman fleet is wrecked.

55. This occurrence caused the Carthaginian interests to look up again and their hopes to revive. But the Romans, though they had met with partial misfortunes before, had never suffered a naval disaster so complete and final. They, in fact, abandoned the sea, and confined themselves to holding the country; while the Carthaginians remained masters of the sea, without wholly despairing of the land.

The Romans abandon the sea.

Great and general was the dismay both at Rome and in the camp at Lilybaeum. Yet they did not abandon their determination of starving out that town. The Roman government did not allow their disasters to prevent their sending provisions into the camp overland; and the besiegers kept up the investment as strictly as they possibly could. Lucius Junius joined the camp after the shipwreck, and, being in a state of great distress at what had happened, was all eagerness to strike some new and effective blow, and thus repair the disaster which had befallen him. Accordingly he took the first slight opening that offered to surprise and seize Eryx; and became master both of the temple of Aphrodite and of the city. This is a mountain close to the sea-coast on that side of Sicily which looks towards Italy, between Drepana and Panormus, but nearer to Drepana of the two. It is by far the greatest mountain in Sicily next to Aetna; and on its summit, which is flat, stands the

Lucius Junius perseveres in the siege. B.C. 248.

Eryx.

[1] The dangerous nature of the S. Coast of Sicily was well known to the pilots. See above, ch. 37.

temple of Erycinian Aphrodite, confessedly the most splendid of all the temples in Sicily for its wealth and general magnificence. The town stands immediately below the summit, and is approached by a very long and steep ascent. Lucius seized both town and temple; and established a garrison both upon the summit and at the foot of the road to it from Drepana. He kept a strict guard at both points, but more especially at the foot of the ascent, believing that by so doing he should secure possession of the whole mountain as well as the town.

56. Next year, the eighteenth of the war, the Carthaginians appointed Hamilcar Barcas general, and put the management of the fleet in his hands. He took over the command, and started to ravage the Italian coast. After devastating the districts of Locri, and the rest of Bruttium, he sailed away with his whole fleet to the coast of Panormus and seized on a place called Hercte, which lies between Eryx and Panormus on the coast, and is reputed the best situation in the district for a safe and permanent camp. For it is a mountain rising sheer on every side, standing out above the surrounding country to a considerable height. The table-land on its summit has a circumference of not less than a hundred stades, within which the soil is rich in pasture and suitable for agriculture; the sea-breezes render it healthy; and it is entirely free from all dangerous animals. On the side which looks towards the sea, as well as that which faces the central part of the island, it is enclosed by inaccessible precipices; while the spaces between them require only slight fortifications, and of no great extent, to make them secure. There is in it also an eminence, which serves at once as an acropolis and as a convenient tower of observation, commanding the surrounding district. It also commands a harbour conveniently situated for the passage from Drepana and Lilybaeum to Italy, in which there is always abundant depth of water; finally, it can only be reached by three ways—two from the land side, one from the sea, all of them difficult. Here Hamilcar entrenched himself. It was a bold measure: but he had no city which he could count upon as friendly, and no other hope on which he could rely; and

B.C. 247.

Occupation of Hercte by Hamilcar.

though by so doing he placed himself in the very midst of the enemy, he nevertheless managed to involve the Romans in many struggles and dangers. To begin with, he would start from this place and ravage the sea-board of Italy as far as Cumae; and again on shore, when the Romans had pitched a camp to overawe him, in front of the city of Panormus, within about five stades of him, he harassed them in every sort of way, and forced them to engage in numerous skirmishes, for the space of nearly three years. Of these combats it is impossible to give a detailed account in writing. B.C. 247-244.

57. It is like the case of two boxers, eminent alike for their courage and their physical condition, engaged in a formal contest for the prize. As the match goes on, blow after blow is interchanged without intermission; but to anticipate, or keep account of every feint or every blow delivered is impossible for combatants and spectators alike. Still one may conceive a sufficiently distinct idea of the affair by taking into account the general activity of the men, the ambition actuating each side, and the amount of their experience, strength, and courage. The same may be said of these two generals. No writer could set down, and no reader would endure the wearisome and profitless task of reading, a detailed statement of the transactions of every day; why they were undertaken, and how they were carried out. For every day had its ambuscade on one side or the other, its attack, or assault. A general assertion in regard to the men, combined with the actual result of their mutual determination to conquer, will give a far better idea of the facts. It may be said then, generally, that nothing was left untried,—whether it be stratagems which could be learnt from history, or plans suggested by the necessities of the hour and the immediate circumstances of the case, or undertakings depending upon an adventurous spirit and a reckless daring. The matter, however, for several reasons, could not be brought to a decisive issue. In the first place, the forces on either side were evenly matched: and in the second place, while the camps were in the case of both equally impregnable, the space which separated the two was very small. The result of this was that skirmishes between

detached parties on both sides were always going on during the day, and yet nothing decisive occurred. For though the men actually engaged in such skirmishes from time to time were cut to pieces, it did not affect the main body. They had only to wheel round to find themselves out of the reach of danger behind their own defences. Once there, they could face about and again engage the enemy.

Siege of Eryx, B.C. 244.

58. Presently however Fortune, acting like a good umpire in the games, transferred them by a bold stroke from the locality just described, and the contest in which they were engaged, to a struggle of greater danger and a locality of narrower dimensions. The Romans, as we have said, were in occupation of the summit of Eryx, and had a guard stationed at its foot. But Hamilcar managed to seize the town which lay between these two spots. There ensued a siege of the Romans who were on the summit, supported by them with extraordinary hardihood and adventurous daring: while the Carthaginians, finding themselves between two hostile armies, and their supplies brought to them with difficulty, because they were in communication with the sea at only one point and by one road, yet held out with a determination that passes belief. Every contrivance which skill or force could sustain did they put in use against each other, as before; every imaginable privation was submitted to; surprises and pitched battles were alike tried: and finally they left the combat a drawn one, not, as Fabius says, from utter weakness and misery, but like men still unbroken and unconquered. The fact is that before either party had got completely the better of the other, though they had maintained the conflict for another two years, the war happened to be decided in quite a different manner.

B.C. 243-242.

The obstinate persistence of the Romans and Carthaginians.

Such was the state of affairs at Eryx and with the forces employed there. The two nations engaged were like well-bred game-cocks that fight to their last gasp. You may see them often, when too weak to use their wings, yet full of pluck to the end, and striking again and again. Finally, chance brings them the opportunity of once more grappling, and they hold on until one or other of them drops down dead.

59. So it was with the Romans and Carthaginians. They were worn out by the labours of the war; the perpetual succession of hard fought struggles was at last driving them to despair; their strength had become paralysed, and their resources reduced almost to extinction by war-taxes and expenses extending over so many years. And yet the Romans did not give in. For the last five years indeed they had entirely abandoned the sea, partly because of the disasters they had sustained there, and partly because they felt confident of deciding the war by means of their land forces; but they now determined for the third time to make trial of their fortune in naval warfare. They saw that their operations were not succeeding according to their calculations, mainly owing to the obstinate gallantry of the Carthaginian general. They therefore adopted this resolution from a conviction that by this means alone, if their design were but well directed, would they be able to bring the war to a successful conclusion. In their first attempt they had been compelled to abandon the sea by disasters arising from sheer bad luck; in their second by the loss of the naval battle off Drepana. This third attempt was successful: they shut off the Carthaginian forces at Eryx from getting their supplies by sea, and eventually put a period to the whole war. Nevertheless it was essentially an effort of despair. The treasury was empty, and would not supply the funds necessary for the undertaking, which were, however, obtained by the patriotism and generosity of the leading citizens. They undertook singly, or by two or three combining, according to their means, to supply a quinquereme fully fitted out, on the understanding that they were to be repaid if the expedition was successful. By these means a fleet of two hundred quinqueremes were quickly prepared, built on the model of the ship of the Rhodian. Gaius Lutatius was then appointed to the command, and despatched at the beginning of the summer. His appearance on the coasts of Sicily was a surprise: the whole of the Carthaginian fleet had gone home; and he took possession both of the harbour near Drepana, and the roadsteads near Lilybaeum. He then threw up works

The Romans once more fit out a fleet.

B C. 242. Coss. C. Lutatius Catulus, A. Postumius Albinus.

round the city on Drepana, and made other preparations for besieging it. And while he pushed on these operations with all his might, he did not at the same time lose sight of the approach of the Carthaginian fleet. He kept in mind the original idea of this expedition, that it was by a victory at sea alone that the result of the whole war could be decided. He did not, therefore, allow the time to be wasted or unemployed. He practised and drilled his crews every day in the manœuvres which they would be called upon to perform; and by his attention to discipline generally brought his sailors in a very short time to the condition of trained athletes for the contest before them.

60. That the Romans should have a fleet afloat once more, and be again bidding for the mastery at sea, was a contingency wholly unexpected by the Carthaginians. They at once set about fitting out their ships, loaded them with corn and other provisions, and despatched their fleet: determined that their troops round Eryx should not run short of necessary provisions. Hanno, who was appointed to command the fleet, put to sea and arrived at the island called Holy Isle. He was eager as soon as possible, if he could escape the observation of the enemy, to get across to Eryx; disembark his stores; and having thus lightened his ships, take on board as marines those of the mercenary troops who were suitable to the service, and Barcas with them; and not to engage the enemy until he had thus reinforced himself. But Lutatius was informed of the arrival of Hanno's squadron, and correctly interpreted their design. He at once took on board the best soldiers of his army, and crossed to the Island of Aegusa, which lies directly opposite Lilybaeum. There he addressed his forces some words suitable to the occasion, and gave full instructions to the pilots, with the understanding that a battle was to be fought on the morrow. At daybreak the next morning Lutatius found that a strong breeze had sprung up on the stern of the enemy, and that an advance towards them in the teeth of it would be difficult for his ships. The sea too was rough and boisterous: and for a while he could not make up his mind what he had

The Carthaginians send Hanno with a fleet.

10th March B.C. 241.

A strong breeze is blowing.

better do in the circumstances. Finally, however, he was decided by the following considerations. If he boarded the enemy's fleet during the continuance of the storm, he would only have to contend with Hanno, and the levies of sailors which he had on board, before they could be reinforced by the troops, and with ships which were still heavily laden with stores: but if he waited for calm weather, and allowed the enemy to get across and unite with their land forces, he would then have to contend with ships lightened of their burden, and therefore in a more navigable condition, and against the picked men of the land forces; and what was more formidable than anything else, against the determined bravery of Hamilcar. He made up his mind, therefore, not to let the present opportunity slip; and when he saw the enemy's ships crowding sail, he put to sea with all speed. The rowers, from their excellent physical condition, found no difficulty in overcoming the heavy sea, and Lutatius soon got his fleet into single line with prows directed to the foe.

Lutatius however decides to fight.

61. When the Carthaginians saw that the Romans were intercepting their passage across, they lowered their masts, and after some words of mutual exhortation had been uttered in the several ships, closed with their opponents. But the respective state of equipment of the two sides was exactly the converse of what it had been in the battle off Drepana; and the result of the battle was, therefore, naturally reversed also. The Romans had reformed their mode of shipbuilding, and had eased their vessels of all freight, except the provisions necessary for the battle: while their rowers having been thoroughly trained and got well together, performed their office in an altogether superior manner, and were backed up by marines who, being picked men from the legions, were all but invincible. The case with the Carthaginians was exactly the reverse. Their ships were heavily laden and therefore unmanageable in the engagement; while their rowers were entirely untrained, and merely put on board for the emergency, and such marines as they had were raw recruits, who had never had any previous experience of any difficult or dangerous

The battle of Aegusa.

service. The fact is that the Carthaginian government never expected that the Romans would again attempt to dispute the supremacy at sea: they had, therefore, in contempt for them, neglected their navy. The result was that, as soon as they closed, their manifold disadvantages quickly decided the battle against them. They had fifty ships sunk, and seventy taken with their crews. The rest set their sails, and running before the wind, which luckily for them suddenly veered round at the nick of time to help them, got away again to Holy Isle. The Roman Consul sailed back to Lilybaeum to join the army, and there occupied himself in making arrangements for the ships and men which he had captured; which was a business of considerable magnitude, for the prisoners made in the battle amounted to little short of ten thousand.

Victory of the Romans.

62. As far as strength of feeling and desire for victory were concerned, this unexpected reverse did not diminish the readiness of the Carthaginians to carry on the war; but when they came to reckon up their resources they were at a complete standstill. On the one hand, they could not any longer send supplies to their forces in Sicily, because the enemy commanded the sea: on the other, to abandon and, as it were, to betray these, left them without men and without leaders to carry on the war. They therefore sent a despatch to Barcas with all speed, leaving the decision of the whole matter in his hands. Nor was their confidence misplaced. He acted the part of a gallant general and a sensible man. As long as there was any reasonable hope of success in the business he had in hand, nothing was too adventurous or too dangerous for him to attempt; and if any general ever did so, he put every chance of victory to the fullest proof. But when all his endeavours miscarried, and no reasonable expectation was left of saving his troops, he yielded to the inevitable, and sent ambassadors to treat of peace and terms of accommodation. And in this he showed great good sense and practical ability; for it is quite as much the duty of a leader to be able to see when it is time to give in, as when it is the time to win a victory. Lutatius was ready enough to listen to the proposal, because he was fully aware that the

Barcas makes terms.

resources of Rome were at the lowest ebb from the strain of the war; and eventually it was his fortune to put an end to the contest by a treaty of which I here give the terms "*Friendship is established between the Carthaginians and Romans on the following terms, provided always that they are ratified by the Roman people. The Carthaginians shall evacuate the whole of Sicily: they shall not make war upon Hiero, nor bear arms against the Syracusans or their allies. The Carthaginians shall give up to the Romans all prisoners without ransom. The Carthaginians shall pay to the Romans in twenty years* 2200 *Euboic talents of silver.*" [1]

The treaty, B.C. 242.

63. When this treaty was sent to Rome the people refused to accept it, but sent ten commissioners to examine into the business. Upon their arrival they made no change in the general terms of the treaty, but they introduced some slight alterations in the direction of increased severity towards Carthage. Thus they reduced the time allowed for the payment of the indemnity by one half; they added a thousand talents to the sum demanded; and extended the evacuation of Sicily to all islands lying between Sicily and Italy.

Such were the conditions on which the war was ended, after lasting twenty-four years continuously. It was at once the longest, most continuous, and most severely contested war known to us in history. Apart from the other battles fought and the preparations made, which I have described in my previous chapters, there were two sea-fights, in one of which the combined numbers of the two fleets exceeded five hundred quinqueremes, in the other nearly approached seven hundred. In the course of the war, counting what were destroyed by shipwreck, the Romans lost seven hundred quinqueremes, the Carthaginians five hundred. Those therefore who have spoken with wonder of the sea-battles of an Antigonus, a Ptolemy, or a Demetrius, and the greatness of their fleets, would we may well believe have been overwhelmed with astonishment at the hugeness of these proportions if they had had to tell the story of this war.[2] If, further,

Greatness of the war.

[1] About £500,000. For the value of the talent, taking the Euboic and Attic talent as the same, see note on Book 34, 8.

[2] *ἱστορήσαντας.* There seems no need to give this word the unusual sense of *narratum legere* here, as some do.

we take into consideration the superior size of the quinqueremes, compared with the triremes employed by the Persians against the Greeks, and again by the Athenians and Lacedaemonians in their wars with each other, we shall find that never in the whole history of the world have such enormous forces contended for mastery at sea.

These considerations will establish my original observation, and show the falseness of the opinion entertained by certain Greeks. It was *not* by mere chance or without knowing what they were doing that the Romans struck their bold stroke for universal supremacy and dominion, and justified their boldness by its success. No: it was the natural result of discipline gained in the stern school of difficulty and danger.

64. And no doubt the question does naturally arise here as to why they find it impossible in our days to man so many ships, or take the sea with such large fleets, though masters of the world, and possessing a superiority over others many times as great as before. The explanation of this difficulty will be clearly understood when we come to the description of their civil constitution. I look upon this description as a most important part of my work, and one demanding close attention on the part of my readers. For the subject is calculated to afford pleasure in the contemplation, and is up to this time so to speak absolutely unknown, thanks to historians, some of whom have been ignorant, while others have given so confused an account of it as to be practically useless. For the present it suffices to say that, as far as the late war was concerned, the two nations were closely matched in the character of the designs they entertained, as well as in the lofty courage they showed in prosecuting them: and this is especially true of the eager ambition displayed on either side to secure the supremacy. But in the individual gallantry of their men the Romans had decidedly the advantage; while we must credit the Carthaginians with the best general of the day both for genius and daring. I mean Hamilcar Barcas, own father of Rome's future enemy Hannibal.

65. The confirmation of this peace was followed by events which involved both nations in a struggle of an identical or

similar nature. At Rome the late war was succeeded by a social war against the Faliscans, which, however, they brought to a speedy and successful termination by the capture of Falerii after only a few days' siege. The Carthaginians were not so fortunate. Just about the same time they found themselves confronted by three enemies at once, their own mercenaries, the Numidians, and such Libyans as joined the former in their revolt. And this war proved to be neither insignificant nor contemptible. It exposed them to frequent and terrible alarms; and, finally, it became a question to them not merely of a loss of territory, but of their own bare existence, and of the safety of the very walls and buildings of their city. There are many reasons that make it worth while to dwell upon the history of this war: yet I must give only a summary account of it, in accordance with the original plan of this work. The nature and peculiar ferocity of the struggle, which has been generally called the "truceless war," may be best learnt from its incidents. It conveys two important lessons: it most conspicuously shows those who employ mercenaries what dangers they should foresee and provide against; and secondly, it teaches how wide the distinction is between the character of troops composed of a confused mass of uncivilised tribes, and of those which have had the benefit of education, the habits of social life, and the restraints of law. But what is of most importance to us is, that we may trace from the actual events of this period the causes which led to the war between Rome and Carthage in the time of Hannibal. These causes have not only been a subject of dispute among historians, but still continue to be so among those who were actually engaged; it is therefore a matter of importance to enable students to form an opinion on this matter as nearly as possible in accordance with the truth.

War between Rome and Falerii.

The mercenary war, B.C. 241.

66. The course of events at Carthage subsequent to the peace was as follows: As soon as possible after it was finally ratified Barcas withdrew the troops at Eryx to Lilybaeum, and then immediately laid down his command. Gesco, who was commandant of the town, proceeded to transport the soldiers into

Evacuation of Sicily

Libya. But foreseeing what was likely to happen, he very prudently embarked them in detachments, and did not send them all in one voyage. His object was to gain time for the Carthaginian government; so that one detachment should come to shore, receive the pay due to them, and depart from Carthage to their own country, before the next detachment was brought across and joined them. In accordance with this idea Gesco began the transportation of the troops. But the Government—partly because the recent expenses had reduced their finances to a low ebb, partly because they felt certain that, if they collected the whole force and entertained them in Carthage, they would be able to persuade the mercenaries to accept something less than the whole pay due to them—did not dismiss the detachments as they landed, but kept them massed in the city. But when this resulted in the commission of many acts of lawlessness by night and day, they began to feel uneasy at their numbers and their growing licentiousness; and required the officers, until such time as arrangements for discharging their pay should have been made, and the rest of the army should have arrived, to withdraw with all their men to a certain town called Sicca, receiving each a piece of gold for their immediate necessities. As far as quitting the city was concerned they were ready enough to obey; but they desired to leave their heavy baggage there as before, on the ground that they would soon have to return to the city for their wages. But the Carthaginian government were in terror lest, considering the length of their absence and their natural desire for the society of wives or children, they would either not quit the city at all; or, if they did, would be sure to be enticed by these feelings to return, and that thus there would be no decrease of outrages in the city. Accordingly they forced them to take their baggage with them: but it was sorely against the will of the men, and roused strong feelings of animosity among them. These mercenaries being forced to retire to Sicca, lived there as they chose without any restraint upon their lawlessness. For they had obtained two things the most demoralising for hired forces, and which in a word are in themselves the all-sufficient source and origin of mutinies,—relaxation of discipline

The mercenaries sent to Sicca.

and want of employment.[1] For lack of something better to do, some of them began calculating, always to their own advantage, the amount of pay owing to them; and thus making out the total to be many times more than was really due, they gave out that this was the amount which they ought to demand from the Carthaginians. Moreover they all began to call to mind the promises made to them by the generals in their harangues, delivered on various occasions of special danger, and to entertain high hopes and great expectations of the amount of compensation which awaited them. The natural result followed.

67. When the whole army had mustered at Sicca, and Hanno, now appointed general in Libya, far from satisfying these hopes and the promises they had received, talked on the contrary of the burden of the taxes and the embarrassment of the public finances; and actually endeavoured to obtain from them an abatement even from the amount of pay acknowledged to be due to them; excited and mutinous feelings at once began to manifest themselves. There were constant conferences hastily got together, sometimes in separate nationalities, sometimes of the whole army; and there being no unity of race or language among them, the whole camp became a babel of confusion, a scene of inarticulate tumult, and a veritable revel of misrule. For the Carthaginians being always accustomed to employ mercenary troops of miscellaneous nationalities, in securing that an army should consist of several different races, act wisely as far as the prevention of any rapid combinations for mutiny, or difficulty on the part of the commanders in overawing insubordination, are concerned: but the policy utterly breaks down when an outburst of anger, or popular delusion, or internal dissension, has actually occurred; for it makes it impossible for the commander to soothe excited feelings, to remove misapprehensions, or to show the ignorant their error. Armies in such a state are not usually content with mere human wickedness; they end by assuming the ferocity of wild beasts and the vindictiveness of insanity.

The beginning of the outbreak. B.C. 241.

This is just what happened in this case. There were in the army Iberians and Celts, men from Liguria and the Balearic

[1] Sicca Venerea, so called from a temple of Venus, was notorious for its licentiousness Valer Max 2, 6, 15.

Islands, and a considerable number of half-bred Greeks, mostly deserters and slaves; while the main body consisted of Libyans. Consequently it was impossible to collect and address them *en masse*, or to approach them with this view by any means whatever. There was no help for it: the general could not possibly know their several languages; and to make a speech four or five times on the same subject, by the mouths of several interpreters, was almost more impossible, if I may say so, than that. The only alternative was for him to address his entreaties and exhortations to the soldiers through their officers. And this Hanno continually endeavoured to do. But there was the same difficulty with them. Sometimes they failed to understand what he said: at others they received his words with expressions of approval to his face, and yet from error or malice reported them in a contrary sense to the common soldiers. The result was a general scene of uncertainty, mistrust, and misunderstanding. And to crown all, they took it into their heads that the Carthaginian government had a design in thus sending Hanno to them: that they purposely did not send the generals who were acquainted with the services they had rendered in Sicily, and who had been the authors of the promises made to them; but had sent the one man who had not been present at any of these transactions. Whether that were so or not, they finally broke off all negotiations with Hanno; conceived a violent mistrust of their several commanders; and in a furious outburst of anger with the Carthaginians started towards the city, and pitched their camp about a hundred and twenty stades from Carthage, at the town of Tunes, to the number of over twenty thousand.

68. The Carthaginians saw their folly when it was too late. It was a grave mistake to have collected so large a number of mercenaries into one place without any warlike force of their own citizens to fall back upon: but it was a still graver mistake to have delivered up to them their children and wives, with their heavy baggage to boot; which they might have retained as hostages, and thus have had greater security for concerting their own measures, and more power of ensuring obedience to their orders. However, being thoroughly alarmed at the action

The mercenaries at Tunes.

of the men in regard to their encampment, they went every length in their eagerness to pacify their anger. They sent them supplies of provisions in rich abundance, to be purchased exactly on their own terms, and at their own price. Members of the Senate were despatched, one after the other, to treat with them; and they were promised that whatever they demanded should be conceded if it were within the bounds of possibility. Day by day the ideas of the mercenaries rose higher. For their contempt became supreme when they saw the dismay and excitement in Carthage; their confidence in themselves was profound; and their engagements with the Roman legions in Sicily had convinced them, that not only was it impossible for the Carthaginians to face them in the field, but that it would be difficult to find any nation in the world who could. Therefore, when the Carthaginians conceded the point of their pay, they made a further claim for the value of the horses they had lost. When this too was conceded, they said that they ought to receive the value of the rations of corn due to them from a long time previous, reckoned at the highest price reached during the war. And in short, the ill-disposed and mutinous among them being numerous, they always found out some new demand which made it impossible to come to terms. Upon the Carthaginian government, however, pledging themselves to the full extent of their powers, they eventually agreed to refer the matter to the arbitration of some one of the generals who had been actually engaged in Sicily. Now they were displeased with Hamilcar Barcas, who was one of those under whom they had fought in Sicily, because they thought that their present unfavourable position was attributable chiefly to him. They thought this from the fact that he never came to them as an ambassador, and had, as was believed, voluntarily resigned his command. But towards Gesco their feelings were altogether friendly. He had, as they thought, taken every possible precaution for their interests, and especially in the arrangements for their conveyance to Libya. Accordingly they referred the dispute to the arbitration of the latter.

Attempts to pacify them.

The demands of the mercenaries.

The dispute referred to the arbitration of Gesco.

69. Gesco came to Tunes by sea, bringing the money with him. There he held a meeting first of the officers, and then of the men, according to their nationalities; rebuked them for their past behaviour, and endeavoured to convince them as to their duty in the present: but most of all he dwelt upon their obligation in the future to show themselves well-disposed towards the people whose pay they had been so long enjoying. Finally, he proceeded to discharge the arrears of pay, taking each nationality separately. But there was a certain Campanian in the army, a runaway Roman slave named Spendius, a man of extraordinary physical strength and reckless courage in the field. Alarmed lest his master should recover possession of him, and he should be put to death with torture, in accordance with the laws of Rome, this man exerted himself to the utmost in word and deed to break off the arrangement with the Carthaginians. He was seconded by a Libyan called Mathōs, who was not a slave but free, and had actually served in the campaign. But he had been one of the most active agitators in the late disturbances: and being in terror of punishment for the past, he now gave in his adhesion to the party of Spendius; and taking the Libyans aside, suggested to them that, when the men of other races had received their pay, and taken their departure to their several countries, the Carthaginians would wreak upon them the full weight of the resentment which they had, in common with themselves, incurred; and would look upon their punishment as a means of striking terror into all the inhabitants of Libya. It did not take long to rouse the men by such arguments, nor were they at a loss for a pretext, however insignificant. In discharging the pay, Gesco postponed the payment of the valuations of rations and horses. This was enough: the men at once hurried to make a meeting; Spendius and Mathōs delivered violent invectives against Gesco and the Carthaginians; their words were received with every sign of approval; no one else could get a hearing; whoever did attempt to speak was promptly stoned to death, without the assembly so much as waiting to ascertain whether he intended to support the party of Spendius or no.

Spendius.

Mathōs.

Spendius and Mathōs cause an outbreak.

A considerable number of privates as well as officers were killed in this manner in the various *émeutes* which took place, and from the constant repetition of this act of violence the whole army learnt the meaning of the word "throw," although there was not another word which was intelligible to them all in common. The most usual occasion for this to happen was when they collected in crowds flushed with wine after their midday meal. On such occasions, if only some one started the cry "throw," such volleys were poured in from every side, and with such rapidity, that it was impossible for any one to escape who once ventured to stand forward to address them. The result was that soon no one had the courage to offer them any counsel at all; and they accordingly appointed Mathōs and Spendius as their commanders.

βάλλε.

70. This complete disorganisation and disorder did not escape the observation of Gesco. But his chief anxiety was to secure the safety of his country; and seeing clearly that, if these men were driven to exasperation, the Carthaginians would be in danger of total destruction, he exerted himself with desperate courage and persistence: sometimes summoning their officers, sometimes calling a meeting of the men according to their nationalities and remonstrating with them. But on one occasion the Libyans, not having received their wages as soon as they considered that they ought to have been paid to them, approached Gesco himself with some insolence. With the idea of rebuking their precipitancy he refused to produce the pay, and bade them "go and ask their general Mathōs for it." This so enraged them, that without a moment's delay they first made a raid upon the money that was kept in readiness, and then arrested Gesco and the Carthaginians with him. Mathōs and Spendius thought that the speediest way to secure an outbreak of war was for the men to commit some outrage upon the sanctity of law and in violation of their engagements. They therefore co-operated with the mass of the men in their reckless outrages; plundered the baggage of the Carthaginians along with their money; manacled Gesco and his staff with every mark of insolent violence, and committed

Gesco and his staff seized and thrown into chains.

them into custody. Thenceforth they were at open war with Carthage, having bound themselves together by oaths which were at once impious and contrary to the principles universally received among mankind.

This was the origin and beginning of the mercenary, or, as it is also called, the Libyan war. Mathōs lost no time after this outrage in sending emissaries to the various cities in Libya, urging them to assert their freedom, and begging them to come to their aid and join them in their undertaking. The appeal was successful: nearly all the cities in Libya readily listened to the proposal that they should revolt against Carthage, and were soon zealously engaged in sending them supplies and reinforcements. They therefore divided themselves into two parties; one of which laid siege to Utica, the other to Hippo Zarytus, because these two cities refused to participate in the revolt.

B.C. 240.

71. Three things must be noticed in regard to the Carthaginians. First, among them the means of life of private persons are supplied by the produce of the land; secondly, all public expenses for war material and stores are discharged from the tribute paid by the people of Libya; and thirdly, it is their regular custom to carry on war by means of mercenary troops. At this moment they not only found themselves unexpectedly deprived of all these resources at once, but saw each one of them actually employed against themselves. Such an unlooked-for event naturally reduced them to a state of great discouragement and despair. After the long agony of the Sicilian war they were in hopes, when the peace was ratified, that they might obtain some breathing space and some period of settled content. The very reverse was now befalling them. They were confronted by an outbreak of war still more difficult and formidable. In the former they were disputing with Rome for the possession of Sicily: but this was a domestic war, and the issue at stake was the bare existence of themselves and their country. Besides, the many battles in which they had been engaged at sea had naturally left them ill supplied with arms, sailors, and vessels. They had no store of provisions ready, and no expectation whatever of external assistance from

Despair at Carthage.

friends or allies. They were indeed now thoroughly taught the difference between a foreign war, carried on beyond the seas, and a domestic insurrection and disturbance.

72. And for these overpowering miseries they had themselves to thank more than any one else. During the late war they had availed themselves of what they regarded as a reasonable pretext for exercising their supremacy over the inhabitants of Libya with excessive harshness. They had exacted half of all agricultural produce; had doubled the tribute of the towns; and, in levying these contributions, had refused to show any grace or indulgence whatever to those who were in embarrassed circumstances. Their admiration and rewards were reserved, not for those generals who treated the people with mildness and humanity, but exclusively for those who like Hanno secured them the most abundant supplies and war material, though at the cost of the harshest treatment of the provincials.

Revolt of the country people.

These people therefore needed no urging to revolt: a single messenger sufficed. The women, who up to this time had passively looked on while their husbands and fathers were being led off to prison for the non-payment of the taxes, now bound themselves by an oath in their several towns that they would conceal nothing that they possessed; and, stripping off their ornaments, unreservedly contributed them to furnish pay for the soldiers. They thus put such large means into the hands of Mathōs and Spendius, that they not only discharged the arrears due to the mercenaries, which they had promised them as an inducement to mutiny, but remained well supplied for future needs. A striking illustration of the fact that true policy does not regard only the immediate necessities of the hour, but must ever look still more keenly to the future.

Hanno's management of the war.

73. No such considerations, however, prevented the Carthaginians in their hour of distress from appointing Hanno general; because he had the credit of having on a former occasion reduced the city called Hecatompylos, in Libya, to obedience. They also set about collecting mercenaries; arming their own citizens who were of military age; training and drilling the city cavalry;

and refitting what were left of their ships, triremes, penteconters, and the largest of the pinnaces. Meanwhile Mathōs, being joined by as many as seventy thousand Libyans, distributed these fresh troops between the two forces which were besieging Utica and Hippo Zarytus, and carried on those sieges without let or hindrance. At the same time they kept firm possession of the encampment at Tunes, and had thus shut out the Carthaginians from the whole of outer Libya. For Carthage itself stands on a projecting peninsula in a gulf, nearly surrounded by the sea and in part also by a lake. The isthmus that connects it with Libya is three miles broad: upon one side of this isthmus, in the direction of the open sea and at no great distance, stands the city of Utica, and on the other stands Tunes, upon the shore of the lake. The mercenaries occupied both these points, and having thus cut off the Carthaginians from the open country, proceeded to take measures against Utica itself. They made frequent excursions up to the town wall, sometimes by day and sometimes by night, and were continually throwing the citizens into a state of alarm and absolute panic.

74. Hanno, however, was busying himself with some success in providing defences. In this department of a general's duty he showed considerable ability; but he was quite a different man at the head of a sally in force: he was not sagacious in his use of opportunities, and managed the whole business with neither skill nor promptitude. It was thus that his first expedition miscarried when he went to relieve Utica. The number of his elephants, of which he had as many as a hundred, struck terror into the enemy; yet he made so poor a use of this advantage that, instead of turning it into a complete victory, he very nearly brought the besieged, as well as himself, to utter destruction. He brought from Carthage catapults and darts, and in fact all the apparatus for a siege; and having encamped outside Utica undertook an assault upon the enemy's entrenchment. The elephants forced their way into the camp, and the enemy, unable to withstand their weight and the fury of their attack, entirely evacuated the position They lost a large number from wounds inflicted by the elephants'

Fails to relieve Utica.

tusks; while the survivors made their way to a certain hill, which was a kind of natural fortification thickly covered with trees, and there halted, relying upon the strength of the position. But Hanno, accustomed to fight with Numidians and Libyans, who, once turned, never stay their flight till they are two days removed from the scene of the action, imagined that he had already put an end to the war and had gained a complete victory. He therefore troubled himself no more about his men, or about the camp generally, but went inside the town and occupied himself with his own personal comfort. But the mercenaries, who had fled in a body on to the hill, had been trained in the daring tactics of Barcas, and accustomed from their experience in the Sicilian warfare to retreat and return again to the attack many times in the same day. They now saw that the general had left his army and gone into the town, and that the soldiers, owing to their victory, were behaving carelessly, and in fact slipping out of the camp in various directions: they accordingly got themselves into order and made an assault upon the camp; killed a large number of the men; forced the rest to fly ignominiously to the protection of the city walls and gates; and possessed themselves of all the baggage and apparatus belonging to the besieged, which Hanno had brought outside the town in addition to his own, and thus put into the hands of the enemy.

But this was not the only instance of his incompetence. A few days afterwards, near a place called Gorza, he came right upon the enemy, who lay encamped there, and had two opportunities of securing a victory by pitched battles; and two more by surprising them, as they changed quarters close to where he was. But in both cases he let the opportunities slip for want of care and proper calculation.

Hanno's continued ill success.

75. The Carthaginians, therefore, when they saw his mismanagement of the campaign, once more placed Hamilcar Barcas at the head of affairs; and despatched him to the war as commander-in-chief, with seventy elephants, the newly-collected mercenaries, and the deserters from the enemy; and along with them the cavalry and infantry enrolled from the citizens themselves,

Hamilcar Barcas takes the command.

amounting in all to ten thousand men. His appearance from the first produced an immediate impression. The expedition was unexpected; and he was thus able, by the dismay which it produced, to lower the courage of the enemy. He succeeded in raising the siege of Utica, and showed himself worthy of his former achievements, and of the confidence felt in him by the people. What he accomplished on this service was this.

A chain of hills runs along the isthmus connecting Carthage with the mainland, which are difficult of access, and are crossed by artificial passes into the mainland; of these hills Mathōs had occupied all the available points and posted guards there. Besides these there is a river called Macaras (Bagradas), which at certain points interrupts the passage of travellers from the city to the mainland, and though for the most part impassable, owing to the strength of its stream, is only crossed by one bridge. This means of egress also Mathōs was guarding securely, and had built a town on it. The result was that, to say nothing of the Carthaginians entering the mainland with an army, it was rendered exceedingly difficult even for private individuals, who might wish to make their way through, to elude the vigilance of the enemy. This did not escape the observation and care of Hamilcar; and while revolving every means and every chance of putting an end to this difficulty about a passage, he at length hit upon the following. He observed that where the river discharges itself into the sea its mouth got silted up in certain positions of the wind, and that then the passage over the river at its mouth became like that over a marsh. He accordingly got everything ready in the camp for the expedition, without telling any one what he was going to do; and then watched for this state of things to occur. When the right moment arrived, he started under cover of night; and by daybreak had, without being observed by any one, got his army across this place, to the surprise of the citizens of Utica as well as of the enemy. Marching across the plain, he led his men straight against the enemy who were guarding the bridge.

He gets his men across the Macaras

76. When he understood what had taken place Spendius advanced into the plain to meet Hamilcar. The force from the city at the bridge amounted to ten thousand men; that from before

Utica to more than fifteen thousand men; both of which now advanced to support each other. When they had effected a junction they imagined that they had the Carthaginians in a trap, and therefore with mutual words of exhortation passed the order to engage, and at once commenced. Hamilcar was marching with his elephants in front, his cavalry and light troops next, while his heavy armed hoplites brought up the rear. But when he saw the precipitation of the enemy's attack, he passed the word to his men to turn to the rear. His instructions were that the troops in front should, after thus turning to the rear, retire with all speed: while he again wheeled to the right about what had been originally his rear divisions, and got them into line successively so as to face the enemy. The Libyans and mercenaries mistook the object of this movement, and imagined that the Carthaginians were panic-stricken and in full retreat. Thereupon they broke from their ranks and, rushing forward, began a vigorous hand to hand struggle. When, however, they found that the cavalry had wheeled round again, and were drawn up close to the hoplites, and that the rest of the army also was being brought up, surprise filled the Libyans with panic; they immediately turned and began a retreat as precipitate and disorderly as their advance. In the blind flight which followed some of them ran foul of their own rearguard, who were still advancing, and caused their own destruction or that of their comrades; but the greater part were trampled to death by the cavalry and elephants who immediately charged. As many as six thousand of the Libyans and foreign troops were killed, and about two thousand taken prisoners. The rest made good their escape, either to the town on the bridge or to the camp near Utica. After this victory Hamilcar followed close upon the heels of the enemy, carried the town on the bridge by assault, the enemy there abandoning it and flying to Tunes, and then proceeded to scour the rest of the district: some of the towns submitting, while the greater number he had to reduce by force. And thus he revived in the breasts of the Carthaginians some little spirit and courage, or at least rescued them from the state of absolute despair into which they had fallen.

And defeats Spendius

77. Meanwhile Mathōs himself was continuing the siege

of Hippo Zarytus, and he now counselled Autaritus, the leader of the Gauls, and Spendius to stick close to the skirts of the enemy, avoiding the plains, because the enemy were strong in cavalry and elephants, but marching parallel with them on the slopes of the mountains, and attacking them whenever they saw them in any difficulty. While suggesting these tactics, he at the same time sent messengers to the Numidians and Libyans, entreating them to come to their aid, and not to let slip the opportunity of securing their own freedom. Accordingly, Spendius took with him a force of six thousand men, selected from each of the several nationalities at Tunes, and started, keeping along a line of hills parallel to the Carthaginians. Besides these six thousand he had two thousand Gauls under Autaritus, who were all that were left of the original number, the rest having deserted to the Romans during the period of the occupation of Eryx. Now it happened that, just when Hamilcar had taken up a position in a certain plain which was surrounded on all sides by mountains, the reinforcements of Numidians and Libyans joined Spendius. The Carthaginians, therefore, suddenly found a Libyan encampment right on their front, another of Numidians on their rear, and that of Spendius on their flank; and it seemed impossible to escape from the danger which thus menaced them on every side.

Mathôs harasses Hamilcar's march.

78. But there was at that time a certain Narávas, a Numidian of high rank and warlike spirit, who entertained an ancestral feeling of affection for the Carthaginians, rendered especially warm at that time by admiration for Hamilcar. He now thought that he had an excellent opportunity for an interview and association with that general; and accordingly came to the Carthaginian quarters with a body of a hundred Numidians, and boldly approaching the outworks, remained there waving his hand. Wondering what his object could be Hamilcar sent a horseman to see; to whom Narávas said that he wished for an interview with the general. The Carthaginian leader still showing hesitation and incredulity, Narávas committed his horse and javelins to the care of his guards, and boldly came into the camp un-

Hamilcar is joined by the Numidian Narávas.

armed. His fearlessness made a profound impression not unmixed with surprise. No further objection, however, was made to his presence, and the desired interview was accorded; in which he declared his good-will to the Carthaginians generally, and his especial desire to be friends with Barcas. "This was the motive of his presence," he said; "he was come with the full intention of taking his place by his side and of faithfully sharing all his actions and undertakings." Hamilcar, on hearing these words, was so immensely charmed by the young man's courage in coming, and his honest simplicity in the interview, that he not only consented to accept his co-operation, but promised also with an oath that he would give him his daughter in marriage if he kept faith with Carthage to the end. The agreement having been thus made, Narávas came with his division of Numidians, numbering two thousand. Thus reinforced Hamilcar offered the enemy battle; which Spendius, having joined forces with the Libyans, accepted; and descending into the plain engaged the Carthaginians. In the severe battle which followed Hamilcar's army was victorious: a result which he owèd partly to the excellent behaviour of the elephants, but particularly to the brilliant services rendered by Narávas. Autaritus and Spendius managed to escape; but of the rest as many as ten thousand were killed and four thousand taken prisoners. When the victory was complete, Hamilcar gave permission to those of the prisoners who chose to enlist in his army, and furnished them with arms from the spoils of the enemy's slain: those who did not choose to accept this offer he summoned to a meeting and harangued them. He told them that the crimes committed by them up to that moment were pardoned, and they were permitted to go their several ways, wheresoever they chose, but on condition that none of them bore arms against Carthage again: if any one of them were ever caught so doing, he warned them distinctly that he would meet with no mercy.

Again defeats Spendius.

79. This conspiracy of Mathōs and Spendius caused an outbreak about this same time in another quarter. For the mercenaries who were in garrison in Sardinia, inspired by their example, attacked the Carthaginians in the island; beleaguered Bostarus,

Mutiny in Sardinia.

the commander of the foreign contingent, in the citadel; and finally put him and his compatriots to the sword. The Carthaginians thereupon sent another army into the island under Hanno. But the men deserted to the mutineers; who then seized Hanno and crucified him, and exercising all their ingenuity in the invention of tortures racked to death every Carthaginian in the island. Having got the towns into their power, they thenceforth kept forcible possession of the island; until they quarrelled with the natives and were driven by them into Italy. This was the way in which Carthage lost Sardinia, an island of first-rate importance from its size, the number of its inhabitants, and its natural products. But as many have described it at great length, I do not think that I need repeat statements about which there is no manner of dispute.

B.C. 239. Plan of Spendius for doing away with the good impression made by the leniency of Barcas.

To return to Libya. The indulgence shown by Hamilcar to the captives alarmed Mathōs and Spendius and Autaritus the Gaul. They were afraid that conciliatory treatment of this sort would induce the Libyans, and the main body of the mercenaries, to embrace with eagerness the impunity thus displayed before their eyes. They consulted together, therefore, how they might by some new act of infamy inflame to the highest pitch of fury the feelings of their men against the Carthaginians. They finally determined upon the following plan. They summoned a meeting of the soldiers; and when it was assembled, they introduced a bearer of a despatch which they represented to have been sent by their fellow conspirators in Sardinia. The despatch warned them to keep a careful watch over Gesco and all his fellow prisoners (whom, as has been stated, they had treacherously seized in Tunes), as certain persons in the camp were secretly negotiating with the Carthaginians for their release. Taking his as his text, Spendius commenced by urging the men not to put any trust in the indulgence shown by the Carthaginian general to the prisoners of war, "For," said he, "it is with no intention of saving their lives that he adopted this course in regard to the prisoners; his aim was, by releasing them, to get us into his power, that punishment might not be confined to some of us, but might fall on all at once." He went on to

urge them to be on their guard, lest by letting Gesco's party go they should teach their enemies to despise them; and should also do great practical damage to their own interests, by suffering a man to escape who was an excellent general, and likely to be a most formidable enemy to themselves. Before he had finished this speech another courier arrived, pretending to have been sent by the garrison at Tunes, and bearing a despatch containing warnings similar to that from Sardinia.

80. It was now the turn of Autaritus the Gaul. "Your only hope," he said, "of safety is to reject all hopes which rest on the Carthaginians. So long as any man clings to the idea of indulgence at their hands, he cannot possibly be a genuine ally of yours. Never trust, never listen, never attend to anyone, unless he recommend unrelenting hostility and implacable hatred towards the Carthaginians: all who speak on the other side regard as traitors and enemies." After this preface, he gave it as his advice that they should put to death with torture both Gesco and those who had been seized with him, as well as the Carthaginian prisoners of war who had been captured since. Now this Autaritus was the most effective speaker of any, because he could make himself understood to a large number of those present at a meeting. For, owing to his length of service, he knew how to speak Phoenician; and Phoenician was the language in which the largest number of men, thanks to the length of the late war, could listen to with satisfaction. Accordingly his speech was received with acclamation, and he stood down amidst loud applause. But when many came forward from the several nationalities at the same time; and, moved by Gesco's former kindnesses to themselves, would have deprecated at least the infliction of torture, not a word of what they said was understood: partly because many were speaking at the same time, and partly because each spoke in his own language. But when at length it was disclosed that what they meant was to dissuade the infliction of torture, upon one of those present shouting out "Throw!" they promptly stoned to death all who had come forward to speak; and their relations buried their bodies, which were crushed into shapeless masses as though by the feet of elephants. Still they at

Murder of Gesco.

least were buried. But the followers of Spendius now seized Gesco and his fellow prisoners, numbering about seven hundred, led them outside the stockade, and having made them march a short distance from the camp, first cut off their hands, beginning with Gesco, the man whom a short while before they had selected out of all Carthage as their benefactor and had chosen as arbitrator in their controversy. When they had cut off their hands, they proceeded to lop off the extremities of the unhappy men, and having thus mutilated them and broken their legs, they threw them still alive into a trench.

81. When news of this dreadful affair reached the Carthaginians, they were powerless indeed to do anything, but they were filled with horror; and in a transport of agony despatched messengers to Hamilcar and the second general Hanno, entreating them to rally to their aid and avenge the unhappy victims; and at the same time they sent heralds to the authors of this crime to negotiate for the recovery of the dead bodies. But the latter sternly refused; and warned the messengers to send neither herald nor ambassador to them again; for the same punishment which had just befallen Gesco awaited all who came. And for the future they passed a resolution, which they encouraged each other to observe, to put every Carthaginian whom they caught to death with torture; and that whenever they captured one of their auxiliaries they would cut off his hands and send him back to Carthage. And this resolution they exactly and persistently carried out. Such horrors justify the remark that it is not only the bodies of men, and the ulcers and imposthumes which are bred in them, that grow to a fatal and completely incurable state of inflammation, but their souls also most of all. For as in the case of ulcers, sometimes medical treatment on the one hand only serves to irritate them and make them spread more rapidly, while if, on the other hand, the medical treatment is stopped, having nothing to check their natural destructiveness, they gradually destroy the substance on which they feed; just so at times it happens that similar plague spots and gangrenes fasten upon men's souls; and when this is so, no wild beast can be more wicked or more cruel than a man. To men in such a

frame of mind if you show indulgence or kindness, they regard it as a cover for trickery and sinister designs, and only become more suspicious and more inflamed against the authors of it; while if you retaliate, their passions are aroused to a kind of dreadful rivalry, and then there is no crime too monstrous or too cruel for them to commit. The upshot with these men was, that their feelings became so brutalised that they lost the instincts of humanity: which we must ascribe in the first place, and to the greatest extent, to uncivilised habits and a wretchedly bad early training; but many other things contributed to this result, and among them we must reckon as most important the acts of violence and rapacity committed by their leaders, sins which at that time were prevalent among the whole mercenary body, but especially so with their leaders.

82. Alarmed by the recklessness displayed by the enemy, Hamilcar summoned Hanno to join him, being convinced that a consolidation of the two armies would give him the best chance of putting an end to the whole war. Such of the enemy as he took in the field he put to execution on the spot, while those who were made prisoners and brought to him he threw to the elephants to be trampled to death; for he now made up his mind that the only possibility of finishing the war was to entirely destroy the enemy. But just as the Carthaginians were beginning to entertain brighter hopes in regard to the war, a reverse as complete as it was unexpected brought their fortunes to the lowest ebb. For these two generals, when they had joined forces, quarrelled so bitterly with each other, that they not only omitted to take advantage of chances against the enemy, but by their mutual animosity gave the enemy many opportunities against themselves. Finding this to be the case, the Carthaginian government sent out instructions that one of the generals was to retire, the other to remain, and that the army itself was to decide which of them it should be. This was one cause of the reverse in the fortunes of Carthage at this time. Another, which was almost contemporaneous, was this. Their chief hope of furnishing the army with provisions and other necessaries rested upon the supplies that were being brought from a place to which they give the

Quarrels of Hanno and Hamilcar.

name of Emporiae: but as these supplies were on their way, they were overtaken by a storm at sea and entirely destroyed. This was all the more fatal because Sardinia was lost to them at the time, as we have seen, and that island had always been of the greatest service to them in difficulties of this sort. But the worst blow of all was the revolt of the cities of Hippo Zarytus and Utica, the only cities in all Libya that had been faithful to them, not only in the present war, but also at the time of the invasion of Agathocles, as well as that of the Romans. To both these latter they had offered a gallant resistance; and, in short, had never at any time adopted any policy hostile to Carthage. But now they were not satisfied with simply revolting to the Libyans, without any reason to allege for their conduct. With all the bitterness of turncoats, they suddenly paraded an ostentatious friendship and fidelity to them, and gave practical expression to implacable rage and hatred towards the Carthaginians. They killed every man of the force which had come from Carthage to their aid, as well as its commander, and threw the bodies from the wall. They surrendered their town to the Libyans, while they even refused the request of the Carthaginians to be allowed to bury the corpses of their unfortunate soldiers. Mathōs and Spendius were so elated by these events that they were emboldened to attempt Carthage itself. But Barcas had now got Hannibal as his coadjutor, who had been sent by the citizens to the army in the place of Hanno, — recalled in accordance with the sentence of the army, which the government had left to their discretion in reference to the disputes that arose between the two generals. Accompanied, therefore, by this Hannibal and by Narávas, Hamilcar scoured the country to intercept the supplies of Mathōs and Spendius, receiving his most efficient support in this, as in other things, from the Numidian Narávas.

Revolt of Hippo Zarytus and Utica.

83. Such being the position of their forces in the field, the Carthaginians, finding themselves hemmed in on every side, were compelled to have recourse to the help of the free states in alliance with them.[1] Now Hiero, of Syracuse, had during this

[1] A line of the text appears to have been lost, probably containing an allusion to Hiero.

war been all along exceedingly anxious to do everything which the Carthaginians asked him; and at this point of it was more forward to do so than ever, from a conviction that it was for his interest, with a view alike to his own sovereignty and to his friendship with Rome, that Carthage should not perish, and so leave the superior power to work its own will without resistance. And his reasoning was entirely sound and prudent. It is never right to permit such a state of things; nor to help any one to build up so preponderating a power as to make resistance to it impossible, however just the cause. Not that the Romans themselves had failed to observe the obligations of the treaty, or were showing any failure of friendly dispositions; though at first a question had arisen between the two powers, from the following circumstance. At the beginning of the war, certain persons sailing from Italy with provisions for the mutineers, the Carthaginians captured them and forced them to land in their own harbour; and presently had as many as five hundred such persons in their prisons. This caused considerable annoyance at Rome: but, after sending ambassadors to Carthage and recovering possession of the men by diplomatic means, the Romans were so much gratified that, by way of returning the favour, they restored the prisoners made in the Sicilian war whom they still retained; and from that time forth responded cheerfully and generously to all requests made to them. They allowed their merchants to export to Carthage whatever from time to time was wanted, and prohibited those who were exporting to the mutineers. When, subsequently, the mercenaries in Sardinia, having revolted from Carthage, invited their interference on the island, they did not respond to the invitation; nor when the people of Utica offered them their submission did they accept it, but kept strictly to the engagements contained in the treaty.

Hiero of Syracuse.

Friendly disposition of Rome.

84. The assistance thus obtained from these allies encouraged the Carthaginians to maintain their resistance: while Mathōs and Spendius found themselves quite as much in the position of besieged as in that of besiegers; for Hamilcar's force reduced them to such distress for provisions that they

were at last compelled to raise the siege. However, after a short interval, they managed to muster the most effective of the mercenaries and Libyans, to the number in all of fifty thousand, among whom, besides others, was Zarzas the Libyan, with his division, and commenced once more to watch and follow on the flank of Hamilcar's march.

B.C. 238. Hamilcar, with assistance from Sicily, surrounds Mathōs and Spendius.

Their method was to keep away from the level country, for fear of the elephants and the cavalry of Narávas; but to seize in advance of him all points of vantage, whether it were rising ground or narrow pass. In these operations they showed themselves quite a match for their opponents in the fury of their assault and the gallantry of their attempts; but their ignorance of military tactics frequently placed them at a disadvantage. It was, in fact, a real and practical illustration of the difference between scientific and unscientific warfare: between the art of a general and the mechanical movements of a soldier. Like a good draught-player, by isolating and surrounding them, he destroyed large numbers in detail without coming to a general engagement at all; and in movements of more importance he cut off many without resistance by enticing them into ambushes; while he threw others into utter dismay by suddenly appearing where they least expected him, sometimes by day and sometimes by night: and all whom he took alive he threw to the elephants. Finally, he managed unexpectedly to beleaguer them on ground highly unfavourable to them and convenient for his own force; and reduced them to such a pitch of distress that, neither venturing to risk an engagement nor being able to run away, because they were entirely surrounded by a trench and stockade, they were at last compelled by starvation to feed on each other: a fitting retribution at the hands of Providence for their violation of all laws human and divine in their conduct to their enemies. To sally forth to an engagement they did not dare, for certain defeat stared them in the face, and they knew what vengeance awaited them if they were taken; and as to making terms, it never occurred to them to mention it, they were conscious that they had gone too far for that. They still hoped for the arrival of relief from Tunes, of which their

officers assured them, and accordingly shrank from no suffering however terrible.

85. But when they had used up for food the captives in this horrible manner, and then the bodies of their slaves, and still no one came to their relief from Tunes, their sufferings became too dreadful to bear; and the common soldiers broke out into open threats of violence against their officers. Thereupon Autaritus, Zarzas, and Spendius decided to put themselves into the hands of the enemy and to hold a parley with Hamilcar, and try to make terms. They accordingly sent a herald and obtained permission for the despatch of an embassy. It consisted of ten ambassadors, who, on their arrival at the Carthaginian camp, concluded an agreement with Hamilcar on these terms: "The Carthaginians may select any ten men they choose from the enemy, and allow the rest to depart with one tunic apiece." No sooner had these terms been agreed to, than Hamilcar said at once that he selected, according to the terms of the agreement, the ten ambassadors themselves. The Carthaginians thus got possession of Autaritus, Spendius, and the other most conspicuous officers. The Libyans saw that their officers were arrested, and not knowing the terms of the treaty, believed that some perfidy was being practised against them, and accordingly flew to seize their arms. Hamilcar thereupon surrounded them with his elephants and his entire force, and destroyed them to a man. This slaughter, by which more than forty thousand perished, took place near a place called the Saw, so named from its shape resembling that tool.

Spendius and Autaritus fall into the hands of Hamilcar.

86. This achievement of Hamilcar revived the hopes of the Carthaginians who had been in absolute despair: while he, in conjunction with Narávas and Hannibal, employed himself in traversing the country and visiting the cities. His victory secured the submission of the Libyans; and when they had come in, and the greater number of the towns had been reduced to obedience, he and his colleagues advanced to attack Tunes, and commenced besieging Mathōs. Hannibal pitched his camp on the side of the town nearest to Carthage, and

Siege of Mathōs in Tunes.

Hamilcar on the opposite side. When this was done they brought the captives taken from the army of Spendius and crucified them in the sight of the enemy. But observing that Hannibal was conducting his command with negligence and over-confidence, Mathōs assaulted the ramparts, killed many of the Carthaginians, and drove the entire army from the camp. All the baggage fell into the hands of the enemy, and Hannibal himself was made a prisoner. They at once took him up to the cross on which Spendius was hanging, and after the infliction of exquisite tortures, took down the latter's body and fastened Hannibal, still living, to his cross; and then slaughtered thirty Carthaginians of the highest rank round the corpse of Spendius. It seemed as though Fortune designed a competition in cruelty, giving either side alternately the opportunity of outdoing the other in mutual vengeance. Owing to the distance of the two camps from each other it was late before Barcas discovered the attack made from the town; nor, when he had discovered it, could he even then go to the rescue with the necessary speed, because the intervening country was rugged and difficult. He therefore broke up his camp, and leaving Tunes marched down the bank of the river Macaras, and pitched his camp close to its mouth and to the sea.

Defeat and death of Hannibal.

87. This unexpected reverse reduced the Carthaginians once more to a melancholy state of despair. But though their recent elation of spirit was followed so closely by this depression, they did not fail to do what they could for their own preservation. They selected thirty members of the Senate; with them they associated Hanno, who had some time ago been recalled; and, arming all that were left of military age in the city, despatched them to Barcas, with the feeling that they were now making their supreme effort. They strictly charged the members of the Senate to use every effort to reconcile the two generals Hamilcar and Hanno, and to make them forget their old quarrel and act harmoniously, in view of the imminence of the danger. Accordingly, after the employment of many various arguments, they induced the generals to meet; and Hanno and Barcas were compelled to

By a final effort the Carthaginians raise a reinforcement for Hamilcar.

give in and yield to their representations. The result was that they ever afterwards co-operated with each other so cordially, that Mathōs found himself continually worsted in the numerous skirmishes which took place round the town called Leptis, as well as certain other towns; and at last became eager to bring the matter to the decision of a general engagement, a desire in which the Carthaginians also shared in an equal degree. Both sides therefore having determined upon this course: they summoned all their allies to join them in confronting the peril, and collected the garrisons stationed in the various towns, conscious that they were about to stake their all on the hazard. All being ready on either side for the conflict, they gave each other battle by mutual consent, both sides being drawn up in full military array. When victory declared itself on the side of the Carthaginians, the larger number of the Libyans perished on the field; and the rest, having escaped to a certain town, surrendered shortly afterwards; while Mathōs himself was taken prisoner by his enemies.

Mathōs beaten and captured.

88. Most places in Libya submitted to Carthage after this battle. But the towns of Hippo and Utica still held out, feeling that they had no reasonable grounds for obtaining terms, because their original acts of hostility left them no place for mercy or pardon. So true is it that even in such outbreaks, however criminal in themselves, it is of inestimable advantage to be moderate, and to refrain from wanton acts which commit their perpetrator beyond all power of forgiveness. Nor did their attitude of defiance help these cities. Hanno invested one and Barcas the other, and quickly reduced them to accept whatever terms the Carthaginians might determine.

Reduction of Hippo and Utica, B.C. 238.

The war with the Libyans had indeed reduced Carthage to dreadful danger; but its termination enabled her not only to re-establish her authority over Libya, but also to inflict condign punishment upon the authors of the revolt. For the last act in the drama was performed by the young men conducting a triumphal procession through the town, and finally inflicting every kind of torture upon Mathōs. For three years and about four months did the

B.C. 241-238.

mercenaries maintain a war against the Carthaginians which far surpassed any that I ever heard of for cruelty and inhumanity.

The Romans interfere in Sardinia.

And about the same time the Romans took in hand a naval expedition to Sardinia upon the request of the mercenaries who had deserted from that island and come to Italy; and when the Carthaginians expressed indignation at this, on the ground that the lordship over Sardinia more properly belonged to them, and were preparing to take measures against those who caused the revolt of the island, the Romans voted to declare war against them, on the pretence that they were making warlike preparations, not against Sardinia, but against themselves. The Carthaginians, however, having just had an almost miraculous escape from annihilation in the recent war, were in every respect disabled from renewing their quarrel with the Romans. They therefore yielded to the necessities of the hour, and not only abandoned Sardinia, but paid the Romans twelve hundred talents into the bargain, that they might not be obliged to undertake the war for the present.

BOOK II

1. In the previous book I have described how the Romans, having subdued all Italy, began to aim at foreign dominion; how they crossed to Sicily, and the reasons of the war which they entered into against the Carthaginians for the possession of that island. Next I stated at what period they began the formation of a navy; and what befell both the one side and the other up to the end of the war; the consequence of which was that the Carthaginians entirely evacuated Sicily, and the Romans took possession of the whole island, except such parts as were still under the rule of Hiero. Following these events I endeavoured to describe how the mutiny of the mercenaries against Carthage, in what is called the Libyan War, burst out; the lengths to which the shocking outrages in it went; its surprises and extraordinary incidents, until its conclusion, and the final triumph of Carthage. I must now relate the events which immediately succeeded these, touching summarily upon each in accordance with my original plan.

Recapitulation of the subjects treated in Book I.

As soon as they had brought the Libyan war to a conclusion the Carthaginian government collected an army and despatched it under the command of Hamilcar to Iberia. This general took over the command of the troops, and with his son Hannibal, then nine years old, crossing by the Pillars of Hercules, set about recovering the Carthaginian possessions in Iberia. He spent nine years in Iberia, and after reducing many Iberian tribes by war or diplomacy to obedience to Carthage he died in a manner worthy of his great achievements; for he lost his life in a battle against the most warlike and powerful tribes, in which he showed a con-

B.C. 238. Hamilcar and his son Hannibal sent to Spain.

B.C. 238-229

spicuous and even reckless personal gallantry. The Carthaginians appointed his son-in-law Hasdrubal to succeed him, who was at the time in command of the fleet.

Illyricum.

2. It was at this same period that the Romans for the first time crossed to Illyricum and that part of Europe with an army. The history of this expedition must not be treated as immaterial; but must be carefully studied by those who wish to understand clearly the story I have undertaken to tell, and to trace the progress and consolidation of the Roman Empire.

B C 233-232

Agron, king of the Illyrians, was the son of Pleuratus, and possessed the most powerful force, both by land and sea, of any of the kings who had reigned in Illyria before him. By a bribe received from Demetrius he was induced to promise help to the Medionians,

Siege of Medion in Acarnania.

who were at that time being besieged by the Aetolians, who, being unable to persuade the Medionians to join their league, had determined to reduce the city by force. They accordingly levied their full army, pitched their camp under the walls of the city, and kept up a continuous blockade, using every means to force their way in, and every kind of siege-machine. But when the time of the annual election of their Strategus drew near, the besieged being now in great distress, and seeming likely every day to surrender, the existing Strategus made an appeal to the Aetolians. He argued that as he had had during his term of office all the suffering and the danger, it was but fair that when they got possession of the town he should have the apportioning of the spoil, and the privilege of inscribing his name on such arms as should be preserved for dedication. This was resisted by some, and especially by those who were candidates for the office, who urged upon the Assembly not to prejudge this matter, but to leave it open for fortune to determine who was to be invested with this honour; and, finally, the Aetolians decided that whoever was general when the city was taken should share the apportioning of the spoils, and the honour of inscribing the arms, with his predecessor.

3. The decision was come to on the day before the election of a new Strategus, and the transference of the command had,

according to the Aetolian custom, to take place. But on that very night a hundred galleys with five thousand Illyrians on board, sailed up to land near Medion. Having dropped anchor at daybreak, they effected a disembarkation with secrecy and despatch; they then formed in the order customary in their country, and advanced in their several companies against the Aetolian lines. These last were overwhelmed with astonishment at the unexpected nature and boldness of the move; but they had long been inspired with overweening self-confidence, and having full reliance in their own forces were far from being dismayed. They drew up the greater part of their hoplites and cavalry in front of their lines on the level ground, and with a portion of their cavalry and their light infantry they hastened to occupy some rising ground in front of their camp, which nature had made easily defensible. A single charge, however, of the Illyrians, whose numbers and close order gave them irresistible weight, served to dislodge the light-armed troops, and forced the cavalry who were on the ground with them to retire to the hoplites. But the Illyrians, being on the higher ground, and charging down from it upon the Aetolian troops formed up on the plain, routed them without difficulty; the Medionians at the same time making a diversion in their favour by sallying out of the town and charging the Aetolians. Thus, after killing a great number, and taking a still greater number prisoners, and becoming masters also of their arms and baggage, the Illyrians, having carried out the orders of their king, conveyed their baggage and the rest of the booty to their boats, and immediately set sail for their own country.

The Illyrians relieve Medion.

4. This was a most unexpected relief to the Medionians. They met in public assembly and deliberated on the whole business, and especially as to the inscribing the arms reserved for dedication. They decided, in mockery of the Aetolian decree, that the inscription should contain the name of the Aetolian commander on the day of battle, and of the candidates for succession to his office. And indeed Fortune seems, in what happened to them, to have designed a display of her power to the rest of mankind. The very thing which these men were in momentary expectation of undergoing at the hands of their

enemies, she put it in their power to inflict upon those enemies, and all within a very brief interval. The unexpected disaster of the Aetolians, too, may teach all the world not to calculate on the future as though it were the actually existent, and not to reckon securely on what may still turn out quite otherwise, but to allow a certain margin to the unexpected. And as this is true everywhere and to every man, so is it especially true in war.

When his galleys returned, and he heard from his officers the events of the expedition, King Agron was so beside himself with joy at the idea of having conquered the Aetolians, whose confidence in their own prowess had been extreme, that, giving himself over to excessive drinking and other similar indulgences, he was attacked by a pleurisy of which in a few days he died. His wife Teuta succeeded him on the throne; and managed the various details of administration by means of friends whom she could trust. But her woman's head had been turned by the success just related, and she fixed her gaze upon that, and had no eyes for anything going on outside the country. Her first measure was to grant letters of marque to privateers, authorising them to plunder all whom they fell in with; and she next collected a fleet and military force as large as the former one, and despatched them with general instructions to the leaders to regard every land as belonging to an enemy.

Death of Agron, who is succeeded by his wife Teuta, B.C. 231.

5. Their first attack was to be upon the coast of Elis and Messenia, which had been from time immemorial the scene of the raids of the Illyrians. For owing to the length of their seaboard, and to the fact that their most powerful cities were inland, troops raised to resist them had a great way to go, and were long in coming to the spot where the Illyrian pirates landed; who accordingly overran those districts, and swept them clean without having anything to fear. However, when this fleet was off Phoenice in Epirus they landed to get supplies. There they fell in with some Gauls, who to the number of eight hundred were stationed at Phoenice, being in the pay of the Epirotes; and contracted with them to betray the town into their hands. Having made this

Teuta's piratical fleet, B.C. 230.

Takes Phoenice in Epirus.

bargain, they disembarked and took the town and everything in it at the first blow, the Gauls within the walls acting in collusion with them. When this news was known, the Epirotes raised a general levy and came in haste to the rescue. Arriving in the neighbourhood of Phoenice, they pitched their camp so as to have the river which flows past Phoenice between them and the enemy, tearing up the planks of the bridge over it for security. But news being brought them that Scerdilaidas with five thousand Illyrians was marching overland by way of the pass near Antigoneia, they detached some of their forces to guard that town; while the main body gave themselves over to an unrestrained indulgence in all the luxuries which the country could supply; and among other signs of demoralisation they neglected the necessary precaution of posting sentries and night pickets. The division of their forces, as well as the careless conduct of the remainder, did not escape the observation of the Illyrians; who, sallying out at night, and replacing the planks on the bridge, crossed the river safely, and having secured a strong position, remained there quietly for the rest of the night. At daybreak both armies drew up their forces in front of the town and engaged. In this battle the Epirotes were decidedly worsted: a large number of them fell, still more were taken prisoners, and the rest fled in the direction of the country of the Atintanes.

6. Having met with this reverse, and having lost all the hopes which they had cherished, the Epirotes turned to the despatch of ambassadors to the Aetolians and Achaeans, earnestly begging for their assistance. Moved by pity for their misfortunes, these nations consented; and an army of relief sent out by them arrived at Helicranum. Meanwhile the Illyrians who had occupied Phoenice, having effected a junction with Scerdilaidas, advanced with him to this place, and, taking up a position opposite to this army of relief, wished at first to give it battle. But they were embarrassed by the unfavourable nature of the ground; and just then a despatch was received from Teuta, ordering their instant return, because certain Illyrians had revolted to the Dardani

The Aetolian and Achaean leagues send a force to the relief of the Epirotes. A truce is made. The Illyrians depart.

Accordingly, after merely stopping to plunder Epirus, they made a truce with the inhabitants, by which they undertook to deliver up all freemen, and the city of Phoenice, for a fixed ransom. They then took the slaves they had captured and the rest of their booty to their galleys, and some of them sailed away; while those who were with Scerdilaidas retired by land through the pass at Antigoneia, after inspiring no small or ordinary terror in the minds of the Greeks who lived along the coast. For seeing the most securely placed and powerful city of Epirus thus unexpectedly reduced to slavery, they one and all began henceforth to feel anxious, not merely as in former times for their property in the open country, but for the safety of their own persons and cities.

The Epirotes were thus unexpectedly preserved: but so far from trying to retaliate on those who had wronged them, or expressing gratitude to those who had come to their relief, they sent ambassadors in conjunction with the Acarnanians to Queen Teuta, and made a treaty with the Illyrians, in virtue of which they engaged henceforth to co-operate with them and against the Achaean and Aetolian leagues. All which proceedings showed conclusively the levity of their conduct towards men who had stood their friends, as well as an originally short-sighted policy in regard to their own interests.

7. That men, in the infirmity of human nature, should fall into misfortunes which defy calculation, is the fault not of the sufferers but of Fortune, and of those who do the wrong; but that they should from mere levity, and with their eyes open, thrust themselves upon the most serious disasters is without dispute the fault of the victims themselves. Therefore it is that pity and sympathy and assistance await those whose failure is due to Fortune: reproach and rebuke from all men of sense those who have only their own folly to thank for it.

It is the latter that the Epirotes now richly deserved at the hands of the Greeks. For in the first place, who in his senses, knowing the common report as to the character of the Gauls, would not have hesitated to trust to them a city so rich, and offering so many opportunities for treason? And again, who would not have been on his guard against the bad character of this

The career of a body of Gallic mercenaries,

particular body of them? For they had originally been driven from their native country by an outburst of popular indignation at an act of treachery done by them to their own kinsfolk and relations. Then having been received by the Carthaginians, because of the exigencies of the war in which the latter were engaged, and being drafted into Agrigentum to garrison it (being at the time more than three thousand strong), they seized the opportunity of a dispute as to pay, arising between the soldiers and their generals, to plunder the city; and again being brought by the Carthaginians into Eryx to perform the same duty, they first endeavoured to betray the city and those who were shut up in it with them to the Romans who were besieging it; and when they failed in that treason, they deserted in a body to the enemy: whose trust they also betrayed by plundering the temple of Aphrodite in Eryx. Thoroughly convinced, therefore, of their abominable character, as soon as they had made peace with Carthage the Romans made it their first business to disarm them, put them on board ship, and forbid them ever to enter any part of Italy. These were the men whom the Epirotes made the protectors of their democracy and the guardians of their laws! To such men as these they entrusted their most wealthy city! How then can it be denied that they were the cause of their own misfortunes?

at Agrigentum,

at Eryx.

Disarmed by the Romans.

My object, in commenting on the blind folly of the Epirotes, is to point out that it is never wise to introduce a foreign garrison, especially of barbarians, which is too strong to be controlled.

8. To return to the Illyrians. From time immemorial they had oppressed and pillaged vessels sailing from Italy; and now while their fleet was engaged at Phoenice a considerable number of them, separating from the main body, committed acts of piracy on a number of Italian merchants: some they merely plundered, others they murdered, and a great many they carried off alive into captivity. Now, though complaints against the Illyrians had reached the Roman government in times past, they had always been

Illyrian piracies.

The Romans interfere, B.C. 230.

neglected; but now when more and more persons approached the Senate on this subject, they appointed two ambassadors, Gaius and Lucius Coruncanius, to go to Illyricum and investigate the matter. But on the arrival of her galleys from Epirus, the enormous quantity and beauty of the spoils which they brought home (for Phoenice was by far the wealthiest city in Epirus at that time), so fired the imagination of Queen Teuta, that she was doubly eager to carry on the predatory warfare on the coasts of Greece. At the moment, however, she was stopped by the rebellion at home; but it had not taken her long to put down the revolt in Illyria, and she was engaged in besieging Issa, the last town which held out, when just at that very time the Roman ambassadors arrived. A time was fixed for their audience, and they proceeded to dis-

Queen Teuta's reception of the Roman legates.

cuss the injuries which their citizens had sustained. Throughout the interview, however, Teuta listened with an insolent and disdainful air; and when they had finished their speech, she replied that she would endeavour to take care that no injury should be inflicted on Roman citizens by Illyrian officials; but that it was not the custom for the sovereigns of Illyria to hinder private persons from taking booty at sea. Angered by these words, the younger of the two ambassadors used a plainness of speech which, though thoroughly to the point, was rather ill-timed. "The Romans," he said, "O Teuta, have a most excellent custom of using the State for the punishment of private wrongs and the redress of private grievances: and we will endeavour, God willing, before long to compel you to improve the relations between the sovereign and the subject in Illyria." The queen received this plain speaking with womanish passion and unreasoning anger. So enraged was she at the speech that, in despite of the conventions universally observed among mankind, she despatched some men after the ambassadors, as they were sailing home, to kill the one who had used this plainness. Upon this being reported at Rome the people were highly incensed at the queen's violation of the law of nations, and at once set about preparations for war, enrolling legions and collecting a fleet.

A Roman legate assassinated.

9. When the season for sailing was come Teuta sent out a larger fleet of galleys than ever against the Greek shores, some of which sailed straight to Corcyra; while a portion of them put into the harbour of Epidamnus on the pretext of taking in victual and water, but really to attack the town. The Epidamnians received them without suspicion and without taking any precautions. Entering the town therefore clothed merely in their tunics, as though they were only come to fetch water, but with swords concealed in the water vessels, they slew the guards stationed at the gates, and in a brief space were masters of the gate-tower. Being energetically supported by a reinforcement from the ships, which came quickly up in accordance with a pre-arrangement, they got possession of the greater part of the walls without difficulty. But though the citizens were taken off their guard they made a determined and desperate resistance, and the Illyrians after maintaining their ground for some time were eventually driven out of the town. So the Epidamnians on this occasion went near to lose their city by their carelessness; but by the courage which they displayed they saved themselves from actual damage while receiving a useful lesson for the future. The Illyrians who had engaged in this enterprise made haste to put to sea, and, rejoining the advanced squadron, put in at Corcyra: there, to the terror of the inhabitants, they disembarked and set about besieging the town. Dismayed and despairing of their safety, the Corcyreans, acting in conjunction with the people of Apollonia and Epidamnus, sent off envoys to the Achaean and Aetolian leagues, begging for instant help, and entreating them not to allow of their being deprived of their homes by the Illyrians. The petition was accepted, and the Achaean and Aetolian leagues combined to send aid. The ten decked ships of war belonging to the Achaeans were manned, and having been fitted out in a few days, set sail for Corcyra in hopes of raising the siege.

B C. 229
Another piratical fleet sent out by Teuta.

Their treacherous attack on Epidamnus, which is repulsed.

Attack on Corcyra.

The Corcyreans appeal to the Aetolian and Achaean leagues.

10. But the Illyrians obtained a reinforcement of seven decked ships from the Acarnanians, in virtue of their treaty with

that people, and, putting to sea, engaged the Achaean fleet off the islands called Paxi. The Acarnanian and Achaean ships fought without victory declaring for either, and without receiving any further damage than having some of their crew wounded. But the Illyrians lashed their galleys four together, and, caring nothing for any damage that might happen to them, grappled with the enemy by throwing their galleys athwart their prows and encouraging them to charge; when the enemies' prows struck them, and got entangled by the lashed-together galleys getting hitched on to their forward gear, the Illyrians leaped upon the decks of the Achaean ships and captured them by the superior number of their armed men. In this way they took four triremes, and sunk one quinquereme with all hands, on board of which Margos of Caryneia was sailing, who had all his life served the Achaean league with complete integrity. The vessels engaged with the Acarnanians, seeing the triumphant success of the Illyrians, and trusting to their own speed, hoisted their sails to the wind and effected their voyage home without further disaster. The Illyrians, on the other hand, filled with self-confidence by their success, continued their siege of the town in high spirits, and without putting themselves to any unnecessary trouble; while the Corcyreans, reduced to despair of safety by what had happened, after sustaining the siege for a short time longer, made terms with the Illyrians, consenting to receive a garrison, and with it Demetrius of Pharos. After this had been settled, the Illyrian admirals put to sea again; and, having arrived at Epidamnus, once more set about besieging that town.

Defeat of the Achaean ships.

Corcyra submits.

11. In this same season one of the Consuls, Gnaeus Fulvius, started from Rome with two hundred ships, and the other Consul, Aulus Postumius, with the land forces. The plan of Gnaeus was to sail direct to Corcyra, because he supposed that he should find the result of the siege still undecided. But when he found that he was too late for that, he determined nevertheless to sail to the island because he wished to know the exact facts as to what had

B C. 229, The Roman Consuls, with fleet and army, start to punish the Illyrians.

happened there, and to test the sincerity of the overtures that had been made by Demetrius. For Demetrius, being in disgrace with Teuta, and afraid of what she might do to him, had been sending messages to Rome, offering to put the city and everything else of which he was in charge into their hands. Delighted at the appearance of the Romans, the Corcyreans not only surrendered the garrison to them, with the consent of Demetrius, but committed themselves also unconditionally to the Roman protection; believing that this was their only security in the future against the piratical incursions of the Illyrians. So the Romans, having admitted the Corcyreans into the number of the friends of Rome, sailed for Apollonia, with Demetrius to act as their guide for the rest of the campaign. At the same time the other Consul, Aulus Postumius, conveyed his army across from Brundisium, consisting of twenty thousand infantry and about two thousand horse. This army, as well as the fleet under Gnaeus Fulvius, being directed upon Apollonia, which at once put itself under Roman protection, both forces were again put in motion on news being brought that Epidamnus was being besieged by the enemy. No sooner did the Illyrians learn the approach of the Romans than they hurriedly broke up the siege and fled. The Romans, taking the Epidamnians under their protection, advanced into the interior of Illyricum, subduing the Ardiaei as they went. They were met on their march by envoys from many tribes: those of the Parthini offered an unconditional surrender, as also did those of the Atintanes. Both were accepted: and the Roman army proceeded towards Issa, which was being besieged by Illyrian troops. On their arrival, they forced the enemy to raise the siege, and received the Issaeans also under their protection. Besides, as the fleet coasted along, they took certain Illyrian cities by storm; among which was Nutria, where they lost not only a large number of soldiers, but some of the Military Tribunes also and the Quaestor. But they captured twenty of the galleys which were conveying the plunder from the country.

Demetrius of Pharos

Corcyra becomes a "friend of Rome."

Aulus Postumius.

The Roman settlement of Illyricum.

Of the Illyrian troops engaged in blockading Issa, those that belonged to Pharos were left unharmed, as a favour to Demetrius; while all the rest scattered and fled to Arbo. Teuta herself, with a very few attendants, escaped to Rhizon, a small town very strongly fortified, and situated on the river of the same name. Having accomplished all this, and having placed the greater part of Illyria under Demetrius, and invested him with a wide dominion, the Consuls retired to Epidamnus with their fleet and army.

12. Then Gnaeus Fulvius sailed back to Rome with the larger part of the naval and military forces, while Postumius, staying behind and collecting forty vessels and a legion from the cities in that district, wintered there to guard the Ardiaei and other tribes that had committed themselves to the protection of Rome. Just before spring in the next year, Teuta sent envoys to Rome and concluded a treaty; in virtue of which she consented to pay a fixed tribute, and to abandon all Illyricum, with the exception of some few districts: and what affected Greece more than anything, she agreed not to sail beyond Lissus with more than two galleys, and those unarmed. When this arrangement had been concluded, Postumius sent legates to the Aetolian and Achaean leagues, who on their arrival first explained the reasons for the war and the Roman invasion; and then stated what had been accomplished in it, and read the treaty which had been made with the Illyrians. The envoys then returned to Corcyra after receiving the thanks of both leagues: for they had freed Greece by this treaty from a very serious cause for alarm, the fact being that the Illyrians were not the enemies of this or that people, but the common enemies of all alike.

B.C. 228. Teuta submits.

Such were the circumstances of the first armed interference of the Romans in Illyricum and that part of Europe, and their first diplomatic relations with Greece; and such too were the motives which suggested them. But having thus begun, the Romans immediately afterwards sent envoys to Corinth and Athens. And it was then that the Corinthians first admitted Romans to take part in the Isthmian games.

13. We must now return to Hasdrubal in Iberia. He had during this period been conducting his command with ability

and success, and had not only given in general a great impulse to the Carthaginian interests there, but in particular had greatly strengthened them by the fortification of the town, variously called Carthage, and New Town, the situation of which was exceedingly convenient for operations in Libya as well as in Iberia. I shall take a more suitable opportunity of speaking of the site of this town, and pointing out the advantages offered by it to both countries: I must at present speak of the impression made by Hasdrubal's policy at Rome. Seeing him strengthening the Carthaginian influence in Spain, and rendering it continually more formidable, the Romans were anxious to interfere in the politics of that country. They discovered, as they thought, that they had allowed their suspicions to be lulled to sleep, and had meanwhile given the Carthaginians the opportunity of consolidating their power. They did not venture, however, at the moment to impose conditions or make war on them, because they were in almost daily dread of an attack from the Celts. They determined therefore to mollify Hasdrubal by gentle measures, and so to leave themselves free to attack the Celts first and try conclusions with them: for they were convinced that, with such enemies on their flank, they would not only be unable to keep their hold over the rest of Italy, but even to reckon on safety in their own city. Accordingly, while sending envoys to Hasdrubal, and making a treaty with him by which the Carthaginians, without saying anything of the rest of Iberia, engaged not to cross the Iber in arms, they pushed on the war with the Celts in Italy.

Hasdrubal in Spain. The founding of New Carthage, B.C. 228.

Dread of the Gauls.

Treaty with Hasdrubal.

14. This war itself I shall treat only summarily, to avoid breaking the thread of my history; but I must go back somewhat in point of time, and refer to the period at which these tribes originally occupied their districts in Italy. For the story I think is worth knowing for its own sake, and must absolutely be kept in mind, if we wish to understand what tribes and districts they were on which Hannibal relied to assist him in his bold design of destroying the Roman dominion. I will first describe the country in which they live, its nature, and its

relation to the rest of Italy; for if we clearly understand its peculiarities, geographical and natural, we shall be better able to grasp the salient points in the history of the war.

The Geography of Italy.

Italy, taken as a whole, is a triangle, of which the eastern side is bounded by the Ionian Sea and the Adriatic Gulf, its southern and western sides by the Sicilian and Tyrrhenian seas; these two sides converge to form the apex of the triangle, which is represented by the southern promontory of Italy called Cocinthus, and which separates the Ionian from the Sicilian Sea.[1] The third side, or base of this triangle, is on the north, and is formed by the chain of the Alps stretching right across the country, beginning at Marseilles and the coast of the Sardinian Sea, and with no break in its continuity until within a short distance of the head of the Adriatic. To the south of this range, which I said we must regard as the base of the triangle, are the most northerly plains of Italy, the largest and most fertile of any with which I am acquainted in all Europe. This is the district with which we are at present concerned. Taken as a whole, it too forms a triangle, the apex of which is the point where the Apennines and Alps converge, above Marseilles, and not far from the coast of the Sardinian Sea. The northern side of this triangle is formed by the Alps, extending for 2200 stades; the southern by the Apennines, extending 3600; and the base is the seaboard of the Adriatic, from the town of Sena to the head of the gulf, a distance of more than 2500 stades. The total length of the three sides will thus be nearly 10,000 stades.

Col di Tenda.

Gallia Cis-Alpina.

15. The yield of corn in this district is so abundant that wheat is often sold at four obols a Sicilian medimnus, barley at two, or a metretes of wine for an equal measure of barley. The quantity of panic and millet produced is extraordinary; and the amount of acorns grown in the oak forests scattered about the country may be gathered from the fact that, though nowhere are more

[1] The southernmost point of Italy is Leucopetra (Capo dell'Armi). Cocinthus (Punta di Stilo) is much too far to the north; yet it may have been regarded as the conventional point of separation between the two seas, Sicilian and Ionian, which have no natural line of demarcation.

pigs slaughtered than in Italy, for sacrifices as well as for family use, and for feeding the army, by far the most important supply is from these plains. The cheapness and abundance of all articles of food may also be clearly shown from the fact that travellers in these parts, when stopping at inns, do not bargain for particular articles, but simply ask what the charge is per head for board. And for the most part the innkeepers are content to supply their guests with every necessary at a charge rarely exceeding half an as (that is, the fourth part of an obol)[1] a day each. Of the numbers, stature, and personal beauty of the inhabitants, and still more of their bravery in war, we shall be able to satisfy ourselves from the facts of their history.

The Alps.

16. Such parts of both slopes of the Alps as are not too rocky or too precipitous are inhabited by different tribes; those on the north towards the Rhone by the Gauls, called Transalpine; those towards the Italian plains by the Taurisci and Agones and a number of other barbarous tribes. The name Transalpine is not tribal, but local, from the Latin proposition *trans*, "across." The summits of the Alps, from their rugged character, and the great depth of eternal snow, are entirely uninhabited. Both slopes of the Apennines, towards the Tuscan Sea and towards the plains, are inhabited by the Ligurians, from above Marseilles and the junction with the Alps to Pisae on the coast, the first city on the west of Etruria, and inland to Arretium. Next to them come the Etruscans; and next on both slopes the Umbrians. The distance between the Apennines and the Adriatic averages about five hundred stades; and when it leaves the northern plains the chain verges to the right, and goes entirely through the middle of the rest of Italy, as far as the Sicilian Sea. The remaining portion of this triangle, namely the plain along the sea coast, extends as far as the town of Sena. The Padus, celebrated by the poets under the name of Eridanus, rises in the Alps near the apex of the triangle, and flows down to the plains with a southerly course; but after reaching the plains, it turns to the east, and flowing through them discharges

The Apennines.

The Po.

[1] Really $\frac{1}{16}$, for 16 ases=6 obols (one drachma or denarius) see 34, 8. The Sicilian medimnus is about a bushel and a half; the metretes 8½ gallons.

itself by two mouths into the Adriatic. The larger part of the plain is thus cut off by it, and lies between this river and the Alps to the head of the Adriatic. In body of water it is second to no river in Italy, because the mountain streams, descending from the Alps and Apennines to the plain, one and all flow into it on both sides; and its stream is at its height and beauty about the time of the rising of the Dog Star, because it is then swollen by the melting snows on those mountains. It is navigable for nearly two thousand stades up stream, the ships entering by the mouth called Olana; for though it is a single main stream to begin with, it branches off into two at the place called Trigoboli, of which streams the northern is called the Padoa, the southern the Olana. At the mouth of the latter there is a harbour affording as safe anchorage as any in the Adriatic. The whole river is called by the country folk the Bodencus. As to the other stories current in Greece about this river,—I mean Phaethon and his fall, and the tears of the poplars and the black clothes of the inhabitants along this stream, which they are said to wear at this day as mourning for Phaethon,—all such tragic incidents I omit for the present, as not being suitable to the kind of work I have in hand; but I shall return to them at some other more fitting opportunity, particularly because Timaeus has shown a strange ignorance of this district.

15th July.

17. To continue my description. These plains were anciently inhabited by Etruscans,[1] at the same period as what are called the Phlegraean plains round Capua and Nola; which latter, however, have enjoyed the highest reputation, because they lay in a great many people's way and so got known. In speaking then of the history of the Etruscan Empire, we should not refer to the district occupied by them at the present time, but to these northern plains, and to what they did when they inhabited them. Their chief intercourse was with the Celts, because they occupied the adjoining districts; who, envying the beauty of their lands, seized some slight pretext to gather a great host and expel the Etruscans from

Gauls expel Etruscans from the valley of the Po.

[1] Livy, 5, 17, 33-49; Plutarch, *Camillus*, 16, Mommsen, *History of Rome*, vol. i. p. 338 (Eng. tr.)

the valley of the Padus, which they at once took possession of themselves. First, the country near the source of the Padus was occupied by the Laevi and Lebecii; after them the Insubres settled in the country, the largest tribe of all; and next them, along the bank of the river, the Cenomani. But the district along the shore of the Adriatic was held by another very ancient tribe called Venĕti, in customs and dress nearly allied to Celts, but using quite a different language, about whom the tragic poets have written a great many wonderful tales. South of the Padus, in the Apennine district, first beginning from the west, the Ananes, and next them the Boii settled. Next them, on the coast of the Adriatic, the Lingones; and south of these, still on the sea-coast, the Senones. These are the most important tribes that took possession of this part of the country. They lived in open villages, and without any permanent buildings. As they made their beds of straw or leaves, and fed on meat, and followed no pursuits but those of war and agriculture, they lived simple lives without being acquainted with any science or art whatever. Each man's property, moreover, consisted in cattle and gold; as they were the only things that could be easily carried with them, when they wandered from place to place, and changed their dwelling as their fancy directed. They made a great point, however, of friendship: for the man who had the largest number of clients or companions in his wanderings, was looked upon as the most formidable and powerful member of the tribe.[1]

Their character.

18. In the early times of their settlement they did not merely subdue the territory which they occupied, but rendered also many of the neighbouring peoples subject to them, whom they overawed by their audacity. Some time afterwards they conquered the Romans in battle, and pursuing the flying

[1] Compare the description of the Gauls given by Caesar, B G. 6, 11-20. They had apparently made considerable progress in civilisation by that time, principally perhaps from the influence of Druidism. But the last characteristic mentioned by Polybius is also observed by Caesar (15), *omnes in bello versantur atque eorum ut quisque est genere copiisque amplissimus, ita plurimos circum se ambactos clientesque habet. Hanc unam gratiam potentiamque habent.* Even in the time of Cato they were at least beginning to add something to their warlike propensities. Or. 2, 2 (Jordan) *Pleraque Gallia duas res industrissime persequitur, rem militare et argute loqui.* Cf. Diod. 5, 27 *sq.*

legions, in three days after the battle occupied Rome itself with the exception of the Capitol. But a circumstance intervened which recalled them home, an invasion, that is to say, of their territory by the Veněti. Accordingly they made terms with the Romans, handed back the city, and returned to their own land; and subsequently were occupied with domestic wars. Some of the tribes, also, who dwelt on the Alps, comparing their own barren districts with the rich territory occupied by the others, were continually making raids upon them, and collecting their forces to attack them. This gave the Romans time to recover their strength, and to come to terms with the people of Latium. When, thirty years after the capture of the city, the Celts came again as far as Alba, the Romans were taken by surprise; and having had no intelligence of the intended invasion, nor time to collect the forces of the Socii, did not venture to give them battle. But when another invasion in great force took place twelve years later, they did get previous intelligence of it; and, having mustered their allies, sallied forth to meet them with great spirit, being eager to engage them and fight a decisive battle. But the Gauls were dismayed at their approach; and, being besides weakened by internal feuds, retreated homewards as soon as night fell, with all the appearance of a regular flight. After this alarm they kept quiet for thirteen years; at the end of which period, seeing that the power of the Romans was growing formidable, they made a peace and a definite treaty with them.

Battle of the Allia, 18th July, B.C. 390.

Latin war, B.C. 349-340.

B.C. 360.

B.C. 348.

B.C. 334.

19. They abided by this treaty for thirty years: but at that time, alarmed by a threatening movement on the part of the Transalpine tribes, and fearing that a dangerous war was imminent, they diverted the attack of the invading horde from themselves by presents and appeals to their ties of kindred, but incited them to attack the Romans, joining in the expedition themselves. They directed their march through Etruria, and were joined by the Etruscans; and the combined armies, after taking a great quantity of booty, got safely back from the Roman territory. But when they got

B.C. 299.

home, they quarrelled about the division of the spoil, and in the end destroyed most of it, as well as the flower of their own force. This is the way of the Gauls when they have appropriated their neighbours' property; and it mostly arises from brutal drunkenness, and intemperate feeding. In the fourth year after this, the Samnites B.C. 297. and Gauls made a league, gave the Romans battle in the neighbourhood of Camerium, and slew a large number. Incensed at this defeat, the Romans marched out a few days afterwards, and with two Consular armies engaged the enemy in the territory of Sentinum; and, having killed the greater number of them, forced the survivors to retreat in hot haste each to his own land. Again, after another interval of ten years, the Gauls besieged Arretium with B.C. 283. a great army, and the Romans went to the assistance of the town, and were beaten in an engagement under its walls. The Praetor Lucius[1] having fallen in this battle, Manius Curius was appointed in his place. The ambassadors, sent by him to the Gauls to treat for the prisoners, were treacherously murdered by them. At this the Romans, in high wrath, sent an expedition against them, which was met by the tribe called the Senones. In a pitched battle the army of the Senones were cut to pieces, and the rest of the tribe expelled from the country; into which the Romans sent the first colony which they ever planted in Gaul—namely, the town of Sena, so Sena Gallica. called from the tribe of Gauls which formerly occupied it. This is the town which I mentioned before as lying on the coast at the extremity of the plains of the Padus.

20. Seeing the expulsion of the Senones, and fearing the same fate for themselves, the Boii made a general levy, summoned the Etruscans to join them, and set out to war. They mustered their forces near the lacus Vadimonis, and there gave the Romans battle; in which the Etruscans indeed suffered a loss of more than half their men, while scarcely any of the Boii escaped. But yet in the very next year B.C. 282. the same two nations joined forces once more; and arming even those of them who had only just reached manhood, gave the Romans battle again; and it was not until they had been utterly

[1] Lucius Caecilius, Livy, Ep. 12.

defeated in this engagement that they humbled themselves so far as to send ambassadors to Rome and make a treaty.[1]

These events took place in the third year before Pyrrhus crossed into Italy, and in the fifth before the destruction of the Gauls at Delphi. For at this period fortune seems to have plagued the Gauls with a kind of epidemic of war. But the Romans gained two most important advantages from these events. First, their constant defeats at the hands of the Gauls had inured them to the worst that could befall them; and so, when they had to fight with Pyrrhus, they came to the contest like trained and experienced gladiators. And in the second place, they had crushed the insolence of the Gauls just in time to allow them to give an undivided attention, first to the war with Pyrrhus for the possession of Italy, and then to the war with Carthage for the supremacy in Sicily.

21. After these defeats the Gauls maintained an unbroken peace with Rome for forty-five years. But when the generation which had witnessed the actual struggle had passed away, and a younger generation of men had taken their places, filled with unreflecting hardihood, and who had neither experienced nor seen any suffering or reverse, they began, as was natural, to disturb the settlement; and on the one hand to let trifling causes exasperate them against Rome, and on the other to invite the Alpine Gauls to join the fray. At first these intrigues were carried on by their chiefs without the knowledge of the tribesmen; and accordingly, when an armed host of Transalpine Gauls arrived at Ariminum, the Boii were suspicious; and forming a conspiracy against their own leaders, as well as against the new-comers, they put their own two kings Atis and Galatus to death, and cut each other to pieces in a pitched battle. Just then the Romans, alarmed at the threatened invasion, had despatched an army; but learning that the Gauls had committed this act of self-destruction, it returned home again. In the fifth year after this alarm, in the Consulship of Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, the Romans

B.C. 236.

[1] For a more complete list of Gallic invasions in this period, see Mommsen, *H.R.* i. p. 344. The scantiness of continuous Roman history from B C. 390, and its total loss from 293 to the first Punic war renders it difficult to determine exactly which of the many movements Polybius has selected

divided among their citizens the territory of Picenum, from which they had ejected the Senones when they conquered them: a democratic measure introduced by Gaius Flaminius, and a policy which we must pronounce to have been the first step in the demoralisation of the people, as well as the cause of the next Gallic war. For many of the Gauls, and especially the Boii whose lands were coterminous with the Roman territory, entered upon that war from the conviction that the object of Rome in her wars with them was no longer supremacy and empire over them, but their total expulsion and destruction. B.C. 232.

22. Accordingly the two most extensive tribes, the Insubres and Boii, joined in the despatch of messengers to the tribes living about the Alps and on the Rhone, who from a word which means "serving for hire," are called Gaesatae. To their kings Concolitanus and Aneroetes they offered a large sum of gold on the spot; and, for the future, pointed out to them the greatness of the wealth of Rome, and all the riches of which they would become possessed, if they took it. In these attempts to inflame their cupidity and induce them to join the expedition against Rome they easily succeeded. For they added to the above arguments pledges of their own alliance; and reminded them of the campaign of their own ancestors in which they had seized Rome itself, and had been masters of all it contained, as well as the city itself, for seven months; and had at last evacuated it of their own free will, and restored it by an act of free grace, returning unconquered and scatheless with the booty to their own land. These arguments made the leaders so eager for the expedition, that there never at any other time came from that part of Gaul a larger host, or one consisting of more notable warriors. Meanwhile, the Romans, informed of what was coming, partly by report and partly by conjecture, were in such a state of constant alarm and excitement, that they hurriedly enrolled legions, collected supplies, and sent out their forces to the frontier, as though the enemy were already in their territory, before the Gauls had stirred from their own lands. B.C. 231.

It was this movement of the Gauls that, more than anything else, helped the Carthaginians to consolidate their power in

Iberia. For the Romans, as I have said, looked upon the Celtic question as the more pressing one of the two, as being so near home; and were forced to wink at what was going on in Iberia, in their anxiety to settle it satisfactorily first. Having, therefore, put their relations with the Carthaginians on a safe footing by the treaty with Hasdrubal, which I spoke of a short time back,[1] they gave an undivided attention to the Celtic war, convinced that their interest demanded that a decisive battle should be fought with them.

23. The Gaesatae, then, having collected their forces, crossed the Alps and descended into the valley of the Padus with a formidable army, furnished with a variety of armour, in the eighth year after the distribution of the lands of Picenum. The Insubres and Boii remained loyal to the agreement they had made with them: but the Venĕti and Cenomani being induced by embassies from Rome to take the Roman side, the Celtic kings were obliged to leave a portion of their forces behind, to guard against an invasion of their territory by those tribes. They themselves, with their main army, consisting of one hundred and fifty thousand foot, and twenty thousand horse and chariots, struck camp and started on their march, which was to be through Etruria, in high spirits. As soon as it was known at Rome that the Celts had crossed the Alps, one of the Consuls, Lucius Aemilius Papus, was sent with an army to Arminum to guard against the passage of the enemy, and one of the Praetors into Etruria: for the other Consul, Gaius Atilius Regulus, happened to be in Sardinia with his legions. There was universal terror in Rome, for the danger threatening them was believed to be great and formidable. And naturally so: for the old fear of the Gauls had never been eradicated from their minds. No one thought of anything else: they were incessantly occupied in mustering the legions, or enrolling new ones, and in ordering up such of the allies as were ready for service. The proper magistrates were ordered to give in lists of all citizens of military age; that it might at once be known to what the total of the available forces amounted. And such stores of corn, and darts, and other military equip-

B C. 225. Coss. L. Aemilius Papus. C. Atilius Regulus.

[1] Ch. 13.

ments were collected as no one could remember on any former occasion. From every side assistance was eagerly rendered; for the inhabitants of Italy, in their terror at the Gallic invasion, no longer thought of the matter as a question of alliance with Rome, or of the war as undertaken to support Roman supremacy, but each people regarded it as a danger menacing themselves and their own city and territory. The response to the Roman appeal therefore was prompt.

The Roman resources.

24. But in order that we may learn from actual facts how great the power was which Hannibal subsequently ventured to attack, and what a mighty empire he faced when he succeeded in inflicting upon the Roman people the most severe disasters, I must now state the amount of the forces they could at that time bring into the field. The two Consuls had marched out with four legions, each consisting of five thousand two hundred infantry and three hundred cavalry. Besides this there were with each Consul allies to the number of thirty thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry. Of Sabines and Etruscans too, there had come to Rome, for that special occasion, four thousand horse and more than fifty thousand foot. These were formed into an army and sent in advance into Etruria, under the command of one of the Praetors. Moreover, the Umbrians and Sarsinatae, hill tribes of the Apennine district, were collected to the number of twenty thousand; and with them were twenty thousand Venĕti and Cenomani. These were stationed on the frontier of the Gallic territory, that they might divert the attention of the invaders, by making an incursion into the territory of the Boii. These were the forces guarding the frontier. In Rome itself, ready as a reserve in case of the accidents of war, there remained twenty thousand foot and three thousand horse of citizens, and thirty thousand foot and two thousand horse of the allies. Lists of men for service had also been returned, of Latins eighty thousand foot and five thousand horse; of Samnites seventy thousand foot and seven thousand horse; of Iapygians and Messapians together fifty thousand foot and sixteen thousand horse; and of Lucanians thirty thousand foot and three thousand horse; of Marsi, and Marrucini, and Ferentani, and Vestini, twenty thousand foot

and four thousand horse. And besides these, there were in reserve in Sicily and Tarentum two legions, each of which consisted of about four thousand two hundred foot, and two hundred horse. Of the Romans and Campanians the total of those put on the roll was two hundred and fifty thousand foot and twenty-three thousand horse; so that the grand total of the forces actually defending Rome was over 150,000 foot, 6000 cavalry:[1] and of the men able to bear arms, Romans and allies, over 700,000 foot and 70,000 horse; while Hannibal, when he invaded Italy, had less than twenty thousand to put against this immense force.

25. There will be another opportunity of treating the subject in greater detail; for the present I must return to the Celts. Having entered Etruria, they began their march through the country, devastating it as they chose, and without any opposition; and finally directed their course against Rome itself. But when they were encamped under the walls of Clusium, which is three days' march from Rome, news was brought them that the Roman forces, which were on duty in Etruria, were following on their rear and were close upon them; upon which they turned back to meet them, eager to offer them battle. The two armies came in sight of each other about sunset, and encamped for the night a short distance apart. But when night fell, the Celts lit their watch fires; and leaving their cavalry on the ground, with instructions that, as soon as daylight made them visible to the enemy, they should follow by the same route, they made a secret retreat along the road to Faesulae, and took up their position there; that they might be joined by their own cavalry, and might disconcert the attack of the enemy. Accordingly, when at daybreak the Romans saw that the cavalry were alone, they believed that the Celts had fled, and hastened in pursuit of the retreating horse; but when they approached the spot where the enemy were stationed, the Celts suddenly left their position and fell upon them. The struggle was at first maintained with fury on

The Gauls enter Etruria.

The Praetor's army defeated at Clusium.

[1] This clause is bracketed by Hultsch, Mommsen, and Strachan-Davidson. See the essay of the last named in his Polybius, p. 22. Livy, Ep. 20, gives the number of Romans and Latins as 300,000.

both sides: but the courage and superior numbers of the Celts eventually gave them the victory. No less than six thousand Romans fell: while the rest fled, most of whom made their way to a certain strongly fortified height, and there remained. The first impulse of the Celts was to besiege them: but they were worn out by their previous night march, and all the suffering and fatigue of the day; leaving therefore a detachment of cavalry to keep guard round the hill, they hastened to procure rest and refreshment, resolving to besiege the fugitives next day unless they voluntarily surrendered.

26. But meanwhile Lucius Aemilius, who had been stationed on the coast of the Adriatic at Ariminum, having been informed that the Gauls had entered Etruria and were approaching Rome, set off to the rescue; and after a rapid march appeared on the ground just at the critical moment. He pitched his camp close to the enemy; and the fugitives on the hill, seeing his watch fires, and understanding what had happened, quickly recovered their courage and sent some of their men unarmed to make their way through the forest and tell the Consul what had happened. This news left the Consul as he thought no alternative but to fight. He therefore ordered the Tribunes to lead out the infantry at daybreak, while he, taking command of the cavalry, led the way towards the hill. The Gallic chieftains too had seen his watch fires, and understood that the enemy was come; and at once held council of war. The advice of King Aneroestes was, "that seeing the amount of booty they had taken,—an incalculable quantity indeed of captives, cattle, and other spoil,—they had better not run the risk of another general engagement, but return home in safety; and having disposed of this booty, and freed themselves from its incumbrance, return, if they thought good, to make another determined attack upon Rome." Having resolved to follow the advice of Aneroestes in the present juncture, the chiefs broke up their night council, and before daybreak struck camp, and marched through Etruria by the road which follows the coast of the Ligurian bay. While Lucius, having taken off the remnant of the army from the hill, and combined it with his own forces, determined that it would not be by any means

On the arrival of Aemilius the Gauls retire.

advantageous to offer the enemy regular battle; but that it was better to dog their footsteps, watching for favourable times and places at which to inflict damage upon them, or wrest some of their booty from their hands.

Atilius landing at Pisa intercepts the march of the Gauls.

27. Just at that time the Consul Gaius Atilius had crossed from Sardinia, and having landed at Pisae was on his way to Rome; and therefore he and the enemy were advancing to meet each other. When the Celts were at Telamon in Etruria, their advanced guard fell in with that of Gaius, and the men being made prisoners informed the Consul in answer to questions of what had taken place; and told him that both the armies were in the neighbourhood: that of the Celts, namely, and that of Lucius close upon their rear. Though somewhat disturbed at the events which he thus learnt, Gaius regarded the situation as a hopeful one, when he considered that the Celts were on the road between two hostile armies. He therefore ordered the Tribunes to martial the legions and to advance at the ordinary pace, and in line as far as the breadth of the ground permitted; while he himself having surveyed a piece of rising ground which commanded the road, and under which the Celts must march, took his cavalry with him and hurried on to seize the eminence, and so begin the battle in person; convinced that by these means he would get the principal credit of the action for himself. At first the Celts not knowing anything about the presence of Gaius Atilius, but supposing from what was taking place, that the cavalry of Aemilius had outmarched them in the night, and were seizing the points of vantage in the van of their route, immediately detached some cavalry and light armed infantry to dispute the possession of this eminence. But having shortly afterwards learnt the truth about the presence of Gaius from a prisoner who was brought in, they hurriedly got their infantry into position, and drew them up so as to face two opposite ways, some, that is, to the front and others to the rear. For they knew that one army was following on their rear; and they expected from the intelligence which had reached them, and from what they saw actually occurring, that they would have to meet another on their front.

28. Aemilius had heard of the landing of the legions at

Pisae, but had not expected them to be already so far on their road; but the contest at the eminence proved to him that the two armies were quite close. He accordingly despatched his horse at once to support the struggle for the possession of the hill, while he marshalled his foot in their usual order, and advanced to attack the enemy who barred his way. The Celts had stationed the Alpine tribe of the Gaesatae to face their enemies on the rear, and behind them the Insubres; on their front they had placed the Taurisci, and the Cispadane tribe of the Boii, facing the legions of Gaius. Their waggons and chariots they placed on the extremity of either wing, while the booty they massed upon one of the hills that skirted the road, under the protection of a guard. The army of the Celts was thus double-faced, and their mode of marshalling their forces was effective as well as calculated to inspire terror. The Insubres and Boii were clothed in their breeches and light cloaks; but the Gaesatae from vanity and bravado threw these garments away, and fell in in front of the army naked, with nothing but their arms; believing that, as the ground was in parts encumbered with brambles, which might possibly catch in their clothes and impede the use of their weapons, they would be more effective in this state. At first the only actual fighting was that for the possession of the hill: and the numbers of the cavalry, from all three armies, that had joined in the struggle made it a conspicious sight to all. In the midst of it the Consul Gaius fell, fighting with reckless bravery in the thick of the battle, and his head was brought to the king of the Celts. The Roman cavalry, however, continued the struggle with spirit, and finally won the position and overpowered their opponents. Then the foot also came to close quarters.

The battle of the horse. Atilius falls.

29. It was surely a peculiar and surprising battle to witness, and scarcely less so to hear described. A battle, to begin with, in which three distinct armies were engaged, must have presented a strange and unusual appearance, and must have been fought under strange and unusual conditions. Again, it must have seemed to a spectator open to question, whether the position of the Gauls were the most dangerous conceivable, from being between two attacking forces; or the most favourable, as

enabling them to meet both armies at once, while their own two divisions afforded each other a mutual support: and, above all, as putting retreat out of the question, or any hope of safety except in victory. For this is the peculiar advantage of having an army facing in two opposite directions. The Romans, on the other hand, while encouraged by having got their enemy between two of their own armies, were at the same time dismayed by the ornaments and clamour of the Celtic host. For there were among them such innumerable horns and trumpets, which were being blown simultaneously in all parts of their army, and their cries were so loud and piercing, that the noise seemed not to come merely from trumpets and human voices, but from the whole country-side at once. Not less terrifying was the appearance and rapid movement of the naked warriors in the van, which indicated men in the prime of their strength and beauty: while all the warriors in the front ranks were richly adorned with gold necklaces and bracelets. These sights certainly dismayed the Romans; still the hope they gave of a profitable victory redoubled their eagerness for the battle.

The infantry engage.

30. When the men who were armed with the *pilum* advanced in front of the legions, in accordance with the regular method of Roman warfare, and hurled their *pila* in rapid and effective volleys, the inner ranks of the Celts found their jerkins and leather breeches of great service; but to the naked men in the front ranks this unexpected mode of attack caused great distress and discomfiture. For the Gallic shields not being big enough to cover the man, the larger the naked body the more certainty was there of the *pilum* hitting. And at last, not being able to retaliate, because the pilum-throwers were out of reach, and their weapons kept pouring in, some of them, in the extremity of their distress and helplessness, threw themselves with desperate courage and reckless violence upon the enemy, and thus met a voluntary death; while others gave ground step by step towards their own friends, whom they threw into confusion by this manifest acknowledgment of their panic. Thus the courage of the Gaesatae had broken down before the preliminary attack of the *pilum*. But when the throwers of it had rejoined their ranks, and the whole Roman

line charged, the Insubres, Boii, and Taurisci received the attack, and maintained a desperate hand-to-hand fight. Though almost cut to pieces, they held their ground with unabated courage, in spite of the fact that man for man, as well as collectively, they were inferior to the Romans in point of arms. The shields and swords of the latter were proved to be manifestly superior for defence and attack, for the Gallic sword can only deliver a cut, but cannot thrust. And when, besides, the Roman horse charged down from the high ground on their flank, and attacked them vigorously, the infantry of the Celts were cut to pieces on the field, while their horse turned and fled.

31. Forty thousand of them were slain, and quite ten thousand taken prisoners, among whom was one of their kings, Concolitanus: the other king, Aneroestes, fled with a few followers; joined a few of his people in escaping to a place of security; and there put an end to his own life and that of his friends. Lucius Aemilius, the surviving Consul, collected the spoils of the slain and sent them to Rome, and restored the property taken by the Gauls to its owners. Then taking command of the legions, he marched along the frontier of Liguria, and made a raid upon the territory of the Boii; and having satisfied the desires of the legions with plunder, returned with his forces to Rome in a few days' march. There he adorned the Capitol with the captured standards and necklaces, which are gold chains worn by the Gauls round their necks; but the rest of the spoils, and the captives, he converted to the benefit of his own estate and to the adornment of his triumph. Aemilius returns home.

Thus was the most formidable Celtic invasion repelled, which had been regarded by all Italians, and especially by the Romans, as a danger of the utmost gravity. The victory inspired the Romans with a hope that they might be able to entirely expel the Celts from the valley of the Padus: and accordingly the Consuls of the next year, Quintus Fulvius Flaccus and Titus Manlius Torquatus, were both sent out with their legions, and military preparations on a large scale, against them. By a rapid attack they terrified the Boii into making submission to Rome; but the campaign had no other practical effect, because, during the B.C 224.

rest of it, there was a season of excessive rains, and an outbreak of pestilence in the army.

32. The Consuls of the next year, however, Publius Furius Philus and Caius Flaminius, once more invaded the Celtic lands, marching through the territory of the Anamares, who live not far from Placentia.[1] Having secured the friendship of this tribe, they crossed into the country of the Insubres, near the confluence of the Adua and Padus. They suffered some annoyance from the enemy, as they were crossing the river, and as they were pitching their camp; and after remaining for a short time, they made terms with the Insubres and left their country. After a circuitous march of several days, they crossed the River Clusius, and came into the territory of the Cenomani. As these people were allies of Rome, they reinforced the army with some of their men, which then descended once more from the Alpine regions into the plains belonging to the Insubres, and began laying waste their land and plundering their houses. The Insubrian chiefs, seeing that nothing could change the determination of the Romans to destroy them, determined that they had better try their fortune by a great and decisive battle. They therefore mustered all their forces, took down from the temple of Minerva the golden standards, which are called "the immovables," and having made other necessary preparations, in high spirits and formidable array, encamped opposite to their enemies to the number of fifty thousand. Seeing themselves thus outnumbered, the Romans at first determined to avail themselves of the forces of the allied Celtic tribes; but when they reflected on the fickle character of the Gauls, and that they were about to fight with an enemy of the same race as these auxiliary troops, they hesitated to associate such men with themselves, at a crisis of such danger, and in an action of such importance. However, they finally decided to do this. They themselves stayed on the side of the river next the enemy: and sending the Celtic contingent to the other side, they pulled up the bridges; which at once precluded any fear of danger from them, and left themselves no hope of safety

B.C. 223.

[1] Others read Ananes and Marseilles [*Ἀνάνων . . . Μασσαλίας*]; but it seems impossible that the Roman march should have extended so far.

except in victory; the impassable river being thus in their rear. These dispositions made, they were ready to engage.

Battle with the Insubres.

33. The Romans are thought to have shown uncommon skill in this battle; the Tribunes instructing the troops how they were to conduct themselves both collectively and individually. They had learned from former engagements that Gallic tribes were always most formidable at the first onslaught, before their courage was at all damped by a check; and that the swords with which they were furnished, as I have mentioned before, could only give one downward cut with any effect, but that after this the edges got so turned and the blade so bent, that unless they had time to straighten them with their foot against the ground, they could not deliver a second blow. The Tribunes accordingly gave out the spears of the Triarii, who are the last of the three ranks, to the first ranks, or Hastati: and ordering the men to use their swords only, after their spears were done with, they charged the Celts full in front. When the Celts had rendered their swords useless by the first blows delivered on the spears, the Romans closed with them, and rendered them quite helpless, by preventing them from raising their hands to strike with their swords, which is their peculiar and only stroke, because their blade has no point. The Romans, on the contrary, having excellent points to their swords, used them not to cut but to thrust: and by thus repeatedly hitting the breasts and faces of the enemy, they eventually killed the greater number of them. And this was due to the foresight of the Tribunes: for the Consul Flaminius is thought to have made a strategic mistake in his arrangements for this battle. By drawing up his men along the very brink of the river, he rendered impossible a manœuvre characteristic of Roman tactics, because he left the lines no room for their deliberate retrograde movements; for if, in the course of the battle, the men had been forced ever so little from their ground, they would have been obliged by this blunder of their leader to throw themselves into the river. However, the valour of the soldiers secured them a brilliant victory, as I have said, and they returned to Rome with abundance of booty of every kind, and of trophies stripped from the enemy.

34. Next year, upon embassies coming from the Celts, desiring peace and making unlimited offers of submission, the new Consuls, Marcus Claudius Marcellus and Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio Calvus, were urgent that no peace should be granted them. Thus frustrated, they determined to try a last chance, and once more took active measures to hire thirty thousand Gaesatae,—the Gallic tribe which lives on the Rhone. Having obtained these, they held themselves in readiness, and waited for the attack of their enemies. At the beginning of spring the Consuls assumed command of their forces, and marched them into the territory of the Insubres; and there encamped under the walls of the city of Acerrae, which lies between the Padus and the Alps, and laid siege to it. The Insubres, being unable to render any assistance, because all the positions of vantage had been seized by the enemy first, and being yet very anxious to break up the siege of Acerrae, detached a portion of their forces to affect a diversion by crossing the Padus and laying siege to Clastidium. Intelligence of this movement being brought to the Consuls, Marcus Claudius, taking with him his cavalry and some light infantry, made a forced march to relieve the besieged inhabitants. When the Celts heard of his approach, they raised the siege; and, marching out to meet him, offered him battle. At first they held their ground against a furious charge of cavalry which the Roman Consul launched at them; but when they presently found themselves surrounded by the enemy on their rear and flank, unable to maintain the fight any longer, they fled before the cavalry; and many of them were driven into the river, and were swept away by the stream, though the larger number were cut down by their enemies. Acerrae also, richly stored with corn, fell into the hands of the Romans: the Gauls having evacuated it, and retired to Mediolanum, which is the most commanding position in the territory of the Insubres. Gnaeus followed them closely, and suddenly appeared at Mediolanum. The Gauls at first did not stir; but upon his starting on his return march to Acerrae, they sallied out, and having boldly attacked his rear, killed a good many men, and even drove a part of it into flight; until Gnaeus recalled some of his vanguard, and urged

B.C. 222. Attack on the Insubres.

them to stand and engage the enemy. The Roman soldiers obeyed orders, and offered a vigorous resistance to the attacking party. The Celts, encouraged by their success, held their ground for a certain time with some gallantry, but before long turned and fled to the neighbouring mountains. Gnaeus followed them, wasting the country as he went, and took Mediolanum by assault. At this the chiefs of the Insubres, despairing of safety, made a complete and absolute submission to Rome.

35. Such was the end of the Celtic war: which, for the desperate determination and boldness of the enemy, for the obstinacy of the battles fought, and for the number of those who fell and of those who were engaged, is second to none recorded in history, but which, regarded as a specimen of scientific strategy, is utterly contemptible. The Gauls showed no power of planning or carrying out a campaign, and in everything they did were swayed by impulse rather than by sober calculation. As I have seen these tribes, after a short struggle, entirely ejected from the valley of the Padus, with the exception of some few localities lying close to the Alps, I thought I ought not to let their original attack upon Italy pass unrecorded, any more than their subsequent attempts, or their final ejectment: for it is the function of the historian to record and transmit to posterity such episodes in the drama of Fortune; that our posterity may not from ignorance of the past be unreasonably dismayed at the sudden and unexpected invasions of these barbarians, but may reflect how shortlived and easily damped the spirit of this race is; and so may stand to their defence, and try every possible means before yielding an inch to them. I think, for instance, that those who have recorded for our information the invasion of Greece by the Persians, and of Delphi by the Gauls, have contributed materially to the struggles made for the common freedom of Greece. For a superiority in supplies, arms, or numbers, would scarcely deter any one from putting the last possible hope to the test, in a struggle for the integrity and the safety of his city and its territory, if he had before his eyes the surprising result of those expeditions; and remembered how many myriads of men, what daring confidence, and what immense armaments were baffled

B.C. 480.
B.C. 279.

by the skill and ability of opponents, who conducted their measures under the dictates of reason and sober calculation. And as an invasion of Gauls has been a source of alarm to Greece in our day, as well as in ancient times, I thought it worth while to give a summary sketch of their doings from the earliest times.

Death of Hasdrubal in Spain, B.C. 221. See chap. 13.

36. Our narrative now returns to Hasdrubal, whom we left in command of the Carthaginian forces in Iberia. After eight years command in that country, he was assassinated in his own house at night by a certain Celt in revenge for some private wrong. Before his death he had done much to strengthen the Carthaginian power in Iberia, not so much by military achievements, as by the friendly relations which he maintained with the native princes. Now that he was dead, the Carthaginians invested Hannibal with the command in Iberia, in spite of his youth, because of the ability in the conduct of affairs, and the daring spirit which he had displayed. He had no sooner assumed the command, than he nourished a fixed resolve to make war on Rome; nor was it long before he carried out this resolution. From that time forth there were constant suspicions and causes of offence arising between the Carthaginians and Romans. And no wonder: for the Carthaginians were meditating revenge for their defeats in Sicily; and the Romans were made distrustful from a knowledge of their designs. These things made it clear to every one of correct judgment that before long a war between these two nations was inevitable.

Succession of Hannibal to the command in Spain. His hostility to Rome.

Social war, B.C. 220-217.

37. At the same period the Achaean league and King Philip, with their allies, were entering upon the war with the Aetolian league, which is called the Social war. Now this was the point at which I proposed to begin my general history; and as I have brought the account of the affairs of Sicily and Libya, and those which immediately followed, in a continuous narrative, up to the date of the beginning of the Social and Second Punic, generally called the Hannibalic, wars, it will be proper to leave this branch of my subject for a while, and to take up the history of events

in Greece, that I may start upon my full and detailed narrative, after bringing the prefatory sketch of the history of the several countries to the same point of time. For since I have not undertaken, as previous writers have done, to write the history of particular peoples, such as the Greeks or Persians, but the history of all known parts of the world at once, because there was something in the state of our own times which made such a plan peculiarly feasible,—of which I shall speak more at length hereafter,—it will be proper, before entering on my main subject, to touch briefly on the state of the most important of the recognised nations of the world.

Of Asia and Egypt I need not speak before the time at which my history commences. The previous history of these countries has been written by a number of historians already, and is known to all the world; nor in our days has any change specially remarkable or unprecedented occurred to them demanding a reference to their past. But in regard to the Achaean league, and the royal family of Macedonia, it will be in harmony with my design to go somewhat farther back: for the latter has become entirely extinct; while the Achaeans, as I have stated before, have in our time made extraordinary progress in material prosperity and internal unity. For though many statesmen had tried in past times to induce the Peloponnesians to join in a league for the common interests of all, and had always failed, because every one was working to secure his own power rather than the freedom of the whole; yet in our day this policy has made such progress, and been carried out with such completeness, that not only is there in the Peloponnese a community of interests such as exists between allies or friends, but an absolute identity of laws, weights, measures, and currency.[1] All the States have the same magistrates, senate, and judges. Nor is there any difference between the entire Peloponnese and a single city, except in the fact that its inhabitants are not included within the same wall; in other respects, both as a whole and in their

The progress of the Achaean league.

[1] That is, each city struck its own coin, but on a common standard of weight and value. See P Gardner's Introduction to Catalogue of Greek Coins (Peloponnesus) in the British Museum, p. xxiv.

individual cities, there is a nearly absolute assimilation of institutions.

The origin of the name as embracing all the Peloponnese.

38. It will be useful to ascertain, to begin with, how it came to pass that the name of the Achaeans became the universal one for all the inhabitants of the Peloponnese. For the original bearers of this ancestral name have no superiority over others, either in the size of their territory and cities, or in wealth, or in the prowess of their men. For they are a long way off being superior to the Arcadians and Lacedaemonians in number of inhabitants and extent of territory; nor can these latter nations be said to yield the first place in warlike courage to any Greek people whatever. Whence then comes it that these nations, with the rest of the inhabitants of the Peloponnese, have been content to adopt the constitution and the name of the Achaeans? To speak of chance in such a matter would not be to offer any adequate solution of the question, and would be a mere idle evasion. A cause must be sought; for without a cause nothing, expected or unexpected, can be accomplished. The cause then, in my opinion, was this. Nowhere could be found a more unalloyed and deliberately established system of equality and absolute freedom, and, in a word, of democracy, than among the Achaeans. This constitution found many of the Peloponnesians ready enough to adopt it of their own accord: many were brought to share in it by persuasion and argument: some, though acting under compulsion at first, were quickly brought to acquiesce in its benefits; for none of the original members had any special privilege reserved for them, but equal rights were given to all comers: the object aimed at was therefore quickly attained by the two most unfailing expedients of equality and fraternity. This then must be looked upon as the source and original cause of Peloponnesian unity and consequent prosperity.

That this was the original principle on which the Achaeans acted in forming their constitution might be demonstrated by many proofs; but for the present purpose it will be sufficient to allege one or two in confirmation of my assertion.

39. And first: When the burning of the Pythagorean

clubs in Magna Grecia was followed by great constitutional disturbances, as was natural on the sudden disappearance of the leading men in each state; and the Greek cities in that part of Italy became the scene of murder, revolutionary warfare, and every kind of confusion; deputations were sent from most parts of Greece to endeavour to bring about some settlement of these disorders.[1] But the disturbed states preferred the intervention of the Achaeans above all others, and showed the greatest confidence in them, in regard to the measures to be adopted for removing the evils that oppressed them. Nor was this the only occasion on which they displayed this preference. For shortly afterwards there was a general movement among them to adopt the model of the Achaean constitution. The first states to move in the matter were Croton, Sybaris, and Caulonia, who began by erecting a common temple to Zeus Homorios,[2] and a place in which to hold their meetings and common councils. They then adopted the laws and customs of the Achaeans, and determined to conduct their constitution according to their principles; but finding themselves hampered by the tyranny of Dionysius of Syracuse, and also by the encroachment of the neighbouring barbarians, they were forced much against their will to abandon them. Again, later on, when the Lacedaemonians met with their unexpected reverse at Leuctra, and the Thebans as unexpectedly claimed the hegemony in Greece, a feeling of uncertainty prevailed throughout the country, and especially among the Lacedaemonians and Thebans themselves, because the former refused to allow that they were beaten, the latter felt hardly certain that they had conquered. On this occasion, once more, the

Ζεὺς ὁμάριος or ἀμάριος.

B.C. 405-367.

B.C. 371.

[1] The Pythagorean clubs, beginning in combinations for the cultivation of mystic philosophy and ascetic life, had grown to be political,—a combination of the upper or cultivated classes to secure political power. Thus Archytas was for many years ruler in Tarentum (Strabo, 1, 3, 4). The earliest was at Croton, but they were also established in many cities of Magna Graecia. Sometime in the fourth century B.C. a general democratic rising took place against them, and their members were driven into exile. Strabo, 8, 7, 1; Justin, 20, 4; Iamblichus *vit. Pythag*, 240-262.

[2] The MS. vary between ὁμάριος and ὁμόριος. The latter form seems to mean "god of a common frontier." But an inscription found at Orchomenus gives the form ἀμάριος, which has been connected with ἡμάρα "day"

Achaeans were the people selected by the two parties, out of all Greece, to act as arbitrators on the points in dispute. And this could not have been from any special view of their power, for at that time they were perhaps the weakest state in Greece; it was rather from a conviction of their good faith and high principles, in regard to which there was but one opinion universally entertained. At that period of their history, however, they possessed only the elements of success; success itself, and material increase, were barred by the fact that they had not yet been able to produce a leader worthy of the occasion. Whenever any man had given indications of such ability, he was systematically thrust into the background and hampered, at one time by the Lacedaemonian government, and at another, still more effectually, by that of Macedonia.

40. When at length, however, the country did obtain leaders of sufficient ability, it quickly manifested its intrinsic excellence by the accomplishment of that most glorious achievement,—the union of the Peloponnese. The originator of this policy in the first instance was Aratus of Sicyon; its active promotion and consummation was due to Philopoemen of Megalopolis; while Lycortas and his party must be looked upon as the authors of the permanence which it enjoyed. The actual achievements of these several statesmen I shall narrate in their proper places: but while deferring a more detailed account of the other two, I think it will be right to briefly record here, as well as in a future portion of my work, the political measures of Aratus, because he has left a record of them himself in an admirably honest and lucid book of commentaries.

I think the easiest method for myself, and most intelligible to my readers, will be to start from the period of the restoration of the Achaean league and federation, after its disintegration into separate states by the Macedonian kings: from which time it has enjoyed an unbroken progress towards the state of completion which now exists, and of which I have already spoken at some length.

41. The period I mean is the 124th Olympiad. In this occurred the first league of Patrae and Dyme, and the deaths of Ptolemy son of Lagus, Lysimachus, Seleucus, Ptolemy Ceraunus. In

124th Olympiad, B.C. 284-280.

the period before this the state of Achaia was as follows. It was ruled by kings from the time of Tisamenus, son of Orestes, who, being expelled from Sparta on the return of the Heraclidae, formed a kingdom in Achaia. The last of this royal line to maintain his power was Ogyges, whose sons so alienated the people by their unconstitutional and tyrannical government, that a revolution took place and a democracy was established. In the period subsequent to this, up to the time of the establishment of the supreme authority of Alexander and Philip, their fortunes were subject to various fluctuations, but they always endeavoured to maintain intact in their league a democratical form of government, as I have already stated. This league consisted of twelve cities, all of them still surviving, with the exception of Olenus, and Helice which was engulfed by the sea before the battle of Leuctra. The other ten were Patrae, Dyme, Pharae, Tritaea, Leontium, Aegium, Aegeira, Pellene, Bura, Caryneia. In the period immediately succeeding Alexander, and before the above-named 124th Olympiad, these cities, chiefly through the instrumentality of the Macedonian kings, became so estranged and ill-disposed to each other, and so divided and opposed in their interests, that some of them had to submit to the presence of foreign garrisons, sent first by Demetrius and Cassander, and afterwards by Antigonus Gonatas, while others even fell under the power of Tyrants; for no one set up more of such absolute rulers in the Greek states than this last-named king.

First Achaean league.

B.C. 371.

B.C. 323-284.

But about the 124th Olympiad, as I have said, a change of sentiment prevailed among the Achaean cities, and they began again to form a league. This was just at the time of Pyrrhus's invasion of Italy. The first to take this step were the peoples of Dyme, Patrae, Tritaea, and Pharae. And as they thus formed the nucleus of the league, we find no column extant recording the compact between these cities. But about five years afterwards the people of Aegium expelled their foreign garrison and joined the league; next, the people of Bura put their tyrant to death and did the same; simul-

B.C. 284-280. Second Achaean league.

taneously, the state of Caryneia was restored to the league. For Iseas, the then tyrant of Caryneia, when he saw the expulsion of the garrison from Aegium, and the death of the despot in Bura at the hands of Margos and the Achaeans, and when he saw that he was himself on the point of being attacked on all sides, voluntarily laid down his office; and having obtained a guarantee for his personal safety from the Achaeans, formally gave in the adhesion of his city to the league.

42. My object in thus going back in point of time was, first, to show clearly at what epoch the Achaeans entered into the second league, which exists at this day, and which were the first members of the original league to do so; and, secondly, that the continuity of the policy pursued by the Achaeans might rest, not on my word only, but on the evidence of the actual facts. It was in virtue of this policy,—by holding out the bait of equality and freedom, and by invariably making war upon and crushing those who on their own account, or with the support of the kings, enslaved any of the states within their borders, that they finally accomplished the design which they had deliberately adopted, in some cases by their own unaided efforts, and in others by the help of their allies. For in fact whatever was effected in this direction, by the help of these allies in after times, must be put down to the credit of the deliberately adopted policy of the Achaeans themselves. They acted indeed jointly with others in many honourable undertakings, and in none more so than with the Romans: yet in no instance can they be said to have aimed at obtaining from their success any advantage for a particular state. In return for the zealous assistance rendered by them to their allies, they bargained for nothing but the freedom of each state and the union of the Peloponnese. But this will be more clearly seen from the record of their actual proceedings.

43. For the first twenty-five years of the league between the cities I have mentioned, a secretary and two strategi for the whole union were elected by each city in turn. But after this period they determined to appoint one strategus only,[1] and put the entire

[1] There was still an under-strategus (*ὑποστρατηγὸς*), see 5, 94; 23, 16; 30, 11. But he was entirely subordinate, and did not even succeed to power on

management of the affairs of the union in his hands. The first to obtain this honour was Margos of Caryneia. In the fourth year after this man's tenure of the office, Aratus of Sicyon caused his city to join the league, which, by his energy and courage, he had, when only twenty years of age, delivered from the yoke of its tyrant. In the eighth year again after this, Aratus, being elected strategus for the second time, laid a plot to seize the Acrocorinthus, then held by Antigonus; and by his success freed the inhabitants of the Peloponnese from a source of serious alarm: and having thus liberated Corinth he caused it to join the league. In his same term of office he got Megara into his hands, and caused it to join also. These events occurred in the year before the decisive defeat of the Carthaginians, in consequence of which they evacuated Sicily and consented for the first time to pay tribute to Rome.

B.C. 255-254. Margos

B.C. 251-250. Aratus.

B.C. 243-242.

Victory of Lutatius off the insulae Aegates, B.C. 241.

Having made this remarkable progress in his design in so short a time, Aratus continued thenceforth in the position of leader of the Achaean league, and in the consistent direction of his whole policy to one single end; which was to expel Macedonians from the Peloponnese, to depose the despots, and to establish in each state the common freedom which their ancestors had enjoyed before them. So long, therefore, as Antigonus Gonatas was alive, he maintained a continual opposition to his interference, as well as to the encroaching spirit of the Aetolians, and in both cases with signal skill and success; although their presumption and contempt for justice had risen to such a pitch, that they had actually made a formal compact with each other for the disruption of the Achaeans.

Antigonus Gonatas, B.C. 283-239.

44. After the death of Antigonus, however, the Achaeans made terms with the Aetolians, and joined them energetically in the war against Demetrius; and, in place of the feelings of estrangement and hostility, there gradually grew up a sentiment of brotherhood and affection between the two peoples. Upon

the death of a strategus during the year of office, as the vice-president in America does.

the death of Demetrius, after a reign of only ten years, just about the time of the first invasion of Illyricum by the Romans, the Achaeans had a most excellent opportunity of establishing the policy which they had all along maintained. For the despots in the Peloponnese were in despair at the death of Demetrius. It was the loss to them of their chief supporter and paymaster. And now Aratus was for ever impressing upon them that they ought to abdicate, holding out rewards and honours for those of them who consented, and threatening those who refused with still greater vengeance from the Achaeans. There was therefore a general movement among them to voluntarily restore their several states to freedom and to join the league. I ought however to say that Ludiades of Megalopolis, in the lifetime of Demetrius, of his own deliberate choice, and foreseeing with great shrewdness and good sense what was going to happen, had abdicated his sovereignty and become a citizen of the national league. His example was followed by Aristomachus, tyrant of Argos, Xeno of Hermione, and Cleonymus of Phlius, who all likewise abdicated and joined the democratic league.

Demetrius. B C. 239-229.

45. But the increased power and national advancement which these events brought to the Achaeans excited the envy of the Aetolians; who, besides their natural inclination to unjust and selfish aggrandisement, were inspired with the hope of breaking up the union of Achaean states, as they had before succeeded in partitioning those of Acarnania with Alexander,[1] and had planned to do those of Achaia with Antigonus Gonatas. Instigated once more by similar expectations, they had now the assurance to enter into communication and close alliance at once with Antigonus (at that time ruling Macedonia as guardian of the young King Philip), and with Cleomenes, King of Sparta. They saw that Antigonus had undisputed possession of the throne of Macedonia, while he was an open and avowed enemy of the Achaeans owing to the surprise of the Acrocorinthus; and they supposed that if they could get the

The Aetolians and Antigonus Doson, B.C. 229-220.

[1] Alexander II. of Epirus, son of Pyrrhus, whom he succeeded B.C. 272. The partition of Acarnania took place in B.C. 266.

Lacedaemonians to join them in their hostility to the league, they would easily subdue it, by selecting a favourable opportunity for their attack, and securing that it should be assaulted on all sides at once. And they would in all probability have succeeded, but that they had left out the most important element in the calculation, namely, that in Aratus they had to reckon with an opponent to their plans of ability equal to almost any emergency. Accordingly, when they attempted this violent and unjust interference in Achaia, so far from succeeding in any of their devices, they, on the contrary, strengthened Aratus, the then president of the league, as well as the league itself. So consummate was the ability with which he foiled their plan and reduced them to impotence. The manner in which this was done will be made clear in what I am about to relate.

46. There could be no doubt of the policy of the Aetolians. They were ashamed indeed to attack the Achaeans openly, because they could not ignore their recent obligations to them in the war with Demetrius: but they were plotting with the Lacedaemonians; and showed their jealousy of the Achaeans by not only conniving at the treacherous attack of Cleomenes upon Tegea, Mantinea, and Orchomenus (cities not only in alliance with them, but actually members of their league), but by confirming his occupation of those places In old times they had thought almost any excuse good enough to justify an appeal to arms against those who, after all, had done them no wrong: yet they now allowed themselves to be treated with such treachery, and submitted without remonstrance to the loss of the most important towns, solely with the view of creating in Cleomenes a formidable antagonist to the Achaeans. These facts were not lost upon Aratus and the other officers of the league: and they resolved that, without taking the initiative in going to war with any one, they would resist the attempts of the Lacedaemonians. Such was their determination, and for a time they persisted in it: but immediately afterwards Cleomenes began to build the hostile fort in the territory of Megalopolis, called the Athenaeum,[1] and showed an undis-

The Aetolians intrigue with Cleomenes, King of Sparta, B.C. 229-227.

[1] Near Bellina, a town on the north-west frontier of Laconia, which had

guised and bitter hostility. Aratus and his colleagues accordingly summoned a meeting of the league, and it was decided to proclaim war openly against Sparta.

47. This was the origin of what is called the Cleomenic war. At first the Achaeans were for depending on their own resources for facing the Lacedaemonians. They looked upon it as more honourable not to look to others for preservation, but to guard their own territory and cities themselves; and at the same time the remembrances of his former services made them desirous of keeping up their friendship with Ptolemy,[1] and averse from the appearance of seeking aid elsewhere. But when the war had lasted some time; and Cleomenes had revolutionised the constitution of his country, and had turned its constitutional monarchy into a despotism; and, moreover, was conducting the war with extraordinary skill and boldness: seeing clearly what would happen, and fearing the reckless audacity of the Aetolians, Aratus determined that his first duty was to be well beforehand in frustrating their plans. He satisfied himself that Antigonus was a man of activity and practical ability, with some pretensions to the character of a man of honour; he however knew perfectly well that kings look on no man as a friend or foe from personal considerations, but ever measure friendships and enmities solely by the standard of expediency. He, therefore, conceived the idea of addressing himself to this monarch, and entering into friendly relations with him, taking occasion to point out to him the certain result of his present policy. But to act openly in this matter he thought inexpedient for several reasons. By doing so he would not only incur the opposition of Cleomenes and the Aetolians, but would cause consternation among the Achaeans themselves, because his appeal to their enemies would give the impression that he had abandoned all the hopes he once had in them. This was the very last idea he desired should go abroad; and he therefore determined to conduct this intrigue in secrecy.

Cleomenes, B C. 227-221.

Aratus applies to Antigonus Doson.

long been a subject of dispute between Sparta and the Achaeans. Plutarch *Arat* 4; Pausan. 8, 35, 4.

[1] Ptolemy Euergetes (B.C. 247-222).

The result of this was that he was often compelled to speak and act towards the public in a sense contrary to his true sentiments, that he might conceal his real design by suggesting one of an exactly opposite nature. For which reason there are some particulars which he did not even commit to his own commentaries.

48. It did not escape the observation of Aratus that the people of Megalopolis would be more ready than others to seek the protection of Antigonus, and the hopes of safety offered by Macedonia; for their neighbourhood to Sparta exposed them to attack before the other states; while they were unable to get the help which they ought to have, because the Achaeans were themselves hard pressed and in great difficulties. Besides they had special reasons for entertaining feelings of affection towards the royal family of Macedonia, founded on the favours received in the time of Philip, son of Amyntas. He therefore imparted his general design under pledge of secrecy to Nicophanes and Cercidas of Megalopolis, who were family friends of his own and of a character suited to the undertaking; and by their means experienced no difficulty in inducing the people of Megalopolis to send envoys to the league, to advise that an application for help should be made to Antigonus. Nicophanes and Cercidas were themselves selected to go on this mission to the league, and thence, if their view was accepted, to Antigonus. The league consented to allow the people of Megalopolis to send the mission; and accordingly Nicophanes lost no time in obtaining an interview with the king. About the interests of his own country he spoke briefly and summarily, confining himself to the most necessary statements; the greater part of his speech was, in accordance with the directions of Aratus, concerned with the national question.

Philip II. in the Peloponnese, B.C. 338.

49. The points suggested by Aratus for the envoy to dwell on were "the scope and object of the understanding between the Aetolians and Cleomenes, and the necessity of caution on the part primarily of the Achaeans, but still more even on that of Antigonus himself: first, because the Achaeans plainly could not resist the attack of both; and, secondly, because if the Aetolians and

The message to Antigonus Doson.

Cleomenes conquered them, any man of sense could easily see that they would not be satisfied or stop there. For the encroaching spirit of the Aetolians, far from being content to be confined by the boundaries of the Peloponnese, would find even those of Greece too narrow for them. Again, the ambition of Cleomenes was at present directed to the supremacy in the Peloponnese: but this obtained, he would promptly aim at that of all Greece, in which it would be impossible for him to succeed without first crushing the government of Macedonia. They were, therefore, to urge him to consider, with a view to the future, which of the two courses would be the more to his own interests,—to fight for supremacy in Greece in conjunction with the Achaeans and Boeotians against Cleomenes in the Peloponnese; or to abandon the most powerful race, and to stake the Macedonian empire on a battle in Thessaly, against a combined force of Aetolians and Boeotians, with the Achaeans and Lacedaemonians to boot. If the Aetolians, from regard to the goodwill shown them by the Achaeans in the time of Demetrius, were to pretend to be anxious to keep the peace as they were at present doing, they were to assert that the Achaeans were ready to engage Cleomenes by themselves; and if fortune declared in their favour they would want no assistance from any one: but if fortune went against them, and the Aetolians joined in the attack, they begged him to watch the course of events, that he might not let things go too far, but might aid the Peloponnesians while they were still capable of being saved. He had no need to be anxious about the good faith or gratitude of the Achaeans: when the time for action came, Aratus pledged himself to find guarantees which would be satisfactory to both parties; and similarly would himself indicate the moment at which the aid should be given."

50. These arguments seemed to Antigonus to have been put by Aratus with equal sincerity and ability: and after listening to them, he eagerly took the first necessary step by writing a letter to the people of Megalopolis with an offer of assistance, on condition that such a measure should receive the consent of the Achaeans. When Nicophanes and Cercidas returned home and delivered this despatch from the king,

reporting at the same time his other expressions of goodwill and zeal in the cause, the spirits of the people of Megalopolis were greatly elated; and they were all eagerness to attend the meeting of the league, and urge that measures should be taken to secure the alliance of Antigonus, and to put the management of the war in his hands with all despatch. Aratus learnt privately from Nicophanes the king's feelings towards the league and towards himself; and was delighted that his plan had not failed, and that he had not found the king completely alienated from himself, as the Aetolians hoped he would be. He regarded it also as eminently favourable to his policy, that the people of Megalopolis were so eager to use the Achaean league as the channel of communication with Antigonus. For his first object was if possible to do without this assistance; but if he were compelled to have recourse to it, he wished that the invitation should not be sent through himself personally, but that it should rather come from the Achaeans as a nation. For he feared that, if the king came, and conquered Cleomenes and the Lacedaemonians in the war, and should then adopt any policy hostile to the interests of the national constitution, he would have himself by general consent to bear the blame of the result: while Antigonus would be justified, by the injury which had been inflicted on the royal house of Macedonia in the matter of the Acrocorinthus. Accordingly when Megalopolitan envoys appeared in the national council, and showed the royal despatch, and further declared the general friendly disposition of the king, and added an appeal to the congress to secure the king's alliance without delay; and when also the sense of the meeting was clearly shown to be in favour of taking this course, Aratus rose, and, after setting forth the king's zeal, and complimenting the meeting upon their readiness to act in the matter, he proceeded to urge upon them in a long speech that "They should try if possible to preserve their cities and territory by their own efforts, for that nothing could be more honourable or more expedient than that: but that, if it turned out that fortune declared against them in this effort, they might then have recourse to the assistance of their friends; but not until they

Aratus wishes to do without the king if possible.

had tried all their own resources to the uttermost." This speech was received with general applause: and it was decided to take no fresh departure at present, and to endeavour to bring the existing war to a conclusion unaided.

Euergetes jealous of the Macedonian policy of Aratus, helps Cleomenes.

51. But when Ptolemy, despairing of retaining the league's friendship, began to furnish Cleomenes with supplies,—which he did with a view of setting him up as a foil to Antigonus, thinking the Lacedaemonians offered him better hopes than the Achaeans of being able to thwart the policy of the Macedonian kings; and when the Achaeans themselves had suffered three defeats,—one at Lycaeum in an engagement with Cleomenes whom they had met on a march; and again in a pitched battle at Ladocaea in the territory of Megalopolis, in which Lydiades fell; and a third time decisively at a place called Hecatomboeum in the territory of Dyme where their whole forces had been engaged,—after these misfortunes, no further delay was possible, and they were compelled by the force of circumstances to appeal unanimously to Antigonus. Thereupon Aratus sent his son to Antigonus, and ratified the terms of the subvention. The great difficulty was this: it was believed to be certain that the king would send no assistance, except on the condition of the restoration of the Acrocorinthus, and of having the city of Corinth put into his hands as a base of operations in this war; and on the other hand it seemed impossible that the Achaeans should venture to put the Corinthians in the king's power against their own consent. The final determination of the matter was accordingly postponed, that they might investigate the question of the securities to be given to the king.

The Achaeans offer to surrender the Acrocorinthus to Antigonus.

52. Meanwhile, on the strength of the dismay caused by his successes, Cleomenes was making an unopposed progress through the cities, winning some by persuasion and others by threats. In this way he got possession of Caphyae, Pellene, Pheneus, Argos, Phlius, Cleonae, Epidaurus, Hermione, Troezen, and last of all Corinth, while he personally commanded a siege of Sicyon. But this in reality relieved the Achaeans from a very grave difficulty. For the Corinthians by ordering

Aratus, as Strategus of the league, and the Achaeans to evacuate the town, and by sending messages to Cleomenes inviting his presence, gave the Achaeans a ground of action and a reasonable pretext for moving. Aratus was quick to take advantage of this; and, as the Achaeans were in actual possession of the Acrocorinthus, he made his peace with the royal family of Macedonia by offering it to Antigonus; and at the same time gave thus a sufficient guarantee for friendship in the future, and further secured Antigonus a base of operations for the war with Sparta.

Upon learning of this compact between the league and Antigonus, Cleomenes raised the siege of Sicyon and pitched his camp near the Isthmus; and, having thrown up a line of fortification uniting the Acrocorinthus with the mountain called the "Ass's Back," began from this time to expect with confidence the empire of the Peloponnese. But Antigonus had made his preparations long in advance, in accordance with the suggestion of Aratus, and was only waiting for the right moment to act. And now the news which he received convinced him that the entrance of Cleomenes into Thessaly, at the head of an army, was only a question of a very few days: he accordingly despatched envoys to Aratus and the league to conclude the terms of the treaty[1] and marched to the Isthmus with his army by way of Euboea. He took this route because the Aetolians, after trying other expedients for preventing Antigonus bringing this aid, now forbade his marching south of Thermopylae with an army, threatening that, if he did, they would offer armed opposition to his passage.

Cleomenes prepares to resist.

Antigonus comes to the Isthmus, B.C. 224.

53. Thus Antigonus and Cleomenes were encamped face

[1] The treaty, besides securing the surrender of the Acrocorinthus, provided that no embassy should be sent to any other king without the consent of Antigonus, and that the Achaeans should supply food and pay for the Macedonian army of relief. Solemn sacrifices and games were also established in his honour, and kept up long after his death at Sicyon, see 28, 19; 30, 23. Plutarch, *Arat.* 45. The conduct of Aratus in thus bringing the Macedonians into the Peloponnese has been always attacked (see Plut. *Cleom.* 16). It is enough here to say that our judgment as to it must depend greatly on our view of the designs and character of Cleomenes.

to face: the former desirous of effecting an entrance into the Peloponnese, Cleomenes determined to prevent him.

The Achaeans seize Argos.

Meanwhile the Achaeans, in spite of their severe disasters, did not abandon their purpose or give up all hopes of retrieving their fortunes. They gave Aristotle of Argos assistance when he headed a rising against the Cleomenic faction; and, under the command of Timoxenus the Strategus, surprised and seized Argos. And this must be regarded as the chief cause of the improvement which took place in their fortunes; for this reverse checked the ardour of Cleomenes and damped the courage of his soldiers in advance, as was clearly shown by what took place afterwards. For though Cleomenes had already possession of more advantageous posts, and was in the enjoyment of more abundant supplies than Antigonus, and was at the same time inspired with superior courage and ambition: yet, as soon as he was informed that Argos was in the hands of the Achaeans, he at once drew back, abandoned all these advantages, and retreated from the Isthmus with every appearance of precipitation, in terror of being completely surrounded by his enemies. At first he retired upon Argos, and for a time made some attempt to regain the town. But the Achaeans offered a gallant resistance; and the Argives themselves were stirred up to do the same by remorse for having admitted him before: and so, having failed in this attempt also, he marched back to Sparta by way of Mantinea.

54. On his part, Antigonus advanced without any casualty into the Peloponnese, and took over the Acrocorinthus; and, without wasting time there, pushed on in his enterprise and entered Argos. He only stayed there long enough to compliment the Argives on their conduct, and to provide for the security of the city; and then immediately starting again directed his march towards Arcadia; and after ejecting the garrisons from the posts which had been fortified by Cleomenes in the territories of Aegys and Belmina, and, putting those strongholds in the hands of the people of Megalopolis, he went to Aegium to attend the meeting of the Achaean league. There he made a statement of his own proceedings, and consulted with the meeting as to the measures to be taken in the

Antigonus receives the Acrocorinthus.

future. He was appointed commander-in-chief of the allied army, and went into winter quarters at Sicyon and Corinth.

At the approach of spring he broke up his camp and got on the march. On the third day he arrived at Tegea, and being joined there by the Achaean forces, he proceeded to regularly invest the city. B C. 223. Recovery of Tegea. But the vigour displayed by the Macedonians in conducting the siege, and especially in the digging of mines, soon reduced the Tegeans to despair, and they accordingly surrendered. After taking the proper measures for securing the town, Antigonus proceeded to extend his expedition. He now marched with all speed into Laconia; and having found Cleomenes in position on the frontier, he was trying to bring him to an engagement, and was harassing him with skirmishing attacks, when news was brought to him by his scouts that the garrison of Orchomenus had started to join Cleomenes. He at once broke up his camp, hurried thither, and carried the town by assault. Having done that, he next invested Mantinea and began to besiege it. This town also being soon terrified into surrender by the Macedonians, he started again along the road to Heraea and Telphusa. These towns, too, being secured by the voluntary surrender of their inhabitants, as the winter was by this time approaching, he went again to Aegium to attend the meeting of the league. His Macedonian soldiers he sent away to winter at home, while he himself remained to confer with the Achaeans on the existing state of affairs.

Skirmish with Cleomenes.

Capture of Orchomenus and Mantinea and Heraea and Telphusa.

55. But Cleomenes was on the alert. He saw that the Macedonians in the army of Antigonus had been sent home; and that the king and his mercenaries in Aegium were three days' march from Megalopolis; and this latter town he well knew to be difficult to guard, owing to its great extent, and the sparseness of its inhabitants; and, moreover, that it was just then being kept with even greater carelessness than usual, owing to Antigonus being in the country; and what was more important than anything else, he knew that the larger number of its men of military age had fallen at the battles of Lycaeum

and Ladoceia. There happened to be residing in Megalopolis some Messenian exiles; by whose help he managed, under cover of night, to get within the walls without being detected. When day broke he had a narrow escape from being ejected, if not from absolute destruction, through the valour of the citizens. This had been his fortune three months before, when he had made his way into the city by the region which is called the Cōlaeum: but on this occasion, by the superiority of his force, and the seizure in advance of the strongest positions in the town, he succeeded in effecting his purpose. He eventually ejected the inhabitants, and took entire possession of the city; which, once in his power, he dismantled in so savage and ruthless a manner as to preclude the least hope that it might ever be restored. The reason of his acting in this manner was, I believe, that Megalopolis and Stymphalus were the only towns in which, during the vicissitudes of that period, he never succeeded in obtaining a single partisan, or inducing a single citizen to turn traitor. For the passion for liberty and the loyalty of the Clitorians had been stained by the baseness of one man, Thearces, whom the Clitorians, with some reason, denied to be a native of their city, asserting that he had been foisted in from Orchomenus, and was the offspring of one of the foreign garrison there.

56. For the history of the same period, with which we are now engaged, there are two authorities, Aratus and Phylarchus,[1] whose opinions are opposed in many points and their statements contradictory. I think, therefore, it will be advantageous, or rather necessary, since I follow Aratus in my account of the Cleomenic war, to go into the question; and not by any neglect on my part to suffer mis-statements in historical

Digression (to ch. 63) on the misstatements of Phylarchus.

[1] Phylarchus, said by some to be a native of Athens, by others of Naucratis, and by others again of Sicyon, wrote, among other things, a history in twenty-eight books from the expedition of Pyrrhus into the Peloponnese (B.C. 272) to the death of Cleomenes. He was a fervent admirer of Cleomenes, and therefore probably wrote in a partisan spirit; yet in the matter of the outrage upon Mantinea, Polybius himself is not free from the same charge. See Mueller's *Histor. Graec.* fr. lxxvii.-lxxxi. Plutarch, though admitting Phylarchus's tendency to exaggeration (*Arat.* 38), yet uses his authority both in his life of Aratus and of Cleomenes; and in the case of Aristomachus says that he was both racked and drowned (*Arat.* 44).

writings to enjoy an authority equal to that of truth. The fact is that the latter of these two writers has, throughout the whole of his history, made statements at random and without discrimination. It is not, however, necessary for me to criticise him on other points on the present occasion, or to call him to strict account concerning them; but such of his statements as relate to the period which I have now in hand, that is the Cleomenic war, these I must thoroughly sift. They will be quite sufficient to enable us to form a judgment on the general spirit and ability with which he approaches historical writing. It was his object to bring into prominence the cruelty of Antigonus and the Macedonians, as well as that of Aratus and the Achaeans; and he accordingly asserts that, when Mantinea fell into their hands, it was cruelly treated; and that the most ancient and important of all the Arcadian towns was involved in calamities so terrible as to move all Greece to horror and tears. And being eager to stir the hearts of his readers to pity, and to enlist their sympathies by his story, he talks of women embracing, tearing their hair, and exposing their breasts; and again of the tears and lamentations of men and women, led off into captivity along with their children and aged parents. And this he does again and again throughout his whole history, by way of bringing the terrible scene vividly before his readers. I say nothing of the unworthiness and unmanliness of the course he has adopted: let us only inquire what is essential and to the purpose in history. Surely an historian's object should not be to amaze his readers by a series of thrilling anecdotes; nor should he aim at producing speeches which *might* have been delivered, nor study dramatic propriety in details like a writer of tragedy: but his function is above all to record with fidelity what was actually said or done, however commonplace it may be. For the purposes of history and of the drama are not the same, but widely opposed to each other. In the former the object is to strike and delight by words as true to nature as possible; in the latter to instruct and convince by genuine words and deeds; in the former the effect is meant to be temporary, in the latter permanent. In the former, again, the power of carrying an audience is the chief excellence, because the object

Mantinea.

is to create illusion; but in the latter the thing of primary importance is truth, because the object is to benefit the learner. And apart from these considerations, Phylarchus, in most of the catastrophes which he relates, omits to suggest the causes which gave rise to them, or the course of events which led up to them: and without knowing these, it is impossible to feel the due indignation or pity at anything which occurs. For instance, everybody looks upon it as an outrage that the free should be struck: still, if a man provokes it by an act of violence, he is considered to have got no more than he deserved; and, where it is done for correction and discipline, those who strike free men are deemed worthy of honour and gratitude. Again, the killing of a fellow-citizen is regarded as a heinous crime, deserving the severest penalties: and yet it is notorious that the man who kills a thief, or his wife's paramour, is held guiltless; while he who kills a traitor or tyrant in every country receives honours and pre-eminence. And so in everything our final judgment does not depend upon the mere things done, but upon their causes and the views of the actors, according as these differ.

57. Now the people of Mantinea had in the first instance abandoned the league, and voluntarily submitted, first to the Aetolians, and afterwards to Cleomenes. Being therefore, in accordance with this policy, members of the Lacedaemonian community, in the fourth year before the coming of Antigonus, their city was forcibly taken possession of by the Achaeans owing to the skilful plotting of Aratus. But on that occasion, so far from being subjected to any severity for their act of treason, it became a matter of general remark how promptly the feelings of the conquerors and the conquered underwent a revolution. As soon as he had got possession of the town, Aratus issued orders to his own men that no one was to lay a finger on anything that did not belong to him; and then, having summoned the Mantineans to a meeting, he bade them be of good cheer, and stay in their own houses; for that, as long as they remained members of the league, their safety was secured. On their part, the Mantineans, surprised at this unlooked-for prospect of safety, immediately experienced a universal revulsion of feeling. The very men against whom

B C. 227.

they had a little while before been engaged in a war, in which they had seen many of their kinsfolk killed, and no small number grievously wounded, they now received into their houses, and entertained as their guests, interchanging every imaginable kindness with them. And naturally so. For I believe that there never were men who met with more kindly foes, or came out of a struggle with what seemed the most dreadful disasters more scatheless, than did the Mantineans, owing to the humanity of Aratus and the Achaeans towards them.

58. But they still saw certain dangers ahead from intestine disorders, and the hostile designs of the Aetolians and Lacedaemonians; they subsequently, therefore, sent envoys to the league asking for a guard for their town. The request was granted: and three hundred of the league army were selected by lot to form it. These men on whom the lot fell started for Mantinea; and, abandoning their native cities and their callings in life, remained there to protect the lives and liberties of the citizens. Besides them, the league despatched two hundred mercenaries, who joined the Achaean guard in protecting the established constitution. But this state of things did not last long: an insurrection broke out in the town, and the Mantineans called in the aid of the Lacedaemonians; delivered the city into their hands; and put to death the garrison sent by the league. It would not be easy to mention a grosser or blacker act of treachery. Even if they resolved to utterly set at nought the gratitude they owed to, and the friendship they had formed with, the league; they ought at least to have spared these men, and to have let every one of them depart under some terms or another: for this much it is the custom by the law of nations to grant even to foreign enemies. But in order to satisfy Cleomenes and the Lacedaemonians of their fidelity in the policy of the hour, they deliberately, and in violation of international law, consummated a crime of the most impious description. To slaughter and wreak vengeance on the men who had just before taken their city, and refrained from doing them the least harm, and who were at that very moment engaged in protecting their lives and liberties,—can anything be imagined more detestable? What punishment can be conceived to correspond

with its enormity? If one suggests that they would be rightly served by being sold into slavery, with their wives and children, as soon as they were beaten in war; it may be answered that this much is only what, by the laws of warfare, awaits even those who have been guilty of no special act of impiety. They deserved therefore to meet with a punishment even more complete and heavy than they did; so that, even if what Phylarchus mentions did happen to them, there was no reason for the pity of Greece being bestowed on them: praise and approval rather were due to those who exacted vengeance for their impious crime. But since, as a matter of fact, nothing worse befel the Mantineans than the plunder of their property and the selling of their free citizens into slavery, this historian, for the mere sake of a sensational story, has not only told a pure lie, but an improbable lie. His wilful ignorance also was so supreme, that he was unable to compare with this alleged cruelty of the Achaeans the conduct of the same people in the case of Tegea, which they took by force at the same period, and yet did no injury to its inhabitants. And yet, if the natural cruelty of the perpetrators was the sole cause of the severity to Mantinea, it is to be presumed that Tegea would have been treated in the same way. But if their treatment of Mantinea was an exception to that of every other town, the necessary inference is that the cause for their anger was exceptional also.

59. Again Phylarchus says that Aristomachus the Argive, a man of a most distinguished family, who had been despot of Argos, as his fathers had been before him, upon falling into the hands of Antigonus and the league "was hurried off to Cenchreae and there racked to death,—an unparalleled instance of injustice and cruelty." But in this matter also our author preserves his peculiar method. He makes up a story about certain cries of this man, when he was on the rack, being heard through the night by the neighbours: "some of whom," he says, "rushed to the house in their horror, or incredulity, or indignation at the outrage." As for the sensational story, let it pass; I have said enough on that point. But I must express my opinion that, even if Aristomachus had committed no crime against the Achaeans besides, yet his whole life and

Aristomachus.

his treason to his own country deserved the heaviest possible punishment. And in order, forsooth, to enhance this man's reputation, and move his reader's sympathies for his sufferings, our historian remarks that he had not only been a tyrant himself, but that his fathers had been so before him. It would not be easy to bring a graver or more bitter charge against a man than this: for the mere word "tyrant" involves the idea of everything that is wickedest, and includes every injustice and crime possible to mankind. And if Aristomachus endured the most terrible tortures, as Phylarchus says, he yet would not have been sufficiently punished for the crime of one day, in which, when Aratus had effected an entrance into Argos with the Achaean soldiers,—and after supporting the most severe struggles and dangers for the freedom of its citizens, had eventually been driven out, because the party within who were in league with him had not ventured to stir, for fear of the tyrant,—Aristomachus availed himself of the pretext of their complicity with the irruption of the Achaeans to put to the rack and execute eighty of the leading citizens, who were perfectly innocent, in the presence of their relations. I pass by the history of his whole life and the crimes of his ancestors; for that would be too long a story.

60. But this shows that we ought not to be indignant if a man reaps as he has sown; but rather if he is allowed to end his days in peace, without experiencing such retribution at all. Nor ought we to accuse Antigonus or Aratus of crime, for having racked and put to death a tyrant whom they had captured in war: to have killed and wreaked vengeance on whom, even in time of peace, would have brought praise and honour to the doers from all right-minded persons.

But when, in addition to these crimes, he was guilty also of treachery to the league, what shall we say that he deserved? The facts of the case are these. He abdicted his sovereignty of Argos shortly before, finding himself in difficulties, owing to the state of affairs brought on by the death of Demetrius. He was, however, protected by the clemency and generosity of the league; and, much to his own surprise, was left unmolested. For the Achaean government not only secured him an indemnity for all crimes committed by him while despot, but

admitted him as a member of the league, and invested him with the highest office in it,—that, namely, of Commander-in-Chief and Strategus.[1] All these favours he immediately forgot, as soon as his hopes were a little raised by the Cleomenic war; and at a crisis of the utmost importance he withdrew his native city, as well as his own personal adhesion, from the league, and attached them to its enemies. For such an act of treason what he deserved was not to be racked under cover of night at Cenchreae, and then put to death, as Phylarchus says: he ought to have been taken from city to city in the Peloponnese, and to have ended his life only after exemplary torture in each of them. And yet the only severity that this guilty wretch had to endure was to be drowned in the sea by order of the officers at Cenchreae.

Megalopolis,

61. There is another illustration of this writer's manner to be found in his treatment of the cases of Mantinea and Megalopolis. The misfortunes of the former he has depicted with his usual exaggeration and picturesqueness: apparently from the notion, that it is the peculiar function of an historian to select for special mention only such actions as are conspicuously bad. But about the noble conduct of the Megalopolitans at that same period he has not said a word: as though it were the province of history to deal with crimes rather than with instances of just and noble conduct; or as though his readers would be less improved by the record of what is great and worthy of imitation, than by that of such deeds as are base and fit only to be avoided. For instance, he has told us clearly enough how Cleomenes took the town, preserved it from damage, and forthwith sent couriers to the Megalopolitans in Messene with a despatch, offering them the safe enjoyment of their country if they would throw in their lot with him,—and his object in telling all this is to enhance the magnanimity and moderation of Cleomenes towards his enemies. Nay, he has gone farther, and told us how the people of Megalopolis would not allow the letter to

[1] *ἡγεμόνα καὶ στρατηγὸν*. It is not quite clear whether this is merely a description of the ordinary office of Strategus, or whether any special office is meant, such as that conferred on Antigonus. In 4, 11 *ἡγεμόνες* includes the Strategus and other officers. See Freeman, *Federal Government*, p. 299.

be read to the end, and were not far from stoning the bearers of it. Thus much he does tell us. But the sequel to this, so appropriate to an historian,—the commendation, I mean, and honourable mention of their noble conduct,—this he has altogether left out. And yet he had an opportunity ready to his hand. For if we view with approval the conduct of a people who merely by their declarations and votes support a war in behalf of friends and allies; while to those who go so far as to endure the devastation of their territory, and a siege of their town, we give not only praise but active gratitude: what must be our estimate of the people of Megalopolis? Must it not be of the most exalted character? First of all, they allowed their territory to be at the mercy of Cleomenes, and then consented to be entirely deprived of their city, rather than be false to the league: and, finally, in spite of an unexpected chance of recovering it, they deliberately preferred the loss of their territory, the tombs of their ancestors, their temples, their homes and property, of everything in fact which men value most, to forfeiting their faith to their allies. No nobler action has ever been, or ever will be performed; none to which an historian could better draw his reader's attention. For what could be a higher incentive to good faith, or the maintenance of frank and permanent relations between states? But of all this Phylarchus says not a word, being, as it seems to me, entirely blind as to all that is noblest and best suited to be the theme of an historian.

62. He does, however, state in the course of his narrative that, from the spoils of Megalopolis, six thousand talents fell to the Lacedaemonians, of which two thousand, according to custom, were given to Cleomenes. This shows, to begin with, an astounding ignorance of the ordinary facts as to the resources of Greece: a knowledge which above all others should be possessed by historians. I am not of course now speaking of the period in which the Peloponnese had been ruined by the Macedonian kings, and still more completely by a long continuance of intestine struggles; but of our own times, in which it is believed, by the establishment of its unity, to be enjoying the highest prosperity of which it is capable. Still

and its wealth.

even at this period, if you could collect all the movable property of the whole Peloponnese (leaving out the value of slaves), it would be impossible to get so large a sum of money together. That I speak on good grounds and not at random will appear from the following fact. Every one has read that when the Athenians, in conjunction with the Thebans, entered upon the war with the Lacedaemonians, and despatched an army of twenty thousand men, and manned a hundred triremes, they resolved to supply the expenses of the war by the assessment of a property tax; and accordingly had a valuation taken, not only of the whole land of Attica and the houses in it, but of all other property: but yet the value returned fell short of six thousand talents by two hundred and fifty; which will show that what I have just said about the Peloponnese is not far wide of the mark. But at this period the most exaggerated estimate could scarcely give more than three hundred talents, as coming from Megalopolis itself; for it is acknowledged that most of the inhabitants, free and slaves, escaped to Messene. But the strongest confirmation of my words is the case of Mantinea, which, as he himself observes, was second to no Arcadian city in wealth and numbers. Though it was surrendered after a siege, so that no one could escape, and no property could without great difficulty be concealed; yet the value of the whole spoil of the town, including the price of the captives sold, amounted at this same period to only three hundred talents.

B.C 378.

63. But a more astonishing mis-statement remains to be remarked. In the course of his history of this war, Phylarchus asserts "that about ten days before the battle an ambassador came from Ptolemy announcing to Cleomenes, that the king declined to continue to support him with supplies, and advised him to make terms with Antigonus. And that when this message had been delivered to Cleomenes, he made up his mind that he had better put his fortune to the supreme test as soon as possible, before his forces learnt about this message, because he could not hope to provide the soldiers' pay from his own resources." But if he had at that very time become the master of six thousand talents, he would have been better supplied

Ptolemy Euergetes and Cleomenes.

than Ptolemy himself. And as for war with Antigonus, if he had become master of only three hundred talents, he would have been able to continue it without any difficulty. But the writer states two inconsistent propositions—that Cleomenes depended wholly on Ptolemy for money: and that he at the same time had become master of that enormous sum. Is this not irrational, and grossly careless besides? I might mention many instances of a similar kind, not only in his account of this period, but throughout his whole work; but I think for my present purpose enough has been said.

64. Megalopolis having fallen, then, Antigonus spent the winter at Argos. But at the approach of spring B C. 222. Cleomenes invades Argos. Cleomenes collected his army, addressed a suitable exhortation to them, and led them into the Argive territory. Most people thought this a hazardous and foolhardy step, because the places at which the frontier was crossed were strongly fortified; but those who were capable of judging regarded the measure as at once safe and prudent. For seeing that Antigonus had dismissed his forces, he reckoned on two things,—there would be no one to resist him, and therefore he would run no risk; and when the Argives found that their territory was being laid waste up to their walls, they would be certain to be roused to anger and to lay the blame upon Antigonus: therefore, if on the one hand Antigonus, unable to bear the complaints of the populace, were to sally forth and give him battle with his present forces, Cleomenes felt sure of an easy victory; but if on the other hand Antigonus refused to alter his plans, and kept persistently aloof, he believed that he would be able to effect a safe retreat home, after succeeding by this expedition in terrifying his enemies and inspiring his own forces with courage. And this was the actual result. For as the devastation of the country went on, crowds began to collect and abuse Antigonus: but like a wise general and king, he refused to allow any consideration to outweigh that of sound strategy, and persisted in remaining inactive. Accordingly Cleomenes, in pursuance of his plan, having terrified his enemies and inspired courage in his own army for the coming struggle, returned home unmolested.

65. Summer having now come, and the Macedonian and

Achaean soldiers having assembled from their winter quarters, Antigonus moved his army, along with his allies, into Laconia. The main force consisted of ten thousand Macedonians for the phalanx, three thousand light armed, and three hundred cavalry. With these were a thousand Agraei; the same number of Gauls; three thousand mercenary infantry, and three hundred cavalry; picked troops of the Achaeans, three thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry; and a thousand Megalopolitans armed in the Macedonian manner, under the command of Cercidas of Megalopolis. Of the allies there were two thousand infantry, and two hundred cavalry, from Boeotia; a thousand infantry and fifty cavalry from Epirus; the same number from Acarnania; and sixteen hundred from Illyria, under the command of Demetrius of Pharos. The whole amounted to twenty-eight thousand infantry and twelve hundred cavalry.

The summer campaign. The army of Antigonus.

Cleomenes had expected the attack, and had secured the passes into the country by posting garrisons, digging trenches, and felling trees; while he took up position at a place called Sellasia, with an army amounting to twenty thousand, having calculated that the invading forces would take that direction: which turned out to be the case. This pass lies between two hills, called respectively Evas and Olympus, and the road to Sparta follows the course of the river Oenus. Cleomenes strengthened both these hills by lines of fortification, consisting of trench and palisade. On Evas he posted the perioeci and allies, under the command of his brother Eucleides; while he himself held Olympus with the Lacedaemonians and mercenaries. On the level ground along the river he stationed his cavalry, with a division of his mercenaries, on both sides of the road. When Antigonus arrived, he saw at once the strength of the position, and the skill with which Cleomenes had selected the different branches of his army to occupy the points of vantage, so that the whole aspect of the position was like that of skilled soldiers drawn up ready for a charge. For no preparation for attack or defence had been omitted; but everything was in order, either for offering battle with effect, or for holding an almost unassailable position.

The position of Cleomenes at Sellasia.

66. The sight of these preparations decided Antigonus not to make an immediate attack upon the position, or rashly hazard an engagement. He pitched his camp a short distance from it, covering his front by the stream called Gorgylus, and there remained for some days; informing himself by reconnaisances of the peculiarities of the ground and the character of the troops, and at the same time endeavouring by feigned movements to elicit the intentions of the enemy. But he could never find an unguarded point, or one where the troops were not entirely on the alert, for Cleomenes was always ready at a moment's notice to be at any point that was attacked. He therefore gave up all thoughts of attacking the position; and finally an understanding was come to between him and Cleomenes to bring the matter to the decision of battle. And, indeed, Fortune had there brought into competition two commanders equally endowed by nature with military skill. To face the division of the enemy on Evas Antigonus stationed his Macedonian hoplites with brazen shields, and the Illyrians, drawn up in alternate lines, under the command of Alexander, son of Acmetus, and Demetrius of Pharos, respectively. Behind them he placed the Acarnanians and Cretans, and behind them again were two thousand Achaeans to act as a reserve. His cavalry, on the banks of the river Oenous, were posted opposite the enemy's cavalry, under the command of Alexander, and flanked by a thousand Achaean infantry and the same number of Megalopolitans. Antigonus himself determined to lead his mercenaries and Macedonian troops in person against the division on Olympus commanded by Cleomenes. Owing to the narrowness of the ground, the Macedonians were arranged in a double phalanx, one close behind the other, while the mercenaries were placed in front of them. It was arranged that the Illyrians, who had bivouacked in full order during the previous night along the river Gorgylus, close to the foot of Evas, were to begin their assault on the hill when they saw a flag of linen raised from the direction of Olympus; and that the Megalopolitans and cavalry should do the same when the king raised a scarlet flag.

67. The moment for beginning the battle had come: the signal was given to the Illyrians, and the word passed by the

officers to their men to do their duty, and in a moment they started into view of the enemy and began assaulting the hill. But the light-armed troops who were stationed with Cleomenes's cavalry, observing that the Achaean lines were not covered by any other troops behind them, charged them on the rear; and thus reduced the division while endeavouring to carry the hill of Evas to a state of great peril,—being met as they were on their front by Eucleidas from the top of the hill, and being charged and vigorously attacked by the light-armed mercenaries on their rear. It was at this point that Philopoemen of Megalopolis, with a clear understanding of the situation and a foresight of what would happen, vainly endeavoured to point out the certain result to his superior officers. They disregarded him for his want of experience in command and his extreme youth; and, accordingly he acted for himself, and cheering on the men of his own city, made a vigorous charge on the enemy. This effected a diversion; for the light-armed mercenaries, who were engaged in harassing the rear of the party ascending Evas, hearing the shouting and seeing the cavalry engaged, abandoned their attack upon this party and hurried back to their original position to render assistance to the cavalry. The result was that the division of Illyrians, Macedonians, and the rest who were advancing with them, no longer had their attention diverted by an attack upon their rear, and so continued their advance upon the enemy with high spirits and renewed confidence. And this afterwards caused it to be acknowledged that to Philopoemen was due the honour of the success against Eucleidas.

Battle of Sellasia.

Philopoemen's presence of mind.

68. It is clear that Antigonus at any rate entertained that opinion, for after the battle he asked Alexander, the commander of the cavalry, with the view of convicting him of his shortcoming, "Why he had engaged before the signal was given?" And upon Alexander answering that "He had not done so, but that a young officer from Megalopolis had presumed to anticipate the signal, contrary to his wish:" Antigonus replied, "That young man acted like a good general in grasping the situation; you, general, were the youngster."

What Eucleidas ought to have done, when he saw the enemy's

lines advancing, was to have rushed down at once upon them; thrown their ranks into disorder; and then retired himself, step by step, to continually higher ground into a safe position: for by thus breaking them up and depriving them, to begin with, of the advantages of their peculiar armour and disposition, he would have secured the victory by the superiority of his position. But he did the very opposite of all this, and thereby forfeited the advantages of the ground. As though victory were assured, he kept his original position on the summit of the hill, with the view of catching the enemy at as great an elevation as possible, that their flight might be all the longer over steep and precipitous ground. The result, as might have been anticipated, was exactly the reverse. For he left himself no place of retreat, and by allowing the enemy to reach his position, unharmed and in unbroken order, he was placed at the disadvantage of having to give them battle on the very summit of the hill; and so, as soon as he was forced by the weight of their heavy armour and their close order to give any ground, it was immediately occupied by the Illyrians; while his own men were obliged to take lower ground, because they had no space for manœuvring on the top. The result was not long in arriving: they suffered a repulse, which the difficult and precipitous nature of the ground over which they had to retire turned into a disastrous flight.

Defeat of Eucleidas.

69. Simultaneously with these events the cavalry engagement was also being brought to a decision; in which all the Achaean cavalry, and especially Philopoemen, fought with conspicuous gallantry, for to them it was a contest for freedom. Philopoemen himself had his horse killed under him, and while fighting accordingly on foot received a severe wound through both his thighs. Meanwhile the two kings on the other hill Olympus began by bringing their light-armed troops and mercenaries into action, of which each of them had five thousand. Both the kings and their entire armies had a full view of this action, which was fought with great gallantry on both sides: the charges taking place sometimes in detachments, and at other times along the whole line, and an eager emulation being displayed between the several ranks, and even between in-

Defeat of Cleomenes.

dividuals. But when Cleomenes saw that his brother's division was retreating, and that the cavalry in the low ground were on the point of doing the same, alarmed at the prospect of an attack at all points at once, he was compelled to demolish the palisade in his front, and to lead out his whole force in line by one side of his position A recall was sounded on the bugle for the light-armed troops of both sides, who were on the ground between the two armies: and the phalanxes shouting their war cries, and with spears couched, charged each other. Then a fierce struggle arose: the Macedonians sometimes slowly giving ground and yielding to the superior courage of the soldiers of Sparta, and at another time the Lacedaemonians being forced to give way before the overpowering weight of the Macedonian phalanx. At length Antigonus ordered a charge in close order and in double phalanx; the enormous weight of this peculiar formation proved sufficient to finally dislodge the Lacedaemonians from their strongholds, and they fled in disorder and suffering severely as they went. Cleomenes himself, with a guard of cavalry, effected his retreat to Sparta: but the same night he went down to Gythium, where all preparations for crossing the sea had been made long before in case of mishap, and with his friends sailed to Alexandria.

70. Having surprised and taken Sparta, Antigonus treated the citizens with magnanimity and humanity; and after re-establishing their ancient constitution, he left the town in a few days, on receiving intelligence that the Illyrians had invaded Macedonia and were laying waste the country. This was a instance of the fantastic way in which Fortune decides the most important matters. For if Cleomenes had only put off the battle for a few days, or if when he returned to Sparta he had only held out for a brief space of time, he would have saved his crown.

Death of Antigonus Doson, B.C. 220.

As it was, Antigonus after going to Tegea and restoring its constitution, arrived on the second day at Argos, at the very time of the Nemean games. Having at this assembly received every mark of immortal honour and glory at the hands of the Achaean community, as well as of the several states, he made all

haste to reach Macedonia. He found the Illyrians still in the country, and forced them to give him battle, in which, though he proved entirely successful, he exerted himself to such a pitch in shouting encouragement to his men, that he ruptured a bloodvessel, and fell into an illness which terminated shortly in his death. He was a great loss to the Greeks, whom he had inspired with good hopes, not only by his support in the field, but still more by his character and good principles. He left the kingdom of Macedonia to Philip, son of Demetrius.

71. My reason for writing about this war at such length, was the advisability, or rather necessity, in view of the general purpose of my history, of making clear the relations existing between Macedonia and Greece at a time which coincides with the period of which I am about to treat.

Just about the same time, by the death of Euergetes, Ptolemy Philopator succeeded to the throne of Egypt. At the same period died Seleucus, son of that Seleucus who had the double surnames of Callinicus and Pogon : he was succeeded on the throne of Syria by his brother Antiochus. The deaths of these three sovereigns—Antigonus, Ptolemy, and Seleucus—fell in the same Olympiad, as was the case with the three immediate successors to Alexander the Great,—Seleucus, Ptolemy, and Lysimachus,— for the latter all died in the 124th Olympiad, and the former in the 139th.

B.C. 284-280.
B.C. 224-220.

I may now fitly close this book. I have completed the introduction and laid the foundation on which my history must rest. I have shown when, how, and why the Romans, after becoming supreme in Italy, began to aim at dominion outside of it, and to dispute with the Carthaginians the dominion of the sea. I have at the same time explained the state of Greece, Macedonia, and Carthage at this epoch. I have now arrived at the period which I originally marked out,—that namely in which the Greeks were on the point of beginning the Social, the Romans the Hannibalic war, and the kings in Asia the war for the possession of Coele-Syria. The termination therefore of the wars just described, and the death of the princes engaged in them, forms a natural period to this book.

BOOK III

1. I STATED in my first book that my work was to start from the Social war, the Hannibalian war, and the war for the possession of Coele-Syria. In the same book I stated my reasons for devoting my first two books to a sketch of the period preceding those events. I will now, after a few prefatory remarks as to the scope of my own work, address myself to giving a complete account of these wars, the causes which led to them, and which account for the proportions to which they attained.

A summary of the work from B.C. 220 to B.C. 168.

The one aim and object, then, of all that I have undertaken to write is to show how, when, and why all the known parts of the world fell under the dominion of Rome. Now as this great event admits of being exactly dated as to its beginning, duration, and final accomplishment, I think it will be advantageous to give, by way of preface, a summary statement of the most important phases in it between the beginning and the end. For I think I shall thus best secure to the student an adequate idea of my whole plan; for as the comprehension of the whole is a help to the understanding of details, and the knowledge of details of great service to the clear conception of the whole; believing that the best and clearest knowledge is that which is obtained from a combination of these, I will preface my whole history by a brief summary of its contents.

I have already described its scope and limits. As to its several parts, the first consists of the above mentioned wars, while the conclusion or closing scene is the fall of the Macedonian monarchy. The time included between these limits is fifty-three years; and never has an equal space em-

braced events of such magnitude and importance. In describing them I shall start from the 140th Olympiad and shall arrange my exposition in the following order: B.C. 220-216.

2. First I shall indicate the causes of the Punic or Hannibalian war: and shall have to describe how the Carthaginians entered Italy; broke up the Roman power there; made the Romans tremble for their safety and the very soil of their country; and contrary to all calculation acquired a good prospect of surprising Rome itself. 1. The cause and course of the Hannibalian war.

I shall next try to make it clear how in the same period Philip of Macedon, after finishing his war with the Aetolians, and subsequently settling the affairs of Greece, entered upon a design of forming an offensive and defensive alliance with Carthage. 2 Macedonian treaty with Carthage, B.C. 216.

Then I shall tell how Antiochus and Ptolemy Philopator first quarrelled and finally went to war with each other for the possession of Coele-Syria. 3. Syrian war, B.C. 218.

Next how the Rhodians and Prusias went to war with the Byzantines, and compelled them to desist from exacting dues from ships sailing into the Pontus. 4. Byzantine war. B.C. 220.

At this point I shall pause in my narrative to introduce a disquisition upon the Roman Constitution, in which I shall show that its peculiar character contributed largely to their success, not only in reducing all Italy to their authority, and in acquiring a supremacy over the Iberians and Gauls besides, but also at last, after their conquest of Carthage, to their conceiving the idea of universal dominion. First digression on the Roman Constitution.

Along with this I shall introduce another digression on the fall of Hiero of Syracuse. Second on Hiero of Syracuse.

After these digressions will come the disturbances in Egypt; how, after the death of King Ptolemy, Antiochus and Philip entered into a compact for the partition of the dominions of that monarch's infant son. I shall describe their treacherous dealings, Philip laying hands upon the islands of the Aegean, and Caria and Samos, Antiochus upon Coele-Syria and Phoenicia. 5. The attempted partition of the dominions of Ptolemy Epiphanes, B.C. 204.

3. Next, after a summary recapitulation of the proceedings of the Carthaginians and Romans in Iberia, Libya, and Sicily, I shall, following the changes of events, shift the scene of my story entirely to Greece. Here I shall first describe the naval battles of Attalus and the Rhodians against Philip; and the war between Philip and Rome, the persons engaged, its circumstances, and result.

6 War with Philip, B.C. 201-197

Next to this I shall have to record the wrath of the Aetolians, in consequence of which they invited the aid of Antiochus, and thereby gave rise to what is called the Asiatic war against Rome and the Achaean league. Having stated the causes of this war, and described the crossing of Antiochus into Europe, I shall have to show first in what manner he was driven from Greece; secondly, how, being defeated in the war, he was forced to cede all his territory west of Taurus; and thirdly, how the Romans, after crushing the insolence of the Gauls, secured undisputed possession of Asia, and freed all the nations on the west of Taurus from the fear of barbarian inroads and the lawless violence of the Gauls.

7. Asiatic war, B.C. 192-191.

Next, after reviewing the disasters of the Aetolians and Cephallenians, I shall pass to the wars waged by Eumenes against Prusias and the Gauls; as well as that carried on in alliance with Ariarathes against Pharnaces.

8. Gallic wars of Eumenes and Prusias.

Finally, after speaking of the unity and settlement of the Peloponnese, and of the growth of the commonwealth of Rhodes, I shall add a summary of my whole work, concluding by an account of the expedition of Antiochus Epiphanes against Egypt; of the war against Perseus; and the destruction of the Macedonian monarchy. Throughout the whole narrative it will be shown how the policy adopted by the Romans in one after another of these cases, as they arose, led to their eventual conquest of the whole world.

9. Union of the Peloponnese. Antiochus Epiphanes in Egypt. Fall of the Macedonian monarchy, B.C. 188-168.

4. And if our judgment of individuals and constitutions, for praise or blame, could be adequately formed from a simple consideration of their successes or defeats, I must necessarily

ave stopped at this point, and have concluded my history as oon as I reached these last events in accordance with my riginal plan. For at this point the fifty-three years were oming to an end, and the progress of the Roman power had rrived at its consummation. And, besides, by this time ıe acknowledgment had been extorted from all that the ıpremacy of Rome must be accepted, and her commands beyed. But in truth, judgments of either side ounded on the bare facts of success or failure ı the field are by no means final. It has ften happened that what seemed the most ignal successes have, from ill management, brought the ıost crushing disasters in their train; while not unfreuently the most terrible calamities, sustained with spirit, ave been turned to actual advantage. I am bound, therefore, to add to my statement of facts a discussion on the ubsequent policy of the conquerors, and their administration of their universal dominion: and again on the arious feelings and opinions entertained by other nations owards their rulers. And I must also describe the tastes nd aims of the several nations, whether in their private ves or public policy. The present generation will learn om this whether they should shun or seek the rule f Rome; and future generations will be taught whether to raise and imitate, or to decry it. The usefulness of my istory, whether for the present or the future, will mainly lie ı this. For the end of a policy should not be, in the eyes ither of the actors or their historians, simply to conquer others nd bring all into subjection. Nor does any man of sense o to war with his neighbours for the mere purpose of ıastering his opponents; nor go to sea for the mere sake of he voyage; nor engage in professions and trades for the sole ırpose of learning them. In all these cases the objects are ıvariably the pleasure, honour, or profit which are the results f the several employments. Accordingly the object of this ork shall be to ascertain exactly what the position of the several tates was, after the universal conquest by which they fell under he power of Rome, until the commotions and disturbances hich broke out at a later period. These I designed to

The plan extended to embrace the period from B.C 168-146.

make the starting-point of what may almost be called a new work, partly because of the greatness and surprising nature of the events themselves, but chiefly because, in the case of most of them, I was not only an eye-witness, but in some cases one of the actors, and in others the chief director.

A new departure; the breaking-up of the arrangement made after the fall of Macedonia. Wars of Carthage against Massinissa; and of Rome against the Celtiberians, B.C. 155-150; and against Carthage (3d Punic war, B.C 149-146).

5. The events I refer to are the wars of Rome against the Celtiberians and Vaccaei; those of Carthage against Massinissa, king of Libya; and those of Attalus and Prusias in Asia. Then also Ariarathes, King of Cappadocia, having been ejected from his throne by Orophernes through the agency of King Demetrius, recovered his ancestral power by the help of Attalus; while Demetrius, son of Seleucus, after twelve years' possession of the throne of Syria, was deprived of it, and of his life at the same time, by a combination of the other kings against him. Then it was, too, that the Romans restored to their country those Greeks who had been charged with guilt in the matter of the war with Perseus, after formally acquitting them of the crimes alleged against them. Not long afterwards the same people turned their hands against Carthage: at first with the intention of forcing its removal to some other spot, but finally, for reasons to be afterwards stated, with the resolution of utterly destroying it. Contemporaneous with this came the renunciation by the Macedonians of their friendship to Rome, and by the Lacedaemonians of their membership of the Achaean league, to which the disaster that befel all Greece alike owed its beginning and end.

This is my purpose: but its fulfilment must depend upon whether Fortune protracts my life to the necessary length. I am persuaded, however, that, even if the common human destiny does overtake me, this theme will not be allowed to lie idle for want of competent men to handle it; for there are many besides myself who will readily undertake its completion. But having given the heads of the most remarkable events, with the object of enabling the reader to grasp the general scope of my history as well as the arrangement of its several

parts, I must now, remembering my original plan, go back to the point at which my history starts.

6. Some historians of the Hannibalian war, when they wish to point out to us the causes of this contest between Rome and Carthage, allege first the siege of Saguntum by the Carthaginians, and, secondly, their breach of treaty by crossing the river called by the natives the Iber. But though I should call these the first actions in the war, I cannot admit them to be its causes. One might just as well say that the crossing of Alexander the Great into Asia was the *cause* of the Persian war, and the descent of Antiochus upon Demetrias the *cause* of his war with Rome. In neither would it be a probable or true statement. In the first case, this action of Alexander's could not be called the cause of a war, for which both he and his father Philip in his lifetime had made elaborate preparations: and in the second case, we know that the Aetolian league had done the same, with a view to a war with Rome, before Antiochus came upon the scene. Such definitions are only worthy of men who cannot distinguish between a first overt act and a cause or pretext; and who do not perceive that a *cause* is the first in a series of events of which such an overt act is the last. I shall therefore regard the first attempt to put into execution what had already been determined as a "beginning," but I shall look for "causes" in the motives which suggested such action and the policy which dictated it; for it is by these, and the calculations to which they give rise, that men are led to decide upon a particular line of conduct. The soundness of this method will be proved by the following considerations. The true causes and origin of the invasion of Persia by Alexander are patent to everybody. They were, first, the return march of the Greeks under Xenophon through the country from the upper Satrapies; in the course of which, though throughout Asia all the populations were hostile, not a single barbarian ventured to face them: secondly, the invasion of Asia by the Spartan king Agesilaus, in which, though he was obliged by troubles in Greece to return in the middle of his

The origin of the 2d Punic war;

B.C. 334,

B.C. 192,

B C. 401-400,

B C. 396-394,

expedition without effecting his object, he yet found no resistance of any importance or adequacy. It was these circumstances which convinced Philip of the cowardice and inefficiency of the Persians; and comparing them with his own high state of efficiency for war, and that of his Macedonian subjects, and placing before his eyes the splendour of the rewards to be gained by such a war, and the popularity which it would bring him in Greece, he seized on the pretext of avenging the injuries done by Persia to Greece, and determined with great eagerness to undertake this war; and was in fact at the time of his death engaged in making every kind of preparation for it.

Here we have the *cause* and the *pretext* of the Persian war. Alexander's expedition into Asia was the *first action* in it.

and of the war with Antiochus.

7. So too of the war of Antiochus with Rome. The *cause* was evidently the exasperation of the Aetolians, who, thinking that they had been slighted in a number of instances at the end of the war with Philip, not only called in the aid of Antiochus, but resolved to go to every extremity in satisfying the anger which the events of that time had aroused in them. This was the *cause*. As for the *pretext*, it was the liberation of Greece, which they went from city to city with Antiochus proclaiming, without regard to reason or truth; while the *first act* in the war was the descent of Antiochus upon Demetrias.

My object in enlarging upon this distinction is not to attack the historians in question, but to rectify the ideas of the studious. A physician can do no good to the sick who does not know the causes of their ailments; nor can a statesman do any good who is unable to conceive the manner, cause, and source of the events with which he has from time to time to deal. Surely the former could not be expected to institute a suitable system of treatment for the body; nor the latter to grapple with the exigencies of the situation, without possessing this knowledge of its elements. There is nothing, therefore, which we ought to be more alive to, and to seek for, than the causes of every event which occurs. For the most important results are often produced by trifles; and it is invariably easier to apply remedial measures at the beginning, before things have got beyond the stage of conception and intention.

8. Now the Roman annalist Fabius asserts that the cause of the Hannibalian war, besides the injury inflicted upon Saguntum, was the encroaching and ambitious spirit of Hasdrubal. "Having secured great power in Iberia, he returned to Libya with the design of destroying the constitution and reducing Carthage to a despotism. But the leading statesmen, getting timely warning of his intention, banded themselves together and successfully opposed him. Suspecting this Hasdrubal retired from Libya, and thenceforth governed Iberia entirely at his own will without taking any account whatever of the Carthaginian Senate. This policy had had in Hannibal from his earliest youth a zealous supporter and imitator; and when he succeeded to the command in Iberia he continued it: and accordingly, even in the case of this war with Rome, was acting on his own authority and contrary to the wish of the Carthaginians; for none of the men of note in Carthage approved of his attack upon Saguntum." This is the statement of Fabius, who goes on to say, that "after the capture of that city an embassy arrived in Carthage from Rome demanding that Hannibal should be given up on pain of a declaration of war." The credibility of Fabius Pictor.

Now what answer could Fabius have given if we had put the following question to him? "What better chance or opportunity could the Carthaginians have had of combining justice and interest? According to your own account they disliked the proceeding of Hannibal: why did they not submit to the demands of Rome by surrendering the author of the injury; and thus get rid of the common enemy of the state without the odium of doing it themselves, and secure the safety of their territory by ridding themselves of the threatened war—all of which they could have effected by merely passing a decree?" If this question were put, I say, it would admit of no answer. The fact is that, so far from doing anything of the sort, they maintained the war in accordance with Hannibal's policy for seventeen years; and refused to make terms until, at the end of a most determined struggle, they found their own city and persons in imminent danger of destruction.

9. I do not allude to Fabius and his annals from any fear of their wearing such an air of probability in themselves as to

gain any credit,—for the fact is that his assertions are so contrary to reason, that it does not need any argument of mine to help his readers to perceive it,—but I wished to warn those who take up his books not to be misled by the authority of his name, but to be guided by facts. For there is a certain class of readers in whose eyes the personality of the writer is of more account than what he says. They look to the fact that Fabius was a contemporary and a member of the Senate, and assume without more ado that everything he says may be trusted. My view, however, is that we ought not to hold the authority of this writer lightly: yet at the same time that we should not regard it as all-sufficient; but in reading his writings should test them by a reference to the facts themselves.

This is a digression from my immediate subject, which is the war between Carthage and Rome. The cause of this war we must reckon to be the exasperation of Hamilcar, surnamed Barcas, the father of Hannibal. The result of the war in Sicily had not broken the spirit of that commander. He regarded himself as unconquered; for the troops at Eryx which he commanded were still sound and undismayed: and though he yielded so far as to make a treaty, it was a concession to the exigencies of the times brought on by the defeat of the Carthaginians at sea. But he never relaxed in his determined purpose of revenge; and, had it not been for the mutiny of the mercenaries at Carthage, he would at once have sought and made another occasion for bringing about a war, as far as he was able to do so: as it was, he was preoccupied by the domestic war, and had to give his attention entirely to that.

The Hannibalian or 2nd Punic war.

First cause.

10. When the Romans, at the conclusion of this mercenary war, proclaimed war with Carthage, the latter at first was inclined to resist at all hazards, because the goodness of her cause gave her hopes of victory,—as I have shown in my former book, without which it would be impossible to understand adequately either this or what is to follow. The Romans, however, would not listen to anything: and the Carthaginians therefore yielded to the force of circumstances; and though feeling bitterly aggrieved, yet being quite unable to do anything, evacuated Sardinia, and consented

B.C. 238.

Bk. i. ch. 88.

Second cause.

to pay a sum of twelve hundred talents, in addition to the former indemnity paid them, on condition of avoiding the war at that time. This is the second and the most important cause of the subsequent war. For Hamilcar, having this public grievance in addition to his private feelings of anger, as soon as he had secured his country's safety by reducing the rebellious mercenaries, set at once about securing the Carthaginian power in Iberia with the intention of using it as a base of operations against Rome. So that I record as a third cause of the war the Carthaginian success in Iberia: for it was the confidence inspired by their forces there which encouraged them to embark upon it. It would be easy to adduce other facts to show that Hamilcar, though he had been dead ten years at its commencement, largely contributed to bring about the second Punic war, but what I am about to say will be sufficient to establish the fact.

Third cause.

11. When, after his final defeat by the Romans, Hannibal had at last quitted his country and was staying at the court of Antiochus, the warlike attitude of the Aetolian league induced the Romans to send ambassadors to Antiochus, that they might be informed of the king's intentions. These ambassadors found that Antiochus was inclined to the Aetolian alliance, and was eager for war with Rome; they accordingly paid great court to Hannibal with a view of bringing him into suspicion with the king. And in this they entirely succeeded. As time went on the king became ever more and more suspicious of Hannibal, until at length an opportunity occurred for an explanation of the alienation that had been thus secretly growing up between them. Hannibal then defended himself at great length, but without success, until at last he made the following statement: "When my father was about to go on his Iberian expedition I was nine years old: and as he was offering the sacrifice to Zeus I stood near the altar. The sacrifice successfully performed, my father poured the libation and went through the usual ritual. He then bade all the other worshippers stand a little back, and calling me to him asked me affectionately whether I wished to go with him on his expedition. Upon

Hannibal's oath.

B.C. 195.

B.C. 238.

my eagerly assenting, and begging with boyish enthusiasm to be allowed to go, he took me by the right hand and led me up to the altar, and bade me lay my hand upon the victim and swear that I would never be friends with Rome. So long, then, Antiochus, as your policy is one of hostility to Rome, you may feel quite secure of having in me a most thorough-going supporter. But if ever you make terms or friendship with her, then you need not wait for any slander to make you distrust me and be on your guard against me; for there is nothing in my power that I would not do against her."

12. Antiochus listened to this story, and being convinced that it was told with genuine feeling and sincerity, gave up all his suspicions. And we, too, must regard this as an unquestionable proof of the animosity of Hamilcar and of the aim of his general policy; which, indeed, is also proved by facts. For he inspired his son-in-law Hasdrubal and his son Hannibal with a bitterness of resentment against Rome which nothing could surpass. Hasdrubal, indeed, was prevented by death from showing the full extent of his purpose; but time gave Hannibal abundant opportunity to manifest the hatred of Rome which he had inherited from his father.

The most important thing, then, for statesmen to observe is the motives of those who lay aside old enmities or form new friendships; and to ascertain when their consent to treaties is a mere concession to the necessities of the hour, and when it is the indication of a real consciousness of defeat. In the former case they must be on their guard against such people lying in wait for an opportunity; while in the latter they may unhesitatingly impose whatever injunctions are necessary, in full reliance on the genuineness of their feelings whether as subjects or friends. So much for the causes of the war. I will now relate the first actions in it.

13. The Carthaginians were highly incensed by their loss of Sicily, but their resentment was heightened still more, as I have said, by the transaction as to Sardinia, and by the addition recently made to their tribute. Accordingly, when the greater part of Iberia had fallen into their power, they were on the alert to seize any opportunity that presented itself of retaliating upon Rome. At the death of Hasdrubal, to whom

hey had committed the command in Iberia after the death of Hamilcar, they waited at first to ascertain the eelings of the army; but when news came from hence that the troops had elected Hannibal as ommander-in-chief, a popular assembly was at once held, and he choice of the army confirmed by a unanimous vote. As oon as he had taken over the command, Hanni- bal set out to subdue the tribe of the Olcades; and, having arrived before their most for- nidable city Althaea, he pitched his camp under its walls; and by a series of energetic and formidable assaults succeeded before long in taking it: by which the rest of the tribe were overawed into submission to Carthage. Having imposed a contribution upon the towns, and thus become possessed of a large sum of money, he went to the New Town to winter. There, by a liberal treatment of the forces under his command, giving them an instalment of their pay at once and promising he rest, he established an excellent feeling towards himself in he army, as well as great hopes for the future.

Death of Hamilcar, B.C. 229.

Death of Hasdrubal, B.C. 221.

14. Next summer he set out on another expedition against he Vaccaei, in which he took Salmantica by assault, but only succeeded in storming Arbu- cala, owing to the size of the town and the number and valour of its inhabitants, after a laborious siege. After this he suddenly found himself in a position of very great danger on his return march: being set upon by the Carpesii, the strongest tribe in those parts, who were joined also by neigh- bouring tribes, incited principally by refugees of the Olcades, but roused also to great wrath by those who escaped from Salmantica. If the Carthaginians had been compelled to give hese people regular battle, there can be no doubt that they would have been defeated: but as it was, Hannibal, with admirable skill and caution, slowly retreated until he had put the Tagus between himself and the enemy; and thus giving battle at the crossing of the stream, supported by it and the elephants, of which he had about forty, he gained, to every one's surprise, a complete success. For when the barbarians attempted to force a crossing at several points of the river at once, the greater number of them were killed as they left the water by

B.C. 220. Hannibal attacks the Vaccaei.

the elephants, who marched up and down along the brink of the river and caught them as they were coming out. Many of them also were killed in the river itself by the cavalry, because the horses were better able than the men to stand against the stream, and also because the cavalry were fighting on higher ground than the infantry which they were attacking. At length Hannibal turned the tables on the enemy, and, recrossing the river, attacked and put to flight their whole army, to the number of more than a hundred thousand men. After the defeat of this host, no one south of the Iber rashly ventured to face him except the people of Saguntum. From that town Hannibal tried his best to keep aloof; because, acting on the suggestions and advice of his father Hamilcar, he did not wish to give the Romans an avowed pretext for war until he had thoroughly secured the rest of the country.

15. But the people of Saguntum kept sending ambassadors to Rome, partly because they foresaw what was coming, and trembled for their own existence, and partly that the Romans might be kept fully aware of the growing power of the Carthaginians in Iberia. For a long time the Romans disregarded their words: but now they sent out some commissioners to see what was going on. Just at that time Hannibal had finished the conquests which he intended for that season, and was going into winter quarters at the New Town again, which was in a way the chief glory and capital town of the Carthaginians in Iberia. He found there the embassy from Rome, granted them an interview, and listened to the message with which they were charged. It was a strong injunction to him to leave Saguntum alone, as being under the protection of Rome; and not to cross the Iber, in accordance with the agreement come to in the time of Hasdrubal. To this Hannibal answered with all the heat of youth, inflamed by martial ardour, recent success, and his long-standing hatred of Rome. He charged the Romans with having a short time before, when on some political disturbances arising in the town they had been chosen to act as arbitrators, seized the opportunity to put some of the leading citizens to death; and he declared that the Carthaginians would not allow the Saguntines to be

Saguntum appeals to Rome
Winter of B.C 220-219

Hannibal's defiance

thus treacherously dealt with, for it was the traditional policy of Carthage to protect all persons so wronged. At the same time he sent home for instructions as to what he was to do "in view of the fact that the Saguntines were injuring certain of their subject allies." And altogether he was in a state of unreasoning anger and violent exasperation, which prevented him from availing himself of the real causes for war, and made him take refuge in pretexts which would not admit of justification, after the manner of men whose passions master all considerations of equity. How much better it would have been to demand of Rome the restoration of Sardinia, and the remission of the tribute, which she had taken an unfair opportunity to impose on pain of a declaration of war. As it was, he said not a word of the real cause, but alleged the fictitious one of the matter of Saguntum; and so got the credit of beginning the war, not only in defiance of reason, but still more in defiance of justice. The Roman ambassadors, finding that there must undoubtedly be a war, sailed to Carthage to enter the same protest before the people there. They expected, however, that they would have to fight not in Italy, but in Iberia, and that they would have Saguntum as a base of operations.

16. Wherefore the Senate, by way of preparing to undertake this business, and foreseeing that the war would be severe and protracted, and at a long distance from the mother country, determined to make Illyria safe. For it happened that, just at this time, Demetrius of Pharos was sacking and subduing to his authority the cities of Illyria which were subject to Rome, and had sailed beyond Lissus, in violation of the treaty, with fifty galleys, and had ravaged many of the Cyclades. For he had quite forgotten the former kindnesses done him by Rome, and had conceived a contempt for its power, when he saw it threatened first by the Gauls and then by Carthage; and he now rested all his hopes on the royal family of Macedonia, because he had fought on the side of Antigonus, and shared with him the dangers of the war against Cleomenes. These transactions attracted the observation of the Romans; who, seeing that the royal house of Macedonia

Illyrian war, B C. 219.

was in a flourishing condition, were very anxious to secure the country east of Italy; feeling convinced that they would have ample time to correct the rash folly of the Illyrians, and rebuke and chastise the ingratitude and temerity of Demetrius. But they were deceived in their calculations. For Hannibal anticipated their measures by the capture of Saguntum: the result of which was that the war took place not in Iberia, but close to Rome itself, and in various parts throughout all Italy. However, with these ideas fixed in their minds, the Romans despatched Lucius Aemilius just before summer to conduct the Illyrian campaign in the first year of the 140th Olympiad.

B.C. 219. Coss. M. Livius Salinator L. Aemilius Paullus.

17. But Hannibal had started from New Carthage and was leading his army straight against Saguntum. This city is situated on the sea-ward foot of the mountain chain on which the frontiers of Iberia and Celtiberia converge, and is about seven stades from the sea. The district cultivated by its inhabitants is exceedingly productive, and has a soil superior to any in all Iberia. Under the walls of this town Hannibal pitched his camp and set energetically to work on the siege, foreseeing many advantages that would accrue if he could take it. Of these the first was that he would thereby disappoint the Romans in their expectation of making Iberia the seat of war: a second was that he would thereby strike a general terror, which would render the already obedient tribes more submissive, and the still independent ones more cautious of offending him: but the greatest advantage of all was that thereby he would be able to push on his advance, without leaving an enemy on his rear. Besides these advantages, he calculated that the possession of this city would secure him abundant supplies for his expedition, and create an enthusiasm in the troops excited by individual acquisitions of booty; while he would conciliate the goodwill of those who remained at Carthage by the spoils which would be sent home. With these ideas he pressed on the siege with energy: sometimes setting an example to his soldiers by personally sharing in the fatigues of throwing up the siege works; and sometimes cheering on his men and recklessly exposing himself to danger.

Hannibal besieges Saguntum.

After a siege extending to the eighth month, in the course of which he endured every kind of suffering and anxiety, he finally succeeded in taking the town. Fall of Saguntum.
An immense booty in money, slaves, and property fell into his hands, which he disposed of in accordance with his original design. The money he reserved for the needs of his projected expedition; the slaves were distributed according to merit among his men; while the property was at once sent entire to Carthage. The result answered his expectations: the army was rendered more eager for action; the home populace more ready to grant whatever he asked; and he himself was enabled, by the possession of such abundant means, to carry out many measures that were of service to his expedition.

18. While this was taking place, Demetrius, discovering the intentions of Rome, threw a sufficient garrison into Dimale and victualled it in proportion. Illyrian war, B.C. 219.
In the other towns he put those who were opposed to him to death, and placed the chief power in the hands of his own partisans; and selecting six thousand of the bravest of his subjects, quartered them in Pharos. When the Consul arrived in Illyria with his army, he found the enemies of Rome confident in the strength of Dimale and the elaborate preparations in it, and encouraged to resistance by their belief in its impregnability; he determined, therefore, to attack that town first, in order to strike terror into the enemy. Accordingly, after addressing an exhortation to the several officers of the legions, and throwing up siege works at several points, he began the siege in form. In seven days he took the town by assault, which so dismayed the enemy, that envoys immediately appeared from all the towns, surrendering themselves unconditionally to the protection of Rome. The Consul accepted their submission: and after imposing such conditions as appeared suitable to the several cases, he sailed to Pharos to attack Demetrius himself. Being informed that the city there was strongly fortified, thronged with excellent soldiers, and well-furnished with provisions and all other munitions of war, he began to entertain misgivings that the siege would be long and difficult; and therefore, with a view to these difficulties, he adopted on the spur of the moment the following

strategem. He crossed to the island by night with his whole army. The greater part of it he disembarked at a spot where the ground was well-wooded and low; while with only twenty ships he sailed at daybreak to the harbour nearest the town. The smallness of the number of the ships moved only the contempt of Demetrius when he saw them, and he immediately marched out of the town down to the harbour to oppose the landing of the enemy.

Capture of Pharos.

19. A violent struggle at once began: and, as it went on, division after division of the troops in the city came down to support him, until at length the whole force had poured out to take part in the engagement. The Romans who had landed in the night arrived at the critical moment, after a march by an obscure route; and seizing a strong position on some rising ground between the city and the harbour, efficiently cut off from the city the troops that had sallied out. When Demetrius became aware of what had taken place, he desisted from opposing the disembarkation; and having rallied his men and addressed the ranks, he put them in motion, with the resolution of fighting a pitched battle with the troops on the hill. When the Romans saw the Illyrian advance being made in good order and with great spirit, they formed their ranks and charged furiously. At the same moment the Roman troops which had just effected their landing, seeing what was going on, charged the enemy on the rear, who being thus attacked on both sides, were thrown into great disorder and confusion. The result was that, finding both his van and his rear in difficulties, Demetrius fled. Some of his men retreated towards the city; but most of them escaped by bye-paths into various parts of the island. Demetrius himself made his way to some galleys which he kept at anchor at a solitary point on the coast, with a view to every contingency; and going on board, he sailed away at nightfall, and arrived unexpectedly at the court of King Philip, where he passed the remainder of his life:—a man whose undoubted boldness and courage were unsupported by either prudence or judgment. His end was of a piece with the whole tenor of his life; for while endeavouring at the instigation of Philip to seize Messene, he exposed himself during

the battle with a careless rashness which cost him his life; of which I shall speak in detail when I come to that period.

The Consul Aemilius having thus taken Pharos at a blow, levelled the city to the ground; and then having become master of all Illyria, and having ordered all its affairs as he thought right, returned towards the end of the summer to Rome, where he celebrated a triumph amid expressions of unmixed approval; for people considered that he had managed this business with great prudence and even greater courage.

20. But when news came to Rome of the fall of Saguntum, there was indeed no debate on the question of war, as some historians assert; who even add the speeches delivered on either side. But nothing could be more ridiculous. For is it conceivable that the Romans should have a year before proclaimed war with the Carthaginians in the event of their entering the territory of Saguntum, and yet, when the city itself had been taken, should have debated whether they should go to war or no? Just as absurd are the wonderful statements that the senators put on mourning, and that the fathers introduced their sons above twelve years old into the Senate House, who, being admitted to the debate, refrained from divulging any of its secrets even to their nearest relations. All this is as improbable as it is untrue; unless we are to believe that Fortune, among its other bounties, granted the Romans the privilege of being men of the world from their cradles. I need not waste any more words upon such compositions as those of Chaereas and Sosilus;[1] which, in my judgment, are more like the gossip of the barber's shop and the pavement than history.

Indignation at Rome at the fall of Saguntum.

The truth is that, when the Romans heard of the disaster at Saguntum, they at once elected envoys, whom they despatched in all haste to Carthage with the offer of two alternatives, one of which appeared to the Carthaginians to involve disgrace as well as injury if they accepted it, while the other was the

Envoys sent to Carthage to demand surrender of Hannibal.

[1] Of Chaereas nothing seems known; a few fragments of an historian of his name are given in Muller, vol. III. Of Sosilus, Diodorus (26, fr. 6) says that he was of Ilium and wrote a history of Hannibal in seven books. Nepos (Hann.

beginning of a great struggle and of great dangers. For one of these alternatives was the surrender of Hannibal and his staff to Rome, the other was war. When the Roman envoys arrived and declared their message to the Senate, the choice proposed to them between these alternatives was listened to by the Carthaginians with indignation. Still they selected the most capable of their number to state their case, which was grounded on the following pleas.

21. Passing over the treaty made with Hasdrubal, as not having ever been made, and, if it had, as not being binding on them because made without their consent (and on this point they quoted the precedent of the Romans themselves, who in the Sicilian war repudiated the terms agreed upon and accepted by Lutatius, as having been made without their consent) — passing over this, they pressed with all the vehemence they could, throughout the discussion, the last treaty made in the Sicilian war; in which they affirmed that there was no clause relating to Iberia, but one expressly providing security for the allies of both parties to the treaty. Now, they pointed out that the Saguntines at that time were not allies of Rome, and therefore were not protected by the clause. To prove their point, they read the treaty more than once aloud. On this occasion the Roman envoys contented themselves with the reply that, while Saguntum was intact, the matter in dispute admitted of pleadings and of a discussion on its merits; but that, that city having been treacherously seized, they had only two alternatives,—either to deliver the persons guilty of the act, and thereby make it clear that they had no share in their crime, and that it was done without their consent; or, if they were not willing to do that, and avowed their complicity in it, to take the consequences.

The question of treaties between Rome and Carthage was referred to in general terms in the course of this debate: but I think a more particular examination of it will be useful both to practical statesmen, who require to know the exact truth of the matter, in order to avoid mistakes in any critical deliberation; and to historical students, that they may not be led astray by

13) calls him a Lacedaemonian, and says that he lived in Hannibal's camp and taught him Greek.

the ignorance or partisan bias of historians; but may have before them a conspectus, acknowledged to be accurate, of the various compacts which have been made between Rome and Carthage from the earliest times to our own day.

22. The first treaty between Rome and Carthage was made in the year of Lucius Junius Brutus and Marcus Horatius, the first Consuls appointed after the expulsion of the kings, by which men also the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus was consecrated. This was twenty-eight years before the invasion of Greece by Xerxes. Of this treaty I append a translation, as accurate as I could make it,—for the fact is that the ancient language differs so much from that at present in use, that the best scholars among the Romans themselves have great difficulty in interpreting some points in it, even after much study. The treaty is as follows:—

Treaties between Rome and Carthage.

The first treaty, B.C. 509-508.

"There shall be friendship between the Romans and their allies, and the Carthaginians and their allies, on these conditions:

"Neither the Romans nor their allies are to sail beyond the Fair Promontory, unless driven by stress of weather or the fear of enemies. If any one of them be driven ashore he shall not buy or take aught for himself save what is needful for the repair of his ship and the service of the gods, and he shall depart within five days.

"Men landing for traffic shall strike no bargain save in the presence of a herald or town-clerk. Whatever is sold in the presence of these, let the price be secured to the seller on the credit of the state—that is to say, if such sale be in Libya or Sardinia.

"If any Roman comes to the Carthaginian province in Sicily he shall enjoy all rights enjoyed by others. The Carthaginians shall do no injury to the people of Ardea, Antium, Laurentium, Circeii, Tarracina, nor any other people of the Latins that are subject to Rome.

"From those townships even which are not subject to Rome[1] they shall hold their hands; and if they take one shall deliver it unharmed to the Romans. They shall build no fort

[1] *i.e* in Latium.

in Latium; and if they enter the district in arms, they shall not stay a night therein."

23. The "Fair Promontory" here referred to is that which lies immediately to the north of Carthage; south of which the Carthaginians stipulated that the Romans should not sail with ships of war, because, as I imagine, they did not wish them to be acquainted with the coast near Byzacium, or the lesser Syrtis, which places they call Emporia, owing to the productiveness of the district. The treaty then goes on to say that, if any one of them is driven thither by stress of weather or fear of an enemy, and stands in need of anything for the worship of the gods and the repair of his vessel, this and no more he may take; and all those who have come to anchor there must necessarily depart within five days. To Carthage, and all the country on the Carthaginian side of the Fair Promontory in Libya, to Sardinia, and the Carthaginian province of Sicily, the treaty allows the Romans to sail for mercantile purposes; and the Carthaginians engage their public credit that such persons shall enjoy absolute security.

It is clear from this treaty that the Carthaginians speak of Sardinia and Libya as belonging to them entirely; but, on the other hand, make a distinction in the case of Sicily, and only stipulate for that part of it which is subject to Carthage. Similarly, the Romans also only stipulate concerning Latium; the rest of Italy they do not mention, as not being under their authority.

24. After this treaty there was a second, in which we find that the Carthaginians have included the Tyrians and the township of Utica in addition to their former territory; and to the Fair Promontory Mastia and Tarseium are added, as the points east of which the Romans are not to make marauding expeditions or found a city. The treaty is as follows: "There shall be friendship between the Romans and their allies, and the Carthaginians, Tyrians, and township of Utica, on these terms: The Romans shall not maraud, nor traffic, nor found a city east of the Fair Promontory, Mastia, Tarseium. If the Carthaginians take any city in Latium which is not subject to Rome, they may keep the prisoners and the

Second treaty, B.C. 306 (?).

goods, but shall deliver up the town. If the Carthaginians take any folk, between whom and Rome a peace has been made in writing, though they be not subject to them, they shall not bring them into any harbours of the Romans; if such an one be so brought ashore, and any Roman lay claim to him,[1] he shall be released. In like manner shall the Romans be bound towards the Carthaginians.

"If a Roman take water or provisions from any district within the jurisdiction of Carthage, he shall not injure, while so doing, any between whom and Carthage there is peace and friendship. Neither shall a Carthaginian in like case. If any one shall do so, he shall not be punished by private vengeance, but such action shall be a public misdemeanour.

"In Sardinia and Libya no Roman shall traffic nor found a city; he shall do no more than take in provisions and refit his ship. If a storm drive him upon those coasts, he shall depart within five days.

"In the Carthaginian province of Sicily and in Carthage he may transact business and sell whatsoever it is lawful for a citizen to do. In like manner also may a Carthaginian at Rome."

Once more in this treaty we may notice that the Carthaginians emphasise the fact of their entire possession of Libya and Sardinia, and prohibit any attempt of the Romans to land in them at all; and on the other hand, in the case of Sicily, they clearly distinguish their own province in it. So, too, the Romans, in regard to Latium, stipulate that the Carthaginians shall do no wrong to Ardea, Antium, Circeii, Tarracina, all of which are on the seaboard of Latium, to which alone the treaty refers.

25. A third treaty again was made by Rome at the time of the invasion of Pyrrhus into Sicily; before the Carthaginians undertook the war for the possession of Sicily. This treaty contains the same provisions as the two earlier treaties with these additional clauses:— Third treaty, B C. 279.

"If they make a treaty of alliance with Pyrrhus, the Romans or Carthaginians shall make it on such terms as

[1] ἐπιλάβηται *injecerit manum*, the legal form of claiming a slave.

not to preclude the one giving aid to the other, if that one's territory is attacked.

"If one or the other stand in need of help, the Carthaginians shall supply the ships, whether for transport or war; but each people shall supply the pay for its own men employed on them.

"The Carthaginians shall also give aid by sea to the Romans if need be; but no one shall compel the crews to disembark against their will."

Provision was also made for swearing to these treaties. In the case of the first, the Carthaginians were to swear by the gods of their ancestors, the Romans by Jupiter Lapis, in accordance with an ancient custom; in the case of the last treaty, by Mars and Quirinus.

The form of swearing by Jupiter Lapis was this. The commissioner for swearing to the treaty took a stone in his hand, and, having taken the oath in the name of his country, added these words, "If I abide by this oath may he bless me; but if I do otherwise in thought or act, may all others be kept safe each in his own country, under his own laws, in enjoyment of his own goods, household gods, and tombs,—may I alone be cast out, even as this stone is now." And having uttered these words he throws the stone from his hand.

Misstatement of Philinus.

26. Seeing that such treaties exist and are preserved to this day, engraved on brass in the treasury of the Aediles in the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus, the historian Philinus certainly does give us some reason to be surprised at him. Not at his ignorance of their existence: for even in our own day those Romans and Carthaginians, whose age placed them nearest to the times, and who had the reputation of taking the greatest interest in public affairs, were unaware of it. But what is surprising is, that he should have ventured on a statement exactly opposite: "That there was a treaty between Rome and Carthage, in virtue of which the Romans were bound to keep away from the whole of Sicily, the Carthaginians from the whole of Italy; and that the Romans broke the treaty and their oath when they first crossed over to Sicily." Whereas there does not exist, nor ever has existed, any such written compact at all. Yet

this assertion he makes in so many words in his second book. I referred to this in the preface of my work, but reserved a more detailed discussion of it to this place; which was necessary, because the assertion of Philinus has misled a considerable number of people on this point. I have nothing to say if a man chooses to attack the Romans for crossing into Sicily, on the grounds of their having taken the Mamertines into alliance at all; or in having thus acted in answer to their request, after these men's treachery to Rhegium as well as Messene: but if any one supposes that in so crossing they broke oaths or treaties, he is manifestly ignorant of the truth.

27. At the end of the first Punic war another treaty was made, of which the chief provisions were these: "The Carthaginians shall evacuate Sicily and all islands lying between Italy and Sicily. Fourth treaty, B C. 241.

"The allies of neither of the parties to the treaty shall be attacked by the other.

"Neither party shall impose any contribution, nor erect any public building, nor enlist soldiers in the dominions of the other, nor make any compact of friendship with the allies of the other.

"The Carthaginians shall within ten years pay to the Romans two-thousand two-hundred talents, and a thousand on the spot; and shall restore all prisoners, without ransom, to the Romans."

Afterwards, at the end of the Mercenary war in Africa, the Romans went so far as to pass a decree for war with Carthage, but eventually made a treaty to the following effect: "The Carthaginians shall evacuate Sardinia, and pay an additional twelve hundred talents." Fifth treaty, B C. 238.

Finally, in addition to these treaties, came that negotiated with Hasdrubal in Iberia, in which it was stipulated that "the Carthaginians should not cross the Iber with arms." Sixth treaty, B C. 228

Such were the mutual obligations established between Rome and Carthage from the earliest times to that of Hannibal.

28. As we find then that the Roman invasion of Sicily was

not in contravention of their oaths, so we must acknowledge in the case of the second proclamation of war, in consequence of which the treaty for the evacuation of Sardinia was made, that it is impossible to find any reasonable pretext or ground for the Roman action. The Carthaginians were beyond question compelled by the necessities of their position, contrary to all justice, to evacuate Sardinia, and to pay this enormous sum of money. For as to the allegation of the Romans, that they had during the Mercenary war been guilty of acts of hostility to ships sailing from Rome,—that was barred by their own act in restoring, without ransom, the Carthaginian prisoners, in gratitude for similar conduct on the part of Carthage to Romans who had landed on their shores; a transaction which I have spoken of at length in my previous book.[1]

No excuse for the Roman claim on Sardinia.

These facts established, it remains to decide by a thorough investigation to which of the two nations the origin of the Hannibalian war is to be imputed.

29. I have explained the pleas advanced by the Carthaginians; I must now state what is alleged on the contrary by the Romans. For though it is true that in this particular interview, owing to their anger at the fall of Saguntum, they did not use these arguments, yet they were appealed to on many occasions, and by many of their citizens. First, they argued that the treaty of Hasdrubal could not be ignored, as the Carthaginians had the assurance to do: for it did not contain the clause, which that of Lutatius did, making its validity conditional on its ratification by the people of Rome; but Hasdrubal made the agreement absolutely and authoritatively that "the Carthaginians should not cross the Iber in arms."

The Roman case.

Next they alleged that the clause in the treaty respecting Sicily, which by their own admission stipulated that "the allies of neither party should be attacked by the other," did not refer to then existing allies only, as the Carthaginians interpreted it; for in that case a clause would have been added, disabling either from making new alliances in addition to those already existing, or excluding allies, taken subsequently to the making of the

[1] I, 83.

treaty, from its benefits. But since neither of these provisions was made, it was plain that both the then existing allies, and all those taken subsequently on either side, were entitled to reciprocal security. And this was only reasonable. For it was not likely that they would have made a treaty depriving them of the power, when opportunity offered, of taking on such friends or allies as seemed to their interest; nor, again, if they had taken any such under their protection, was it to be supposed that they would allow them to be injured by any persons whatever. But, in fact, the main thing present in the minds of both parties to the treaty was, that they should mutually agree to abstain from attacking each other's allies, and on no account admit into alliance with themselves the allies of the other: and it was to subsequent allies that this particular clause applied, "Neither shall enlist soldiers, or impose contributions on the provinces or allies of the other; and all shall be alike secure of attack from the other side."

30. These things being so, they argued that it was beyond controversy that Saguntum had accepted the protection of Rome, several years before the time of Hannibal. The strongest proof of this, and one which would not be contested by the Carthaginians themselves, was that, when political disturbances broke out at Saguntum, the people chose the Romans, and not the Carthaginians, as arbitrators to settle the dispute and restore their constitution, although the latter were close at hand and were already established in Iberia.

I conclude, then, that if the destruction of Saguntum is to be regarded as the cause of this war, the Carthaginians must be acknowledged to be in the wrong, both in view of the treaty of Lutatius, which secured immunity from attack for the allies of both parties, and in view of the treaty of Hasdrubal, which disabled the Carthaginians from passing the Iber with arms.[1] If on the other hand the taking Sardinia from them, and imposing the heavy money fine which accompanied it, are to

Mutual provocation.

[1] Saguntum of course is south of the Iber, but the attack on it by Hannibal was a breach of the former of the two treaties. Livy (21, 2) seems to assert that it was specially exempted from attack in the treaty with Hasdrubal.

be regarded as the causes, we must certainly acknowledge that the Carthaginians had good reason for undertaking the Hannibalian war: for as they had only yielded to the pressure of circumstances, so they seized a favourable turn in those circumstances to revenge themselves on their injurers.

31. Some uncritical readers may perhaps say that such minute discussion on points of this kind is unnecessary. And if any man were entirely self-sufficing in every event, I might allow that the accurate knowledge of the past, though a graceful accomplishment, was perhaps not essential: but as long as it is not in mere mortals to say this, either in public or private affairs,—seeing that no man of sense, even if he is prosperous for the moment, will ever reckon with certainty on the future,—then I say that such knowledge is essential, and not merely graceful. For take the three commonest cases. Suppose, first, a statesman to be attacked either in his own person or in that of his country: or, secondly, suppose him to be anxious for a forward policy and to anticipate the attack of an enemy: or, lastly, suppose him to desire to maintain the *status quo*. In all these cases it is history alone that can supply him with precedents, and teach him how, in the first case, to find supporters and allies; in the second, to incite co-operation; and in the third, to give vigour to the conservative forces which tend to maintain, as he desires, the existing state of things. In the case of contemporaries, it is difficult to obtain an insight into their purposes; because, as their words and actions are dictated by a desire of accommodating themselves to the necessity of the hour, and of keeping up appearances, the truth is too often obscured. Whereas the transactions of the past admit of being tested by naked fact; and accordingly display without disguise the motives and purposes of the several persons engaged; and teach us from what sort of people to expect favour, active kindness, and assistance, or the reverse. They give us also many opportunities of distinguishing who would be likely to pity us, feel indignation at our wrongs, and defend our cause,—a power that contributes very greatly to national as well as individual security. Neither the writer nor the reader of history, therefore, should confine his attention to a bare statement of facts: he must take into account all that

preceded, accompanied, or followed them. For if you take from history all explanation of cause, principle, and motive, and of the adaptation of the means to the end, what is left is a mere panorama without being instructive; and, though it may please for the moment, has no abiding value.

32. Another mistake is to look upon my history as difficult to obtain or master, because of the number and size of the books. Compare it in these particulars with the various writings of the episodical historians. Is it not much easier to purchase and read my forty books, which are as it were all in one piece, and so to follow with a comprehensive glance the events in Italy, Sicily, and Libya from the time of Pyrrhus to the fall of Carthage, and those in the rest of the world from the flight of Cleomenes of Sparta, continuously, to the battle between the Achaeans and Romans at the Isthmus? To say nothing of the fact that the compositions of these historians are many times as numerous as mine, it is impossible for their readers to get any certain information from them: first, because most of them differ in their account of the same transactions; and secondly, because they omit contemporary history,—the comparative review of which would put a very different complexion upon events to that derived from isolated treatment,—and are unable to touch upon the most decisive events at all. For, indeed, the most important parts of history are those which treat the events which follow or accompany a certain course of conduct, and pre-eminently so those which treat of causes. For instance, we see that the war with Antiochus took its rise from that with Philip; that with Philip from the Hannibalian; and the Hannibalian from the Sicilian war: and though between these wars there were numerous events of various character, they all converged upon the same consummation. Such a comprehensive view may be obtained from universal history, but not from the histories of particular wars, such as those with Perseus or Philip; unless we fondly imagine that, by reading the accounts contained in them of the pitched battles, we gain a knowledge of the conduct and plan of the whole war. This of course is not the case; and in the present instance I hope that there will be as wide a difference between my history and such episodical

compositions, as between real learning and mere listening.

33. To resume the story of the Carthaginians and the Roman deputies.[1] To the arguments of the former the ambassadors made no answer, except that the senior among them, in the presence of the assembly, pointed to the folds of his toga and said that in them he carried peace and war, and that he would bring out and leave with them whichever they bade him. The Carthaginian Suffete[2] bade him bring out whichever of the two he chose: and upon the Roman saying that it should be war, a majority of the senators cried out in answer that they accepted it. It was on these terms that the Senate and the Roman ambassadors parted.

Answer of Fabius. See Livy, 21, 18.

Meanwhile Hannibal, upon going into winter quarters at New Carthage, first of all dismissed the Iberians to their various cities, with the view of their being prepared and vigorous for the next campaign. Secondly, he instructed his brother Hasdrubal in the management of his government in Iberia, and of the preparations to be made against Rome, in case he himself should be separated from him. Thirdly, he took precautions for the security of Libya, by selecting with prudent skill certain soldiers from the home army to come over to Iberia, and certain from the Iberian army to go to Libya; by which interchange he secured cordial feeling of confidence between the two armies. The Iberians sent to Libya were the Thersitae, the Mastiani, as well as the Oretes and Olcades, mustering together twelve hundred cavalry and thirteen thousand eight hundred and fifty foot. Besides these there were eight hundred and seventy slingers from the Balearic Isles, whose name, as that of the islands they inhabit, is derived from the word *ballein*, "to throw," because of their peculiar skill with the sling. Most of these troops he ordered to be stationed at Metagonia in Libya, and the rest in Carthage itself. And from the cities in the district

Winter of 219-218 B.C. Hannibal's arrangements for the coming campaign.

[1] From ch. 21.

[2] *βασιλεύς*. The two Suffetes represented the original Kings of Carthage (6, 51). The title apparently remained for sacrificial purposes, like the *ἄρχων βασιλεύς*, and the *rex sacrificulus*. Polybius, like other Greek writers, calls them *βασιλεῖς*. *Infra*, 42. Herod 7, 165. Aristot. Pol. 2, 8.

of Metagonia he sent four thousand foot also into Carthage, to serve at once as hostages for the fidelity of their country, and as an additional guard for the city. With his brother Hasdrubal in Iberia he left fifty quinqueremes, two quadriremes, and five triremes, thirty-two of the quinqueremes being furnished with crews, and all five of the triremes; also cavalry consisting of four hundred and fifty Libyophenicians and Libyans, three hundred Lergetae, eighteen hundred Numidians of the Massolian, Massaesylian, Maccoeian, and Maurian tribes, who dwell by the ocean; with eleven thousand eight hundred and fifty Libyans, three hundred Ligures, five hundred of the Balearic Islanders, and twenty-one elephants.

The inscription recording these facts.

The accuracy of this enumeration of Hannibal's Iberian establishment need excite no surprise, though it is such as a commander himself would have some difficulty in displaying; nor ought I to be condemned at once of imitating the specious falsehoods of historians: for the fact is that I myself found on Lacinium [1] a bronze tablet, which Hannibal had caused to be inscribed with these particulars when he was in Italy; and holding it to be an entirely trustworthy authority for such facts, I did not hesitate to follow it.

34. Though Hannibal had taken every precaution for the security of Libya and Iberia, he yet waited for the messengers whom he expected to arrive from the Celts. He had thoroughly acquainted himself with the fertility and populousness of the districts at the foot of the Alps and in the valley of the Padus, as well as with the warlike courage of the men; but most important of all, with their hostile feelings to Rome derived from the previous war, which I described in my last book, with the express purpose of enabling my readers to follow my narrative. He therefore reckoned very much on the chance of their co-operation; and was careful to send messages to the chiefs of the Celts, whether dwelling actually on the Alps or on the Italian side of them, with unlimited promises; because he believed that he would be able to confine the war against Rome to Italy, if he could make his way through the intervening difficulties to these parts, and avail

[1] A promontory in Bruttium, *Capo delle Colonne.*

himself of the active alliance of the Celts. When his messengers returned with a report that the Celts were ready to help him and all eagerness for his approach; and that the passage of the Alps, though laborious and difficult, was not, however, impossible, he collected his forces from their winter quarters at the approach of spring. Just before receiving this report he had learnt the circumstances attending the Roman embassy at Carthage. Encouraged by the assurance thus given him, that he would be supported by the popular sentiment at home, he no longer disguised from his army that the object of the forthcoming campaign was Rome; and tried to inspire them with courage for the undertaking. He explained to them how the Romans had demanded the surrender of himself and all the officers of the army: and pointed out the fertility of the country to which they were going, and the good-will and active alliance which the Celts were prepared to offer them. When the crowd of soldiers showed an enthusiastic readiness to accompany him, he dismissed the assembly, after thanking them, and naming the day on which he intended to march.

B.C. 218. Hannibal breaks up his winter quarters and starts for Italy.

35. These measures satisfactorily accomplished while he was in winter quarters, and the security of Libya and Iberia being sufficiently provided for; when the appointed day arrived, Hannibal got his army in motion, which consisted of ninety thousand infantry and about twelve thousand cavalry. After crossing the Iber, he set about subduing the tribes of the Ilurgetes and Bargusii, as well as the Aerenosii and Andosini, as far as the Pyrenees. When he had reduced all this country under his power, and taken certain towns by storm, which he did with unexpected rapidity, though not without severe fighting and serious loss; he left Hanno in chief command of all the district north of the Iber, and with absolute authority over the Burgusii, who were the people that gave him most uneasiness on account of their friendly feeling towards Rome. He then detached from his army ten thousand foot and a thousand horse for the service of Hanno,—to whom also he entrusted the heavy baggage of the troops that were to accompany himself,—and the same number to go to their own

land. The object of this last measure was twofold: he thereby left a certain number of well-affected persons behind him; and also held out to the others a hope of returning home, both to those Iberians who were to accompany him on his march, and to those also who for the present were to remain at home, so that there might be a general alacrity to join him if he were ever in want of a reinforcement. He then set his remaining troops in motion unencumbered by heavy baggage, fifty thousand infantry and nine thousand cavalry, and led them through the Pyrenees to the passage of the river Rhone. The army was not so much numerous, as highly efficient, and in an extraordinary state of physical training from their continuous battles with the Iberians.

36. But as a knowledge of topography is necessary for the right understanding of my narrative, I must state the places from which Hannibal started, through which he marched, and into which he descended when he arrived in Italy. Nor must I, like some historians, content myself with mentioning the mere names of places and rivers, under the idea that that is quite sufficient to give a clear knowledge. My opinion is that, in the case of well-known places, the mention of names is of great assistance; but that, in the case of unknown countries, names are no better than unintelligible and unmeaning sounds: for the understanding having nothing to go upon, and being unable by referring to something known to translate the words into thought, the narrative becomes confused and vague, and conveys no clear idea. A plan therefore must be discovered, whereby it shall be possible, while speaking of unknown countries, to convey real and intelligible notions. Geography of Hannibal's march.

The first, most important, and most general conception is that of the division of the heaven into four quarters, which all of us that are capable of a general idea at all know as east, west, south, and north. The next is to arrange the several parts of the globe according to these points, and always to refer in thought any place mentioned to one or other of them. We shall thus get an intelligible and familiar conception of places which we do not know or have never seen.

37. This principle established as universally applicable to the world, the next point will be to make the geography of our own part of it intelligible by a corresponding division.

General view of the geography of the world.

It falls, then, into three divisions, each distinguished by a particular name,—Asia, Libya, Europe.[1] The boundaries are respectively the Don, the Nile, and the Straits of the Pillars of Hercules. Asia lies between the Don and the Nile, and lies under that portion of the heaven which is between the north-east and the south. Libya lies between the Nile and the Pillars of Hercules, and falls beneath the south portion of the heaven, extending to the south-west without a break, till it reaches the point of the equinoctial sunset, which corresponds with the Pillars of Hercules. These two divisions of the earth, therefore, regarded in a general point of view, occupy all that part which is south of the Mediterranean from east to west. Europe with respect to both of these lies to the north facing them, and extending continuously from east to west. Its most important and extensive part lies under the northern sky between the river Don and the Narbo, which is only a short distance west of Marseilles and the mouths by which the Rhone discharges itself into the Sardinian Sea. From Narbo is the district occupied by the Celts as far as the Pyrenees, stretching continuously from the Mediterranean to the Mare Externum. The rest of Europe south of the Pyrenees, to the point where it approaches the Pillars of Hercules, is bounded on one side by the Mediterranean, on the other by the Mare Externum: and that part of it which is washed by the Mediterranean as far as the Pillars of Hercules is called Iberia, while the part which lies along the Outer or Great Sea has no general name, because it has but recently been discovered, and is inhabited entirely by barbarous tribes, who are very numerous, and of whom I will speak in more detail hereafter.

38. But as no one up to our time has been able to settle in regard to those parts of Asia and Libya, where they approach

[1] This division of the world into three parts was an advance upon the ancient geographers, who divided it into two, combining Egypt with Asia, and Africa with Europe. See Sall. *Jug.* 17; Lucan, *Phars.* 9, 411, Varro de L. L. 5, § 31. And note on 12, 25.

each other in the neighbourhood of Ethiopia, whether the continent is continuous to the south, or is surrounded by the sea, so it is in regard to the part between Narbo and the Don: none of us as yet knows anything of the northern extent of this district, and anything we can ever know must be the result of future exploration; and those who rashly venture by word of mouth or written statements to describe this district must be looked upon as ignorant or romancing. The extreme north and south unknown

My object in these observations was to prevent my narrative being entirely vague to those who were unacquainted with the localities. I hoped that, by keeping these broad distinctions in mind, they would have some definite standard to which to refer every mention of a place, starting from the primary one of the division of the sky into four quarters. For, as in the case of physical sight, we instinctively turn our faces to any object pointed at; so in the case of the mind, our thoughts ought to turn naturally to localities as they are mentioned from time to time.

It is time now to return to the story we have in hand.

39. At this period the Carthaginians were masters of the whole Mediterranean coast of Libya from the Altars of Philaenus,[1] opposite the Great Syrtis, to the Pillars of Hercules, a seaboard of over sixteen thousand stades They had also crossed the strait of the Pillars of Hercules, and got possession of the whole seaboard of Iberia on the Mediterranean as far as the Pyrenees, which separate the Iberes from the Celts—that is, for a distance of about eight thousand stades: for it is three thousand from the Pillars to New Carthage, from which Hannibal started for Italy; two thousand six hundred from thence to the Iber; and from that river to Emporium again sixteen hundred; from which town, I may add, to the passage of the Rhone is a distance of about sixteen hundred stades: for all these distances have now been carefully measured by the Romans and marked with milestones at every The length of the march from Carthagena to the Po, 1125 Roman miles.

[1] The *arae Philaenorum* were apparently set up as boundary stones to mark the territory of the Pentapolis or Cyrene from Egypt: and the place retained the name long after the disappearance of the altars (Strabo, 3, 5, 5-6).

eighth stade.[1] After crossing the river there was a march up stream along its bank of fourteen hundred stades, before reaching the foot of the pass over the Alps into Italy. The pass itself was about twelve hundred stades, which being crossed would bring him into the plains of the Padus in Italy. So that the whole length of his march from New Carthage was about nine thousand stades, or 1125 Roman miles. Of the country he had thus to traverse he had already passed almost half in mere distance, but in the difficulties the greater part of his task was still before him.

Coss. P. Cornelius Scipio and Tib. Sempronius Longus. B C. 218. The Consuls are sent, one to Spain, and the other to Africa.

40. While Hannibal was thus engaged in effecting a passage over the Pyrenees, where he was greatly alarmed at the extraordinary strength of the positions occupied by the Celts; the Romans, having heard the result of the embassy to Carthage, and that Hannibal had crossed the Iber earlier than they expected, at the head of an army, voted to send Publius Cornelius Scipio with his legions into Iberia, and Tiberius Sempronius Longus into Libya. And while the Consuls were engaged in hastening on the enrolment of their legions and other military preparations, the people were active in bringing to completion the colonies which they had already voted to send into Gaul. They accordingly caused the fortification of these towns to be energetically pushed on, and ordered the colonists to be in residence within thirty days: six thousand having been assigned to each colony. One of these colonies was on the south bank of the Padus, and was called Placentia; the other on the north bank, called Cremona. But no sooner had these colonies been formed, than the Boian Gauls, who had long been lying in wait to throw off their loyalty to Rome, but had up to that time lacked an opportunity, encouraged by the news that reached them of Hannibal's approach, revolted; thus abandoning the hostages which they had given at the end of the war described in my last book. The ill-feeling still remaining towards Rome enabled them to induce the Insubres

Placentia and Cremona.

[1] For Polybius's calculation as to the length of the stade, see note on 34, 12.

to join in the revolt; and the united tribes swept over the territory recently allotted by the Romans, and following close upon the track of the flying colonists, laid siege to the Roman colony of Mutina, in which the fugitives had taken refuge. Among them were the *triumviri* or three commissioners who had been sent out to allot the lands; of whom one—Gaius Lutatius—was an ex-consul, the other two ex-praetors. These men having demanded a parley with the enemy, the Boii consented: but treacherously seized them upon their leaving the town, hoping by their means to recover their own hostages. The praetor Lucius Manlius was on guard in the district with an army; and as soon as he heard what had happened, he advanced with all speed to the relief of Mutina. But the Boii, having got intelligence of his approach, prepared an ambuscade; and as soon as his army had entered a certain wood, they rushed out upon it from every side and killed a large number of his men. The survivors at first fled with precipitation: but having gained some higher ground, they rallied sufficiently to enable them with much difficulty to effect an honourable retreat. Even so, the Boii followed close upon their heels, and besieged them in a place called the village of Tannes.[1] When the news arrived at Rome, that the fourth legion was surrounded and closely besieged by the Boii, the people in all haste despatched the legions which had been voted to the Consul Publius, to their relief, under the command of a Praetor; and ordered the Consul to enrol two more legions for himself from the allies.

Outrage by Boii and Insubres.

41. Such was the state of Celtic affairs from the beginning to the arrival of Hannibal; thus completing the course of events which I have already had occasion to describe.

Meanwhile the Consuls, having completed the necessary preparations for their respective missions, set sail at the beginning of summer—Publius to Iberia, with sixty ships, and Tiberius Sempronius to Libya, with a hundred and sixty quinqueremes. The latter thought by means of this great fleet to strike terror into the enemy; and made vast preparations at Lily-

Tiberius Sempronius prepares to attack Carthage.

[1] Livy, 21, 25, calls it *Tannetum*, and describes it only as *vicus Pado propinquus*. It was a few miles from Parma.

baeum, collecting fresh troops wherever he could get them, as though with the view of at once blockading Carthage itself.

Publius Cornelius coasted along Liguria, and crossing in five days from Pisae to Marseilles, dropped anchor at the most eastern mouth of the Rhone, called the Mouth of Marseilles,[1] and began disembarking his troops. For though he heard that Hannibal was already crossing the Pyrenees, he felt sure that he was still a long way off, owing to the difficulty of his line of country, and the number of the intervening Celtic tribes. But long before he was expected, Hannibal had arrived at the crossing of the Rhone, keeping the Sardinian Sea on his right as he marched, and having made his way through the Celts partly by bribes and partly by force. Being informed that the enemy were at hand, Publius was at first incredulous of the fact, because of the rapidity of the advance; but wishing to know the exact state of the case,—while staying behind himself to refresh his troops after their voyage, and to consult with the Tribunes as to the best ground on which to give the enemy battle,—he sent out a reconnoitring party, consisting of three hundred of his bravest horse; joining with them as guides and supports some Celts, who chanced to be serving as mercenaries at the time in Marseilles.

Publius Scipio lands near Marseilles.

42. Meanwhile Hannibal had reached the river and was trying to get across it where the stream was single, at a distance of four days' march from the sea. He did all he could to make the natives living by the river friendly to him, and purchased from them all their canoes of hollow trunks, and wherries, of which there were a large number, owing to the extensive sea traffic of the inhabitants of the Rhone valley. He got from them also the timber suited to the construction of these canoes; and so in two days had an innumerable supply of transports, every soldier seeking to be independent of his neighbour, and to have the means of crossing in his own hands. But now a large multitude of barbarians collected on the other side of the stream to hinder the passage of the Carthaginians. When Hannibal saw them, he came to the con-

Hannibal reaches the Rhone.

[1] *Pluribus enim divisus amnis in mare decurrit* (Livy, 21, 26).

clusion that it would be impossible either to force a passage in the face of so large a body of the enemy, or to remain where he was, for fear of being attacked on all sides at once: and he accordingly, on the third night, sent forward a detachment of his army with native guides, under the command of Hanno, the son of the Suffete[1] Bomilcar. This force marched up stream along the bank for two hundred stades, until they arrived at a certain spot where the stream is divided by an eyot, and there halted. They found enough wood close at hand to enable them, by nailing or tying it together, to construct within a short time a large number of rafts good enough for temporary use; and on these they crossed in safety, without any one trying to stop them. Then, seizing upon a strong position, they kept quiet for the rest of the day: partly to refresh themselves after their fatigues, and at the same time to complete their preparations for the service awaiting them, as they had been ordered to do. Hannibal was preparing to proceed much in the same way with the forces left behind with himself; but his chief difficulty was in getting the elephants across, of which he had thirty-seven.

A detachment crosses higher up the river.

43. When the fifth night came, however, the division which had crossed first started before daybreak to march down the opposite bank of the river and attack the barbarians; while Hannibal, having his men in readiness, began to attempt the passage of the river. He had filled the wherries with the heavy-armed cavalry, and the canoes with the most active of his foot; and he now arranged that the wherries should cross higher up the stream, and the canoes below them, that the violence of the current might be broken by the former, and the canoes cross more safely. The plan for the horses was that they should swim at the stern of the wherries, one man on each side of the stern guiding three or four with leading reins: so that a considerable number of horses were brought over at once with the first detachment. When they saw what the enemy meant to do, the barbarians, without forming their ranks, poured out of their entrenchments in scattered groups,

The crossing begun.

[1] See on ch. 33, note 2.

feeling no doubt of being able to stop the crossing of the Carthaginians with ease. As soon as Hannibal saw by the smoke, which was the signal agreed upon, that the advanced detachment on the other side was approaching, he ordered all to go on board, and the men in charge of the transports to push out against the stream. This was promptly done: and then began a most anxious and exciting scene. Cheer after cheer rose from the men who were working the boats, as they struggled to outstrip each other, and exerted themselves to the utmost to overcome the force of the current. On the edge of either bank stood the two armies: the one sharing in the struggles of their comrades by sympathy, and shouting encouragement to them as they went; while the barbarians in front of them yelled their war-cries and challenged them to battle. While this was going on the barbarians had abandoned their tents, which the Carthaginians on that side of the river suddenly and unexpectedly seized. Some of them proceeded to set fire to the camp, while the greater number went to attack the men who were standing ready to resist the passage. Surprised by this unlooked-for event, some of the barbarians rushed off to save their tents, while others prepared to resist the attack of the enemy, and were now actually engaged. Seeing that everything was going as he had intended, Hannibal at once formed the first division as it disembarked: and after addressing some encouraging words to it, closed with the barbarians, who, having no time to form their ranks, and being taken by surprise, were quickly repulsed and put to flight.

Completed.

44. Being thus master of the passage of the river, and victorious over those who opposed him, the first care of the Carthaginian leader was to bring his whole army across. This being expeditiously accomplished, he pitched his camp for that night by the river-side, and on the morrow, when he was told that the Roman fleet was anchored off the mouths of the river, he detached five hundred Numidian horsemen to reconnoitre the enemy and find out their position, their numbers, and what they were going to do; and at the same time selected suitable men to manage the passage of the elephants. These arrangements made, he summoned a meeting of his army and intro-

duced Magilus and the other chiefs who had come to him from the valley of the Padus, and caused them to declare to the whole army, by means of an interpreter, the resolutions passed by their tribes. Message from friendly Gauls. The points which were the strongest encouragement to the army were, first, the actual appearance of envoys inviting them to come, and promising to take part in the war with Rome; secondly, the confidence inspired by their promise of guiding them by a route where they would be abundantly supplied with necessaries, and which would lead them with speed and safety into Italy; and, lastly, the fertility and vast extent of the country to which they were going, and the friendly feelings of the men with whose assistance they were about to fight the armies of Rome.

Such was the substance of the speeches of the Celts. When they had withdrawn, Hannibal himself rose, and after reminding the soldiers of what they had already achieved, and pointing out that, though they had under his counsel and advice engaged in many perilous and dangerous enterprises, they had never failed in one, he bade them "not lose courage now that the most serious part of their undertaking was accomplished. The Rhone was crossed: they had seen with their own eyes the display of goodwill and zeal of their allies. Let this convince them that they should leave the rest to him with confidence; and while obeying his orders show themselves men of courage and worthy of their former deeds." These words being received with shouts of approval, and other manifestations of great enthusiasm, on the part of the soldiers, Hannibal dismissed the assembly with words of praise to the men and a prayer to the gods on their behalf; after giving out an order that they should refresh themselves, and make all their preparations with despatch, as the advance must begin on the morrow.

45. When the assembly had been dismissed, the reconnoitring party of Numidians returned in headlong flight, after losing more than half their numbers. Not far from the camp they had fallen in with a party of Roman horse, who had been sent out by Publius on the same errand; and an engagement took place with such fury on either side, that the Romans and Skirmish between reconnoitring parties.

Celts lost a hundred and forty men, and the Numidians more than two hundred. After this skirmish, the Romans pursued them up to the Carthaginian entrenchments: and having surveyed it, they hastened back to announce to the Consul the presence of the enemy. As soon as they arrived at the Roman camp with this intelligence, Publius put his baggage on board ship, and marched his men up the bank of the river, with the earnest desire of forcing the enemy to give him battle.

But at sunrise on the day after the assembly, Hannibal having stationed his whole cavalry on the rear, in the direction of the sea, so as to cover the advance, ordered his infantry to leave the entrenchment and begin their march; while he himself waited behind for the elephants, and the men who had not yet crossed the river.

The passage of the elephants.

46. The mode of getting the elephants across was as follows. They made a number of rafts strongly compacted, which they lashed firmly two and two together, so as to form combined a breadth of about fifty feet, and brought them close under the bank at the place of crossing. To the outer edge of these they lashed some others and made them join exactly; so that the whole raft thus constructed stretched out some way into the channel, while the edges towards the stream were made fast to the land with ropes tied to trees which grew along the brink, to secure the raft keeping its place and not drifting down the river. These combined rafts stretching about two hundred feet across the stream, they joined two other very large ones to the outer edges, fastened very firmly together, but connected with the others by ropes which admitted of being easily cut. To these they fastened several towing lines, that the wherries might prevent the rafts drifting down stream, and might drag them forcibly against the current and so get the elephants across on them. Then they threw a great deal of earth upon all the rafts, until they had raised the surface to the level of the bank, and made it look like the path on the land leading down to the passage. The elephants were accustomed to obey their Indian riders until they came to water, but could never be induced to step into water: they therefore led them upon this earth, putting two females in front whom the others

obediently followed. When they had set foot on the rafts that were farthest out in the stream, the ropes were cut which fastened these to the other rafts, the towing lines were pulled taut by the wherries, and the elephants, with the rafts on which they stood, were quickly towed away from the mound of earth. When this happened, the animals were terror-stricken; and at first turned round and round, and rushed first to one part of the raft and then to another, but finding themselves completely surrounded by the water, they were too frightened to do anything, and were obliged to stay where they were. And it was by repeating this contrivance of joining a pair of rafts to the others, that eventually the greater part of the elephants were got across. Some of them, however, in the middle of the crossing, threw themselves in their terror into the river: but though their Indian riders were drowned, the animals themselves got safe to land, saved by the strength and great length of their probosces; for by raising these above the water, they were enabled to breathe through them, and blow out any water that got into them, while for the most part they got through the river on their feet.

47. The elephants having been thus got across, Hannibal formed them and the cavalry into a rearguard, and marched up the river bank away from the sea in an easterly direction, as though making for the central district of Europe.

The Rhone rises to the north-west of the Adriatic Gulf on the northern slopes of the Alps,[1] and flowing westward, eventually discharges itself into the Sardinian Sea. It flows for the most part through a deep valley, to the north of which lives the Celtic tribe of the Ardyes; while its southern side is entirely walled in by the northern slopes of the Alps, the ridges of which, beginning at Marseilles and extending to the head of the Adriatic, separate it from the valley of the Padus, of which I have already had occasion to speak at length. It was these mountains that Hannibal now crossed from the Rhone valley into Italy.

Some historians of this passage of the Alps, in their desire

[1] This statement has done much to ruin Polybius's credit as a geographer. It indicates indeed a strangely defective conception of distance; as his idea, of the Rhone flowing always west, does of the general lie of the country.

to produce a striking effect by their descriptions of the wonders of this country, have fallen into two errors which are more alien than anything else to the spirit of history,—perversion of fact and inconsistency. Introducing Hannibal as a prodigy of strategic skill and boldness, they yet represent him as acting with the most conspicuous indiscretion; and then, finding themselves involved in an inextricable maze of falsehood, they try to cut the knot by the introduction of gods and heroes into what is meant to be genuine history. They begin by saying that the Alps are so precipitous and inaccessible that, so far from horses and troops, accompanied too by elephants, being able to cross them, it would be very difficult for even active men on foot to do so: and similarly they tell us that the desolation of this district is so complete, that, had not some god or hero met Hannibal's forces and showed them the way, they would have been hopelessly lost and perished to a man.

Such stories involve both the errors I have mentioned,—they are both false and inconsistent.

48. For could a more irrational proceeding on the part of a general be imagined than that of Hannibal, if, when in command of so numerous an army, on whom the success of his expedition entirely depended, he allowed himself to remain in ignorance of the roads, the lie of the country, the route to be taken, and the people to which it led, and above all as to the practicability of what he was undertaking to do? They, in fact, represent Hannibal, when at the height of his expectation of success, doing what those would hardly do who have utterly failed and have been reduced to despair,—that is, to entrust themselves and their forces to an unknown country. And so, too, what they say about the desolation of the district, and its precipitous and inaccessible character, only serves to bring their untrustworthiness into clearer light. For first, they pass over the fact that the Celts of the Rhone valley had on several occasions before Hannibal came, and that in very recent times, crossed the Alps with large forces, and fought battles with the Romans in alliance with the Celts of the valley of the Padus, as I have already stated. And secondly, they are unaware of the fact that a very numerous tribe of people inhabit the Alps. Accordingly in their ignorance of these facts they take refuge

in the assertion that a hero showed Hannibal the way. They are, in fact, in the same case as tragedians, who, beginning with an improbable and impossible plot, are obliged to bring in a *deus ex machina* to solve the difficulty and end the play. The absurd premises of these historians naturally require some such supernatural agency to help them out of the difficulty: an absurd beginning could only have an absurd ending. For of course Hannibal did not act as these writers say he did; but, on the contrary, conducted his plans with the utmost prudence. He had thoroughly informed himself of the fertility of the country into which he designed to descend, and of the hostile feelings of its inhabitants towards Rome; and for his journey through the difficult district which intervened he employed native guides and pioneers, whose interests were bound up with his own. I speak with confidence on these points, because I have questioned persons actually engaged on the facts; and have inspected the country, and gone over the Alpine pass myself, in order to inform myself of the truth and see with my own eyes.

49. Three days after Hannibal had resumed his march, the Consul Publius arrived at the passage of the river. He was in the highest degree astonished to find the enemy gone: for he had persuaded himself that they would never venture to take this route into Italy, on account of the numbers and fickleness of the barbarians who inhabited the country. But seeing that they had done so, he hurried back to his ships and at once embarked his forces. He then despatched his brother Gnaeus to conduct the campaign in Iberia, while he himself turned back again to Italy by sea, being anxious to anticipate the enemy by marching through Etruria to the foot of the pass of the Alps.

Scipio finds that Hannibal has escaped him.

Meanwhile, after four days' march from the passage of the Rhone, Hannibal arrived at the place called the Island, a district thickly inhabited and exceedingly productive of corn. Its name is derived from its natural features: for the Rhone and Isara flowing on either side of it make the apex of a triangle where they meet, very nearly of the same size and shape as the delta of the Nile, except that the base of the latter is formed by the

Hannibal's march to the foot of the Alps.

sea into which its various streams are discharged, while in the case of the former this base is formed by mountains difficult to approach or climb, and, so to speak, almost inaccessible. When Hannibal arrived in this district he found two brothers engaged in a dispute for the royal power, and confronting each other with their armies. The elder sought his alliance and invited his assistance in gaining the crown: and the advantage which such a circumstance might prove to him at that juncture of his affairs being manifest, he consented; and having joined him in his attack upon his brother, and aided in expelling him, he obtained valuable support from the victorious chieftain. For this prince not only liberally supplied his army with provisions, but exchanged all their old and damaged weapons for new ones, and thus at a very opportune time thoroughly restored the efficiency of the troops: he also gave most of the men new clothes and boots, which proved of great advantage during their passage of the mountains. But his most essential service was that, the Carthaginians being greatly alarmed at the prospect of marching through the territory of the Allobroges, he acted with his army as their rearguard, and secured them a safe passage as far as the foot of the pass.

50. Having in ten days' march accomplished a distance of eight hundred stades along the river bank, Hannibal began the ascent of the Alps,[1] and immediately found himself involved in the most serious dangers. For as long as the Carthaginians were on the plains, the various chiefs of the Allobroges refrained from attacking them from fear of their cavalry, as well as of the Gauls who were escorting them. But when these last departed back again to their own lands, and Hannibal began to enter the mountainous region, the chiefs of the Allobroges collected large numbers of their tribe and occupied the points of vantage in advance, on the route by which Hannibal's troops were constrained to make their ascent. If they had only kept their design secret, the Carthaginian army would have been entirely

The ascent.

[1] I have no intention of rediscussing the famous question of the pass by which Hannibal crossed the Alps. The reader will find an admirably clear statement of the various views entertained, and the latest arguments advanced in favour of each, in the notes to Mr. W T Arnold's edition of Dr. Arnold's *History of the Second Punic War*, pp. 362-373.

destroyed: as it was, their plans became known, and though they did much damage to Hannibal's army, they suffered as much themselves. For when that general learnt that the natives were occupying the points of vantage, he halted and pitched his camp at the foot of the pass, and sent forward some of his Gallic guides to reconnoitre the enemy and discover their plan of operations. The order was obeyed: and he ascertained that it was the enemy's practice to keep under arms, and guard these posts carefully, during the day, but at night to retire to some town in the neighbourhood. Hannibal accordingly adapted his measures to this strategy of the enemy. He marched forward in broad daylight, and as soon as he came to the mountainous part of the road, pitched his camp only a little way from the enemy. At nightfall he gave orders for the watch-fires to be lit; and leaving the main body of his troops in the camp, and selecting the most suitable of his men, he had them armed lightly, and led them through the narrow parts of the road during the night, and seized on the spots which had been previously occupied by the enemy: they having, according to their regular custom, abandoned them for the nearest town.

51. When day broke the natives saw what had taken place, and at first desisted from their attempts; but presently the sight of the immense string of beasts of burden, and of the cavalry, slowly and painfully making the ascent, tempted them to attack the advancing line. Accordingly they fell upon it at many points at once; and the Carthaginians sustained severe losses, not so much at the hands of the enemy, as from the dangerous nature of the ground, which proved especially fatal to the horses and beasts of burden. For as the ascent was not only narrow and rough, but flanked also with precipices, at every movement which tended to throw the line into disorder, large numbers of the beasts of burden were hurled down the precipices with their loads on their backs. And what added more than anything else to this sort of confusion were the wounded horses; for, maddened by their wounds, they either turned round and ran into the advancing beasts of burden, or, rushing furiously forward, dashed aside everything

The Gauls harass the army.

that came in their way on the narrow path, and so threw the whole line into disorder. Hannibal saw what was taking place, and knowing that, even if they escaped this attack, they could never survive the loss of all their baggage, he took with him the men who had seized the strongholds during the night and went to the relief of the advancing line. Having the advantage of charging the enemy from the higher ground he inflicted a severe loss upon them, but suffered also as severe a one in his own army; for the commotion in the line now grew worse, and in both directions at once—thanks to the shouting and struggling of these combatants: and it was not until he had killed the greater number of the Allobroges, and forced the rest to fly to their own land, that the remainder of the beasts of burden and the horses got slowly, and with difficulty, over the dangerous ground. Hannibal himself rallied as many as he could after the fight, and assaulted the town from which the enemy had sallied; and finding it almost deserted, because its inhabitants had been all tempted out by the hope of booty, he got possession of it: from which he obtained many advantages for the future as well as for the present. The immediate gain consisted of a large number of horses and beasts of burden, and men taken with them; and for future use he got a supply of corn and cattle sufficient for two or three days: but the most important result of all was the terror inspired in the next tribes, which prevented any one of those who lived near the ascent from lightly venturing to meddle with him again.

Treachery of the Gauls.

52. Here he pitched a camp and remained a day, and started again. For the next three days he accomplished a certain amount of his journey without accident. But on the fourth he again found himself in serious danger. For the dwellers along his route, having concerted a plan of treachery, met him with branches and garlands, which among nearly all the natives are signs of friendship, as the herald's staff is among the Greeks. Hannibal was cautious about accepting such assurances, and took great pains to discover what their real intention and purpose were. The Gauls however professed to be fully aware of the capture of the town, and the destruction

of those who had attempted to do him wrong; and explained that those events had induced them to come, because they wished neither to inflict nor receive any damage; and finally promised to give him hostages. For a long while Hannibal hesitated and refused to trust their speeches. But at length coming to the conclusion that, if he accepted what was offered, he would perhaps render the men before him less mischievous and implacable; but that, if he rejected them, he must expect undisguised hostility from them, he acceded to their request, and feigned to accept their offer of friendship. The barbarians handed over the hostages, supplied him liberally with cattle, and in fact put themselves unreservedly into his hands; so that for a time Hannibal's suspicions were allayed, and he employed them as guides for the next difficulty that had to be passed. They guided the army for two days: and then these tribes collected their numbers, and keeping close up with the Carthaginians, attacked them just as they were passing through a certain difficult and precipitous gorge.

53. Hannibal's army would now have certainly been utterly destroyed, had it not been for the fact that his fears were still on the alert, and that, having a prescience of what was to come, he had placed his baggage and cavalry in the van and his hoplites in the rear. These latter covered his line, and were able to stem the attack of the enemy, and accordingly the disaster was less than it would otherwise have been. As it was, however, a large number of beasts of burden and horses perished; for the advantage of the higher ground being with the enemy, the Gauls moved along the slopes parallel with the army below, and by rolling down boulders, or throwing stones, reduced the troops to a state of the utmost confusion and danger; so that Hannibal with half his force was obliged to pass the night near a certain white rock,[1] which afforded them protection, separated from his horses and baggage which he was covering; until after a whole night's struggle they slowly and with difficulty emerged from the gorge. Severe losses.

Next morning the enemy had disappeared: and Hannibal, having effected a junction with his cavalry and baggage, led

[1] *περὶ τι λευκόπετρον*, which, however, perhaps only means "bare rock," cf. 10, 30. But see Law's *Alps of Hannibal*, vol. i. p. 201 *sq.*

his men towards the head of the pass, without falling in again with any important muster of the natives, though he was harassed by some of them from time to time; who seized favourable opportunities, now on his van and now on his rear, of carrying off some of his baggage. His best protection was his elephants; on whatever parts of the line they were placed the enemy never ventured to approach, being terrified at the unwonted appearance of the animals. The ninth day's march brought him to the head of the pass: and there he encamped for two days, partly to rest his men and partly to allow stragglers to come up. Whilst they were there, many of the horses who had taken fright and run away, and many of the beasts of burden that had got rid of their loads, unexpectedly appeared: they had followed the tracks of the army and now joined the camp.

Arrives at the summit.

54. But by this time, it being nearly the period of the setting of the Pleiads, the snow was beginning to be thick on the heights; and seeing his men in low spirits, owing both to the fatigue they had gone through, and that which still lay before them, Hannibal called them together and tried to cheer them by dwelling on the one possible topic of consolation in his power, namely the view of Italy: which lay stretched out in both directions below those mountains, giving the Alps the appearance of a citadel to the whole of Italy. By pointing therefore to the plains of the Padus, and reminding them of the friendly welcome which awaited them from the Gauls who lived there, and at the same time indicating the direction of Rome itself, he did somewhat to raise the drooping spirits of his men.

9th November.

Next day he began the descent, in which he no longer met with any enemies, except some few secret pillagers; but from the dangerous ground and the snow he lost almost as many men as on the ascent. For the path down was narrow and precipitous, and the snow made it impossible for the men to see where they were treading, while to step aside from the path, or to stumble, meant being hurled down the precipices. The troops however bore up against the fatigue, having now

The descent.

grown accustomed to such hardships; but when they came to a place where the path was too narrow for the elephants or beasts of burden to pass,—and which, narrowed before by landslips extending about a stade and a half, had recently been made more so by another landslip,—then once more despondency and consternation fell upon the troops. Hannibal's first idea was to avoid this *mauvais pas* by a detour, but this route too being made impossible by a snow-storm, he abandoned the idea.

A break in the road.

55. The effect of the storm was peculiar and extraordinary. For the present fall of snow coming upon the top of that which was there before, and had remained from the last winter, it was found that the former, being fresh, was soft and offered no resistance to the foot; but when the feet reached the lower frozen snow, they could no longer make any impression upon it, but the men found both their feet slipping from under them, as though they were on hard ground with a layer of mud on the top. And a still more serious difficulty followed: for not being able to get a foothold on the lower snow, when they fell and tried to get themselves up by their hands and knees, the men found themselves plunging downwards quicker and quicker, along with everything they laid hold of, the ground being a very steep decline. The beasts, however, when they fell did break through this lower snow as they struggled to rise, and having done so were obliged to remain there with their loads, as though they were frozen to it, both from the weight of these loads and the hardness of the old snow. Giving up, therefore, all hope of making this detour, he encamped upon the ridge after clearing away the snow upon it. He then set large parties of his men to work, and, with infinite toil, began constructing a road on the face of the precipice. One day's work sufficed to make a path practicable for beasts of burden and horses; and he accordingly took them across at once, and having pitched his camp at a spot below the snow line, he let them go in search of pasture; while he told off the Numidians in detachments to proceed with the making of the road; and after three days' difficult and painful labour he got his elephants across, though in a miserable condition from

hunger. For the tops of the Alps, and the parts immediately below them, are completely treeless and bare of vegetation, because the snow lies there summer and winter; but about half-way down the slopes on both sides they produce trees and shrubs, and are, in fact, fit for human habitation.

56. So Hannibal mustered his forces and continued the descent; and on the third day after passing the precipitous path just described he reached the plains. From the beginning of his march he had lost many men by the hands of the enemy, and in crossing rivers, and many more on the precipices and dangerous passes of the Alps; and not only men in this last way, but horses and beasts of burden in still greater numbers. The whole march from New Carthage had occupied five months, the actual passage of the Alps fifteen days; and he now boldly entered the valley of the Padus, and the territory of the Insubres, with such of his army as survived, consisting of twelve thousand Libyans and eight thousand Iberians, and not more than six thousand cavalry in all, as he himself distinctly states on the column erected on the promontory of Lacinium to record the numbers.

He reaches the plains.

At the same time, as I have before stated, Publius having left his legions under the command of his brother Gnaeus, with orders to prosecute the Iberian campaign and offer an energetic resistance to Hasdrubal, landed at Pisae with a small body of men. Thence he marched through Etruria, and taking over the army of the Praetors which was guarding the country against the Boii, he arrived in the valley of the Padus; and, pitching his camp there, waited for the enemy with an eager desire to give him battle.

57. Having thus brought the generals of the two nations and the war itself into Italy, before beginning the campaign, I wish to say a few words about what I conceive to be germane or not to my history.

Digression on the limits of history.

I can conceive some readers complaining that, while devoting a great deal of space to Libya and Iberia, I have said little or nothing about the strait of the Pillars of Hercules, the Mare Externum, or the British Isles, and the manufacture of

tin in them, or even of the silver and gold mines in Iberia itself, of which historians give long and contradictory accounts. It was not, let me say, because I thought these subjects out of place in history that I passed them over; but because, in the first place, I did not wish to be diffuse, or distract the attention of students from the main current of my narrative; and, in the next place, because I was determined not to treat of them in scattered notices or casual allusions, but to assign them a distinct time and place, and at these, to the best of my ability, to give a trustworthy account of them. On the same principle I must deprecate any feeling of surprise if, in the succeeding portions of my history, I pass over other similar topics, which might seem naturally in place, for the same reasons. Those who ask for dissertations in history on every possible subject, are somewhat like greedy guests at a banquet, who, by tasting every dish on the table, fail to really enjoy any one of them at the time, or to digest and feel any benefit from them afterwards. Such omniverous readers get no real pleasure in the present, and no adequate instruction for the future.

58. There can be no clearer proof, than is afforded by these particular instances, that this department of historical writing stands above all others in need of study and correction. For as all, or at least the greater number of writers, have endeavoured to describe the peculiar features and positions of the countries on the confines of the known world, and in doing so have, in most cases, made egregious mistakes, it is impossible to pass over their errors without some attempt at refutation; and that not in scattered observations or casual remarks, but deliberately and formally. But such confutation should not take the form of accusation or invective. While correcting their mistakes we should praise the writers, feeling sure that, had they lived to the present age, they would have altered and corrected many of their statements. The fact is that, in past ages, we know of very few Greeks who undertook to investigate these remote regions, owing to the insuperable difficulties of the attempt. The dangers at sea were then more than can easily be calculated, and those on land more numerous still. And even if one did reach these countries on the confines of the world, whether compulsorily or voluntarily, the difficulties in the way

of a personal inspection were only begun: for some of the regions were utterly barbarous, others uninhabited; and a still greater obstacle in way of gaining information as to what he saw was his ignorance of the language of the country. And even if he learnt this, a still greater difficulty was to preserve a strict moderation in his account of what he had seen, and despising all attempts to glorify himself by traveller's tales of wonder, to report for our benefit the truth and nothing but the truth.

59. All these impediments made a true account of these regions in past times difficult, if not impossible. Nor ought we to criticise severely the omissions or mistakes of these writers: rather they deserve our praise and admiration for having in such an age gained information as to these places, which distinctly advanced knowledge. In our own age, however, the Asiatic districts have been opened up both by sea and land owing to the empire of Alexander, and the other places owing to the supremacy of Rome. Men too of practical experience in affairs, being released from the cares of martial or political ambition, have thereby had excellent opportunities for research and inquiry into these localities; and therefore it will be but right for us to have a better and truer knowledge of what was formerly unknown. And this I shall endeavour to establish, when I find a fitting opportunity in the course of my history. I shall be especially anxious to give the curious a full knowledge on these points, because it was with that express object that I confronted the dangers and fatigues of my travels in Libya, Iberia, and Gaul, as well as of the sea which washes the western coasts of these countries; that I might correct the imperfect knowledge of former writers, and make the Greeks acquainted with these parts of the known world.

After this digression, I must go back to the pitched battles between the Romans and Carthaginians in Italy.

60. After arriving in Italy with the number of troops which I have already stated, Hannibal pitched his camp at the very foot of the Alps, and was occupied, to begin with, in refreshing his men. For not only had his whole army suffered terribly from the difficulties of transit in the ascent, and still more in the

Rest and recovery.

descent of the Alps, but it was also in evil case from the shortness of provisions, and the inevitable neglect of all proper attention to physical necessities. Many had quite abandoned all care for their health under the influence of starvation and continuous fatigue; for it had proved impossible to carry a full supply of food for so many thousands over such mountains, and what they did bring was in great part lost along with the beasts that carried it. So that whereas, when Hannibal crossed the Rhone, he had thirty-eight thousand infantry, and more than eight thousand cavalry, he lost nearly half in the pass, as I have shown above; while the survivors had by these long continued sufferings become almost savage in look and general appearance. Hannibal therefore bent his whole energies to the restoration of the spirits and bodies of his men, and of their horses also. When his army had thus sufficiently recovered, finding the Taurini, who live immediately under the Alps, at war with the Insubres and inclined to be suspicious of the Carthaginians, Hannibal first invited them to terms of friendship and alliance; and, on their refusal, invested their chief city and carried it after a three days' siege. Having put to the sword all who had opposed him, he struck such terror into the minds of the neighbouring tribes, that they all gave in their submission out of hand. The other Celts inhabiting these plains were also eager to join the Carthaginians, according to their original purpose; but the Roman legions had by this time advanced too far, and had intercepted the greater part of them: they were therefore unable to stir, and in some cases were even obliged to serve in the Roman ranks. This determined Hannibal not to delay his advance any longer, but to strike some blow which might encourage those natives who were desirous of sharing his enterprise.

Taking of Turin.

61. When he heard, while engaged on this design, that Publius had already crossed the Padus with his army, and was at no great distance, he was at first inclined to disbelieve the fact, reflecting that it was not many days since he had left him near the passage of the Rhone, and that the voyage from Marseilles to Etruria was a long and difficult one. He was told, moreover, that from the

Approach of Scipio.

Tyrrhenian Sea to the Alps through Italian soil was a long march, without good military roads. But when messenger after messenger confirmed the intelligence with increased positiveness, he was filled with amazement and admiration at the Consul's plan of campaign, and promptness in carrying it out. The feelings of Publius were much the same: for he had not expected that Hannibal would even attempt the passage of the Alps with forces of different races, or, if he did attempt it, that he could escape utter destruction. Entertaining such ideas he was immensely astonished at his courage and adventurous daring, when he heard that he had not only got safe across, but was actually besieging certain towns in Italy. Similar feelings were entertained at Rome when the news arrived there. For scarcely had the last rumour about the taking of Saguntum by the Carthaginians ceased to attract attention, and scarcely had the measures adopted in view of that event been taken,—namely the despatch of one Consul to Libya to besiege Carthage, and of the other to Iberia to meet Hannibal there,—than news came that Hannibal had arrived in Italy with his army, and was already besieging certain towns in it. Thrown into great alarm by this unexpected turn of affairs, the Roman government sent at once to Tiberius at Lilybaeum, telling him of the presence of the enemy in Italy, and ordering him to abandon the original design of his expedition, and to make all haste home to reinforce the defences of the country. Tiberius at once collected the men of the fleet and sent them off, with orders to go home by sea; while he caused the Tribunes to administer an oath to the men of the legions that they would all appear at a fixed day at Ariminum by bedtime. Ariminum is a town on the Adriatic, situated at the southern boundary of the valley of the Padus. In every direction there was stir and excitement: and the news being a complete surprise to everybody, there was everywhere a great and irrepressible anxiety as to the future.

Tiberius Sempronius recalled.

62. The two armies being now within a short distance of each other, Hannibal and Publius both thought it necessary to address their men in terms suitable to the occasion.

Gallic prisoners.

The manner in which Hannibal tried to encourage his army was this. He mustered the men, and caused some youthful prisoners whom he had caught when they were attempting to hinder his march on the Alpine passes, to be brought forward. They had been subjected to great severities with this very object, loaded with heavy chains, half-starved, and their bodies a mass of bruises from scourging. Hannibal caused these men to be placed in the middle of the army, and some suits of Gallic armour, such as are worn by their kings when they fight in single combat, to be exhibited; in addition to these he placed there some horses, and brought in some valuable military cloaks. He then asked these young prisoners, which of them were willing to fight with each other on condition of the conqueror taking these prizes, and the vanquished escaping all his present miseries by death. Upon their all answering with a loud shout that they were desirous of fighting in these single combats, he bade them draw lots; and the pair, on whom the first lot fell, to put on the armour and fight with each other. As soon as the young men heard these orders, they lifted up their hands, and each prayed the gods that he might be one of those to draw the lot. And when the lots were drawn, those on whom they fell were overjoyed, and the others in despair. When the fight was finished, too, the surviving captives congratulated the one who had fallen no less than the victor, as having been freed from many terrible sufferings, while they themselves still remained to endure them. And in this feeling the Carthaginian soldiers were much disposed to join, all pitying the survivors and congratulating the fallen champion.

63. Having by this example made the impression he desired upon the minds of his troops, Hannibal then came forward himself and said, "that he had exhibited these captives in order that they might see in the person of others a vivid representation of what they had to expect themselves, and might so lay their plans all the better in view of the actual state of affairs. Fortune had summoned them to a life and death contest very like that of the two captives, and in which the prize of victory was the same. For they must either conquer, or die, or fall alive into

Hannibal's speech.

the hands of their enemies; and the prize of victory would not be mere horses and military cloaks, but the most enviable position in the world if they became masters of the wealth of Rome: or if they fell in battle their reward would be to end their life fighting to their last breath for the noblest object, in the heat of the struggle, and with no sense of pain; while if they were beaten, or from desire of life were base enough to fly, or tried to prolong that life by any means except victory, every sort of misery and misfortune would be their lot: for it was impossible that any one of them could be so irrational or senseless, when he remembered the length of the journey he had performed from his native land, and the number of enemies that lay between him and it, and the size of the rivers he had crossed, as to cherish the hope of being able to reach his home by flight. They should therefore cast away such vain hopes, and regard their position as being exactly that of the combatants whom they had but now been watching. For, as in their case, all congratulated the dead as much as the victor, and commiserated the survivors; so they should think of the alternatives before themselves, and should, one and all, come upon the field of battle resolved, if possible, to conquer, and, if not, to die. Life with defeat was a hope that must by no means whatever be entertained. If they reasoned and resolved thus, victory and safety would certainly attend them: for it never happened that men who came to such a resolution, whether of deliberate purpose or from being driven to bay, were disappointed in their hope of beating their opponents in the field. And when it chanced, as was the case with the Romans, that the enemy had in most cases a hope of quite an opposite character, from the near neighbourhood of their native country making flight an obvious means of safety, then it was clear that the courage which came of despair would carry the day."

When he saw that the example and the words he had spoken had gone home to the minds of the rank and file, and that the spirit and enthusiasm which he aimed at inspiring were created, he dismissed them for the present with commendations, and gave orders for an advance at daybreak on the next morning.

64. About the same day Publius Scipio, having now crossed the Padus, and being resolved to make a farther advance across the Ticinus, ordered those who were skilled in such works to construct a bridge across this latter river; and then summoned a meeting of the remainder of his army and addressed them: dwelling principally on the reputation of their country and of the ancestors' achievements. But he referred particularly to their present position, saying, "that they ought to entertain no doubt of victory, though they had never as yet had any experience of the enemy; and should regard it as a piece of extravagant presumption of the Carthaginians to venture to face Romans, by whom they had been so often beaten, and to whom they had for so many years paid tribute and been all but slaves. And when in addition to this they at present knew thus much of their mettle,—that they dared not face them, what was the fair inference to be drawn for the future? Their cavalry, in a chance encounter on the Rhone with those of Rome, had, so far from coming off well, lost a large number of men, and had fled with disgrace to their own camp; and the general and his army, as soon as they knew of the approach of his legions, had beat a retreat, which was exceedingly like a flight, and, contrary to their original purpose, had in their terror taken the road over the Alps. And it was evident that Hannibal had destroyed the greater part of his army; and that what he had left was feeble and unfit for service, from the hardships they had undergone: in the same way he had lost the majority of his horses, and made the rest useless from the length and difficult nature of the journey. They had, therefore, only to show themselves to the enemy." But, above all, he pointed out that "his own presence at their head ought to be special encouragement to them: for that he would not have left his fleet and Spanish campaign, on which he had been sent, and have come to them in such haste, if he had not seen on consideration that his doing so was necessary for his country's safety, and that a certain victory was secured to him by it."

Scipio crosses the Ticinus.

The weight and influence of the speaker, as well as their belief in his words, roused great enthusiasm among the men; which Scipio acknowledged, and then dismissed them with the

additional injunction that they should hold themselves in readiness to obey any order sent round to them.

Skirmish of cavalry near the Ticinus, Nov. B.C. 219.

65. Next day both generals led their troops along the river Padus, on the bank nearest the Alps, the Romans having the stream on their left, the Carthaginians on their right; and having ascertained on the second day, by means of scouts, that they were near each other, they both halted and remained encamped for that day: but on the next, both taking their cavalry, and Publius his sharp-shooters also, they hurried across the plain to reconnoitre each other's forces. As soon as they came within distance, and saw the dust rising from the side of their opponents, they drew up their lines for battle at once. Publius put his sharp-shooters and Gallic horsemen in front, and bringing the others into line, advanced at a slow pace. Hannibal placed his cavalry that rode with bridles, and was most to be depended on, in his front, and led them straight against the enemy; having put the Numidian cavalry on either wing to take the enemy on the flanks. The two generals and the cavalry were in such hot haste to engage, that they closed with each other before the sharp-shooters had an opportunity of discharging their javelines at all. Before they could do so, they left their ground, and retreated to the rear of their own cavalry, making their way between the squadrons, terrified at the approaching charge, and afraid of being trampled to death by the horses which were galloping down upon them. The cavalry charged each other front to front, and for a long time maintained an equal contest; and a great many men dismounting on the actual field, there was a mixed fight of horse and foot. The Numidian horse, however, having outflanked the Romans, charged them on the rear: and so the sharp-shooters, who had fled from the cavalry charge at the beginning, were now trampled to death by the numbers and furious onslaught of the Numidians; while the front ranks originally engaged with the Carthaginians, after losing many of their men and inflicting a still greater loss on the enemy, finding themselves charged on the rear by the Numidians, broke into flight: most of them scattering in every direction, while some of them kept closely massed round the Consul.

66. Publius then broke up his camp, and marched through the plains to the bridge over the Padus, in haste to get his legions across before the enemy came up. He saw that the level country where he was then was favourable to the enemy with his superiority in cavalry. He was himself disabled by a wound;[1] and he decided that it was necessary to shift his quarters to a place of safety. For a time Hannibal imagined that Scipio would give him battle with his infantry also: but when he saw that he had abandoned his camp, he went in pursuit of him as far as the bridge over the Ticinus; but finding that the greater part of the timbers of this bridge had been torn away, while the men who guarded the bridge were left still on his side of the river, he took them prisoners to the number of about six hundred; and being informed that the main army was far on its way, he wheeled round and again ascended the Padus in search of a spot in it which admitted of being easily bridged. After two days' march he halted and constructed a bridge over the river by means of boats. He committed the task of bringing over the army to Hasdrubal;[2] while he himself crossed at once, and busied himself in receiving the ambassadors who arrived from the neighbouring districts. For no sooner had he gained the advantage in the cavalry engagement, than all the Celts in the vicinity hastened to fulfil their original engagement by avowing themselves his friends, supplying him with provisions, and joining the Carthaginian forces. After giving these men a cordial reception, and getting his own army across the Padus, he began to march back again down stream, with an earnest desire of giving the enemy battle. Publius, too, had crossed the river and was now encamped under the walls of the Roman colony Placentia. There he made no sign of any intention to move; for he was engaged in trying to heal his own wound and those of his men, and considered that he had a secure base of operations where he was. A two days' march

Scipio retires to Placentia on the right bank of the Po.

Hannibal crosses the Po higher up and follows Scipio to Placentia.

[1] His life, according to one story, was saved by his son, the famous Scipio Africanus (10, 3); according to another, by a Ligurian slave (Livy, 21, 46).

[2] Livy says "to Mago," Hannibal's younger brother (21, 47). This Hasdrubal is called in ch. 93 "captain of pioneers."

from the place where he had crossed the Padus brought Hannibal to the neighbourhood of the enemy; and on the third day he drew out his army for battle in full view of his opponents: but as no one came out to attack, he pitched his camp about fifty stades from them.

Treachery of the Gauls serving in the army of Scipio.

67. But the Celtic contingent of the Roman army, seeing that Hannibal's prospects looked the brighter of the two, concerted their plans for a fixed time, and waited in their several tents for the moment of carrying them out. When the men within the rampart of the camp had taken their supper and were gone to bed, the Celts let more than half the night pass, and just about the time of the morning watch armed themselves and fell upon the Romans who were quartered nearest to them; killed a considerable number, and wounded not a few; and, finally, cutting off the heads of the slain, departed with them to join the Carthaginians, to the number of two thousand infantry and nearly two hundred cavalry. They were received with great satisfaction by Hannibal; who, after addressing them encouragingly, and promising them all suitable rewards, sent them to their several cities, to declare to their compatriots what they had done, and to urge them to make alliance with him: for he knew that they would now all feel compelled to take part with him, when they learnt the treachery of which their fellow-countrymen had been guilty to the Romans. Just at the same time the Boii came in, and handed over to him the three Agrarian Commissioners, sent from Rome to divide the lands; whom, as I have already related, they had seized by a sudden act of treachery at the beginning of the war. Hannibal gratefully acknowledged their good intention, and made a formal alliance with those who came: but he handed them back their prisoners, bidding them keep them safe, in order to get back their own hostages from Rome, as they intended at first.

Scipio changes his position at Placentia to one on the Trebia.

Publius regarded this treachery as of most serious importance; and feeling sure that the Celts in the neighbourhood had long been ill-disposed, and would, after this event, all incline to the Carthaginians, he made up his mind that some precaution for the future was necessary. The next night, therefore,

just before the morning watch, he broke up his camp and marched for the river Trebia, and the high ground near it, feeling confidence in the protection which the strength of the position and the neighbourhood of his allies would give him.

68. When Hannibal was informed of Scipio's change of quarters, he sent the Numidian horse in pursuit at once, and the rest soon afterwards, following close behind with his main army. The Numidians, finding the Roman camp empty, stopped to set fire to it: which proved of great service to the Romans; for if they had pushed on and caught up the Roman baggage, a large number of the rear-guard would have certainly been killed by the cavalry in the open plains. But as it was, the greater part of them got across the River Trebia in time; while those who were after all too far in the rear to escape, were either killed or made prisoners by the Carthaginians.

Hannibal follows him.

Scipio, however, having crossed the Trebia occupied the first high ground; and having strengthened his camp with trench and palisade, waited the arrival of his colleague, Tiberius Sempronius, and his army; and was taking the greatest pains to cure his wound, because he was exceedingly anxious to take part in the coming engagement. Hannibal pitched his camp about forty stades from him. While the numerous Celts inhabiting the plains, excited by the good prospects of the Carthaginians, supplied his army with provisions in great abundance, and were eager to take their share with Hannibal in every military operation or battle.

Scipio's position on the slopes of Apennines, near the source of the Trebia.

When news of the cavalry engagement reached Rome, the disappointment of their confident expectations caused a feeling of consternation in the minds of the people. Not but that plenty of pretexts were found to prove to their own satisfaction that the affair was not a defeat. Some laid the blame on the Consul's rashness, and others on the treacherous lukewarmness of the Celts, which they concluded from their recent revolt must have been shown by them on the field. But, after all, as the infantry was still unimpaired, they made up their minds that the general result was still as hopeful as ever. Accordingly, when Tiberius and his legions arrived at Rome, and

marched through the city, they believed that his mere appearance at the seat of war would settle the matter.

Tiberius Sempronius joins Scipio.

His men met Tiberius at Ariminum, according to their oath, and he at once led them forward in all haste to join Publius Scipio. The junction effected, and a camp pitched by the side of his colleague, he was naturally obliged to refresh his men after their forty days' continuous march between Ariminum and Lilybaeum: but he went on with all preparations for a battle; and was continually in conference with Scipio, asking questions as to what had happened in the past, and discussing with him the measures to be taken in the present.

69. Meanwhile Hannibal got possession of Clastidium, by the treachery of a certain Brundisian, to whom it had been entrusted by the Romans. Having become master of the garrison and the stores of corn, he used the latter for his present needs; but took the men whom he had captured with him, without doing them any harm, being desirous of showing by an example the policy he meant to pursue; that those whose present position towards Rome was merely the result of circumstances should not be terrified, and give up hope of being spared by him. The man who betrayed Clastidium to him he treated with extraordinary honour, by way of tempting all men in similar situations of authority to share the prospects of the Carthaginians. But afterwards, finding that certain Celts who lived in the fork of the Padus and the Trebia, while pretending to have made terms with him, were sending messages to the Romans at the same time, believing that they would thus secure themselves from being harmed by either side, he sent two thousand infantry with some Celtic and Numidian cavalry with orders to devastate their territory. This order being executed, and a great booty obtained, the Celts appeared at the Roman camp beseeching their aid. Tiberius had been all along looking out for an opportunity of striking a blow: and at once seized on this pretext for sending out a party, consisting of the greater part of his cavalry, and a thousand sharp-shooters of his infantry along with them; who having speedily come up

Fall of Clastidium. Hannibal's policy towards the Italians.

A skirmish favourable to the Romans

with the enemy on the other side of the Trebia, and engaged them in a sharp struggle for the possession of the booty, forced the Celts and Numidians to beat a retreat to their own camp. Those who were on duty in front of the Carthaginian camp quickly perceived what was going on, and brought some reserves to support the retreating cavalry; then the Romans in their turn were routed, and had to retreat to their camp. At this Tiberius sent out all his cavalry and sharp-shooters; whereupon the Celts again gave way, and sought the protection of their own camp. The Carthaginian general being unprepared for a general engagement, and thinking it a sound rule not to enter upon one on every casual opportunity, or except in accordance with a settled design, acted, it must be confessed, on this occasion with admirable generalship. He checked their flight when his men were near the camp, and forced them to halt and face about; but he sent out his aides and buglers to recall the rest, and prevented them from pursuing and engaging the enemy any more. So the Romans after a short halt went back, having killed a large number of the enemy, and lost very few themselves.

70. Excited and overjoyed at this success Tiberius was all eagerness for a general engagement. Now, it was in his power to administer the war for the present as he chose, owing to the ill-health of Publius Scipio; yet wishing to have his colleague's opinion in support of his own, he consulted him on this subject. Publius however took quite an opposite view of the situation. He thought his legions would be all the better for a winter under arms; and that the fidelity of the fickle Celts would never stand the test of want of success and enforced inactivity on the part of the Carthaginians: they would be certain, he thought, to turn against them once more. Besides, when he had recovered from his wound, he hoped to be able to do good service to his country himself. With these arguments he tried to dissuade Tiberius from his design. The latter felt that every one of these arguments were true and sound; but, urged on by ambition and a blind confidence in his fortune, he was eager to have the credit of the decisive action to himself, before Scipio should be able to be present

Sempronius resolves to give battle.

at the battle, or the next Consuls arrive to take over the command; for the time for that to take place was now approaching. As therefore he selected the time for the engagement from personal considerations, rather than with a view to the actual circumstances of the case, he was bound to make a signal failure.

Hannibal took much the same view of the case as Scipio, and was therefore, unlike him, eager for a battle; because, in the first place, he wished to avail himself of the enthusiasm of the Celts before it had at all gone off: in the second place, he wished to engage the Roman legions while the soldiers in them were raw recruits without practice in war: and, in the third place, because he wished to fight the battle while Scipio was still unfit for service: but most of all because he wanted to be doing something and not to let the time slip by fruitlessly; for when a general leads his troops into a foreign country, and attempts what looks like a desperate undertaking, the one chance for him is to keep the hopes of his allies alive by continually striking some fresh blow.

Such were Hannibal's feelings when he knew of the intended attack of Tiberius.

71. Now he had some time before remarked a certain piece of ground which was flat and treeless, and yet well suited for an ambush, because there was a stream in it with a high overhanging bank thickly covered with thorns and brambles. Here he determined to entrap the enemy. The place was admirably adapted for putting them off their guard; because the Romans were always suspicious of woods, from the fact of the Celts invariably choosing such places for their ambuscades, but felt no fear at all of places that were level and without trees: not knowing that for the concealment and safety of an ambush such places are much better than woods; because the men can command from them a distant view of all that is going on: while nearly all places have sufficient cover to make concealment possible,—a stream with an overhanging bank, reeds, or ferns, or some sort of bramble-bushes,—which are good enough to hide not infantry only, but sometimes even cavalry, if the simple precaution is taken of laying conspicuous

Hannibal prepares an ambuscade.

arms flat upon the ground and hiding helmets under shields. Hannibal had confided his idea to his brother Mago and to his council, who had all approved of the plan. Accordingly, when the army had supped, he summoned this young man to his tent, who was full of youthful enthusiasm, and had been trained from boyhood in the art of war, and put under his command a hundred cavalry and the same number of infantry. These men he had himself earlier in the day selected as the most powerful of the whole army, and had ordered to come to his tent after supper. Having addressed and inspired them with the spirit suitable to the occasion, he bade each of them select ten of the bravest men of their own company, and to come with them to a particular spot in the camp. The order having been obeyed, he despatched the whole party, numbering a thousand cavalry and as many infantry, with guides, to the place selected for the ambuscade; and gave his brother directions as to the time at which he was to make the attempt. At daybreak he himself mustered the Numidian cavalry, who were conspicuous for their powers of endurance; and after addressing them, and promising them rewards if they behaved with gallantry, he ordered them to ride up to the enemy's lines, and then quickly cross the river, and by throwing showers of darts at them tempt them to come out: his object being to get at the enemy before they had had their breakfast, or made any preparations for the day. The other officers of the army also he summoned, and gave them similar instructions for the battle, ordering all their men to get breakfast and to see to their arms and horses.

72. As soon as Tiberius saw the Numidian horse approaching, he immediately sent out his cavalry by itself with orders to engage the enemy, and keep them in play, while he despatched after them six thousand foot armed with javelins, and got the rest of the army in motion, with the idea that their appearance would decide the affair: for his superiority in numbers, and his success in the cavalry skirmish of the day before, had filled him with confidence. But it was now mid-winter and the day was snowy and excessively cold, and men and horses were marching out almost entirely without having tasted food; and

Battle of the Trebia, December B.C. 218.

accordingly, though the troops were at first in high spirits, yet when they had crossed the Trebia, swollen by the floods which the rain of the previous night had brought down from the high ground above the camp, wading breast deep through the stream, they were in a wretched state from the cold and want of food as the day wore on. While the Carthaginians on the contrary had eaten and drunk in their tents, and got their horses ready, and were all anointing and arming themselves round the fires. Hannibal waited for the right moment to strike, and as soon as he saw that the Romans had crossed the Trebia, throwing out eight thousand spearmen and slingers to cover his advance, he led out his whole army. When he had advanced about eight stades from the camp, he drew up his infantry, consisting of about twenty thousand Iberians, Celts, and Libyans, in one long line, while he divided his cavalry and placed half on each wing, amounting in all to more than ten thousand, counting the Celtic allies; his elephants also he divided between the two wings, where they occupied the front rank. Meanwhile Tiberius had recalled his cavalry because he saw that they could do nothing with the enemy. For the Numidians when attacked retreated without difficulty, scattering in every direction, and then faced about again and charged, which is the peculiar feature of their mode of warfare. But he drew up his infantry in the regular Roman order, consisting of sixteen thousand citizens and twenty thousand allies; for that is the complete number of a Roman army in an important campaign, when the two Consuls are compelled by circumstances to combine forces.[1] He then placed the cavalry on either wing, numbering four thousand, and advanced against the enemy in gallant style, in regular order, and at a deliberate pace.

Hannibal's forces.

The Roman forces.

73. When the two forces came within distance, the light-armed troops in front of the two armies closed with each other. In this part of the battle the Romans were in many respects at a disadvantage, while the Carthaginians had everything in their favour. For the Roman spearmen had been on hard

The Roman cavalry retreat.

[1] That is, four legions and their regular contingent of socii. See 6, 19 *sqq*

service ever since daybreak, and had expended most of their weapons in the engagement with the Numidians, while those weapons which were left had become useless from being long wet. Nor were the cavalry, or indeed the whole army, any better off in these respects. The case of the Carthaginians was exactly the reverse: they had come on the field perfectly sound and fresh, and were ready and eager for every service required of them. As soon, therefore, as their advanced guard had retired again within their lines, and the heavy-armed soldiers were engaged, the cavalry on the two wings of the Carthaginian army at once charged the enemy with all the effect of superiority in numbers, and in the condition both of men and horses secured by their freshness when they started. The Roman cavalry on the contrary retreated: and the flanks of the line being thus left unprotected, the Carthaginian spearmen and the main body of the Numidians, passing their own advanced guard, charged the Roman flanks: and, by the damage which they did them, prevented them from keeping up the fight with the troops on their front. The heavy-armed soldiers, however, who were in the front rank of both armies, and in the centre of that, maintained an obstinate and equal fight for a considerable time.

74. Just then the Numidians, who had been lying in ambush, left their hiding-place, and by a sudden charge on the centre of the Roman rear produced great confusion and alarm throughout the army. Finally both the Roman wings, being hard pressed in front by the elephants, and on both flanks by the light-armed troops of the enemy, gave way, and in their flight were forced upon the river behind them. After this, while the centre of the Roman rear was losing heavily, and suffering severely from the attack of the Numidian ambuscade, their front, thus driven to bay, defeated the Celts and a division of Africans, and, after killing a large number of them, succeeded in cutting their way through the Carthaginian line. Then seeing that their wings had been forced off their ground, they gave up all hope of relieving them or getting back to their camp, partly because of the number of the enemy's cavalry, and partly because they were hindered by the river and the

Both Roman wings defeated.

pelting storm of rain which was pouring down upon their heads. They therefore closed their ranks, and made their way safely to Placentia, to the number of ten thousand. Of the rest of the army the greater number were killed by the elephants and cavalry on the bank of the Trebia; while those of the infantry who escaped, and the greater part of the cavalry, managed to rejoin the ten thousand mentioned above, and arrived with them at Placentia. Meanwhile the Carthaginian army pursued the enemy as far as the Trebia; but being prevented by the storm from going farther, returned to their camp. They regarded the result of the battle with great exultation, as a complete success; for the loss of the Iberians and Africans had been light, the heaviest having fallen on the Celts. But from the rain and the snow which followed it, they suffered so severely, that all the elephants except one died, and a large number of men and horses perished from the cold.

The Roman centre fights its way to Placentia.

75. Fully aware of the nature of his disaster, but wishing to conceal its extent as well as he could from the people at home, Tiberius sent messengers to announce that a battle had taken place, but that the storm had deprived them of the victory. For the moment this news was believed at Rome; but when soon afterwards it became known that the Carthaginians were in possession of the Roman camp, and that all the Celts had joined them: while their own troops had abandoned their camp, and, after retiring from the field of battle, were all collected in the neighbouring cities; and were besides being supplied with necessary provisions by sea up the Padus, the Roman people became only too certain of what had really happened in the battle. It was a most unexpected reverse, and it forced them at once to urge on with energy the remaining preparations for the war. They reinforced those positions which lay in the way of the enemy's advance; sent legions to Sardinia and Sicily, as well as garrisons to Tarentum, and other places of strategical importance; and, moreover, fitted out a fleet of sixty quinqueremes. The Consuls designate, Gnaeus Servilius and Gaius Flaminius, were collecting the allies and enrolling the

Winter of B.C. 118-117.

Great exertions at Rome to meet the danger.

citizen legions, and sending supplies to Ariminum and Etruria, with a view of going to the seat of war by those two routes. They sent also to king Hiero asking for reinforcements, who sent them five hundred Cretan archers and a thousand peltasts. In fact they pushed on their preparations in every direction with energy. For the Roman people are most formidable, collectively and individually, when they have real reason for alarm.

Gnaeus Scipio in Spain.

76. While these events were happening in Italy, Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio, who had been left by his brother Publius in command of the fleet, setting sail from the mouth of the Rhone, came to land with his whole squadron at a place in Iberia called Emporium. Starting from this town, he made descents upon the coast, landing and besieging those who refused to submit to him along the seaboard as far as the Iber; and treating with every mark of kindness those who acceded to his demands, and taking all the precautions he could for their safety. When he had garrisoned those towns on the coast that submitted, he led his whole army inland, having by this time a not inconsiderable contingent of Iberian allies; and took possession of the towns on his line of march, some by negotation and some by force of arms. The Carthaginian troops which Hannibal had left in that district under the command of Hanno, lay entrenched to resist him under the walls of a town called Cissa.

Defeating this army in a pitched battle, Gnaeus not only got possession of a rich booty, for the whole baggage of the army invading Italy had been left under its charge, but secured the friendly alliance of all the Iberian tribes north of the Iber, and took both Hanno, the general of the Carthaginians, and Andobales, the general of the Iberians, prisoners. The latter was despot of central Iberia, and had always been especially inclined to the side of Carthage.

Immediately he learnt what had happened, Hasdrubal crossed the Iber to bring aid. There he ascertained that the Roman troops left in charge of the fleet had abandoned all precautions, and were trading on the success of the land forces to pass their time in ease. He therefore took with him eight

thousand infantry and one thousand cavalry of his own army, and finding the men of the fleet scattered about the country, he killed a great many of them and forced the rest to fly for refuge to their ships. He then retired across the Iber again, and employed himself in fortifying and garrisoning the posts south of the river, taking up his winter quarters at New Carthage. When Gnaeus rejoined his fleet, he punished the authors of the disaster according to the Roman custom; and then collected his land and sea forces together in Tarraco, and there took up his winter quarters; and by dividing the booty equally between his soldiers, inspired them at once with affection towards himself and eagerness for future service. Such was the course of the Iberian campaign.

77. At the beginning of the following spring, Gaius Flaminius marched his army through Etruria, and pitched his camp at Arretium; while his colleague Gnaeus Servilius on the other hand went to Ariminum, to await the advance of the enemy in that direction. B.C. 217.

Passing the winter in the Celtic territory, Hannibal kept his Roman prisoners in close confinement, supplying them very sparingly with food; while he treated their allies with great kindness from the first, and finally called them together and addressed them, alleging, "that he had not come to fight against them, but against Rome in their behalf; and that, therefore, if they were wise, they would attach themselves to him: because he had come to restore freedom to the Italians, and to assist them to recover their cities and territory which they had severally lost to Rome." With these words he dismissed them without ransom to their own homes: wishing by this policy to attract the inhabitants of Italy to his cause, and to alienate their affections from Rome, and to awaken the resentment of all those who considered themselves to have suffered by the loss of harbours or cities under the Roman rule. Hannibal conciliates the Italians.

78. While he was in these winter quarters also he practised a ruse truly Punic. Being apprehensive that from the fickleness of their character, and the newness of the tie between himself and them, the Celts might lay plots against his life, he caused a number of wigs to be made for him, suited in

appearance to men of various ages; and these he constantly varied, changing at the same time his clothes also to harmonise with the particular wig which he wore. He thus made it hard to recognise him, not only for those who met him suddenly, but even for his intimates. But seeing that the Celts were discontented at the lengthened continuance of the war within their borders, and were in a state of restless hurry to invade the enemy's territory,—on the pretence of hatred for Rome, but in reality from love of booty,—he determined to break up his camp as soon as possible, and satisfy the desires of his army. Accordingly as soon as the change of season set in, by questioning those who were reputed to know the country best, he ascertained that the other roads leading into Etruria were long and well known to the enemy, but that the one which led through the marshes was short, and would bring them upon Flaminius as a surprise.[1] This was what suited his peculiar genius, and he therefore decided to take this route. But when the report was spread in his army that the general was going to lead them through some marshes, every soldier felt alarmed at the idea of the quagmires and deep sloughs which they would find on this march.

79. But after a careful inquiry as to what part of the road was firm or boggy, Hannibal broke up his camp and marched out. He placed the Libyans and Iberians and all his best soldiers in the van, and the baggage within their lines, that there might be plenty of provisions for their immediate needs. Provisions for the future he entirely neglected. Because he calculated that on reaching the enemy's territory, if he were beaten he should not require them, and if he were victorious he would find abundance in the open country. Behind this vanguard he placed the Celts, and in the rear of all the cavalry. He entrusted the command of the rear-guard to his brother Mago, that he might see to the security of all, and especially to guard against the cowardice and impatience of hard labour which characterised the Celts; in order that, if the

Hannibal starts for Etruria Spring of B.C. 217.

[1] "He crossed the Apennines, not by the ordinary road to Lucca, descending the valley of the Macra, but, as it appears, by a straighter line down the valley of the Auser or Serchio."—ARNOLD.

difficulty of the route should induce them to turn back, he might intercept them by means of the cavalry and force them to proceed. In point of fact, the Iberians and Libyans, having great powers of endurance and being habituated to such fatigues, and also because when they marched through them the marshes[1] were fresh and untrodden, accomplished their march with a moderate amount of distress: but the Celts advanced with great difficulty, because the marshes were now disturbed and trodden into a deep morass: and being quite unaccustomed to such painful labours, they bore the fatigue with anger and impatience; but were hindered from turning back by the cavalry in their rear. All however suffered grievously, especially from the impossibility of getting sleep on a continuous march of four days and three nights through a route which was under water: but none suffered so much, or lost so many men, as the Celts. Most of his beasts of burden also slipping in the mud fell and perished, and could then only do the men one service: they sat upon their dead bodies, and piling up baggage upon them so as to stand out above the water, they managed to get a snatch of sleep[2] for a short portion of the night. Another misfortune was that a considerable number of the horses lost their hoofs by the prolonged march through bog. Hannibal himself was with difficulty and much suffering got across riding on the only elephant left alive, enduring great agony from a severe attack of ophthalmia, by which he eventually lost the sight of one eye, because the time and the difficulties of the situation did not admit of his waiting or applying any treatment to it.

Hannibal in the valley of the Arno.

80. Having crossed the marshes in this unexpected manner, Hannibal found Flaminius in Etruria encamped under the walls of Arretium. For the present he pitched his camp close to the marshes, to refresh his army, and to investigate the plans of his enemies and the lie of the country in his front. And being informed that the country before him abounded in wealth, and that Flaminius

[1] The marshes between the Arno and the Apennines south of Florence

[2] ἀπεκοιμῶντο Schw. translates simply *dormiebant*. But the compound means more than that; it conveys the idea of an interval of sleep snatched from other employments. See Herod. 8, 76; Aristoph. *Vesp.* 211.

was a mere mob-orator and demagogue, with no ability for the actual conduct of military affairs, and was moreover unreasonably confident in his resources; he calculated that, if he passed his camp and made a descent into the district beyond, partly for fear of popular reproach and partly from a personal feeling of irritation, Flaminius would be unable to endure to watch passively the devastation of the country, and would spontaneously follow him wherever he went; and being eager to secure the credit of a victory for himself, without waiting for the arrival of his colleague, would give him many opportunities for an attack.

Hannibal correctly judges the character of Flaminius

81. And in making these calculations Hannibal showed his consummate prudence and strategical ability. For it is mere blind ignorance to believe that there can be anything of more vital importance to a general than the knowledge of his opponent's character and disposition. As in combats between individuals or ranks, he who would conquer must observe carefully how it is possible to attain his object, and what part of his enemy appears unguarded or insufficiently armed,—so must a commander of an army look out for the weak place, not in the body, but in the mind of the leader of the hostile force. For it has often happened before now that, from mere idleness and lack of energy, men have let not only the welfare of the state, but even their private fortunes fall to ruin: some are so addicted to wine that they cannot sleep without bemusing their intellects with drink; and others so infatuated in their pursuit of sensual pleasures, that they have not only been the ruin of their cities and fortunes, but have forfeited life itself with disgrace. In the case of individuals, however, cowardice and sloth bring shame only on themselves; but when it is a commander-in-chief that is concerned, the disaster affects all alike and is of the most fatal consequence. It not only infects the men under him with an inactivity like his own; but it often brings absolute dangers of the most serious description upon those who trust such a general. For rashness, temerity, and uncalculating impetuosity, as well as foolish ambition and vanity, give an easy victory to the enemy. And are the source of numerous dangers to one's friends: for a man who is the

prey of such weaknesses falls the easiest victim to every stratagem, ambush or ruse. The general then who can gain a clear idea of his opponent's weaknesses, and direct his attack on the point where he is most open to it, will very soon be the victor in the campaign. For as a ship, if you deprive it of its steerer, falls with all its crew into the hands of the enemy; so, in the case of an army in war, if you outwit or out-manœuvre its general, the whole will often fall into your hands.

Flaminius is drawn out of camp.

82. Nor was Hannibal mistaken in his calculations in regard to Flaminius. For no sooner had he left the neighbourhood of Faesulae, and, advancing a short way beyond the Roman camp, made a raid upon the neighbouring country, than Flaminius became excited, and enraged at the idea that he was despised by the enemy: and as the devastation of the country went on, and he saw from the smoke that rose in every direction that the work of destruction was proceeding, he could not patiently endure the sight. Some of his officers advised that they should not follow the enemy at once nor engage him, but should act on the defensive, in view of his great superiority in cavalry; and especially that they should wait for the other Consul, and not give battle until the two armies were combined. But Flaminius, far from listening to their advice, was indignant at those who offered it; and bade them consider what the people at home would say at the country being laid waste almost up to the walls of Rome itself, while they remained encamped in Etruria on the enemy's rear. Finally, with these words, he set his army in motion, without any settled plan of time or place; but bent only on falling in with the enemy, as though certain victory awaited him. For he had managed to inspire the people with such confident expectations, that the unarmed citizens who followed his camp in hope of booty, bringing chains and fetters and all such gear, were more numerous than the soldiers themselves.

Meanwhile Hannibal was advancing on his way to Rome through Etruria, keeping the city of Cortona and its hills on his left, and the Thrasymene lake on his right; and as he marched, he burned and wasted the country with a view of

rousing the wrath of the enemy and tempting him to come out. And when he saw Flaminius get well within distance, and observed that the ground he then occupied was suited to his purpose, he bent his whole energies on preparing for a general engagement.

83. The route which he was following led through a low valley enclosed on both sides by long lines of lofty hills. Of its two ends, that in front was blocked by an abrupt and inaccessible hill, and that on the rear by the lake, between which and the foot of the cliff there is only a very narrow defile leading into this valley. Making his way to the end of the valley along the bank of the lake, Hannibal posted himself with the Spanish and Libyan troops on the hill immediately in front of him as he marched, and pitched a camp on it; but sent his Balearic slingers and light-armed troops by a détour, and stationed them in extended order under the cover of the hills to the right of the valley; and by a similar détour placed the Gauls and cavalry under the cover of hills to the left, causing them also to extend their line so far as to cover the entrance of the defile running between the cliff and lake into the valley.[1] The ambuscade at Lake Thrasymene.

Having made these preparations during the night, and having thus enclosed the valley with ambuscades, Hannibal remained quiet. In pursuit of him came Flaminius, in hot haste to close with the enemy. It was late in the evening before he pitched his camp on the border of the lake; and at daybreak next morning, just before the morning watch, he led his front maniples forward along the borders of the lake into the valley with a view of engaging the enemy.

84. The day was exceedingly misty: and as soon as the greater part of the Roman line was in the valley, and the leading maniples were getting close to him, Hannibal gave the signal for attack; and at the same time The battle, 22d June.

[1] Livy, 22, 4-6. For a discussion of the modern views as to the scene of the battle, see W. T. Arnold's edition of Dr. Arnold's *History of the Second Punic War*, pp. 384-393. The radical difference between the account of Livy and that of Polybius seems to be that the former conceives the fighting to have been on the north shore of the lake between Tuoro and Passignano; Polybius conceives the rear to have been caught in the defile of Passignano, the main fighting to have been more to the east, where the road turns up at

sent orders to the troops lying in ambush on the hills to do the same, and thus delivered an assault upon the enemy at every point at once. Flaminius was taken completely by surprise: the mist was so thick, and the enemy were charging down from the upper ground at so many points at once, that not only were the Centurions and Tribunes unable to relieve any part of the line that was in difficulties, but were not even able to get any clear idea of what was going on: for they were attacked simultaneously on front, rear, and both flanks. The result was that most of them were cut down in the order of march, without being able to defend themselves: exactly as though they had been actually given up to slaughter by the folly of their leader. Flaminius himself, in a state of the utmost distress and despair, was attacked and killed by a company of Celts. As many as fifteen thousand Romans fell in the valley, who could neither yield nor defend themselves, being habituated to regard it as their supreme duty not to fly or quit their ranks. But those who were caught in the defile between the lake and the cliff perished in a shameful, or rather a most miserable, manner: for being thrust into the lake, some in their frantic terror endeavoured to swim with their armour on, and presently sank and were drowned; while the greater number, wading as far as they could into the lake, remained there with their heads above water; and when the cavalry rode in after them, and certain death stared them in the face, they raised their hands and begged for quarter, offering to surrender, and using every imaginary appeal for mercy; but were finally despatched by the enemy, or, in some cases, begged the favour of the fatal blow from their friends, or inflicted it on themselves. A number of men, however, amounting perhaps to six thousand, who were in the valley, defeated the enemy immediately in front of them; but though they might have done much to retrieve the fortune of the day, they were unable to go to the relief of their comrades, or get to the rear of their opponents, because they could not see what was going on. They accord-

right angles to the lake by La Torricella. Mr. Capes, however, in his note on the passage of Livy, seems to think that both accounts agree in representing the fighting on the vanguard as being opposite Tucro.

ingly pushed on continually to the front, always expecting to find themselves engaged with some of the enemy: until they discovered that, without noticing it, they were issuing upon the higher ground. But when they were on the crest of the hills, the mist broke and they saw clearly the disaster which had befallen them; and being no longer able to do any good, since the enemy was victorious all along the line, and in complete possession of the ground, they closed their ranks and made for a certain Etrurian village. After the battle Maharbal was sent by Hannibal with the Iberians and light-armed troops to besiege the village; and seeing themselves surrounded by a complication of dangers, they laid down their arms and surrendered on condition of their lives being spared. Such was the end of the final engagement between the Romans and Carthaginians in Etruria.

Hannibal's treatment of prisoners.

85. When the prisoners who had surrendered on terms were with the other prisoners brought to Hannibal, he had them all collected together to the number of more than fifteen thousand, and began by saying that Maharbal had no authority to grant them their lives without consulting him. He then launched out into an invective against Rome: and when he had finished that, he distributed all the prisoners who were Romans among the companies of his army to be held in safe keeping; but allowed all the allies to depart without ransom to their own country, with the same remark as he had made before, that "he was not come to fight against Italians, but in behalf of Italians against Rome." He then gave his army time to refresh themselves after their fatigue, and buried those of highest rank who had fallen in his army, amounting to about thirty; the total number of his loss being fifteen hundred, most of whom were Celts. He then began considering, in conjunction with his brother and friends, where and how he should continue his attack, for he now felt confident of ultimate success.

Dismay at Rome.

When the news of this disaster reached Rome, the chief men of the state could not, in view of the gravity of the blow, conceal its extent or soften it down, but were forced to assemble the people and tell them the truth. When the Praetor, therefore,

from the Rostra said, "We have been beaten in a great battle," there was such a consternation, that those who had been present at the battle as well as at this meeting, felt the disaster to be graver than when they were on the field of battle itself. And this feeling of the people was not to be wondered at. For many years they had been unaccustomed to the word or the fact of defeat, and they could not now endure reverse with patience or dignity. The Senate, however, rose to the occasion, and held protracted debates and consultations as to the future, anxiously considering what it was the duty of all classes to do, and how they were to do it.

Servilius's advanced guard cut to pieces.

86. About the same time as the battle of Thrasymene, the Consul Gnaeus Servilius, who had been stationed on duty at Ariminum, — which is on the coast of the Adriatic, where the plains of Cis-Alpine Gaul join the rest of Italy, not far from the mouths of the Padus,—having heard that Hannibal had entered Etruria and was encamped near Flaminius, designed to join the latter with his whole army. But finding himself hampered by the difficulty of transporting so heavy a force, he sent Gaius Centenius forward in haste with four thousand horse, intending that he should be there before himself in case of need. But Hannibal, getting early intelligence after the battle of Thrasymene of this reinforcement of the enemy, sent Maharbal with his light-armed troops, and a detachment of cavalry, who falling in with Gaius, killed nearly half his men at the first encounter; and having pursued the remainder to a certain hill, on the very next day took them all prisoners. The news of the battle of Thrasymene was three days' old at Rome, and the sorrow caused by it was, so to speak, at its hottest, when this further disaster was announced. The consternation caused by it was no longer confined to the people. The Senate now fully shared in it; and it was resolved that the usual annual arrangements for the election of magistrates should be suspended, and a more radical remedy be sought for the present dangers; for they came to the conclusion that their affairs were in such a state, as to require a commander with absolute powers.

Feeling now entirely confident of success, Hannibal rejected

the idea of approaching Rome for the present; but traversed the country plundering it without resistance, and directing his march towards the coast of the Adriatic. Having passed through Umbria and Picenum, he came upon the coast after a ten days' march with such enormous booty, that the army could neither drive nor carry all the wealth which they had taken, and after killing a large number of people on his road. For the order was given, usual in the storming of cities, to kill all adults who came in their way: an order which Hannibal was prompted to give now by his deep-seated hatred of Rome.[1]

Hannibal's advance after the battle.

87. Pitching his camp on the shore of the Adriatic, in a district extraordinarily rich in every kind of produce, he took great pains to refresh his men and restore their health, and no less so that of the horses. For the cold and squalor of a winter spent in Gallia Cis-Alpina without the protection of a roof, and then the painful march through the marshes, had brought upon most of the horses, and the men as well, an attack of scurvy and all its consequences. Having therefore now got possession of a rich country, he got his horses into condition again, and restored the bodies and spirits of his soldiers; and made the Libyans change their own for Roman arms selected for the purpose, which he could easily do from being possessed of so many sets stripped from the bodies of the enemy. He now sent messengers, too, to Carthage by sea, to report what had taken place, for this was the first time he had reached the sea since he entered Italy. The Carthaginians were greatly rejoiced at the news: and took measures with enthusiasm for forwarding supplies to their armies, both in Iberia and Italy.

Meanwhile the Romans had appointed Quintus Fabius Dictator,[2] a man distinguished no less for his wisdom than his

[1] This treatment of non-combatants was contrary to the usages of civilised warfare even in those days, and seems to have been the true ground for the charge of *crudelitas* always attributed to Hannibal by Roman writers, as opposed to the behaviour of such an enemy as Pyrrhus (Cic. *de Am.* 28) It may be compared to the order of the Convention to give no quarter to English soldiers, which the French officers nobly refused to execute.

[2] Polybius expresses the fact accurately, for, in the absence of a Consul to nominate a Dictator, Fabius was created by a plebiscitum; but the scruples of the lawyers were quieted by his having the title of *prodictator* only (Livy, 22, 8).

high birth; as is still commemorated by the fact that the members of his family are even now called *Maximi*, that is "Greatest," in honour of his successful achievements. A Dictator differs from the Consuls in this, that each Consul is followed by twelve lictors, the Dictator by twenty-four. Again, the Consuls have frequently to refer to the Senate to enable them to carry out their proposed plans; but the Dictator is absolute, and when he is appointed all other magistrates in Rome are at once deprived of power, except the Tribunes of the People.[1] I shall, however, take another opportunity of speaking in more detail about these officers. With the Dictator they appointed Marcus Minucius master of the horse; this is an officer under the Dictator, and takes his place when engaged elsewhere.

Q. Fabius Maximus Dictator.

88. Though Hannibal shifted his quarters from time to time for short distances in one direction or another, he remained in the neighbourhood of the Adriatic; and by bathing his horses with old wine, of which he had a great store, cured them of the scab and got them into condition again. By a similar treatment he cured his men of their wounds, and got the others into a sound state of health and spirits for the service before them. After traversing with fire and sword the territories of Praetutia,[2] Hadriana, Marrucina, and Frentana, he started on his road to Iapygia. This district is divided among three peoples, each with a district name, Daunii [Peucetii], and Messapii. Hannibal first invaded the territory of the Daunii, beginning from Luceria, a Roman colony, and laid the country waste. He next encamped near Vibo, and overran the territory of Arpi, and plundered all Daunia without resistance.

Meanwhile Fabius, after offering the usual sacrifice to the gods upon his appointment, started with his master of the horse, and four legions which had been enrolled for the purpose; and having effected a junction near Daunia with the troops that

Fabius takes the command.

[1] Ramsay (*Roman Antiquities*, p. 148) denies this exception, quoting Livy, 6, 16. But Polybius could hardly have been mistaken on such a point; and there are indications (Plutarch, *Anton.* 9) that the Tribunes did not occupy the same position as the other magistrates towards the Dictator.

[2] The *ager Praetutianus* was the southern district of Picenum (Livy, 22, 9; 27, 43). The chief town was Interamna.

had come to the rescue from Ariminum, he relieved Gnaeus of his command on shore and sent him with an escort to Rome, with orders to be ready with help for any emergency, in case the Carthaginians made any movement by sea. Fabius himself, with his master of the horse, took over the command of the whole army and pitched his camp opposite the Carthaginians, near a place called Aecae,[1] about six miles from the enemy.

89. When Hannibal learnt that Fabius had arrived, he determined to terrify the enemy by promptly attacking. He therefore led out his army, approached the Roman camp, and there drew up his men in order of battle; but when he had waited some time, and nobody came out to attack him, he drew off and retired to his own camp. For Fabius, having made up his mind to incur no danger and not to risk a battle, but to make the safety of his men his first and greatest object, kept resolutely to this purpose. At first he was despised for it, and gave rise to scandalous insinuations that he was an utter coward and dared not face an engagement: but in course of time he compelled everybody to confess and allow that it was impossible for any one to have acted, in the existing circumstances, with greater discretion and prudence. And it was not long before facts testified to the wisdom of his policy. Nor was it wonderful that it was so. For the forces of his opponents had been trained from their earliest youth without intermission in war; had a general who had grown up with them and from childhood had been instructed in the arts of the camp; had won many battles in Iberia, and twice running had beaten the Romans and their allies: and, what was more than all, had thoroughly made up their minds that their one hope of safety was in victory. In every respect the circumstances of the Roman army were the exact opposite of these; and therefore, their manifest inferiority making it impossible for Fabius to offer the enemy battle, he fell back upon those resources in which the Romans had the advantage of the enemy; clung to them; and conducted the war by their means: and they were—an inexhaustible supply of provisions and of men.

Cunctator.

[1] On the Appian Way between Equus Tuticus and Herdonia, mod. *Troja.*

90. He, then, during the following months, kept his army continually hovering in the neighbourhood of the enemy, his superior knowledge of the country enabling him to occupy beforehand all the posts of vantage; and having supplies in abundance on his rear, he never allowed his soldiers to go on foraging expeditions, or get separated, on any pretence, from the camp; but keeping them continually massed together and in close union, he watched for favourable opportunities of time and place; and by this method of proceeding captured and killed a large number of the enemy, who in their contempt of him straggled from their camp in search of plunder. His object in these manœuvres was twofold,—to gradually diminish the limited numbers of the enemy: and to strengthen and renew by such successes in detail the spirits of his own men, which had been depressed, to begin with, by the general defeat of their armies. But nothing would induce him to agree to give his enemy a set battle. This policy however was by no means approved of by his master of the horse, Marcus. He joined in the general verdict, and decried Fabius in every one's hearing, as conducting his command in a cowardly and unenterprising spirit; and was himself eager to venture upon a decisive engagement.

Minucius discontented.

Meanwhile the Carthaginians, after wasting these districts, crossed the Apennines; and descending upon Samnium, which was rich and had been free from war for many years past, found themselves in possession of such an abundance of provisions, that they could get rid of them neither by use nor waste. They overran also the territory of Beneventum, which was a Roman colony; and took the town of Venusia, which was unwalled and richly furnished with every kind of property. All this time the Romans were following on his rear, keeping one or two days' march behind him, but never venturing to approach or engage the enemy. Accordingly, when Hannibal saw that Fabius plainly meant to decline a battle, but yet would not abandon the country altogether, he formed the bold resolution of penetrating to the plains round Capua; and actually did so as far as Falernum, convinced that thereby he should do one of two things,—force the enemy to give him battle, or

Hannibal in Samnium and Apulia.

make it evident to all that the victory was his, and that the Romans had abandoned the country to him. This he hoped would strike terror into the various cities, and cause them to be eager to revolt from Rome. For up to that time, though the Romans had been beaten in two battles, not a single city in Italy had revolted to the Carthaginians; but all maintained their fidelity, although some of them were suffering severely; —a fact which may show us the awe and respect which the Republic had inspired in its allies.

91. Hannibal, however, had not adopted this plan without good reason. For the plains about Capua are the best in Italy for fertility and beauty and proximity to the sea, and for the commercial harbours, into which merchants run who are sailing to Italy from nearly all parts of the world. They contain, moreover, the most famous and beautiful cities of Italy. On its seaboard are Sinuessa, Cumae, Puteoli, Naples, and Nuceria; and inland to the north there are Cales and Teanum, to the east and south [Caudium[1]] and Nola. In the centre of these plains lies the richest of all the cities, that of Capua. No tale in all mythology wears a greater appearance of probability than that which is told of these, which, like others remarkable for their beauty, are called the Phlegraean plains; for surely none are more likely for beauty and fertility to have been contended for by gods. In addition to these advantages, they are strongly protected by nature and difficult of approach; for one side is protected by the sea, and the rest by a long and high chain of mountains, through which there are but three passes from the interior, narrow and difficult, one from Samnium [a second from Latium[2]] and a third from Hirpini. So that if the Carthaginians succeeded in fixing their quarters in these plains, they would have the advantage of a kind of theatre, in which to display the terrors of their power before the gaze of all Italy; and would make a spectacle also of the cowardice of their enemies in shrinking from giving them battle, while they themselves would be proved beyond dispute to be masters of the country.

[1] Holsten for the *Δαύνιοι* of the old text; others suggest *Calatia*.

[2] Added by conjecture of Schw. One MS. has *δευτέρα ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἐριβανοῦ*.

92. With this view Hannibal crossed from Samnium by the pass of the hill called Eribianus,[1] and encamped on the bank of the river Vulturnus, which almost divides these plains in half. His camp was on the side of the river towards Rome, but he overran the whole plain with foraging parties. Though utterly aghast at the audacity of the enemy's proceedings, Fabius stuck all the more firmly to the policy upon which he had determined. But his colleague Minucius, and all the centurions and tribunes of the army, thinking that they had caught the enemy in an excellent trap, were of opinion that they should make all haste into the plains, and not allow the most splendid part of the country to be devastated. Until they reached the spot, Fabius hurried on, and feigned to share their eager and adventurous spirit; and, when he was near the ager Falernus, he showed himself on the mountain skirts and kept in a line with the enemy, that he might not be thought by the allies to abandon the country: but he would not let his army descend into the plain, being still unwilling to risk a general engagement, partly for the same reasons as before, and partly because the enemy were conspicuously superior in cavalry.

Hannibal descends into the Falernian plain.

After trying to provoke his enemies, and collecting an unlimited amount of booty by laying waste the whole plain, Hannibal began taking measures for removing: wishing not to waste his booty, but to stow it in some safe place, which he might also make his winter quarters; that the army might not only be well off for the present, but might have abundant supplies all through the winter. Fabius, learning that he meditated returning the same way as he came, and seeing that the pass was a narrow one, and extremely well suited for an attack by ambush, placed about four thousand men at the exact spot that he would have to pass; while he, with the main body of his troops, encamped on a hill which commanded the entrance of the pass.

Fabius lies in wait.

93. Fabius hoped when the Carthaginians came thither, and encamped on the plain immediately under the foot of the hill, that he would be able to snatch away their

[1] Near Cales.

plunder without any risk to himself; and, most of all, might even put an end to the whole war by means of the excellent situation for an attack in which he now was. He was accordingly wholly intent on forming plans for this purpose, anxiously considering in what direction and in what manner he should avail himself of the advantages of the ground, and which of his men were to be the first to attack the enemy. Whilst his enemies were making these preparations for the next day, Hannibal, guessing the truth, took care to give them no time or leisure for executing their design; but summoning Hasdrubal, the captain of his pioneers, ordered him, with all speed, to make as many fagots of dry wood of all sorts as possible, and selecting two thousand of the strongest of the working oxen from the booty, to collect them outside the camp. When this was done, he summoned the pioneers, and pointed out to them a certain ridge lying between the camp and the gorge by which he meant to march. To this ridge they were to drive the oxen, when the order was given, as actively and energetically as they could, until they came to the top. Having given these instructions, he bade them take their supper and go to rest betimes. Towards the end of the third watch of the night he led the pioneers out of the camp, and ordered them to tie the fagots to the horns of the oxen. The men being numerous, this did not take long to do; and he then ordered them to set the fagots all alight, and to drive the oxen off and force them to mount the ridge; and placing his light-armed troops behind them he ordered them to assist the drivers up to a certain distance: but, as soon as the beasts had got well started, to take open order and pass them at the double, and, with as much noise as possible, make for the top of the ridge; that, if they found any of the enemy there, they might close with and attack them at once. At the same time he himself led the main army towards the narrow gorge of the pass,—his heavy-armed men in front, next to them the cavalry, then the booty, and the Iberians and Celts bringing up the rear.

Hannibal eludes him.

94. The Romans who were guarding the gorge, no sooner saw these fiery fagots advancing to the heights, than, quitting the narrow part of the pass, they made for the ridge to meet the

enemy. But when they got near the oxen, they were puzzled by the lights, imagining them to be something more dangerous than they really were; and when the Carthaginian light-armed troops came on to the ground, after some slight skirmishing between the two parties, upon the oxen rushing in among them, they separated and took up their positions on different heights and waited for daybreak, not being able to comprehend what was taking place.

Hannibal gets through the pass. Autumn, B.C. 217.

Partly because he was at a loss to understand what was happening, and, in the words of the poet, "some deep design suspecting;"[1] and partly that, in accordance with his original plan, he was determined not to risk a general engagement, Fabius remained quietly within his camp: while Hannibal, finding everything going as he designed, led his army and booty in safety through the gorge, the men who had been set to guard the narrow road having abandoned their post. At daybreak, seeing the two troops fronting each other on the heights, he sent some Iberian companies to the light-armed troops, who engaged the Romans, and, killing a thousand of them, easily relieved his own light-armed troops and brought them down to the main body.

Having thus effected his departure from the Falernian plain, Hannibal thenceforth busied himself in looking out for a place in which to winter, and in making the necessary preparations, after having inspired the utmost alarm and uncertainty in the cities and inhabitants of Italy. Though Fabius meanwhile was in great disrepute among the common people, for having let his enemy escape from such a trap, he nevertheless refused to abandon his policy; and being shortly afterwards obliged to go to Rome to perform certain sacrifices, he handed over the command of his legions to his master of the horse, with many parting injunctions, not to be so anxious to inflict a blow upon the enemy, as to avoid receiving one himself. Marcus, however, paid no heed to the advice, and, even while Fabius was speaking, had wholly resolved to risk a general engagement.

Fabius goes to Rome, leaving the command to M. Minucius.

95. While these things were going on in Italy, Hasdrubal,

[1] Homer, *Odyss.* 10, 230.

who was in command in Iberia, having during the winter repaired the thirty ships left him by his brother, and manned ten additional ones, got a fleet of forty decked vessels to sea, at the beginning of the summer, from New Carthage, under the command of Hamilcar; and at the same time collected his land forces, and led them out of their winter quarters. The fleet coasted up the country, and the troops marched along the shore towards the Iber. Suspecting their design, Gnaeus Scipio was for issuing from his winter quarters and meeting them both by land and sea. But hearing of the number of their troops, and the great scale on which their preparations had been made, he gave up the idea of meeting them by land; and manning thirty-five ships, and taking on board the best men he could get from his land forces to serve as marines, he put to sea, and arrived on the second day near the mouth of the Iber. Here he came to anchor, at a distance of about ten miles from the enemy, and sent two swift-sailing Massilian vessels to reconnoitre. For the sailors of Marseilles were the first in every service of difficulty and danger, and ready at the shortest notice to do whatever was required of them; and, in fact, Marseilles has distinguished itself above all other places, before and since, in fidelity to Rome, and never more so than in the Hannibalian war. The ships sent to reconnoitre having reported that the enemy's fleet was lying off the mouth of the Iber, Scipio put to sea with all speed, wishing to surprise them.

Spain, B.C. 217.

96. But being informed in good time by his look-out men that the enemy were bearing down upon him, Hasdrubal drew up his troops on the beach, and ordered his crews to go on board; and, when the Romans hove in sight, gave the signal for the attack, determined to fight the enemy at sea. But, after engaging, the Carthaginians made but a short struggle for victory, and very soon gave way. For the support of the troops on the beach did less service in encouraging them to attack, than harm in offering them a safe place of retreat. Accordingly, after losing two ships with their crews, and the oars and marines of four others, they gave way and made for the land; and when the Romans pressed on with spirit in pur-

Roman success at sea.

suit, they ran their ships ashore, and leaping from the vessels fled for refuge to the troops. The Romans came boldly close to land, towed off such of the vessels as could be got afloat, and sailed away in great exultation at having beaten the enemy at the first blow, secured the mastery of the sea, and taken twenty-five of the enemy's ships.

In Iberia therefore, after this victory, the Roman prospects had begun to brighten. But when news of this reverse arrived at Carthage, the Carthaginians at once despatched a fleet of seventy ships, judging it to be essential to their whole design that they should command the sea. These ships touched first at Sardinia and then at Pisae in Italy, the commanders believing that they should find Hannibal there. But the Romans at once put to sea to attack them from Rome itself, with a fleet of a hundred and twenty quinqueremes; and hearing of this expedition against them, the Carthaginians sailed back to Sardinia, and thence returned to Carthage. Gnaeus Servilius, who was in command of this Roman fleet, followed the Carthaginians for a certain distance, believing that he should fall in with them; but, finding that he was far behind, he gave up the attempt. He first put in at Lilybaeum, and afterwards sailed to the Libyan island of Cercina; and after receiving a sum of money from the inhabitants on condition of not laying waste the country, he departed. On his return voyage he took the island of Cossyrus, and having put a garrison into its small capital, returned to Lilybaeum. There he placed the fleet, and shortly afterwards went off himself to join the land army.

97. When the Senate heard of Gnaeus Scipio's naval success, believing it to be advantageous or rather essential not to relax their hold on Iberia, but to press on the war there against Carthage with redoubled vigour, they prepared a fleet of twenty ships, and put them under the command of Publius Scipio; and in accordance with arrangements already made, despatched him with all speed to join his brother Gnaeus, and carry on the Iberian campaign in conjunction with him. Their great anxiety was lest the Carthaginians should get the upper hand in Iberia, and thus possessing

Publius Scipio, whose imperium is prolonged after his Consulship of the previous year, with Spain assigned as his province, is sent to join his brother there with 20 ships. early in B.C. 217.

themselves of abundant supplies and recruits, should get a more complete mastery of the sea, and assist the invasion of Italy, by sending troops and money to Hannibal. Regarding therefore the Iberian war as of the utmost importance, they sent these ships and Publius Scipio to that country; who, when he arrived in Iberia, effected a junction with his brother and did most substantial service to the State. For up to that time the Romans had not ventured to cross the Iber; but had thought themselves fortunate if they could secure the friendship and allies of the tribes up to that river. They now however did cross it, and for the first time had the courage to attempt a movement on the other side: their designs being greatly favoured also by an accidental circumstance.

When the two brothers, after overawing the Iberian tribes that lived near the passage of the Iber, had arrived before the city of Saguntum, they pitched their camp about forty stades from it, near the temple of Aphrodite, selecting the position as offering at once security from the attacks of the enemy, and a means of getting supplies by sea: for their fleet was coasting down parallel with them.

98. Here an event occurred which produced a decisive change in their favour. When Hannibal was about to start for Italy, from the Iberian towns whose loyalty he suspected he took the sons of their leading men as hostages, and placed them all in Saguntum, because of the strength of that town and his confidence in the fidelity of those who were left in charge of it. Now there was a certain Iberian there named Abilyx, who enjoyed the highest character and reputation with his countrymen, and was believed to be especially well disposed and loyal to the Carthaginians. Seeing how affairs were going, and believing that the fortune of the Romans was in the ascendant, he formed in his own mind a scheme, worthy of an Iberian and barbarian, for giving up the hostages. Convinced that he might obtain a high place in the favour of Rome, if he gave a proof of his fidelity at a critical moment, he made up his mind to turn traitor to Carthage and put the hostages in the hands of the Romans. He began his machinations by addressing himself to Bostar, the Carthaginian general who had

Treason of Abilyx.

been despatched by Hasdrubal to prevent the Romans from crossing the river, but, not venturing to do this, had retreated, and was now encamped in the region of Saguntum next the sea. To this man, who was of a guileless and gentle character, and quite disposed to trust him, Abilyx now introduced the subject of the hostages. He argued that "the Romans having now crossed the Iber, the Carthaginians could no longer hold Iberia by terror, but stood now in need of the good feeling of their subjects: seeing then that the Romans had actually approached Saguntum and were besieging it, and that the city was in danger,—if he were to take the hostages and restore them to their parents and cities, he would not only frustrate the ambitious scheme of the Romans, who wished above all things by getting possession of the hostages to have the credit of doing this; but would also rouse a feeling of goodwill towards Carthage in all the cities, for having taken thought for the future and provided for the safety of the hostages. He would, too, much enhance the favour by personally managing this business: for if he restored these boys to their homes, he would provoke the gratitude, not only of their parents, but of the people at large also, by giving a striking instance of the magnanimous policy of Carthage towards her allies. He might even expect large rewards for himself from the families that recovered their children; for all those, who thus unexpectedly got into their hands the dearest objects of their affection, would vie with each other in heaping favours on the author of such a service." By these and similar arguments he persuaded Bostar to fall in with his proposals.

99. Abilyx then went away, after arranging a fixed day on which he would appear with everything necessary for conveying the boys. At night he made his way to the Roman lines, and, having fallen in with some Iberians serving in the Roman army, was by them conducted to the generals; to whom he discoursed at great length on the revulsion of feeling of the Iberians in their favour, which would be caused if they got possession of the hostages: and finally offered to put the boys in their hands. Publius Scipio received the proposal with extreme eagerness: and, promising him large rewards, he agreed with him on a day, hour, and place at which a party

were to be waiting to receive him. After returning home, Abilyx next went with a band of chosen friends to Bostar; and, after receiving the boys, left the camp at night, as though he wished not to be seen by the Roman camp as he passed it, and came at the appointed time to the place arranged, and there handed over all the boys to the Roman officers. Publius treated Abilyx with special honour, and employed him in restoring the boys to their native cities, along with certain of his own friends. He accordingly went from city to city, giving them a visible proof by the restoration of the boys of the Roman mildness and magnanimity, in contrast to the Carthaginian suspiciousness and harshness; and bidding them also observe that he had found it necessary to change sides, he induced many Iberians to join the Roman alliance. Bostar was thought, in thus surrendering the hostages to the enemy, to have behaved more like a child than became a man of his age, and was in serious danger of his life. For the present, however, as it was getting late in the season, both sides began dispersing into winter quarters; the Romans having made an important step towards success in the matter of the boys.

Hannibal takes Geronium.

100. Such was the position of affairs in Iberia. To return to Hannibal, whom we left having just effected the passage from the Falernian plain. Hearing from his scouts that there was abundance of corn in the district round Luceria and Geronium, and that Geronium was an excellent place to store it in, he determined to make his winter quarters there; and accordingly marched thither by way of Mount Liburnum. And having come to Geronium, which is about two hundred stades from Luceria, he first endeavoured to win over the inhabitants by promises, offering them pledges of his good faith; but when no one would listen to him, he determined to lay siege to the town. Having taken it without much delay, he put the inhabitants to the sword; but preserved most of the houses and walls, because he wished to use them as granaries for his winter camp: and having encamped his army in front of it, he fortified his position with trench and palisade. Having finished these labours, he sent out two-thirds of the army to collect corn, with orders to bring home every day, each division for the use of its

own men, as much as the regular heads of this department would usually supply: while with the remaining third of his army he kept watch over his camp, and occupied certain places with a view of protecting the foraging parties in case they were attacked. The district being mostly very accessible and flat, and the harvesting party being almost innumerable, and the season moreover being at the very best stage for such operations, the amount of corn collected every day was very great.

Minucius obtains a slight success. Autumn B.C. 217.

101. When Minucius took over the command from Fabius, he at first kept along the line of hills, feeling certain that he would sooner or later fall in with the Carthaginians; but when he heard that Hannibal had already taken Geronium, and was collecting the corn of the country, and had pitched his camp in front of the town, he changed the direction of his march, and descended from the top of the hills by way of a ridge leading down into the plains. Arriving at the height which lies in the territory of Larinum, and is called Calena, he encamped round its foot, being eager on any terms whatever to engage the enemy. When Hannibal saw the enemy approaching, he sent a third of his army foraging for corn, but took the other two-thirds with him, and, advancing sixteen stades from Geronium towards the enemy, pitched a camp upon a piece of rising ground, with a view at once of overawing his opponents, and affording safety to his foraging parties: and there being another elevation between him and the two armies, which was near, and conveniently placed for an attack upon the enemy's lines, he sent out about two thousand light-armed troops in the night and seized it. At daybreak when Minucius saw these men, he took his own light-armed troops and assaulted the hill. After a gallant skirmish the Romans prevailed; and subsequently their whole camp was transferred to this place. For a certain time Hannibal kept his men for the most part within their lines, because the camps were so close to each other; but, after the lapse of some days, he was obliged to divide them into two parties, one for pasturing the animals, and one for gathering corn: being very anxious to carry out his design of avoiding the destruction of his booty, and of collecting as much corn as possible, that his men might have abundant

food during the winter, and his horses and beasts of burden as much so; for the chief hope of his army rested on his cavalry.

Carthaginian foragers cut off.

102. It was then that Minucius, seeing the great part of the enemy scattered about the country on these services, selected the exact hour of the day when they would be away to lead out his army. Having come close to the Carthaginian lines he drew out his heavy-armed troops there; and then, dividing his cavalry and light-armed into detachments, sent them in search of the foragers, ordering them to give no quarter. This put Hannibal into a great difficulty: for he was not strong enough to accept battle with the enemy drawn up outside his lines, or to relieve those of his men who were scattered about the country. The Romans meanwhile who had been sent to take the foragers found a great number of them scattered about, and killed them; while the troops drawn up in front of the camp grew so contemptuous of the enemy, that they even began to pull down their palisade, and all but assaulted the Carthaginians. Hannibal was in a very dangerous position: but in spite of the storm that had suddenly fallen on him, he held his ground, repulsing the enemy when they approached and defending, though with difficulty, the rampart; until Hasdrubal came to his relief with about four thousand of the foraging parties, who had fled for refuge from the country and collected within the lines near Geronium. This encouraged Hannibal to make a sally: and having got into order of battle a short distance from the camp, he just managed with difficulty to avert the threatened danger. After killing large numbers of the enemy in the struggle at the camp, and still more in the open country, Minucius for the present retired, but with great hopes for the future; and on the morrow, the Carthaginians having abandoned their lines on the hill, he went up and occupied their position. For Hannibal being alarmed lest the Romans should go by night and find the camp at Geronium undefended, and become masters of his baggage and stores, determined to retire thither himself and again fix his quarters there. After this the Carthaginians were more timid and cautious in their manner of foraging; while the

Romans on the other hand acted with greater boldness and recklessness.

Minucius invested with co-equal powers with Fabius.

103. An exaggerated account of this success reached Rome, and caused excessive exultation: first, because in their gloomy prospects some sort of change for the better had at last shown itself; and, secondly, because the people could now believe that the ill success and want of nerve, which had hitherto attended the legions, had not arisen from the cowardice of the men, but the timidity of their leader. Wherefore everybody began finding fault with and depreciating Fabius, as failing to seize his opportunities with spirit; while they extolled Minucius to such a degree for what had happened, that a thing was done for which there was no precedent. They gave him absolute power as well as Fabius, believing that he would quickly put an end to the campaign; and so there were two Dictators made for carrying on the same war, which had never happened at Rome before. When Minucius was informed of his popularity with the people, and of the office bestowed upon him by the citizens, he felt doubly incited to run all risks and act with daring boldness against the enemy. Fabius rejoined the army with sentiments not in the least changed by what had happened, but rather fixed still more immovably on his original policy. Seeing, however, that Minucius was puffed up with pride, and inclined to offer him a jealous opposition at every turn, and was wholly bent on risking an engagement, he offered him the choice of two alternatives: either to command the whole army on alternate days with him; or that they should separate their two armies, and each command their respective part in their own way. Minucius joyfully accepting the second alternative, they divided the men and encamped separately about twelve stades apart.

Hannibal draws on Minucius.

104. Partly from observing what was taking place, and partly from the information of prisoners, Hannibal knew of the mutual jealousy of the two generals, and the impetuosity and ambition of Minucius. Looking upon what was happening in the enemy's camp as rather in his favour than otherwise, he set himself to deal with Minucius; being anxious to put an end to his bold methods and check in time his adventurous

spirit. There being then an elevation between his camp and that of Minucius, which might prove dangerous to either, he resolved to occupy it; and, knowing full well that, elated by his previous success, Minucius would be certain to move out at once to oppose his design, he concerted the following plan. The country round the hill being bare of trees, but having much broken ground and hollows of every description, he despatched some men during the night, in bodies of two and three hundred, to occupy the most favourable positions, numbering in all five hundred horse and five thousand light-armed and other infantry: and in order that they might not be observed in the morning by the enemy's foraging parties, he seized the hill at daybreak with his light-armed troops. When Marcus saw what was taking place, he looked upon it as an excellent opportunity; and immediately despatched his light-armed troops, with orders to engage the enemy and contest the possession of the position; after these he sent his cavalry, and close behind them he led his heavy-armed troops in person, as on the former occasion, intending to repeat exactly the same manœuvres.

105. As the day broke, and the thoughts and eyes of all were engrossed in observing the combatants on the hill, the Romans had no suspicion of the troops lying in ambush. But as Hannibal kept pouring in reinforcements for his men on the hill, and followed close behind them himself with his cavalry and main body, it was not long before the cavalry also of both sides were engaged. The result was that the Roman light-armed troops, finding themselves hard pressed by the numbers of the cavalry, caused great confusion among the heavy-armed troops by retreating into their lines; and the signal being given at the same time to those who were in ambush, these latter suddenly showed themselves and charged: whereby not only the Roman light-armed troops, but their whole army, were in the greatest danger. At that moment Fabius, seeing what was taking place, and being alarmed lest they should sustain a complete defeat, led out his forces with all speed and came to the relief of his imperilled comrades. At his approach the Romans quickly recovered their courage; and though their lines were entirely broken up, they rallied again round their

Fabius comes to the rescue.

standards, and retired under cover of the army of Fabius, with a severe loss in the light-armed division, and a still heavier one in the ranks of the legions, and that too of the bravest men. Alarmed at the freshness and perfect order of the relieving army, Hannibal retired from the pursuit and ceased fighting. To those who were actually engaged it was quite clear that an utter defeat had been brought about by the rashness of Minucius, and that their safety on this and previous occasions had been secured by the caution of Fabius; while those at home had a clear and indisputable demonstration of the difference between the rashness and bravado of a soldier, and the farseeing prudence and cool calculation of a general. Taught by experience the Romans joined camps once more, and for the future listened to Fabius and obeyed his orders: while the Carthaginians dug a trench across the space between the knoll and their own lines, and threw up a palisade round the crest of the captured hill; and, having placed a guard upon it, proceeded thenceforth with their preparations for the winter unmolested.

106. The Consular elections being now come, the Romans elected Lucius Aemilius and Gaius Terentius. On their appointment the Dictators laid down their offices, and the Consuls of the previous year, Gnaeus Servilius and Marcus Regulus—who had been appointed after the death of Flaminius,—were invested with pro-consular authority by Aemilius; and, taking the command at the seat of war, administered the affairs of the army independently. Meanwhile Aemilius, in consultation with the Senate, set at once to work to levy new soldiers, to fill up the numbers of the legions required for the campaign, and despatched them to headquarters; enjoining at the same time upon Servilius that he should by no means hazard a general engagement, but contrive detailed skirmishes, as sharp and as frequent as he could, for the sake of practising the raw recruits, and giving them courage for a pitched battle: for they held the opinion that their former defeats were owing, as much as anything else, to the fact that they were employing troops newly levied and entirely untrained. The Senate also sent the Praetor Lucius

B.C. 216. Coss. C. Terentius Varro and L. Aemilius Paulus.

Postumius into Gaul, to affect a diversion there, and induce the Celts who were with Hannibal to return home. They also took measures for recalling the fleet that had wintered at Lilybaeum, and for sending to the commanders in Iberia such supplies as were necessary for the service. Thus the Consul and Senate were busied with these and other preparations for the campaign; and Servilius, having received his instructions from the Consuls, carried them out in every particular. The details of this part of the campaign, therefore, I shall omit to record; for nothing of importance or worth remembering occurred, partly in consequence of these instructions, and partly from circumstances; but there were a considerable number of skirmishes and petty engagements, in which the Roman commanders gained a high reputation for courage and prudence.

107. Thus through all that winter and spring the two armies remained encamped facing each other. But when the season for the new harvest was come, Hannibal began to move from the camp at Geronium; and making up his mind that it would be to his advantage to force the enemy by any possible means to give him battle, he occupied the citadel of a town called Cannae, into which the corn and other supplies from the district round Canusium were collected by the Romans, and conveyed thence to the camp as occasion required. The town itself, indeed, had been reduced to ruins the year before: but the capture of its citadel and the material of war contained in it, caused great commotion in the Roman army; for it was not only the loss of the place and the stores in it that distressed them, but the fact also that it commanded the surrounding district. They therefore sent frequent messages to Rome asking for instructions: for if they approached the enemy they would not be able to avoid an engagement, in view of the fact that the country was being plundered, and the allies all in a state of excitement. The Senate passed a resolution that they should give the enemy battle: they, however, bade Gnaeus Servilius wait, and despatched the Consuls to the seat of war. It was to Aemilius that all eyes turned, and on him the most confident hopes were fixed; for his life had been a noble one, and

Autumn, B.C. 216.

The Senate order a battle.

he was thought to have managed the recent Illyrian war with advantage to the State. The Senate determined to bring eight legions into the field, which had never been done at Rome before, each legion consisting of five thousand men besides allies. For the Romans, as I have stated before,[1] habitually enrol four legions each year, each consisting of about four thousand foot and two hundred horse; and when any unusual necessity arises, they raise the number of foot to five thousand and of the horse to three hundred. Of allies, the number in each legion is the same as that of the citizens, but of the horse three times as great. Of the four legions thus composed, they assign two to each of the Consuls for whatever service is going on. Most of their wars are decided by one Consul and two legions, with their quota of allies; and they rarely employ all four at one time and on one service. But on this occasion, so great was the alarm and terror of what would happen, they resolved to bring not only four but eight legions into the field.

The Consuls Aemilius Paulus, and Terentius Varro go to the seat of war.

108. With earnest words of exhortation, therefore, to Aemilius, putting before him the gravity in every point of view of the result of the battle, they despatched him with instructions to seek a favourable opportunity to fight a decisive battle with a courage worthy of Rome. Having arrived at the camp and united their forces, they made known the will of the Senate to the soldiers, and Aemilius exhorted them to do their duty in terms which evidently came from his heart. He addressed himself especially to explain and excuse the reverses which they had lately experienced; for it was on this point particularly that the soldiers were depressed and stood in need of encouragement. "The causes," he argued, "of their defeats in former battles were many, and could not be reduced to one or two. But those causes were at an end; and no excuse existed now, if they only showed themselves to be men of courage, for not conquering their enemies. Up to that time both Consuls had never been engaged together, or employed thoroughly trained soldiers: the combatants on the contrary had been raw levies, entirely unexperienced in danger; and what was most important

Speech of Aemilius.

[1] See i. 16.

of all, they had been so entirely ignorant of their opponents, that they had been brought into the field, and engaged in a pitched battle with an enemy that they had never once set eyes on. Those who had been defeated on the Trebia were drawn up on the field at daybreak, on the very next morning after their arrival from Sicily; while those who had fought in Etruria, not only had never seen the enemy before, but did not do so even during the very battle itself, owing to the unfortunate state of the atmosphere.

109. But now the conditions were quite different. For in the first place both Consuls were with the army: and were not only prepared to share the danger themselves, but had also induced the Consuls of the previous year to remain and take part in the struggle. While the men had not only seen the arms, order, and numbers of the enemy, but had been engaged in almost daily fights with them for the last two years. The conditions therefore under which the two former battles were fought being quite different, it was but natural that the result of the coming struggle should be different too. For it would be strange or rather impossible that those who in various skirmishes, where the numbers of either side were equal, had for the most part come off victorious, should, when drawn up all together, and nearly double of the enemy in number, be defeated."

"Wherefore, men of the army," he continued, "seeing that we have every advantage on our side for securing a victory, there is only one thing necessary,—your determination, your zeal! And I do not think I need say more to you on that point. To men serving others for pay, or to those who fight as allies on behalf of others, who have no greater danger to expect than meets them on the field, and for whom the issues at stake are of little importance,—such men may need words of exhortation. But men who, like you, are fighting not for others, but themselves,—for country, wives, and children; and for whom the issue is of far more momentous consequence than the mere danger of the hour, need only to be reminded: require no exhortation. For who is there among you who would not wish if possible to be victorious; and next, if that may not be, to die with arms in his hands, rather than to live and see the outrage and death of those dear objects which I have named?

Wherefore, men of the army, apart from any words of mine, place before your eyes the momentous difference to you between victory and defeat, and all their consequences. Enter upon this battle with the full conviction, that in it your country is not risking a certain number of legions, but her bare existence. For she has nothing to add to such an army as this, to give her victory, if the day now goes against us. All she has of confidence and strength rests on you; all her hopes of safety are in your hands. Do not frustrate those hopes: but pay back to your country the gratitude you owe her; and make it clear to all the world that the former reverses occurred, not because the Romans are worse men than the Carthaginians, but from the lack of experience on the part of those who were then fighting, and through a combination of adverse circumstances." With such words Aemilius dismissed the troops.

110. Next morning the two Consuls broke up their camp, and advanced to where they heard that the enemy were entrenched. On the second day they arrived within sight of them, and pitched their camp at about fifty stades' distance. But when Aemilius observed that the ground was flat and bare for some distance round, he said that they must not engage there with an enemy superior to them in cavalry; but that they must rather try to draw him off, and lead him to ground on which the battle would be more in the hands of the infantry. But Gaius Terentius being, from inexperience, of a contrary opinion, there was a dispute and misunderstanding between the leaders, which of all things is the most dangerous. It is the custom, when the two Consuls are present, that they should take the chief command on alternate days; and the next day happening to be the turn of Terentius, he ordered an advance with a view of approaching the enemy, in spite of the protests and active opposition of his colleague. Hannibal set his light-armed troops and cavalry in motion to meet him, and charging the Romans while they were still marching, took them by surprise and caused a great confusion in their ranks. The Romans repulsed the first charge by putting some of their heavy-armed in front; and then sending forward their light-armed and

The Roman army approaches Cannae.

Terentius Varro orders an advance.

The Romans are successful.

cavalry, began to get the best of the fight all along the line: the Carthaginians having no reserves of any importance, while certain companies of the legionaries were mixed with the Roman light-armed, and helped to sustain the battle. Night-fall for the present put an end to a struggle which had not at all answered to the hopes of the Carthaginians. But next day Aemilius, not thinking it right to engage, and yet being unable any longer to lead off his army, encamped with two-thirds of it on the banks of the Aufidus, the only river which flows right through the Apennines,—that chain of mountains which forms the watershed of all the Italian rivers, which flow either west to the Tuscan sea, or east to the Hadriatic. This chain is, I say, pierced by the Aufidus, which rises on the side of Italy nearest the Tuscan Sea, and is discharged into the Hadriatic. For the other third of his army he caused a camp to be made across the river, to the east of the ford, about ten stades from his own lines, and a little more from those of the enemy; that these men, being on the other side of the river, might protect his own foraging parties, and threaten those of the enemy.

Hannibal harangues his troops.

111. Then Hannibal, seeing that his circumstances called for a battle with the enemy, being anxious lest his troops should be depressed by their previous reverse, and believing that it was an occasion which required some encouraging words, summoned a general meeting of his soldiers. When they were assembled, he bid them all look round upon the country, and asked them, "What better fortune they could have asked from the gods, if they had had the choice, than to fight in such ground as they saw there, with the vast superiority of cavalry on their side?" And when all signified their acquiescence in such an evident truth, he added: "First, then, give thanks to the gods: for they have brought the enemy into this country, because they designed the victory for us. And, next to me, for having compelled the enemy to fight,—for they cannot avoid it any longer,—and to fight in a place so full of advantages for us. But I do not think it becoming in me now to use many words in exhorting you to be brave and forward in this battle. When you had had no experience of

fighting the Romans this was necessary, and I did then suggest many arguments and examples to you. But now seeing that you have undeniably beaten the Romans in three successive battles of such magnitude, what arguments could have greater influence with you in confirming your courage than the actual facts? Now, by your previous battles you have got possession of the country and all its wealth, in accordance with my promises: for I have been absolutely true in everything I have ever said to you. But the present contest is for the cities and the wealth in them: and if you win it, all Italy will at once be in your power; and freed from your present hard toils, and masters of the wealth of Rome, you will by this battle become the leaders and lords of the world. This, then, is a time for deeds, not words: for by God's blessing I am persuaded that I shall carry out my promises to you forthwith." His words were received with approving shouts, which he acknowledged with gratitude for their zeal; and having dismissed the assembly, he at once formed a camp on the same bank of the river as that on which was the larger camp of the Romans.

112. Next day he gave orders that all should employ themselves in making preparations and getting themselves into a fit state of body. On the day after that he drew out his men along the bank of the river, and showed that he was eager to give the enemy battle. But Aemilius, dissatisfied with his position, and seeing that the Carthaginians would soon be obliged to shift their quarters for the sake of supplies, kept quiet in his camps, strengthening both with extra guards. After waiting a considerable time, when no one came out to attack him, Hannibal put the rest of the army into camp again, but sent out his Numidian horse to attack the enemy's water parties from the lesser camp. These horsemen riding right up to the lines and preventing the watering, Gaius Terentius became more than ever inflamed with the desire of fighting, and the soldiers were eager for a battle, and chafed at the delay. For there is nothing more intolerable to mankind than suspense; when a thing is once decided, men can but endure whatever out of the catalogue of evils it is their misfortune to undergo.

Hannibal irritates the enemy.

But when the news arrived at Rome that the two armies were face to face, and that skirmishes between advanced parties of both sides were daily taking place, the city was in a state of high excitement and uneasiness; the people dreading the result, owing to the disasters which had now befallen them on more than one occasion; and foreseeing and anticipating in their imaginations what would happen if they were utterly defeated. All the oracles preserved at Rome were in everybody's mouth; and every temple and house was full of prodigies and miracles: in consequence of which the city was one scene of vows, sacrifices, supplicatory processions, and prayers. For the Romans in times of danger take extraordinary pains to appease gods and men, and look upon no ceremony of that kind in such times as unbecoming or beneath their dignity.

Anxiety at Rome.

113. When he took over the command on the following day, as soon as the sun was above the horizon, Gaius Terentius got the army in motion from both the camps. Those from the larger camp he drew up in order of battle, as soon as he had got them across the river, and bringing up those of the smaller camp he placed them all in the same line, selecting the south as the aspect of the whole. The Roman horse he stationed on the right wing along the river, and their foot next them in the same line, placing the maniples, however, closer together than usual, and making the depth of each maniple several times greater than its front. The cavalry of the allies he stationed on the left wing, and the light-armed troops he placed slightly in advance of the whole army, which amounted with its allies to eighty thousand infantry and a little more than six thousand horse. At the same time Hannibal brought his Balearic slingers and spearmen across the river, and stationed them in advance of his main body; which he led out of their camp, and, getting them across the river at two spots, drew them up opposite the enemy. On his left wing, close to the river, he stationed the Iberian and Celtic horse opposite the Roman cavalry; and next to them half the Libyan heavy-armed foot; and next to them the Iberian and Celtic

Dispositions for the battle of Cannae.

foot; next, the other half of the Libyans, and, on the right wing, the Numidian horse. Having now got them all into line he advanced with the central companies of the Iberians and Celts; and so arranged the other companies next these in regular gradations, that the whole line became crescent-shaped, diminishing in depth towards its extremities: his object being to have his Libyans as a reserve in the battle, and to commence the action with his Iberians and Celts.

114. The armour of the Libyans was Roman, for Hannibal had armed them with a selection of the spoils taken in previous battles. The shield of the Iberians and Celts was about the same size, but their swords were quite different. For that of the Roman can thrust with as deadly effects as it can cut, while the Gallic sword can only cut, and that requires some room. And the companies coming alternately,—the naked Celts, and the Iberians with their short linen tunics bordered with purple stripes, the whole appearance of the line was strange and terrifying. The whole strength of the Carthaginian cavalry was ten thousand, but that of their foot was not more than forty thousand, including the Celts. Aemilius commanded on the Roman right, Gaius Terentius on the left, Marcus Atilius and Gnaeus Servilius, the Consuls of the previous year, on the centre. The left of the Carthaginians was commanded by Hasdrubal, the right by Hanno, the centre by Hannibal in person, attended by his brother Mago. And as the Roman line faced the south, as I said before, and the Carthaginian the north, the rays of the rising sun did not inconvenience either of them.

115. The battle was begun by an engagement between the advanced guard of the two armies; and at first the affair between these light-armed troops was indecisive. But as soon as the Iberian and Celtic cavalry got at the Romans, the battle began in earnest, and in the true barbaric fashion: for there was none of the usual formal advance and retreat; but when they once got to close quarters, they grappled man to man, and, dismounting from their horses, fought on foot. But when the Carthaginians had got the upper hand in this encounter and killed most of their opponents on the ground,—

The battle, 2d August, B C. 216.

because the Romans all maintained the fight with spirit and determination,—and began chasing the remainder along the river, slaying as they went and giving no quarter; then the legionaries took the place of the light-armed and closed with the enemy. For a short time the Iberian and Celtic lines stood their ground and fought gallantly; but, presently overpowered by the weight of the heavy-armed lines, they gave way and retired to the rear, thus breaking up the crescent. The Roman maniples followed with spirit, and easily cut their way through the enemy's line; since the Celts had been drawn up in a thin line, while the Romans had closed up from the wings towards the centre and the point of danger. For the two wings did not come into action at the same time as the centre: but the centre was first engaged, because the Gauls, having been stationed on the arc of the crescent, had come into contact with the enemy long before the wings, the convex of the crescent being towards the enemy. The Romans, however, going in pursuit of these troops, and hastily closing in towards the centre and the part of the enemy which was giving ground, advanced so far, that the Libyan heavy-armed troops on either wing got on their flanks. Those on the right, facing to the left, charged from the right upon the Roman flank; while those who were on the left wing faced to the right, and, dressing by the left, charged their right flank,[1] the exigency of the moment suggesting to them what they ought to do. Thus it came about, as Hannibal had planned, that the Romans were caught between two hostile lines of Libyans—thanks to their impetuous pursuit of the Celts. Still they fought, though no longer in line, yet singly, or in maniples, which faced about to meet those who charged them on the flanks.

The Romans outflanked by the cavalry.

116. Though he had been from the first on the right wing, and had taken part in the cavalry engagement, Lucius Aemi-

[1] ἐξ ἀσπίδος ἐπιπαρενέβαλλον. The ordinary word for "forming line" or "taking dressing" is παρεμβάλλειν. In the other two passages where ἐπιπαρεμβάλλειν is used, ἐπί has a distinct (though different) force. I think here it must mean "against," "so as to attack." And this seems to be Casaubon's interpretation.

lius still survived. Determined to act up to his own exhortatory speech, and seeing that the decision of the battle rested mainly on the legionaries, riding up to the centre of the line he led the charge himself, and personally grappled with the enemy, at the same time cheering on and exhorting his soldiers to the charge. Hannibal, on the other side, did the same, for he too had taken his place on the centre from the commencement. The Numidian horse on the Carthaginian right were meanwhile charging the cavalry on the Roman left; and though, from the peculiar nature of their mode of fighting, they neither inflicted nor received much harm, they yet rendered the enemy's horse useless by keeping them occupied, and charging them first on one side and then on another. But when Hasdrubal, after all but annihilating the cavalry by the river, came from the left to the support of the Numidians, the Roman allied cavalry, seeing his charge approaching, broke and fled. At that point Hasdrubal appears to have acted with great skill and discretion. Seeing the Numidians to be strong in numbers, and more effective and formidable to troops that had once been forced from their ground, he left the pursuit to them; while he himself hastened to the part of the field where the infantry were engaged, and brought his men up to support the Libyans. Then, by charging the Roman legions on the rear, and harassing them by hurling squadron after squadron upon them at many points at once, he raised the spirits of the Libyans, and dismayed and depressed those of the Romans.

Fall of Aemilius Paulus.

It was at this point that Lucius Aemilius fell, in the thick of the fight, covered with wounds: a man who did his duty to his country at that last hour of his life, as he had throughout its previous years, if any man ever did.[1] As long as the Romans could keep an unbroken front, to turn first in one direction and then in another to meet the assaults of the enemy, they held out; but the outer files of the circle continually falling, and the circle becoming more and more contracted, they at last were all killed on the field; and among them Marcus Atilius and

[1] There is nothing here absolutely to contradict the picturesque story of the death of Paulus given by Livy (22, 49), but the words certainly suggest that Polybius had never heard it.

Gnaeus Servilius, the Consuls of the previous year, who had shown themselves brave men and worthy of Rome in the battle. While this struggle and carnage were going on, the Numidian horse were pursuing the fugitives, most of whom they cut down or hurled from their horses; but some few escaped into Venusia, among whom was Gaius Terentius, the Consul, who thus sought a flight, as disgraceful to himself, as his conduct in office had been disastrous to his country.

117. Such was the end of the battle of Cannae, in which both sides fought with the most conspicuous gallantry, the conquered no less than the conquerors. This is proved by the fact that, out of six thousand horse, only seventy escaped with Gaius Terentius to Venusia, and about three hundred of the allied cavalry to various towns in the neighbourhood. Of the infantry ten thousand were taken prisoners in fair fight, but were not actually engaged in the battle: of those who were actually engaged only about three thousand perhaps escaped to the towns of the surrounding district; all the rest died nobly, to the number of seventy thousand, the Carthaginians being on this occasion, as on previous ones, mainly indebted for their victory to their superiority in cavalry: a lesson to posterity that in actual war it is better to have half the number of infantry, and the superiority in cavalry, than to engage your enemy with an equality in both. On the side of Hannibal there fell four thousand Celts, fifteen hundred Iberians and Libyans, and about two hundred horse.

Losses of the Romans.

The ten thousand Romans who were captured had not, as I said, been engaged in the actual battle; and the reason was this. Lucius Aemilius left ten thousand infantry in his camp that, in case Hannibal should disregard the safety of his own camp, and take his whole army on to the field, they might seize the opportunity, while the battle was going on, of forcing their way in and capturing the enemy's baggage; or if, on the other hand, Hannibal should, in view of this contingency, leave a guard in his camp, the number of the enemy in the field might thereby be diminished. These men were captured in the following circumstances. Hannibal, as a matter of fact, did leave a sufficient guard in his camp; and

as soon as the battle began, the Romans, according to their instructions, assaulted and tried to take those thus left by Hannibal. At first they held their own: but just as they were beginning to waver, Hannibal, who was by this time gaining a victory all along the line, came to their relief, and routing the Romans, shut them up in their own camp; killed two thousand of them; and took all the rest prisoners. In like manner the Numidian horse brought in all those who had taken refuge in the various strongholds about the district, amounting to two thousand of the routed cavalry.

118. The result of this battle, such as I have described it, had the consequences which both sides expected. For the Carthaginians by their victory were thenceforth masters of nearly the whole of the Italian coast which is called *Magna Graecia*. Thus the Tarentines immediately submitted; and the Arpani and some of the Campanian states invited Hannibal to come to them; and the rest were with one consent turning their eyes to the Carthaginians: who, accordingly, began now to have high hopes of being able to carry even Rome itself by assault.

The results of the battle. Defection of the allies.

On their side the Romans, after this disaster, despaired of retaining their supremacy over the Italians, and were in the greatest alarm, believing their own lives and the existence of their city to be in danger, and every moment expecting that Hannibal would be upon them. For, as though Fortune were in league with the disasters that had already befallen them to fill up the measure of their ruin, it happened that only a few days afterwards, while the city was still in this panic, the Praetor who had been sent to Gaul fell unexpectedly into an ambush and perished, and his army was utterly annihilated by the Celts. In spite of all, however, the Senate left no means untried to save the State. It exhorted the people to fresh exertions, strengthened the city with guards, and deliberated on the crisis in a brave and manly spirit. And subsequent events made this manifest. For though the Romans were on that occasion indisputably beaten in the field, and had lost reputation for military prowess; by the peculiar excellence of their political constitution, and the prudence of their counsels, they

Fall of Lucius Postumius in Gaul. See *supra*, ch. 106.

not only recovered their supremacy over Italy, by eventually conquering the Carthaginians, but before very long became masters of the whole world.

I shall, therefore, end this book at this point, having now recounted the events in Iberia and Italy, embraced by the 140th Olympiad. When I have B.C. 216. arrived at the same period in my history of Greece during this Olympiad, I shall then fulfil my promise of devoting a book to a formal account of the Roman constitution itself; for I think that a description of it will not only be germane to the matter of my history, but will also be of great help to practical statesmen, as well as students, either in reforming or establishing other constitutions.

BOOK IV

1. In my former book I explained the causes of the second war between Rome and Carthage; and described Hannibal's invasion of Italy, and the engagements which took place between them up to the battle of Cannae, on the banks of the Aufidus. I shall now take up the history of Greece during the same period, ending at the same date, and commencing from the 140th Olympiad. But I shall first recall to the recollection of my readers what I stated in my second book on the subject of the Greeks, and especially of the Achaeans, for the league of the latter has made extraordinary progress up to our own age and the generation immediately preceding.

B.C. 220-216.

I started, then, from Tisamenus, one of the sons of Orestes, and stated that the dynasty existed from his time to that of Ogygus: that then there was an excellent form of democratical federal government established: and that then the league was broken up by the kings of Sparta into separate towns and villages. Then I tried to describe how these towns began to form a league once more: which were the first to join; and the policy subsequently pursued, which led to their inducing all the Peloponnesians to adopt the general title of Achaeans, and to be united under one federal government. Descending to particulars, I brought my story up to the flight of Cleomenes, King of Sparta: then briefly summarising the events included in my prefatory sketch up to the deaths of Antigonus Doson, Seleucus Ceraunus, and Ptolemy Euergetes, who all three died at about the same time, I announced that my main history was to begin from that point.

Recapitulation of Achaean history, before B.C. 220, contained in Book II., cc. 41-71.

Ending with the deaths of Antigonus Doson, Seleucus Ceraunus, and Ptolemy Euergetes, before the 140th Olympiad, B.C., 220-216.

2. I thought this was the best point; first, because it is there that Aratus leaves off, and I meant my work, as far as it was Greek history, to be a continuation of his; and, secondly, because the period thus embraced in my history would fall partly in the life of my father, and partly in my own; and thus I should be able to speak as eye-witness of some of the events, and from the information of eye-witnesses of others. To go further back and write the report of a report, traditions at second or third hand, seemed to me unsatisfactory either with a view to giving clear impressions or making sound statements. But, above all, I began at this period because it was then that the history of the whole world entered on a new phase. Philip, son of Demetrius, had just become the boy king of Macedonia; Achaeus, prince of Asia on this side of Taurus, had converted his show of power into a reality; Antiochus the Great had, a short time before, by the death of his brother Seleucus, succeeded while quite a young man to the throne of Syria; Ariarathes to that of Cappadocia; and Ptolemy Philopator to that of Egypt. Not long afterwards Lycurgus became King of Sparta, and the Carthaginians had recently elected Hannibal general to carry on the war lately described. Every government therefore being changed about this time, there seemed every likelihood of a new departure in policy: which is but natural and usual, and in fact did at this time occur. For the Romans and Carthaginians entered upon the war I have described; Antiochus and Ptolemy on one for the possession of Coele-Syria; and the Achaeans and Philip one against the Aetolians and Lacedaemonians. The causes of this last war must now be stated.

Reasons for starting from this point. (1.) The fact that the history of Aratus ends at that point. (2.) The possibility of getting good evidence. (3.) The changes in the various governments in the 139th Olympiad. B C 224-220

3. The Aetolians had long been discontented with a state of peace and tired at living at their own charges; for they were accustomed to live on their neighbours, and their natural ostentation required abundant means to support it. Inslaved by this passion they live a life as predatory as that of wild beasts, respecting no tie of friendship and regarding every one as an enemy to be plundered.

The Aetolians.

Hitherto, however, as long as Antigonus Doson was alive, their fear of the Macedonians had kept them quiet. But when he was succeeded at his death by the boy Philip, they conceived a contempt for the royal power, B.C. 222. and at once began to look out for a pretext and opportunity for interfering in the Peloponnese: induced partly by an old habit of getting plunder from that country, and partly by the belief that, now the Achaeans were unsupported by Macedonia, they would be a match for them. While their thoughts were fixed on this, chance to a certain extent contributed to give them the opportunity which they desired.

The raids of Dorimachus in Messenia.

There was a certain man of Trichonium[1] named Dorimachus, son of that Nicostratus who made the treacherous attack on the Pan-Boeotian congress.[2] This Dorimachus, being young and inspired with the true spirit of Aetolian violence and aggressiveness, was sent by the state to Phigalea in the Peloponnese, which, being on the borders of Arcadia and Messenia, happened at that time to be in political union with the Aetolian league. His mission was nominally to guard the city and territory of Phigalea, but in fact to act as a spy on the politics of the Peloponnese. A crowd of pirates flocked to him at Phigalea; and being unable to get them any booty by fair means, because the peace between all Greeks which Antigonus had concluded was still in force, he was finally reduced to allowing the pirates to drive off the cattle of the Messenians, though they were friends and allies of the Aetolians. These injurious acts were at first confined to the sheep on the border lands; but becoming more and more reckless and audacious, they even ventured to break into the farm-houses by sudden attacks at night. The Messenians were naturally indignant, and sent embassies to Dorimachus; which he at first disregarded, because he wanted not only to benefit the men under him, but himself also, by getting a share in their spoils. But when the arrival of such embassies became more and more frequent, owing to the perpetual

[1] A town on the lake of Trichonis, in Aetolia, but its exact situation is uncertain. Strabo (10, 2, 3) says that it was on a fertile plain, which answers best to a situation north of the lake.

[2] Cf. 9, 34. We know nothing of this incident.

recurrence of these acts of depredation, he said at last that he would come in person to Messene, and decide on the claims they had to make against the Aetolians. When he came, however, and the sufferers appeared, he laughed at some, threatened to strike others, and drove others away with abusive language.

4. Even while he was actually in Messene, the pirates came close to the city walls in the night, and by means of scaling-ladders broke into a country-house called Chiron's villa; killed all the slaves who resisted them; and having bound the others, took them and the cattle away with them. The Messenian Ephors had long been much annoyed by what was going on, and by the presence of Dorimachus in their town; but this they thought was too insolent: and they accordingly summoned him to appear before the assembled magistrates. There Sciron, who happened to be an Ephor at the time, and enjoyed a high reputation for integrity among his fellow-citizens, advised that they should not allow Dorimachus to leave the city, until he had made good all the losses sustained by the Messenians, and had given up the guilty persons to be punished for the murders committed. This suggestion being received with unanimous approval, as but just, Dorimachus passionately exclaimed that "they were fools if they imagined that they were now insulting only Dorimachus, and not the Aetolian league." In fact he expressed the greatest indignation at the whole affair, and said that "they would meet with a public punishment, which would serve them well right." Now there was at that time in Messene a man of disgraceful and effeminate character named Babyrtas, who was so exactly like Dorimachus in voice and person, that, when he was dressed in Dorimachus's sun-hat and cloak, it was impossible to tell them apart; and of this Dorimachus was perfectly aware. When therefore he was speaking in these threatening and insolent tones to the Messenian magistrates, Sciron lost his temper and said: "Do you think we care for you or your threats, *Babyrtas?*" After this Dorimachus was compelled for the present to yield to circumstances, and to give satisfaction for the injuries inflicted upon the Messenians: but when he

Dorimachus leaves Messene

returned to Aetolia, he nursed such a bitter and furious feeling of anger at this taunt, that, without any other reasonable pre text, but for this cause and this alone, he got up a war against the Messenians.

5. The Strategus of the Aetolians at that time was Ariston; but being from physical infirmities unable to serve in the field, and being a kinsman of Dorimachus and Scopas, he had somehow or another surrendered his whole authority to the former. In his public capacity Dorimachus could not venture to urge the Aetolians to undertake the Messenian war, because he had no reasonable pretext for so doing: the origin of his wish being, as everybody well knew, the wrongs committed by himself and the bitter gibe which they had brought upon him. He therefore gave up the idea of publicly advocating the war, but tried privately to induce Scopas to join in the intrigue against the Messenians. He pointed out that there was now no danger from the side of Macedonia owing to the youth of the king (Philip being then only seventeen years old); that the Lacedaemonians were alienated from the Messenians; and that they possessed the affection and alliance of the Eleans; and these circumstances taken together would make an invasion of Messenia perfectly safe. But the argument most truly Aetolian which he used was to put before him that a great booty was to be got from Messenia, because it was entirely unguarded, and had alone, of all the Peloponnesian districts, remained unravaged throughout the Cleomenic war. And, to sum up all, he argued that such a move would secure them great popularity with the Aetolians generally. And if the Achaeans were to try to hinder their march through the country, they would not be able to complain if they retaliated: and if, on the other hand, they did not stir, would be no hindrance to their enterprise. Besides, he affirmed that they would have plenty of pretext against the Messenians; for they had long been in the position of aggressors by promising the Achaeans and Macedonians to join their alliance.

Dorimachus becomes practically Strategus of Aetolia, B.C. 221.

He induces Scopas to go to war with Messenia, Epirus, Achaia, Acarnania, and Macedonia.

By these, and similar arguments to the same effect, he roused such a strong feeling in the minds of Scopas and his

friends, that, without waiting for a meeting of the Aetolian federal assembly, and without communicating with the Apocleti, or taking any of the proper constitutional steps, of their own mere impulse and opinion they committed acts of hostility simultaneously against Messenia, Epirus, Achaia, Acarnania, and Macedonia.

6. By sea they immediately sent out privateers, who, falling in with a royal vessel of Macedonia near Cythera, brought it with all its crew to Aetolia, and sold ship-owners, sailors, and marines, and finally the ship itself. Then they began sacking the seaboard of Epirus, employing the aid of some Cephallenian ships for carrying out this act of violence. They tried also to capture Thyrium in Acarnania. At the same time they secretly sent some men to seize a strong place called Clarium, in the centre of the territory of Megalopolis; which they used thenceforth as a place of sale for their spoils, and a starting-place for their marauding expeditions. However Timoxenus, the Achaean Strategus, with the assistance of Taurion, who had been left by Antigonus in charge of the Macedonian interests in the Peloponnese, took the place after a siege of a very few days. For Antigonus retained Corinth, in accordance with his convention with the Achaeans, made at the time of the Cleomenic war;[1] and had never restored Orchomenus to the Achaeans after he had taken it by force, but claimed and retained it in his own hands; with the view, as I suppose, not only of commanding the entrance of the Peloponnese, but of guarding also its interior by means of his garrison and warlike apparatus in Orchomenus.

Acts of hostility against Macedonia, Epirus, and Acarnania.

Dorimachus and Scopas waited until Timoxenus had a very short time of office left, and when Aratus, though elected by the Achaeans for the coming year, would not yet be in office;[2] and then collecting a general levy of Aetolians at

[1] See 2, 53.

[2] The Achaean Strategus was elected in the middle of May, the Aetolian in the autumn. Aratus would be elected May 12, B.C. 220, and come into office some time before midsummer; Ariston's Aetolian office would terminate in September B.C. 220. See v 1.

Rhium, and preparing means of transport, with some Cephallenian ships ready to convoy them, they got their men across to the Peloponnese, and led them against Messenia. While marching through the territories of Patrae, Pharae, and Tritaea they pretended that they did not wish to do any injury to the Achaeans; but their forces, from their inveterate passion for plunder, could not be restrained from robbing the country; and consequently they committed outrages and acts of violence all along their line of march, till they arrived at Phigalea. Thence, by a bold and sudden movement, they entered Messenia; and without any regard for their ancient friendship and alliance with the Messenians, or for the principles of international justice common to all mankind, subordinating every consideration to their selfish greed, they set about plundering the country without resistance, the Messenians being absolutely afraid to come out to attack them.

Before midsummer B.C. 220. Invasion of Messenia by Dorimachus and Scopas.

7. This being the time, according to their laws, for the meeting of the Achaean federal assembly, the members arrived at Aegium. When the assembly met, the deputies from Patrae and Pharae made a formal statement of the injuries inflicted upon their territories during the passage of the Aetolians: an embassy from Messenia also appeared, begging for their assistance on the ground that the treatment from which they were suffering was unjust and in defiance of treaty. When these statements were heard, great indignation was felt at the wrongs of Patrae and Pharae, and great sympathy for the misfortunes of the Messenians. But it was regarded as especially outrageous that the Aetolians should have ventured to enter Achaia with an army, contrary to treaty, without obtaining or even asking for permission from any one to pass through the country. Roused to indignation by all these considerations, the assembly voted to give assistance to the Messenians: that the Strategus should summon a general levy of the Achaean arms: and that whatever was decided by this levy, when it met, should be done. Now Timoxenus, the existing Strategus, was just on the point of quitting office, and felt besides small confidence in the Achaeans, because martial exercise had been

The Achaean league decide to assist the Messenians.

allowed to fall into neglect among them; he therefore shrank from undertaking the expedition, or from even summoning the popular levy. The fact was that, after the expulsion of Cleomenes, King of Sparta, the Peloponnesians, weary of the wars that had taken place, and trusting to the peaceful arrangement that had been come to, neglected all warlike preparations. Aratus, however, indignant and incensed at the audacity of the Aetolians, was not inclined to take things so calmly, for he had in fact a grudge of long standing against these people. Wherefore he was for instantly summoning the Achaeans to an armed levy, and was all eagerness to attack the Aetolians. Eventually he took over from Timoxenus the seal of the league, five days before the proper time, and wrote to the various cities summoning a meeting in arms of all those who were of the military age, at Megalopolis. But the peculiar character of this man, I think, makes it proper for me to give a brief preliminary sketch of him.

B.C. 222-221.

Aratus becomes Strategus of the Achaean league, B.C 220 (May-June)

8. Aratus had many of the qualities of a great ruler. He could speak, and contrive, and conceal his purpose: no one surpassed him in the moderation which he showed in political contests, or in his power of attaching friends and gaining allies: in intrigue, stratagem, and laying plots against a foe, and in bringing them to a successful termination by personal endurance and courage, he was pre-eminent. Many clear instances of these qualities may be found; but none more convincing than the episodes of the capture of Sicyon and Mantinea, of the expulsion of the Aetolians from Pellene, and especially of the surprise of the Acrocorinthus.[1] On the other hand whenever he attempted a campaign in the field, he was slow in conception and timid in execution, and without personal gallantry in the presence of danger. The result was that the Peloponnese was full of

Character of Aratus.

[1] The capture of Sicyon and expulsion of the tyrant Nicocles was the earliest exploit of Aratus, B C. 251. Plutarch, *Arat.* 4-9. The taking of the Acrocorinthus from the Macedonian garrison was in B.C. 243, *ib.* ch. 19-24. For the affair at Pellene see *ib.* 31. The capture of Mantinea was immediately after a defeat by Cleomenes. See Plutarch, *Cleom.* 5.

trophies which marked reverses sustained by him; and that in this particular department he was always easily defeated. So true is it that men's minds, no less than their bodies, have many aspects. Not only is it the case that the same man has an aptitude for one class of activities and not for another; it often happens that in things closely analogous, the same man will be exceedingly acute and exceedingly dull, exceedingly courageous and exceedingly timid. Nor is this a paradox: it is a very ordinary fact, well known to all attentive observers. For instance you may find men who in hunting show the greatest daring in grappling with wild beasts, and yet are utter cowards in the presence of an armed enemy. Or again, in actual war some are active and skilful in single combats, who are yet quite ineffective in the ranks. For example, the Thessalian cavalry in squadron and column are irresistible, but when their order is once broken up, they have not the skill in skirmishing by which each man does whatever the time and place suggests: while, on the other hand, exactly the reverse of this is the case with the Aetolians. The Cretans, again, either by land or sea, in ambushes and piratical excursions, in deceiving the enemy, in making night attacks, and in fact in every service which involves craft and separate action, are irresistible; but for a regular front to front charge in line they have neither the courage nor firmness; and the reverse again is the case with the Achaeans and Macedonians.

I have said thus much, that my readers may not refuse me credit if I have at times to make contradictory statements about the same men and in regard to analogous employments. To return to my narrative.

The armed levy of Achaeans summoned.

9. The men of military age having assembled in arms at Megalopolis, in accordance with the decree of the federal assembly, the Messenian envoys once more came forward, and entreated the people not to disregard the flagrant breach of treaty from which they were suffering; and expressed their willingness to become allies of the league, and their anxiety to be enrolled among its members. The Achaean magistrates declined the offered alliance, on the ground that it was impossible to admit a new member without the concurrence of Philip and the other allies,—for the sworn alli-

ance negotiated by Antigonus during the Cleomenic war was still in force, and included Achaia, Epirus, Phocis, Macedonia, Boeotia, Acarnania, and Thessaly;—but they said that they would march out to their relief, if the envoys there present would place their sons in Sparta, as hostages for their promise not to make terms with the Aetolians without the consent of the Achaeans. The Spartans among the rest were encamped on the frontier of Megalopolis, having marched out in accordance with the terms of their alliance; but they were acting rather as reserves and spectators than as active allies. Having thus settled the terms of the arrangement with the Messenians, Aratus sent a messenger to the Aetolians to inform them of the decree of the Achaean federation, and to order them to quit the territory of Messenia without entering that of Achaia, on pain of being treated as enemies if they set foot in it. When they heard the message and knew that the Achaeans were mustered in force, Scopas and Dorimachus thought it best for the present to obey. They therefore at once sent despatches to Cyllene and to the Aetolian Strategus, Ariston, begging that the transports should be sent to a place on the coast of Elis called the island of Pheia;[1] and they themselves two days later struck camp, and laden with booty marched towards Elis. For the Aetolians always maintained a friendship with the Eleans that they might have through them an entrance for their plundering and piratical expeditions into the Peloponnese.

Dorimachus ordered to quit Messenia without passing through Achaia.

Scopas and Dorimachus prepare to obey.

10. Aratus waited two days: and then, foolishly believing that the Aetolians would return by the route they had indicated, he dismissed all the Achaeans and Lacedaemonians to their homes, except three thousand foot and three hundred horse and the division under Taurion, which he led to Patrae, with the view of keeping on the flank of the Aetolians. But when Dorimachus learnt that Aratus was thus watching his march, and was still under

Aratus dismisses the Achaean levy, with the exception of 3000 foot and 300 horse.

Dorimachus turns upon Aratus.

[1] The city of Pheia was on the isthmus connecting the promontory Ichthys (*Cape Katákolo*) with the mainland: opposite its harbour is a small island which Polybius here calls *Pheias, i e.* the island belonging to Pheia.

arms; partly from fear of being attacked when his forces were engaged on the embarkation, and partly with a view to confuse the enemy, he sent his booty on to the transports with a sufficient number of men to secure their passage, under orders to meet him at Rhium where he intended to embark; while he himself, after remaining for a time to superintend and protect the shipment of the booty, changed the direction of his march and advanced towards Olympia. But hearing that Taurion, with the rest of the army, was near Cleitoria; and feeling sure that in these circumstances he would not be able to effect the crossing from Rhium without danger and a struggle with the enemy; he made up his mind that it would be best for his interests to bring on an engagement with the army of Aratus as soon as possible, since it was weak in numbers and wholly unprepared for the attack. He calculated that if he could defeat this force, he could then plunder the country, and effect his crossing from Rhium in safety, while Aratus was waiting and deliberating about again convoking the Achaean levy; but if on the other hand Aratus were terrified and declined the engagement, he would then effect his departure unmolested, whenever he thought it advisable. With these views, therefore, he advanced, and pitched his camp at Methydrium in the territory of Megalopolis.

The battle of Caphyae, B.C. 220.

11. But the leaders of the Achaeans, on learning the arrival of the Aetolians, adopted a course of proceeding quite unsurpassable for folly. They left the territory of Cleitor and encamped at Caphyae; but the Aetolians marching from Methydrium past the city of Orchomenus, they led the Achaean troops into the plain of Caphyae, and there drew them up for battle, with the river which flows through that plain protecting their front. The difficulty of the ground between them and their enemy, for there were besides the river a number of ditches not easily crossed,[1] and the show of readiness on the part of the Achaeans

[1] Caphyae was on a small plain, which was subject to inundations from the lake of Orchomenus; the ditches here mentioned appear to be those dug to drain this district. They were in the time of Pausanias superseded by a high dyke, from the inner side of which ran the River Tragus (*Tara*). Pausan. 8, 23, 2.

for the engagement, caused the Aetolians to shrink from attacking according to their original purpose; but they retreated in good order to the high ground of Oligyrtus, content if only they were not attacked and forced to give battle. But Aratus, when the van of the Aetolians was already making the ascent, while the cavalry were bringing up the rear along the plain, and were approaching a place called Propus at the foot of the hills, sent out his cavalry and light-armed troops, under the command of Epistratus of Acarnania, with orders to attack and harass the enemy's rear. Now if an engagement was necessary at all, they ought not to have attempted it with the enemy's rear, when they had already accomplished the march through the plain, but with his van directly it had debouched upon the plain: for in this way the battle would have been wholly confined to the plain and level ground, where the peculiar nature of the Aetolian arms and general tactics would have been least effective; while the Achaeans, from precisely opposite reasons, would have been most effective and able to act. As it was, they surrendered the advantages of time and place which were in their favour, and deliberately accepted the conditions which were in favour of the enemy.

12. Naturally the result of the engagement was in harmony with such a beginning. For when the light-armed troops approached, the Aetolian cavalry retired in good order up the hill, being anxious to effect a junction with their own infantry. But Aratus, having an imperfect view of what was going on, and making a bad conjecture of what would happen next, no sooner saw the cavalry retiring, than, hoping that they were in absolute flight, he sent forward the heavy-armed troops of his two wings, with orders to join and support the advanced guard of their light-armed troops; while he himself, with his remaining forces, executed a flank movement, and led his men on at the double. But the Aetolian cavalry had now cleared the plain, and, having effected the junction with their infantry, drew up under cover of the hill; massed the infantry on their flanks; and called to them to stand by them: the infantry themselves showing great promptness in answering to their shouts, and in coming to their relief, as the several companies arrived. Thinking them-

The Achaeans defeated.

selves now sufficiently strong in numbers, they closed their ranks, and charged the advanced guard of Achaean cavalry and light-armed troops; and being superior in number, and having the advantage of charging from higher ground, after a long struggle, they finally turned their opponents to flight: whose flight involved that of the heavy-armed troops also which were coming to their relief. For the latter were advancing in separate detachments in loose order, and, either in dismay at what was happening, or upon meeting their flying comrades on their retreat, were compelled to follow their example: the result being that, whereas the number of those actually defeated on the field was less than five hundred, the number that fled was more than two thousand. Taught by experience what to do, the Aetolians followed behind them with round after round of loud and boisterous shouts. The Achaeans at first retreated in good order and without danger, because they were retiring upon their heavy-armed troops, whom they imagined to be in a place of safety on their original ground; but when they saw that these too had abandoned their position of safety, and were marching in a long straggling line, some of them immediately broke off from the main body and sought refuge in various towns in the neighbourhood; while others, meeting the phalanx as it was coming up to their relief, proved to be quite sufficient, without the presence of an enemy, to strike fear into it and force it into headlong flight. They directed their flight, as I said, to the towns of the neighbourhood. Orchomenus and Caphyae, which were close by, saved large numbers of them: and if this had not been the case, they would in all probability have been annihilated by this unlooked-for catastrophe. Such was the result of the engagement at Caphyae.

13. When the people of Megalopolis learnt that the Aetolians were at Methydrium, they came to the rescue *en masse*, at the summons of a trumpet, on the very day after the battle of Caphyae; and were compelled to bury the very men with whose assistance they had expected to fight the Aetolians. Having therefore dug a trench in the territory of Caphyae, and collected the corpses, they performed the funeral rites of these unhappy men with all imaginable honour. But the Aetolians,

The Aetolians retire at their leisure.

after this unlooked-for success gained by the cavalry and light-armed troops, traversed the Peloponnese from that time in complete security. In the course of their march they made an attack upon the town of Pellene, and, after ravaging the territory of Sicyon, finally quitted the Peloponnese by way of the Isthmus.

This, then, was the cause and occasion of the Social war: its formal beginning was the decree passed by all the allies after these events, which was confirmed by a general meeting held at Corinth, on the proposal of King Philip, who presided at the assembly.

14. A few days after the events just narrated the ordinary meeting of the Achaean federal assembly took place, and Aratus was bitterly denounced, publicly as well as privately, as indisputably responsible for this disaster; and the anger of the general public was still further roused and embittered by the invectives of his political opponents. It was shown to every one's satisfaction that Aratus had been guilty of four flagrant errors. His first was that, having taken office before his predecessor's time was legally at an end, he had availed himself of a time properly belonging to another to engage in the sort of enterprise in which he was conscious of having often failed. His second and graver error was the disbanding the Achaeans, while the Aetolians were still in the middle of the Peloponnese; especially as he had been well aware beforehand that Scopas and Dorimachus were anxious to disturb the existing settlement, and to stir up war. His third error was to engage the enemy, as he did, with such a small force, without any strong necessity; when he might have retired to the neighbouring towns and have summoned a levy of the Achaeans, and then have engaged, if he had thought that measure absolutely necessary. But his last and gravest error was that, having determined to fight, he did so in such an ill-considered manner, and managed the business with so little circumspection, as to deprive himself of the advantages of the plain and the support of his heavy-armed troops, and allow the battle to be settled by light-armed troops, and to take

Midsummer, B C. 220.

Attacked at the Achaean Congress, Aratus successfully defends himself.

place on the slopes, than which nothing could have been more advantageous or convenient to the Aetolians. Such were the allegations against Aratus. He, however, came forward and reminded the assembly of his former political services and achievements; and urged in his defence that, in the matters alleged, his was not the blame for what had occurred. He begged their indulgence if he had been guilty of any oversight in the battle, and claimed that they should at any rate look at the facts without prejudice or passion. These words created such a rapid and generous change in the popular feeling, that great indignation was roused against the political opponents who attacked him; and the resolutions as to the measures to be taken in the future were passed wholly in accordance with the views of Aratus.

15. These events occurred in the previous Olympiad,[1] what I am now going to relate belong to the 140th. The resolutions passed by the Achaean federal assembly were these. That embassies should be sent to Epirus, Boeotia, Phocis, Acarnania, and Philip, to declare how the Aetolians, in defiance of treaty, had twice entered Achaia with arms, and to call upon them for assistance in virtue of their agreement, and for their consent to the admission of the Messenians into the alliance. Next, that the Strategus of the Achaeans should enrol five thousand foot and five hundred horse, and support the Messenians in case the Aetolians were to invade their territory; and to arrange with the Lacedaemonians and Messenians how many horse and foot were to be supplied by them severally for the service of the league. These decrees showed a noble spirit on the part of the Achaeans in the presence of defeat, which prevented them from abandoning either the cause of the Messenians or their own purpose. Those who were appointed to serve on these embassies to the allies proceeded to carry them out; while the Strategus at once, in accordance with the decree, set about enrolling the troops

139th Olympiad, B.C. 224-220; 140th Olympiad, B.C. 220-216.

The Achaean league determine upon war with the Aetolians, and send round to their allies for assistance.

[1] The Olympiads being counted from the summer solstice, these events occurring before midsummer of B.C. 220 belong to the 139th Olympiad. The 140th begins with midsummer B.C. 220.

from Achaia, and arranged with the Lacedaemonians and Messenians to supply each two thousand five hundred infantry and two hundred and fifty cavalry, so that the whole army for the coming campaign should amount to ten thousand foot and a thousand horse.

On the day of their regular assembly the Aetolians also met and decided to maintain peace with the Spartans and Messenians; hoping by that crafty measure to tamper with the loyalty of the Achaean allies and sow disunion among them. With the Achaeans themselves they voted to maintain peace, on condition that they withdrew from alliance with Messenia, and to proclaim war if they refused,—than which nothing could have been more unreasonable. For being themselves in alliance, both with Achaeans and Messenians, they proclaimed war against the former, unless the two ceased to be in alliance and friendly relationship with each other; while if the Achaeans chose to be at enmity with the Messenians, they offered them a separate peace. Their proposition was too iniquitous and unreasonable to admit of being even considered.

16. The Epirotes and King Philip on hearing the ambassadors consented to admit the Messenians to alliance; but though the conduct of the Aetolians caused them momentary indignation, they were not excessively moved by it, because it was no more than what the Aetolians habitually did. Their anger, therefore, was short-lived, and they presently voted against going to war with them. So true is it that an habitual course of wrong-doing finds readier pardon than when it is spasmodic or isolated. The former, at any rate, was the case with the Aetolians: they perpetually plundered Greece, and levied unprovoked war upon many of its people: they did not deign either to make any defence to those who complained, but answered only by additional insults if any one challenged them to arbitration for injuries which they had inflicted, or indeed which they meditated inflicting. And yet the Lacedaemonians, who had but recently been liberated by means of Antigonus and the generous zeal of the Achaeans, and though they were bound not to commit any act of hostility towards the Macedonians and Philip, sent

Treachery of the Spartans.

clandestine messages to the Aetolians, and arranged a secret treaty of alliance and friendship with them.

Invasion of Achaia by the Aetolians and Illyrians.

The army had already been enrolled from the Achaeans of military age, and had been assigned to the duty of assisting the Lacedaemonians and Messenians, when Scerdilaidas and Demetrius of Pharos sailed with ninety galleys beyond Lissus, contrary to the terms of their treaty with Rome. These men first touched at Pylos, and failing in an attack upon it, they separated: Demetrius making for the Cyclades, from some of which he exacted money and plundered others; while Scerdilaidas, directing his course homewards, put in at Naupactus with forty galleys at the instigation of Amynas, king of the Athamanes, who happened to be his brother-in-law; and after making an agreement with the Aetolians, by the agency of Agelaus, for a division of spoils, he promised to join them in their invasion of Achaia. With this agreement made with Scerdilaidas, and with the co-operation of the city of Cynaetha, Agelaus, Dorimachus, and Scopas, collected a general levy of the Aetolians, and invaded Achaia in conjunction with the Illyrians.

17. But the Aetolian Strategus Ariston, ignoring everything that was going on, remained quietly at home, asserting that he was not at war with the Achaeans, but was maintaining peace: a foolish and childish mode of acting,—for what better epithets could be applied to a man who supposed that he could cloak notorious facts by mere words? Meanwhile Dorimachus and his colleague had marched through the Achaean territory and suddenly appeared at Cynaetha.

The previous history of Cynaetha.

Cynaetha was an Arcadian city[1] which, for many years past, had been afflicted with implacable and violent political factions. The two parties had frequently retaliated on each other with massacres, banishments, confiscations, and re-divisions of lands; but finally the party which affected the Achaean connexion prevailed and got possession of the city, securing themselves by a city-guard and commandant from Achaia. This was the state of affairs when, shortly before the Aetolian invasion, the exiled

[1] But outside the natural borders of Arcadia. Mod. Kalávryta.

party sent to the party in possession intreating that they would be reconciled and allow them to return to their own city; whereupon the latter were persuaded, and sent an embassy to the Achaeans with the view of obtaining their consent to the pacification. The Achaeans readily consented, in the belief that both parties would regard them with goodwill: since the party in possession had all their hopes centred in the Achaeans, while those who were about to be restored would owe that restoration to the consent of the same people. Accordingly the Cynaethans dismissed the city-guard and commandant, and restored the exiles, to the number of nearly three hundred, after taking such pledges from them as are reckoned the most inviolable among all mankind. But no sooner had they secured their return, than, without any cause or pretext arising which might give a colour to the renewal of the quarrel, but on the contrary, at the very first moment of their restoration, they began plotting against their country, and against those who had been their preservers. I even believe that at the very sacrifices, which consecrated the oaths and pledges which they gave each other, they were already, even at such a solemn moment, revolving in their minds this offence against religion and those who had trusted them. For, as soon as they were restored to their civil rights they called in the Aetolians, and betrayed the city into their hands, eager to effect the utter ruin both of the people who had preserved, and the city which had nourished, them.

18. The bold stroke by which they actually consummated this treason was as follows. Of the restored exiles certain officers had been appointed called Polemarchs, whose duty it was to lock the city-gates, and keep the keys while they remained closed, and also to be on guard during the day at the gate-houses. The Aetolians accordingly waited for this period of closing the gates, ready to make the attempt, and provided with ladders; while the Polemarchs of the exiles, having assassinated their colleagues on guard at the gate-house, opened the gate. Some of the Aetolians, therefore, got into the town by it, while others applied their ladders to the walls, and mounting by their means, took forcible possession of them. The inhabitants of the town, panic-stricken at the occurrence,

could not tell which way to turn. They could not give their undivided energies to opposing the party which was forcing its way through the gate, because of those who were attacking them at the walls; nor could they defend the walls owing to the enemies that were pouring through the gate. The Aetolians having thus become rapidly masters of the town, in spite of the injustice of the whole proceeding, did one act of supreme justice. For the very men who had invited them, and betrayed the town to them, they massacred before any one else, and plundered their property. They then treated all the others of the party in the same way; and, finally, taking up their quarters in the houses, they systematically robbed them of all valuables, and in many cases put Cynaethans to the rack, if they suspected them of having anything concealed, whether money, or furniture, or anything else of unusual value.

After inflicting this ruin on the Cynaethans they departed, leaving a garrison to guard the walls, and marched towards Lusi. Arrived at the temple of Artemis, which lies between Cleitor and Cynaetha, and is regarded as inviolable by the Greeks, they threatened to plunder the cattle of the goddess and the other property round the temple. But the people of Lusi acted with great prudence: they gave the Aetolians some of the sacred furniture, and appealed to them not to commit the impiety of inflicting any outrage. The gift was accepted, and the Aetolians at once removed to Cleitor and pitched their camp under its walls.

Measures taken by Aratus.

19. Meanwhile Aratus, the Achaean Strategus, had despatched an appeal for help to Philip; was collecting the men selected for service; and was sending for the troops, arranged for by virtue of the treaty, from Sparta and Messenia.

The Aetolians at the temple of Artemis. They fail at Cleitor.

The Aetolians at first urged the people of Cleitor to abandon their alliance with the Achaeans and adopt one with themselves; and upon the Cleitorians absolutely refusing, they began an assault upon the town, and endeavoured to take it by an escalade. But meeting with a bold and determined resistance from the inhabitants, they desisted from the attempt; and breaking up their camp marched back to Cynaetha, driving off

with them on their route the cattle of the goddess. They at first offered the city to the Eleans, but upon their refusing to accept it, they determined to keep the town in their own hands, and appointed Euripides to command it: but subsequently, on the alarm of an army of relief coming from Macedonia, they set fire to the town and abandoned it, directing their march to Rhium with the purpose of there taking ship and crossing home. But when Taurion heard of the Aetolian invasion, and what had taken place at Cynaetha, and saw that Demetrius of Pharos had sailed into Cenchreae from his island expedition, he urged the latter to assist the Achaeans, and dragging his galleys across the Isthmus to attack the Aetolians as they crossed the gulf. Now though Demetrius had enriched himself by his island expedition, he had had to beat an ignominious retreat, owing to the Rhodians putting out to sea to attack him: he was therefore glad to accede to the request of Taurion, as the latter undertook the expense of having his galleys dragged across the Isthmus.[1] He accordingly got them across, and arriving two days after the passage of the Aetolians, plundered some places on the seaboard of Aetolia and then returned to Corinth.

They burn Cynaetha and return home.

Demetrius of Pharos

The Lacedaemonians had dishonourably failed to send the full complement of men to which they were bound by their engagement, but had despatched a small contingent only of horse and foot, to save appearances.

Treason of the Spartans.

Aratus however, having his Achaean troops, behaved in this instance also with the caution of a statesman, rather than the promptness of a general: for remembering his previous failure he remained inactively watching events, until Scopas and Dorimachus had accomplished all they wanted and were safe home again; although they had marched through a line of country which was quite open to attack, full of defiles, and wanting only a trumpeter[2] to sound a call to arms. But the great disaster

Inactivity of Aratus.

[1] By the diolcos which had been formed for the purpose. Strabo, 8, 2. Ships had been dragged across the Isthmus on various occasions from early times. See Thucyd. 3, 15.

[2] Reading, *μόνου*. See ch. 13.

and misfortunes endured by the Cynaethans at the hands of the Aetolians were looked upon as most richly deserved by them.

The reasons of the barbarity of the Cynaethans. Their neglect of the refining influences of music, which is carefully encouraged in the rest of Arcadia.

20. Now, seeing that the Arcadians as a whole have a reputation for virtue throughout Greece, not only in respect of their hospitality and humanity, but especially for their scrupulous piety, it seems worth while to investigate briefly the barbarous character of the Cynaethans: and inquire how it came about that, though indisputably Arcadians in race, they at that time so far surpassed the rest of Greece in cruelty and contempt of law.

They seem then to me to be the first, and indeed the only, Arcadians who have abandoned institutions nobly conceived by their ancestors and admirably adapted to the character of all the inhabitants of Arcadia. For music, and I mean by that *true* music, which it is advantageous to every one to practice, is obligatory with the Arcadians. For we must not think, as Ephorus in a hasty sentence of his preface, wholly unworthy of him, says, that music was introduced among mankind for the purpose of deception and jugglery; nor must the ancient Cretans and Spartans be supposed to have introduced the pipe and rhythmic movement in war, instead of the trumpet, without some reason; nor the early Arcadians to have given music such a high place in their constitution, that not only boys, but young men up to the age of thirty, are compelled to practise it, though in other respects most simple and primitive in their manner of life. Every one is familiarly acquainted with the fact that the Arcadians are the only people among whom boys are by the laws trained from infancy to sing hymns and paeans, in which they celebrate in the traditional fashion the heroes and gods of their particular towns. They next learn the airs of Philoxenus and Timotheus, and dance with great spirit to the pipers at the yearly Dionysia in the theatres, the boys at the boys' festival, and the young men at what is called the men's festival. Similarly it is their universal custom, at all festal gatherings and banquets, not to have strangers to make the music, but to produce it themselves, call-

ing on each other in turn for a song. They do not look upon it as a disgrace to disclaim the possession of any other accomplishment: but no one can disclaim the knowledge of how to sing, because all are forced to learn; nor can they confess the knowledge, and yet excuse themselves from practising it, because that too among them is looked upon as disgraceful. Their young men again practise a military step to the music of the pipe and in regular order of battle, producing elaborate dances, which they display to their fellow-citizens every year in the theatres, at the public charge and expense.

21. Now the object of the ancient Arcadians in introducing these customs was not, as I think, the gratifi- The object of the musical training of the Arcadians. cation of luxury and extravagance. They saw that Arcadia was a nation of workers; that the life of the people was laborious and hard; and that, as a natural consequence of the coldness and gloom which were the prevailing features of a great part of the country, the general character of the people was austere. For we mortals have an irresistible tendency to yield to climatic influences: and to this cause, and no other, may be traced the great distinctions which prevail amongst us in character, physical formation, and complexion, as well as in most of our habits, varying with nationality or wide local separation. And it was with a view of softening and tempering this natural ruggedness and rusticity, that they not only introduced the things which I have mentioned, but also the custom of holding assemblies and frequently offering sacrifices, in both of which women took part equally with men; and having mixed dances of girls and boys: and in fact did everything they could to humanise their souls by the civilising and softening influence of such culture. The people of Cynaetha entirely neglected these things, although they needed them more than any one else, because their climate and country is by far the most unfavourable in all Arcadia; and on the contrary gave their whole minds to mutual animosities and contentions. They in consequence became finally so brutalised, that no Greek city has ever witnessed a longer series of the most atrocious crimes. I will give one instance of the ill fortune of Cynaetha in this respect, and of the disapproval of such proceedings on the

part of the Arcadians at large. When the Cynaethans, after their great massacre, sent an embassy to Sparta, every city which the ambassadors entered on their road at once ordered them by a herald to depart; while the Mantineans not only did that, but after their departure regularly purified their city and territory from the taint of blood, by carrying victims round them both.

I have had three objects in saying thus much on this subject. First, that the character of the Arcadians should not suffer from the crimes of one city: secondly, that other nations should not neglect music, from an idea that certain Arcadians give an excessive and extravagant attention to it: and, lastly, I speak for the sake of the Cynaethans themselves, that, if ever God gives them better fortune, they may humanise themselves by turning their attention to education, and especially to music.

22. To return from this digression. When the Aetolians had reached their homes in safety after this raid upon the Peloponnese, Philip, coming to the aid of the Achaeans with an army, arrived at Corinth. Finding that he was too late, he sent despatches to all the allies urging them to send deputies at once to Corinth, to consult on the measures required for the common safety. Meanwhile he himself marched towards Tegea, being informed that the Lacedaemonians were in a state of revolution, and were fallen to mutual slaughter. For being accustomed to have a king over them, and to be entirely submissive to their rulers, their sudden enfranchisement by means of Antigonus, and the absence of a king, produced a state of civil war; because they all imagined themselves to be on a footing of complete political equality. At first two of the five Ephors kept their views to themselves; while the other three threw in their lot with the Aetolians, because they were convinced that the youth of Philip would prevent him as yet from having a decisive influence in the Peloponnese. But when, contrary to their expectations, the Aetolians retired quickly from the Peloponnese, and Philip arrived still more quickly from Macedonia, the three Ephors became distrustful of Adeimantus,

Philip V. comes to Corinth. B.C. 220.

Advances toward Sparta.

one of the other two, because he was privy to and disapproved of their plans; and were in a great state of anxiety lest he should tell Philip everything as soon as that monarch approached. After some consultation therefore with certain young men, they published a proclamation ordering all citizens of military age to assemble in arms in the sacred enclosure of Athene of the Brazen-house, on the pretext that the Macedonians were advancing against the town. This startling announcement caused a rapid muster: when Adeimantus, who disapproved of the measure, came forward and endeavoured to show that "the proclamation and summons to assemble in arms should have been made some time before, when they were told that their enemies the Aetolians were approaching the frontier: not then, when they learnt that their benefactors and preservers the Macedonians were coming with their king." In the middle of this dissuasive speech the young men whose co-operation had been secured struck him dead, and with him Sthenelaus, Alcamenes, Thyestes, Bionidas, and several other citizens; whereupon Polyphontes and certain of his party, seeing clearly what was going to happen, went off to join Philip.

Adeimantus assassinated.

23. Immediately after the commission of this crime, the Ephors who were then in power sent men to Philip, to accuse the victims of this massacre; and to beg him to delay his approach, until the affairs of the city had returned to their normal state after this commotion; and to be assured meanwhile that it was their purpose to be loyal and friendly to the Macedonians in every respect. These ambassadors found Philip near Mount Parthenius,[1] and communicated to him their commission. Having listened, he bade the ambassadors make all haste home, and inform the Ephors that he was going to continue his march to Tegea, and expected that they would as quickly as possible send him men of credit to consult with him on the present position of affairs. After hearing this message from the king, the Lacedaemonian officers despatched

Philip summons Spartan deputies to Tegea.

[1] A mountain on the frontier, on the pass over which the roads to Tegea and Argos converge.

ten commissioners headed by Omias to meet Philip; who, on arriving at Tegea, and entering the king's council chamber, accused Adiemantus of being the cause of the late commotion; and promised that they would perform all their obligations as allies to Philip, and show that they were second to none of those whom he looked upon as his most loyal friends, in their affection for his person. With these and similar asseverations the Lacedaemonian commissioners left the council chamber. The members of the council were divided in opinion: one party knowing the secret treachery of the Spartan magistrates, and feeling certain that Adeimantus had lost his life from his loyalty to Macedonia, while the Lacedaemonians had really determined upon an alliance with the Aetolians, advised Philip to make an example of the Lacedaemonians, by treating them precisely as Alexander had treated the Thebans, immediately after his assumption of his sovereignty. But another party, consisting of the older counsellors, sought to show that such severity was too great for the occasion, and that all that ought to be done was to rebuke the offenders, depose them, and put the management of the state and the chief offices in the hands of his own friends.

The king decides not to chastise Sparta.

24. The king gave the final decision, if that decision may be called the king's: for it is not reasonable to suppose that a mere boy should be able to come to a decision on matters of such moment. Historians, however, must attribute to the highest official present the final decisions arrived at: it being thoroughly understood among their readers that propositions and opinions, such as these, in all probability proceed from the members of the council, and particularly from those highest in his confidence. In this case the decision of the king ought most probably to be attributed to Aratus. It was to this effect: the king said that "in the case of injuries inflicted by the allies upon each other separately, his intervention ought to be confined to a remonstrance by word of mouth or letter; but that it was only injuries affecting the whole body of the allies which demanded joint intervention and redress: and seeing that the Lacedaemonians had plainly committed no such injury against the whole body of allies,

but professed their readiness to satisfy every claim that could with justice be made upon them, he held that he ought not to decree any measure of excessive severity against them. For it would be very inconsistent for him to take severe measures against them for so insignificant a cause; while his father inflicted no punishment at all upon them, though when he conquered them they were not allies but professed enemies." It having, therefore, been formally decided to overlook the incident, the king immediately sent Petraeus, one of his most trusted friends, with Omias, to exhort the people to remain faithful to their friendship with him and Macedonia, and to interchange oaths of alliance; while he himself started once more with his army and returned towards Corinth, having in his conduct to the Lacedaemonians given an excellent specimen of his policy towards the allies.

25. When he arrived at Corinth he found the envoys from the allied cities already there; and in consultation with them he discussed the measures to be taken in regard to the Aetolians. The complaints against them were stated by the various envoys. The Boeotians accused them of plundering the temple of Athene at Itone[1] in time of peace: the Phocians of having attacked and attempted to seize the cities of Ambrysus and Daulium: the Epirotes of having committed depredations in their territory. The Acarnanians showed how they had contrived a plot for the betrayal of Thyrium into their hands, and had gone so far as to actually assault it under cover of night. The Achaeans made a statement showing that they had seized Clarium in the territory of Megalopolis; traversed the territories of Patrae and Pharae, pillaging the country as they went; completely sacked Cynaetha; plundered the temple of Artemis in Lusi; laid siege to Cleitor; attempted Pylus by sea, and Megalopolis by land, doing all they could by aid of the Illyrians to lay waste the latter after its recent restoration. After listening to these depositions, the congress of allies unanimously decided to go to war with the Aetolians. A decree was, therefore, formulated in which the aforesaid causes for war were stated as a preamble,

The congress of allies at Corinth declare war against the Aetolians.

[1] A town of Phthiotis in Thessaly. See Book 25. 3.

and a declaration subjoined of their intention of restoring to the several allies any portion of their territory seized by the Aetolians since the death of Demetrius, father of Philip; and similarly of restoring to their ancestral forms of government all states that had been compelled against their will to join the Aetolian league; with full possession of their own territory and cities; subject to no foreign garrison or tribute; in complete independence; and in enjoyment of their own constitutions and laws. Finally a clause in the decree declared their intention of assisting the Amphictyonic council to restore the laws, and to recover its control of the Delphic temple, wrested from it by the Aetolians, who were determined to keep in their own hands all that belonged to that temple.

26. This decree was made in the first year of the 140th Olympiad, and with it began the so-called Social war, the commencement of which was thoroughly justifiable and a natural consequence of the injurious acts of the Aetolians. The first step of the congress was to send commissioners at once to the several allies, that the decree having been confirmed by as many as possible, all might join in this national war. Philip also sent a declaratory letter to the Aetolians, in order that, if they had any justification to put forward on the points alleged against them, they might even at that late hour meet and settle the controversy by conference: "but if they supposed that they were, with no public declaration of war, to sack and plunder, without the injured parties retaliating, on pain of being considered, if they did so, to have commenced hostilities, they were the most simple people in the world." On the receipt of this letter the Aetolian magistrates, thinking that Philip would never come, named a day on which they would meet him at Rhium. When they were informed, however, that he had actually arrived there, they sent a despatch informing him that they were not competent, before the meeting of the Aetolian assembly, to settle any public matter on their own authority. But when the Achaeans met at the usual federal assembly, they ratified the decree, and published a proclamation authorising reprisals upon the Aetolians. And when King Philip appeared before the council at Aegium, and informed

B.C. 220.

them at length of all that had taken place, they received his speech with warmth, and formally renewed with him personally the friendship which had existed between his ancestors and themselves. Autumn, B.C. 220.

27. Meanwhile, the time of the annual election having come round, the Aetolians elected Scopas as their Strategus, the man who had been the moving spirit in all these acts of violence. I am at a loss for fitting terms to describe such a public policy. To pass a decree against going to war,[1] and yet to go on an actual expedition in force and pillage their neighbours' territories: not to punish one of those responsible for this: but on the contrary to elect as Strategi and bestow honours on the leaders in these transactions,—this seems to me to involve the grossest disingenuousness. I can find no word which better describes such a treacherous policy; and I will quote two instances to show what I mean by it. When Phoebidas treacherously seized the Cadmeia, the Lacedaemonians fined the guilty general but declined to withdraw the garrison, on the ground that the wrong was fully atoned for by the punishment of the perpetrator of it: though their plain duty was to have done the reverse, for it was the latter which was of importance to the Thebans. Again this same people published a proclamation giving the various cities freedom and autonomy in accordance with the terms of the peace of Antalcidas, and yet did not withdraw their Harmosts from the cities. Again, having driven the Mantineans from their home, who were at the time their friends and allies, they denied that they were doing any wrong, inasmuch as they removed them from one city and settled them in several. But indeed a man is a fool, as much as a knave, if he imagines that, because he shuts his own eyes, his neighbours cannot see. Their fondness for such tortuous policy proved however, both to the Lacedaemonians and Aetolians, the source of the greatest disasters; and it is not one which should commend itself to the imitation either of individuals or states, if they are well advised.

Scopas elected Aetolian Strategus.

B.C. 382.

B.C. 387.

B.C. 385.

[1] See ch 15

King Philip, then, after his interview with the Achaean assembly, started with his army on the way to Macedonia, in all haste to make preparations for war; leaving a pleasant impression in the minds of all the Greeks: for the nature of the decree, which I have mentioned as having been passed by him,[1] gave them good hopes of finding him a man of moderate temper and royal magnanimity.

28. These transactions were contemporaneous with Hannibal's expedition against Saguntum, after his conquest of all Iberia south of the Iber. Now, had the first attempts of Hannibal been from the beginning involved with the transactions in Greece, it would have been plainly my proper course to have narrated the latter side by side with those in Iberia in my previous book, with an eye solely to dates. But seeing that the wars in Italy, Greece, and Asia were at their commencements entirely distinct, and yet became finally involved with each other, I decided that my history of them must also be distinct, until I came to the point at which they became inseparably interlaced, and began to tend towards a common conclusion. Thus both will be made clear,—the account of their several commencements: and the time, manner, and causes which led to the complication and amalgamation, of which I spoke in my introduction. This point having been reached, I must thenceforth embrace them all in one uninterrupted narrative. This amalgamation began towards the end of the war, in the third year of the 140th Olympiad. From that year, therefore, my history will, with a due regard to dates, become a general one. Before that year it must be divided into distinct narratives, with a mere recapitulation in each case of the events detailed in the preceding book, introduced for the sake of facilitating the comprehension, and rousing the admiration, of my readers.

B.C. 118.

29. Philip then passed the winter in Macedonia, in an energetic enlistment of troops for the coming campaign, and in securing his frontier on the side of the Barbarians. And having accomplished these objects, he met Scerdilaidas and put himself fearlessly in his power, and discussed with him the terms

Philip secures the support of Scerdilaidas.

[1] See ch. 24

of friendship and alliance; and partly by promising to help him in securing his power in Illyria, and partly by bringing against the Aetolians the charges to which they were only too open, persuaded him without difficulty to assent to his proposals. The fact is that public crimes do not differ from private, except in quantity and extent; and just as in the case of petty thieves, what brings them to ruin more than anything else is that they cheat and are unfaithful to each other, so was it in the case of the Aetolians. They had agreed with Scerdilaidas to give him half the booty, if he would join them in their attack upon Achaea; but when, on his consenting to do so, and actually carrying out his engagement, they had sacked Cynaetha and carried off a large booty in slaves and cattle, they gave him no share in the spoil at all. He was therefore already enraged with them; and required very little persuasion on Philip's part to induce him to accept the proposal, and agree to join the alliance, on condition of receiving a yearly subsidy of twenty talents; and, in return, putting to sea with thirty galleys and carrying on a naval war with the Aetolians.

30. While Philip was thus engaged, the commissioners sent out to the allies were performing their mission. The first place they came to was Acarnania; and the Acarnanians, with a noble promptitude, confirmed the decree and undertook to join the war against the Aetolians with their full forces. And yet they, if any one, might have been excused if they had put the matter off, and hesitated, and shown fear of entering upon a war with their neighbours; both because they lived upon the frontiers of Aetolia, and still more because they were peculiarly open to attack, and, most of all, because they had a short time before experienced the most dreadful disasters from the enmity of the Aetolians. But I imagine that men of noble nature, whether in private or public affairs, look upon duty as the highest consideration; and in adherence to this principle no people in Greece have been more frequently conspicuous than the Acarnanians, although the forces at their command were but slender. With them, above all others in Greece, an alliance should be sought at a crisis, without any misgiving;

The Acarnanians, B.C. 220.

for they have, individually and collectively, an element of stability and a spirit of liberality. The conduct of the Epirotes was in strong contrast. When they heard what the commissioners had to say, indeed, they, like the Acarnanians, joined in confirming the decree, and voted to go to war with the Aetolians at such time as Philip also did the same; but with ignoble duplicity they told the Aetolian envoys that they had determined to maintain peace with them.

Duplicity of the Epirotes.

Ambassadors were despatched also to King Ptolemy, to urge him not to send money to the Aetolians, nor to supply them with any aid against Philip and the allies.

Ptolemy Philopator.

31. The Messenians again, on whose account the war began, answered the commissioners sent to them that, seeing Phigalia was on their frontier and was in the power of the Aetolians, they would not undertake the war until that city was wrested from them. This decision was forcibly carried, much against the will of the people at large, by the Ephors Oenis and Nicippus, and some others of the oligarchical party: wherein they showed, to my thinking, great ignorance of their true interests. I admit, indeed, that war is a terrible thing; but it is less terrible than to submit to anything whatever in order to avoid it. For what is the meaning of our fine talk about equality of rights, freedom of speech, and liberty, if the one important thing is peace? We have no good word for the Thebans, because they shrunk from fighting for Greece and chose from fear to side with the Persians,—nor indeed for Pindar who supported their inaction in the verses—[1]

Timidity of the Messenians.

B.C. 480-479. Pindar fr.

> A quiet haven for the ship of state
> Should be the patriot's aim,
> And smiling peace, to small and great
> That brings no shame.

For though his advice was for the moment acceptable, it was not long before it became manifest that his opinion was as

[1] See Stobaeus Floril. 58, 9, who gives three more lines.

mischievous as it was dishonourable. For peace, with justice and honour, is the noblest and most advantageous thing in the world; when joined with disgrace and contemptible cowardice, it is the basest and most disastrous.[1]

32. The Messenian leaders, then, being of oligarchical tendencies, and aiming at their own immediate advantage, were always too much inclined to peace. On many critical occasions indeed they managed to elude fear and danger: but all the while this policy of theirs was accumulating a heavy retribution for themselves; and they finally involved their country in the gravest misfortunes. And the reason in my opinion was this, that being neighbours to two of the most powerful nations in the Peloponnese, or I might almost say in Greece, I mean the Arcadians and Lacedaemonians,—one of which had been irreconcilably hostile to them from the moment they occupied the country, and the other disposed to be friendly and protect them,—they never frankly accepted hostility to the Spartans, or friendship with the Arcadians. Accordingly when the attention of the former was distracted by domestic or foreign war, the Messenians were secure; for they always enjoyed peace and tranquillity from the fact of their country lying out of the road: but when the Lacedaemonians, having nothing else on hand to distract their attention, took to inflicting injuries on them, they were unable to withstand the superior strength of the Lacedaemonians by their own power; and, having failed to secure the support of their true friends, who were ready to do anything for their protection, they were reduced to the alternatives of becoming the slaves of Sparta and enduring her heavy exactions; or of leaving their homes to escape from this servitude, abandoning their country with wives and children. And this has repeatedly happened to them within comparatively recent times.

That the present settlement of the Peloponnese may prove a lasting one, so that no measure such as I am about to describe may be ever necessary, is indeed my earnest wish: but if anything does happen to disturb it, and threaten revolutionary changes, the only hope for the Messenians and Megalopolitans of continuing to occupy their present territory, that I can see,

[1] Cf. ch. 74.

is a recurrence to the policy of Epaminondas. They must resolve, that is to say, upon a cordial and sincere partnership with each other in every danger and labour.

33. And perhaps my observation may receive some support from ancient history. For, among many other indications, it is a fact that the Messenians did set up a pillar close to the altar of Zeus Lycaeus in the time of Aristomenes,[1] according to the evidence of Callisthenes, in which they inscribed the following verses :

A faithless king will perish soon or late !
Messene tracked him down right easily,
The traitor :—perjury must meet its fate ;
Glory to Zeus, and life to Arcady !

The point of this is, that, having lost their own country, they pray the gods to save Arcadia as their second country.[2] And it was very natural that they should do so ; for not only did the Arcadians receive them when driven from their own land, at the time of the Aristomenic war, and make them welcome to their homes and free of their civic rights ; but they also passed a vote bestowing their daughters in marriage upon those of the Messenians who were of proper age ; and besides all this, investigated the treason of their king Aristocrates in the battle of the Trench ; and, finding him guilty, put him to death and utterly destroyed his whole family. But setting aside these ancient events, what has happened recently after the restoration of Megalopolis and Messene will be sufficient to support what I have said. For when, upon the death of Epaminondas leaving the result of the battle of Mantinea doubtful, the Lacedaemonians endeavoured to prevent the Messenians from being included

B.C. 362.

[1] The hero of the second Messenian war, B.C. 685-668 (Pausan. 4, 14-24). The story told by Pausanias, who also quotes these verses, is that Aristocrates, king of the Arcadians, twice played the traitor to Aristomenes, the Messenian champion : once at the battle of the Great Trench, and again when Aristomenes renewed the war after his escape from the Pits at Sparta ; and that on the second occasion his own people stoned him to death, and set up this pillar in the sacred enclosure of Zeus on Mount Lycaeus.

[2] But Pausanias represents the pillar as put up by the Arcadians, not the Messenians (4, 22, 7).

in the truce, hoping even then to get Messenia into their own hands, the Megalopolitans, and all the other Arcadians who were allied with the Messenians, made such a point of their being admitted to the benefits of the new confederacy, that they were accepted by the allies and allowed to take the oaths and share in the provisions of the peace; while the Lacedaemonians were the only Greeks excluded from the treaty. With such facts before him, could any one doubt the soundness of the suggestion I lately made?

I have said thus much for the sake of the Arcadians and Messenians themselves; that, remembering all the misfortunes which have befallen their countries at the hands of the Lacedaemonians, they may cling close to the policy of mutual affection and fidelity; and let no fear of war, or desire of peace, induce them to abandon each other in what affects the highest interests of both.

34. In the matter of the commissioners from the allies, to go back to my story, the behaviour of the Lacedaemonians was very characteristic. For their own ill-considered and tortuous policy had placed them in such a difficulty, that they finally dismissed them without an answer: thus illustrating, as it seems to me, the truth of the saying, that, "boldness pushed to extremes amounts to want of sense, and comes to nothing." Subsequently, however, on the appointment of new Ephors, the party who had originally promoted the outbreak, and had been the causes of the massacre, sent to the Aetolians to induce them to despatch an ambassador to Sparta. The Aetolians gladly consented, and in a short time Machatas arrived there in that capacity. Pressure was at once put upon the Ephors to allow Machatas to address the people,[1] and to re-establish royalty in accordance with the ancient constitution, and not to allow the Heraclid dynasty to be any longer suppressed, contrary to the laws. The Ephors were annoyed at the proposal, but were unable to withstand the pressure, and afraid of a rising of the younger men: they therefore answered that the question of restoring the kings must be reserved for future consideration; but they consented to grant Machatas an opportunity of address-

Division of opinion in Sparta, B.C. 220.

[1] The text is uncertain here.

ing a public assembly. When the people accordingly were met, Machatas came forward, and in a long speech urged them to embrace the alliance with Aetolia; inveighing in reckless and audacious terms against the Macedonians, while he went beyond all reason and truth in his commendations of the Aetolians. Upon his retirement, there was a long and animated debate between those who supported the Aetolians and advised the adoption of their alliance, and those who took the opposite side. When, however, some of the elders reminded the people of the good services rendered them by Antigonus and the Macedonians, and the injuries inflicted on them by Charixenus and Timaeus,—when the Aetolians invaded them with their full force and ravaged their territory, enslaved the neighbouring villages, and laid a plot for attacking Sparta itself by a fraudulent and forcible restoration of exiles,—these words produced a great revulsion of feeling, and the people finally decided to maintain the alliance with Philip and the Macedonians. Machatas accordingly had to go home without attaining the object of his mission.

Murder of the Ephors, B.C. 220.

35. The party, however, at Sparta who were the original instigators of the outbreak could not make up their minds to give way. They once more therefore determined to commit a crime of the most impious description, having first corrupted some of the younger men. It was an ancestral custom that, at a certain sacrifice, all citizens of military age should join fully armed in a procession to the temple of Athene of the Brazen-house, while the Ephors remained in the sacred precinct and completed the sacrifice. As the young men therefore were conducting the procession, some of them suddenly fell upon the Ephors, while they were engaged with the sacrifice, and slew them. The enormity of this crime will be made apparent by remembering that the sanctity of this temple was such, that it gave a safe asylum even to criminals condemned to death; whereas its privileges were now by the cruelty of these audacious men treated with such contempt, that the whole of the Ephors were butchered round the altar and the table of the goddess. In pursuance of their purpose they next killed one of the elders, Gyridas, and drove into exile those who had

spoken against the Aetolians. They then chose some of their own body as Ephors, and made an alliance with the Aetolians. Their motives for doing all this, for incurring the enmity of the Achaeans, for their ingratitude to the Macedonians, and generally for their unjustifiable conduct towards all, was before everything else their devotion to Cleomenes, and the hopes and expectations they continued to cherish that he would return to Sparta in safety. So true it is that men who have the tact to ingratiate themselves with those who surround them can, even when far removed, leave in their hearts very effective materials for kindling the flame of a renewed popularity. This people for instance, to say nothing of other examples, after nearly three years of constitutional government, following the banishment of Cleomenes, without once thinking of appointing kings at Sparta, no sooner heard of the death of Cleomenes than they were eager—populace and Ephors alike—to restore kingly rule. Accordingly the Ephors who were in sympathy with the conspirators, and who had made the alliance with Aetolia which I just now mentioned, did so. One of these kings so restored they appointed in accordance with the regular and legal succession, namely Agesipolis. He was a child at the time, a son of Agesipolis, and grandson of that Cleombrotus who had become king, as the next of kin to this family, when Leonidas was driven from office. As guardian of the young king they elected Cleomenes, son of Cleombrotus and brother of Agesipolis.

Agesipolis appointed king, B.C. 242.

Of the other royal house there were surviving two sons of Archidamus, son of Eudamidas, by the daughter of Hippodemon; as well as Hippodemon himself, the son of Agesilaus, and several other members of the same branch, though somewhat less closely connected than those I have mentioned. But these were all passed over, and Lycurgus was appointed king, none of whose ancestors had ever enjoyed that title. A present of a talent to each of the Ephors made him "descendant of Hercules" and king of Sparta. So true is it all the world over that such nobility[1] is a mere question of a little money.

and Lycurgas.

[1] Reading with Hultsch, τὰ καλά.

The result was that the penalty for their folly had to be paid, not by the third generation, but by the very authors of this royalist restoration.

Spartans attack Argos, and proclaim war with the Achaeans.

36. When Machatas heard what had happened at Sparta, he returned thither and urged the Ephors and kings to go to war with the Achaeans; arguing that that was the only way of stopping the ambition of the party in Sparta who were doing all they could to break up the alliance with the Aetolians, or of the party in Aetolia who were co-operating with them. Having obtained the consent of the Ephors and kings, Machatas returned home with a success secured him by the blindness of his partisans in Sparta; while Lycurgus with the army and certain others of the citizens invaded the Argive territory, the inhabitants being quite unprepared for an attack, owing to the existing settlement. By a sudden assault he seized Polichna, Prasiae, Leucae, and Cyphanta, but was repulsed at Glympes and Zarax. After these achievements of their king, the Lacedaemonians proclaimed a licence of reprisal against the Achaeans. With the Eleans also Machatas was successful in persuading them, by the same arguments as he had used at Sparta, to go to war with the Achaeans.

The unexpected success of these intrigues caused the Aetolians to enter upon the war with high spirits. But it was quite the contrary with the Achaeans: for Philip, on whom their hopes rested, was still busy with his preparations; the Epirotes were hesitating about going to war, and the Messenians were entirely passive; and meantime the Aetolians, aided by the blind policy of the Eleans and Lacedaemonians, were threatening them with actual war on every side.

Aratus succeeded by his son as Strategus of the Achaeans, May B.C. 219.

37. The year of Aratus's office was just expiring, and his son Aratus the younger had been elected to succeed him as Strategus, and was on the point of taking over the office. Scopas was still Strategus of the Aetolians, and in fact it was just about the middle of his year. For the Aetolians hold their elections immediately after the autumn equinox, while the Achaeans hold theirs about the time of the rising of the Pleiads. As soon therefore as summer had

well set in, and Aratus the younger had taken over his office, all these wars at once began simultaneously. Hannibal began besieging Saguntum; the Romans sent Lucius Aemilius with an army to Illyria against Demetrius of Pharos,—of both which I spoke in the last book: Antiochus, having had Ptolemais and Tyre betrayed to him by Theodotus, meditated attacking Coele-Syria; and Ptolemy was engaged in preparing for the war with Antiochus. While Lycurgus, wishing to make a beginning after the pattern of Cleomenes, pitched his camp near the Athenaeum of Megalopolis and was laying siege to it: the Achaeans were collecting mercenary horse and foot for the war which was upon them: and Philip, finally, was starting from Macedonia with an army consisting of ten thousand heavy-armed soldiers of the phalanx, five thousand light-armed, and eight hundred cavalry. Such was the universal state of war or preparation for war.

June—September. B.C. 219.

38. At the same time the Rhodians went to war with the Byzantines, for reasons which I must now describe.

Rhodian and Byzantium war, 220-219 B.C.

As far as the sea is concerned, Byzantium occupies a position the most secure and in every way the most advantageous of any town in our quarter of the world: while in regard to the land, its situation is in both respects the most unfavourable. By sea it so completely commands the entrance to the Pontus, that no merchant can sail in or out against its will. The Pontus therefore being rich in what the rest of the world requires for the support of life, the Byzantines are absolute masters of all such things. For those commodities which are the first necessaries of existence, cattle and slaves, are confessedly supplied by the districts round the Pontus in greater profusion, and of better quality, than by any others: and for luxuries, they supply us with honey, wax, and salt-fish in great abundance; while they take our superfluous stock of olive oil and every kind of wine. In the matter of corn there is a mutual interchange, they supplying or taking it as it happens to be convenient. Now the Greeks would necessarily have been excluded entirely from traffic in these articles, or at least would have had to carry it on at a loss, if the Byzantines had adopted a hostile attitude, and made

Advantages of the situation of Byzantium.

common cause formerly with the Gauls, or still more at this time with the Thracians, or had abandoned the place altogether: for owing to the narrowness of the strait, and the number of the barbarians along its shores, it would have become entirely impassable to our ships. The Byzantines themselves probably feel the advantages of the situation, in the supplies of the necessaries of life, more than any one else; for their superfluity finds a ready means of export, and what they lack is readily imported, with profit to themselves, and without difficulty or danger: but other people too, as I have said, get a great many commodities by their means. As common benefactors therefore of all Greece they might justly expect, not only gratitude, but the united assistance of Greeks, when threatened by the barbarians.

But since the peculiar natural advantages of this site are generally unknown, because it lies somewhat outside the parts of the world ordinarily visited; and since it is an universal wish to be acquainted with things of this sort, by ocular inspection, if possible, of such places as have any unusual or remarkable features; or, if that is impossible, by having in our minds some ideas or images of them as like the truth as may be, I must now state the facts of the case, and what it is that makes this city so eminently rich and prosperous.

The Pontus.

39. The sea called "The Pontus" has a circumference of twenty-two thousand stades, and two mouths diametrically opposite to each other, the one opening into the Propontis and the other into the Maeotic Lake; which latter also has itself a circumference of eight thousand stades. Into these two basins many great rivers discharge themselves on the Asiatic side, and still larger and more numerous on the European; and so the Maeotic lake, as it gets filled up, flows into the Pontus, and the Pontus into the Propontis. The mouth of the Maeotic lake is called the Cimmerian Bosporus, about thirty stades broad and sixty long, and shallow all over; that of the Pontus is called the Thracian Bosporus, and is a hundred and twenty stades long, and of a varying breadth. Between Calchedon and Byzantium the channel is fourteen stades broad, and this is the entrance at the end nearest the

Propontis. Coming from the Pontus, it begins at a place called Hieron, at which they say that Jason on his return voyage from Colchis first sacrificed to the twelve gods. This place is on the Asiatic side, and its distance from the European coast is twelve stades, measuring to Sarapieium, which lies exactly opposite in Thrace. There are two causes which account for the fact that the waters, both of the Maeotic lake and the Pontus, continually flow outwards. One is patent at once to every observer, namely, that by the continual discharge of many streams into basins which are of definite circumference and content, the water necessarily is continually increasing in bulk, and, had there been no outlet, would inevitably have encroached more and more, and occupied an ever enlarging area in the depression: but as outlets do exist, the surplus water is carried off by a natural process, and runs perpetually through the channels that are there to receive it. The second cause is the alluvial soil brought down, in immense quantities of every description, by the rivers swollen from heavy rains, which forms shelving banks and continually forces the water to take a higher level, which is thus also carried through these outlets. Now as this process of alluvial deposit and influx of water is unceasing and continuous, so also the discharge through the channels is necessarily unceasing and continuous.

These are the true causes of the outflow of the Pontus, which do not depend for their credit on the stories of merchants, but upon the actual observation of nature, which is the most accurate method discoverable.

40. As I have started this topic I must not, as most historians do, leave any point undiscussed, or only barely stated. My object is rather to give information, and to clear up doubtful points for my readers. This is the peculiarity of the present day, in which every sea and land has been thrown open to travellers; and in which, therefore, one can no longer employ the evidence of poets and fabulists, as my predecessors have done on very many points, "offering," as Heraclitus says, "tainted witnesses to disputed facts,"—but I must try to make my narrative in itself carry conviction to my readers.

I say then the Pontus has long been in process of being filled up with mud, and that this process is actually going on

now: and further, that in process of time both it and the Propontis, assuming the same local conditions to be maintained, and the causes of the alluvial deposit to continue active, will be entirely filled up. For time being infinite, and the depressions most undoubtedly finite, it is plain that, even though the amount of deposit be small, they must in course of time be filled. For a finite process, whether of accretion or decrease, must, if we presuppose infinite time, be eventually completed, however infinitesimal its progressive stages may be. In the present instance the amount of soil deposited being not small, but exceedingly large, it is plain that the result I mentioned will not be remote but rapid. And, in fact, it is evident that it is already taking place. The Maeotic lake is already so much choked up, that the greater part of it is only from seven to five fathoms deep, and accordingly cannot any longer be passed by large ships without a pilot. And having moreover been originally a sea precisely on a level with the Pontus, it is now a freshwater lake: the sea-water has been expelled by the silting up of the bottom, and the discharge of the rivers has entirely overpowered it. The same will happen to the Pontus, and indeed is taking place at this moment; and though it is not evident to ordinary observers, owing to the vastness of its basin, yet a moderately attentive study will discover even now what is going on.

41. For the Danube discharging itself into the Pontus by several mouths, we find opposite it a bank formed by the mud discharged from these mouths extending for nearly a thousand stades, at a distance of a day's sail from the shore as it now exists, upon which ships sailing to the Pontus run, while apparently still in deep water, and find themselves unexpectedly stranded on the sandbanks which the sailors call the Breasts. That this deposit is not close to the shore, but projected to some distance, must be accounted for thus: exactly as far as the currents of the rivers retain their force from the strength of the descending stream, and overpower that of the sea, it must of course follow that to that distance the earth, and whatever else is carried down by the rivers, would be projected, and neither settle nor become fixed until it is reached. But when the force of the currents has become quite spent by the depth and bulk of the

sea, it is but natural that the soil held in solution should settle down and assume a fixed position. This is the explanation of the fact, that, in the case of large and rapid rivers, such embankments are at considerable distances, and the sea close in shore deep; while in the case of smaller and more sluggish streams, these sandbanks are at their mouths. The strongest proof of this is furnished by the case of heavy rains; for when they occur, rivers of inferior size, overpowering the waves at their mouths, project the alluvial deposit out to sea, to a distance exactly in proportion to the force of the streams thus discharging themselves. It would be mere foolish scepticism to disbelieve in the enormous size of this sandbank, and in the mass of stones, timber, and earth carried down by the rivers; when we often see with our own eyes an insignificant stream suddenly swell into a torrent, and force its way over lofty rocks, sweeping along with it every kind of timber, soil, and stones, and making such huge moraines, that at times the appearance of a locality becomes in a brief period difficult to recognise.[1]

42. This should prevent any surprise that rivers of such magnitude and rapidity, flowing perpetually instead of intermittently, should produce these effects and end by filling up the Pontus. For it is not a mere probability, but a logical certainty, that this must happen. And a proof of what is going to take place is this, that in the same proportion as the Maeotic lake is less salt than the Pontus, the Pontus is less so than the Mediterranean. From which it is manifest that, when the time which it has taken for the Maeotic lake to fill up shall have been extended in proportion to the excess of the Pontic over the Maeotic basin, then the Pontus will also become like a marsh and lake, and filled with fresh water like the Maeotic lake: nay, we must suppose that the process will be somewhat more rapid, insomuch as the rivers falling into it are more numerous and more rapid. I have said thus much in answer to the incredulity of those who cannot believe that

[1] However cogent may be the reasons for his prophecy adduced by Polybius, there are no signs of its being fulfilled. Indeed, the bank at the mouth of the Danube, which he mentions, has long disappeared. The fact seems to be that he failed to take into calculation the constant rush of water out of the Euxine, which is sufficient to carry off any amount of alluvial deposit

the Pontus is actually being silted up, and will some day be filled; and that so vast a sea will ever become a lake or marsh. But I have another and higher object also in thus speaking: which is to prevent our ignorance from forcing us to give a childish credence to every traveller's tale and marvel related by voyagers; and that, by possessing certain indications of the truth, we may be enabled by them to test the truth or falsehood of anything alleged by this or that person.

43. I must now return to the discussion of the excellence of the site of Byzantium. The length of the channel connecting the Pontus and Propontis being, as I have said, a hundred and twenty stades, and Hieron marking its termination towards the Pontus, and the Strait of Byzantium that towards the Propontis, —half-way between these, on the European side, stands Hermaeum, on a headland jutting out into the channel, about five stades from the Asiatic coast, just at the narrowest point of the whole channel; where Darius is said to have made his bridge of ships across the strait, when he crossed to invade Scythia. In the rest of the channel the running of the current from the Pontus is much the same, owing to the similarity of the coast formation on either side of it; but when it reaches Hermaeum on the European side, which I said was the narrowest point, the stream flowing from the Pontus, and being thus confined, strikes the European coast with great violence, and then, as though by a rebound from a blow, dashes against the opposite Asiatic coast, and thence again sweeps back and strikes the European shore near some headlands called the Hearths: thence it runs rapidly once more to the spot on the Asiatic side called the Cow, the place on which the myth declares Io to have first stood after swimming the channel. Finally the current runs from the Cow right up to Byzantium, and dividing into two streams on either side of the city, the lesser part of it forms the gulf called the Horn, while the greater part swerves once more across. But it has no longer sufficient way on it to reach the opposite shore on which Calchedon stands: for after its several counter-blows the current, finding at this point a wider channel, slackens; and no longer makes short rebounds at right angles from one shore to the other, but

Site of Byzantium.

B.C. 512.

more and more at an obtuse angle, and accordingly, falling short of Calchedon, runs down the middle of the channel.

44. What then makes Byzantium a most excellent site, and Calchedon the reverse, is just this: and although at first sight both positions seem equally convenient, the practical fact is that it is difficult to sail up to the latter, even if you wish to do so; while the current carries you to the former, whether you will or no, as I have just now shown. And a proof of my assertion is this: those who want to cross from Calchedon to Byzantium cannot sail straight across the channel, but coast up to the Cow and Chrysopolis,—which the Athenians formerly seized, by the advice of Alcibiades, when they for the first time levied customs on ships sailing into the Pontus,[1]—and then drift down the current, which carries them as a matter of course to Byzantium. And the same is the case with a voyage on either side of Byzantium. For if a man is running before a south wind from the Hellespont, or to the Hellespont from the Pontus before the Etesian winds, if he keeps to the European shore, he has a direct and easy course to the narrow part of the Hellespont between Abydos and Sestos, and thence also back again to Byzantium: but if he goes from Calchedon along the Asiatic coast, the case is exactly the reverse, from the fact that the coast is broken up by deep bays, and that the territory of Cyzicus projects to a considerable distance. Nor can a man coming from the Hellespont to Calchedon obviate this by keeping to the European coast as far as Byzantium, and then striking across to Calchedon; for the current and other circumstances which I have mentioned make it difficult. Similarly, for one sailing out from Calchedon it is absolutely impossible to make straight for Thrace, owing to the intervening current, and to the fact that both winds are unfavourable to both voyages; for as the south wind blows into the Pontus, and the north wind from it, the one or the other of these must be encountered in both these voyages. These, then, are the advantages enjoyed by Byzantium in regard to the sea: I must now describe its disadvantages on shore.

B C. 410.

45. They consist in the fact that its territory is so com-

[1] Xenophon, *Hellen.* I, I, 22.

pletely hemmed in by Thrace from shore to shore, that the Byzantines have a perpetual and dangerous war continually on hand with the Thracians. For they are unable once for all to arm and repel them by a single decisive battle, owing to the number of their people and chiefs. For if they conquer one chief, three others still more formidable invade their territory. Nor again do they gain anything by consenting to pay tribute and make terms; for a concession of any sort to one brings at once five times as many enemies upon them. Therefore, as I say, they are burdened by a perpetual and dangerous war: for what can be more hazardous or more formidable than a war with barbarians living on your borders? Nay, it is not only this perpetual struggle with danger on land, but, apart from the evils that always accompany war, they have to endure a misery like that ascribed by the poets to Tantalus: for being in possession of an extremely fertile district, no sooner have they expended their labour upon it and been rewarded by crops of the finest quality, than the barbarians sweep down, and either destroy them, or collect and carry them off; and then, to say nothing of the loss of their labour and expense, the very excellence of the crops enhances the misery and distress of seeing them destroyed before their eyes. Still, habit making them able to endure the war with the Thracians, they maintained their original connexions with the other Greeks; but when to their other misfortunes was added the attack of the Gauls under Comontorius, they were reduced to a sad state of distress indeed.

Disadvantages of Byzantium.

46. These Gauls had left their country with Brennus, and having survived the battle at Delphi and made their way to the Hellespont, instead of crossing to Asia, were captivated by the beauty of the district round Byzantium, and settled there. Then, having conquered the Thracians and erected Tyle[1] into a capital, they placed the Byzantines in extreme danger. In their earlier attacks, made under the command of Comontorius their first king, the Byzantines always bought them off by

The Gauls, B.C. 279.

[1] Or Tylis, according to Stephanos Byz., who says it was near the Haemus. Perhaps the modern Kilios.

presents amounting to three, or five, or sometimes even ten thousand gold pieces, on condition of their not devastating their territory: and at last were compelled to agree to pay them a yearly tribute of eighty talents, until the time of Cavarus, in whose reign their kingdom came to an end; and their whole tribe, being in their turn conquered by the Thracians, were entirely annihilated. It was in these times, then, that being hard pressed by the payment of these exactions, the Byzantines first sent embassies to the Greek states with a prayer for aid and support in their dangerous situation: but being disregarded by the greater number, they, under pressure of necessity, attempted to levy dues upon ships sailing into the Pontus.

47. Now this exaction by the Byzantines of a duty upon goods brought from the Pontus, being a heavy loss and burden to everybody, was universally regarded as a grievance; and accordingly an appeal from all those engaged in the trade was made to the Rhodians, as acknowledged masters of the sea: and it was from this circumstance that the war originated of which I am about to speak.

The Byzantines levy a toll.

For the Rhodians, roused to action by the loss incurred by themselves, as well as that of their neighbours, at first joined their allies in an embassy to Byzantium, and demanded the abolition of the impost. The Byzantines refused compliance, being persuaded that they were in the right by the arguments advanced by their chief magistrates, Hecatorus and Olympidorus, in their interview with the ambassadors. The Rhodian envoys accordingly departed without effecting their object. But upon their return home, war was at once voted against Byzantium on these grounds; and messengers were immediately despatched to Prusias inviting his co-operation in the war: for they knew that Prusias was from various causes incensed with the Byzantines.

The Rhodians declare war, B.C. 220.

48. The Byzantines took steps of a similar nature, by sending to Attalus and Achaeus begging for their assistance. For his part Attalus was ready enough to give it: but his importance was small, because he had been reduced within the

limits of his ancestral dominions by Achaeus. But Achaeus, who exercised dominion throughout Asia on this side Taurus, and had recently established his regal power, promised assistance; and his attitude roused high hopes in the minds of the Byzantines, and corresponding depression in those of the Rhodians and Prusias. Achaeus was a relation of the Antiochus who had just succeeded to the kingdom of Syria; and he became possessed of the dominion I have mentioned through the following circumstances. After the death of Seleucus, father of the above-named Antiochus, and the succession of his eldest son Seleucus to the throne, Achaeus accompanied the latter in an expedition over Mount Taurus, about two years before the period of which we are speaking.[1] For as soon as Seleucus the younger had succeeded to the kingdom he learnt that Attalus had already reduced all Asia on this side of Taurus under his power; and being accordingly eager to support his own rights, he crossed Taurus with a large army. There he was treacherously assassinated by Apaturius the Gaul, and Nicanor. Achaeus, in right of his relationship, promptly revenged his murder by killing Nicanor and Apaturius; and taking supreme command of the army and administration, conducted it with wisdom and integrity. For the opportunity was a convenient one, and the feeling of the common soldiers was all in favour of his assuming the crown; yet he refused to do so, and preserving the royal title for Antiochus the younger, son of Seleucus, went on energetically with the expedition, and the recovery of the whole of the territory this side Taurus. Meeting however with unexpected success,—for he shut up Attalus within the walls of Pergamus and became master of all the rest of the country,—he was puffed up by his good fortune, and at once swerved from his straightforward course of policy. He assumed the diadem, adopted the title of king, and was at this time the most powerful and formidable of all the kings and princes this side Taurus. This was the man on whose help the Byzantines relied when they undertook the war against the Rhodians and Prusias.

Achaeus.

B.C. 226.

[1] Seleucus II. (Callinicus), B.C. 246-226. Seleucus III. (Ceraunus), B.C. 226-223. Antiochus the Great (son of Callinicus), B.C 223-187.

49. As to the provocations given before this to Prusias by the Byzantines they were various. In the first place he complained that, having voted to put up certain statues of him, they had not done so, but had delayed or forgotten it. In the second place he was annoyed with them for taking great pains to compose the hostility, and put an end to the war, between Achaeus and Attalus; because he looked upon a friendship between these two as in many ways detrimental to his own interests. He was provoked also because it appeared that when Attalus was keeping the festival of Athene, the Byzantines had sent a mission to join in the celebration; but had sent no one to him when he was celebrating the Soteria. Nursing therefore a secret resentment for these various offences, he gladly snatched at the pretext offered him by the Rhodians; and arranged with their ambassadors that they were to carry on the war by sea, while he would undertake to inflict no less damage on the enemy by land. Prusias.

Such were the causes and origin of the war between Rhodes and Byzantium.

50. At first the Byzantines entered upon the war with energy, in full confidence of receiving the assistance of Achaeus; and of being able to cause Prusias as much alarm and danger by fetching Tiboetes from Macedonia as he had done to them. For Prusias, entering upon the war with all the animosity which I have described, had seized the place called Hieron at the entrance of the channel, which the Byzantines not long before had purchased for a considerable sum of money, because of its convenient situation; and because they did not wish to leave in any one else's hands a point of vantage to be used against merchants sailing into the Pontus, or one which commanded the slave trade, or the fishing. Besides this, Prusias had seized in Asia a district of Mysia, which had been in the possession of Byzantium for many years past. Hostilities commence, B.C. 220.

Meanwhile the Rhodians manned six ships and received four from their allies; and, having elected Xenophantus to command them, they sailed with this squadron of ten ships to the Hellespont. Nine of them dropped anchor near Sestos,

and stopped ships sailing into the Pontus; with the tenth the admiral sailed to Byzantium, to test the spirit of the people, and see whether they were already sufficiently alarmed to change their minds about the war. Finding them resolved not to listen he sailed away, and, taking up his other nine ships, returned to Rhodes with the whole squadron.

Meanwhile the Byzantines sent a message to Achaeus asking for aid, and an escort to conduct Tiboetes from Macedonia. For it was believed that Tiboetes had as good a claim to the kingdom of Bithynia as Prusias, who was his nephew.

51. But seeing the confident spirit of the Byzantines, the Rhodians adopted an exceedingly able plan to obtain their object. They perceived that the resolution of the Byzantines in venturing on the war rested mainly on their hopes of the support of Achaeus. Now they knew that the father of Achaeus was detained at Alexandria, and that Achaeus was exceedingly anxious for his father's safety: they therefore hit upon the idea of sending an embassy to Ptolemy, and asking him to deliver this Andromachus to them. This request, indeed, they had before made, but without laying any great stress upon it: now, however, they were genuinely anxious for it; that, by doing this favour to Achaeus, they might lay him under such an obligation to them, that he would be unable to refuse any request they might make to him. When the ambassadors arrived, Ptolemy at first deliberated as to detaining Andromachus; because there still remained some points of dispute between himself and Antiochus unsettled; and Achaeus, who had recently declared himself king, could exercise a decisive influence in several important particulars. For Andromachus was not only father of Achaeus, but brother also of Laodice, the wife of Seleucus.[1] However, on a review of the whole situation, Ptolemy inclined to the Rhodians; and being anxious to show them every favour, he yielded to their request, and handed over Andromachus to them to conduct to his son. Having accordingly done this, and having conferred some additional marks of honour on Achaeus, they deprived the

The Rhodians secure the friendship of Achaeus.

[1] Of Seleucus Callinicus.

Byzantines of their most important hope. And this was not the only disappointment which the Byzantines had to encounter; for as Tiboetes was being escorted from Macedonia, he entirely defeated their plans by dying. This misfortune damped the ardour of the Byzantines, while it encouraged Prusias to push on the war. On the Asiatic side he carried it on in person, and with great energy; while on the European side he hired Thracians who prevented the Byzantines from leaving their gates. For their party being thus baulked of their hopes, and surrounded on every side by enemies, the Byzantines began to look about then for some decent pretext for withdrawing from the war.

52. So when the Gallic king, Cavarus, came to Byzantium, and showed himself eager to put an end to the war, and earnestly offered his friendly intervention, both Prusias and the Byzantines consented to his proposals. And when the Rhodians were informed of the interference of Cavarus and the consent of Prusias, being very anxious to secure their own object also, they elected Aridices as ambassador to Byzantium, and sent Polemocles with him in command of three triremes, wishing, as the saying is, to send the Byzantines "spear and herald's staff at once." Upon their appearance a pacification was arranged, in the year of Cothon, son of Callisthenes, Hieromnemon in Byzantium.[1] The treaty with the Rhodians was simple: "The Byzantines will not collect toll from any ship sailing into the Pontus; and in that case the Rhodians and their allies are at peace with the Byzantines." But that with Prusias contained the following provisions: "There shall be peace and amity for ever between Prusias and the Byzantines; the Byzantines shall in no way attack Prusias, nor Prusias the Byzantines. Prusias shall restore to

The Gallic king, Cavarus, negotiates a peace, B C. 220.

[1] That this was the name of a yearly officer at Byzantium appears from a decree in Demosthenes (*de Cor.* § 90), and Byzantine coins, Eckhel, II. p. 31. The title seems to have been brought from the mother-city Megara; as at Chalcedon, another colony of Megara, the same existed (C. I. G. 3794). It was connected with the worship of Apollo brought from Megara, Muller's *Dorians*, i. p. 250. It seems that this use of the name (generally employed of the deputies to the Amphictyonic council) was peculiarly Dorian. See Boeckh. C. I., vol. i. p. 610.

Byzantines all lands, forts, populations, and prisoners of war, without ransom; and besides these things, the ships taken at the beginning of the war, and the arms seized in the fortresses; and also the timbers, stone-work, and roofing belonging to the fort called Hieron" (for Prusias, in his terror of the approach of Tiboetes, had pulled down every fort which seemed to lie conveniently for him): "finally, Prusias shall compel such of the Bithynians as have any property taken from the Byzantine district of Mysia to restore it to the farmers."

Such were the beginning and end of the war of Rhodes and Prusias with Byzantium.

War between Rhodes and Crete.

53. At the same time the Cnossians sent an embassy to the Rhodians, and persuaded them to send them the ships that were under the command of Polemocles, and to launch three undecked vessels besides and send them also to Crete. The Rhodians having complied, and the vessels having arrived at Crete, the people of Eleutherna suspecting that one of their citizens named Timarchus had been put to death by Polemocles to please the Cnossians, first proclaimed a right of reprisal against the Rhodians, and then went to open war with them.

The destruction of Lyttos.

The people of Lyttos,[1] too, a short time before this, met with an irretrievable disaster. At that time the political state of Crete as a whole was this. The Cnossians, in league with the people of Gortyn, had a short time previously reduced the whole island under their power, with the exception of the city of Lyttos; and this being the only city which refused obedience, they resolved to go to war with it, being bent upon removing its inhabitants from their homes, as an example and terror to the rest of Crete. Accordingly at first the whole of the other Cretan cities were united in war against Lyttos: but presently when some jealousy arose from certain trifling causes, as is the way with the Cretans, they separated into hostile parties, the peoples of Polyrrhen, Cere, and Lappa, along with the Horii and Arcades,[2] forming one party and separating themselves from connexion with the Cnossians, resolved to make common

[1] Or Lyctos (Steph. Byz.)
[2] Of Arcadia, a city of Crete (Steph. Byz.)

cause with the Lyttians. Among the people of Gortyn, again, the elder men espoused the side of Cnossus, the younger that of Lyttos, and so were in opposition to each other. Taken by surprise by this disintegration of their allies, the Cnossians fetched over a thousand men from Aetolia in virtue of their alliance: upon which the party of the elders in Gortyn immediately seized the citadel; introduced the Cnossians and Aetolians; and either expelled or put to death the young men, and delivered the city into the hands of the Cnossians. And at the same time, the Lyttians having gone out with their full forces on an expedition into the enemy's territory, the Cnossians got information of the fact, and seized Lyttos while thus denuded of its defenders. The children and women they sent to Cnossus; and having set fire to the town, thrown down its buildings, and damaged it in every possible way, returned. When the Lyttians reached home from their expedition, and saw what had happened, they were struck with such violent grief that not a man of the whole host had the heart to enter his native city; but one and all having marched round its walls, with frequent cries and lamentations over their misfortune and that of their country, turned back again towards the city of Lappa. The people of Lappa gave them a kind and entirely cordial reception; and having thus in one day become cityless and aliens, they joined these allies in their war against the Cnossians. Thus at one fell swoop was Lyttos, a colony of Sparta and allied with the Lacedaemonians in blood, the most ancient of the cities in Crete, and by common consent the mother of the bravest men in the island, utterly cut off.

55. But the peoples of Polyrrhen and Lappa and all their allies, seeing that the Cnossians clung to the alliance of the Aetolians, and that the Aetolians were at war with King Philip and the Achaeans, sent ambassadors to the two latter asking for their help and to be admitted to alliance with them. Both requests were granted: they were admitted into the roll of allies, and assistance was sent to them, consisting of four hundred Illyrians under Plator, two hundred Achaeans, and a hundred Phocians; whose arrival was of the utmost advantage to the interest of Polyrrhenia and her allies: for in a brief space

Appeal to the Achaeans and Philip.

of time they shut the Eleuthernaeans and Cydonians within their walls, and compelled the people of Aptera to forsake the alliance of the Cnossians and share their fortunes. When these results had been obtained, the Polyrrhenians and their allies joined in sending to the aid of Philip and the Achaeans five hundred Cretans, the Cnossians having sent a thousand to the Aetolians a short time before; both of which contingents took part in the existing war on their respective sides. Nay more, the exiled party of Gortyn seized the harbour of Phaestus,[1] and also by a sudden and bold attack occupied the port of Gortyn itself; and from these two places as bases of operation they carried on the war with the party in the town. Such was the state of Crete.

Mithridates IV., king of Pontus, declares war against Sinope.

56. About the same time Mithridates also declared war against the people of Sinope; which proved to be the beginning and occasion of the disaster which ultimately befell the Sinopeans. Upon their sending an embassy with a view to this war to beg for assistance from the Rhodians, the latter decided to elect three men, and to grant them a hundred and forty thousand drachmae with which to procure supplies needed by the Sinopeans. The men so appointed got ready ten thousand jars of wine, three hundred talents[2] of prepared hair, a hundred talents of made-up bowstring, a thousand suits of armour, three thousand gold pieces, and four catapults with engineers to work them. The Sinopean envoys took these presents and departed; for the people of Sinope, being in great anxiety lest Mithridates should attempt to besiege them both by land and sea, were making all manner of preparations with this view. Sinope lies on the right-hand shore of the Pontus as one sails to Phasis, and is built upon a peninsula jutting out into the sea: it is on the neck of this peninsula, connecting it with Asia, which is not more than two stades wide, that the city is so placed as to entirely close

[1] Which had a harbour formed by a projecting headland called Lisses. Steph. Byz., who quotes Homer, *Odyss.* 3, 293:

ἔστι δέ τις Λίσσης αἰπεῖά τε εἰς ἅλα πέτρη.

[2] As a measure of weight a talent = about 57 lbs. avoirdupois. The prepared hair was for making ropes and bowstrings apparently.

it up from sea to sea; the rest of the peninsula stretches out into the open sea,—a piece of flat land from which the town is easily accessible, but surrounded by a steep coast offering very bad harbourage, and having exceedingly few spots admitting of disembarkation. The Sinopeans then were dreadfully alarmed lest Mithridates should blockade them, by throwing up works against their town on the side towards Asia, and by making a descent on the opposite side upon the low ground in front of the town: and they accordingly determined to strengthen the line of the peninsula, where it was washed by the sea, by putting up wooden defences and erecting palisades round the places accessible from the sea; and at the same time by storing weapons and stationing guards at all points open to attack: for the whole area is not large, but is capable of being easily defended and by a moderate force.

Such was the situation at Sinope at the time of the commencement of the Social war,—to which I must now return.

57. King Philip started from Macedonia with his army for Thessaly and Epirus, being bent on taking that route in his invasion of Aetolia. And at the same time Alexander and Dorimachus, having succeeded in establishing an intrigue for the betrayal of Aegira, had collected about twelve hundred Aetolians into Oeanthe, which is in Aetolia, exactly opposite the above-named town; and, having prepared vessels to convey them across the gulf, were waiting for favourable weather for making the vogage in fulfilment of their design. For a deserter from Aetolia, who had spent a long time at Aegira, and had had full opportunity of observing that the guards of the gate towards Aegium were in the habit of getting drunk, and keeping their watch with great slackness, had again and again crossed over to Dorimachus; and, laying this fact before him, had invited him to make the attempt, well knowing that he was thoroughly accustomed to such practices. The city of Aegira lies on the Peloponnesian coast of the Corinthian gulf, between the cities of Aegium and Sicyon, upon some strong and inaccessible heights, facing towards Parnassus and that district of the opposite coast, and standing about seven stades

The History of the Social war resumed from ch. 37. Philip starts for Aetolia, B.C. 219. Night surprise of Aegira.

back from the sea. At the mouth of the river which flows past this town Dorimachus dropped anchor under cover of night, having at length obtained favourable weather for crossing. He and Alexander, accompanied by Archidamus the son of Pantaleon and the main body of the Aetolians, then advanced towards the city along the road leading from Aegium. But the deserter, with twenty of the most active men, having made his way by a shorter cut than the others over the cliffs where there was no road, owing to his knowledge of the locality, got into the city through a certain water-course and found the guards of the gate still asleep. Having killed them while actually in their beds, and cut the bolts of the gates with their axes, they opened them to the Aetolians. Having thus surprised the town, they behaved with a conspicuous want of caution, which eventually saved the people of Aegira, and proved the destruction of the Aetolians themselves. They seemed to imagine that to get within the gates was all there was to do in occupying an enemy's town; and accordingly acted as I shall now describe.

Alexander killed.

58. They kept together for a very brief space of time near the market-place, and then scattering in every direction, in their passion for plunder, rushed into the houses and began carrying off the wealth they contained. But it was now broad daylight: and the attack being wholly unexpected and sudden, those of the Aegiratans whose houses were actually entered by the enemy, in the utmost terror and alarm, all took to flight and made their way out of the town, believing it to be completely in the power of the enemy; but those of them whose houses were untouched, and who, hearing the shouting, sallied out to the rescue, all rushed with one accord to the citadel. These last continually increased in number and confidence; while the Aetolians on the contrary kept continually becoming less closely united, and less subject to discipline, from the causes above mentioned. But Dorimachus, becoming conscious of his danger, rallied his men and charged the citizens who were occupying the citadel: imagining that, by acting with decision and boldness, he would terrify and turn to flight those who had rallied to defend the town. But the Aegiratans, cheering

each other on, offered a strenuous resistance, and grappled gallantly with the Aetolians. The citadel being unwalled, and the struggle being at close quarters and man to man, the battle was at first as desperate as might be expected between two sides, of which one was fighting for country and children, the other for bare life. Finally the invading Aetolians were repulsed: and the Aegiratans, taking advantage of their higher position, made a fierce and vigorous charge down the slope upon the enemy; which struck such terror in them, that in the confusion that followed the fugitives trampled each other to death at the gates. Alexander himself fell fighting in the actual battle; but Archidamus was killed in the struggle and crush at the gates. Of the main body of Aetolians, some were trampled to death; others flying over the pathless hills fell over precipices and broke their necks; while such as escaped in safety to the ships managed, after shamefully throwing away their arms, to sail away and escape from what seemed a desperate danger. Thus it came about that the Aegiratans having lost their city by their carelessness, unexpectedly regained it by their valour and gallantry.

Euripidas.

59. About the same time Euripidas, who had been sent out to act as general to the Eleans, after overrunning the districts of Dyme, Pharae, and Tritaea, and collecting a considerable amount of booty, was marching back to Elis. But Miccus of Dyme, who happened at the time to be Sub-strategus of the Achaean league, went out to the rescue with a body of Dymaeans, Pharaeans, and Tritaeans, and attacked him as he was returning. But proceeding too precipitately, he fell into an ambush and lost a large number of his men: for forty of his infantry were killed and about two hundred taken prisoners. Elated by this success, Euripidas a few days afterwards made another expedition, and seized a fort belonging to the Dymaeans on the river Araxus, standing in an excellent situation, and called the Wall, which the myths affirm to have been anciently built by Hercules, when at war with the Eleans, as a base of operations against them.

60. The peoples of Dyme, Pharae, and Tritaea having been worsted in their attempt to relieve the country, and

afraid of what would happen from this capture of the fort, first sent messengers to the Strategus, Aratus, to inform him of what had happened and to ask for aid, and afterwards a formal embassy with the same request. But Aratus was unable to get the mercenaries together, because in the Cleomenic war the Achaeans had failed to pay some of the wages of the hired troops: and his entire policy and management of the whole war was in a word without spirit or nerve. Accordingly Lycurgus seized the Athenaeum of Megalopolis, and Eurıpidas followed up his former successes by taking Gortyna[1] in the territory of Telphusa. But the people of Dyme, Pharae, and Tritaea, despairing of assistance from the Strategus, came to a mutual agreement to cease paying the common contribution to the Achaean league, and to collect a mercenary army on their own account, three hundred infantry and fifty horse; and to secure the country by their means. In this action they were considered to have shown a prudent regard for their own interests, but not for those of the community at large; for they were thought to have set an evil example, and supplied a precedent to those whose wish it was to break up the league. But in fact the chief blame for their proceeding must rightfully be assigned to the Strategus, who pursued such a dilatory policy, and slighted or wholly rejected the prayers for help which reached him from time to time. For as long as he has any hope, from relations and allies, any man who is in danger will cling to them; but when in his distress he has to give up that hope, he is forced to help himself the best way he can. Wherefore we must not find fault with the people of Tritaea, Pharae, and Dyme for having mercenaries on their own account, when the chief magistrate of the league hesitated to act: but some blame does attach to them for renouncing the joint contribution. They certainly were not bound to neglect to secure their own safety by every opportunity and means in their power; but they were bound at the same time to keep up their just dues to the league: especially as the recovery of such payment was

Inactivity of Aratus. Dyme, Pharae, and Tritaea separate from the league.

[1] Gortyna or Gortys is an emendation of Reiske for Gorgus, which is not known. Gortys is mentioned by Pausanias, 5, 7, 1; 8, 27, 4; 8, 28, 1; it was on the river Bouphagus, and in the time of Pausanias was a mere village

perfectly secured to them by the common laws; and most of all because they had been the originators of the Achaean confederacy.[1]

61. Such was the state of things in the Peloponnese when King Philip, after crossing Thessaly, arrived in Epirus. Reinforcing his Macedonians by a full levy of Epirotes, and being joined by three hundred slingers from Achaia, and the five hundred Cretans sent him by the Polyrrhenians, he continued his march through Epirus and arrived in the territory of the Ambracians. Now, if he had continued his march without interruption, and thrown himself into the interior of Aetolia, by the sudden and unlooked-for attack of so formidable an army he would have put an end to the whole campaign: but as it was, he was over-persuaded by the Epirotes to take Ambracus first; and so gave the Aetolians an interval in which to make a stand, to take precautionary measures, and to prepare for the future. For the Epirotes, thinking more of their own advantage than of that of the confederacy, and being very anxious to get Ambracus[2] into their power, begged Philip to *invest the town and take it before doing anything else*: the fact being that they regarded it as a matter of the utmost importance to recover Ambracia from the Aetolians; and thought that the only way of doing this was to become masters of this place, Ambracus, and besiege the town of Ambracia from it. For Ambracus is a place strongly fortified by walls and out-works, standing in the midst of marshes, and approached from the land by only one narrow raised causeway; and commanding by its situation both the district and town of Ambracia.

Philip V at Ambracia, B C. 219.

62. While Philip, then, by the persuasion of the Epirotes, pitching his camp near Ambracus, was engaged in making his preparations for the siege, Scopas raised a general levy of Aetolians, and marching through Thessaly crossed the frontiers

[1] See 2, 41. We have no hint, as far as I know, of the circumstances under which such recovery would take place. We may conjecture from this passage that it would be on showing that losses had been sustained by reason of a failure of the league to give protection.

[2] Stephanos describes Ambracus as a πολίχνιον close to Ambracia.

of Macedonia; traversed the plain of Pieria, and laid it waste; and after securing considerable booty, returned by the road leading to Dium. The inhabitants of that town abandoning the place, he entered it and threw down its walls, houses, and gymnasium; set fire to the covered walks round the sacred enclosure, and destroyed all the other offerings which had been placed in it, either for ornament, or for the use of visitors to the public assemblies; and threw down all the statues of the kings. And this man, who, at the very beginning and first action of the war, had thus turned his arms against the gods as well as men, was not treated on his return to Aetolia as guilty of impiety, but was honoured and looked up to. For he had indeed filled the Aetolians with empty hopes and irrational conceit. From this time they indulged the idea that no one would venture to set foot in Aetolia; while they would be able without resistance not only to plunder the Peloponnese, which they were quite accustomed to do, but Thessaly and Macedonia also.

Scopas tries to effect a diversion by invading Macedonia. On his return he destroys Dium.

63. When he heard what had happened in Macedonia, and had thus paid on the spot for the selfishness and folly of the Epirotes, Philip proceeded to besiege Ambracus. By an energetic use of earthworks, and other siege operations, he quickly terrified the people into submission, and the place surrendered after a delay of forty days in all. He let the garrison, consisting of five hundred Aetolians, depart on fixed conditions, and gratified the cupidity of the Epirotes by handing over Ambracus to them; while he himself set his army in motion, and marched by way of Charadra, being anxious to cross the Ambracian gulf where it is narrowest, that is to say, near the Acarnanian temple called Actium. For this gulf is a branch of the Sicilian sea between Epirus and Acarnania, with a very narrow opening of less than five stades, but expanding as it extends inland to a breadth of a hundred stades; while the length of the whole arm from the open sea is about three hundred stades. It forms the boundary between Epirus on the north and Acarnania on the south. Philip, therefore, having got his army across this entrance of the gulf, and advanced through

Ambracus taken.

Acarnania, came to the city of Phoeteiae, which belonged to the Aetolians;[1] having, during his march, been joined by an Acarnanian force of two thousand foot and two hundred horse. Encamping under the walls of this town, and making energetic and formidable assaults upon it during two days, it was surrendered to him on terms, and the Aetolian garrison were dismissed on parole. Next night, however, five hundred other Aetolians, believing the town still untaken, came to its relief; whose arrival being ascertained beforehand by the king, he stationed some men in ambush at certain convenient spots, and slew most of the new-comers and captured all but a very few of the rest. After these events, he distributed a month's rations of corn among his men from what had been captured, for a large store was found collected at Phoeteiae, and then continued his advance into the territory of Stratus. At about ten stades from that town he pitched his camp on the banks of the river Achelous; and from that began laying waste the country without resistance, none of the enemy venturing out to attack him.

Philip enters Aetolia, takes Phoeteiae.

64. Meanwhile the Achaeans, being hard pressed by the war, and ascertaining that the king was not far off, sent ambassadors to him begging for help. They found Philip still in his camp near Stratus, and there delivered their commission: and besides the message with which they were charged, they pointed out to him the richness of the booty which his army would get from the enemy's country, and tried to persuade him to cross to Rhium and invade Elis. The king listened to what they had to say, and kept the ambassadors with him, alleging that he must consider of their request; and meanwhile broke up his camp, and marched in the direction of Metropolis and Conope. The Aetolians kept possession of the citadel of Metropolis but abandoned the town: whereupon Philip set fire to Metropolis, and continued his advance against Conope. But when the Aetolian horse rallied and ventured to meet him at the ford of the Achelous, which is about twenty stades before you reach the town, believing that they would

Metropolis and Conope.

[1] Though it was in the territory of Acarnania (Steph. Byz.)

either stop his advance altogether, or inflict much damage on the Macedonians while crossing the river; the king, fully understanding their tactics, ordered his light-armed troops to enter the river first and to cross it in close order, keeping to their regular companies, and with shields interlocked. His orders were obeyed: and as soon as the first company had effected the crossing, the Aetolian cavalry attacked it; but they could make no impression upon it, standing as it did in close order, and being joined in similar close order, shield to shield, by a second and a third company as they crossed. Therefore they wheeled off discomfited and retired to the city. From this time forth the proud gallantry of the Aetolians was fain to confine itself to the protection of the towns, and keep quiet; while Philip crossed with his army, and after wasting this district also without resistance, arrived at Ithoria. This is a position completely commanding the road, and of extraordinary strength, natural as well as artificial. On his approach, however, the garrison occupying the place abandoned it in a panic; and the king, taking possession, levelled it to the ground: and gave orders to his skirmishing parties to treat all forts in the district in the same way.

Skirmish on the Achelous.

Ithoria.

65. Having thus passed the narrow part of the road, he proceeded at a slow and deliberate pace, giving his army time to collect booty from the country; and by the time he reached Oeniadae his army was richly provided with every kind of goods. But he resolved first to take Paeanium: and having pitched his camp under its walls, by a series of assaults carried the place by force,—a town not large in circumference, for that was less than seven stades, but second to none in the construction of its houses, walls, and towers. The wall of this town he levelled with its foundation, and, breaking down its houses, he packed their timbers and tiles with great care upon rafts, and sent them down the river to Oeniadae. At first the Aetolians resolved to hold the citadel in Oeniadae, which they had strengthened with walls and other fortifications; but upon Philip's approach they evacuated it in a panic. The king

Paeanium.

therefore having taken this city also, advanced from it and encamped on a certain secure position in Calydonia, called Elaeus, which had been rendered extraordinarily strong with walls and other fortifications by Attalus, who undertook the work for the Aetolians. Having carried this also by assault, and plundered the whole of Calydonia, the Macedonians returned to Oeniadae. And observing the convenient position of this place for all purposes, and especially as providing a place of embarkation for the Peloponnese, Philip resolved to build a wall round the town. For Oeniadae lies on the sea-coast, at the juncture of the Acarnanian and Aetolian frontiers, just at the entrance of the Corinthian gulf; and the town faces the sea-coast of Dyme in the Peloponnesus, and is the nearest point to the promontory of Araxus in it; for the intervening sea is not more than a hundred stades across. Looking to these facts he fortified the citadel by itself; and, building a wall round the harbour and dockyards, was intending to connect them with the citadel, employing for the construction the materials brought from Paeanium.

Fortifies Oeniadae.

66. But whilst he was still engaged on this work, news was brought to the king that the Dardani, suspecting his intention of invading the Peloponnese, were collecting forces and making great preparations with the determination of invading Macedonia. When he heard this, Philip made up his mind that he was bound to go with all speed to the protection of Macedonia: and accordingly he dismissed the Achaean envoys with the answer, which he now gave them, that when he had taken effectual measures with regard to the circumstances that had just been announced to him, he would look upon it as his first business to bring them aid to the best of his ability. Thereupon he broke up his camp, and began his return march with all speed, by the same route as that by which he had come. When he was on the point of recrossing the Ambracian gulf from Acarnania into Epirus, Demetrius of Pharos presented himself, sailing with a single galley, having just been banished from Illyria by the Romans,—as I have stated in the previous book.[1] Philip received him with kindness and bade him sail

Philip recalled to Macedonia by a threatened invasion of Dardani.

[1] 3, 19.

to Corinth, and go thence through Thessaly to Macedonia; while he himself crossed into Epirus and pushed on without a halt. When he had reached Pella in Macedonia, the Dardani learnt from some Thracian deserters that he was in the country, and they at once in a panic broke up their army, though they were close to the Macedonian frontier. And Philip, being informed of their change of purpose, dismissed his Macedonian soldiers to gather in their harvest: while he himself went to Thessaly, and spent the rest of the summer at Larisa.

Late summer of B.C. 219.

It was at this season that Aemilius celebrated a splendid triumph at Rome for his Illyrian victories; and Hannibal after the capture of Saguntum dismissed his troops into winter quarters; while the Romans, on hearing of the capture of Saguntum, were sending ambassadors to Carthage to demand the surrender of Hannibal, and at the same time were making preparations for the war after electing Publius Cornelius Scipio and Tiberius Sempronius Longus Consuls for the following year, as I have stated in detail in the previous book. My object in recalling the facts here is to carry out my original plan of showing what events in various parts of the world were contemporaneous.

Contemporary events in Spain and Italy.

67. And so the first year of this Olympiad was drawing to a close. In Aetolia, the time of the elections having come round, Dorimachus was elected Strategus. He was no sooner invested with his office, than, summoning the Aetolian forces, he made an armed foray upon the highlands of Epirus, and began wasting the country with an even stronger passion for destruction than usual; for his object in everything he did was not so much to secure booty for himself, as to damage the Epirotes. And having come to Dodona[1] he burnt the colonnades, destroyed the sacred offerings, and even demolished the sacred building; so that we may say that the Aetolians

Midsummer B.C. 217. Dorimachus Aetolian Strategus, Sept. B.C. 119.

Destroys Dodona.

[1] The position of Dodona, long a subject of doubt, was settled by the discovery of the numerous inscriptions found about seven miles from Jannina, and published by Constantine Carapanos in 1878, *Dodon et ses Ruines*. See also *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, vol. i. p. 228.

had no regard for the laws of peace or war, but in the one as well as in the other, acted in defiance of the customs and principles of mankind. After those, and other similar achievements, Dorimachus returned home.

But the winter being now considerably advanced, and all idea of the king coming being given up owing to the time of the year, Philip suddenly started from Larisa with an army of three thousand hoplites armed with brass shields, two thousand light-armed, three hundred Cretans, and four hundred horse of the royal guard; and having transported them into Euboea and thence to Cynos he came through Boeotia and the Megarid to Corinth, about the time of the winter solstice; having conducted his arrival with such promptitude and secrecy, that not a single Peloponnesian suspected it. He at once closed the gates of Corinth and secured the roads by guards; and on the very next day sent for Aratus the elder to come to him from Sicyon, and issued despatches to the Strategus of the Achaean league and the cities, in which he named a time and place for them all to meet him in arms. Having made these arrangements, he again started, and pitched his camp near the temple of the Dioscuri in Phliasia.

Philip starts again.

Dec. B.C. 219.

68. Meanwhile Euripidas, with two companies of Eleans,—who combined with the pirates and mercenaries made up an army of two thousand two hundred men, besides a hundred horse,—started from Psophis and began marching by way of Pheneus and Stymphalus, knowing nothing about Philip's arrival, with the purpose of wasting the territory of Sicyon. The very night in which it chanced that Philip had pitched his camp near the temple of the Dioscuri, he passed the royal quarters, and succeeded in entering the territory of Sicyon, about the time of the morning watch. But some Cretans of Philip's army who had left their ranks, and were prowling about on the track of prey, fell into the hands of Euripidas, and being questioned by him informed him of the arrival of the Macedonians. Without saying a word of his discovery to any one, he at once caused his army to face about, and marched back by the same road as that by which

B.C. 218, Jan.-Feb. Destruction of a marauding army of Eleans under Euripidas.

he had come; with the intention and hope of getting through Stymphalia, and reaching the difficult ground beyond it, before the Macedonians could catch him. But the king knowing nothing at all about the proceedings of the enemy, at daybreak broke up his camp and began his advance in pursuance of his original plan, determining to march by way of Stymphalus itself to Caphyae: for it was at that town that he had written to the Achaeans to meet him.

The Eleans come across the Macedonians at the junction of the two roads above Stymphalus.

69. Now it happened that, just as the Macedonian advanced guard came to the top of the hill, near a place called Apelaurus, about ten stades before you come to Stymphalus, the advanced guard of the Eleans converged upon it also. Understanding from his previous information what had happened, Euripidas took some horsemen with him and avoided the danger by flight, making his way across country to Psophis. The rest of the Eleans being thus deserted by their leader, and panic-struck at what had happened, remained stationary on the road, not knowing what to do, or which way to turn. For at first their officers imagined that the troops they saw were some Achaeans come out to resist them. What favoured this mistake more than anything else were the brass shields of the hoplites: for they imagined that they were Megalopolitans, because the soldiers of that town had borne shields of that sort at the battle of Sellasia against Cleomenes, King Antigonus having furnished them for the occasion. Under this idea, they retired in good order to some rising ground, by no means despairing of getting off safely: but as soon as the Macedonians had advanced close up to them, grasping the true state of the case, they threw down their shields and fled. About twelve hundred of them were taken prisoners; but the rest perished utterly, some at the hands of the Macedonians, and others by falling down precipices: and finally not more than a hundred altogether escaped. Having despatched the spoils and the prisoners to Corinth, Philip continued his expedition. But a great impression was made upon the Peloponnesians: for they had not heard of the king's arrival until they heard of his victory.

70. Continuing his march through Arcadia, and encounter-

ing heavy snow storms and much fatigue in the pass over Mount Oligyrtus, he arrived on the third day at Caphyae. There he rested his army for two days, and was joined by Aratus the younger, and the Achaean soldiers whom he had collected; so that, with an army now amounting to ten thousand men, he advanced by way of Clitoria towards Psophis, collecting missiles and scaling ladders from the towns through which he passed. Psophis is a place of acknowledged antiquity, and a colony of the Arcadian town of Azanis. Taking the Peloponnesus as a whole, it occupies a central position in the country; but in regard to Arcadia it is on its western frontier, and is close also to the western border-land of Achaia: its position also commands the territory of the Eleans, with whom at that time it was politically united. Philip reached this town on the third day after leaving Caphyae, and pitched his camp on some rising ground overhanging the city, from which he could in perfect security command a view both of the whole town and the country round it. But when the king saw the great strength of the place, he was at a loss what to do. Along the left side of it rushes a violent winter torrent, which for the greater part of the winter is impassable, and in any case renders the city secure and difficult of approach, owing to the size of the bed which its waters have worn out for themselves by slow degrees, in the course of ages, as it comes rushing down from the higher ground. On the east again there is a broad and rapid river, the Erymanthus, about which so many tales are told. This river is joined by the winter torrent at a point south of the town, which is thus defended on three sides by these streams; while the fourth, or northern, side is commanded by a hill, which has been fortified, and serves as a convenient and efficient citadel. The town has walls also of unusual size and construction; and besides all this, a reinforcement of Eleans happened to have just come in, and Euripidas himself was in the town after his escape from Stymphalus.

Philip advances to Psophis.

A description of Psophis.

71. The sight of these things caused Philip much anxious thought. Sometimes he was for giving up his plan of attacking and besieging the place: at others the excellence of its situation made him eager to accomplish this. For just as

it was then a source of danger to the Achaeans and Arcadians, and a safe place of arms for the Eleans; so would it on the other hand, if captured, become a source of safety to the Arcadians, and a most convenient base of operations for the allies against the Eleans. These considerations finally decided him to make the attempt: and he therefore issued orders to the Macedonians to get their breakfasts at daybreak, and be ready for service with all preparations completed. Everything being done as he ordered, the king led his army over the bridge across the Erymanthus; and no one having offered him resistance, owing to the unexpectedness of the movement, he arrived under the walls of the town in gallant style and with formidable show. Euripidas and the garrison were overpowered with astonishment; because they had felt certain that the enemy would not venture on an assault, or try to carry a town of such strength; and that a siege could not last long either, owing to the severity of the season. This calculation of chances made them begin to entertain suspicions of each other, from a misgiving that Philip must have established a secret intrigue with some persons in the town against it. But finding that nothing of the sort existed among themselves, the greater number hurried to the walls to defend them, while the mercenary Elean soldiers sallied out of a gate in the upper part of the town to attack the enemy. The king stationed his men who had ladders at three different spots, and divided the other Macedonians among these three parties; this being arranged, he gave the signal by the sound of trumpet, and began the assault on the walls at once. At first the garrison offered a spirited resistance and hurled many of the enemy from their ladders; but when the supply of weapons inside the town, as well as other necessary materials, began to run short,—as was to be expected from the hasty nature of the preparations for defence,—and the Macedonians showed no sign of terror, the next man filling up the place of each who was hurled from the scaling-ladder, the garrison at length turned to flight, and made their escape one and all into the citadel. In the king's army the Macedonians then made good their footing on the wall, while the Cretans went against the party of mercenaries who

Capture of Psophis.

had sallied from the upper gate, and forced them to throw away their shields and fly in disorder. Following the fugitives with slaughter, they forced their way along with them through the gate: so that the town was captured at all points at once. The Psophidians with their wives and children retreated into the citadel, and Euripidas with them, as well as all the soldiers who had escaped destruction.

72. Having thus carried the place, the Macedonians at once plundered all the furniture of the houses; and then, setting up their quarters in the houses, took regular possession of the town. But the people who had taken refuge in a body in the citadel, having no provisions with them, and well foreseeing what must happen, made up their minds to give themselves up to Philip. They accordingly sent a herald to the king; and having received a safe-conduct for an embassy, they despatched their magistrates and Euripidas with them on this mission, who made terms with the king by which the lives and liberties of all who were on the citadel, whether citizens or foreigners, were secured. The ambassadors then returned whence they came, carrying an order to the people to remain where they were until the army had marched out, for fear any of the soldiers should disobey orders and plunder them. A fall of snow however compelled the king to remain where he was for some days; in the course of which he summoned a meeting of such Achaeans as were in the army, and after pointing out to them the strength and excellent position of the town for the purposes of the present war, he spoke also of his own friendly disposition towards their nation: and ended by saying, "We hereby yield up and present this town to the Achaeans; for it is our purpose to show them all the favour in our power, and to omit nothing that may testify to our zeal." After receiving the thanks of Aratus and the meeting, Philip dismissed the assembly, and getting his army in motion, marched towards Lasion. The Psophidians descending from the citadel received back the possession of the town, each man recovering his own house; while Euripidas departed to Corinth, and thence to Aetolia. Those of the Achaean magistrates who were present put Prolaus of Sicyon in command of the citadel, with an ade-

Surrender of the citadel of Psophis

quate garrison; and Pythias of Pallene in command of the town. Such was the end of the incident of Psophis.

Lasion and Stratus.

73. But when the Elean garrison of Lasion heard of the coming of the Macedonians, and were informed of what had taken place at Psophis, they at once abandoned the town; so that upon his arrival the king took it immediately, and by way of enhancing his favours to the Achaeans handed Lasion also over to them; and in a similar spirit restored Stratus to the Telphusians, which was also evacuated by the Eleans. On the fifth day after settling these matters he arrived at Olympia. There he offered a sacrifice to Zeus and entertained his officers at a banquet; and, having given his army three days' rest, commenced his return march. After advancing some way into Elis, he allowed foraging parties to scour the country while he himself lay encamped near Artemisium, as it is called; and after receiving the booty there, he removed to the Dioscurium.[1] In the course of this devastation of the country the number of the captives was indeed great, but a still greater number made their escape to the neighbouring villages and strongholds. For Elis is more populous, as well as more richly furnished with slaves and other property, than the rest of the Peloponnese: and some of the Eleans are so enamoured of a country life, that there are cases of families who, being in enjoyment of considerable wealth, have for two or three generations never entered a public law-court at all.[2] And this result is brought about by the great care and attention bestowed upon the agricultural class by the government, to see that their law-suits should be settled on the spot, and every necessary of life abundantly supplied them. To me it seems that they owed these laws and customs originally to the wide extent of their arable land, and still more to the fact that their lives were under the protection of religion; for, owing to the Olympic assembly, their territory was especially exempted by the Greeks from pillage; and they had accordingly been free from all injury and hostile invasion.

Philip at Olympia.

Prosperity of Elis.

[1] See ch. 68

[2] Reading ἀλλαν. See Muller's *Dorians*, vol. II. p. 88.

74. But in the course of time, when the Arcadians advanced a claim for Lasion and the whole district of Pisa, being forced to defend their territory and change their habits of life, they no longer troubled themselves in the least about recovering from the Greeks their ancient and ancestral immunity from pillage, but were content to remain exactly as they were. This in my opinion was a short-sighted policy. For peace is a thing we all desire, and are willing to submit to anything to obtain: it is the only one of our so-called blessings that no one questions. If then there are people who, having the opportunity of obtaining it, with justice and honour, from the Greeks, without question and for perpetuity, neglect to do so, or regard other objects as of superior importance to it, must we not look upon them as undoubtedly blind to their true interests? But if it be objected that, by adopting such a mode of life, they would become easily open to attack and exposed to treachery: I answer that such an event would be rare, and if it did happen, would be a claim on the aid of united Greece; but that for minor injuries, having all the wealth which unbroken peace would be sure to bring them, they would never have been at a loss for foreign soldiers or mercenaries to protect them at certain places and times. As it is, from dread of what is occasional and unlikely, they involve their country and property in perpetual wars and losses.

The ancient privileges of Elis lost.

My object in thus speaking is to admonish the Eleans: for they have never had a more favourable time than the present to get back their ancient privilege of exemption from pillage, which is universally acknowledged to belong to them. Even now, some sparks, so to speak, of their old habit remaining, Elis is more thickly populated than other districts.

75. And therefore during Philip's occupation of the country the number of prisoners taken was immense; and the number of those who escaped by flight still greater. An enormous amount of movable property, and an enormous crowd of slaves and cattle, were collected at a place called Thalamae; which was selected for the purpose, because the approach to it was narrow and difficult, and the place itself was retired and not easy to enter. But when the king was informed of the num-

Capture of Thalamae.

ber of those who had taken refuge in this place, resolved to leave nothing unattempted or incomplete, he occupied certain spots which commanded the approach to it, with his mercenaries: while leaving his baggage and main army in his entrenched camp, he himself led his peltasts and light-armed troops through the gorge, and, without meeting with any resistance, came directly under the fortress. The fugitives were panic-stricken at his approach: for they were utterly inexperienced in war and unprovided with means of defence,—a mere rabble hurriedly collected together; they therefore at once surrendered, and among them two hundred mercenary soldiers, of various nationalities, who had been brought there by Amphidamas the Elean Strategus. Having thus become master of an immense booty in goods, and of more than five thousand slaves, and having in addition to these driven off an incalculable number of cattle, Philip now returned to his camp; but finding his army overburdened with spoils of every description, and rendered by that means cumbrous and useless for service, he retraced his steps, and once more marched to Olympia.

Oppressive conduct of Apelles to the Achaeans.

76. But now a difficulty arose which was created by Apelles. Apelles was one of those who had been left by Antigonus as guardians of his son, and had, as it happened, more influence than any one else with the king. He conceived the wish to bring the Achaeans into the same position as the Thessalians; and adopted for that purpose a very offensive line of conduct. The Thessalians were supposed to enjoy their own constitution, and to have quite a different status to the Macedonians; but in fact they had exactly the same, and obeyed every order of the royal ministers. It was with the purpose of bringing about the same state of things, that this officer now set himself to test the subservience of the Achaean contingent. At first he confined himself to giving the Macedonian soldiers leave to eject Achaeans from their quarters, who on any occasion had taken possession of them first, as well as to wrest from them any booty they might have taken; but he afterwards treated them with actual violence, through the agency of his subordinates, on any trifling pretext; while such as complained of this treat-

ment, or took the part of those who were being beaten, he personally arrested and put into confinement: being convinced that by this method he would gradually and imperceptibly bring them into the habit of submitting, without remonstrance, to any thing which the king might choose to inflict. And this opinion he deduced from his previous experience in the army of Antigonus, when he had seen the Achaeans willing to endure any hardship, on the one condition of escaping from the yoke of Cleomenes. However, certain young Achaeans held a meeting, and going to Aratus explained to him the policy which was being pursued by Apelles: whereupon Aratus at once went to Philip, feeling that a stand must be made on this point at once and without delay. He made his statement to the king; who, being informed of the facts, first of all encouraged the young men by a promise that nothing of the sort should happen to them again; and then commanded Apelles not to impose any orders upon the Achaeans without consulting their own Strategus.

77. Philip, then, was acquiring a great reputation, not only among those actually in his army, but among the other Peloponnesians also, for his behaviour to the allies serving with him, as well as for his ability and courage in the field. Indeed it would not be easy to find a king endowed with more natural qualities requisite for the acquisition of power. He had in an eminent degree a quick understanding, a retentive memory, and a winning grace of manner, joined to a look of royal dignity and authority; and most important of all, ability and courage as a general. What neutralised all these excellent qualities, and made a cruel tyrant of a naturally well-disposed king, it is not easy to say in a few words: and therefore that inquiry must be reserved for a more suitable time than the present.

Character of Philip V.

Starting from Olympia by the road leading to Pharae, Philip came first to Telphusa, and thence to Heraea. There he had the booty sold by auction, and repaired the bridge over the Alpheus, with the view of passing over it to the invasion of Triphylia.

Philip continues his campaign.

Just at that time the Aetolian Strategus, Dorimachus, in answer

to a request of the Eleans for protection against the devastation they were enduring, despatched six hundred Aetolians, under the command of Phillidas, to their aid. Having arrived in Elis, and taken over the Elean mercenaries, who were five hundred in number, as well as a thousand citizen soldiers and the Tarentine cavalry,[1] he marched to the relief of Triphylia. This district is so called from Triphylus, one of the sons of Arcas, and lies on the coast of the Peloponnese between Elis and Messenia, facing the Libyan Sea, and touching the south-west frontier of Arcadia. It contains the following towns, Samicum, Lepreum, Hypana, Typaneae, Pyrgos, Aepium, Bolax, Stylangium, Phrixa; all of which, shortly before this, the Eleans had conquered and annexed, as well as the city of Alipheira, which had originally been subject to Arcadia and Megalopolis, but had been exchanged with the Eleans, for some private object of his own, by Lydiadas when tyrant of Megalopolis.

Arrival of Aetolian troops under Phillidas, B.C. 218.

Triphylia.

78. Phillidas, then, sent his Elean troops to Lepreum, and his mercenaries to Aliphera; while he himself went with the Aetolian troops to Typaneae, and waited to see what would happen. Meanwhile the king, having got rid of his heavy baggage, and crossed the bridge over the river Alpheus, which flows right under Heraea, came to Alipheira, which lies on a hill precipitous on every side, and the ascent of which is more than ten stades. The citadel is on the very summit of this hill, adorned with a colossal statue of Athene, of extraordinary size and beauty. The origin and purpose of this statue, and at whose expense it was set up, are doubtful questions even among the natives; for it has never been clearly discovered why or by whom it was dedicated: yet it is universally allowed that its skilful workmanship classes it among the most splendid and artistic productions of Hecatodorus[2] and Sostratus.

[1] The local name of Tarentine, though doubtless originating in fact, had come to indicate a species of mercenary cavalry armed in a particular way. Arrian, *Tact.* 4, distinguishes two sorts of light cavalry for skirmishing, Tarentines armed with javelins (*δοράτια*), and horse archers (*ἱπποτοξόται*). Cp, 11, 12. Livy 35, 29; 37, 40.

[2] Pausanias (8, 26, 7) calls him Hypatodorus; and mentions another work of his at Delphi (10, 10, 3). He flourished about B.C. 370. He was a

The next morning being fine and bright, the king made his dispositions at daybreak. He placed parties of men with scaling ladders at several points, and supported each of them with bodies of mercenaries, and detachments of Macedonian hoplites, on the rear of these several parties. His orders being fulfilled with enthusiasm and a formidable display of power, the garrison of Alipheira were kept continually rushing and rallying to the particular spots to which they saw the Macedonians approaching: and while this was going on, the king himself took some picked men, and mounted unobserved over some steep hills up to the suburb of the citadel; and then, at a given signal, all at once put the scaling ladders to the walls and began attempting the town. The king was the first to take the suburb of the acropolis, which had been abandoned by the garrison; and when this was set on fire, those who were defending the town walls, foreseeing what must happen, and afraid that by the fall of the citadel they would be deprived of their last hope, abandoned the town walls, and fled into it: whereupon the Macedonians at once took the walls and the town. Subsequently the garrison on the citadel sent an embassy to Philip, who granted them their lives, and received possession of it also by formal surrender. Capture of Alipheira.

79. These achievements of the king alarmed the whole people of Triphylia, and made them take counsel severally for the safety of themselves and their respective cities: while Phillidas left Typaneae, after plundering some of the houses there, and retired to Lepreum. This was the reward which the allies of the Aetolians at that time usually got: not only to be deserted at the hour of utmost need in the most barefaced way, but, by being plundered as well as betrayed, to suffer at the hands of their allies exactly what they had a right to expect from a victorous enemy. But the people of Typaneae surrendered their city to Philip; as also did the inhabitants of Hypana. And the people of Phigalia, hearing of what had taken place in Triphylia, and disliking the alliance with the Typanae and Phigalia surrender to Philip.

native of Thebes. Sostratos was a Chian, and father of another statuary named Pantias. Paus. 6, 9, 3.

Aetolians, rose in arms and seized the space round the Polemarchium.[1] The Aetolian pirates who were residing in this city, for the purpose of plundering Messene, were able at first to keep down and overawe the people; but when they saw that the whole town was mustering to the rescue, they desisted from the attempt. Having made terms with them, they took their baggage and evacuated the town; whereupon the inhabitants sent an embassy to Philip, and delivered themselves and their town into his hands.

Lepreum.

80. While these things were going on, the people of Lepreum, having seized a certain quarter of their town, demanded that the Elean, Aetolian, and Lacedaemonian garrisons (for a reinforcement had come from Sparta also) should all alike evacuate the citadel and city. At first Phillidas refused, and stayed on, hoping to overawe the citizens; but when the king, despatching Taurion with a guard of soldiers to Phigalia, advanced in person towards Lepreum, and was now close to the town, Phillidas lowered his tone, and the Lepreates were encouraged in their determination. It was indeed a glorious act of gallantry on their part. Though there was a garrison within their walls of a thousand Eleans, a thousand Aetolians with the pirates, five hundred mercenaries, and two hundred Lacedaemonians, and though too their citadel was in the occupation of these troops, yet they ventured to make a stand for the freedom of their native city, and would not give up hope of deliverance. Phillidas therefore, seeing that the Lepreates were prepared to offer a stout resistance, and that the Macedonians were approaching, evacuated the town with the Eleans and Lacedaemonians. The Cretans, who had been sent by the Spartans, made their way home through Messenia; but Phillidas departed for Samicum. The people of Lepreum, having thus got control of their own town, sent ambassadors to place it in the power of Philip. Hearing the news, Philip sent all his army, except the peltasts and light-armed troops, to Lepreum; and taking the latter with him, he made all the haste he could to catch Phillidas. He succeeded so far as to capture all his

[1] That is the office of the Polemarch, as in Athens the Strategium (*στρατηγίον*) is the office of the Strategi. Plutarch, *Nicias*, 5.

baggage; but Phillidas himself managed to outstrip him and throw himself into Samicum. The king therefore sat down before this place: and having sent for the rest of his army from Lepreum, made the garrison believe that he meant to besiege the town. But the Aetolians and Eleans within it, having nothing ready for sustaining a siege beyond their bare hands, alarmed at their situation, held a parley with Philip to secure their lives; and having obtained leave from him to march out with their arms, they departed into Elis. Thus the king became master of Samicum on the spot: and this was followed by deputations from other towns to him, with entreaties for protection; in virtue of which he took over Phrixa, Stylangium, Aepium, Bolax, Pyrgos, and Epitalium. Having settled these things, and reduced all Triphylia into his power in six days, he returned to Lepreum; and having addressed the necessary warnings to the Lepreates, and put a garrison into the citadel, he departed with his army towards Heraea, leaving Ladicus of Acarnania in command of Triphylia. When he arrived at Heraea, he made a distribution of all the booty; and taking up again his baggage from Heraea, arrived about the middle of the winter at Megalopolis.

Samicum,

and other towns

81. While Philip was thus engaged in Triphylia, Chilon the Lacedaemonian, holding that the kingship belonged to him in virtue of birth, and annoyed at the neglect of his claims by the Ephors in selecting Lycurgus, determined to stir up a revolution: and believing that if he took the same course as Cleomenes had done, and gave the common people hopes of land allotments and redivision of property, the masses would quickly follow him, he addressed himself to carrying out this policy. Having therefore agreed with his friends on this subject, and got as many as two hundred people to join his conspiracy, he entered upon the execution of his project. But perceiving that the chief obstacles in the way of the accomplishment of his design were Lycurgus, and those Ephors who had invested him with the crown, he directed his first efforts against them. The Ephors he seized while at dinner, and put them all to death on the spot,—chance thus inflicting upon them the

Chilon tries to seize the crown of Sparta, B C. 218.

punishment they deserved: for whether we regard the person at whose hands, or the person for whose sake they were thus destroyed, we cannot but say that they richly merited their fate.

After the successful accomplishment of this deed, Chilon went to the house of Lycurgus, whom he found at home, but failed to seize. Assisted by slaves and neighbours Lycurgus was smuggled out of the house, and effected a secret escape; and thence got away by a cross-country route to the town of Pellene in Tripolis. Thus baffled in the most important point of his enterprise, Chilon was greatly discouraged; but was forced all the same to go on with what he had begun. Accordingly he made a descent upon the market-place, and laid violent hands upon those opposed to him; tried to rouse his relations and friends; and declared to the rest of the people there what hopes of success he had. But when nobody seemed inclined to join him, but on the contrary a mob began to collect with threatening looks, he saw how it was, and found a secret way of leaving the town; and, making his way across Laconia, arrived in Achaia alone and an exile. But the Lacedaemonians who were in the territory of Megalopolis, terrified by the arrival of Philip, stowed away all the goods they had got from the country, and first demolished and then abandoned the Athenaeum.

Decline of Sparta.

The fact is that the Lacedaemonians enjoyed a most excellent constitution, and had a most extensive power, from the time of the legislation of Lycurgus to that of the battle of Leuctra. But after that event their fortune took an unfavourable turn; and their political state continued ever growing worse and worse, until they finally suffered from a long succession of internal struggles and partisan warfare; were repeatedly agitated by schemes for the redivision of lands and the banishment of one party or another; and were subjected to the severest possible slavery, culminating in the tyrannical government of Nabis: though the word "tyrant" was one which they had in old times scarcely endured to hear mentioned. However, the ancient history of Sparta as well as the great

B.C. 800(?)-B.C. 371.

part of it since, has been recorded by many in terms of eulogy or the reverse; but the part of that history which admits of the least controversy is that which followed the entire destruction of the ancient constitution by Cleomenes;[1] and that shall be narrated by me in the order of events as they occur. B.C. 236-222.

82. Meanwhile Philip left Megalopolis, and marching by way of Tegea arrived at Argos, and there spent the rest of the winter, having gained in this campaign an admiration beyond his years for his general conduct and his brilliant achievements. But, in spite of all that had happened, Apelles was by no means inclined to desist from the policy on which he had entered; but was resolved little by little to bring the Achaeans under the yoke. He saw that the most determined opponents of his scheme were the elder and younger Aratus; and that Philip was inclined to listen to them, and especially to the elder, both on account of his former intimacy with Antigonus, and his pre-eminent influence in Achaia, and, most of all, because of his readiness of resource and practical ability: he therefore determined to devote his attention to them, and enter upon the intrigue against them which I shall proceed to describe. He sought out in the several cities all such as were opposed to Aratus, and invited them to visit him: and having got them into his hands he tried all he could to win their affections, encouraged them to look upon him as a friend, and introduced them to Philip. To the king he was always pointing out that, if he listened to Aratus, he would have to treat the Achaeans according to the letter of the treaty of alliance; but that, if he would listen to him, and take men like those which he had introduced to him into favour, he would have the whole of the Peloponnese at his own unfettered disposal. But what he was most anxious about was the election; being desirous to secure the office of Strategus for one of this party, and to oust Aratus in accordance with his settled plan. With this purpose, he persuaded Philip to be at Aegium at the time of the Achaean election, on Apelles opposes Aratus, Jan.-May, B.C. 218

May, B.C. 218

[1] Yet the avowed project of Cleomenes was the restoration of the ancient constitution. Plutarch, *Cleom.* c. 10.

the pretext of being on his way to Elis. The king's consent to this enabled Apelles himself to be there at the right time; and

Election of Eperatus as Achaean Strategus.

though he found great difficulty, in spite of entreaties and threats, in carrying his point; yet he did eventually succeed in getting Eperatus of Pharae elected Strategus, and Timoxenus, the candidate proposed by Aratus, rejected.

83. This over, the king departed by way of Patrae and

Capture of the Wall, and expedition into Elis.

Dyme, and arrived with his army before the fortress called the Wall, which is situated on the frontier of the territory of Dyme, and had a short time before, as I mentioned above,[1] been occupied by Euripidas. The king, being anxious at all hazards to recover this place for the Dymaeans, encamped under its walls with his full force: and thereupon the Elean garrison in alarm surrendered the place to Philip, which, though not large, had been fortified with extraordinary care. For though the circumference of its walls was not more than a stade and a half, its height was nowhere less than thirty cubits. Having handed the place over to the Dymaeans, Philip continued his advance, plundering the territory of Elis: and when he had thoroughly devastated it, and acquired a large booty, he returned with his army to Dyme.

84. Meanwhile Apelles, thinking that, by the election

The intrigue of Apelles.

of the Achaean Strategus through his influence, he had partly succeeded in his policy, began once more attacking Aratus, with the view of entirely detaching Philip from his friendship: and he accordingly determined to make up an accusation against him grounded on the following circumstance: When Amphidamus, the Elean Strategus, had been, with the other refugees, made prisoner at Thalamae, and had been brought among other captives to Olympia, he made earnest efforts by the agency of certain individuals to be allowed an interview with the king. This favour having been accorded him, he made a statement to the effect that it was in his power to bring over the Eleans to the king's side, and induce them to enter into alliance with him. Philip believed him; and accordingly dis-

[1] See ch. 59.

missed Amphidamus without ransom, with instructions to promise the Eleans, that, if they would join the king, he would restore their captive citizens without ransom, and would himself secure their territory safely from all outside attacks: and besides this would maintain them in freedom, without impost or foreign garrison, and in enjoyment of their several constitutions.

But the Eleans refused to listen to the proposal, although the offer was thought attractive and substantial. Apelles therefore used this circumstance to found the false accusation which he now brought before Philip, alleging that Aratus was not a loyal friend to the Macedonians, nor sincere in his feelings towards them: "He was responsible for this alienation of the Eleans; for when the king despatched Amphidamus from Olympia into Elis, Aratus took him aside and talked to him, asserting that it was by no means to the interest of the Peloponnesians that Philip should become supreme in Elis: and this was the reason of the Eleans despising the king's offers, and clinging to the friendship of the Aetolians, and persisting in war against the Macedonians."

85. Regarding the matter as important, the first step the king took was to summon the elder and younger Aratus, and order Apelles to repeat these assertions in their presence: which he thereupon did in a bold and threatening tone. And upon the king still not saying a word, he added: "Since his Majesty finds you, Aratus, so ungrateful and so exceedingly adverse to his interests, he is determined to summon a meeting of the Achaeans, and, after making a statement of his reasons, forthwith to return to Macedonia." Aratus the elder answered him with a general exhortation to Philip, never to give a hasty or inconsiderate credit to any thing which might be alleged before him against his friends and allies: but when any such allegation were made, to test its truth before accepting it; for that was the conduct which became a king, and was in every way to his interest. Wherefore he said, "I claim that you should, in the present instance of these accusations of Apelles, summon those who heard my words; and openly produce the man that informed Apelles of them, and omit no means of ascertaining

The king investigates the charge against Aratus.

the real truth, before making any statement in regard to these matters to the Achaeans."

86. The king approved of this speech, and said that he would not neglect the matter, but would thoroughly investigate it. And so for the present the audience was dissolved. But during the following days, while Apelles failed to bring any proof of his allegations, Aratus was favoured by the following combination of circumstances. While Philip was laying waste their territory, the Eleans, suspecting Amphidamus of treachery, determined to arrest him and send him in chains to Aetolia. But getting intelligence of their purpose, he escaped first to Olympia; and there, hearing that Philip was at Dyme engaged in the division of his spoils, he followed him to that town in great haste. When Aratus heard that Amphidamus had been driven from Elis and was come to Dyme, he was delighted, because his conscience was quite clear in the matter; and going to the king demanded that he should summon Amphidamus to his presence; on the ground that the man to whom the words were alleged to have been spoken would best know about the accusations, and would declare the truth; for he had become an exile from his home from Philip's sake, and had now no hope of safety except in him. These arguments satisfied the king, who thereupon sent for Amphidamus and ascertained that the accusation was false. The result was that from that day forward his liking and respect for Aratus continually increased, while he began to regard Apelles with suspicion; though being still under the influence of his old ascendency, he was compelled to connive at many of his actions.

Aratus is cleared.

87. Apelles however by no means abandoned his policy. He began undermining the position of Taurion also, who had been placed in command of the Peloponnese by Antigonus, not indeed openly attacking him, but rather praising his character, and asserting that he was a proper person to be with the king on a campaign; his object being to get some one else appointed to conduct the government of the Peloponnese. This was indeed a novel method of defamation,—to damage one's neighbours, not by attacking, but by praising their characters; and this method of wreaking one's malice, envy, and treachery may

be regarded as primarily and specially the invention of the jealousy and selfish ambition of courtiers. In the same spirit he began making covert attacks upon Alexander, the captain of the bodyguard, whenever he got an opportunity; being bent on reconstituting by his own authority even the personal attendants of the king, and on making a clean sweep of all arrangements left existing by Antigonus. For as in his life Antigonus had managed his kingdom and his son with wisdom, so at his death he made wise provisions for every department of the State. For in his will he explained to the Macedonians the nature of these arrangements; and also gave definite instructions for the future, how and by whom each of these arrangements was to be carried out: being desirous of leaving no vantage-ground to the courtiers for mutual rivalry and strife. Among these arrangements was one selecting Apelles from among his companions in arms to be one of the guardians of his son; Leontius to command the peltasts; Megaleas to be chief secretary; Taurion to be governor of the Peloponnese; and Alexander to be captain of the bodyguard. Apelles had already got Leontius and Megaleas completely under his influence: and he was now desirous to remove Alexander and Taurion from their offices, and so to control these, as well as all other departments of the government, by the agency of his own friends. And he would have easily succeeded in doing so, had he not raised up an opponent in the person of Aratus. As it was, he quickly reaped the fruits of his own blind selfishness and ambition; for that which he purposed inflicting on his neighbours he had to endure himself, and that within a very brief space. How and by what means this was brought about, I must forbear to tell for the present, and must bring this book to an end: but in subsequent parts of my work I will endeavour to make every detail of these transactions clear.

For the present, after concluding the business which I have described, Philip returned to Argos, and there spent the rest of the winter season with his friends, while he sent back his forces to Macedonia.

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BOOK V

1. THE year of office as Strategus of the younger Aratus had now come to an end with the rising of the Pleiades; for that was the arrangement of time then observed by the Achaeans.[1] Accordingly he laid down his office and was succeeded in the command of the Achaeans by Eperatus; Dorimachus being still Strategus of the Aetolians.

May, B.C. 218.

It was at the beginning of this summer that Hannibal entered upon open war with Rome; started from New Carthage; and crossing the Iber, definitely began his expedition and march into Italy; while the Romans despatched Tiberius Sempronius to Libya with an army, and Publius Cornelius to Iberia.

This year, too, Antiochus and Ptolemy, abandoning diplomacy, and the support of their mutual claims upon Coele-Syria by negotiation, began actual war with each other.

As for Philip, being in need of corn and money for his army, he summoned the Achaeans to a general assembly by means of their magistrates. When the assembly had met, according to the federal law, at Aegium,[2] the king saw that Aratus and his son were indisposed to act for him, because of the intrigues against them in the matter of the election, which had been carried on by Apelles; and that Eperatus was naturally inefficient, and an object of general contempt. These

Recognition of Philip's services by the assembly of the Achaean league.

[1] From 4, 6, it appears that the election took place at the rising of the Pleiads (13th May) and that the new Strategus did not enter upon his office until some time afterwards, towards the middle of June or even midsummer. But the custom apparently varied, and the use of τότε seems to indicate a change.

[2] Later on the assembles were held at the different cities in turn. See 23, 17; 24, 10, etc.

facts convinced the king of the folly of Apelles and Leontius, and he once more decided to stand by Aratus. He therefore persuaded the magistrates to transfer the assembly to Sicyon; and there inviting both the elder and younger Aratus to an interview, he laid the blame of all that had happened upon Apelles, and urged them to maintain their original policy. Receiving a ready consent from them, he then entered the Achaean assembly, and being energetically supported by these two statesmen, carried all the measures that he desired. For the Achaeans past a vote decreeing "that five hundred talents should be paid to the king at once for his last campaign; that three months' pay should be given to his army, and ten thousand medimni of corn: and that, for the future, so long as the king should remain in the Peloponnese as their ally in the war, he should receive seventeen talents a month from the Achaeans.

2. Having passed this decree, the Achaeans dispersed to their various cities. And now the king's forces mustered again from their winter quarters; and after deliberations with his friends, Philip decided to transfer the war to the sea. For he had become convinced that it was only by so doing that he would himself be able to surprise the enemy at all points at once, and would best deprive them of the opportunity of coming to each others' relief; as they were widely scattered, and each would be in alarm for their own safety, because the approach of an enemy by sea is so silent and rapid. For he was at war with three separate nations,—Aetolians, Lacedaemonians, and Eleans.

The king prepares to carry on the war by sea.

Having arrived at this decision, he ordered the ships of the Achaeans as well as his own to muster at Lechaeum; and there he made continual experiments in practising the soldiers of the phalanx to the use of the oar. The Macedonians answered to his instructions with ready enthusiasm: for they are in fact the most gallant soldiers on the field of battle, the promptest to undertake service at sea if need be, and the most laborious workers at digging trenches, making palisades, and all such engineering work, in the world: just such as Hesiod describes the Aeacidae to be

"Joying in war as in a feast."

The king, then, and the main body of the Macedonian army, remained in Corinth, busied with these practisings and preparations for taking the sea. But Apelles, being neither able to retain an ascendency over Philip, nor to submit to the loss of influence which resulted from this disregard, entered into a conspiracy with Leontius and Megaleas, by which it was agreed that these two men should stay on the spot and damage the king's service by deliberate neglect; while he went to Chalcis, and contrived that no supplies should be brought the king from thence for the promotion of his designs. Having made this arrangement and mischievous stipulation with these two men, Apelles set out for Chalcis, having found some false pretexts to satisfy the king as to his departure. And while protracting his stay there, he carried out his sworn agreement with such determination, that, as all men obeyed him because of this former credit, the king was at last reduced by want of money to pawn some of the silver-plate used at his own table, to carry on his affairs. However, when the ships were all collected, and the Macedonian soldiers already well trained to the oar; the king, giving out rations of corn and pay to the army, put to sea, and arrived at Patrae on the second day, with six thousand Macedonians and twelve hundred mercenaries.

Fresh intrigue of Apelles.

Philip starts on his naval expedition, B.C. 218.

8. Just at that time the Aetolian Strategus Dorimachus sent Agelaus and Scopas with five hundred Neo-Cretans[1] into Elis; while the Eleans, in fear of Philip's attempting the siege of Cyllene, were collecting mercenaries, preparing their own citizens, and carefully strengthening the defences of Cyllene. When Philip saw what was going on, he stationed a force at Dyme, consisting of the Achaean mercenaries, some of the Cretans serving with him, and some of the Gallic horse, together with two thousand picked Achaean infantry. These he left there as a reserve, as well as an advance guard to prevent the danger of an attack from Elis; while he himself, having first written to the Acarnanians and Scerdilaidas, that each of

[1] *Νεοκρῆτες*, cf. cc. 65, 79. Livy (37, 40) transcribes the word *Neocretes*. It is uncertain what the exact meaning of the word is. It seems most reasonable to suppose that, like Tarentini, it had ceased to be an ethical term, and meant mercenary soldiers (*νέοι*) armed like Cretans, that is, as archers

their towns should man such vessels as they had and meet him at Cephallenia, put to sea from Patrae at the time arranged, and arrived off Pronni in Cephallenia. But when he saw that this fortress was difficult to besiege, and its position a contracted one, he coasted past it with his fleet and came to anchor at Palus. Finding that the country there was full of corn and capable of supporting an army, he disembarked his troops and encamped close to the city: and having beached his ships close together, secured them with a trench and palisade, and sent out his Macedonian soldiers to forage. He himself made a personal inspection of the town, to see how he could bring his siege-works and artillery to bear upon the wall. He wished to be able to use the place as a rendezvous for his allies; but he was also desirous of taking it: first, because he would thereby deprive the Aetolians of their most useful support,—for it was by means of Cephallenian ships that they made their descents upon the Peloponnese, and ravaged the sea-boards of Epirus and Acarnania,—and, secondly, that he might secure for himself and his allies a convenient base of operations against the enemy's territory. For Cephallenia lies exactly opposite the Corinthian Gulf, in the direction of the Sicilian Sea, and commands the north-western district of the Peloponnese, and especially Elis; as well as the south-western parts of Epirus, Aetolia, and Acarnania.

The siege of Palus.

4. The excellent position, therefore, of the island, both as a rendezvous for the allies and as a base of attack against the hostile, or of defence for the friendly, territory, made the king very anxious to get it into his power. His survey of the town showed him that it was entirely defended by the sea and steep hills, except for a short distance in the direction of Zacynthus, where the ground was flat; and he accordingly resolved to erect his works and concentrate his attack at that spot.

While the king was engaged in these operations fifty galleys arrived from Scerdilaidas, who had been prevented from sending more by the plots and civil broils throughout Illyria, caused by the despots of the various cities. There arrived also the appointed contingents of allies from Epirus, Acarnania, and even Messenia; for the Messenians had ceased to excuse them-

Arrival of the allies at Palus.

selves from taking part in the war ever since the capture of Phigalia.

The walls are undermined and a breach made. Leontius plays the traitor.

Having now made his arrangements for the siege, and having got his catapults and ballistae in position to annoy the defenders on the walls, the king harangued his Macedonian troops, and, bringing his siege-machines up to the walls, began under their protection to sink mines. The Macedonians worked with such enthusiastic eagerness that in a short time two hundred feet of the wall were undermined and underpinned: and the king then approached the walls and invited the citizens to come to terms. Upon their refusal, he set fire to the props, and thus brought down the whole part of the wall that rested upon them simultaneously. Into this breach he first sent his peltasts under the command of Leontius, divided into cohorts, and with orders to force their way over the ruin. But Leontius, in fulfilment of his compact with Apelles, three times running prevented the soldiers, even after they had carried the breach, from effecting the capture of the town. He had corrupted beforehand the most important officers of the several cohorts; and he himself deliberately affected fear, and shrunk from every service of danger; and finally they were ejected from the town with considerable loss, although they could have mastered the enemy with ease. When the king saw that the officers were behaving with cowardice, and that a considerable number of the Macedonian soldiers were wounded, he abandoned the siege, and deliberated with his friends on the next step to be taken.

Ambassadors from Acarnania urge Philip to invade Aetolia; others from Messenia beg him to come there.

5. Meanwhile Lycurgus had invaded Messenia; and Dorimachus had started for Thessaly with half the Aetolian army,—both with the idea that they would thus draw off Philip from the siege of Palus. Presently ambassadors arrived at the court to make representations on these subjects from Acarnania and Messenia: the former urging Philip to prevent Dorimachus's invasion of Macedonia by himself invading Aetolia, and traversing and plundering the whole country while there was no one to resist him; the latter begged him to come to their assistance, representing that in the

existing state of the Etesian winds the passage from Cephallenia to Messenia could be effected in a single day, whereby, so Gorgus of Messenia and his colleagues argued, a sudden and effective attack would be made upon Lycurgus. In pursuance of his policy Leontius eagerly supported Gorgus, seeing that by this means Philip would absolutely waste the summer. For it was easy enough to sail to Messenia; but to sail back again, while the Etesian winds prevailed, was impossible. It was plain therefore that Philip would get shut up in Messenia with his army, and remain inactive for what remained of the summer; while the Aetolians would traverse Thessaly and Epirus and plunder them at their pleasure. Such was the insidious nature of the advice given by Gorgus and Leontius. But Aratus, who was present, advocated an exactly opposite policy, urging the king to sail to Aetolia and devote himself to that part of the campaign: for as the Aetolians had gone on an expedition across the frontier under Dorimachus, it was a most excellent opportunity for invading and plundering Aetolia. The king had begun to entertain distrust of Leontius since his exhibition of cowardice in the siege; and had detected his dishonesty in the course of the discussions held about Palus: he therefore decided to act in the present instance in accordance with the opinion of Aratus. Accordingly he wrote to the Achaean Strategus Eperatus, bidding him take the Achaean levies, and go to the aid of the Messenians; while he himself put to sea from Cephallenia, and arrived at night after a two days' voyage at Leucas: and having managed by proper contrivances to get his ships through the channel or Dioryctus,[1] he sailed up the Ambracian Gulf, which, as I have already stated,[2] stretches from the Sicilian Sea a long distance into the interior of Aetolia. Having made the whole length of this gulf, and anchored a short time before daybreak at Limnaea, he ordered his men to get their breakfast, and leaving the greater part of their baggage behind them, to make themselves ready in light equipment for a march; while he

Philip decides on the invasion of Aetolia.

[1] The narrow channel between Leucas and the mainland, which had been artificially enlarged. Dionys. Halic. 1, 50.

[2] 4, 63.

himself collected the guides, and made careful inquiries of them about the country and neighbouring towns.

Philip is joined by the Acarnanians, and marches to the Achelous.

6. Before they started, Aristophanes the Acarnanian Strategus arrived with the full levy of his people. For having in former times suffered many severe injuries at the hands of the Aetolians, they were now inspired with a fierce determination to be revenged upon them and damage them in every possible way: they gladly therefore seized this opportunity of getting the help of the Macedonians; and the men who now appeared in arms were not confined to those forced by law to serve, but were in some cases past the military age. The Epirotes were quite as eager to join, and for the same motives; but owing to the wide extent of their country, and the suddenness of the Macedonian arrival, they had not been able to muster their forces in time. As to the Aetolians, Dorimachus had taken half their army with him, as I have said, while the the other half he had left at home; thinking that it would be an adequate reserve to defend the towns and district against unforeseen contingencies. The king, leaving a sufficient guard for his baggage, started from Limnaea in the evening, and after a march of sixty stades pitched his camp: but, having dined and given his men a short rest, he started again; and marching right through the night, arrived just as the day was breaking at the river Achelous, between the towns of Stratus and Conope, being anxious that his entrance into the district of Thermus should be sudden and unexpected.

Leontius tries to hinder the march.

7. Leontius saw that it was likely that the king would attain his object, and the Aetolians be unable to resist him, for the double reason of the speed and unexpectedness of the Macedonian attack, and of his having gone to Thermus; for the Aetolians would never suppose him likely to venture to expose himself so rashly, seeing the strongly fortified nature of the country, and would therefore be sure to be caught off their guard and wholly unprepared for the danger. Clinging still to his purpose, therefore, he advised the king to encamp on the Achelous, and rest his army after their night's march; being anxious to give the Aetolians a short respite to make prepara-

tions for their defence. But Aratus, seeing clearly that the opportunity for action was fleeting, and that Leontius was plainly trying to hinder their success, conjured Philip not to let slip the opportunity by delaying.

The king was now thoroughly annoyed with Leontius: and accepting the advice of Aratus, continued his march without interruption; and, after crossing the Achelous, advanced rapidly upon Thermus, plundering and devastating the country as he went, and marching so as to keep Stratus, Agrinium, and Thestia on his left, Conope, Lysimachia, Trichonium, and Phytaeum on his right. Arrived at the town of Metapa, which is on the borders of the Trichonian Lake, and close to the narrow pass along it, about sixty stades from Thermus, he found it abandoned by the Aetolians, and occupied it with a detachment of five hundred men, with a view of its serving as a fortress to secure both ends of the pass: for the whole shore of the lake is mountainous and rugged, closely fringed with forest, and therefore affording but a narrow and difficult path. He now arranged his order of march, putting the mercenaries in the van, next them the Illyrians, and then the peltasts and the men of the phalanx, and thus advanced through the pass; his rear protected by the Cretans: while the Thracians and light-armed troops took a different line of country, parallel to his own, and kept up with him on his right: his left being secured by the lake for nearly thirty stades.

The king crosses the Achelous and advances against Thermus.

8. At the end of this distance he arrived at the village of Pamphia; and having, as in the case of Panapa, secured it by a guard, he continued his advance towards Thermus: the road now being not only steep and exceedingly rough, but with deep precipices also on either side, so as to make the path in places very dangerous and narrow; and the whole ascent being nearly thirty stades. But having accomplished this also in a short time, thanks to the energy with which the Macedonians conducted the march, he arrived late in the day at Thermus. There he pitched a camp, and allowed his men to go off plundering the neighbouring villages and scouring the plain of Thermus, as well as to sack the dwelling-houses in Thermus itself,

The plundering of Thermus.

which were full, not only of corn and such like provisions, but of all the most valuable property which the Aetolians possessed. For as the annual fair and most famous games, as well as the elections, were held there, everybody kept their most costly possessions in store at Thermus, to enable them to entertain their friends, and to celebrate the festivals with proper magnificence. But besides this occasion for the employment of their property, they expected to find the most complete security for it there, because no enemy had ever yet ventured to penetrate to that place; while its natural strength was so great as to serve as an acropolis to the whole of Aetolia. The place therefore having been in the enjoyment of peace from time immemorial, not only were the buildings immediately round the temple filled with a great variety of property, but the homesteads on the outskirts also. For that night the army bivouacked on the spot laden with booty of every description; but the next morning they selected the most valuable and portable part of it, and making the rest into a heap in front of their tents, set fire to it. So also in regard to the dedicated arms which were hanging up in the porticoes,—those of them which were valuable they took down and carried off, some they exchanged for their own, while the rest they collected together and burnt. The number of these was more than fifteen thousand.

Sacrilege committed at Thermus Was it justifiable?

9. Up to this point everything was right and fair by the laws of war; but I do not know how to characterise their next proceedings. For remembering what the Aetolians had done at Dium[1] and Dodona,[2] they burnt the colonnades, and destroyed what were left of the dedicated offerings, some of which were of costly material, and had been elaborated with great skill and expense. And they were not content with destroying the roofs of these buildings with fire, they levelled them to their foundations; and threw down all the statues, which numbered no less than two thousand; and many of them they broke to pieces, sparing only those that were inscribed with the names or figures of gods. Such they did abstain from injuring. On the walls also they wrote the celebrated line com-

[1] 4, 62. [2] 4, 67.

posed by Samus, the son of Chrysogonus, a foster-brother of the king, whose genius was then beginning to manifest itself. The line was this—

"Seest thou the path the bolt divine has sped?"

And in fact the king and his staff were fully convinced that, in thus acting, they were obeying the dictates of right and justice, by retaliating upon the Aetolians with the same impious outrages as they had themselves committed at Dium.[1] But I am clearly of an opposite opinion. And the readiest argument, to prove the correctness of my view, may be drawn from the history of this same royal family of Macedonia.

For when Antigonus, by his victory in a pitched battle over Cleomenes the King of the Lacedaemonians, had become master of Sparta, and had it absolutely in his own power to treat the town and its citizens as he chose, he was so far from doing any injury to those who had thus fallen into his hands, that he did not return to his own country until he had bestowed upon the Lacedaemonians, collectively and individually, some benefits of the utmost importance. The consequence was that he was honoured at the time with the title of "Benefactor," and after his death with that of "Preserver"; and not only among the Lacedaemonians, but among the Greeks generally, has obtained undying honour and glory.[2]

10. Take again the case of Philip, the founder of the family splendour, and the first of the race to establish the greatness of the kingdom. The success which he obtained, after his victory over the Athenians at Chaeronea, was not due so much to his superiority in arms, as to his justice and humanity. His victory in the field gave him the mastery only over those immediately engaged against him; while his equity and moderation secured his hold upon the entire Athenian people and their city. For he did not allow his measures to be dictated by vindictive passion; but laid aside his arms and warlike

B C 338.

[1] The pun disappears in translation. The line is

ὁρᾷς τὸ δῖον οὐ βέλος διέπτατο.

[2] Games in his honour were celebrated at Sicyon. See Plutarch, *Arat.* 45. *Cleomenes*, 16. *Supra*, p. 147 n. *Infra*, 28, 19; 30, 23.

measures, as soon as he found himself in a position to display the mildness of his temper and the uprightness of his motives. With this view he dismissed his Athenian prisoners without ransom, and took measures for the burial of those who had fallen, and, by the agency of Antipater, caused their bones to be conveyed home; and presented most of those whom he released with suits of clothes. And thus, at small expense, his prudence gained him a most important advantage. The pride of the Athenians was not proof against such magnanimity; and they became his zealous supporters, instead of antagonists, in all his schemes.

Again in the case of Alexander the Great. He was so enraged with the Thebans that he sold all the inhabitants of the town into slavery, and levelled the city itself with the ground; yet in making its capture he was careful not to outrage religion, and took the utmost precautions against even involuntary damage being done to the temples, or any part of their sacred enclosures. Once more, when he crossed into Asia, to avenge on the Persians the impious outrages which they had inflicted on the Greeks, he did his best to exact the full penalty from men, but refrained from injuring places dedicated to the gods; though it was in precisely such that the injuries of the Persians in Greece had been most conspicuous. These were the precedents which Philip should have called to mind on this occasion; and so have shown himself the successor and heir of these men,—not so much of their power, as of their principles and magnanimity. But throughout his life he was exceedingly anxious to establish his relationship to Alexander and Philip, and yet took not the least pains to imitate them. The result was that, as he advanced in years, as his conduct differed from theirs, so his general reputation came to be different also.

B.C. 335.

The subsequent decline in Philip's character.

11. The present affair was an instance of this. He imagined that he was doing nothing wrong in giving the rein to his anger, and retaliating upon the impious acts of the Aetolians by similar impieties, and "curing ill by ill"; and while he was always reproaching Scopas and Dorimachus with

depravity and abandoned wickedness, on the grounds of their acts of impiety at Dodona and Dium, he imagined that, while emulating their crimes, he would leave quite a different impression of his character in the minds of those to whom he spoke. But the fact is, that whereas the taking and demolishing an enemy's forts, harbours, cities, men, ships and crops, and other such things, by which our enemy is weakened, and our own interests and tactics supported, are necessary acts according to the laws and rights of war; to deface temples, statues, and such like erections in pure wantonness, and without any prospect of strengthening oneself or weakening the enemy, must be regarded as an act of blind passion and insanity. For the purpose with which good men wage war is not the destruction and annihilation of the wrongdoers, but the reformation and alteration of the wrongful acts. Nor is it their object to involve the innocent in the destruction of the guilty, but rather to see that those who are held to be guilty should share in the preservation and elevation of the guiltless. It is the act of a tyrant to inflict injury, and so to maintain his power over unwilling subjects by terror,—hated, and hating those under him: but it is the glory of a king to secure, by doing good to all, that he should rule over willing subjects, whose love he has earned by humanity and beneficence.

But the best way of appreciating the gravity of Philip's mistake is to put before our eyes the idea which the Aetolians would probably have conceived of him, had he acted in an opposite way, and destroyed neither colonnades nor statutes, nor done injury to any of the sacred offerings. For my part I think it would have been one of the greatest goodness and humanity. For they would have had on their consciences their own acts at Dium and Dodona; and would have seen unmistakably that, whereas Philip was absolutely master of the situation, and could do what he chose, and would have been held fully justified as far as their deserts went in taking the severest measures, yet deliberately, from mere gentleness and magnanimity, he refused to copy their conduct in any respect.

The error of such sacrilege as a matter of policy.

12. Clearly these considerations would most probably have led them to condemn themselves, and to view Philip

with respect and admiration for his kingly and high minded qualities, shown by his respect for religion and by the moderation of his anger against themselves. For in truth to conquer one's enemies in integrity and equity is not of less, but of greater, practical advantage than victories in the field. In the one case the defeated party yields under compulsion; in the other with cheerful assent. In the one case the victor effects his reformation at the cost of great losses; in the other he recalls the erring to better courses without any damage to himself. But above all, in the one case the chief credit of the victory belongs to the soldiers, in the other it falls wholly and solely to the part of the leaders.

The blame chiefly belongs to Demetrius of Pharos.

Perhaps, however, one ought not to lay all the blame for what was done on that occasion on Philip, taking his age into consideration; but chiefly on his friends, who were in attendance upon him and co-operating with him, among whom were Aratus and Demetrius of Pharos. In regard to them it would not be difficult to assert, even without being there, from which of the two a counsel of this sort proceeded. For apart from the general principles animating the whole course of his life, in which nothing savouring of rashness and want of judgment can be alleged of Aratus, while the exact contrary may be said of Demetrius, we have an undisputed instance of the principles actuating both the one and the other in analogous circumstances, on which I shall speak in its proper place.

The return of Philip from Thermus.

13. To return then to Philip. Taking with him as much booty living and dead as he could, he started from Thermus, returning by the same road as that by which he had come; putting the booty and heavy-armed infantry in the van, and reserving the Acarnanians and mercenaries to bring up the rear. He was in great haste to get through the difficult passes, because he expected that the Aetolians, relying on the security of their strongholds, would harass his rear. And this in fact promptly took place: for a body of Aetolians, that had collected to the number of nearly three thousand for the defence of the country, under the command of Alexander of Trichonium,

hovered about, concealing themselves in certain secret hiding-places, and not venturing to approach as long as Philip was on the high ground; but as soon as he got his rear-guard in motion they promptly threw themselves into Thermus and began harassing the hindermost of the enemy's column. The rear being thus thrown into confusion, the attacks and charges of the Aetolians became more and more furious, encouraged by the nature of the ground. But Philip had foreseen this danger, and had provided for it, by stationing his Illyrians and his best peltasts under cover of a certain hill on the descent. These men suddenly fell upon the advanced bodies of the enemy as they were charging; whereupon the rest of the Aetolian army fled in headlong haste over a wild and trackless country, with a loss of a hundred and thirty killed, and about the same number taken prisoners. This success relieved his rear; which, after burning Pamphium, accomplished the passage of the narrow gorge with rapidity and safety, and effected a junction with the Macedonians near Matape, at which place Philip had pitched a camp and was waiting for his rear-guard to come up. Next day, after levelling Metape to the ground, he advanced to the city called Acrae; next day to Conope, ravaging the country as he passed, and there encamped for the night. On the next he marched along the Achelous as far as Stratus; there he crossed the river, and, having halted his men out of range, endeavoured to tempt the garrison outside the walls; for he had been informed that two thousand Aetolian infantry and about four hundred horse, with five hundred Cretans, had collected into Stratus. But when no one ventured out, he renewed his march, and ordered his van to advance towards Limnaea and the ships.

Matape.

Acrae.

Stratus.

14. But no sooner had his rear passed the town than, first, a small body of Aetolian cavalry sallied out and began harassing the hindmost men; and then, the whole of the Cretans and some Aetolian troops having joined their cavalry, the conflict became more severe, and the rear of Philip's army were forced to face about and engage the enemy. At first the conflict was undecided; but on Philip's mercenaries being

Philip victorious in a skirmish with the garrison of Stratus.

supported by the arrival of the Illyrians, the Aetolian cavalry and mercenaries gave way and fled in disorder. The royal troops pursued most of them to the entrance of the gates, or up to the walls, and killed about a hundred of them. After this skirmish the garrison remained inactive, and the rear of the royal army reached the camp and the ships in safety.

Arrival at Limnaea.

Philip pitched his camp early in the day, and proceeded to make a thank offering to the gods for the successful issue of his undertaking; and to invite the officers to a banquet, at which it was his intention to entertain them all. His view was that he had ventured upon a dangerous country, and such as no one had ever ventured to enter with an army before; while he had not only entered it with an army, but had returned in safety, after accomplishing all that he had intended. But while he was thus intent on entertaining his officers in great elation of mind, Megaleas and Leontius were nursing feelings of great annoyance at the success of the king. They had arranged with Apelles to hamper all his plans, but had been unable to do so; and now saw everything turning out exactly contrary to their views.

15. Still they came to the banquet, where they from the first excited the suspicions of the king and the rest of the company, by showing less joy at the events than the others present. But as the drinking went on, and grew less and less moderate, being forced to do just as the others did, they soon showed themselves in their true colours. For as soon as the company broke up, losing control over themselves under the influence of wine, they roamed about looking for Aratus; and having fallen in with him on his way home, they first attacked him with abusive language, and then threw stones at him; and a number of people coming to the assistance of both parties, there was a noise and disturbance in the camp. But the king hearing the noise sent some officers to ascertain the cause, and to put an end to the disturbance. On their coming upon the scene, Aratus stated what had occurred, called those present to witness the truth of his words, and retired to his

Megaleas and Leontius betray their chagrin at the king's success.

They assault Aratus.

own tent; but Leontius by some unexplained means slipped away in the crowd. When informed of what had taken place, the king sent for Megaleas and Crinon and rebuked them sharply: and when they not only expressed no submission, but actually retorted with a declaration that they would never desist until they had paid Aratus out, the king, enraged at their words, at once required them to give security for the payment of a fine of twenty talents, and ordered them to be placed under arrest.

Megaleas and Crinon held to bail.

16. Next morning, too, he sent for Aratus and bade him have no fears, for that he would see that the business was properly settled. When Leontius learned what had happened to Megaleas, he came to the king's tent with some peltasts, believing that, owing to his youth, he should overawe the king, and quickly induce him to repent of his purpose. Coming into the royal presence he demanded who had ventured to lay hands on Megaleas, and lead him to confinement? But when the king answered with firmness that he had given the order, Leontius was dismayed; and, with an exclamation of indignant sorrow, departed in high wrath. Immediately after getting the fleet across the gulf, and anchoring at Leucas, the king first gave orders to the officers appointed to distribute the spoils to carry out that business with all despatch; and then summoned his friends to council, and tried the case of Megaleas. In his speech as accuser Aratus went over the crimes of Leontius and his party from beginning to end; detailed the massacre in Argos perpetrated by them after the departure of Antigonus; their arrangement made with Apelles; and finally their contrivance to prevent success at Palus. Of all these accusations he gave distinct proof, and brought forward witnesses: and Megaleas and Crinon being entirely unable to refute any of them, were unanimously condemned by the king's friends. Crinon remained under arrest, but Leontius went bail for the payment of the Megaleas's fine. Thus the intrigue of Apelles and Leontius turned out quite contrary to their original hopes: for they had expected, by terrifying Aratus and isolating Philip, to do whatever seemed to suit their interests; whereas the result had been exactly the reverse.

Arrival at Leucas. Megaleas fined twenty talents.

17. About the same time Lycurgus returned from Messenia without having accomplished anything of importance. Afterwards he started again and seized Tegea. The inhabitants having retreated into the citadel, he determined to besiege it; but finding himself unable to make any impression upon it he returned once more to Sparta.

Lycurgus of Sparta attacks Tegea.

The Eleans after over-running Dymaea, gained an easy victory over some cavalry that had come out to resist them, by decoying them into an ambush. They killed a considerable number of the Gallic mercenaries, and among the natives whom they took prisoners were Polymedes of Aegium, and Agesipolis, and Diocles of Dyme.

Elis.

Dorimachus had made his expedition originally, as I have already mentioned, under the conviction that he would be able to devastate Thessaly without danger to himself, and would force Philip to raise the siege of Palus. But when he found Chrysogonus and Petraeus ready in Thessaly to engage him, he did not venture to descend into the plain, but kept close upon the skirts of the mountains; and when news reached him of the Macedonian invasion of Aetolia, he abandoned his attempt upon Thessaly, and hurried home to resist the invaders, whom he found however already departed from Aetolia: and so was too late for the campaign at all points.

Dorimachus recalled from Thessaly by Philip's invasion of Aetolia.

Meanwhile the king set sail from Leucas; and after ravaging the territory of Oeanthe as he coasted along, arrived with his whole fleet at Corinth, and dropping anchor in the harbour of Lechaeum, disembarked his troops, and sent his letter-bearers to the allied cities in the Peloponnese, naming a day on which he wished all to be at Tegea by bed-time.

Philip arrives at Corinth.

18. Then, without making any stay in Corinth, he gave the Macedonians marching orders; and came at the end of a two days' march by way of Argos to Tegea. There he took on the Achaean troops that had assembled, and advanced by the mountain road, being very desirous to effect an entrance into the territory of the

Tegea.

Lacedaemonians before they became aware of it. Thus after a circuitous route through an uninhabited district he came out upon the hills facing the town, and continued his advance right upon Amyclae, keeping the Menelaium on his right. The Lacedaemonians were dismayed and terrified at seeing from the town the army passing along the hills, and wondered what was happening. For they were still in a state of excitement at the news of Philip which had arrived,—his destruction of Thermus, and his whole campaign in Aetolia; and there was even some talk among them of sending Lycurgus to the assistance of the Aetolians. But no one had so much as thought of danger coming so quickly to their own gates from such a distance, especially as the youth of the king still gave room for a certain feeling of contempt. The event therefore being totally contrary to their expectations, they were naturally in a state of great dismay. For the courage and energy beyond his years, with which Philip acted, reduced all his enemies to a state of the utmost difficulty and terror. For setting out, as I have shown, from the centre of Aetolia, and crossing the Ambracian gulf by night, he passed over to Leucas; and after a two days' halt there, on the third he renewed his voyage before daybreak, and after a two days' sail, during which he ravaged the sea-board of the Aetolians, he dropped anchor in Lechaeum; thence, after seven days' continuous march, he arrived on the heights above Sparta in the neighbourhood of the Menelaium,—a feat which most of those even who saw it done could scarcely believe.

Amyclae and Sparta.

Dismay at Sparta.

19. While the Lacedaemonians were thus thoroughly terrified at the unexpected danger, and at a loss what to do to meet it, Philip encamped on the first day at Amyclae: a place in Laconia about twenty stades from Lacedaemon, exceedingly rich in forest and corn, and containing a temple of Apollo, which is about the most splendid of all the temples in Laconia, situated in that quarter of the city which slopes down towards the sea. Next day the king descended to a place called the Camp of Pyrrhus,[1] wasting the country as

[1] A memorial, apparently, of the fruitless expedition of Pyrrhus into Laconia in B C 272.

he went. After devastating the neighbouring districts for the two following days, he encamped near Carnium; thence he started for Asine, and after some fruitless assaults upon it, he started again, and thenceforth devoted himself to plundering all the country bordering on the Cretan Sea as far as Taenarum. Then, once more changing the direction of his march, he advanced to Gythium, the naval arsenal of Sparta, which possesses a safe harbour, and is about thirty stades from the city. Then leaving this on the right, he pitched his camp in the territory of Helos, which of all the districts of Laconia is the most extensive and most beautiful. Thence he sent out foraging parties and wasted the country with fire and sword, and destroyed the crops in it: pushing his devastation as far as Acriae and Leucae, and even to the district of Boeae.

Carnium.

Gythium.

Helos.

20. On the receipt of the despatch from Philip commanding the levy, the Messenians were no less forward than the other allies to undertake it. They showed indeed great zeal in making the expedition, sending out the flower of their troops, two thousand infantry and two hundred cavalry. Owing, however, to their distance from the seat of war, they arrived at Tegea after Philip had left, and at first were at a loss what to do; but being very anxious not to appear lukewarm in the campaign, because of the suspicions which had attached to them before, they pressed forward through Argolis into Laconia, with a view of effecting a junction with Philip; and having reached a fort called Glympes, which is situated on the frontiers of Argolis and Laconia, they encamped there in an unskilful and careless manner: for they neither entrenched themselves with ditch nor rampart, nor selected an advantageous spot; but trusting to the friendly disposition of the natives, bivouacked there unsuspiciously outside the walls of the fortress. But on news being brought to Lycurgus of the arrival of the Messenians, he took his mercenaries and some Lacedaemonians with him, and reaching the place before daybreak, boldly attacked the camp. Ill advised as the proceedings of the Messenians had been, and especially in advancing

Abortive attempt of the Messenians to join Philip.

from Tegea with inadequate numbers and without the direction of experts, in the actual hour of danger, when the enemy was upon them, they did all that circumstances admitted of to secure their safety. For as soon as they saw the enemy appearing they abandoned everything and took refuge within the fort. Accordingly, though Lycurgus captured most of the horses and the baggage, he did not take a single prisoner, and only succeeded in killing eight of the cavalry. After this reverse, the Messenians returned home through Argolis: but elated with success Lycurgus went to Sparta, and set about preparations for war; and took secret counsel with his friends to prevent Philip from getting safe out of the country without an engagement. Meanwhile the king had started from the district of Helos, and was on his return march, wasting the country as he came; and on the fourth day, about noon, arrived once more with his whole army at Amyclae.

Lycurgus resolves to intercept Philip on his return at the pass opposite Sparta.

21. Leaving directions with his officers and friends as to the coming engagement, Lycurgus himself left Sparta and occupied the ground near the Menelaium, with as many as two thousand men. He agreed with the officers in the town that they should watch carefully, in order that, whenever he raised the signal, they might lead out their troops from the town at several points at once, and draw them up facing the Eurotas, at the spot where it is nearest the town. Such were the measures and designs of Lycurgus and the Lacedaemonians.

But lest ignorance of the locality should render my story unintelligible and vague, I must describe its natural features and general position: following my practice throughout this work of drawing out the analogies and likenesses between places which are unknown and those already known and described. For seeing that in war, whether by sea or land, it is the difference of position which generally is the cause of failure; and since I wish all to know, not so much what happened, as how it happened, I must not pass over local description in detailing events of any sort, least of all in such as relate to war: and I must not shrink from using as landmarks, at one time harbours

Value of local knowledge.

and seas and islands, at another temples, mountains, or local names; or, finally, variations in the aspect of the heaven, these being of the most universal application throughout the world. For it is thus, and thus only, that it is possible, as I have said, to bring my readers to a conception of an unknown scene.

22. These then are the features of the country in question. Sparta, as a whole, is in the shape of a circle; and is situated on level ground, broken at certain points by irregularities and hills. The river Eurotas flows past it on the east, and for the greater part of the year is too large to be forded; and the hills on which the Menelaium stands are on the other side of the river, to the south-east of the town, rugged and difficult of access and exceedingly lofty; they exactly command the space between the town and the Eurotas, which flows at the very foot of the hill, the whole valley being at this point no more than a stade and a half wide. Through this Philip was obliged to pass on his return march, with the city, and the Lacedaemonians ready and drawn up for battle, on his left hand, and on his right the river, and the division of Lycurgus posted upon the hills. In addition to these arrangements the Lacedaemonians had had recourse to the following device: They had dammed up the river above the town, and turned the stream upon the space between the town and the hills; with the result that the ground became so wet that men could not keep their feet, to say nothing of horses. The only course, therefore, left to the king was to lead his men close under the skirts of the hills, thus presenting to the attack of the enemy a long line of march, in which it was difficult for one part to relieve another.

The position of Sparta and the neighbouring heights.

The dispositions of Lycurgus.

Philip perceived these difficulties, and after consultation with his friends decided that the matter of most urgent necessity was to dislodge the division of Lycurgus, first of all, from the position near the Menelaium. He took therefore his mercenaries, peltasts, and Illyrians, and advanced across the river in the direction of the hills. Perceiving Philip's design, Lycurgus began getting his men ready, and exhorted them to face the battle, and

Philip succeeds in baffling Lycurgus.

at the same time displayed the signal to the forces in the town: whereupon those whose duty it was immediately led out the troops from the town, as had been arranged, and drew them up outside the wall, with the cavalry on their right wing.

23. When he had got within distance of Lycurgus, Philip at first ordered the mercenaries to charge alone: and, accordingly, their superiority in arms and position contributed not a little to give the Lacedaemonians the upper hand at the beginning of the engagement. But when Philip supported his men by sending his reserve of peltasts on to the field, and caused the Illyrians to charge the enemy on the flanks, the king's mercenaries were encouraged by the appearance of these reserves to renew the battle with much more vigour than ever; while Lycurgus's men, terrified at the approach of the heavy-armed soldiers, gave way and fled, leaving a hundred killed and rather more prisoners, while the rest escaped into the town. Lycurgus himself, with a few followers going by a deserted and pathless route, made his way into the town under cover of night. Philip secured the hills by means of the Illyrians; and, accompanied by his light-armed troops and peltasts, rejoined his main forces. Just at the same time Aratus, leading the phalanx from Amyclae, had come close to the town. So the king, after re-crossing the Eurotas, halted with his light-armed peltasts and cavalry until the heavy-armed got safely through the narrow part of the road at the foot of the hills. Then the troops in the city ventured to attack the covering force of cavalry. There was a serious engagement, in which the peltasts fought with conspicuous valour; and the success of Philip being now beyond dispute, he chased the Lacedaemonians to their very gates, and then, having got his army safely across the Eurotas he brought up the rear of his phalanx.

24. But it was now getting late: and being obliged to encamp, he availed himself for that purpose of a place at the very mouth of the pass, his officers having chanced already to have selected that very place; than which it would be impossible to find one more advantageous for making an invasion of

Philip's strong position.

Laconia by way of Sparta itself. For it is at the very commencement of this pass, just where a man coming from Tegea, or, indeed, from any point in the interior, approaches Sparta; being about two stades from the town and right upon the river. The side of it which looks towards the town and river is entirely covered by a steep, lofty, and entirely inaccessible rock; while the top of this rock is a table-land of good soil and well supplied with water, and very conveniently situated for the exit and entrance of troops. A general, therefore, who was encamped there, and who had command of the height overhanging it, would evidently be in a place of safety as regards the neighbouring town, and in a most advantageous situation as commanding the entrance and exit of the narrow pass. Having accordingly encamped himself on this spot in safety, next day Philip sent forward his baggage; but drew out his army on the table-land in full view of the citizens, and remained thus for a short time. Then he wheeled to the left and marched in the direction of Tegea; and when he reached the site of the battle of Antigonus and Cleomenes, he encamped there. Next day, having made an inspection of the ground and sacrificed to the gods on both the eminences, Olympus and Evas, he advanced with his rear-guard strengthened. On arriving at Tegea he caused all the booty to be sold; and then, marching through Argos, arrived with his whole force at Corinth. There ambassadors appeared from Rhodes and Chios to negotiate a suspension of hostilities; to whom the king gave audience, and feigning that he was, and always had been, quite ready to come to terms with the Aetolians, sent them away to negotiate with the latter also; while he himself went down to Lechaeum, and made preparations for an embarkation, as he had an important undertaking to complete in Phocis.

Sellasia, B.C. 222.

Philip proceeds to Tegea, where he is visited by ambassadors from Rhodes and Chios seeking to end the Aetolian war.

25. Leontius, Megaleas, and Ptolemy, being still persuaded that they could frighten Philip, and thus neutralise their former failures, took this opportunity of tampering with the peltasts, and what the Macedonians call the

Agema,[1] by suggesting to them that they were risking their all, and getting none of their just rights, nor receiving the booty which, according to custom, properly fell to their share. By these words they incited the young men to collect together, and attempt to plunder the tents of the most prominent of the king's friends, and to pull down the doors, and break through the roof of the royal head-quarters.

Treason of Megaleas and Ptolemy.

The whole city being thereby in a state of confusion and uproar, the king heard of it and immediately came hastily running to the town from Lechaeum; and having summoned the Macedonians to the theatre he addressed them in terms of mingled exhortation and rebuke for what had happened. A scene of great uproar and confusion followed: and while some advised him to arrest and call to account the guilty, others to come to terms and declare an indemnity, for the moment the king dissembled his feelings, and pretended to be satisfied; and so with some words of exhortation addressed to all, retired: and though he knew quite well who were the ringleaders in the disturbance, he made a politic pretence of not doing so.

26. After this outbreak the king's schemes in Phocis met with certain impediments which prevented their present execution. Meanwhile Leontius, despairing of success by his own efforts, had recourse to Apelles, urging him by frequent messages to come from Chalcis, and setting forth his own difficulties and the awkwardness of his position owing to his quarrel with the king. Now Apelles had been acting in Chalcis with an unwarrantable assumption of authority. He gave out that the king was still a mere boy, and for the most part under his control, and without independent power over anything; the management of affairs and the supreme authority in the kingdom he asserted to belong to himself. Accordingly, the magistrates and commissioners of Macedonia and Thessaly reported to him; and the cities in Greece in their decrees and

Apelles sent for by Leontius.

[1] The Guard. The word *agemà* properly means the leading corps in an army; but it obtained this technical meaning in the Macedonian army (see Arrian, I, I, II), whence it was used in other armies also founded on the Macedonian model, as for instance in Alexandria (see *infra*, ch. 65).

votes of honours and rewards made brief reference to the king, while Apelles was all in all to them. Philip had been kept informed of this, and had for some time past been feeling annoyed and offended at it,—Aratus being at his side, and using skilful means to further his own views; still he kept his own counsel, and did not let any one see what he intended to do, or what he had in his mind. In ignorance, therefore, of his own position, and persuaded that, if he could only come into Philip's presence, he would manage everything as he chose,

Apelles rebuffed by the king.

Apelles set out from Chalcis to the assistance of Leontius. On his arrival at Corinth, Leontius, Ptolemy and Megaleas, being commanders of the peltasts and the other chief divisions of the army, took great pains to incite the young men to go to meet him. He entered the town, therefore, with great pomp, owing to the number of officers and soldiers who went to meet him, and proceeded straight to the royal quarters. But when he would have entered, according to his former custom, one of the ushers prevented him, saying that the king was engaged. Troubled at this unusual repulse, and hesitating for a long while what to do, Apelles at last turned round and retired. Thereupon all those who were escorting him began at once openly to fall off from him and disperse, so that at last he entered his own lodging, with his children, absolutely alone. So true it is all the

Courtiers.

world over that a moment exalts and abases us; but most especially is this true of courtiers. They indeed are exactly like counters on a board, which, according to the pleasure of the calculator, are one moment worth a farthing, the next a talent. Even so courtiers at the king's nod are one moment at the summit of prosperity, at another the objects of pity. When Megaleas saw that the help he had looked for from Apelles was failing him, he was exceedingly frightened, and made preparations for flight. Apelles meanwhile was admitted to the king's banquets and honours of that sort, but had no share in his council or daily social employments; and when, some days afterwards, the king resumed his voyage from Lechaeum, to complete his designs in Phocis, he took Apelles with him.

27. The expedition to Phocis proving a failure, the king

was retiring from Elatea; and while this was going on, Megaleas removed to Athens, leaving Leontius behind him as his security for his twenty talents fine. The Athenian Strategi however refused to admit him, and he therefore resumed his journey and went to Thebes. Meanwhile the king put to sea from the coast of Cirrha and sailed with his guards[1] to the harbour of Sicyon, whence he went up to the city and, excusing himself to the magistrates, took up his quarters with Aratus, and spent the whole of his time with him, ordering Apelles to sail back to Corinth. But upon news being brought him of the proceedings of Megaleas, he despatched the peltasts, whose regular commander was Leontius, in the charge of Taurion to Triphylia, on the pretext of some service of pressing need; and, when they had departed, he gave orders to arrest Leontius to answer his bail. When the peltasts heard what had happened from a messenger sent to them by Leontius, they despatched ambassadors to the king, begging him that, "if he had arrested Leontius on any other score, not to have him tried on the charges alleged against him without their presence: for otherwise they should consider themselves treated with signal contempt, and to be one and all involved in the condemnation." Such was the freedom of speech towards their king which the Macedonians always enjoyed. They added, that "if the arrest was on account of his bail for Megaleas, they would themselves pay the money by a common subscription." The king however was so enraged, that he put Leontius to death sooner than he had intended, owing to the zeal displayed by the peltasts.

Flight of Megaleas.

Leontius put to death.

28. Presently the ambassadors of Rhodes and Chios returned from Aetolia. They had agreed to a truce of thirty days, and asserted that the Aetolians were ready to make peace: they had also arranged for a stated day on which they claimed that Philip should meet them at Rhium; undertaking that the Aetolians would be ready to do anything on condition of making peace. Philip ac-

A thirty days' truce offered by the Aetolians through the Rhodian and Chian ambassadors.

[1] Hypaspists, originally a bodyguard to the king, had been extended in number and formed one or more distinct corps of light infantry (Grote, ch. 92).

cepted the truce and wrote letters to the allies, bidding them send assessors and commissioners to discuss the terms with the Aetolians; while he himself sailed from Lechaeum and arrived on the second day at Patrae. Just then certain letters were sent to him from Phocis, which Megaleas had written to the Aetolians, exhorting them not to be frightened, but to persist in the war, because Philip was in extremities through a lack of provisions. Besides this the letters contained some offensive and bitter abuse of the king. As soon as he had read these, the king feeling no doubt that Apelles was the ringleader of the mischief, placed him under a guard and despatched him in all haste to Corinth, with his son and favourite boy; while he sent Alexander to Thebes to arrest Megaleas, with orders to bring him before the magistrates to answer to his bail. When Alexander had fulfilled his commission, Megaleas, not daring to await the issue, committed suicide: and about the same time Apelles, his son and favourite boy, ended their lives also. Such was the end of these men, thoroughly deserved in every way, and especially for their outrageous conduct to Aratus.

Treason of Megaleas detected. His arrest and suicide.

Death of Apelles.

29. Now the Aetolians were at first very anxious for the ratification of a peace, because they found the war burdensome, and because things had not gone as they expected. For, looking to his tender years and lack of experience, they had expected to have a mere child to deal with in Philip; but had found him a full-grown man both in his designs and his manner of executing them: while they had themselves made a display of imbecility and childishness alike in the general conduct, and the particular actions, of the campaign. But as soon as they heard of the outbreak of the disturbance among the peltasts, and of the deaths of Apelles and Leontius, hoping that there was a serious and formidable disaffection at the court, they procrastinated until they had outstayed the day appointed for the meeting at Rhium. But Philip was delighted to seize the pretext: for he felt confident of success in the war, and had already resolved to avoid coming to terms. He therefore at once exhorted such of the allies as had come to meet him

Failure of the negotiations with the Aetolians.

to make preparations, not for the peace, but for war; and putting to sea again sailed back to Corinth. He then dismissed his Macedonian soldiers to go home through Thessaly for the winter: while he himself putting to sea from Cenchreae, and coasting along Attica, sailed through the Euripus to Demetrias, and there before a jury of Macedonians had Ptolemy tried and put to death, who was the last survivor of the conspiracy of Leontius.

B.C. 218. Review of the events of the year in Italy, Asia, Sparta.

It was in this season that Hannibal, having succeeded in entering Italy, was lying encamped in presence of the Roman army in the valley of the Padus. Antiochus, after subduing the greater part of Coele-Syria, had once more dismissed his army into winter quarters. The Spartan king Lycurgus fled to Aetolia in fear of the Ephors: for acting on a false charge that he was meditating a *coup d'état*, they had collected the young men and come to his house at night. But getting previous intimation of what was impending, he had quitted the town accompanied by the members of his household.

Winter of B.C. 218-217.

30. When the next winter came, Philip having departed to Macedonia, and the Achaean Strategus Eperatus having incurred the contempt of the Achaean soldiers and the complete disregard of the mercenaries, no one would obey his orders, and no preparation was made for the defence of the country. This was observed by Pyrrhias, who had been sent by the Aetolians to command the Eleans. He had under him a force of thirteen hundred Aetolians, and the mercenaries hired by the Eleans, as well as a thousand Elean infantry and two hundred Elean cavalry, amounting in all to three thousand: and he now began committing frequent raids, not only upon the territories of Dyme and Pharae, but upon that of Patrae also. Finally he pitched his camp on what is called the Panachaean Mountain, which commands the town of Patrae, and began wasting the whole district towards Rhium and Aegium. The result was that the cities, being exposed to much suffering, and unable to obtain any assistance, began to make difficulties

Disorder in Achaia owing to the incompetence of the Strategus Eperatus.

about paying their contribution to the league; and the soldiers finding their pay always in arrear and never paid at the right time acted in the same way about going to the relief of the towns. Both parties thus mutually retaliating on each other, affairs went from bad to worse, and at last the foreign contingent broke up altogether. And all this was the result of the incompetence of the chief magistrate. The time for the next election finding Achaean affairs in this state, Eperatus laid down his office, and just at the beginning of summer Aratus the elder was elected Strategus.[1]

May, B.C. 217. Aratus the elder elected Strategus.

Such was the position of affairs in Europe. We have now arrived at a proper juncture, both of events and of time, to transfer our narrative to the history of Asia. I will therefore resume my story of the transactions which occurred there during the same Olympiad.

140th Olympiad, Asia.

31. I will first endeavour, in accordance with my original plan, to give an account of the war between Antiochus and Ptolemy for the possession of Coele-Syria. Though I am fully aware that at the period, at which I have stopped in my Greek history, this war was all but decided and concluded, I have yet deliberately chosen this particular break and division in my narrative; believing that I shall effectually provide against the possibility of mistakes on the part of my readers in regard to dates, if I indicate in the course of my narrative the years in this Olympiad in which the events in the several parts of the world, as well as in Greece, began and ended. For I think nothing more essential to the clearness of my history of this Olympiad than to avoid confusing the several narratives. Our object should be to distinguish and keep them separate as much as possible, until we come to the next Olympiad, and begin setting down the contemporary events in the several countries under each year. For since I have undertaken to write, not a particular, but a universal history, and have

[1] Here again, as in 5, 1, the outgoing Strategus appears to go out of office at the time of the election of his successor (see note on ch. 1, and cp. 4, 6). There seems to have been some variety of practice. Perhaps the interval was left somewhat to mutual arrangement, the summer solstice being the outside limit.

ventured upon a plan on a greater scale, as I have already shown, than any of my predecessors, it will be necessary also for me to take greater care than they, as to my method of treatment and arrangement; so as to secure clearness, both in the details, and in the general view adopted in my history. I will accordingly go back a short way in the history of the kingdoms of Antiochus and Ptolemy, and try to fix upon a starting-point for my narrative which shall be accepted and recognised by all: for this is a matter of the first importance.

32. For the old saying, "Well begun is half done," was meant by its inventors to urge the importance of taking the greater pains to make a good beginning than anything else. And though some may consider this an exaggeration, in my opinion it comes short of the truth; for one might say with confidence, not that "the beginning was half the business," but rather that it was near being the whole. For how can one make a good beginning without having first grasped in thought the complete plan, or without knowing where, with what object, and with what purpose he is undertaking the business? Or how can a man sum up a series of events satisfactorily without a reference to their origin, and without showing his point of departure, or why and how he has arrived at the particular crisis at which he finds himself? Therefore both historian and reader alike should be exceedingly careful to mark the beginnings of events, with a conviction that their influence does not stop half-way, but is paramount to the end. And this is what I shall endeavour to do.

33. I am aware, however, that a similar profession has been made by many other historians of an intention to write a universal history, and of undertaking a work on a larger scale than their predecessors. About these writers, putting out of the question Ephorus, the first and only man who has really attempted a universal history, I will not mention any name or say more about them than this,—that several of my contemporaries, while professing to write a universal history have imagined that they could tell the story of the war of Rome and Carthage in three or four pages. Yet every one knows that events more numerous or important were never accomplished in Iberia,

Libya, Sicily, and Italy than in that war; and that the Hannibalian war was the most famous and lasting of any that has taken place except the Sicilian. So momentous was it, that all the rest of the world were compelled to watch it in terrified expectation of what would follow from its final catastrophe. Yet some of these writers, without even giving as many details of it as those who, after the manner of the vulgar, inscribe rude records of events on house walls, pretend to have embraced the whole of Greek and foreign history. The truth of the matter is, that it is a very easy matter to profess to undertake works of the greatest importance; but by no means so simple a matter in practice to attain to any excellence. The former is open to every one with the requisite audacity: the latter is rare, and is given to few. So much for those who use pompous language about themselves and their historical works. I will now return to my narrative.

Death of Ptolemy Euergetes, B.C. 222.

34. Immediately after his father's death, Ptolemy Philopator put his brother Magas and his partisans to death, and took possession of the throne of Egypt. He thought that he had now freed himself by this act from domestic danger; and that by the deaths of Antigonus and Seleucus, and their being respectively succeeded by mere children like Antiochus and Philip, fortune had released him from danger abroad. He therefore felt secure of his position and began conducting his reign as though it were a perpetual festival. He would attend to no business, and would hardly grant an interview to the officials about the court, or at the head of the administrative departments in Egypt. Even his agents abroad found him entirely careless and indifferent; though his predecessors, far from taking less interest in foreign affairs, had generally given them precedence over those of Egypt itself. For being masters of Coele-Syria and Cyprus, they maintained a threatening attitude towards the kings of Syria, both by land and sea; and were also in a commanding position in regard to the princes of Asia, as well as the islands, through their possession of the most splendid cities, strongholds, and harbours all along the sea-coast from Pamphylia to the Hellespont and the district round Lysimachia. Moreover they were favourably placed for an

attack upon Thrace and Macedonia from their possession of Aenus, Maroneia, and more distant cities still. And having thus stretched forth their hands to remote regions, and long ago strengthened their position by a ring of princedoms, these kings had never been anxious about their rule in Egypt; and had naturally, therefore, given great attention to foreign politics. But when Philopator, absorbed in unworthy intrigues, and senseless and continuous drunkenness, treated these several branches of government with equal indifference, it was naturally not long before more than one was found to lay plots against his life as well as his power: of whom the first was Cleomenes, the Spartan.[1]

Cleomenes endeavours to get assistance from the Egyptian court.

35. As long as Euergetes was alive, with whom he had agreed to make an alliance and confederacy, Cleomenes took no steps. But upon that monarch's death, seeing that the time was slipping away, and that the peculiar position of affairs in Greece seemed almost to cry aloud for Cleomenes,—for Antigonus was dead, the Achaeans involved in war, and the Lacedaemonians were at one with the Aetolians in hostility to the Achaeans and Macedonians, which was the policy originally adopted by Cleomenes,—then, indeed, he was actually compelled to use some expedition, and to bestir himself to secure his departure from Alexandria. First therefore, in interviews with the king, he urged him to send him out with the needful amount of supplies and troops; but not being listened to in this request, he next begged him earnestly to let him go alone with his own servants; for he affirmed that the state of affairs was such as to show him sufficient opportunities for recovering his ancestral throne. The king, however, for the reasons I have mentioned, taking absolutely no interest in such matters, nor exercising any foresight whatever, continued with extraordinary folly and blindness to neglect the petitions of Cleomenes. But the party of Sosibius, the leading statesman at the time, took counsel together, and agreed on the following course of action in regard to him. They decided not to send him out with a fleet and supplies; for, owing to the death of Antigonus, they took little account

[1] See 2, 69.

of foreign affairs, and thought money spent on such things would be thrown away. Besides, they were afraid that since Antigonus was dead, and no one was left who could balance him, Cleomenes might, if he got Greece into his power quickly and without trouble, prove a serious and formidable rival to themselves; especially as he had had a clear view of Egyptian affairs, had learnt to despise the king; and had discovered that the kingdom had many parts loosely attached, and widely removed from the centre, and presenting many facilities for revolutionary movements: for not a few of their ships were at Samos, and a considerable force of soldiers at Ephesus. These considerations induced them to reject the idea of sending Cleomenes out with supplies; for they thought it by no means conducive to their interests to carelessly let a man go, who was certain to be their opponent and enemy. The other proposal was to keep him there against his will; but this they all rejected at once without discussion, on the principle that the lion and the flock could not safely share the same stall. Sosibius himself took the lead in regarding this idea with aversion, and his reason was this.

The reason of the opposition of Sosibius.

36. While engaged in effecting the destruction of Magas and Berenice, his anxiety at the possible failure of his attempt, especially through the courageous character of Berenice, had forced him to flatter the courtiers, and give them all hopes of advantage in case his intrigue succeeded. It was at this juncture that, observing Cleomenes to stand in need of the king's help, and to be possessed of a clear understanding and a genuine grasp of the situation, he admitted him to a knowledge of his design, holding out to him hopes of great advantage. And when Cleomenes saw that Sosibius was in a state of great anxiety, and above all afraid of the foreign soldiers and mercenaries, he bade him not be alarmed; and undertook that the foreign soldiers should do him no harm, but should rather be of assistance to him. And on Sosibius expressing surprise rather than conviction at this promise, he said, "Don't you see that there are three thousand foreign soldiers here from the Peloponnese, and a thousand from Crete? I have only to nod to these men, and every

man of them will at once do what I want. With these all ready to hand, whom do you fear? Surely not mere Syrians and Carians." Sosibius was much pleased at the remark at the time, and doubly encouraged in his intrigue against Berenice; but ever afterwards, when observing the indifference of the king, he repeated it to himself, and put before his eyes the boldness of Cleomenes, and the goodwill of the foreign contingent towards him.

37. These feelings now moved him to advise the king and his friends above all things to arrest and incarcerate Cleomenes: and to carry out this policy he availed himself of the following circumstance, which happened conveniently for him. There was a certain Messenian called Nicagoras, an ancestral guest-friend of the Lacedaemonian king Archidamus. They had not previously had much intercourse; but when Archidamus fled from Sparta, for fear of Cleomenes, and came to Messenia, not only did Archidamus show great kindness in receiving him under his roof and furnishing him with other necessaries, but from the close association that followed a very warm friendship and intimacy sprang up between them: and accordingly when Cleomenes subsequently gave Archidamus some expectation of being restored to his city, and composing their quarrels, Nicagoras devoted himself to conducting the negotiation and settling the terms of their compact. These being ratified, Archelaus returned to Sparta relying on the treaty made by the agency of Nicagoras. But as soon as he met him, Cleomenes assassinated Archidamus,[1] sparing however Nicagoras and his companions. To the outside world Nicagoras pretended to be under an obligation to Cleomenes for saving his life; but in heart he was exceedingly incensed at what had happened, because he had the discredit of having been the cause of the king's death. Now it happened that this same Nicagoras had, a short time before the events of which we are speaking, come to Alexandria with a cargo of horses. Just as

The intrigue of Sosibius against Cleomenes.

[1] Archidamus was the brother of Agis, the king of the other line, who had been assassinated in B.C. 240. Plutarch, *Cleom.* 5, probably on the authority of Phylarchus, represents the murder of Archidamus as not the work of Cleomenes, but of the same party that had murdered Agis and feared the vengeance of his brother. (See Thirlwall, 8, p 158, who agrees with Plutarch.)

he was disembarking he came upon Cleomenes, Panterus, and Hippitas walking together along the quay. When Cleomenes saw him, he came up and welcomed him warmly, and asked him on what business he was come. Upon his replying that he had brought a cargo of horses, "You had better," said he, "have brought a cargo of catamites and sakbut girls; for that is what the present king is fond of." Nicagoras laughed, and said nothing at the time: but some days afterwards, when he had, in the course of his horse-sales, become more intimate with Sosibius, he did Cleomenes the ill turn of repeating his recent sarcasm; and seeing that Sosibius heard it with satisfaction, he related to him the whole story of his grievance against Cleomenes.

38. Finding then that he was hostile in feeling to Cleomenes, Sosibius persuaded Nicagoras, partly by presents given on the spot and partly by promises for the future, to write a letter accusing Cleomenes, and leave it sealed; that as soon as he had sailed, as he would do in a few days, his servant might bring it to him as though sent by Nicagoras. Nicagoras performed his part in the plot; and after he had sailed, the letter was brought by the servant to Sosibius, who at once took the servant and the letter to the king. The servant stated that Nicagoras had left the letter with orders to deliver it to Sosibius; and the letter declared that it was the intention of Cleomenes, if he failed to secure his despatch from the country with suitable escort and provisions, to stir up a rebellion against the king. Sosibius at once seized the opportunity of urging on the king and his friends to take prompt precautions against Cleomenes and to put him in ward. This was at once done, and a very large house was assigned to him in which he lived under guard, differing from other prisoners only in the superior size of his prison. Finding himself in this distressing plight, and with fear of worse for the future, Cleomenes determined to make the most desperate attempts for freedom: not so much because he felt confident of success, —for he had none of the elements of success in such an enterprise on his side,—but rather because he was eager to die nobly, and endure nothing unworthy of the gallantry which he

Cleomenes put under arrest

had previously displayed. He must, I think, as is usually the case with men of high courage, have recalled and reflected upon as his model those words of the hero :[1]—

> "Yea, let me die,—but not a coward's death,
> Nor all inglorious: let me do one deed,
> That children yet unborn may hear and mark!"

Bold attempt of Cleomenes to recover his liberty. His failure and death, B.C 220.

39. He therefore waited for the time at which the king left Alexandria for Canopus, and then spread a report among his guards that he was going to be released by the king; and on this pretext entertained his own attendants at a banquet, and sent out some flesh of the sacrificial victims, some garlands, and some wine to his guards. The latter indulged in these good things unsuspiciously, and became completely drunk; whereupon Cleomenes walked out about noon, accompanied by his friends and servants armed with daggers, without being noticed by his guard. As the party advanced they met Ptolemy in the street, who had been left by the king in charge of the city; and overawing his attendants by the audacity of his proceeding, dragged Ptolemy himself from his chariot and put him in a place of security, while they loudly called upon the crowds of citizens to assert their freedom. But every one was unprepared for the movement, and therefore no one obeyed their summons or joined them; and they accordingly turned their steps to the citadel, with the intention of bursting open the doors and obtaining the help of the prisoners confined there. But the commanders of the citadel were on the alert, and learning what was going to take place had secured the entrance gate: having therefore failed in this design they killed themselves like brave men and Spartans.

Such was the end of Cleomenes: a man of brilliant social qualities, with a natural aptitude for affairs, and, in a word, endued with all the qualifications of a general and a king.

40. Shortly after the catastrophe of Cleomenes, the governor of Coele-Syria, who was an Aetolian by birth, resolved to hold treasonable parley with Antiochus and put the cities of that

[1] Homer, *Il.*, 22, 304.

province into his hands. He was induced to take this step partly by the contempt with which Ptolemy's shameful debauchery and general conduct had inspired him; and partly by distrust of the king's ministers, which he had learned to entertain in the course of the recent attempt of Antiochus upon Coele-Syria: for in that campaign he had rendered signal service to Ptolemy, and yet, far from receiving any thanks for it, he had been summoned to Alexandria and barely escaped losing his life. The advances which he now made to Antiochus were gladly received, and the affair was soon in the course of being rapidly completed.

B.C. 220-219. The origin of the war in Coele-Syria.

But I must make my readers acquainted with the position of the royal family of Syria as I have already done with that of Egypt; and in order to do so, I will go back to the succession of Antiochus to the throne, and give a summary of events from that point to the beginning of the war of which I am to speak.

Antiochus was the younger son of Seleucus Callinicus; and on the death of his father, and the succession in right of seniority of his brother Seleucus to the throne, he at first removed to upper Asia and lived there. But Seleucus having been treacherously assassinated after crossing Mount Taurus with his army, as I have already related, he succeeded to the throne himself; and made Achaeus governor of Asia on this side Taurus, Molon and his brother Alexander guardians of his dominions in upper Asia,—Molon acting as Satrap of Media, his brother of Persia.

B.C. 226

B.C. 223. See 4, 48.

41. These two brothers despising the king for his youth, and hoping that Achaeus would join in their treason, but most of all because they dreaded the cruel character and malign influence of Hermeias, who was at that time the chief minister of the entire kingdom, formed the design of revolting themselves and causing the upper Satrapies to revolt also.

Revolt of Molon.

This Hermeias was a Carian and had obtained his power by the appointment of the king's brother Seleucus, who had entrusted it to him when he was setting out on his expedition

to the Taurus. Invested with this authority he at once began to display jealousy of all those about the court who were in any way prominent; and being cruel by nature he inflicted punishment on some for acts of ignorance, on which he always managed to place the worst interpretation; while against others he brought trumped-up and lying charges, and then acted towards them the part of an inflexible and harsh judge. But his chief end and object was to secure the destruction of Epigenes who had brought home the forces which had accompanied Seleucus; because he saw that he was a man of eloquence and practical ability, and highly acceptable to the army. With this design he was ever on the watch to lay hold of some handle or pretext against him. Accordingly when a council was summoned on the subject of Molon's revolt, and when the king bade each councillor deliver his opinion on the measures to be taken against the rebels, Epigenes spoke first and urged that "there ought to be no delay, but the matter should be taken in hand at once; and that, first and foremost, the king should go in person to the district, and be ready to seize the right moments for action. For the actual presence of the king, and his appearance at the head of an army before the eyes of the common people, would prevent the party of Molon from venturing upon revolutionary measures at all; or if they had the audacity to do so, and persisted in their design, they would be quickly arrested by the populace and handed over into the king's power."

Intrigues of Hermeias.

42. While Epigenes was still speaking in this strain, Hermeias, in a burst of rage, exclaimed, "That Epigenes had long been secretly plotting treason against the king; but that now he had happily shown his real sentiments by the advice which he had given, proving how eager he was to expose the king's person to the rebels with an insignificant guard." For the present he was content with making this insinuation as fuel for a future outburst of slander, and without further reference to Epigenes, after what was rather an ill-timed ebullition of temper than serious hostility, he delivered his own opinion; which, from his fear of the danger and his inexperience in war, was against undertaking the expedition against Molon personally, but was

warmly in favour of an attack upon Ptolemy; because he was of opinion that this latter war would involve no danger, owing to that monarch's cowardly character. For the present he overawed the rest of the council into agreement with him: and he thereupon sent Xenon and Theodotus Hemiolius with an army against Molon; while he employed himself in continually inciting Antiochus to undertake the expedition into Coele-Syria: thinking that it was only by involving the young king in war on every side that he could escape punishment for his past misdeeds, and avoid being deprived of his position of authority; for the king would have need of his services when he found himself surrounded by struggles and dangers. With this object in view, he finally hit on the device of forging a letter, which he presented to the king as having been sent by Achaeus. In it Achaeus was made to state that "Ptolemy had urged him to assert his right to the government: and promised to supply him with ships and money for all his attempts, if he would only take the crown, and come forward in the sight of all the world as a claimant of the sovereign power; which he already possessed, in fact, though he grudged himself the title, and rejected the crown which fortune gave him."

This letter successfully imposed on the king, who became ready and eager to go on the expedition against Coele-Syria.

Marriage of Antiochus III.

48. While this was going on, Antiochus happened to be at Seleucia, on the Zeugma, when the Navarchus Diognetus arrived from Cappadocia, on the Euxine, bringing Laodice, the daughter of king Mithridates, an unmarried girl, destined to be the king's wife. This Mithridates boasted of being a descendant of one of the seven Persians who killed the Magus,[1] and he had maintained the sovereignty handed down from his ancestors, as it had been originally given to them by Darius along the shore of the Euxine. Having gone to meet the princess with all due pomp and splendour, Antiochus immediately celebrated his nuptials with royal magnificence. The marriage having been completed, he went to Antioch; and after proclaiming Laodice queen, devoted himself thenceforth to making preparation for the war.

[1] The false Smerdis (Herod. 3, 61-82).

Meanwhile Molon had prepared the people of his own Satrapy to go all lengths, partly by holding out to them hopes of advantages to be gained, and partly by working on the fears of their chief men, by means of forged letters purporting to be from the king, and couched in threatening terms. He had also a ready coadjutor in his brother Alexander; and had secured the co-operation of the neighbouring Satrapies, by winning the goodwill of their leading men with bribes. It was, therefore, at the head of a large force that he took the field against the royal generals. Terrified at his approach Xenon and Theodotus retired into the cities; and Molon, having secured the territory of Apollonia, had now a superabundance of supplies.

Molon.

44. But, indeed, even before that he was a formidable enemy owing to the importance of his province. For the whole of the royal horses out at grass are entrusted to the Medes;[1] and they have an incalculable quantity of corn and cattle. Of the natural strength and extent of the district it would be impossible to speak highly enough. For Media lies nearly in the centre of Asia and in its size, and in the height of its steppes compares favourably with every other district of Asia. And again it overlooks some of the most warlike and powerful tribes. On the east lie the plains of the desert which intervenes between Persia and Parthia; and, moreover, it borders on and commands the "Caspian Gates," and touches the mountains of the Tapyri, which are not far from the Hyrcanian Sea. On the south it slopes down to Mesopotamia and the territory of Apollonia. It is protected from Persia by the barrier of Mount Zagrus, which has an ascent of a hundred stades, and containing in its range many separate peaks and defiles is subdivided by deep valleys, and at certain points by cañons, inhabited by Cosseans, Corbrenians, Carchi, and several other barbarous tribes who have the reputation of being excellent warriors. Again on the west it is coterminous

Description of Media

[1] Hence the sacred breed of Nisaean horses, used for the Persian king's chariot (Herod 7, 40; 9, 20). The Nisaean plain was one of those in Media containing the best pasture, and is identified by Rawlinson with that of *Khawar* and *Alistan* near *Behistun*.

with the tribe called Satrapeii, who are not far from the tribes which extend as far as the Euxine. Its northern frontier is fringed by Elymaeans, Aniaracae, Cadusii, and Matiani, and overlooks that part of the Pontus which adjoins the Maeotis. Media itself is subdivided by several mountain chains running from east to west, between which are plains thickly studded with cities and villages.

Molon takes up arms.

45. Being masters, then, of a territory of proportions worthy of a kingdom, his great power had made Molon from the first a formidable enemy: but when the royal generals appeared to have abandoned the country to him, and his own forces were elated at the successful issue of their first hopes, the terror which he inspired became absolute, and he was believed by the Asiatics to be irresistible. Taking advantage of this, he first of all resolved to cross the Tigris and lay siege to Seleucia; but when his passage across the river was stopped by Zeuxis seizing the river boats, he retired to the camp at Ctesiphon, and set about preparing winter quarters for his army.

Xenoetas sent against Molon, B.C. 221.

When King Antiochus heard of Molon's advance and the retreat of his own generals, he was once more for giving up the expedition against Ptolemy, and going in person on the campaign against Molon, and not letting slip the proper time for action. But Hermeias persisted in his original plan, and despatched the Achaean Xenoetas against Molon, in command of an army, with full powers; asserting that against rebels it was fitting that generals should have the command; but that the king ought to confine himself to directing plans and conducting national wars against monarchs. Having therefore the young king entirely in his power, owing to his age, he set out; and having mustered the army at Apameia he started thence and arrived at Laodiceia. Advancing from that time with his whole army, the king crossed the desert and entered the cañon called Marsyas, which lies between the skirts of Libanus and Anti-Libanus, and is contracted into a narrow gorge by those two mountains. Just where the valley is narrowest it is divided by marshes and lakes, from which the scented reed is cut.

King Antiochus in Coele-Syria.

46. On one side of the entrance to this pass lies a place called Brochi, on the other Gerrha, which leave but a narrow space between them. After a march of several days through this cañon, and subduing the towns that lay along it, Antiochus arrived at Gerrha. Finding that Theodotus the Aetolian had already occupied Gerrha and Brochi, and had secured the narrow road by the lakes with ditches and palisades and a proper disposition of guards, the king at first tried to carry the pass by force; but after sustaining more loss than he inflicted, and finding that Theodotus remained still stanch, he gave up the attempt. In the midst of these difficulties news was brought that Xenoetas had suffered a total defeat and that Molon was in possession of all the upper country: he therefore abandoned his foreign expedition and started to relieve his own dominions.

Xenoetas at first successful.

The fact was that when the general Xenoetas had been despatched with absolute powers, as I have before stated, his unexpected elevation caused him to treat his friends with haughtiness and his enemies with overweening temerity. His first move however was sufficiently prudent. He marched to Seleucia, and after sending for Diogenes the governor of Susiana, and Pythiades the commander in the Persian Gulf, he led out his forces and encamped with the river Tigris protecting his front. But there he was visited by many men from Molon's camp, who swam across the river and assured him that, if he would only cross the Tigris, the whole of Molon's army would declare for him; for the common soldiers were jealous of Molon and warmly disposed towards the king. Xenoetas was encouraged by these statements to attempt the passage of the Tigris. He made a feint of bridging the river at a spot where it is divided by an island; but as he was getting nothing ready for such an operation, Molon took no notice of his pretended move; while he was really occupied in collecting boats and getting them ready with every possible care. Then having selected the most courageous men, horse and foot, from his entire army, he left Zeuxis and Pythiades in charge of his camp, and marched up stream at night about eighty stades above Molon's camp; and having got his force safely over in boats, encamped them before

daybreak in an excellent position, nearly surrounded by the river, and covered where there was no river by marshes and swamps.

47. When Molon learnt what had taken place, he sent his cavalry, under the idea that they would easily stop those who were actually crossing, and ride down those who had already crossed. But as soon as they got near Xenoetas's force, their ignorance of the ground proved fatal to them without any enemy to attack them; for they got immersed by their own weight, and sinking in the lakes were all rendered useless, while many of them actually lost their lives. Xenoetas, however, feeling sure that if he only approached, Molon's forces would all desert to him, advanced along the bank of the river and pitched a camp close to the enemy. Thereupon Molon, either as a stratagem, or because he really felt some doubt of the fidelity of his men, and was afraid that some of Xenoetas's expectations might be fulfilled, left his baggage in his camp and started under cover of night in the direction of Media. Xenoetas, imagining that Molon had fled in terror at his approach, and because he distrusted the fidelity of his own troops, first attacked and took the enemy's camp, and then sent for his own cavalry and their baggage from the camp of Zeuxis. He next summoned the soldiers to a meeting, and told them that they should feel encouraged and hopeful now that Molon had fled. With this preface, he ordered them all to attend to their bodily wants and refresh themselves; as he intended without delay to go in pursuit of the enemy early next morning.

Molon returns to his camp.

48. But the soldiers, filled with confidence, and enriched with every kind of provisions, eagerly turned to feasting and wine and the demoralisation which always accompanies such excesses. But Molon, after marching a considerable distance, caused his army to get their dinner, and then wheeling round reappeared at the camp. He found all the enemy scattered about and drunk, and attacked their palisade just before daybreak. Dismayed by this unexpected danger, and unable to awake his men from their drunken slumber, Xenoetas and his staff rushed furiously upon the enemy and were killed. Of the sleeping soldiers most were killed in their beds, while the

rest threw themselves into the river and endeavoured to cross to the opposite camp. The greater part however even of these perished; for in the blind hurry and confusion which prevailed, and in the universal panic and dismay, seeing the camp on the other side divided by so narrow a space, they all forgot the violence of the stream, and the difficulty of crossing it, in their eagerness to reach a place of safety. In wild excitement therefore, and with a blind instinct of self-preservation, they not only hurled themselves into the river, but threw their beasts of burden in also, with their packs, as though they thought that the river by some providential instinct would take their part and convey them safely to the opposite camp. The result was that the stream presented a truly pitiable and extraordinary spectacle,—horses, beasts of burden, arms, corpses, and every kind of baggage being carried down the current along with the swimmers.

Having secured the camp of Xenoetas, Molon crossed the river in perfect safety and without any resistance, as Zeuxis also now fled at his approach; took possession of the latter's camp, and then advanced with his whole army to Seleucia; carried it at the first assault, Zeuxis and Diomedon the governor of the place both abandoning it and flying; and advancing from this place reduced the upper Satrapies to submission without a blow. That of Babylon fell next, and then the Satrapy which lay along the Persian Gulf. This brought him to Susa, which he also carried without a blow; though his assaults upon the citadel proved unavailing, because Diogenes the general had thrown himself into it before he could get there. He therefore abandoned the idea of carrying it by storm, and leaving a detachment to lay siege to it, hurried back with his main army to Seleucia on the Tigris. There he took great pains to refresh his army, and after addressing his men in encouraging terms he started once more to complete his designs, and occupied Parapotamia as far as the city Europus, and Mesopotamia as far as Dura.

Molon's successful campaign. B.C. 221.

49. When news of these events was brought to Antiochus, as I have said before, he gave up all idea of the Coele-Syrian campaign, and turned all his attention to this war. Another meeting of his council was thereupon summoned: and on the

king ordering the members of it to deliver their opinions as to the tactics to be employed against Molon, the first to speak on the business was again Epigenes: who said that "his advice should have been followed all along, and measures have been promptly taken before the enemy had obtained such important successes: still even at this late hour they ought to take it in hand resolutely." Thereupon Hermeias broke out again into an unreasonable and violent fit of anger and began to heap abuse upon Epigenes; and while belauding himself in a fulsome manner, brought accusations against Epigenes that were absurd as well as false. He ended by adjuring the king not to be diverted from his purpose without better reason, nor to abandon his hopes in Coele-Syria. This advice was ill-received by the majority of the council, and displeasing to Antiochus himself; and, accordingly, as the king showed great anxiety to reconcile the two men, Hermeias was at length induced to put an end to his invectives. The council decided by a majority that the course recommended by Epigenes was the most practical and advantageous, and a resolution was come to that the king should go on the campaign against Molon, and devote his attention to that. Thereupon Hermeias promptly made a hypocritical pretence of having changed his mind: and remarking that it was the duty of all to acquiesce loyally in the decision, made a great show of readiness and activity in pushing on the preparations.

Epigenes put to death by the intrigues of Hermeias.

50. The forces, however, having been mustered at Apameia, upon a kind of mutiny arising among the common soldiers, on account of some arrears of pay, Hermeias, observing the king to be in a state of anxiety, and to be alarmed at the disturbance at so critical a moment, offered to discharge all arrears, if the king would only consent to Epigenes not accompanying the expedition; on the ground that nothing could be properly managed in the army when such angry feelings, and such party spirit, had been excited. The proposal was very displeasing to the king, who was exceedingly anxious that Epigenes should accompany him on the campaign, owing to his experience in the field; but he was bound so completely hand and foot, and entangled by the craft of

Hermeias, his skilful finance, constant watchfulness, and designing flattery, that he was not his own master; and accordingly he yielded to the necessity of the moment and consented to his demand. When Epigenes thereupon retired, as he was bidden, the members of the council were too much afraid of incurring displeasure to remonstrate; while the army generally, by a revulsion of feeling, turned with gratitude to the man to whom they owed the settlement of their claims for pay. The Cyrrhestae were the only ones that stood out: and they broke out into open mutiny, and for some time occasioned much trouble; but, being at last conquered by one of the king's generals, most of them were killed, and the rest submitted to the king's mercy. Hermeias having thus secured the allegiance of his friends by fear, and of the troops by being of service to them, started on the expedition in company with the king; while in regard to Epigenes he elaborated the following plot, with the assistance of Alexis, the commander of the citadel of Apameia. He wrote a letter purporting to have been sent from Molon to Epigenes, and persuaded one of the latter's servants, by holding out the hope of great rewards, to take it to the house of Epigenes, and mix it with his other papers. Immediately after this had been done, Alexis came to the house and asked Epigenes whether he had not received certain letters from Molon; and, upon his denial, demanded in menacing terms to be allowed to search. Having entered, he quickly discovered the letter, which he availed himself of as a pretext for putting Epigenes to death on the spot. By this means the king was persuaded to believe that Epigenes had justly forfeited his life; and though the courtiers had their suspicions, they were afraid to say anything.

51. When Antiochus had reached the Euphrates, and had taken over the force stationed there, he once more started on his march and got as far as Antioch, in Mygdonia, about mid-winter, and there remained until the worst of the winter should be over. Thence after a stay of forty days he advanced to Libba. Molon was now in the neighbourhood of Babylon: and Antiochus consulted his council as to the route to be pursued, the tactics to be adopted, and the source from which

B.C 221-220. Antiochus advances through Mesopotamia.

provisions could best be obtained for his army on the march in their expedition against Molon. The proposal of Hermeias was to march along the Tigris, with this river, and the Lycus and Caprus, on their flank. Zeuxis, having the fate of Epigenes before his eyes, was in a state of painful doubt whether to speak his real opinion or no; but as the mistake involved in the advice of Hermeias was flagrant, he at last mustered courage to advise that the Tigris should be crossed; alleging as a reason the general difficulty of the road along the river: especially from the fact that, after a considerable march, the last six days of which would be through a desert, they would reach what was called the "King's Dyke," which it would be impossible to cross if they found it invested by the enemy; while a retirement by a second march through the wilderness would be manifestly dangerous, especially as their provisions would be sure to be running short. On the other hand he showed that if they crossed the Tigris it was evident the Apolloniates would repent of their treason and join the king; for even as it was they had submitted to Molon, not from choice, but under compulsion and terror; and the fertility of their soil promised abundance of provisions for the troops. But his most weighty argument was that by their thus acting Molon would be cut off from a return to Media, and from drawing supplies from that country, and would thereby be compelled to risk a general action: or, if he refused to do so, his troops would promptly fix their hopes upon the king.

Antiochus crosses the Tigris.

52. The suggestion of Zeuxis being approved, the army was immediately arranged in three divisions, and got across with the baggage at three points in the river. Thence they marched in the direction of Dura, where they quickly caused the siege of the citadel to be raised, which was being invested at the time by some of Molon's officers; and thence, after a march of eight successive days, they crossed the mountain called Oreicum and arrived at Apollonia.

Meanwhile Molon had heard of the king's arrival, and not feeling confidence in the inhabitants of Susiana and Babylonia, because he had conquered them so recently and by surprise, fearing also to be cut off from a retreat to Media, he determined to throw a bridge over the Tigris and get his army

across; being eager if it were possible to secure the mountain district of Apollonia, because he had great confidence in his corps of slingers called Cyrtii. He carried out his resolution, and was pushing forward in an unbroken series of forced marches. Thus it came about that, just as he was entering the district of Apollonia, the king at the head of his whole army was marching out. The advanced guard of skirmishers of the two armies fell in with each other on some high ground, and at first engaged and made trial of each other's strength; but upon the main armies on either side coming on to the ground, they separated. For the present both retired to their respective entrenchments, and encamped at a distance of forty stades from each other. When night had fallen, Molon reflected that there was some risk and disadvantage in a battle by broad daylight and in the open field between rebels and their sovereign, and he determined therefore to attack Antiochus by night. Selecting the best and most vigorous of his soldiers, he made a considerable detour, with the object of making his attack from higher ground. But having learnt during his march that ten young men had deserted in a body to the king, he gave up his design, and facing right about returned in haste to his own entrenchment where he arrived about daybreak. His arrival caused a panic in the army; for the troops in the camp, startled out of their sleep by the arrival of the returning men, were very near rushing out of the lines.

Molon also crosses the Tigris.

Abortive attempt of Molon to make a night attack on the king

53. But while Molon was doing his best to calm the panic, the king, fully prepared for the engagement, was marching his whole army out of their lines at daybreak. On his right wing he stationed his lancers under the command of Ardys, a man of proved ability in the field; next to them the Cretan allies, and next the Gallic Rhigosages. Next these he placed the foreign contingent and mercenary soldiers from Greece, and next to them he stationed his phalanx: the left wing he assigned to the cavalry called the "Companions."[1] His elephants, which

Disposition of the king's army.

[1] ἑταῖροι are cavalry; the πεζέταιροι of the Macedonian army are represented in Polybius by the Hypaspists. See *supra*, ch 27, cp. 16, 18.

were ten in number, he placed at intervals in front of the line. His reserves of infantry and cavalry he divided between the two wings, with orders to outflank the enemy as soon as the battle had begun. He then went along the line and addressed a few words of exhortation to the men suitable to the occasion; and put Hermeias and Zeuxis in command of the left wing, taking that of the right himself.

Molon's disposition.

On the other side, owing to the panic caused by his rash movement of the previous night, Molon was unable to get his men out of camp, or into position without difficulty and confusion. He did however divide his cavalry between his two wings, guessing what the disposition of the enemy would be; and stationed the scutati and Gauls, and in short all his heavy-armed men in the space between the two bodies of cavalry. His archers, slingers, and all such kind of troops he placed on the outer flank of the cavalry on either wing; while his scythed chariots he placed at intervals in front of his line. He gave his brother Neolaus command of the left wing, taking that of the right himself.

Death of Molon and his fellow-conspirators.

54. When the two armies advanced to the battle, Molon's right wing remained faithful to him, and vigorously engaged the division of Zeuxis; but the left wing no sooner came within sight of the king than it deserted to the enemy: the result of which was that Molon's army was thrown into consternation, while the king's troops were inspired with redoubled confidence. When Molon comprehended what had taken place, and found himself surrounded on every side, reflecting on the tortures which would be inflicted upon him if he were taken alive, he put an end to his own life. So too all who had taken part in the plot fled severally to their own homes, and terminated their lives in the same way. Neolaus escaped from the field and found his way into Persis, to the house of Molon's brother Alexander; and there first killed his mother and Molon's children and afterwards himself, having previously persuaded Alexander to do the same to himself. After plundering the enemy's camp, the king ordered the body of Molon to be impaled on the most conspicuous spot in Media: which the men appointed

to the work immediately did; for they took it to Callonitis and impaled it close to the pass over Mount Zagrus. The king, after plundering the enemy's camp, rebuked the rebel army in a long speech; and finally receiving them back into favour by holding out his right hand to them, appointed certain officers to lead them back to Media and settle the affairs of that district; while he himself went down to Seleucia and made arrangements for the government of the Satrapies round it, treating all with equal clemency and prudence. But Hermeias acted with his usual harshness: he got up charges against the people of Seleucia, and imposed a fine of a thousand talents upon the city; drove their magistrates, called Adeiganes, into exile; and put many Seleucians to death with various tortures, by mutilation, the sword and the rack. With great difficulty, sometimes by dissuading Hermeias, and sometimes by interposing his own authority, the king did at length put an end to these severities; and, exacting only a fine of a hundred and fifty talents from the citizens for the error they had committed, restored the city to a state of order. This being done, he left Diogenes in command of Media, and Apollodorus of Susiana; and sent Tychon, his chief military secretary, to command the district along the Persian Gulf.

Thus was the rebellion of Molon and the rising in the upper Satrapies suppressed and quieted.

Extension of the expedition. The treasonable designs of Hermeias.

55. Elated by his success, and wishing to strike awe and terror into the minds of the princes of the barbarians who were near, or conterminous with his own Satrapies, that they might never venture to aid by supplies or arms those who revolted from him, he determined to march against them. And first of all against Artabazanes, who appeared to be the most formidable and able of all the princes, and who ruled over a tribe called the Satrapeii, and others on their borders. But Hermeias was at that time afraid of an expedition farther up country, owing to its danger; and was always yearning for the expedition against Ptolemy in accordance with his original plan. When news, however, came that a son had been born to the king, thinking that Antiochus might possibly fall by the hands of the

Artabazanes.

barbarians in upper Asia, or give him opportunities of putting him out of the way, he consented to the expedition; believing that, if he could only effect the death of Antiochus, he would be guardian to his son and so sole master of the whole kingdom. This having been decided, the army crossed Mount Zagrus and entered the territory of Artabazanes, which borders on Media, and is separated from it by an intervening chain of mountains. Part of it overlooks the Pontus, near the valley of the Phasis; and it extends to the Hyrcanian Sea. Its inhabitants are numerous and warlike and especially strong in horsemen; while the district produces within itself all other things necessary for war. The dynasty has lasted from the time of the Persians, having been overlooked at the period of Alexander's conquests. But now in great alarm at the king's approach, and at his own infirmities, for he was an extremely old man, Artabazanes yielded to the force of circumstances, and made a treaty with Antiochus on his own terms.

Fall and death of Hermeias, B.C. 220.

56. It was after the settlement of this treaty that Apollophanes, the physician, who was regarded with great affection by the king, observing that Hermeias was getting beyond all bounds in his high place, began to be anxious for the king's safety, and still more suspicious and uneasy for his own. He took an opportunity, therefore, of conveying a suggestion to the king, that he had better not be too careless or unsuspicious of the audacious character of Hermeias; nor let things go on until he found himself involved in a disaster like that of his brother. "The danger," he said, "is not at all remote." And he begged him to be on his guard, and take prompt measures for the safety of himself and his friends. Antiochus owned to him that he disliked and feared Hermeias; and thanked him for the care of his person, which had emboldened him to speak to him on the subject. This conversation encouraged Apollophanes by convincing him that he had not been mistaken about the feelings and opinions of the king; and Antiochus begged him not to confine his assistance to words, but to take some practical steps to secure the safety of himself and his friends. Upon Apollophanes replying that he was ready to do anything in the world, they concerted the

following plan. On the pretext of the king being afflicted with an attack of vertigo, it was given out that the daily attendance of courtiers and officials was to be discontinued for a few days: the king and his physician thus getting the opportunity of conferring with such of his friends as he chose, who came on the pretext of visiting him. In the course of these visits suitable persons for carrying out the design were prepared and instructed; and every one readily responding to the proposal, from hatred of Hermeias, they proceeded to complete it. The physicians having prescribed walks at daybreak for Antiochus on account of the coolness, Hermeias came to the place assigned for the walk, and with him those of the king's friends who were privy to the design; while the rest were much too late on account of the time of the king's coming out being very different from what it had usually been. Thus they got Hermeias gradually a considerable distance from the camp, until they came to a certain lonely spot, and then, on the king's going a little off the road, on the pretence of a necessary purpose, they stabbed him to death. Such was the end of Hermeias, whose punishment was by no means equal to his crimes. Thus freed from much fear and embarrassment, the king set out on his march home amidst universal manifestations from the people of the country in favour of his measures and policy; but nothing was more emphatically applauded in the course of his progress than the removal of Hermeias. In Apameia, at the same time, the women stoned the wife of Hermeias to death, and the boys his sons.

57. When he had reached home and had dismissed his troops into winter quarters, Antiochus sent a message to Achaeus, protesting against his assumption of the diadem and royal title, and warning him that he was aware of his dealings with Ptolemy, and of his restless intrigues generally. For while the king was engaged on his expedition against Artabazanes, Achaeus, being persuaded that Antiochus would fall, or that, if he did not fall, would be so far off, that it would be possible for him to invade Syria before his return, and with the assistance of the Cyrrhestae, who were in revolt against the king, seize the

Attempted treason of Achaeus.

kingdom, started from Lydia with his whole army; and on arriving at Laodiceia, in Phrygia, assumed the diadem, and had the audacity for the first time to adopt the title of king, and to send royal despatches to the cities, the exile Garsyeris being his chief adviser in this measure. But as he advanced farther and farther, and was now almost at Lycaonia, a mutiny broke out among his forces, arising from the dissatisfaction of the men at the idea of being led against their natural king. When Achaeus found that this disturbed state of feeling existed among them, he desisted from his enterprise; and wishing to make his men believe that he had never had any intention of invading Syria, he directed his march into Pisidia, and plundered the country. By thus securing large booty for his army he conciliated its affection and confidence, and then returned to his own Satrapy.

58. Every detail of these transactions was known to the king: who, while sending frequent threatening messages to Achaeus, was now concentrating all his efforts on the preparations for the war against Ptolemy. Having accordingly mustered his forces at Apameia just before spring, he summoned his friends to advise with him as to the invasion of Coele-Syria. After many suggestions had been made in respect to this undertaking, touching the nature of the country, the military preparation required, and the assistance to be rendered by the fleet,—Apollophanes of Seleucia, whom I mentioned before, put an abrupt end to all these suggestions by remarking that "it was folly to desire Coele-Syria and to march against that, while they allowed Seleucia to be held by Ptolemy, which was the capital, and so to speak, the very inner shrine of the king's realm. Besides the disgrace to the kingdom which its occupation by the Egyptian monarchs involved, it was a position of the greatest practical importance, as a most admirable base of operations. Occupied by the enemy it was of the utmost hindrance to all the king's designs; for in whatever direction he might have it in his mind to move his forces, his own country, owing to the fear of danger from this place, would need as much care and precaution as the preparations against his foreign enemies. Once taken, on the

War with Ptolemy, B.C. 219.

Apollophanes advises that they begin by taking Seleucia.

other hand, not only would it perfectly secure the safety of the home district, but was also capable of rendering effective aid to the king's other designs and undertakings, whether by land or sea, owing to its commanding situation." His words carried conviction to the minds of all, and it was resolved that the capture of the town should be their first step. For Seleucia was still held by a garrison for the Egyptian kings; and had been so since the time of Ptolemy Euergetes, who took it when he invaded Syria to revenge the murder of Berenice.

59. In consequence of this decision, orders were sent to Diognetus the commander of the fleet to sail towards Seleucia: while Antiochus himself started from Apameia with his army, and encamped near the Hippodrome, about five stades from the town. He also despatched Theodotus Hemiolius with an adequate force against Coele-Syria, with orders to occupy the passes and to keep the road open for him.

Description of Seleucia.

The situation of Seleucia and the natural features of the surrounding country are of this kind. The city stands on the sea coast between Cilicia and Phoenicia[1]; and has close to it a very great mountain called Coryphaeus, which on the west is washed by the last waves of the sea which lies between Cyprus and Phoenicia; while its eastern slopes overlook the territories of Antioch and Seleucia. It is on the southern skirt of this mountain that the town of Seleucia lies, separated from it by a deep and difficult ravine. The town extends down to the sea in a straggling line broken by irregularities of the soil, and is surrounded on most parts by cliffs and precipitous rocks. On the side facing the sea, where the ground is level, stand the market-places, and the lower town strongly walled. Similarly the whole of the main town has been fortified by walls of a costly construction, and splendidly decorated with temples and other elaborate buildings. There is only one approach to it on the seaward side, which is an artificial ascent cut in the form of a stair, interrupted by frequently occurring drops and awkward places. Not far from the town is the mouth of the river Orontes, which rises in the district of Libanus and Anti-Libanus, and after traversing the plain of Amyca reaches

Antioch; through which it flows, and carrying off by the force of its current all the sewage of that town, finally discharges itself into this sea not far from Seleucia.

Capture of Seleucia.

60. Antiochus first tried sending messages to the magistrates of Seleucia, offering money and other rewards on condition of having the city surrendered without fighting. And though he failed to persuade the chief authorities, he corrupted some of the subordinate commanders; and relying on them, he made preparations to assault the town on the sea-ward side with the men of his fleet, and on the land side with his soldiers. He divided his forces therefore into three parts, and addressed suitable words of exhortation to them, causing a herald to proclaim a promise to men and officers alike of great gifts and crowns that should be bestowed for gallantry in action. To the division under Zeuxis he entrusted the attack upon the gate leading to Antioch; to Hermogenes that upon the walls near the temple of Castor and Pollux; and to Ardys and Diognetus the assault upon the docks and the lower town: in accordance with his understanding with his partisans in the town, whereby it had been agreed that, if he could carry the lower town by assault, the city also should then be put into his hands. When the signal was given, a vigorous and determined assault was begun simultaneously at all these points: though that made by Ardys and Diognetus was by far the most daring; for the other points did not admit of any assault at all by means of scaling ladders, nor could be carried except by the men climbing up on their hands and knees; while at the docks and lower town it was possible to apply scaling ladders and fix them firmly and safely against the walls. The naval contingent therefore having fixed their ladders on the docks, and the division of Ardys theirs upon the lower town, a violent effort was made to carry the walls: and the garrison of the upper town being prevented from coming to the assistance of these places, because the city was being assaulted at every other point at the same time, Ardys was not long before he captured the lower town. No sooner had this fallen, than the subordinate officers who had been corrupted hurried to the commander-in-chief Leontius, and urged that he ought to

send ambassadors to Antiochus, and make terms with him, before the city was taken by storm. Knowing nothing about the treason of these officers, but alarmed by their consternation, Leontius sent commissioners to the king to make terms for the safety of all within the city.

61. The king accepted the proposal and agreed to grant safety to all in the town who were free, amounting to six thousand souls. And when he took over the town, he not only spared the free, but also recalled those of the inhabitants who had been exiled, and restored to them their citizenship and property; while he secured the harbour and citadel with garrisons.

While still engaged in this business, he received a letter from Theodotus offering to put Coele-Syria into his hands, and inviting him to come thither with all speed. This letter caused him great embarrassment and doubt as to what he ought to do, and how best to take advantage of the offer. This Theodotus was an Aetolian who, as I have already narrated, had rendered important services to Ptolemy's kingdom: for which, far from being reckoned deserving of gratitude, he had been in imminent danger of his life, just about the time of the expedition of Antiochus against Molon. Thereupon conceiving a contempt for Ptolemy, and a distrust of his courtiers, he seized upon Ptolemais with his own hands, and upon Tyre by the agency of Panaetolus, and made haste to invite Antiochus. Postponing therefore his expedition against Achaeus, and regarding everything else as of secondary importance, Antiochus started with his army by the same route as he had come. After passing the cañon called Marsyas, he encamped near Gerrha, close to the lake which lies between the two mountains. Hearing there that Ptolemy's general Nicolaus was besieging Theodotus in Ptolemais, he left his heavy-armed troops behind with orders to their leaders to besiege Brochi,—the stronghold which commands the road along the lake,—and led his light-armed troops forward himself, with the intention of raising the siege of Ptolemais. But Nicolaus had already got intelligence of the king's approach; and had accordingly retired from Ptolemais himself, and sent forward Diogoras the

Theodotus turns against Ptolemy. See ch. 46.

Cretan and Dorymenes the Aetolian to occupy the passes at Berytus. The king therefore attacked these men, and having easily routed them took up a position near the pass.

Antiochus invades Coele-Syria.

62. There he awaited the coming up of the remainder of his forces, and, after addressing them in words befitting the occasion, continued his advance with his entire army, full of courage and with high hopes of success. When Theodotus and Panaetolus met him with their partisans he received them graciously, and took over from them Tyre and Ptolemais, and the war material which those cities contained. Part of this consisted of forty vessels, of which twenty were decked and splendidly equipped, and none with less than four banks of oars; the other twenty were made up of triremes, biremes, and cutters. These he handed over to the care of the Navarch Diognetus; and being informed that Ptolemy had come out against him, and had reached Memphis, and that all his forces were collected at Pelusium, and were opening the sluices, and filling up the wells of drinking water, he abandoned the idea of attacking Pelusium; but making a progress through the several cities, endeavoured to win them over by force or persuasion to his authority. Some of the less-fortified cities were overawed at his approach and made no difficulty about submitting, but others trusting to their fortifications or the strength of their situations held out; and to these he was forced to lay regular siege and so wasted a considerable time.

Though treated with such flagrant perfidy, the character of Ptolemy was so feeble, and his neglect of all military preparations had been so great, that the idea of protecting his rights with the sword, which was his most obvious duty, never occurred to him.

Active measures of Agathocles and Sosibius

63. Agathocles and Sosibius, however, the leading ministers in the kingdom at that time, took counsel together and did the best they could with the means at their disposal, in view of the existing crisis. They resolved to devote themselves to the preparations for war; and, meanwhile, by embassies to try to retard the advance of Antiochus: pretending to confirm him in the opinion he originally entertained about

Ptolemy, namely, that he would not venture to fight, but would trust to negotiations, and the interposition of common friends, to induce him to evacuate Coele-Syria. Having determined upon this policy, Agathocles and Sosibius, to whom the whole business was entrusted, lost no time in sending their ambassadors to Antiochus: and at the same time they sent messages to Rhodes, Byzantium, and Cyzicus, not omitting the Aetolians, inviting them to send commissioners to discuss the terms of a treaty. The commissioners duly arrived, and by occupying the time with going backwards and forwards between the two kings, abundantly secured to these statesmen the two things which they wanted,—delay, and time to make their preparations for war. They fixed their residence at Memphis and there carried on these negotiations continuously. Nor were they less attentive to the ambassadors from Antiochus, whom they received with every mark of courtesy and kindness. But meanwhile they were calling up and collecting at Alexandria the mercenaries whom they had on service in towns outside Egypt; were despatching men to recruit foreign soldiers; and were collecting provisions both for the troops they already possessed, and for those that were coming in. No less active were they in every other department of the military preparations. They took turns in going on rapid and frequent visits to Alexandria, to see that the supplies should in no point be inadequate to the undertaking before them. The manufacture of arms, the selection of men, and their division into companies, they committed to the care of Echecrates of Thessaly and Phoxidas of Melita. With these they associated Eurylochus of Magnesia, and Socrates of Boeotia, who were also joined by Cnopias of Allaria. By the greatest good fortune they had got hold of these officers, who, while serving with Demetrius and Antigonus,[1] had acquired some experience of real war and actual service in the field. Accordingly they took command of the assembled troops, and made the best of them by giving them the training of soldiers.

64. Their first measure was to divide them according to their country and age, and to assign to each division its appropriate arms, taking no account of what they had borne

[1] That is, Demetrius II. and Antigonus Doson.

before. Next they broke up their battalions and muster-rolls, which had been formed on the basis of their old system of pay, and formed them into companies adapted to the immediate purpose. Having effected this they began to drill the men; habituating them severally not only to obey the words of command, but also to the proper management of their weapons.[1] They also frequently summoned general meetings at head-quarters, and delivered speeches to the men. The most useful in this respect were Andromachus of Aspendus and Polycrates of Argos; because they had recently crossed from Greece, and were still thoroughly imbued with the Greek spirit, and the military ideas prevalent in the several states. Moreover, they were illustrious on the score of their private wealth, as well as on that of their respective countries; to which advantages Polycrates added those of an ancient family, and of the reputation obtained by his father Mnasiades as an athlete. By private and public exhortations these officers inspired their men with a zeal and enthusiasm for the struggle which awaited them.

Reorganisation of the army.

65. All these officers, too, had commands in the army suited to their particular accomplishments. Eurylochus of Magnesia commanded about three thousand men of what were called in the royal armies the Agema, or Guard; Socrates of Boeotia had two thousand light-armed troops under him; while the Achaean Phoxidas, and Ptolemy the son of Thraseas, and Andromachus of Aspendus were associated in the duty of drilling the phalanx and the mercenary Greek soldiers on the same ground, — Andromachus and Ptolemy commanding the phalanx, Phoxidas the mercenaries; of which the numbers were respectively twenty-five thousand and eight thousand. The cavalry, again, attached to the court, amounting to seven hundred, as well as that which was obtained from Lybia or enlisted in the country, were being trained by Polycrates, and were under his personal command: amounting

[1] See Professor Mahaffy, *Greek Life and Thought*, p. 405, who points out that this refers to the Egyptian troops especially, whose old military castes (see Herod. 2, 164-6) though not extinct had forgotten their old skill. In a sense, however, it applies to both kinds of troops; for they had to be trained to act *together*, as is shown in the next chapter.

in all to about three thousand men. In the actual campaign the most effective service was performed by Echecrates of Thessaly, by whom the Greek cavalry, which, with the whole body of mercenary cavalry, amounted to two thousand men, was splendidly trained. No one took more pains with the men under his command than Cnopias of Allaria. He commanded all the Cretans, who numbered three thousand, and among them a thousand Neo-Cretans,[1] over whom he had set Philo of Cnossus. They also armed three thousand Libyans in the Macedonian fashion, who were commanded by Ammonius of Barce. The Egyptians themselves supplied twenty thousand soldiers to the phalanx, and were under the command of Sosibius. A body of Thracians and Gauls was also enrolled, four thousand being taken from settlers in the country and their descendants, while two thousand had been recently enlisted and brought over: and these were under the command of Dionysius of Thrace. Such in its numbers, and in the variety of the elements of which it was composed, was the force which was being got ready for Ptolemy.

66. Meanwhile Antiochus had been engaged in the siege of Dura:[2] but the strength of the place and the support given it by Nicolaus prevented him from effecting anything; and as the winter was closing in, he agreed with the ambassadors of Ptolemy to a suspension of hostilities for four months, and promised that he would discuss the whole question at issue in a friendly spirit. But he was as far as possible from being sincere in this negotiation: his real object was to avoid being detained any length of time from his own country, and to be able to place his troops in winter quarters in Seleucia; because Achaeus was now notoriously plotting against him, and without disguise co-operating with Ptolemy. So having come to this agreement, Antiochus dismissed the ambassadors with injunctions to acquaint him as soon as possible with the decision of Ptolemy, and to meet him at Seleucia. He then placed the necessary guards in the various strongholds, committed to

Negotiations at Memphis, B C. 219-218.

[1] See above, ch. 5, note.

[2] Two different towns of this name have already been mentioned (ch. 48, 52). This Dura appears to be in Phoenicia; but nothing is known of it.

Theodotus the command-in-chief over them all, and returned home. On his arrival at Seleucia he distributed his forces into their winter quarters; and from that time forth took no pains to keep the mass of his army under discipline, being persuaded that the business would not call for any more fighting; because he was already master of some portions of Coele-Syria and Phoenicia, and expected to secure the rest by voluntary submission or by diplomacy: for Ptloemy, he believed, would not venture upon a general engagement. This opinion was shared also by the ambassadors: because Sosibius fixing his residence at Memphis conducted his negotiations with them in a friendly manner; while he prevented those who went backwards and forwards to Antiochus from ever becoming eye-witnesses of the preparations that were being carried on at Alexandria. Nay, even by the time that the ambassadors arrived, Sosibius was already prepared for every eventuality.

Antiochus's case.

67. Meanwhile Antiochus was extremely anxious to have as much the advantage over the government of Alexandria in diplomatic argument as he had in arms. Accordingly when the ambassadors arrived at Seleucia, and both parties began, in accordance with the instructions of Sosibius, to discuss the clauses of the proposed arrangement in detail, the king made very light of the loss recently sustained by Ptolemy, and the injury which had been manifestly inflicted upon him by the existing occupation of Coele-Syria; and in the pleadings on this subject he refused to look upon this transaction in the light of an injury at all, alleging that the places belonged to him of right. He asserted that the original occupation of the country by Antigonus the One-eyed, and the royal authority exercised over it by Seleucus,[1] constituted an absolutely decisive and equitable claim, in virtue of which Coele-Syria belonged of right to himself and not to Ptolemy; for Ptolemy I. went to war with Antigonus with the view of annexing this country, not to his own government, but to that of Seleucus. But, above all, he

Ptolemy, son of Lagus, B.C. 323-285.

[1] Seleucus I., B.C. 306-280. Antigonus, the One-eyed, in B C 318, occupied Coele-Syria and Phoenicia after a victory over Perdiccas. Diodor. Sic. 18, 43.

pressed the convention entered into by the three kings, Cassander, Lysimachus, and Seleucus, when, after having conquered Antigonus,[1] they deliberated in common upon the arrangements to be made, and decided that the whole of Syria should belong to Seleucus. The commissioners of Ptolemy endeavoured to establish the opposite case. They magnified the existing injury, and dilated on its hardship; asserting that the treason of Theodotus and the invasion of Antiochus amounted to a breach of treaty-rights. They alleged the possession of these places in the reign of Ptolemy, son of Lagus; and tried to show that Ptolemy had joined Seleucus in the war on the understanding that he was to invest Seleucus with the government of the whole of Asia, but was to take Coele-Syria and Phoenicia for himself.

Ptolemy's case.

Such were the arguments brought forward by the two contracting parties in the course of the embassies and counter-embassies and conferences. There was no prospect, however, of arriving at any result, because the controversy was conducted, not by the principals, but by the common friends of both; and there was no one to intervene authoritatively to check and control the caprice of the party which they might decide to be in the wrong. But what caused the most insuperable difficulty was the matter of Achaeus. For Ptolemy was eager that the terms of the treaty should include him: while Antiochus would not allow the subject to be so much as mentioned; and was indignant that Ptolemy should venture to protect rebels, or bring such a point into the discussion at all.

68. The approach of spring found both sides weary of negotiations, and with no prospect of coming to a conclusion. Antiochus therefore began collecting his forces, with a view of making an invasion by land and sea, and completing his conquest of Coele-Syria. On his part Ptolemy gave the supreme management of the war to Nicolaus, sent abundant provisions to Gaza, and despatched land and sea forces. The arrival of these reinforcements gave Nicolaus courage to enter upon the war: the commander of the navy promptly co-operating with him in carrying out all his orders. This admiral was Perigenes, whom Ptolemy sent out

Renewal of hostilities, B C. 218.

[1] Battle of Ipsus, B C. 301

in command of the fleet, consisting of thirty fully-decked ships and more than four thousand ships of burden. Nicolaus was by birth an Aetolian, and was the boldest and most experienced officer in the service of Ptolemy. With one division of his army he hastened to seize the pass at Platanus; with the rest, which he personally commanded, he occupied the environs of Porphyrion; and there prepared to resist the invasion of the king: the fleet being also anchored close to him.

Antiochus marches to Beirût.

Meanwhile Antiochus had advanced as far as Marathus. On his way he had received a deputation of Aradians, asking for an alliance; and had not only granted their request, but had put an end to a quarrel which they had amongst themselves, by reconciling those of them who lived on the island with those who lived on the mainland. Starting from Marathus he entered the enemy's country near the promontory called Theoprosopon, and advanced to Berytus, having seized Botrys on his way, and burnt Trieres and Calamus. From Berytus he sent forward Nicarchus and Theodotus with orders to secure the difficult passes near the river Lycus; while he himself set his army in motion and encamped near the river Damuras: Diognetus, the commander of his navy, coasting along parallel with him all the while. Thence once more, taking with him the divisions commanded by Theodotus and Nicarchus, which were the light troops of the army, he set out to reconnoitre the pass occupied already by Nicolaus. After thoroughly surveying the nature of the ground, he retired to his camp for that day. But on the next, leaving his heavy-armed troops in the charge of Nicarchus, he set out with the rest of his forces to execute his design.

The pass at Porphyrion

69. At this point there is but a small and narrow space between the foot of Libanus and the sea; and even that is intersected by a steep and rugged spur, leaving only a narrow and difficult passage along the very water's edge. On this pass Nicolaus had taken up his position; and having occupied some of the points by means of his large numbers, and secured others by artificial works, he felt certain that he would be able to prevent Antiochus from effecting an entrance. But

the king divided his army into three parts, of which he entrusted one to Theodotus with orders to close with the enemy and force their way along the skirts of Libanus; the second to Menedemus with urgent orders to attempt the centre of the spur; while the third he put under the command of Diocles, the military governor of Parapotamia, and ordered them to keep close to the sea. He himself with his guard occupied a central position, intending to superintend the whole action and give help where it was wanted. At the same time Diognetus and Perigenes made preparations for a sea-fight, coming as close as possible to the shore, and endeavouring to make the battles at sea and on land present the appearance of a single contest. A general advance having begun by sea and land, at the same signal and word of command, the battle on the sea was undecided, because the number of vessels on either side and their equipment were about equal: but on land the troops of Nicolaus got the best of it at first, from the advantage of their position. But when Theodotus routed the men on the mountain skirts, and then charged from the higher ground, Nicolaus's men all turned and fled precipitately. In this flight two thousand of them fell, and as many were taken prisoners: the rest retreated towards Sidon. Though he now had the better prospect of the two in the sea-fight; yet, when he saw the defeat of the army on land, Perigenes turned his prows and made good his retreat to the same place.

carried by Antiochus.

70. Thereupon Antiochus got his army on the march, and, arriving at Sidon, encamped under its wall. He did not however venture to attempt the town, because of the vast stores it contained and the number of its ordinary inhabitants, as well as of the refugees who had collected there. He therefore broke up his camp again, and continued his march towards Philoteria: ordering Diognetus his navarch to sail back with his ships to Tyre. Now Philoteria is situated right upon the shores of the lake into which the river Jordan discharges itself, and from which it issues out again into the plains surrounding Scythopolis. The surrender of these two cities

The advance of Antiochus continued.

Philoteria.

to him encouraged him to prosecute his further designs; because the country subject to them was easily able to supply his whole army with provisions, and everything necessary for the campaign in abundance. Having therefore secured them by garrisons, he crossed the mountain chain and arrived at Atabyrium, which is situated upon a rounded hill, the ascent of which is more than fifteen stades long. But on this occasion he managed to take it by an ambuscade and stratagem. He induced the men of the town to come out to a skirmish, and enticed their leading columns to a considerable distance; then his troops suddenly turned from their pretended flight, and those who were concealed rising from their ambush, he attacked and killed a large number of the enemy; and finally, by pursuing close upon their heels, and thus creating a panic in the town before he reached it, he carried it as he had done others by assault. At this juncture Ceraeas, one of Ptolemy's officers, deserted to Antiochus, whose distinguished reception caused great excitement in the minds of many other of the enemy's officers. At any rate, not long afterwards, Hippolochus of Thessaly joined Antiochus with four hundred cavalry of Ptolemy's army. Having therefore secured Atabyrium also with a garrison, Antiochus started once more and took over Pella, Camus, and Gephrus.

Scythopolis.

Atabyrium.

Defections from Ptolemy.

Pella, Camus, Gephrus.

71. This unbroken stream of success caused the inhabitants of the neighbouring Arabia to rouse each other up to take action; and they unanimously joined Antiochus. With the additional encouragement and supplies which they afforded he continued his advance; and, arriving in the district of Galatis, made himself master of Abila, and the relieving force which had thrown itself into that town, under the command of Nicias, a friend and kinsman of Menneas Gadara was the only town now left, which is thought to be the strongest of any in those parts. He therefore encamped under its walls and, bringing siege-works to bear upon it, quickly terrified it into submission. Then hearing that a strong force of the enemy were concentrated at Rabbatamana in Arabia,

Abila.

Gadara.

Rabbatamana.

and were pillaging and overrunning the territory of those Arabians who had joined him, he threw everything else aside and started thither; and pitched his camp at the foot of the high ground on which that city stands. After going round and reconnoitring the hill, and finding that it admitted of being ascended only at two points, he led his army to them and set up his siege artillery at these points. He put one set of siege-works under the care of Nicarchus, the other under that of Theodotus: while he superintended both equally, and observed the zeal shown by the two respectively. Great exertions were accordingly made by each, and a continual rivalry kept up as to which should be the first to make a breach in the wall opposite their works: and the result was that both breaches were made with unexpected rapidity; whereupon they kept making assaults night and day, and trying every means to force an entrance, without an hour's intermission. But though they kept up these attempts continuously, they failed to make any impression; until a prisoner showed them the underground passage through which the besieged were accustomed to descend to fetch water. They broke into this and stopped it up with timber and stones and everything of that sort; and when this was done, the garrison surrendered for want of water. Having thus got possession of Rabbatamana, Antiochus left Nicarchus with an adequate garrison in command of it; and sent the two deserters from Ptolemy, Hippolochus and Ceraeas, with five thousand infantry, to Samaria: with orders to take the government of the district and protect all who submitted to him. He then started with his army for Ptolemais, where he was resolved to winter.

Fall of Rabbatamana.

Samaria.

Antiochus goes into winter quarters, B.C. 218-217.

72. In the course of this same summer, the Pednelissians, being besieged and reduced to great straits by the Selgians, sent messages to Achaeus asking for help: and upon receiving a ready assent, continued to sustain the siege with great spirit in reliance upon this hope of relief. Achaeus selected Garsyeris to conduct the expedition; and sent him out in all haste, with six thousand

Asia-Minor,[1] B.C. 218. Relief of Pednelissus.

[1] See *ante*, ch. 40-2, 57-8.

infantry and five hundred horse, to relieve the Pednelissians. But when they heard of the approach of the army of relief, the Selgians occupied the pass called the Stair with the main body of their own army; and put a garrison at the entrance into Saperda: breaking up and spoiling all the paths and tracks leading to it. After entering Milyades and encamping under the walls of Cretopolis, perceiving that a farther advance was made impossible by the occupation of these positions by the enemy, Garsyeris hit upon the following ruse. He broke up his camp, and began his return march, as though he had abandoned all thoughts of relieving Pednelissus, owing to the enemy's occupation of these positions. The Selgians were readily persuaded that he had really abandoned the relief of Pednelissus, and departed, some to the besieging camp and others home to Selge, as it was now close upon harvest-time. Thereupon Garsyeris faced about, and, marching with great speed, arrived at the pass over the mountain; and finding it unguarded, secured it by a garrison, under the command of Phayllus; while he himself with his main army went to Perga: and thence sent embassies to the other states in Pisidia and Pamphylia, pointing out that the power of the Selgians was a standing menace, and urging all to ally themselves with Achaeus and join in relieving Pednelissus.

73. Meanwhile the Selgians had sent out a general in command of a force which they hoped would terrify Phallyus by their superior knowledge of the country, and expel him from his strong position. But when, far from attaining their object, they lost large numbers of men in their attacks upon him; though they abandoned the hope of accomplishing this, they yet persisted with increased ardour in the siege of Pednelissus. Garsyeris was now reinforced by eight thousand hoplites from the Etennes, who inhabit the highlands of Pisidia above Side, and half that number from Aspendus. The people of Side itself, partly from a wish to curry favour with Antiochus, but chiefly from hatred to the Aspendians, refused to take part in the relief of Pednelissus. With these reinforcements, as well as his own army, Garsyeris advanced towards Pednelissus, feeling certain that he would be able to raise the siege at the

first attack: but when the Selgians showed no sign of alarm, he entrenched himself at a moderate distance from them. The Pednelissians were now becoming hard pressed from want of provisions; and Garsyeris, being anxious to do all he could, got ready two thousand men, giving each a medimnus of wheat, and despatched them under cover of night into Pednelissus. But the Selgians getting intelligence of what was going on, and, coming out to intercept them, most of those who were carrying in the corn were killed, and the Selgians got possession of the wheat. Elated with this success, they now essayed to storm the camp of Garsyeris as well as the city. An adventurous daring in the presence of the enemy is indeed characteristic of the Selgians: and on this occasion they left a barely sufficient number to guard their camp; and, surrounding the enemy's entrenchment with the rest, assaulted it at several points at once. Finding himself unexpectedly attacked on every side, and portions of his palisade being already torn down, Garsyeris, appreciating the gravity of the danger, and feeling that there was but little chance of averting total destruction, sent out some cavalry at a point which the enemy had left unguarded. These the Selgians imagined to be flying in a panic and for fear of what was coming: and therefore, instead of attending to them, they treated them with utter contempt. When these horsemen, however, had ridden round, so as to get on the rear of the enemy, they charged and fought with great fierceness. This raised the spirits of Garsyeris's infantry, though they had already given way: and they therefore faced round, and once more offered resistance to the troops that were storming their camp. The Selgians, accordingly, being now attacked on front and rear at once, broke and fled. At the same time the Pednelissians sallied out and attacked the troops left in charge of the Selgian camp, and drove them out. The pursuit lasted to so great a distance that no less than ten thousand of the Selgian army fell: of the survivors all who were allies fled to their own cities; while the Selgians themselves escaped over the highlands into their native land.

74. Garsyeris immediately started in pursuit of the fugitives, being in haste to get over the narrow pass, and approach Selge, before they could make a stand, and form any

plan for meeting his approach. Thus he came to Selge with his army. But the inhabitants, having no longer any hopes in their allies, after the disaster which had affected them all alike, and themselves dispirited at the misfortune which had befallen them, became exceedingly anxious for the safety of themselves and their country. They accordingly determined in public assembly to send one of their citizens on an embassy to Gassyeris; and selected for the purpose Logbasis, who had been for a long time on terms of intimacy and friendship with the Antiochus that lost his life in Thrace.[1] Laodice,[2] also, who became afterwards the wife of Achaeus, having been committed to his care, he had brought this young lady up as his daughter, and had treated her with conspicuous kindness. The Selgians therefore thought that his character made him eminently fitted for an ambassador in the circumstances, and accordingly sent him on the mission. He, however, obtained a private interview with Garsyeris, and was so far from carrying out the purpose for which he came, by properly supporting the interests of his country, that on the contrary he strongly urged Garsyeris to send with all speed for Achaeus, and undertook to put the city into their hands. Garsyeris, of course, grasped eagerly at the chance offered to him and sent messengers to induce Achaeus to come, and to inform him of the position of affairs. Meanwhile he concluded an armistice with the Selgians, and protracted the negotiations for a treaty by continually bringing forward objections and scruples on points of detail, in order to give time for the arrival of Achaeus, and for Logbasis to conduct his negotiations and mature his plot.

Panic at Selge.

Logbasis turns traitor.

75. While this was going on frequent meetings for discussion took place between the camp and the town, and it became quite an ordinary thing for the soldiers to go into the town to purchase corn. This is a state of things which has on many occasions proved fatal. And it appears to me that of all animals the most easily deceived is man, though he has the credit of being the most cunning. For consider how

[1] Antiochus Hierax, son of Antiochus II.

[2] Laodice was sister of the wife of Antiochus (5, 43) and a daughter of King Mithridates (8, 22-23).

many entrenched camps and fortresses, how many and wha great cities have been betrayed by this kind of trick! And ye in spite of such frequent and conspicuous examples of the man people to whom it has happened, somehow or another we ar always new to such deceit, and fall into the trap with the inex perience of youth. The reason is that we do not keep read for reference in our minds the disasters of those who have mad mistakes before us in this or that particular. But while prepar ing with great labour and cost stores of corn and money, and provision of walls and weapons to meet unforeseen eventualities that which is the easiest of all and the most serviceable in th hour of danger—that we all neglect; although we might obtai this experience from history and research, which in themselve add a dignity to leisure and a charm to existence.

Failure of the treason of Logbasis

Achaeus then duly arrived at the time expected: and afte conference with him, the Selgians had great hopes of experiencing some signal kindness at his hands. But in the interval Logbasis had little by little collected in his house some of the soldiers wh came into the town from the camp; and now advised th citizens not to let slip the opportunity, but to act with th display of Achaeus's kindly disposition towards them before thei eyes; and to put the finishing stroke to the treaty, after holdin a general assembly of the whole community to discuss th situation. An assembly was at once convened, to which ever those on guard were all summoned to assist in bringing th treaty to completion; and the citizens began deliberating o the state of affairs.

76. Meanwhile Logbasis, who had agreed with the enem to take that opportunity, began getting ready those who ha congregated at his house, and prepared and armed himsel and his sons also for the fight. And now Achaeus with hal the hostile force was advancing towards the city itself; whil Garsyeris with the remainder was marching towards th Cesbedium as it is called, or temple of Zeus, which stand in a position commanding the city and presenting very muc the appearance of a citadel. But a goatherd, having b chance observed what was going on, brought the news to th assembly; thereupon some of the citizens made a hurried rus

to the Cesbedium, others to their posts on the wall, and the majority in great anger to the house of Logbasis. His treasonable practice being thus detected, some of them climbed upon the roof, others forced their way in by the front door, and murdered Logbasis and his sons and all the other men which they found there at the same time. Then they caused a proclamation to be made promising freedom to all slaves who would join them: and dividing themselves into three companies, they hastened to defend all the points of vantage. When he saw that the Cesbeduim was already occupied, Garsyeris abandoned his enterprise; but Achaeus held on his way until he came right up to the gates: whereupon the Selgians sallied out, killed seven hundred, and forced the rest to give up the attempt. Upon this conclusion of their enterprise, Achaeus and Garsyeris retired to the camp. But the Selgians fearing treason among themselves, and alarmed at the presence of a hostile camp, sent out some of their elders in the guise of suppliants, and concluded a peace, on condition of paying four hundred talents on the spot and restoring the Pednelissians whom they had taken prisoners, and paying a further sum of three hundred talents at a fixed date. Thus did the Selgians by their own valour save their country, which they had been in danger of losing through the infamous treason of Logbasis; and thus neither disgraced their freedom, nor their relationship to the Lacedaemonians.[1]

77. But after reducing Milyas, and the greater part of Pamphylia, Achaeus took his departure, and arriving at Sardis kept up a continuous warfare with Attalus, and began threatening Prusias, and making himself an object of terror and alarm to all the inhabitants on this side Taurus.

The expedition of Attalus to recover cities which had joined Achaeus.

But while Achaeus was engaged on his expedition against Selge, Attalus with the Aegosagae from Gaul was going through all the cities in Aeolis, and the neighbourhood, which had before this been terrified into joining Achaeus; but most of which now voluntarily and even gratefully gave in their adherence to him, though there were some few which waited to be forced. Now the cities which transferred their

[1] Selge was said to be a colony of the Lacedaemonians Strabo, 13, 7, 3.

allegiance to him in the first instance were Cyme, Smyrna, and Phocaea; after them Aegae and Temnus submitted, in terror at his approach; and thereupon he was waited upon by ambassadors from Teos and Colophon with offers to surrender themselves and their cities. He received them also upon the same terms as they had enjoyed before, taking hostages; but he treated the ambassadors from Smyrna with special kindness, because they had been the most constant in their loyalty of all. Continuing his march without interruption, he crossed the Lycus and arrived at the hamlets of Mysia, and thence came to Carseae. Overawing the inhabitants of this town, as well as the garrison of the Two Walls, he got them surrendered to him by Themistocles, who had been, as it happened, left by Achaeus in command of this district. Starting thence, and wasting the plain of Apia, he crossed Mount Pelecas and encamped near the river Megistus.

78. While he was here an eclipse of the moon occurred: and the Gauls who had all along been much discontented at the hardships of the march,—which was rendered the more painful for them by the fact of their being accompanied by their wives and children, who followed the host in waggons,—now regarded the eclipse as an evil augury, and refused to go on. But King Attalus, who got no effective service out of them, and saw that they straggled during the march and encamped by themselves, and wholly declined to obey orders and despised all authority, was in great doubt as to what to do. He was anxious less they should desert to Achaeus, and join in an attack upon himself: and was at the same time uneasy at the scandal to which he would give rise, if he caused his soldiers to surround and kill all these men, who were believed to have crossed into Asia in reliance on his honour. He therefore seized the occasion of their refusal to proceed, to promise them that he would see that they were taken back to the place where they had crossed into Asia; would assign them suitable lands for a settlement; and would afterwards do them any service they asked for, if it was within his power and consistent with justice.

Mutiny of the Gauls.

Accordingly Attalus led the Aegosagae back to the Helles-

pont; and after negotiations with the people of Lampsacus, Ilium, and Alexandria, conducted in a friendly spirit because they had preserved their loyalty to him, he returned with his army to Pergamum.

79. At the beginning of the following spring, having all preparations for war completed, Antiochus and Ptolemy determined to bring their claims to Coele-Syria to the decision of a battle. Ptolemy accordingly set out from Alexandria with seventy thousand infantry, five thousand cavalry, and seventy-three elephants. Being informed of his approach, Antiochus drew his forces together. These consisted of Daae, Carmani, and Cilicians, equipped as light-armed troops to the number of about five thousand, under the charge and command of Byttacus the Macedonian. Under Theodotus, the Aetolian, who had deserted from Ptolemy, were ten thousand picked men from the whole kingdom, armed in the Macedonian fashion, most of whom had silver shields. The number of the phalanx was twenty thousand, and they were led by Nicarchus and Theodotus Hemiolius. In addition to these there were Agrianes and Persians, who were either bowmen or slingers, to the number of two thousand. With them were a thousand Thracians, under the command of Menedemus of Alabanda. There was also a mixed force of Medes, Cissians, Cadusians, and Carmanians, amounting to five thousand men, who were assigned to the chief command of Aspasianus the Mede. Certain Arabians also and men of neighbouring tribes, to the number of ten thousand, were commanded by Zabdibelus. The mercenaries from Greece amounting to five thousand were led by Hippolochus of Thessaly. Antiochus had also fifteen hundred Cretans who came with Eurylochus, and a thousand Neo-Cretans commanded by Zelys of Gortyna; with whom were five hundred javelin-men of Lydia, and a thousand Cardaces who came with Lysimachus the Gaul. The entire number of his horse was six thousand; four thousand were commanded by the king's nephew Antipater, the rest by Themison: so that the whole

B.C. 217. Antiochus and Ptolemy recommence hostilities in the spring.

Ptolemy's army: 70,000 infantry, 5000 cavalry, 73 elephants.

The army of Antiochus: 62,000 infantry, 6000 cavalry, 102 elephants.

number of Antiochus's force was sixty-two thousand infantry, six thousand cavalry, and one hundred and two elephants.

80. Having marched to Pelusium Ptolemy made his first halt in that town: and having been there joined by the stragglers, and having given out their rations of corn to his men, he got the army in motion, and led them by a line of march which goes through the waterless region skirting Mount Casius and the Marshes.[1] On the fifth day's march he reached his destination, and pitched his camp a distance of fifty stades from Rhaphia, which is the first city of Coele-Syria towards Egypt.

Ptolemy enters Palestine

While Ptolemy was effecting this movement Antiochus arrived with his army at Gaza, where he was joined by some reinforcements, and once more commenced his advance, proceeding at a leisurely pace. He passed Rhaphia and encamped about ten stades from the enemy. For a while the two armies preserved this distance, and remained encamped opposite each other. But after some few days, wishing to remove to more advantageous ground and to inspire confidence in his troops, Antiochus pushed forward his camp so much nearer Ptolemy, that the palisades of the two camps were not more than five stades from each other; and while in this position, there were frequent struggles at the watering-places and on forays, as well as infantry and cavalry skirmishes in the space between the camps.

Antiochus goes to meet him.

81. In the course of these proceedings Theodotus conceived and put into execution an enterprise, very characteristic of an Aetolian, but undoubtedly requiring great personal courage. Having formerly lived at Ptolemy's court he knew the king's tastes and habits. Accordingly, accompanied by two others, he entered the enemy's camp just before daybreak; where, owing to the dim light, he could not be recognised by his face, while his dress and other accoutrements did not render him noticeable, owing to the variety of costume prevailing among themselves. He had marked the position of the king's tent during the

Daring attempt of Theodotus to assassinate Ptolemy.

[1] Called Barathra. See Strabo, 17, 1, 21.

preceding days, for the skirmishes took place quite close; and he now walked boldly up to it, and passed through all the outer ring of attendants without being observed: but when he came to the tent in which the king was accustomed to transact business and dine, though he searched it in every conceivable way, he failed to find the king; for Ptolemy slept in another tent, separate from the public and official tent. He however wounded two men who were sleeping there, and killed Andreas, the king's physician; and then returned safely to his own camp, without meeting with any molestation, except just as he was passing over the vallum of the enemy's camp. As far as daring went, he had fulfilled his purpose: but he had failed in prudence by not taking the precaution to ascertain where Ptolemy was accustomed to sleep.

Disposition of the two armies for the battle of Rhaphia.

82. After being encamped opposite each other for five days, the two kings resolved to bring matters to the decision of battle. And upon Ptolemy beginning to move his army outside its camp, Antiochus hastened to do the same. Both formed their front of their phalanx and men armed in the Macedonian manner. But Ptolemy's two wings were formed as follows:—Polycrates, with the cavalry under his command, occupied the left, and between him and the phalanx were Cretans standing close by the horsemen; next them came the royal guard;[1] then the peltasts under Socrates, adjoining the Libyans armed in Macedonian fashion. On the right wing was Echecrates of Thessaly, with his division of cavalry; on his left were stationed Gauls and Thracians; next them Phoxidas and the Greek mercenaries, extending to the Egyptian phalanx. Of the elephants forty were on the left wing, where Ptolemy was to be in person during the battle; the other thirty-three had been stationed in front of the right wing opposite the mercenary cavalry.

Antiochus also placed sixty of his elephants commanded by his foster-brother Philip in front of his right wing, on which he was to be present personally, to fight opposite Ptolemy. Behind these he stationed the two thousand cavalry commanded by Antipater, and two thousand more at right angles to them.

[1] Agema. See note on 5, 25

In line with the cavalry he placed the Cretans, and next them the Greek mercenaries; with the latter he mixed two thousand of these armed in the Macedonian fashion under the command of the Macedonian Byttacus. At the extreme point of the left wing he placed two thousand cavalry under the command of Themison; by their side Cardacian and Lydian javelin-men; next them the light-armed division of three thousand, commanded by Menedemus; then the Cissians, Medes, and Carmanians; and by their side the Arabians and neighbouring peoples who continued the line up to the phalanx. The remainder of the elephants he placed in front of his left wing under the command of Myiscus, one of the boys about the court.

83. The two armies having been drawn up in the order I have described; the kings went along their respective lines, and addressed words of encouragement and exhortation to their officers and friends. But as they both rested their strongest hopes on their phalanx, they showed their greatest earnestness and addressed their strongest exhortations to them; which were re-echoed in Ptolemy's case by Andromachus and Sosibius and the king's sister Arsinoe; in the case of Antiochus by Theodotus and Nicarchus: these officers being the commanders of the phalanx in the two armies respectively. The substance of what was said on both sides was the same: for neither monarch had any glorious or famous achievement of his own to quote to those whom he was addressing, seeing that they had but recently succeeded to their crowns; but they endeavoured to inspire the men of the phalanx with spirit and boldness, by reminding them of the glory of their ancestors, and the great deeds performed by them. But they chiefly dwelt upon the hopes of advancement which the men might expect at their hands in the future; and they called upon and exhorted the leaders and the whole body of men, who were about to be engaged, to maintain the fight with a manly and courageous spirit. So with these or similar words, delivered by their own lips or by interpreters, they rode along their lines.

Addresses to the two armies before the battle of Rhaphia.

84. Ptolemy, accompanied by his sister, having arrived at

the left wing of his army, and Antiochus with the royal guard at the right: they gave the signal for the battle, and opened the fight by a charge of elephants. Only some few of Ptolemy's elephants came to close quarters with the foe: seated on these the soldiers in the howdahs maintained a brilliant fight, lunging at and striking each other with crossed pikes.[1] But the elephants themselves fought still more brilliantly, using all their strength in the encounter, and pushing against each other, forehead to forehead.

The battle of Rhaphia.

The way in which elephants fight is this: they get their tusks entangled and jammed, and then push against one another with all their might, trying to make each other yield ground until one of them proving superior in strength has pushed aside the other's trunk; and when once he can get a side blow at his enemy, he pierces him with his tusks as a bull would with his horns. Now, most of Ptolemy's animals, as is the way with Libyan elephants, were afraid to face the fight: for they cannot stand the smell or the trumpeting of the Indian elephants, but are frightened at their size and strength, I suppose, and run away from them at once without waiting to come near them. This is exactly what happened on this occasion: and upon their being thrown into confusion and being driven back upon their own lines, Ptolemy's guard gave way before the rush of the animals; while Antiochus, wheeling his men so as to avoid the elephants, charged the division of cavalry under Polycrates. At the same time the Greek mercenaries stationed near the phalanx, and behind the elephants, charged Ptolemy's peltasts and made them give ground, the elephants having already thrown their ranks also into confusion. Thus Ptolemy's whole left wing began to give way before the enemy.

Fighting elephants.

Antiochus's right wing successful.

85. Echecrates the commander of the right wing waited at first to see the result of the struggle between the other wings of the two armies: but when he saw the dust coming his way, and that the elephants opposite his division were afraid even to approach

Ptolemy's right wing also successful.

[1] Sarissae, the long Macedonian spears.

the hostile elephants at all, he ordered Phoxidas to charge the part of the enemy opposite him with his Greek mercenaries; while he made a flank movement with the cavalry and the division behind the elephants; and so getting out of the line of the hostile elephants' attack, charged the enemy's cavalry on the rear or the flank and quickly drove them from their ground. Phoxidas and his men were similarly successful: for they charged the Arabians and Medes and forced them into precipitate flight. Thus Antiochus's right wing gained a victory, while his left was defeated. The phalanxes, left without the support of either wing, remained intact in the centre of the plain, in a state of alternate hope and fear for the result. Meanwhile Antiochus was assisting in gaining the victory on his right wing; while Ptolemy, who had retired behind his phalanx, now came forward in the centre, and showing himself in the view of both armies struck terror in the hearts of the enemy, but inspired great spirit and enthusiasm in his own men; and Andromachus and Sosibius at once ordered them to lower their sarissae and charge. The picked Syrian troops stood their ground only for a short time, and the division of Nicarchus quickly broke and fled. Antiochus presuming, in his youthful inexperience, from the success of his own division, that he would be equally victorious all along the line, was pressing on the pursuit; but upon one of the older officers at length giving him warning, and pointing out that the cloud of dust raised by the phalanx was moving towards their own camp, he understood too late what was happening; and endeavoured to gallop back with the squadron of royal cavalry on to the field. But finding his whole line in full retreat he was forced to retire to Rhaphia: comforting himself with the belief that, as far as he was personally concerned, he had won a victory, but had been defeated in the whole battle by the want of spirit and courage shown by the rest.

The centre coming into action, Ptolemy is victorious

Final retreat of Antiochus.

86. Having secured the final victory by his phalanx, and killed large numbers of the enemy in the pursuit by means of his cavalry and mercenaries on his right wing, Ptolemy retired to his own camp and there spent the night. But next day,

after picking up and burying his own dead, and stripping the bodies of the enemy, he advanced towards Rhaphia. Antiochus had wished, immediately after the retreat of his army, to make a camp outside the city; and there rally such of his men as had fled in compact bodies: but finding that the greater number had retreated into the town, he was compelled to enter it himself also. Next morning, however, before daybreak, he led out the relics of his army and made the best of his way to Gaza. There he pitched a camp: and having sent an embassy to obtain leave to pick up his dead, he obtained a truce for performing their obsequies. His loss amounted to nearly ten thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry killed, and four thousand taken prisoners. Three elephants were killed on the field, and two died afterwards of their wounds. On Ptolemy's side the losses were fifteen hundred infantry killed and seven hundred cavalry: sixteen of his elephants were killed, and most of the others captured.

The losses on either side.

Such was the result of the battle of Rhaphia between kings Ptolemy and Antiochus for the possession of Coele-Syria.

After picking up his dead Antiochus retired with his army to his own country: while Ptolemy took over Rhaphia and the other towns without difficulty, all the states vying with each other as to which should be first to renew their allegiance and come over to him. And perhaps it is the way of the world everywhere to accommodate one's self to circumstances at such times; but it is eminently true of the race inhabiting that country, that they have a natural turn and inclination to worship success. Moreover it was all the more natural in this case, owing to the existing disposition of the people in favour of the Alexandrian kings; for the inhabitants of Coele-Syria are somehow always more loyally disposed to this family than to any other. Accordingly they now stopped short of no extravagance of adulation, honouring Ptolemy with crowns, sacrifices, and every possible compliment of the kind.

The effect of the battle of Rhaphia.

87. Meanwhile Antiochus, on arriving at the city which bears his own name, immediately despatched an embassy to Ptolemy, consisting of Antipater, his nephew, and Theodotus

Hemiolius, to treat of a peace, in great alarm lest the enemy should advance upon him. For his defeat had inspired him with distrust of his own forces, and he was afraid that Achaeus would seize the opportunity to attack him. It did not occur to Ptolemy to take any of these circumstances into account: but being thoroughly satisfied with his unexpected success, and generally at his unlooked for acquisition of Coele-Syria, he was by no means indisposed to peace; but even more inclined to it than he ought to have been: influenced in that direction by the habitual effeminacy and corruption of his manner of life. Accordingly, when Antipater and his colleague arrived, after some little bluster and vituperation of Antiochus for what had taken place, he agreed to a truce for a year. He sent Sosibius back with the ambassadors to ratify the treaty: while he himself, after remaining three months in Syria and Phoenicia, and settling the towns, left Andromachus of Aspendus as governor of this district, and started with his sister and friends for Alexandria: having brought the war to a conclusion in a way that surprised his subjects, when they contrasted it with the principles on which he spent the rest of his life. Antiochus after exchanging ratifications of the treaty with Sosibius, employed himself in making preparations for attacking Achaeus, as he had originally begun doing. Such was the political situation in Asia.

Peace between Ptolemy and Antiochus for a year, B C. 217.

88. About the same period the earthquake occurred at Rhodes, which overthrew the great Colossus and the larger part of the walls and dockyards. But the adroit policy of the Rhodians converted this misfortune into an opportunity; and under their skilful management, instead of adding to their embarrassments, it became the means of restoring their prosperity. So decisive in human affairs, public or private, is the difference between incapacity and good sense, between idle indifference and a close attention to business. Good fortune only damages the one, while disaster is but a means of recovery to the other. This was illustrated by the manner in which the Rhodians turned the misfortune that befel them to account. They enhanced its magnitude and importance by the prominence which they gave

Earthquake at Rhodes. Royal liberality, B.C 224.

it, and the serious tone in which they spoke of it, as well by the mouth of their ambassadors as in the intercourse of private life; and they created thus such an effect upon other states, and especially upon the feelings of the kings, that they were not only overwhelmed with presents, but made the donors feel actually obliged for their acceptance of them. Hiero and Gelo, for instance, presented them with seventy-five talents of silver, part at once, and the rest at a very short interval, as a contribution towards the expenses of the gymnasium; gave them for religious purposes some silver cauldrons and their stands, and some water vessels; and in addition to this ten talents for their sacrifices, and ten more to attract new citizens: their intention being that the whole present should amount to a hundred talents.[1] Not only so, but they gave immunity from customs to Rhodian merchants coming to their ports; and presented them besides with fifty catapults of three cubits length. In spite too of these large gifts, they regarded themselves as under an obligation to the Rhodians; and accordingly erected statues in the *Deigma* or Mart of Rhodes, representing the community of Rhodes crowned by that of Syracuse.

Hiero and Gelo.

89. Then too Ptolemy offered them three hundred talents of silver; a million medimni[2] of corn; ship timber for ten quinqueremes and ten triremes, consisting of forty thousand cubits of squared pine planking; a thousand talents of bronze coinage; three thousand talents[3] of tow; three thousand pieces of sail cloth; three thousand talents for the repair of the Colossus; a hundred master builders with three hundred and fifty workmen, and fourteen talents yearly to pay their wages. Besides this he gave twelve thousand medimni of corn for their public games and sacrifices, and twenty thousand medimni for victualling ten triremes. The greater part of these goods was delivered at once, as well as a third of the whole of the

Ptolemy.

[1] Polybius therefore reckons the value of the λέβητες and ὐδρίαι as five talents.

[2] That is about 171,000 lbs, see 34, 8, note, reckoning the talent as = 57 lbs.

[3] ἀρτάβη, an Egyptian measure = the Attic medimnus.

money named. In a similar spirit Antigonus offered ten thousand timbers, varying from sixteen to eight cubits in length, to be used as purlins; five thousand rafters seven cubits long; three thousand talents of iron; a thousand talents of pitch; a thousand amphorae of the same unboiled; and a hundred talents of silver besides. His queen, Chryseis, also gave a hundred thousand medimni of corn, and three thousand talents of lead. Again Seleucus,[1] father of Antiochus, besides granting freedom from imports to Rhodians sailing to his dominions, and besides giving ten quinqueremes fully equipped, and two hundred thousand medimni of corn; gave also ten thousand cubits of timber, and a thousand talents of resin and hair. Antigonus.

90. Nor were Prusias and Mithridates far behind these in liberality; nor the princes Lysanias, Olympichus, and Lymnaeas, who were at that time in power in different parts of Asia; and as for states that, according to their several abilities contributed to their assistance, it would be difficult to reckon their number. In fact, though when we regard the time which it took the city to recover its populousness, and the state of desolation from which it started, we cannot fail to be struck at the rapidity and the extent of its improvement in regard both to private and public wealth; yet when we contemplate the natural advantages of its site, and the contributions from outside which served to raise its fortunes to their original height, this feeling must give way to a conviction that the advance was somewhat less than might have been expected. Other princes.

My object in giving these details is twofold. I wished to exhibit the brilliant conduct of their public affairs by the Rhodians, for indeed they deserve both to be commended and imitated: and I wished also to point out the insignificance of the gifts bestowed by the kings of our own day, and received by nations and states; that these monarchs may not imagine that by the expenditure of four or five talents they are doing anything so very great, or expect to receive at the hands of the Greeks the honour enjoyed by former kings; and that states when they see before their eyes the magnitude of the presents

[1] Callinicus, ob. B.C. 226. This must refer to another case.

formerly bestowed, may not, nowadays, in return for insignificant and paltry benefactions, blindly bestow their most ample and splendid honours; but may use that discrimination in apportioning their favours to desert, in which Greeks excel the rest of the world.

B.C. 217. Greece. Return of Lycurgus to Sparta. He projects an invasion of Messenia.

91. Just at the beginning of this summer, while Agetas was Strategus of the Aetolians, and when Aratus had just become Strategus of the Achaean league, — at which point we broke off in our history of the Social war,[1]—Lycurgus of Sparta returned home from Aetolia. The Ephors had discovered that the charge on which he had been banished was false; and had accordingly sent for him back, and recalled him from exile. He at once began making an arrangement with Pyrrhias the Aetolian, who happened at the time to be commander in Elis, for an invasion of Messenia.

The preparations of Aratus.

Now, when Aratas came into office, he found the mercenary army of the league in a state of complete demoralisation, and the cities very slack to pay the tax for their support, owing to the bad and spiritless manner in which his predecessor Eperatus had managed the affairs of the league. He, however, exhorted the members of the league to reform, and obtained a decree dealing with this matter; and then threw himself with energy into the preparations for the war. The decree passed by the Achaeans ordered the maintenance of eight thousand mercenary infantry and five hundred horse, together with three thousand Achaean infantry and three hundred horse, enrolled in the usual way; and that of these latter five hundred foot and fifty horse were to be brazen-shield men from Megalopolis, and the same number of Argives. It ordered also that three ships should be manned to cruise off Acte and in the Argolic gulf, and three off Patrae and Dyme, and in the sea there.

92. While Aratus was engaged in these transactions, and in completing these preparations, Lycurgus and Pyrrhias, after

[1] See *ante*, ch. 30. Agetas had been elected Aetolian Strategus in the autumn of 218 B.C., Aratus Achaean Strategus in the early summer of B.C. 217.

an interchange of messages to secure their making their expedition at the same time, marched into Messenia. The Achaean Strategus, aware of their design, came with the mercenaries and some of the picked Achaeans to Megalopolis, with the view of supporting the Messenians. After setting out, Lycurgus got possession of Calamae, a stronghold in Messenia, by treachery; and pressed hurriedly forward to effect a junction with the Aetolians. But Pyrrhias had started from Elis with a wholly inadequate force, and, having been easily stopped at the pass into Messenia by the Cyparissians, had turned back. Lycurgus therefore being unable to effect his junction with Pyrrhias, and not being strong enough by himself, after assaulting Andania for a short time, returned back to Sparta without having effected anything.

The ill-success of Lycurgus

When the plot of the enemy had thus gone to pieces; Aratus, with a provident regard for the future, arranged with Taurion to provide fifty horse and five hundred foot, and with the Messenians to send an equal number; with the view of using these men to protect the territories of Messenia, Megalopolis, Tegea, and Argos,—for these districts, being on the frontier of Laconia, have to bear the brunt of Lacedaemonian invasion for the rest of the Peloponnese; while with the Achaean levies and mercenaries he planned to guard the parts of Achaia which lay towards Elis and Aetolia.

93. After adjusting these matters, he settled in accordance with the decree of the league the intestine disputes at Megalopolis. For it happened that the people of this town having been recently deprived of their country by Cleomenes,[1] and, to use a common expression, shaken to their foundations, were in absolute want of many things, and ill-provided with all: for they persisted in maintaining their usual scale of living, while their means both public and private were entirely crippled. The consequence was that the town was filled with disputes, jealousies, and mutual hatred; which is ever the case, both with states and individuals, when means fall short of desires. The first controversy was about the walling of the

Condition of Megalopolis.

[1] See 2, 61-4. B.C. 222.

town,—one party maintaining that the limits of the city should be contracted to a size admitting of being completely walled and guarded at a time of danger; for that in the late occasion it was its size and unguarded state which had caused their disaster. In addition to this it was maintained by this party that the landowners should contribute the third part of their land to provide for the enrolment of new citizens. The other party rejected the notion of contracting the limits of the city and would not consent to contribute a third part of their lands. But the most serious controversy of all was in regard to the laws draughted for them by Prytanis, an eminent Peripatetic philosopher, whom Antigonus Doson appointed to draw them up a constitution. In this distracted state of politics, Aratus intervened with all the earnestness he could command, and succeeded in pacifying the heated feelings of the citizens. The terms on which the controversies were settled were engraved on a column, and set up near the altar of Vesta in the Homarium.[1]

Another raid of Aetolians from Elis.

94. After arranging this settlement, Aratus broke up his camp; and going on himself to the congress of the Achaeans, handed over the mercenaries to Lycus of Pharae, as the Sub-Strategus of the league. But the Eleans, being dissatisfied with Pyrrhias, once more induced the Aetolians to send them Euripidas; who, waiting until the Achaeans were engaged in their congress, took sixty horse and two thousand foot, and started on a raid. Having passed through the territory of Pharae, he overran the country up to the territory of Aegium; and after securing and driving off a considerable booty, he began a retreat towards Leontium. But Lycus, learning what had happened, went in all haste to protect the country; and falling in with the enemy, he attacked them at once and killed four hundred and took two hundred prisoners, among whom were the following men of rank: Physsias, Antanor, Clearchus, Androlochus, Euanoridas, Aristogeiton, Nicasippus, and Aspasius. The arms and baggage fell entirely into his hands. About the same time the Navarch of the league having gone on an expedition to Molycria, returned with nearly a hundred

The Achaean fleet retaliates on Aetolia.

[1] See 2, 39.

captives. Returning once more to Aetolia he sailed to Chalceia and captured two war ships, with their crews, which put out to resist him; and took also a long boat with its men on the Aetolian Rhium. There being thus an influx of booty both by sea and land at the same period, and a considerable amount of money and provisions being obtained from this, the soldiers felt confident of getting their pay, and the cities of the league were sanguine of not being likely to be hard pressed by their contributions.

95. While these events were taking place Scerdilaidas, thinking that he was not being treated fairly, because some of the payments agreed upon in his treaty with Philip were in arrear, sent out fifteen galleys, treacherously pretending that their object was to receive and convoy the money. These galleys sailed to Leucas, where they were received by all as friendly, owing to their former alliance: but the only mischief they had time to do was to make a treacherous attack on the Corinthian Agathinus and Cassander, who had come there on board Taurion's ships, and were lying at anchor close to them with four vessels. These they captured with their vessels and sent to Scerdilaidas; and then putting out to sea from Leucas, and sailing towards Malea, they plundered and captured the merchants whom they met.

Scerdilaidas the Illyrian plunders the coast.

Harvest time was now approaching: and as Taurion paid little attention to the protection of the cities I mentioned above; Aratus in person, at the head of some picked Achaean troops, protected the getting in of the harvest round Argos: while Euripidas at the head of a force of Aetolians set out on a raid, with the object of ravaging the territory of Tritaea. But when Lycus and Demodocus, the Hipparch of the league, heard of the expedition of the Aetolians from Elis, they collected the people of Dymae, Patrae and Pharae, and joining the mercenaries to these forces made an incursion upon Elis. Arrived at a place called Phyxium, they allowed their light-armed troops and their horse to plunder the country, but kept their hoplites concealed near this place: and when the Eleans had sallied out in full force to attack the foraging parties, and were

More raids.

pursuing them as they retreated, the hoplites with Lycus rose from their hiding-place and charged them as they rushed heedlessly on. The Eleans did not stand against the attack, but fled at the mere appearance of the hoplites: who killed two hundred of them and took eighty prisoners, and carried off with them in safety all the booty that had been driven in from the country. At the same time the Navarch of the league made numerous descents upon Calydonia and the territory of Naupactus; and not only overran the country, but twice annihilated the force sent out to resist him. Among others he took Cleonicus of Naupactus prisoner: who owing to this being a proxenus of the Achaeans was not sold on the spot, and after some little time was set free without ransom.

96. About the same time Agetas, the Strategus of the Aetolian league, proclaimed a general levy of Aetolians, and went a foraging expedition into the territory of the Acarnanians. He marched through all Epirus, plundering as he went without let or hindrance; after doing which he returned home, and dismissed the Aetolian levy to their own cities. But the Acarnanians, upon making a retaliatory invasion of the territory of Stratus, were seized with a panic: and returned with disgrace, though without loss; because the people of Stratus did not venture to pursue them, believing that their retreat was a ruse to cover an ambuscade.

Acarnania.

An instance of counter treachery occurred also at Phanoteus. Alexander who had been appointed governor of Phocis by Philip, entered into a plot against the Aetolians, through the agency of a certain Jason, who had been appointed by himself to command the city of Phanoteus. This man sent a message to Agetas, the Strategus of the Aetolian league, agreeing to hand over to him the citadel of Phanoteus; and he confirmed his offer by a regularly sworn treaty. On the appointed day Agetas came with his Aetolian levy to Phanoteus under cover of night; and concealing the rest at some little distance, he selected a hundred of the most active men and sent them towards the citadel. Jason had Alexander all ready with his soldiers, but duly received the Aetolians as he had sworn into the citadel. Immediately Alexander and his men threw themselves into the citadel also:

Phanoteus in Phocis. The biter bit.

the Aetolian hundred picked soldiers were made prisoners; and when daylight showed Agetas what had taken place, he drew off his troops,—baffled by a ruse very like what he had on many occasions practised himself.

97. About this same period King Philip captured Bylazora, the largest town of Paeonia, and very favourably situated for commanding the pass from Dardania to Macedonia: so that by this achievement he was all but entirely freed from any fear of the Dardani, it being no longer easy for them to invade Macedonia, as long as this city gave Philip the command of the pass. Having secured this place, he despatched Chrysogonus with all speed to summon the upper Macedonians to arms; while he himself, taking on the men of Bottia and Amphaxitis, arrived at Edessa. Waiting there until he was joined by the Macedonians under Chrysogonus, he started with his whole army, and on the sixth day's march arrived at Larisa; and thence by a rapid night march he came before daybreak to Meliteia, and placing scaling ladders against the walls, attempted to take the town by escalade. The suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack so dismayed the people of Meliteia, that he would easily have taken the town; but he was baffled by the fact of the ladders proving to be far too short.

Philip's campaign in Upper Macedonia and Thessaly.

Meliteia

98. This is the kind of mistake which above all others reflects discredit on the commanders. For what can be more culpable than to arrive at a town which they mean to carry, in an entirely unprovided state, without having taken the precaution of measuring walls, cliffs, and the like, by which they intend to effect their entrance? Or again, while satisfying themselves as to these measurements, to entrust the construction of ladders and all such machinery, which, though taking little time to make, have to stand the test of a very critical service, without consideration, and to incompetent persons,—is not this deserving of censure? For in such actions it is not a question of succeeding or failing without ill consequences; but failure is followed by positive damage in manifold respects: danger to the bravest of the men at the actual time, and still greater danger during their retreat, when they have once

incurred the contempt of the enemy. The examples of such disasters are numerous; for you will find that of those who have failed in such attempts, many more have perished, or have been reduced to the last extremity of danger, than have come off scatheless. Moreover, no one can deny that they arouse distrust and hatred against themselves for the future, and give all men warning to be on their guard. For it is not only the persons attacked, but all who know what has happened, who are thereby bidden to look out for themselves and be on the watch. Wherefore it is never right for men in places of trust to conduct such enterprises inconsiderately. The method also of taking such measurements, and constructing machines of this kind, is easy and liable to no mistakes, if they are taken in hand scientifically.

For the present, however, I must resume the thread of my narrative; but I shall take another fitting opportunity in the course of my work to speak of these matters, and will endeavour to show how mistakes may best be avoided in such undertakings.

99. Thus baffled in his attempt upon Meliteia, Philip encamped upon the bank of the Enipeus, and collected from Larisa and the other cities the siege train which he had caused to be constructed during the winter. For the chief object of his campaign was the capture of the city called Phthiotid Thebes. Now this city lies no long way from the sea, about thirty stades from Larisa, and is conveniently situated in regard both to Magnesia and Thessaly; but especially as commanding the district of Demetrias in Magnesia, and of Pharsalus and Pherae in Thessaly. From it, at that very time, much damage was being inflicted upon the Demetrians, Pharsalians, and Larisaeans; as the Aetolians were in occupation of it, and made continual predatory expeditions, often as far as to the plain of Amyrus. Philip did not regard the matter as at all of small importance, but was exceedingly bent on taking the town. Having therefore got together a hundred and fifty catapults, and twenty-five stone-throwing balistae, he sat down before Thebes. He distributed his forces between three points in the vicinity of the city; one was encamped near

Thebae Phthiotides, B.C. 217.

Scopium; a second near a place called Heliotropium; and the third on the hill overhanging the town. The spaces between these camps he fortified by a trench and double palisade, and further secured them by towers of wood, at intervals of a hundred feet, with an adequate guard. When these works were finished, he collected all his siege train together and began to move his engines towards the citadel.

Thebes is taken, its inhabitants enslaved, and its name changed to Philippopolis.

100. For the first three days the king was unable to make any progress in bringing his machines against the town, owing to the gallant and even desperate defence which the garrison opposed to him. But when the continual skirmishing, and the volleys of missiles, had began to tell upon the defenders, and some of them were killed and others disabled by wounds; the defence becoming a little slacker, the Macedonians began sinking mines, and at last after nine days' work reached the walls. They then carried on the work by relays, so as never to leave it off day or night: and thus in three days had undermined and underpinned two hundred feet of the wall. The props, however, proved too weak to support the weight, and gave way; so that the wall fell without the Macedonians having the trouble of setting fire to them. When they had worked energetically at clearing the debris, and had made every preparation for entering by the breach, and were just on the point of carrying it, the Thebans in a panic surrendered the town. The security which this achievement of Philip's gave to Magnesia and Thessaly deprived the Aetolians of a rich field for plunder; and demonstrated to his army that he had been justified in putting Leontius to death, for his deliberate treachery in the previous siege of Palae. Having thus become master of Thebes he sold its existing inhabitants into slavery, and drafting in some Macedonian settlers changed its name to Philippopolis.

Just as the king had finished the settlement of Thebes, ambassadors once more came from Chios, Rhodes, Byzantium, and King Ptolemy to negotiate terms of peace. He answered them in much the same terms as he had the former,[1] that he was not averse to peace; and bade them go and find out

[1] See *supra*, ch. 24.

what the feelings of the Aetolians were. Meanwhile he himself cared little about making peace, but continued steadily to prosecute his designs.

101. Accordingly, when he heard that the galleys of Scerdilaidas were committing acts of piracy off Malea, and treating all merchants as open enemies, and had treacherously seized some of his own vessels which were at anchor at Leucas, he fitted out twelve decked ships, eight open vessels, and thirty light craft called hemioliae,[1] and sailed through the Euripus in hot haste to come up with the Illyrians; exceedingly excited about his plans for carrying on the war against the Aetolians, as he knew nothing as yet of what had happened in Italy. For the defeat of the Romans by Hannibal in Etruria took place while Philip was besieging Thebes, but the report of that occurrence had not yet reached Greece. Philip arrived too late to capture the galleys: and therefore, dropping anchor at Cenchreae, he sent away his decked ships, with orders to sail round Malea in the direction of Aegium and Patrae; but having caused the rest of his vessels to be dragged across the Isthmus, he ordered them to anchor at Lechaeum; while he went in haste with his friends to Argos to attend the Nemean festival.

Nemean festival.

Midsummer of B.C. 217.

Just as he was engaged in watching the gymnastic contest, a courier arrived from Macedonia with news of the Romans having been defeated in a great battle, and of Hannibal being in possession of the open country. Philip showed the letter to no one at the moment, except to Demetrius of Pharos, enjoining him not to say a word. The latter seized the occasion to advise Philip to throw over the war against the Aetolians as soon as possible; and to concentrate his efforts upon Illyria, and an expedition into Italy. "For Greece," said he, "is already entirely obedient to you, and will remain so: the Achaeans from genuine affection; the Aetolians from the with terror which their disasters in the present war have inspired

Philip hears of the Battle of Thrasymene, 22d June.

[1] According to Suidas, these were light vessels used by pirates · but whether the name arose from their construction, capacity, or the number of their oars, seems uncertain. According to Hesychius they had two banks of oars (δίκροτος ναῦς · πλοῖον μικρόν).

them. Italy, and your crossing into it, is the first step in the acquirement of universal empire, to which no one has a better claim than yourself. And now is the moment to act when the Romans have suffered a reverse."

102. By using such arguments he found no difficulty in firing Philip's ambition: as was natural, I think, considering that he was but a youthful monarch, who had as yet been successful in all his undertakings, and was in any case of a singularly daring character; and considering too that he was sprung from a family which above all families has somehow a tendency to aim at universal monarchy.

At the moment then, as I said, Philip communicated the news conveyed by the letter to Demetrius alone; and afterwards summoning a council of his friends consulted them on the subject of making peace with the Aetolians. And when even Aratus professed no disinclination to the measure, on the ground that they would be making peace as conquerors, the king without waiting for the ambassadors, who were officially engaged in negotiating its terms, sent Cleonicus of Naupactus at once to Aetolia, whom he found still awaiting the meeting of the Achaean league after his captivity;[1] while he himself, taking his ships and land force from Corinth, came with it to Aegium. Thence he advanced as far as Lasion and took the Tower in Perippia, and pretended, in order to avoid appearing too eager for the conclusion of the war, that he was meditating an invasion of Elis. By this time Cleonicus had been backwards and forwards two or three times; and as the Aetolians begged that he would meet them personally in conference, he assented; and abandoning all warlike measures, he sent couriers to the allied cities, bidding their commissioners to sit in the conference with him and take part in the discussion of the terms of peace: and then crossed over with his army and encamped near Panormus, which is a harbour of the Peloponnese, and lies exactly opposite Naupactus. There he waited for the commissioners from the allies, and employed the time required for their assembling in sailing to Zacynthus, and settling on his own

A peace congress summoned.

Zacynthus visited by Philip.

[1] See ch. 95.

authority the affairs of the island; and having done so he sailed back to Panormus.

103. The commissioners having now assembled, Philip sent Aratus and Taurion, and some others who had come with them, to the Aetolians. They found them in full assembly at Naupactus; and after a short conference with them, and satisfying themselves as to their inclination for peace, they sailed back to Philip to inform him of the state of the case. But the Aetolians, being very eager to bring the war to a conclusion, sent ambassadors with them to Philip urging him to visit them with his army, that by a personal conference the business might be brought to a satisfactory conclusion.

Philip goes to Naupactus.

Moved by these representations, the king sailed across with his army to what is called the Hollows of Naupactus, about twenty stades from the town. Having pitched a camp there, and having caused both it and his ships to be surrounded by a palisade, he waited for the time fixed for the interview. The Aetolians came *en masse* without arms; and keeping at a distance of two stades from Philip's camp, interchanged messages and discussions on the subjects in question. The negotiation was begun by the king sending all the commissioners of the allies, with instructions to offer the Aetolians peace, on the condition of both parties retaining what they then held. This preliminary the Aetolians readily agreed to; and then there began a continuous interchange of messages between the two, most of which I shall omit as containing no point of interest: but I shall record the speech made by Agelaus of Naupactus in the first conference before the king and the assembled allies. It was this.

104. "The best thing of all is that the Greeks should not go to war with each other at all, but give the gods hearty thanks if by all speaking with one voice, and joining hands like people crossing a stream, they may be able to repel the attacks of barbarians and save themselves and their cities. But if this is altogether impossible, in the present juncture at least we ought to be unanimous and on our guard, when we see the bloated armaments and the vast

Speech of Agelaus of Naupactus foreshadowing the Roman conquest.

proportions assumed by the war in the west. For even now it is evident to any one who pays even a moderate attention to public affairs, that whether the Carthaginians conquer the Romans, or the Romans the Carthaginians, it is in every way improbable that the victors will remain contented with the empire of Sicily and Italy. They will move forward: and will extend their forces and their designs farther than we could wish. Wherefore, I beseech you all to be on your guard against the danger of the crisis, and above all you, O King. You will do this, if you abandon the policy of weakening the Greeks, and thus rendering them an easy prey to the invader; and consult on the contrary for their good as you would for your own person, and have a care for all parts of Greece alike, as part and parcel of your own domains. If you act in this spirit, the Greeks will be your warm friends and faithful coadjutors in all your undertakings; while foreigners will be less ready to form designs against you, seeing with dismay the firm loyalty of the Greeks. If you are eager for action, turn your eyes to the west, and let your thoughts dwell upon the wars in Italy. Wait with coolness the turn of events there, and seize the opportunity to strike for universal dominion. Nor is the present crisis unfavourable for such a hope. But I intreat of you to postpone your controversies and wars with the Greeks to a time of greater tranquillity; and make it your supreme aim to retain the power of making peace or war with them at your own will. For if once you allow the clouds now gathering in the west to settle upon Greece, I fear exceedingly that the power of making peace or war, and in a word all these games which we are now playing against each other, will be so completely knocked out of the hands of us all, that we shall be praying heaven to grant us only this power of making war or peace with each other at our own will and pleasure, and of settling our own disputes."

105. This speech of Agelaus greatly influenced the allies in favour of peace; and Philip more than any one: as the arguments employed chimed in with the wishes which the advice of Demetrius had already roused in him. Both parties therefore came to terms on the details of the treaty; and after ratifying it, separated to their several cities, taking peace with them instead of war.

The peace is ratified.

These events all fell in the third year of the 140th Olympiad. I mean the battle of the Romans in Etruria, that of Antiochus for Coele-Syria, and lastly the treaty between Philip and the Aetolians.

Olympiad 140, 3. Before July B.C. 217.

This then was the first point of time, and the first instance of a deliberation, which may be said to have regarded the affairs of Greece, Italy, and Libya as a connected whole: for neither Philip nor the leading statesmen of the Greek cities made war or peace any longer with each other with a view to Greek affairs, but were already all fixing their eyes upon Italy. Nor was it long before the islanders and inhabitants of Asia were affected in the same way; for those who were displeased with Philip, or who had quarrels with Attalus, no longer turned to Antiochus or Ptolemy, to the south or the east, but from this time forth fixed their eyes on the west, some sending embassies to Carthage, others to Rome. The Romans similarly began sending legates to Greece, alarmed at the daring character of Philip, and afraid that he might join in the attack upon them in their present critical position. Having thus fulfilled my original promise of showing when, how, and why Greek politics became involved in those of Italy and Libya, I shall now bring my account of Greek affairs down to the date of the battle of Cannae, to which I have already brought the history of Italy, and will end this book at that point.

The Eastern and Western politics become involved with each other.

106. Directly the Achaeans had put an end to the war, they elected Timoxenus Strategus for the next year[1] and departed to take up once more their regular ways and habits. Along with the Achaeans the other Peloponnesian communities also set to work to repair the losses they had sustained; recommenced the cultivation of the land; and re-established their national sacrifices, games, and other religious observances peculiar to their several states. For these things

Timoxenus Achaean Strategus, May B.C. 216.

[1] This language is so vague that we might suppose from it that the Achaeans elected Timoxenus in the summer of B.C. 217 to come into office in the following spring. But there is nowhere else any indication of such an interval at this period, and we must suppose Polybius to be speaking in general terms of the result of the peace during the next ten months. Agelaus was elected Aetolian Strategus in the autumn of B.C. 217.

had all but sunk into oblivion in most of the states through the persistent continuance of the late wars. It has ever somehow been the case that the Peloponnesians, who of all men are the most inclined to a peaceful and civilised way of life, have hitherto enjoyed it less than any other nation in the world; but have been rather as Euripides[1] says "still worn with toil and war's unrest." But to me it seems clear that they bring this upon themselves in the natural course of events: for their universal desire of supremacy, and their obstinate love of freedom, involve them in perpetual wars with each other, all alike being resolutely set upon occupying the first place.

Isolation of Athens.

The Athenians on the contrary had by this time freed themselves from fear of Macedonia, and considered that they had now permanently secured their independence. They accordingly adopted Eurycleidas and Micion as their representatives, and took no part whatever in the politics of the rest of Greece; but following the lead and instigation of these statesmen, they laid themselves out to flatter all the kings, and Ptolemy most of all; nor was there any kind of decree or proclamation too fulsome for their digestion: any consideration of dignity being little regarded, under the guidance of these vain and frivolous leaders.

Revolt in Egypt.

107. Ptolemy however immediately after these events became involved in a war with his Egyptian subjects. For in arming them for his campaign against Antiochus he had taken a step which, while it served his immediate purpose sufficiently well, proved eventually disastrous. Elated with their victory at Rhaphia they refused any longer to receive orders from the king; but looked out for a leader to represent them, on the ground that they were quite able to maintain their independence. And this they succeeded in doing before very long.

Winter of 217-216 B.C.

Antiochus spent the winter in extensive preparations for war; and when the next summer came, he crossed Mount Taurus and after making a treaty of alliance with King Attalus entered upon the war against Achaeus.

B.C. 216.

At the time the Aetolians were delighted at the settlement

[1] Euripides, fr. 529. Ed. Nauck

of peace with the Achaean league, because the war had not answered to their wishes; and they accordingly elected Agelaus of Naupactus as their Strategus, because he was believed to have contributed more largely than any one to the success of the negotiations. But this was scarcely arranged before they began to be discontented, and to find fault with Agelaus for having cut off all their opportunities of plundering abroad, and all their hopes of gain for the future, since the peace was not made with certain definite states, but with all Greeks. But this statesman patiently endured these unreasonable reproaches and succeeded in checking the popular impulse. The Aetolians therefore were forced to acquiesce in an inactivity quite alien to their nature.

Discontent of the Aetolians with the peace.

108. King Philip having returned, after the completion of the treaty of peace, to Macedonia by sea, found that Scerdilaidas on the same pretext of money owed to him, on which he had treacherously seized the vessels at Leucas, had now plundered a town in Pelagonia called Pissaeum; had won over by promises some cities of the Dassaretae, namely, Phibotides, Antipatria, Chrysondym, and Geston; and had overrun much of the district of Macedonia bordering on these places. He therefore at once started with his army in great haste to recover the revolted cities, and determined to proclaim open war with Scerdilaidas; for he thought it a matter of the most vital importance to bring Illyria into a state of good order, with a view to the success of all his projects, and above all of his passage into Italy. For Demetrius was so assiduous in keeping hot these hopes and projects in the king's mind, that Philip even dreamed of them in his sleep, and thought of nothing else but this Italian expedition. The motive of Demetrius in so acting was not a consideration for Philip, for he certainly did not rank higher than third in the calculations of Demetrius. A stronger motive than that was his hatred of Rome: but the strongest of all was the consideration of his own prospects. For he had made up his mind that it was only in this way that he could ever recover his principality in Pharos. Be that as it may, Philip went on his expedition and recovered the cities I have named, and took besides Creonium

Philip's war against Scerdilaidas of Illyria, autumn of 217 B.C.

and Gerus in Dassaretis; Enchelanae, Cerax, Sation, Boei, round the Lychnidian Lake; Bantia in the district of the Calicoeni; and Orgyssus in that of the Pisantini. After completing these operations he dismissed his troops to their winter quarters.

This was the winter in which Hannibal, after plundering the fairest districts of Italy, intended to place his winter quarters near Gerunium in Daunia. And it was then that at Rome Caius Terentius and Lucius Aemilius entered upon their Consulship. B.C. 217-216. B.C. 216. Coss. Caius Terentius Varro and Lucius Aemilius Paulus II.

109. In the course of the winter, Philip, taking into consideration that he would want ships to carry out his designs, and men for rowing, not for fighting,—for he could never have even entertained a hope of fighting the Romans at sea,—but rather for the transport of soldiers, and to enable him to cross with greater speed to any point to which he might desire to go, and so surprise the enemy by a sudden appearance, and thinking that the Illyrian build was the best for the sort of ships he wanted, determined to have a hundred galleys built; which hardly any Macedonian king had ever done before. Having had these fitted out, he collected his forces at the beginning of the summer; and, after a brief training of the Macedonians in rowing them, put to sea. It was just at the time that Antiochus crossed Mount Taurus when Philip, after sailing through the Euripus and rounding Cape Malea, came to Cephallenia and Leucas, where he dropped anchor, and awaited anxiously the movements of the Roman fleet. Being informed that it was at anchor off Lilybaeum, he mustered up courage to put to sea, and steered for Apollonia. Philip's preparation for an invasion of Italy. B.C. 216.

110. As he neared the mouth of the Aous, which flows past Apollonia, a panic fell upon his fleet such as happens to land forces. Certain galleys on the rear of the fleet being anchored at an island called Sason, which lies at the entrance to the Ionian Sea, came by night to Philip with a report that some men who had lately come from the Sicilian Strait had been anchored with them at Sason, who Panic-stricken at the reported approach of a Roman squadron, Philip retreats to Cephallenia.

reported that they left some Roman quinqueremes at Rhegium, which were bound for Apollonia to support Scerdilaidas. Thinking this fleet must be all but upon him, Philip, in great alarm, promptly ordered his ships to weigh anchor and sail back the way they came. They started and got out to sea in great disorder, and reached Cephallenia, after sailing two nights and days without intermission. Having now partially recovered his courage, Philip remained there, covering his flight under the pretext of having returned for some operations in the Peloponnese. It turned out that it was a false alarm altogether. The truth was that Scerdilaidas, hearing in the course of the winter that Philip was having a number of galleys built, and expecting him to come to attack him by sea, had sent messages to Rome stating the facts and imploring help; and the Romans had detached a squadron of ten ships from the fleet at Lilybaeum, which were what had been seen at Rhegium. But if Philip had not fled from them in such inconsiderate alarm, he would have had the best opportunity possible of attaining his objects in Illyria; because the thoughts and resources of Rome were absorbed in the war with Hannibal and the battle of Cannae, and it may fairly be presumed that he would have captured the ten Roman ships. As it was, he was utterly upset by the news and returned to Macedonia, without loss indeed, but with considerable dishonour.

Prusias and the Gauls. See ch. 78.

111. During this period Prusias also did a thing which deserves to be recorded. The Gauls, whom King Attalus had brought over from Europe to assist him against Achaeus on account of their reputation for courage, had separated from that monarch on account of the jealous suspicions of which I have before spoken, and were plundering the cities on the Hellespont with gross licentiousness and violence, and finally went so far as actually to besiege Ilium. In these circumstances the inhabitants of the Alexandria in the Troad acted with commendable spirit. They sent Themistes with four thousand men and forced the Gauls to raise the siege of Ilium, and drove them entirely out of the Troad, by cutting off their supplies and frustrating all their designs. Thereupon the Gauls seized Arisba, in the territory

of Abydos, and thenceforth devoted themselves to forming designs and committing acts of hostility against the cities built in that district. Against them Prusias led out an army, and in a pitched battle put the men to the sword on the field, and slew nearly all their women and children in the camp, leaving the baggage to be plundered by his soldiers. This achievement of Prusias delivered the cities on the Hellespont from great fear and danger, and was a signal warning for future generations against barbarians from Europe being over-ready to cross into Asia.

Such was the state of affairs in Greece and Asia. Meanwhile the greater part of Italy had joined the Carthaginians after the battle of Cannae, as I have shown before. I will interrupt my narrative at this point, after having detailed the events in Asia and Greece, embraced by the 140th Olympiad. In my next book after a brief recapitulation of this narrative, I shall fulfil the promise made at the beginning of my work by recurring to the discussion of the Roman constitution. B.C. 220-216.

BOOK VI

PREFACE

1. I AM aware that some will be at a loss to account for my interrupting the course of my narrative for the sake of entering upon the following disquisition on the Roman constitution. But I think that I have already in many passages made it fully evident that this particular branch of my work was one of the necessities imposed on me by the nature of my original design; and I pointed this out with special clearness in the preface which explained the scope of my history. I there stated that the feature of my work which was at once the best in itself, and the most instructive to the students of it, was that it would enable them to know and fully realise in what manner, and under what kind of constitution, it came about that nearly the whole world fell under the power of Rome in somewhat less than fifty-three years,—an event certainly without precedent. This being my settled purpose, I could see no more fitting period than the present for making a pause, and examining the truth of the remarks about to be made on this constitution. In private life if you wish to satisfy yourself as to the badness or goodness of particular persons, you would not, if you wish to get a genuine test, examine their conduct at a time of uneventful repose, but in the hour of brilliant success or conspicuous reverse. For the true test of a perfect man is the power of bearing with spirit and dignity violent changes of fortune. An examination of a constitution should be conducted in the same way: and therefore being unable to find in our day a more rapid or more signal change than that which has happened to Rome, I reserved my disquistion on its constitution for this place. . . .

What is really educational and beneficial to students of history is the clear view of the causes of events, and the consequent power of choosing the better policy in a particular case. Now in every practical undertaking by a state we must regard as the most powerful agent for success or failure the form of its constitution; for from this as from a fountain-head all conceptions and plans of action not only proceed, but attain their consummation.[1] . . .

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3. Of the Greek republics, which have again and again risen to greatness and fallen into insignificance, it is not difficult to speak, whether we recount their past history or venture an opinion on their future. For to report what is already known is an easy task, nor is it hard to guess what is to come from our knowledge of what has been. But in regard to the Romans it is neither an easy matter to describe their present state, owing to the complexity of their constitution; nor to speak with confidence of their future, from our inadequate acquaintance with their peculiar institutions in the past whether affecting their public or their private life. It will require then no ordinary attention and study to get a clear and comprehensive conception of the distinctive features of this constitution.

Classification of polities.

Now, it is undoubtedly the case that most of those who profess to give us authoritative instruction on this subject distinguish three kinds of constitutions, which they designate *kingship*, *aristocracy*, *democracy*. But in my opinion the question might fairly be put to them, whether they name these as being the *only* ones, or as the *best*. In either case I think they are wrong. For it is plain that we must regard as the *best* constitution that which partakes of all these three elements. And this is no mere assertion, but has been proved by the example of Lycurgus, who was the first to construct a constitution—that of Sparta—on this principle. Nor can we

[1] Some disconnected fragments which are usually placed at the end of the first chapter, and form the second chapter of this book, I have placed among the minor fragments at the end of these volumes.

admit that these are the *only* forms: for we have had before now examples of absolute and tyrannical forms of government, which, while differing as widely as possible from kingship, yet appear to have some points of resemblance to it; on which account all absolute rulers falsely assume and use, as far as they can, the title of king. Again there have been many instances of oligarchical governments having in appearance some analogy to aristocracies, which are, if I may say so, as different from them as it is possible to be. The same also holds good about democracy.

Six forms of polity, and their natural cycle.

4. I will illustrate the truth of what I say. We cannot hold every absolute government to be a kingship, but only that which is accepted voluntarily, and is directed by an appeal to reason rather than to fear and force. Nor again is every oligarchy to be regarded as an aristocracy; the latter exists only where the power is wielded by the justest and wisest men selected on their merits. Similarly, it is not enough to constitute a democracy that the whole crowd of citizens should have the right to do whatever they wish or propose. But where reverence to the gods, succour of parents, respect to elders, obedience to laws, are traditional and habitual, in such communities, if the will of the majority prevail, we may speak of the form of government as a democracy. So then we enumerate six forms of government,—the three commonly spoken of which I have just mentioned, and three more allied forms, I mean *despotism*, *oligarchy* and *mob-rule*. The first of these arises without artificial aid and in the natural order of events. Next to this, and produced from it by the aid of art and adjustment, comes *kingship*; which degenerating into the evil form allied to it, by which I mean *tyranny*, both are once more destroyed and *aristocracy* produced. Again the latter being in the course of nature perverted to *oligarchy*, and the people passionately avenging the unjust acts of their rulers, *democracy* comes into existence; which again by its violence and contempt of law becomes sheer *mob-rule*.[1] No clearer

[1] Aristotle's classification is kingship, aristocracy, πολιτεία, democracy, oligarchy, tyranny (Pol. 4, 2). This was derived from Plato (Pol. 302, c.) who arranges the six (besides the ideal polity) in pairs, kingship, tyranny,—

proof of the truth of what I say could be obtained than by a careful observation of the natural origin, genesis, and decadence of these several forms of government. For it is only by seeing distinctly how each of them is produced that a distinct view can also be obtained of its growth, zenith, and decadence, and the time, circumstance, and place in which each of these may be expected to recur. This method I have assumed to be especially applicable to the Roman constitution, because its origin and growth have from the first followed natural causes.

5. Now the natural laws which regulate the merging of one form of government into another are perhaps discussed with greater accuracy by Plato and some other philosophers. But their treatment, from its intricacy and exhaustiveness, is only within the capacity of a few. I will therefore endeavour to give a summary of the subject, just so far as I suppose it to fall within the scope of a practical history and the intelligence of ordinary people. For if my exposition appear in any way inadequate, owing to the general terms in which it is expressed, the details contained in what is immediately to follow will amply atone for what is left for the present unsolved.

The origin of the social compact.

What is the origin then of a constitution, and whence is it produced? Suppose that from floods, pestilences, failure of crops, or some such causes the race of man is reduced almost to extinction. Such things we are told have happened, and it is reasonable to think will happen again. Suppose accordingly all knowledge of social habits and arts to have been lost. Suppose that from the survivors, as from seeds, the race of man to have again multiplied. In that case I presume they would, like the animals, herd together; for it is but reasonable to suppose that bodily weakness would induce them to seek those of their own kind to herd with. And in that case too, as with the animals, he who was superior to the rest in strength

aristocracy, oligarchy,—democracy, good and bad. Plato has no distinct name, except *δημοκρατία παράνομος*, for the bad democracy which Polybius calls *ὀχλοκρατία*, "mob-rule." Polybius's arrangement is this—

Kingship (arising from a natural despotism or monarchy)	degenerates into	Tyranny.
Aristocracy	,,	Oligarchy.
Democracy	,,	Mob-rule.

of body or courage of soul would lead and rule them. For what we see happen in the case of animals that are without the faculty of reason, such as bulls, goats, and cocks,—among whom there can be no dispute that the strongest take the lead, —that we must regard as in the truest sense the teaching of nature. Originally then it is probable that the condition of life among men was this,—herding together like animals and following the strongest and bravest as leaders. The limit of this authority would be physical strength, and the name we should give it would be despotism. But as soon as the idea of family ties and social relation has arisen amongst such agglomerations of men, then is born also the idea of kingship, and then for the first time mankind conceives the notion of goodness and justice and their reverse.

Origin of morality,

6. The way in which such conceptions originate and come into existence is this. The intercourse of the sexes is an instinct of nature, and the result is the birth of children. Now, if any one of these children who have been brought up, when arrived at maturity, is ungrateful and makes no return to those by whom he was nurtured, but on the contrary presumes to injure them by word and deed, it is plain that he will probably offend and annoy such as are present, and have seen the care and trouble bestowed by the parents on the nurture and bringing up of their children. For seeing that men differ from the other animals in being the only creatures possessed of reasoning powers, it is clear that such a difference of conduct is not likely to escape their observation; but that they will remark it when it occurs, and express their displeasure on the spot: because they will have an eye to the future, and will reason on the likelihood of the same occurring to each of themselves. Again, if a man has been rescued or helped in an hour of danger, and, instead of showing gratitude to his preserver, seeks to do him harm, it is clearly probable that the rest will be displeased and offended with him, when they know it: sympathising with their neighbour and imagining themselves in his case. Hence arises a notion in every breast of the meaning and theory of duty, which is in fact the beginning and end of justice. Similarly, again, when any one man

stands out as the champion of all in a time of danger, and braves with firm courage the onslaught of the most powerful wild beasts, it is probable that such a man would meet with marks of favour and pre-eminence from the common people; while he who acted in a contrary way would fall under their contempt and dislike. From this, once more, it is reasonable to suppose that there would arise in the minds of the multitude a theory of the disgraceful and the honourable, and of the difference between them; and that one should be sought and imitated for its advantages, the other shunned. When, therefore, the leading and most powerful man among his people ever encourages such persons in accordance with the popular sentiment, and thereby assumes in the eyes of his subject the appearance of being the distributor to each man according to his deserts, they no longer obey him and support his rule from fear of violence, but rather from conviction of its utility, however old he may be, rallying round him with one heart and soul, and fighting against all who form designs against his government. In this way he becomes a *king* instead of a *despot* by imperceptible degrees, reason having ousted brute courage and bodily strength from their supremacy.

which transmutes despotism into kingship,

7. This then is the natural process of formation among mankind of the notion of goodness and justice, and their opposites; and this is the origin and genesis of genuine kingship: for people do not only keep up the government of such men personally, but for their descendants also for many generations; from the conviction that those who are born from and educated by men of this kind will have principles also like theirs. But if they subsequently become displeased with their descendants, they do not any longer decide their choice of rulers and kings by their physical strength or brute courage; but by the differences of their intellectual and reasoning faculties, from practical experience of the decisive importance of such a distinction. In old times, then, those who were once thus selected, and obtained this office, grew old in their royal functions, making magnificent strongholds and surrounding them with walls and extending their frontiers, partly for the

which in its turn degenerates into tyranny.

security of their subjects, and partly to provide them with abundance of the necessaries of life; and while engaged in these works they were exempt from all vituperation or jealousy; because they did not make their distinctive dress, food, or drink, at all conspicuous, but lived very much like the rest, and joined in the everyday employments of the common people. But when their royal power became hereditary in their family, and they found every necessary for security ready to their hands, as well as more than was necessary for their personal support, then they gave the rein to their appetites, imagined that rulers must needs wear different clothes from those of subjects; have different and elaborate luxuries of the table; and must even seek sensual indulgence, however unlawful the source, without fear of denial. These things having given rise in the one case to jealousy and offence, in the other to outburst of hatred and passionate resentment, the kingship became a tyranny: the first step in disintegration was taken; and plots began to be formed against the government, which did not now proceed from the worst men but from the noblest, most high-minded, and most courageous, because these are the men who can least submit to the tyrannical acts of their rulers.

Tyranny is then displaced by aristocracy,

8. But as soon as the people got leaders, they co-operated with them against the dynasty for the reasons I have mentioned; and then *kingship* and *despotism* were alike entirely abolished, and *aristocracy* once more began to revive and start afresh. For in their immediate gratitude to those who had deposed the despots, the people employed them as leaders, and entrusted their interests to them; who, looking upon this charge at first as a great privilege, made the public advantage their chief concern, and conducted all kinds of business, public or private, with diligence and caution. But when the sons of these men received the same position of authority from their fathers,—having had no experience of misfortunes, and none at all of civil equality and freedom of speech, but having been bred up from the first under the shadow of their fathers' authority and lofty position,—some of them gave themselves up with passion to avarice and

unscrupulous love of money, others to drinking and the boundless debaucheries which accompanies it, and others to the violation of women or the forcible appropriation of boys; and so they turned an *aristocracy* into an *oligarchy*. But it was not long before they roused in the minds of the people the same feelings as before; and their fall therefore was very like the disaster which befel the tyrants.

which degenerates into oligarchy,

9. For no sooner had the knowledge of the jealousy and hatred existing in the citizens against them emboldened some one to oppose the government by word or deed, than he was sure to find the whole people ready and prepared to take his side. Having then got rid of these rulers by assassination or exile, they do not venture to set up a king again, being still in terror of the injustice to which this led before; nor dare they intrust the common interests again to more than one, considering the recent example of their misconduct: and therefore, as the only sound hope left them is that which depends upon themselves, they are driven to take refuge in that; and so changed the constitution from an oligarchy to a *democracy*, and took upon themselves the superintendence and charge of the state. And as long as any survive who have had experience of oligarchical supremacy and domination, they regard their present constitution as a blessing, and hold equality and freedom as of the utmost value. But as soon as a new generation has arisen, and the democracy has descended to their children's children, long association weakens their value for equality and freedom, and some seek to become more powerful than the ordinary citizens; and the most liable to this temptation are the rich. So when they begin to be fond of office, and find themselves unable to obtain it by their own unassisted efforts and their own merits, they ruin their estates, while enticing and corrupting the common people in every possible way. By which means when, in their senseless mania for reputation, they have made the populace ready and greedy to receive bribes, the virtue of democracy is destroyed, and it is transformed into a govern-

which is replaced by democracy,

which degenerates into rule of corruption and violence, only to be stopped by a return to despotism.

ment of violence and the strong hand. For the mob, habituated to feed at the expense of others, and to have its hopes of a livelihood in the property of its neighbours, as soon as it has got a leader sufficiently ambitious and daring, being excluded by poverty from the sweets of civil honours, produces a reign of mere violence. Then come tumultuous assemblies, massacres, banishments, redivisions of land; until, after losing all trace of civilisation, it has once more found a master and a despot.

This is the regular cycle of constitutional revolutions, and the natural order in which constitutions change, are transformed, and return again to their original stage. If a man have a clear grasp of these principles he may perhaps make a mistake as to the dates at which this or that will happen to a particular constitution; but he will rarely be entirely mistaken as to the stage of growth or decay at which it has arrived, or as to the point at which it will undergo some revolutionary change. However, it is in the case of the Roman constitution that this method of inquiry will most fully teach us its formation, its growth, and zenith, as well as the changes awaiting it in the future; for this, if any constitution ever did, owed, as I said just now, its original foundation and growth to natural causes, and to natural causes will owe its decay. My subsequent narrative will be the best illustration of what I say.

Lycurgus recognised these truths, and legislated accordingly

10. For the present I will make a brief reference to the legislation of Lycurgus: for such a discussion is not at all alien to my subject. That statesman was fully aware that all those changes which I have enumerated come about by an undeviating law of nature; and reflected that every form of government that was unmixed, and rested on one species of power, was unstable; because it was swiftly perverted into that particular form of evil peculiar to it and inherent in its nature. For just as rust is the natural dissolvent of iron, wood-worms and grubs to timber, by which they are destroyed without any external injury, but by that which is engendered in themselves; so in each constitution there is naturally engendered a particular vice inseparable from it: in kingship it is absolutism; in aristocracy it is oligarchy; in democracy lawless ferocity and

violence; and to these vicious states all these forms of government are, as I have lately shown, inevitably transformed. Lycurgus, I say, saw all this, and accordingly combined together all the excellences and distinctive features of the best constitutions, that no part should become unduly predominant, and be perverted into its kindred vice; and that, each power being checked by the others, no one part should turn the scale or decisively out-balance the others; but that, by being accurately adjusted and in exact equilibrium, the whole might remain long steady like a ship sailing close to the wind. The royal power was prevented from growing insolent by fear of the people, which had also assigned to it an adequate share in the constitution. The people in their turn were restrained from a bold contempt of the kings by fear of the Gerusia: the members of which, being selected on grounds of merit, were certain to throw their influence on the side of justice in every question that arose; and thus the party placed at a disadvantage by its conservative tendency was always strengthened and supported by the weight and influence of the Gerusia. The result of this combination has been that the Lacedaemonians retained their freedom for the longest period of any people with which we are acquainted.

Lycurgus however established his constitution without the discipline of adversity, because he was able to foresee by the light of reason the course which events naturally take and the source from which they come. But though the Romans have arrived at the same result in framing their commonwealth, they have not done so by means of abstract reasoning, but through many struggles and difficulties, and by continually adopting reforms from knowledge gained in disaster. The result has been a constitution like that of Lycurgus, and the best of any existing in my time. . . .

11. I have given an account of the constitution of Lycurgus, I will now endeavour to describe that of Rome at the period of their disastrous defeat at Cannae.

I am fully conscious that to those who actually live under

this constitution I shall appear to give an inadequate account of it by the omission of certain details. Knowing accurately every portion of it from personal experience, and from having been bred up in its customs and laws from childhood, they will not be struck so much by the accuracy of the description, as annoyed by its omissions; nor will they believe that the historian has purposely omitted unimportant distinctions, but will attribute his silence upon the origin of existing institutions or other important facts to ignorance. What is told they depreciate as insignificant or beside the purpose; what is omitted they desiderate as vital to the question: their object being to appear to know more than the writers. But a good critic should not judge a writer by what he leaves unsaid, but from what he says: if he detects mis-statement in the latter, he may then feel certain that ignorance accounts for the former; but if what he says is accurate, his omissions ought to be attributed to deliberate judgment and not to ignorance. So much for those whose criticisms are prompted by personal ambition rather than by justice. . . .

The Roman constitution at the epoch of Cannae, B.C. 216.

Another requisite for obtaining a judicious approval for an historical disquisition, is that it should be germane to the matter in hand; if this is not observed, though its style may be excellent and its matter irreproachable, it will seem out of place, and disgust rather than please. . . .

As for the Roman constitution, it had three elements, each of them possessing sovereign powers: and their respective share of power in the whole state had been regulated with such a scrupulous regard to equality and equilibrium, that no one could say for certain, not even a native, whether the constitution as a whole were an aristocracy or democracy or despotism. And no wonder: for if we confine our observation to the power of the Consuls we should be inclined to regard it as despotic; if on that of the Senate, as aristocratic; and if finally one looks at the power possessed by the people it would seem a clear case of a democracy. What the exact powers of these several parts were, and still, with slight modifications, are, I will now state.

Triple element in the Roman Constitution.

12. The Consuls, before leading out the legions, remain in Rome and are supreme masters of the administration. All other magistrates, except the Tribunes, are under them and take their orders. They introduce foreign ambassadors to the Senate; bring matters requiring deliberation before it; and see to the execution of its decrees. If, again, there are any matters of state which require the authorisation of the people, it is their business to see to them, to summon the popular meetings, to bring the proposals before them, and to carry out the decrees of the majority. In the preparations for war also, and in a word in the entire administration of a campaign, they have all but absolute power. It is competent to them to impose on the allies such levies as they think good, to appoint the Military Tribunes, to make up the roll for soldiers and select those that are suitable. Besides they have absolute power of inflicting punishment on all who are under their command while on active service: and they have authority to expend as much of the public money as they choose, being accompanied by a quaestor who is entirely at their orders. A survey of these powers would in fact justify our describing the constitution as despotic,—a clear case of royal government. Nor will it affect the truth of my description, if any of the institutions I have described are changed in our time, or in that of our posterity: and the same remarks apply to what follows. The Consuls.

13. The Senate has first of all the control of the treasury, and regulates the receipts and disbursements alike. For the Quaestors cannot issue any public money for the various departments of the state without a decree of the Senate, except for the service of the Consuls. The Senate controls also what is by far the largest and most important expenditure, that, namely, which is made by the censors every *lustrum* for the repair or construction of public buildings; this money cannot be obtained by the censors except by the grant of the Senate. Similarly all crimes committed in Italy requiring a public investigation, such as treason, conspiracy, poisoning, or wilful murder, are in the hands of the Senate. Besides, if any individual or state The Senate

among the Italian allies requires a controversy to be settled, a penalty to be assessed, help or protection to be afforded,—all this is the province of the Senate. Or again, outside Italy, if it is necessary to send an embassy to reconcile warring communities, or to remind them of their duty, or sometimes to impose requisitions upon them, or to receive their submission, or finally to proclaim war against them,—this too is the business of the Senate. In like manner the reception to be given to foreign ambassadors in Rome, and the answers to be returned to them, are decided by the Senate. With such business the people have nothing to do. Consequently, if one were staying at Rome when the Consuls were not in town, one would imagine the constitution to be a complete aristocracy: and this has been the idea entertained by many Greeks, and by many kings as well, from the fact that nearly all the business they had with Rome was settled by the Senate.

The people.

14. After this one would naturally be inclined to ask what part is left for the people in the constitution, when the Senate has these various functions, especially the control of the receipts and expenditure of the exchequer; and when the Consuls, again, have absolute power over the details of military preparation, and an absolute authority in the field? There is, however, a part left the people, and it is a most important one. For the people is the sole fountain of honour and of punishment; and it is by these two things and these alone that dynasties and constitutions and, in a word, human society are held together: for where the distinction between them is not sharply drawn both in theory and practice, there no undertaking can be properly administered,—as indeed we might expect when good and bad are held in exactly the same honour. The people then are the only court to decide matters of life and death; and even in cases where the penalty is money, if the sum to be assessed is sufficiently serious, and especially when the accused have held the higher magistracies. And in regard to this arrangement there is one point deserving especial commendation and record. Men who are on trial for their lives at Rome, while sentence is in process of being voted,—if even only one of the tribes whose votes are needed to ratify the

sentence has not voted,—have the privilege at Rome of openly departing and condemning themselves to a voluntary exile. Such men are safe at Naples or Praeneste or at Tibur, and at other towns with which this arrangement has been duly ratified on oath.

Again, it is the people who bestow offices on the deserving, which are the most honourable rewards of virtue. It has also the absolute power of passing or repealing laws; and, most important of all, it is the people who deliberate on the question of peace or war. And when provisional terms are made for alliance, suspension of hostilities, or treaties, it is the people who ratify them or the reverse.

These considerations again would lead one to say that the chief power in the state was the people's, and that the constitution was a democracy.

15. Such, then, is the distribution of power between the several parts of the state. I must now show how each of these several parts can, when they choose, oppose or support each other.

The mutual relation of the three.

The Consul, then, when he has started on an expedition with the powers I have described, is to all appearance absolute in the administration of the business in hand; still he has need of the support both of people and Senate, and, without them, is quite unable to bring the matter to a successful conclusion. For it is plain that he must have supplies sent to his legions from time to time; but without a decree of the Senate they can be supplied neither with corn, nor clothes, nor pay, so that all the plans of a commander must be futile, if the Senate is resolved either to shrink from danger or hamper his plans. And again, whether a Consul shall bring any undertaking to a conclusion or no depends entirely upon the Senate: for it has absolute authority at the end of a year to send another Consul to supersede him, or to continue the existing one in his command. Again, even to the successes of the generals the Senate has the power to add distinction and glory, and on the other hand to obscure their merits and lower their credit. For these high achievements are brought in tangible form before the eyes of the citizens by what are called "triumphs."

The Consul dependent on the Senate,

But these triumphs the commanders cannot celebrate with proper pomp, or in some cases celebrate at all, unless the Senate concurs and grants the necessary money. As for the people, the Consuls are pre-eminently obliged to court their favour, however distant from home may be the field of their operations; for it is the people, as I have said before, that ratifies, or refuses to ratify, terms of peace and treaties; but most of all because when laying down their office they have to give an account[1] of their administration before it. Therefore in no case is it safe for the Consuls to neglect either the Senate or the good-will of the people.

and on the people.

16. As for the Senate, which possesses the immense power I have described, in the first place it is obliged in public affairs to take the multitude into account, and respect the wishes of the people; and it cannot put into execution the penalty for offences against the republic, which are punishable with death, unless the people first ratify its decrees. Similarly even in matters which directly affect the senators,—for instance, in the case of a law diminishing the Senate's traditional authority, or depriving senators of certain dignities and offices, or even actually cutting down their property,—even in such cases the people have the sole power of passing or rejecting the law. But most important of all is the fact that, if the Tribunes interpose their veto, the Senate not only are unable to pass a decree, but cannot even hold a meeting at all, whether formal or informal. Now, the Tribunes are always bound to carry out the decree of the people, and above all things to have regard to their wishes: therefore, for all these reasons the Senate stands in awe of the multitude, and cannot neglect the feelings of the people.

The Senate controlled by the people.

17. In like manner the people on its part is far from being independent of the Senate, and is bound to take its wishes into account both collectively and individually. For

[1] *εὐθύνας.* Polybius uses a word well known at Athens and other Greek states, but the audit of a Consul seems to have been one of money accounts only. At the expiration, however, of his office he took an oath in public that he had obeyed the laws, and if any prosecution were brought against him it would be tried before the people. See the case of Publius Claudius, 1, 52.

contracts, too numerous to count, are given out by the censors in all parts of Italy for the repairs or construction of public buildings; there is also the collection of revenue from many rivers, harbours, gardens, mines, and land—everything, in a word, that comes under the control of the Roman government: and in all these the people at large are engaged; so that there is scarcely a man, so to speak, who is not interested either as a contractor or as being employed in the works. For some purchase the contracts from the censors for themselves; and others go partners with them; while others again go security for these contractors, or actually pledge their property to the treasury for them. Now over all these transactions the Senate has absolute control. It can grant an extension of time; and in case of unforeseen accident can relieve the contractors from a portion of their obligation, or release them from it altogether, if they are absolutely unable to fulfil it. And there are many details in which the Senate can inflict great hardships, or, on the other hand, grant great indulgences to the contractors: for in every case the appeal is to it. But the most important point of all is that the judges are taken from its members in the majority of trials, whether public or private, in which the charges are heavy.[1] Consequently, all citizens are much at its mercy; and being alarmed at the uncertainty as to when they may need its aid, are cautious about resisting or actively opposing its will. And for a similar reason men do not rashly resist the wishes of the Consuls, because one and all may become subject to their absolute authority on a campaign.

The people dependent on the Senate

and Consul.

18. The result of this power of the several estates for mutual help or harm is a union sufficiently firm for all emergencies, and a constitution than which it is impossible to find a better. For whenever any danger from without compels

[1] This refers primarily to the *consilium* of the *quaestor* in any special *quaestio*, which up to the time of the lex judiciaria of Gracchus, B C. 122, was invariably composed of Senators. The same would apply to the *Quaestiones perpetuae*, only one of which existed in the time of Polybius, i e., *de repetundis*, established in 149 B.C. by the lex Calpurnia. Other single judices in civil suits, though nominated by the Praetor, were, Polybius intimates, almost necessarily Senators in cases of importance.

them to unite and work together, the strength which is developed by the State is so extraordinary, that everything required is unfailingly carried out by the eager rivalry shown by all classes to devote their whole minds to the need of the hour, and to secure that any determination come to should not fail for want of promptitude; while each individual works, privately and publicly alike, for the accomplishment of the business in hand. Accordingly, the peculiar constitution of the State makes it irresistible, and certain of obtaining whatever it determines to attempt. Nay, even when these external alarms are past, and the people are enjoying their good fortune and the fruits of their victories, and, as usually happens, growing corrupted by flattery and idleness, show a tendency to violence and arrogance,—it is in these circumstances, more than ever, that the constitution is seen to possess within itself the power of correcting abuses. For when any one of the three classes becomes puffed up, and manifests an inclination to be contentious and unduly encroaching, the mutual interdependency of all the three, and the possibility of the pretensions of any one being checked and thwarted by the others, must plainly check this tendency: and so the proper equilibrium is maintained by the impulsiveness of the one part being checked by its fear of the other. . . .

ON THE ROMAN ARMY

19. After electing the Consuls they proceed to elect military tribunes,—fourteen from those who had five years', and ten from those who had ten years', service. All citizens must serve ten years in the cavalry or twenty years in the infantry before the forty-sixth year of their age, except those rated below four hundred asses. The latter are employed in the navy; but if any great public necessity arises they are obliged to serve as infantry also for twenty campaigns: and no one can hold an office in the state until he has completed ten years of military service. . . .

The levy.

When the Consuls are about to enrol the army they give public notice of the day on which all Roman citizens of military age must appear. This is done every year. When the day has arrived,

and the citizens fit for service are come to Rome and have assembled on the Capitoline, the fourteen junior tribunes divide themselves, in the order in which they were appointed by the people or by the Imperators, into four divisions, because the primary division of the forces thus raised is into four legions. The four tribunes first appointed are assigned to the legion called the 1st; the next three to the 2d; the next four to the 3d; and the three last to the 4th. Of the ten senior tribunes, the two first are assigned to the 1st legion; the next three to the 2d; the two next to the 3d; and the three last to the 4th.

20. This division and assignment of the tribunes having been settled in such a way that all four legions have an equal number of officers, the tribunes of the several legions take up a separate position and draw lots for the tribes one by one; and summon the tribe on whom it from time to time falls. From this tribe they select four young men as nearly like each other in age and physical strength as possible. These four are brought forward, and the tribunes of the first legion picks out one of them, those of the second another, those of the third another, and the fourth has to take the last. When the next four are selected the tribunes of the second legion have the first choice, and those of the first the last. With the next four the tribunes of the third legion have the first choice, those of the second the last; and so on in regular rotation: of which the result is that each legion gets men of much the same standard. But when they have selected the number prescribed,—which is four thousand two hundred infantry for each legion, or at times of special danger five thousand,—they next used to pass men for the cavalry, in old times *after* the four thousand two hundred infantry; but now they do it before them, the selection having been made by the censor on the basis of wealth; and they enrol three hundred for each legion.[1]

21. The roll having been completed in this manner, the

[1] Casaubon altered this to "two hundred." In 3, 107, Polybius certainly states that the ordinary number of cavalry was 200, raised in cases of emergency to 300; and Livy, 22, 36, gives an instance. But both authors in many other passages mention 300 as the usual number, and any alteration of this passage would be unsafe.

tribunes belonging to the several legions muster their men; and selecting one of the whole body that they think most suitable for the purpose, they cause him to take an oath that he will obey his officers and do their orders to the best of his ability. And all the others come up and take the oath separately, merely affirming that they will do the same as the first man.

At the same time the Consuls send orders to the magistrates of the allied cities in Italy, from which they determine that allied troops are to serve: declaring the number required, and the day and place at which the men selected must appear. The cities then enrol their troops with much the same ceremonies as to selection and administration of the oath, and appoint a commander and a paymaster.[1]

Fourfold division of the Legionaries.

The Military Tribunes at Rome, after the administering of the oath to their men, and giving out the day and place at which they are to appear without arms, for the present dismiss them. When they arrive on the appointed day, they first select the youngest and poorest to form the *Velites*, the next to them the *Hastati*, while those who are in the prime of life they select as *Principes*, and the oldest of all as *Triarii*. For in the Roman army these divisions, distinct not only as to their ages and nomenclature, but also as to the manner in which they are armed, exist in each legion. The division is made in such proportions that the senior men, called *Triarii*, should number six hundred, the *Principes* twelve hundred, the *Hastati* twelve hundred, and that all the rest as the youngest should be reckoned among the *Velites*. And if the whole number of the legion is more than four thousand, they vary the numbers of these divisions proportionally, except those of the *Triarii*, which is always the same.

22. The youngest soldiers or *Velites* are ordered to carry a sword, spears, and target (*parma*). The target is strongly made, and large enough to protect the man; being round, with a diameter of three feet. Each man also wears a headpiece without a

1. Arms of the *Velites*.

[1] *Praefectus sociis* and *quaestor*. But this quaestor must be distinguished from the Roman quaestors.

crest (*galea*); which he sometimes covers with a piece of wolf's skin or something of that kind, for the sake both of protection and identification; that the officers of his company may be able to observe whether he shows courage or the reverse on confronting dangers. The spear of the velites has a wooden haft of about two cubits, and about a finger's breadth in thickness; its head is a span long, hammered fine, and sharpened to such an extent that it becomes bent the first time it strikes, and cannot be used by the enemy to hurl back; otherwise the weapon would be available for both sides alike.

2 Arms of the *Hastati, Principes,* and *Triarii.*

The second rank, the *Hastati*, are ordered to have the complete panoply. This to a Roman means, first, a large shield (*scutum*), the surface of which is curved outwards, its breadth two and a half feet, its length four feet,—though there is also an extra sized shield in which these measures are increased by a palm's breadth. It consists of two layers of wood fastened together with bull's-hide glue; the outer surface of which is first covered with canvas, then with calf's skin, on the upper and lower edges it is bound with iron to resist the downward strokes of the sword, and the wear of resting upon the ground. Upon it also is fixed an iron boss (*umbo*), to resist the more formidable blows of stones and pikes, and of heavy missiles generally. With the shield they also carry a sword (*gladius*) hanging down by their right thigh, which is called a Spanish sword.[1] It has an excellent point, and can deal a formidable blow with either edge, because its blade is stout and unbending. In addition to these they have two *pila*, a brass helmet, and greaves (*ocreae*). Some of the *pila* are thick, some fine. Of the thicker, some are round with the diameter of a palm's length, others are a palm square. The fine pila are like moderate sized hunting spears, and they are carried along with the former sort. The wooden haft of them all is about three cubits long; and the iron head fixed to each half is barbed, and of the same length as the haft. They take extraordinary pains to attach the head to the haft firmly; they make the fastening of the one to the other so secure for use by binding it half

[1] For the Spanish sword see Fr. xxii.

way up the wood, and riveting it with a series of clasps, that the iron breaks sooner than this fastening comes loose, although its thickness at the socket and where it is fastened to the wood is a finger and a half's breadth. Besides these each man is decorated with a plume of feathers, with three purple or black feathers standing upright, about a cubit long. The effect of these being placed on the helmet, combined with the rest of the armour, is to give the man the appearance of being twice his real height, and to give him a noble aspect calculated to strike terror into the enemy. The common soldiers also receive a brass plate, a span square, which they put upon their breast and call a breastpiece (*pectorale*), and so complete their panoply. Those who are rated above a hundred thousand asses, instead of these breastpieces wear, with the rest of their armour, coats of mail (*loricae*). The Principes and Triarii are armed in the same way as the *Hastati*, except that instead of *pila* they carry long spears (*hastae*).

Election of Centurions.

24. The *Principes*, *Hastati*, and *Triarii*, each elect ten centurions according to merit, and then a second ten each. All these sixty have the title of centurion alike, of whom the first man chosen is a member of the council of war. And they in their turn select a rear-rank officer each who is called *optio*. Next, in conjunction with the centurions, they divide the several orders (omitting the *Velites*) into ten companies each, and appoint to each company two centurions and two *optiones*; the *Velites* are divided equally among all the companies; these companies are called orders (*ordines*) or maniples (*manipuli*), or vexilla, and their officers are called centurions or *ordinum ductores*.[1] Each maniple selects two of their strongest and best born men as standard-bearers (*vexillarii*). And that each maniple should have two commanding officers is only reasonable; for it being impossible to know what a commander may be doing or what may happen to him, and necessities of war admitting of no parleying, they are anxious that the maniple may never be without a leader and commander.

[1] Polybius does not mention the subdivision of maniples into centuries, for which the word ordines is sometimes used. Livy, 8, 8; 42, 34.

When the two centurions are both on the field, the first elected commands the right of the maniple, the second the left: if both are not there, the one who is commands the whole. And they wish the centurions not to be so much bold and adventurous, as men with a faculty for command, steady, and of a profound rather than a showy spirit; not prone to engage wantonly or be unnecessarily forward in giving battle; but such as in the face of superior numbers and overwhelming pressure will die in defence of their post.

25. Similarly they divide the cavalry into ten squadrons (*turmae*), and from each they select three officers (*decuriones*), who each select a subaltern (*optio*). The decurio first elected commands the squadron, the other two have the rank of *decuriones*: a name indeed which applies to all alike. If the first *decurio* is not on the field, the second takes command of the squadron. The armour of the cavalry is very like that in Greece. In old times they did not wear the lorica, but fought in their tunics (*campestria*); the result of which was that they were prompt and nimble at dismounting and mounting again with despatch, but were in great danger at close quarters from the unprotected state of their bodies. And their lances too were useless in two ways: first because they were thin, and prevented their taking a good aim; and before they could get the head fixed in the enemy, the lances were so shaken by the mere motion of the horse that they generally broke. Secondly, because, having no spike at the butt end of their lance, they only had one stroke, namely that with the spear-head; and if the lance broke, what was left in their hands was entirely useless. Again they used to have shields of bull's hide, just like those round cakes, with a knob in the middle which are used at sacrifices, which were useless at close quarters because they were flexible rather than firm; and, when their leather shrunk and rotted from the rain, unserviceable as they were before, they then became entirely so. Wherefore, as experience showed them the uselessness of these, they lost no time in changing to the Greek fashion of arms: the advantages of which were, first, that men were able to deliver the first stroke of their lance-head with a good

Officers and arms of the equites.

aim and effect, because the shaft from the nature of its construction was steady and not quivering; and, secondly, that they were able, by reversing the lance, to use the spike at the butt-end for a steady and effective blow. And the same may be said about the Greek shields: for, whether used to ward off a blow or to thrust against the enemy, they neither give nor bend. When the Romans learnt these facts about the Greek arms they were not long in copying them; for no nation has ever surpassed them in readiness to adopt new fashions from other people, and to imitate what they see is better in others than themselves.

Assembly of the legions.

26. Having made this distribution of their men and given orders for their being armed, as I have described, the military tribunes dismiss them to their homes. But when the day has arrived on which they were all bound by their oath to appear at the place named by the Consuls (for each Consul generally appoints a separate place for his own legions, each having assigned to him two legions and a moiety of the allies), all whose names were placed on the roll appear without fail: no excuse being accepted in the case of those who have taken the oath, except a prohibitory omen or absolute impossibility. The allies muster along with the citizens, and are distributed and managed by the officers appointed by the Consuls, who have the title of *Praefecti sociis* and are twelve in number. These officers select for the Consuls from the whole infantry and cavalry of the allies such as are most fitted for actual service, and these are called *extraordinarii* (which in Greek is ἐπίλεκτοι). The whole number of the infantry of the socii generally equals that of the legions, but the cavalry is treble that of the citizens. Of these they select a third of the cavalry, and a fifth of the infantry to serve as *extraordinarii*. The rest they divide into two parts, one of which is called the right, the other the left wing (*alae*).

The Socii.

These arrangements made, the military tribunes take over the citizens and allies and proceed to form a camp. Now the principle on which they construct their camps, no matter when or where, is the same; I think therefore that it will be in place

here to try and make my readers understand, as far as words can do so, the Roman tactics in regard to the march (*agmen*), the camp (*castrorum metatio*), and the line of battle (*acies*). I cannot imagine any one so indifferent to things noble and great, as to refuse to take some little extra trouble to understand things like these; for if he has once heard them, he will be acquainted with one of those things genuinely worth observation and knowledge.

Castrorum metatio

27. Their method of laying out a camp is as follows. The place for the camp having been selected, the spot in it best calculated to give a view of the whole, and most convenient for issuing orders, is appropriated for the general's tent (*Praetorium*).

Having placed a standard on the spot on which they intend to put the Praetorium, they measure off a square round this standard, in such a way that each of its sides is a hundred feet from the standard, and the area of the square is four plethra.[1] Along one side of this square—whichever aspect appears most convenient for watering and foraging—the legions are stationed as follows. I have said that there were six Tribuni in each legion, and that each Consul had two legions,—it follows that there are twelve *Tribuni* in a Consular army. Well, they pitch the tents of these Tribuni all in one straight line, parallel to the side of the square selected, at a distance of fifty feet from it (there is a place too selected for the horses, beasts of burden, and other baggage of the Tribuni); these tents face the outer side of the camp and away from the square described above,—a direction which will henceforth be called "the front" by me. The tents of the Tribuni stand at equal distances from each other, so that they extend along the whole breadth of the space occupied by the legions.

The principia

28. From the line described by the front of these tents they measure another distance of a hundred feet towards the front. At that distance another parallel straight line is drawn, and it is from this last that they begin arranging the quarters of the legions, which they do as follows:—they bisect the last mentioned straight line, and

[1] The plethrum = 10,000 square feet. The side of the square of the Praetorium, therefore, is 200 feet

from that point draw another straight line at right angles to it; along this line, on either side of it facing each other, the cavalry of the two legions are quartered with a space of fifty feet between them, which space is exactly bisected by the line last mentioned. The manner of encamping the infantry is similar to that of the cavalry. The whole area of each space occupied by the maniples and squadrons is a square, and faces the *via*;[1] the length facing the *via* is one hundred feet, and they generally try to make the depth the same, except in the case of the socii; and when they are employing legions of an extra number, they increase the length and depth of these squares proportionally.

The quarters.

29. The spaces assigned to the cavalry are opposite the space between the two groups of tents belonging to the Tribuni of the two legions, at right angles to the line along which they stand, like a cross-road; and indeed the whole arrangement of the *viae* is like a system of cross-roads, running on either side of the blocks of tents, those of the cavalry on one side and those of the infantry on the other. The spaces assigned to the cavalry and the Triarii in each legion are back to back, with no *via* between them, but touching each other, looking opposite ways; and the depth of the spaces assigned to the Triarii is only half that assigned to other maniples, because their numbers are generally only half; but though the number of the men is different, the length of the space is always the same owing to the lesser depth. Next, parallel with these spaces, at a distance of fifty feet, they place the *Principes* facing the Triarii; and as they face the space between themselves and the *Triarii*, we have two more roads formed at right angles to the hundred-foot area in front of the tents of the Tribunes, and running down from it to the outer agger of the camp on the side opposite to that of the Principia, which we agreed to call the front of the camp. Behind the spaces for the *Triarii* and looking in the opposite direction, and touching each other, are the spaces for the *Hastati*. These several branches of the service (*Triarii*, *Principes*, *Hastati*), being each divided into ten maniples, the cross-roads between the blocks are all the same length and terminate in the front agger of the camp;

[1] That is the *via* separating it from the next block, or from the vallum.

towards which they cause the last maniples in the rows to face.

30. Beyond the *Hastati* they again leave a space of fifty feet, and there, beginning from the same base (the Principia), and going in a parallel direction, and to the same distance as the other blocks, they place the cavalry of the allies facing the *Hastati*. Now the number of the allies, as I have stated above, is equal to that of the legions in regard to the infantry, though it falls below that if we omit the *extraordinarii;* but that of the cavalry is double, when the third part is deducted for service among the *extraordinarii*. Therefore in marking out the camp the spaces assigned to the latter are made proportionally deeper, so that their length remains the same as those occupied by the legions. Thus five viae are formed:[1] and back to back with these cavalry are the spaces for the infantry of the allies, the depth being proportionally increased according to their numbers;[2] and these maniples face the outer sides of the camp and the agger. In each maniple the first tent at either end is occupied by the centurions. Between the fifth and sixth squadrons of cavalry, and the fifth and sixth maniple of infantry, there is a space of fifty left, so that another road is made across the camp at right angles to the others and parallel to the tents of the Tribuni, and this they call the *Via Quintana*, as it runs along the fifth squadrons and maniples.

Via Quintana.

31. The space behind the tents of the Tribuni is thus used. On one side of the square of the Praetorium is the market, on the other the office of the Quaestor and the supplies which he has charge of. Then behind the last tent of the Tribuni on either side, arranged at right angles to those tents, are the quarters of the cavalry picked out of the *extraordinarii*, as well as of some of those who are serving as volunteers from personal friendship to the Consuls. All these are arranged parallel to the side aggers, facing on the one side the Quaestorium, on

The space between the Principia and the agger.

The Staff, or Praetoria cohors.

[1] That is, one between the two legions, and two between the blocks in each

[2] That is to say—without the *extraordinarii* ($\frac{1}{5}$)—there are 2400 to get into 10 spaces instead of 3000 into 30.

the other the market-place. And, generally speaking, it falls to the lot of these men not only to be near the Consul in the camp, but to be wholly employed about the persons of the Consul and the Quaestor on the march and all other occasions. Back to back with these again, facing the agger, are placed the infantry who serve in the same way as these cavalry.[1]

Beyond these there is another empty space or road left, one hundred feet broad, parallel to the tents of the Tribuni, skirting the market-place, Praetorium, and Quaestorium, from agger to agger. On the further side of this road the rest of the *equites extraordinarii* are placed facing the market-place and Quaestorium: and between the quarters of these cavalry of the two legions a passage is left of fifty feet, exactly opposite and at right angles to the square of the Praetorium, leading to the rearward agger.

Back to back with the *equites extraordinarii* are the infantry of the same, facing the agger at the rear of the whole camp. And the space left empty on either side of these, facing the agger on each side of the camp, is given up to foreigners and such allies as chance to come to the camp.

The space round the quarters

The result of these arrangements is that the whole camp is a square, with streets and other constructions regularly planned like a town. Between the line of the tents and the agger there is an empty space of two hundred feet on every side of the square, which is turned to a great variety of uses. To begin with, it is exceedingly convenient for the marching in and out of the legions. For each division descends into this space by the *via* which passes its own quarters, and so avoids crowding and hustling each other, as they would if they were all collected on one road. Again, all cattle brought into the camp, as well as booty of all sorts taken from the enemy, are deposited in this space and securely guarded during the night-watches. But the most important use of this space is that, in night assaults, it secures the tents from the danger of being set on fire, and keeps the soldiers out of the range of the enemy's missiles; or, if a few of them do carry so far, they are spent and cannot penetrate the tents.

[1] That is, who have been selected from the pedites sociorum to serve on the praetoria cohors

32. The number then of foot-soldiers and cavalry being given (at the rate, that is to say, of four thousand or of five thousand for each legion), and the length, depth, and number of the maniples being likewise known, as well as the breadth of the passages and roads, it becomes possible to calculate the area occupied by the camp and the length of the aggers. If on any occasion the number of allies, either those originally enrolled or those who joined subsequently, exceeds their due proportion, the difficulty is provided for in this way. To the overplus of allies who joined subsequent to the enrolment of the army are assigned the spaces on either side of the Praetorium, the market-place and Quaestorium being proportionally contracted. For the extra numbers of allies who joined originally an extra line of tents (forming thus another *via*) is put up parallel with the other tents of the socii, facing the agger on either side of the camp. But if all four legions and both Consuls are in the same camp, all we have to do is to imagine a second army, arranged back to back to the one already placed, in exactly the same spaces as the former, but side by side with it at the part where the picked men from the *extraordinarii* are stationed facing the rearward agger. In this case the shape of the camp becomes an oblong, the area double, and the length of the entire agger half as much again. This is the arrangement when both Consuls are within the same agger; but if they occupy two separate camps, the above arrangements hold good, except that the market-place is placed half way between the two camps.

Provision for extra numbers,

and for two consular armies.

33. The camp having thus been laid out, the Tribuni next administer an oath to all in it separately, whether free or slave, that they will steal nothing within the agger, and in case they find anything will bring it to the Tribuni. They next select for their several duties the maniples of the Principes and Hastati in each legion. Two are told off to guard the space in front of the quarters of the Tribuni. For in this space, which is called the Principia, most of the Romans in the camp transact all the business of the day; and are therefore very particular about its

Guard duty.

being kept well watered and properly swept. Of the other eighteen maniples, three are assigned to each of the six Tribuni, that being the respective numbers in each legion; and of these three maniples each takes its turn of duty in waiting upon the Tribune. The services they render him are such as these: they pitch his tent for him when a place is selected for encampment, and level the ground all round it; and if any extra precaution is required for the protection of his baggage, it is their duty to see to it. They also supply him with two relays of guards. A guard consists of four men, two of whom act as sentries in front of his tent, and two on the rear of it near the horses. Seeing that each Tribune has three maniples, and each maniple has a hundred men, without counting *Triarii* and *Velites* who are not liable for this service, the duty is a light one, coming round to each maniple only once in three days; while by this arrangement ample provision is made for the convenience as well as the dignity of the Tribuni. The maniples of Triarii are exempted from this personal service to the Tribuni, but they each supply a watch of four men to the squadron of cavalry nearest them. These watches have to keep a general look out; but their chief duty is to keep an eye upon the horses, to prevent their hurting themselves by getting entangled in their tethers, and so becoming unfit for use; or from getting loose, and making a confusion and disturbance in the camp by running against other horses. Finally, all the maniples take turns to mount guard for a day each at the Consul's tent, to protect him from plots, and maintain the dignity of his office.

Construction of the *fossa* and *agger*.

34. As to the construction of the foss and vallum,[1] two sides fall to the lot of the socii, each division taking that side along which it is quartered; the other two are left to the Romans, one to each legion. Each side is divided into portions according to the number of maniples, and the centurions stand by and superintend the work of each maniple; while two of the Tribunes superintend the construction of the whole

[1] Polybius always calls this the χάραξ or χαράκωμα But the Romans had two words, *agger* the embankment, and *vallum* the palisading on the top of it. Either word, however, is often used to represent the whole structure.

side and see that it is adequate. In the same way the Tribunes superintend all other operations in the camp. They divide themselves in twos, and each pair is on duty for two months out of six; they draw lots for their turns, and the pair on whom the lot falls takes the superintendence of all active operations. The prefects of the socii divide their duty in the same way. At daybreak the officers of the cavalry and the centurions muster at the tents of the Tribunes, while the Tribunes go to that of the Consul. He gives the necessary orders to the Tribunes, they to the cavalry officers and centurions, and these last pass them on to the rank and file as occasion may demand.

Orders of the day.

To secure the passing round of the watchword for the night the following course is followed. One man is selected from the tenth maniple, which, in the case both of cavalry and infantry, is quartered at the ends of the road between the tents, this man is relieved from guard-duty and appears each day about sunset at the tent of the Tribune on duty, takes the *tessera* or wooden tablet on which the watchword is inscribed, and returns to his own maniple and delivers the wooden tablet and watchword in the presence of witnesses to the chief officer of the maniple next his own; he in the same way to the officer of the next, and so on, until it arrives at the first maniple stationed next the Tribunes. These men are obliged to deliver the tablet (*tessera*) to the Tribunes before dark. If they are all handed in, the Tribune knows that the watchword has been delivered to all, and has passed through all the ranks back to his hands: but if any one is missing, he at once investigates the matter; for he knows by the marks on the tablets from which division of the army the tablet has not appeared; and the man who is discovered to be responsible for its non-appearance is visited with condign punishment.

The watchword

35. Next as to the keeping guard at night. The Consul's tent is guarded by the maniple on duty: those of the Tribuni and praefects of the cavalry by the pickets formed as described above from the several maniples. And in the same way each maniple and squadron posts guards of their own men. The

Night watches.

other pickets are posted by the Consul. Generally speaking there are three pickets at the Quaestorium, and two at the tent of each of the legati or members of council. The vallum is lined by the *velites*, who are on guard all along it from day to day. That is their special duty; while they also guard all the entrances to the camp, telling off ten sentinels to take their turn at each of them. Of the men told off for duty at the several *stationes*, the man who in each maniple is to take the first watch is brought by the rear-rank man of his company to the Tribune at eventide. The latter hands over to them severally small wooden tablets (*tesserae*), one for each watch, inscribed with small marks; on receiving which they go off to the places indicated.

Visiting rounds.

The duty of going the rounds is intrusted to the cavalry. The first Praefect of cavalry in each legion, early in the morning, orders one of his rear-rank men to give notice before breakfast to four young men of his squadron who are to go the rounds. At evening this same man's duty is to give notice to the Praefect of the next squadron that it is his turn to provide for going the rounds until next morning. This officer thereupon takes measures similar to the preceding one until the next day; and so on throughout the cavalry squadrons. The four men thus selected by the rear-rank men from the first squadron, after drawing lots for the watch they are to take, proceed to the tent of the Tribune on duty, and receive from him a writing stating the order[1] and the number of the watches they are to visit. The four then take up their quarters for the night alongside of the first maniple of Triarii; for it is the duty of the centurion of this maniple to see that a bugle is blown at the beginning of every watch. When the time has arrived, the man to whose lot the first watch has fallen goes his rounds, taking some of his friends as witnesses. He walks through the posts assigned, which are not only those along the vallum and gates, but also the pickets set by the several maniples and squadrons. If he find the men of the first watch awake he takes from them their tessera; but if he find any one of them asleep or absent from his post, he calls those with him to witness the fact and passes

[1] That is, whether in first, second, or other watch in the night.

on. The same process is repeated by those who go the rounds during the other watches. The charge of seeing that the bugle is blown at the beginning of each watch, so that the right man might visit the right pickets, is as I have said, laid upon the centurions of the first maniple of Triarii, each one taking the duty for a day.

Each of these men who have gone the rounds (*tessarii*) at daybreak conveys the tesserae to the Tribune on duty. If the whole number are given in they are dismissed without question; but if any of them brings a number less than that of the pickets, an investigation is made by means of the mark on the tessera, as to which picket he has omitted. Upon this being ascertained the centurion is summoned; he brings the men who were on duty, and they are confronted with the patrol. If the fault is with the men on guard, the patrol clears himself by producing the witnesses whom he took with him; for he cannot do so without. If nothing of that sort happened, the blame recoils upon the patrol.

37. Then the Tribunes at once hold a court-martial, and the man who is found guilty is punished by the *fustuarium;* the nature of which is this. The Tribune takes a cudgel and merely touches the condemned man; whereupon all the soldiers fall upon him with cudgels and stones. Generally speaking men thus punished are killed on the spot; but if by any chance, after running the gauntlet, they manage to escape from the camp, they have no hope of ultimately surviving even so. They may not return to their own country, nor would any one venture to receive such an one into his house. Therefore those who have once fallen into this misfortune are utterly and finally ruined. The same fate awaits the praefect of the squadron, as well as his rear-rank man, if they fail to give the necessary order at the proper time, the latter to the patrols, and the former to the praefect of the next squadron. The result of the severity and inevitableness of this punishment is that in the Roman army the night watches are faultlessly kept. The common soldiers are amenable to the Tribunes; the Tribunes to the Consuls. The Tribune is competent to punish a soldier by inflicting a

Military punishments. the *fustuarium.*

fine, distraining his goods, or ordering him to be flogged; so too the praefects in the case of the socii. The punishment of the *fustuarium* is assigned also to any one committing theft in the camp, or bearing false witness: as also to any one who in full manhood is detected in shameful immorality: or to any one who has been thrice punished for the same offence. All these things are punished as crimes. But such as the following are reckoned as cowardly and dishonourable in a soldier: —for a man to make a false report to the Tribunes of his valour in order to get reward; or for men who have been told off to an ambuscade to quit the place assigned them from fear; and also for a man to throw away any of his arms from fear, on the actual field of battle. Consequently it sometimes happens that men confront certain death at their stations, because, from their fear of the punishment awaiting them at home, they refuse to quit their post: while others, who have lost shield or spear or any other arm on the field, throw themselves upon the foe, in hopes of recovering what they have lost, or of escaping by death from certain disgrace and the insults of their relations.[1]

Decimatio.

38. But if it ever happens that a number of men are involved in these same acts: if, for instance, some entire maniples have quitted their ground in the presence of the enemy, it is deemed impossible to subject all to the *fustuarium* or to military execution; but a solution of the difficulty has been found at once adequate to the maintenance of discipline and calculated to strike terror. The Tribune assembles the legion, calls the defaulters to the front, and, after administering a sharp rebuke, selects five or eight or twenty out of them by lot, so that those selected should be about a tenth of those who have been guilty of the act of cowardice. These selected are punished with the *fustuarium* without mercy; the rest are put on rations of barley instead of wheat, and are ordered to take up their quarters outside the vallum and the protection of the camp. As all are equally in danger of having the lot fall on them, and as all alike who escape that, are made a conspicuous example of by having their rations of barley, the best

[1] See the story of Cato's son, Plutarch, *Cato Maj.* 20.

possible means are thus taken to inspire fear for the future, and to correct the mischief which has actually occurred.

39. A very excellent plan also is adopted for inducing young soldiers to brave danger. When an engagement has taken place and any of them have showed conspicuous gallantry, the Consul summons an assembly of the legion, puts forward those whom he considers to have distinguished themselves in any way, and first compliments each of them individually on his gallantry, and mentions any other distinction he may have earned in the course of his life, and then presents them with gifts: to the man who has wounded an enemy, a spear; to the man who has killed one and stripped his armour, a cup, if he be in the infantry, horse-trappings if in the cavalry: though originally the only present made was a spear. This does not take place in the event of their having wounded or stripped any of the enemy in a set engagement or the storming of a town; but in skirmishes or other occasions of that sort, in which, without there being any positive necessity for them to expose themselves singly to danger, they have done so voluntarily and deliberately. In the capture of a town those who are first to mount the walls are presented with a gold crown. So too those who have covered and saved any citizens or allies are distinguished by the Consul with certain presents; and those whom they have preserved present them voluntarily with a crown, or if not, they are compelled to do so by the Tribunes. The man thus preserved, too, reverences his preserver throughout his life as a father, and is bound to act towards him as a father in every respect. By such incentives those who stay at home are stirred up to a noble rivalry and emulation in confronting danger, no less than those who actually hear and see what takes place. For the recipients of such rewards not only enjoy great glory among their comrades in the army, and an immediate reputation at home, but after their return they are marked men in all solemn festivals; for they alone, who have been thus distinguished by the Consuls for bravery, are allowed to wear robes of honour on those occasions: and moreover they place

Military decorations.

Mural crown.

Civic crown.

the spoils they have taken in the most conspicuous places in their houses, as visible tokens and proofs of their valour. No wonder that a people, whose rewards and punishments are allotted with such care and received with such feelings, should be brilliantly successful in war.

The pay of the foot soldier is $5\frac{1}{3}$ asses a day; of the centurion $10\frac{2}{3}$; of the cavalry 16. The infantry receive a ration of wheat equal to about $\frac{2}{3}$ of an Attic medimnus a month, and the cavalry 7 medimni of barley, and 2 of wheat; of the allies the infantry receive the same, the cavalry $1\frac{1}{3}$ medimnus of wheat, and 5 of barley. This is a free gift to the allies; but in the cases of the Romans, the Quaestor stops out of their pay the price of their corn and clothes, or any additional arms they may require at a fixed rate.

40. The following is their manner of moving camp. At the first bugle the men all strike their tents and collect their baggage; but no soldier may strike his tent, or set it up either, till the same is done to that of the Tribuni and the Consul. At the second bugle they load the beasts of burden with their baggage: at the third the first maniples must advance and set the whole camp in motion. Generally speaking, the men appointed to make this start are the *extraordinarii*: next comes the right wing of the socii; and behind them their beasts of burden. These are followed by the first legion with its own baggage immediately on its rear; then comes the second legion, followed by its own beasts of burden, and the baggage of those socii who have to bring up the rear of the march, that is to say, the left wing of the socii. The cavalry sometimes ride on the rear of their respective divisions, sometimes on either side of the beasts of burden, to keep them together and secure them. If an attack is expected on the rear, the *extraordinarii* themselves occupy the rear instead of the van. Of the two legions and wings each takes the lead in the march on alternate days, that by this interchange of position all may have an equal share in the advantage of being first at the water and forage. The order of march, however, is different at times of unusual danger, if they have open ground enough. For in that case they advance in three parallel columns, consisting of the *Hastati*, *Principes*, and *Triarii*: the

beasts of burden belonging to the maniples in the van are placed in front of all, those belonging to the second behind the leading maniples, and those belonging to the third behind the second maniples, thus having the baggage and the maniples in alternate lines. With this order of march, on an alarm being given, the columns face to the right or left according to the quarter on which the enemy appears, and get clear of the baggage. So that in a short space of time, and by one movement, the whole of the hoplites are in line of battle—except that sometimes it is necessary to half-wheel the *Hastati* also—and the baggage and the rest of the army are in their proper place for safety, namely, in the rear of the line of combatants.

Encampment on the march

41. When the army on the march is approaching the place of encampment, a Tribune, and those of the centurions who have been from time to time selected for that duty, are sent forward to survey the place of encampment. Having done this they proceed first of all to fix upon the place for the Consul's tent (as I have described above), and to determine on which side of the Praetorium to quarter the legions. Having decided these points they measure out the Praetorium, then they draw the straight line along which the tents of the Tribunes are to be pitched, and then the line parallel to this, beyond which the quarters of the legions are to begin. In the same way they draw the lines on the other sides of the Praetorium in accordance with the plan which I have already detailed at length. This does not take long, nor is the marking out of the camp a matter of difficulty, because the dimensions are all regularly laid down, and are in accordance with precedent. Then they fix one flag in the ground where the Consul's tent is to stand, and another on the base of the square containing it, and a third on the line of the Tribunes' tents; the two latter are scarlet, that which marks the Consul's tent is white; the lines on the other sides of the Praetorium are marked sometimes with plain spears and sometimes by flags of other colours. After this they lay out the *viae* between the quarters, fixing spears at each *via*. Consequently when the legions in the course of their march have come near enough to get a clear view of the place of encampment, they can all make out

exactly the whole plan of it, taking as their base the Consul's flag and calculating from that. Moreover as each soldier knows precisely on which *via*, and at what point of it, his quarters are to be, because all occupy the same position in the camp wherever it may be, it is exactly like a legion entering its own city; when breaking off at the gates each man makes straight for his own residence without hesitation, because he knows the direction and the quarter of the town in which home lies. It is precisely the same in a Roman camp.

42. It is because the first object of the Romans in the matter of encampment is facility, that they seem to me to differ diametrically from Greek military men in this respect. Greeks, in choosing a place for a camp, think primarily of security from the natural strength of the position: first, because they are averse from the toil of digging a foss, and, secondly, because they think that no artificial defences are comparable to those afforded by the nature of the ground. Accordingly, they not only have to vary the whole configuration of the camp to suit the nature of the ground, but to change the arrangement of details in all kinds of irregular ways; so that neither soldier nor company has a fixed place in it. The Romans, on the other hand, prefer to undergo the fatigue of digging, and of the other labours of circumvallation, for the sake of the facility in arrangement, and to secure a plan of encampment which shall be one and the same and familiar to all.

Such are the most important facts in regard to the legions and the method of encamping them. . . .

THE ROMAN REPUBLIC COMPARED WITH OTHERS

The Theban constitution may be put aside.

43. Nearly all historians have recorded as constitutions of eminent excellence those of Lacedaemonia, Crete, Mantinea, and Carthage. Some have also mentioned those of Athens and Thebes. The former I may allow to pass; but I am convinced that little need be said of the Athenian and Theban constitutions: their growth was abnormal, the period of their zenith brief, and the changes they experienced unusually violent. Their glory was a sudden and fortuitous flash, so to

speak; and while they still thought themselves prosperous, and likely to remain so, they found themselves involved in circumstances completely the reverse. The Thebans got their reputation for valour among the Greeks, by taking advantage of the senseless policy of the Lacedaemonians, and the hatred of the allies towards them, owing to the valour of one, or at most two, men who were wise enough to appreciate the situation. Since fortune quickly made it evident that it was not the peculiarity of their constitution, but the valour of their leaders, which gave the Thebans their success. For the great power of Thebes notoriously took its rise, attained its zenith, and fell to the ground with the lives of Epaminondas and Pelopidas. We must therefore conclude that it was not its constitution, but its men, that caused the high fortune which it then enjoyed.

as also the Athenian.

44. A somewhat similar remark applies to the Athenian constitution also. For though it perhaps had more frequent interludes of excellence, yet its highest perfection was attained during the brilliant career of Themistocles; and having reached that point it quickly declined, owing to its essential instability. For the Athenian demus is always in the position of a ship without a commander. In such a ship, if fear of the enemy, or the occurrence of a storm induce the crew to be of one mind and to obey the helmsman, everything goes well; but if they recover from this fear, and begin to treat their officers with contempt, and to quarrel with each other because they are no longer all of one mind,—one party wishing to continue the voyage, and the other urging the steersman to bring the ship to anchor; some letting out the sheets, and others hauling them in, and ordering the sails to be furled,—their discord and quarrels make a sorry show to lookers on; and the position of affairs is full of risk to those on board engaged on the same voyage: and the result has often been that, after escaping the dangers of the widest seas, and the most violent storms, they wreck their ship in harbour and close to shore. And this is what has often happened to the Athenian constitution. For, after repelling, on various occasions, the greatest and most formidable dangers by the valour of its people and their leaders, there

have been times when, in periods of secure tranquillity, it has gratuitously and recklessly encountered disaster.[1] Therefore I need say no more about either it, or the Theban constitution: in both of which a mob manages everything on its own unfettered impulse—a mob in the one city distinguished for headlong outbursts of fiery temper, in the other trained in long habits of violence and ferocity.

The Spartan polity unlike that of Crete.

45. Passing to the Cretan polity there are two points which deserve our consideration. The first is how such writers as Ephorus, Xenophon, Callisthenes and Plato[2]—who are the most learned of the ancients—could assert that it was like that of Sparta; and secondly how they came to assert that it was at all admirable. I can agree with neither assertion; and I will explain why I say so. And first as to its dissimilarity with the Spartan constitution. The peculiar merit of the latter is said to be its land laws, by which no one possesses more than another, but all citizens have an equal share in the public land.[3] The next distinctive feature regards the possession of money: for as it is utterly discredited among them, the jealous competition which arises from inequality of wealth is entirely removed from the city. A third peculiarity of the Lacedaemonian polity is that, of the officials by whose hands and with whose advice the whole government is conducted, the kings hold an hereditary office, while the members of the Gerusia are elected for life.

46. Among the Cretans the exact reverse of all these arrange-

[1] In seeking a constitution to compare with that of Rome, that of Athens is rejected (1) as not being a mixed one, (2) as not having been successful. successful, that is, in gaining or keeping an empire. He is speaking somewhat loosely. The power of Athens, of which Themistocles laid the foundation, was mainly consolidated by Pericles; so that Polybius includes much of the period of her rise with that of her decline.

[2] For what remains of the account of Ephorus see Strabo, 10, 4, 8-9. The reference to Plato is to the "Laws," especially Book I See also Aristotle, *Pol.* 2, 10, who points out the likeness and unlikeness between the Cretan and Lacedaemonian constitutions.

[3] This equality of land had gradually disappeared by the time of King Agis IV. (B C. 243-239). so that, according to Plutarch [*Agis* 5], the number of landowners was reduced to 100 This process had been accelerated by the Rhetra of Epitadeus, allowing free bequest of land, Plutarch, *ib.* See Thirlwall, vol. VIII. p. 132

ments obtains. The laws allow them to possess as much land as they can get with no limitation whatever. Money is so highly valued among them, that its possession is not only thought to be necessary but in the highest degree creditable. And in fact greed and avarice are so native to the soil in Crete, that they are the only people in the world among whom no stigma attaches to any sort of gain whatever. Again all their offices are annual and on a democratical footing. I have therefore often felt at a loss to account for these writers speaking of the two constitutions, which are radically different, as though they were closely united and allied. But, besides overlooking these important differences, these writers have gone out of their way to comment at length on the legislation of Lycurgus: "He was the only legislator," they say, "who saw the important points. For there being two things on which the safety of a commonwealth depends,—courage in the face of the enemy and concord at home,—by abolishing covetousness, he with it removed all motive for civil broil and contest: whence it has been brought about that the Lacedaemonians are the best governed and most united people in Greece." Yet while giving utterance to these sentiments, and though they see that, in contrast to this, the Cretans by their ingrained avarice are engaged in countless public and private seditions, murders and civil wars, they yet regard these facts as not affecting their contention, but are bold enough to speak of the two constitutions as alike. Ephorus, indeed, putting aside names, employs expressions so precisely the same, when discoursing on the two constitutions, that, unless one noticed the proper names, there would be no means whatever of distinguishing which of the two he was describing.

47. In what the difference between them consists I have already stated. I will now address myself to showing that the Cretan constitution deserves neither praise nor imitation.

Tests of a good polity

To my mind, then, there are two things fundamental to every state, in virtue of which its powers and constitution become desirable or objectionable. These are customs and laws. Of these the desirable are those which make men's private lives holy and pure, and the public character of the state

civilised and just. The objectionable are those whose effect is the reverse. As, then, when we see good customs and good laws prevailing among certain people, we confidently assume that, in consequence of them, the men and their civil constitution will be good also, so when we see private life full of covetousness, and public policy of injustice, plainly we have reason for asserting their laws, particular customs, and general constitution to be bad. Now, with few exceptions, you could find no habits prevailing in private life more steeped in treachery than those in Crete, and no public policy more inequitable. Holding, then, the Cretan constitution to be neither like the Spartan, nor worthy of choice or imitation, I reject it from the comparison which I have instituted.

Ideal polities may be omitted.

Nor again would it be fair to introduce the Republic of Plato, which is also spoken of in high terms by some philosophers. For just as we refuse admission to the athletic contests to those actors or athletes who have not acquired a recognised position[1] or trained for them, so we ought not to admit this Platonic constitution to the contest for the prize of merit unless it can first point to some genuine and practical achievement. Up to this time the notion of bringing it into comparison with the constitutions of Sparta, Rome, and Carthage would be like putting up a statue to compare with living and breathing men. Even if such a statue were faultless in point of art, the comparison of the lifeless with the living would naturally leave an impression of imperfection and incongruity upon the minds of the spectators.

The aims of Lycurgus.

48. I shall therefore omit these, and proceed with my description of the Laconian constitution. Now it seems to me that for securing unity among the citizens, for safe-guarding the Laconian

[1] The meaning of *νενενημένους*, which I here represent by "acquired a recognised position," is at least doubtful. Casaubon translates it *qui in album non fuerint recepti*, referring to Sueton Nero, 21. But nothing is elsewhere known of such an *album* for registering the names of recognised athletes The passage is important as helping to explain how the number of those entering for the contests in the greater games was practically limited, and therefore how it happened that, for instance, the five contests of the Pentathlum did not often fall to different athletes so as to leave the victory uncertain.

territory, and preserving the liberty of Sparta inviolate, the legislation and provisions of Lycurgus were so excellent, that I am forced to regard his wisdom as something superhuman. For the equality of landed possessions, the simplicity in their food, and the practice of taking it in common, which he established, were well calculated to secure morality in private life and to prevent civil broils in the State; as also their training in the endurance of labours and dangers to make men brave and noble minded: but when both these virtues, courage and high morality, are combined in one soul or in one state, vice will not readily spring from such a soil, nor will such men easily be overcome by their enemies. By constructing his constitution therefore in this spirit, and of these elements, he secured two blessings to the Spartans,—safety for their territory, and a lasting freedom for themselves long after he was gone. He appears however to have made no one provision whatever, particular or general, for the acquisition of the territory of their neighbours; or for the assertion of their supremacy; or, in a word, for any policy of aggrandisement at all. What he had still to do was to impose such a necessity, or create such a spirit among the citizens, that, as he had succeeded in making their individual lives independent and simple, the public character of the state should also become independent and moral. But the actual fact is, that, though he made them the most disinterested and sober-minded men in the world, as far as their own ways of life and their national institutions were concerned, he left them in regard to the rest of Greece ambitious, eager for supremacy, and encroaching in the highest degree.

Their partial failure

49. For in the first place is it not notorious that they were nearly the first Greeks to cast a covetous eye upon the territory of their neighbours, and that accordingly they waged a war of subjugation on the Messenians? In the next place is it not related in all histories that in their dogged obstinacy they bound themselves with an oath never to desist from the siege of Messene until they had taken it? And lastly it is known to all that in their efforts for supremacy in Greece they submitted to do

First and second Messenian wars, B.C. 745-724 (?), 685-668.

the bidding of those whom they had once conquered in war. For when the Persians invaded Greece, they conquered them, as champions of the liberty of the Greeks; yet when the invaders had retired and fled, they betrayed the cities of Greece into their hands by the peace of Antalcidas, for the sake of getting money to secure their supremacy over the Greeks. It was then that the defect in their constitution was rendered apparent. For as long as their ambition was confined to governing their immediate neighbours, or even the Peloponnesians only, they were content with the resources and supplies provided by Laconia itself, having all material of war ready to hand, and being able without much expenditure of time to return home or convey provisions with them. But directly they took in hand to despatch naval expeditions, or to go on campaigns by land outside the Peloponnese, it was evident that neither their iron currency, nor their use of crops for payment in kind, would be able to supply them with what they lacked if they abided by the legislation of Lycurgus; for such undertakings required money universally current, and goods from foreign countries. Thus they were compelled to wait humbly at Persian doors, impose tribute on the islanders, and exact contributions from all the Greeks: knowing that, if they abided by the laws of Lycurgus, it was impossible to advance any claims upon any outside power at all, much less upon the supremacy in Greece.

Battle of Plataea, B C. 479.

Peace of Antalcidas, B.C 387.

The causes of this failure.

50. My object, then, in this digression is to make it manifest by actual facts that, for guarding their own country with absolute safety, and for preserving their own freedom, the legislation of Lycurgus was entirely sufficient; and for those who are content with these objects we must concede that there neither exists, nor ever has existed, a constitution and civil order preferable to that of Sparta. But if any one is seeking aggrandisement, and believes that to be a leader and ruler and despot of numerous subjects, and to have all looking and turning to him, is a finer thing than that,—in this point of view we must acknowledge that the Spartan constitution is

Sparta fails where Rome succeeds

deficient, and that of Rome superior and better constituted for obtaining power. And this has been proved by actual facts. For when the Lacedaemonians strove to possess themselves of the supremacy in Greece, it was not long before they brought their own freedom itself into danger. Whereas the Romans, after obtaining supreme power over the Italians themselves, soon brought the whole world under their rule,—in which achievement the abundance and availability of their supplies largely contributed to their success.

51. Now the Carthaginian constitution seems to me originally to have been well contrived in these most distinctively important particulars. For they had kings,[1] and the Gerusia had the powers of an aristocracy, and the multitude were supreme in such things as affected them; and on the whole the adjustment of its several parts was very like that of Rome and Sparta. But about the period of its entering on the Hannibalian war the political state of Carthage was on the decline,[2] that of Rome improving. For whereas there is in every body, or polity, or business a natural stage of growth, zenith, and decay; and whereas everything in them is at its best at the zenith; we may thereby judge of the difference between these two constitutions as they existed at that period. For exactly so far as the strength and prosperity of Carthage preceded that of Rome in point of time, by so much was Carthage then past its prime, while Rome was exactly at its zenith, as far as its political constitution was concerned. In Carthage therefore the influence of the people in the policy of the state had already risen to be supreme, while at Rome the Senate was at the height of its power: and so, as in the one measures were deliberated upon by the many, in the other by the best men, the policy of the Romans in all public undertakings proved the stronger; on which account, though they met with capital disasters, by force of

Rome fresher than Carthage;

[1] The Carthaginian Suffetes are always called *βασιλεῖς* by the Greek writers. see 3, 33, note; Herod 7, 165; Diod *Sic.* 14, 53. Aristotle [*Pol.* 2, 11], in contrasting the Spartan and Carthaginian constitutions, mentions with approval that, unlike the Spartan kings, those at Carthage were elected, and were not confined to a particular family

[2] See Bosworth Smith, *Carthage and the Carthaginians*, p. 26 ff

prudent counsels they finally conquered the Carthaginians in the war.

and its citizen levies superior to Carthaginian mercenaries

52. If we look however at separate details, for instance at the provisions for carrying on a war, we shall find that whereas for a naval expedition the Carthaginians are the better trained and prepared,—as it is only natural with a people with whom it has been hereditary for many generations to practise this craft, and to follow the seaman's trade above all nations in the world,—yet, in regard to military service on land, the Romans train themselves to a much higher pitch than the Carthaginians. The former bestow their whole attention upon this department: whereas the Carthaginians wholly neglect their infantry, though they do take some slight interest in the cavalry. The reason of this is that they employ foreign mercenaries, the Romans native and citizen levies. It is in this point that the latter polity is preferable to the former. They have their hopes of freedom ever resting on the courage of mercenary troops: the Romans on the valour of their own citizens and the aid of their allies. The result is that even if the Romans have suffered a defeat at first, they renew the war with undiminished forces, which the Carthaginians cannot do. For, as the Romans are fighting for country and children, it is impossible for them to relax the fury of their struggle; but they persist with obstinate resolution until they have overcome their enemies. What has happened in regard to their navy is an instance in point. In skill the Romans are much behind the Carthaginians, as I have already said; yet the upshot of the whole naval war has been a decided triumph for the Romans, owing to the valour of their men. For although nautical science contributes largely to success in sea-fights, still it is the courage of the marines that turns the scale most decisively in favour of victory. The fact is that Italians as a nation are by nature superior to Phoenicians and Libyans both in physical strength and courage; but still their habits also do much to inspire the youth with enthusiasm for such exploits. One example will be sufficient of the pains taken by the Roman state to turn out men ready to endure anything to win a reputation in their country for valour.

53. Whenever one of their illustrious men dies, in the course of his funeral, the body with all its paraphernalia is carried into the forum to the Rostra, as a raised platform there is called, and sometimes is propped upright upon it so as to be conspicuous, or, more rarely, is laid upon it. Then with all the people standing round, his son, if he has left one of full age and he is there, or, failing him, one of his relations, mounts the Rostra and delivers a speech concerning the virtues of the deceased, and the successful exploits performed by him in his lifetime. By these means the people are reminded of what has been done, and made to see it with their own eyes,—not only such as were engaged in the actual transactions but those also who were not;—and their sympathies are so deeply moved, that the loss appears not to be confined to the actual mourners, but to be a public one affecting the whole people. After the burial and all the usual ceremonies have been performed, they place the likeness of the deceased in the most conspicuous spot in his house, surmounted by a wooden canopy or shrine. This likeness consists of a mask made to represent the deceased with extraordinary fidelity both in shape and colour. These likenesses they display at public sacrifices adorned with much care. And when any illustrious member of the family dies, they carry these masks to the funeral, putting them on men whom they thought as like the originals as possible in height and other personal peculiarities. And these substitutes assume clothes according to the rank of the person represented: if he was a consul or praetor, a toga with purple stripes; if a censor, whole purple;[1] if he had also celebrated a triumph or performed any exploit of that kind, a toga embroidered with gold. These representatives also ride themselves in chariots, while the fasces and axes, and all the other customary insignia of the particular offices, lead the way, according to the dignity of the rank in the state enjoyed by the deceased in his lifetime; and on arriving at the Rostra they all take their seats on ivory chairs in their order.

Laudations at funerals.

Imagines

Toga praetexta, purpurea, picta.

Sellae curules.

[1] This seems to be the only authority for assigning to the censors the *toga*

There could not easily be a more inspiring spectacle than this for a young man of noble ambitions and virtuous aspirations. For can we conceive any one to be unmoved at the sight of all the likenesses collected together of the men who have earned glory, all as it were living and breathing? Or what could be a more glorious spectacle?

54. Besides the speaker over the body about to be buried, after having finished the panegyric of this particular person, starts upon the others whose representatives are present, beginning with the most ancient, and recounts the successes and achievements of each. By this means the glorious memory of brave men is continually renewed; the fame of those who have performed any noble deed is never allowed to die; and the renown of those who have done good service to their country becomes a matter of common knowledge to the multitude, and part of the heritage of posterity. But the chief benefit of the ceremony is that it inspires young men to shrink from no exertion for the general welfare, in the hope of obtaining the glory which awaits the brave. And what I say is confirmed by this fact. Many Romans have volunteered to decide a whole battle by single combat; not a few have deliberately accepted certain death, some in time of war to secure the safety of the rest, some in time of peace to preserve the safety of the commonwealth. There have also been instances of men in office putting their own sons to death, in defiance of every custom and law, because they rated the interests of their country higher than those of natural ties even with their nearest and dearest. There are many stories of this kind, related of many men in Roman history; but one will be enough for our present purpose; and I will give the name as an instance to prove the truth of my words.

Devotion of the citizens.

55. The story goes that Horatius Cocles, while fighting with two enemies at the head of the bridge over the Tiber, which is the entrance to the city on the north, seeing a large body of

Horatius Cocles.

purpurea instead of the *toga praetexta*: and, indeed, Athenaeus speaks of them as wearing the toga praetexta (*περιπόρφυρος*), 14, 69. In Livy, 40, 45, they occupy *sellae curules*.

men advancing to support his enemies, and fearing that they would force their way into the city, turned round, and shouted to those behind him to hasten back to the other side and break down the bridge. They obeyed him: and whilst they were breaking the bridge, he remained at his post receiving numerous wounds, and checked the progress of the enemy: his opponents being panic stricken, not so much by his strength as by the audacity with which he held his ground. When the bridge had been broken down, the attack of the enemy was stopped; and Cocles then threw himself into the river with his armour on and deliberately sacrificed his life, because he valued the safety of his country and his own future reputation more highly than his present life, and the years of existence that remained to him.[1] Such is the enthusiasm and emulation for noble deeds that are engendered among the Romans by their customs.

56. Again the Roman customs and principles regarding money transactions are better than those of the Carthaginians. In the view of the latter nothing is disgraceful that makes for gain; with the former nothing is more disgraceful than to receive bribes and to make profit by improper means. For they regard wealth obtained from unlawful transactions to be as much a subject of reproach, as a fair profit from the most unquestioned source is of commendation. A proof of the fact is this. The Carthaginians obtain office by open bribery, but among the Romans the penalty for it is death. With such a radical difference, therefore, between the rewards offered to virtue among the two peoples, it is natural that the ways adopted for obtaining them should be different also.

Purity of election.

Cf ch. 14.

But the most important difference for the better which the Roman commonwealth appears to me to display is in their religious beliefs. For I conceive that what in other nations is looked upon as a reproach, I mean a scrupulous fear of the gods, is the very thing which keeps the Roman commonwealth together. To such an extraordinary height is this carried among them, both in private and public business, that nothing could

Regard to religion

[1] Livy (2, 10) makes Cocles succeed in reaching the bank alive.

exceed it. Many people might think this unaccountable; but in my opinion their object is to use it as a check upon the common people. If it were possible to form a state wholly of philosophers, such a custom would perhaps be unnecessary. But seeing that every multitude is fickle, and full of lawless desires, unreasoning anger, and violent passion, the only resource is to keep them in check by mysterious terrors and scenic effects of this sort. Wherefore, to my mind, the ancients were not acting without purpose or at random, when they brought in among the vulgar those opinions about the gods, and the belief in the punishments in Hades: much rather do I think that men nowadays are acting rashly and foolishly in rejecting them. This is the reason why, apart from anything else, Greek statesmen, if entrusted with a single talent, though protected by ten checking-clerks, as many seals, and twice as many witnesses, yet cannot be induced to keep faith. whereas among the Romans, in their magistracies and embassies, men have the handling of a great amount of money, and yet from pure respect to their oath keep their faith intact. And, again, in other nations it is a rare thing to find a man who keeps his hands out of the public purse, and is entirely pure in such matters: but among the Romans it is a rare thing to detect a man in the act of committing such a crime.[1] . . .

RECAPITULATION AND CONCLUSION

57. That to all things, then, which exist there is ordained decay and change I think requires no further arguments to show: for the inexorable course of nature is sufficient to convince us of it.

But in all polities we observe two sources of decay existing from natural causes, the one external, the other internal and self-produced. The external admits of no certain or fixed definition, but the internal follows a definite order. What kind of polity, then, comes naturally first, and what second, I have already stated in such a way, that those who are capable of taking in the whole drift of my argument can henceforth

[1] But Polybius afterwards admits hat a falling off in this respect had begun See 18, 35; 32, 11.

draw their own conclusions as to the future of the Roman polity. For it is quite clear, in my opinion. When a commonwealth, after warding off many great dangers, has arrived at a high pitch of prosperity and undisputed power, it is evident that, by the lengthened continuance of great wealth within it, the manner of life of its citizens will become more extravagant; and that the rivalry for office, and in other spheres of activity, will become fiercer than it ought to be. And as this state of things goes on more and more, the desire of office and the shame of losing reputation, as well as the ostentation and extravagance of living, will prove the beginning of a deterioration. And of this change the people will be credited with being the authors, when they become convinced that they are being cheated by some from avarice, and are puffed up with flattery by others from love of office. For when that comes about, in their passionate resentment and acting under the dictates of anger, they will refuse to obey any longer, or to be content with having equal powers with their leaders, but will demand to have all or far the greatest themselves. And when that comes to pass the constitution will receive a new name, which sounds better than any other in the world, liberty or democracy; but, in fact, it will become that worst of all governments, mob-rule.

With this description of the formation, growth, zenith, and present state of the Roman polity, and having discussed also its difference, for better and worse, from other polities, I will now at length bring my essay on it to an end.

58. Resuming my history from the point at which I started on this digression I will briefly refer to one transaction, that I may give a practical illustration of the perfection and power of the Roman polity at that period, as though I were producing one of his works as a specimen of the skill of a good artist.

When Hannibal, after conquering the Romans in the battle at Cannae, got possession of the eight thousand who were guarding the Roman camp, he made them all prisoners of war, and granted them permission to send messages to their relations that they might be ransomed and return home. They accordingly selected ten of their chief men, whom Hannibal allowed to depart after binding them with an oath to return. But one

B C. 216. Hannibal offers to put the prisoners at Cannae to ransom.

of them, just as he had got outside the palisade of the camp, saying that he had forgotten something, went back; and, having got what he had left behind, once more set out, under the belief that by means of this return he had kept his promise and discharged his oath. Upon the arrival of the envoys at Rome, imploring and beseeching the Senate not to grudge the captured troops their return home, but to allow them to rejoin their friends by paying three minae each for them,—for these were the terms, they said, granted by Hannibal,—and declaring that the men deserved redemption, for they had neither played the coward in the field, nor done anything unworthy of Rome, but had been left behind to guard the camp; and that, when all the rest had perished, they had yielded to absolute necessity in surrendering to Hannibal: though the Romans had been severely defeated in the battles, and though they were at the time deprived of, roughly speaking, all their allies, they neither yielded so far to misfortune as to disregard what was becoming to themselves, nor omitted to take into account any necessary consideration. They saw through Hannibal's purpose in thus acting,—which was at once to get a large supply of money, and at the same time to take away all enthusiasm from the troops opposed to him, by showing that even the conquered had a hope of getting safe home again. Therefore the Senate, far from acceding to the request, refused all pity even to their own relations, and disregarded the services to be expected from these men in the future: and thus frustrated Hannibal's calculations, and the hopes which he had founded on these prisoners, by refusing to ransom them; and at the same time established the rule for their own men, that they must either conquer or die on the field, as there was no other hope of safety for them if they were beaten. With this answer they dismissed the nine envoys who returned of their own accord; but the tenth who had put the cunning trick in practice for discharging himself of his oath they put in chains and delivered to the enemy. So that Hannibal was not so much rejoiced at his victory in the battle, as struck with astonishment at the unshaken firmness and lofty spirit displayed in the resolutions of these senators.[1]

[1] Livy, 22, 58-61.

BOOK VII

CAPUA AND PETELIA

1. THE people of Capua, in Campania, becoming wealthy through the fertility of their soil, degenerated into luxury and extravagance surpassing even the common report about Croton and Sybaris. Being then unable to support their burden of prosperity they called in Hannibal; and were accordingly treated with great severity by Rome. But the people of Petelia maintained their loyalty to Rome and held out so obstinately, when besieged by Hannibal, that after having eaten all the leather in the town, and the bark of all the trees in it, and having stood the siege for eleven months, as no one came to their relief, they surrendered with the entire approval of the Romans. . . . But Capua by its influence drew over the other cities to the Carthaginians. . . .

Capua and Petelia, the contrast of their fortunes.

HIERONYMUS OF SYRACUSE

2. After the plot against Hieronymus, King of Syracuse, Thraso having departed, Zoippus and Andranodorus persuaded Hieronymus to lose no time in sending ambassadors to Hannibal. He accordingly selected Polycleitus of Cyrene and Philodemus of Argos for the purpose, and sent them into Italy, with a commission to discuss the subject of an alliance with the Carthaginians; and at the same time he sent his brothers to Alexandria. Hannibal received Polycleitus and Philodemus with warmth; held out great prospects to the young king; and sent the ambassadors back without delay, accompanied by

Hieronymus succeeded his grandfather Hiero II. in B.C. 216. Under the influence of his uncles, Zoippus and Andranodorus, members of the Council of 15 established by Hiero, Hieronymus opens communications with Hannibal.

the commander of his triremes, a Carthaginian also named Hannibal, and the Syracusan Hippocrates and his younger brother Epicydes. These men had been for some time serving in Hannibal's army, being domiciled at Carthage, owing to their grandfather having been banished from Syracuse because he was believed to have assassinated Agatharchus, one of the sons of Agathocles. On the arrival of these commissioners at Syracuse, Polycleitus and his colleague reported the result of their embassy, and the Carthaginian delivered the message given by Hannibal: whereupon the king without hesitation expressed his willingness to make a treaty with the Carthaginians; and, begging the Hannibal who had come to him to go with all speed to Carthage, promised that he also would send commissioners from his own court, to settle matters with the Carthaginians.

Commissioners sent to Carthage to formulate a treaty of alliance.

3. Meanwhile intelligence of this transaction had reached the Roman praetor at Lilybaeum, who immediately despatched legates to Hieronymus, to renew the treaty which had been made with his ancestors. Being thoroughly annoyed with this embassy, Hieronymus said that "He was sorry for the Romans that they had come to such utter and shameful grief[1] in the battles in Italy at the hands of the Carthaginians." The legates were overpowered by the rudeness of the answer: still they proceeded to ask him, "Who said such things about them?" Whereupon the king pointed to the Carthaginian envoys who were there, and said, "You had better convict them, if they have really been telling me lies?" The Roman legates answered that it was not their habit to take the word of enemies: and advised him to do nothing in violation of the existing treaty; for that would be at once equitable and the best thing for himself. To this the king answered that he would take time to consider of it, and tell them his decision another time; but he proceeded to ask them, "How it came about that before his grandfather's death a squadron of fifty Roman ships had sailed as far as Pachynus and then gone back again." The fact was that a short

The Roman praetor sends to remonstrate. A scene with the king.

[1] *κακοί κακῶς*, a phrase at once insulting and vulgar.

time ago the Romans had heard that Hiero was dead; and being much alarmed lest people in Syracuse, despising the youth of the grandson whom he left, should stir up a revolution, they had made this cruise with the intention of being ready there to assist his youthful weakness, and to help in maintaining his authority; but being informed that his grandfather was still alive, they sailed back again. When the ambassadors had stated these facts, the young king answered again, "Then please to allow me too now, O Romans, to maintain my authority by 'sailing back' to see what I can get from Carthage." The Roman legates perceiving the warmth with which the king was engaging in his policy, said nothing at the time; but returned and informed the praetor who had sent them of what had been said. From that time forward, therefore, the Romans kept a careful watch upon him as an enemy.

4. Hieronymus on his part selected Agatharchus, Onesimus, and Hipposthenes to send with Hannibal to Carthage, with instructions to make an alliance on the following terms: "The Carthaginians to assist him with land and sea forces, in expelling the Romans from Sicily, and then divide the island with him; so as to have the river Himera, which divides Sicily almost exactly in half, as the boundary between the two provinces." The commissioners arrived in Carthage: and finding, on coming to a conference, that the Carthaginians were prepared to meet them in every point, they completed the arrangement. Meanwhile Hippocrates got the young Hieronymus entirely into his hands: and at first fired his imagination by telling him of Hannibal's marches and pitched battles in Italy; and afterwards by repeating to him that no one had a better right to the government of all Siceliots than he; in the first place as the son of Nereis daughter of Pyrrhus, the only man whom all Siceliots alike had accepted deliberately and with full assent as their leader and king; and in the second place in virtue of his grandfather Hiero's sovereign rights. At last he and his brother so won upon the young man by their conversation, that he would attend to no one else at all: partly from the natural feebleness of his character, but still more from the ambitious feelings

The treaty with Carthage

which they had excited in him. And therefore, just whe

The king's pretensions rise, and a new arrangement is made with Carthage.

Agatharchus and his colleagues were completin the business on which they had been sent i Carthage, he sent fresh ambassadors, saying tha all Sicily belonged to him; and demanding tha the Carthaginians should help him to recove Sicily: while he promised that he would assist the Carthaginian in their Italian campaign. Though the Carthaginians now sa perfectly well the whole extent of the young man's ficklenes and infatuation: yet thinking it to be in manifold ways to thei interests not to let Sicilian affairs out of their hands, the assented to his demands; and having already prepared ship and men, they set about arranging for the transport of thei forces into Sicily.

5. When they heard of this, the Romans sent legates to hin

The Romans again remonstrate. Another scene at the Council.

again, protesting against his violation of th treaty made with his forefathers. Hieronymu thereupon summoned a meeting of his counci and consulted them as to what he was to dc The native members of it kept silent, becaus they feared the folly of their ruler. Aristomachus of Corinth Damippus of Sparta, Autonous of Thessaly advised that h should abide by the treaty with Rome. Andranodorus alon urged that he should not let the opportunity slip; and affirmec that the present was the only chance of establishing his rul over Sicily. After the delivery of this speech, the kin asked Hippocrates and his brother what they thought, anc upon their answering, "The same as Andranodorus," the de liberation was concluded in that sense. Thus, then, war with Rome had been decided upon: but while the king was anxiou to be thought to have given an adroit answer to the am bassadors, he committed himself to such an utter absurdity a to make it certain that he would not only fail to conciliate the Romans, but would inevitably offend them violently. For he said that he would abide by the treaty, firstly, if the Romans would repay all the gold they had received from his grand father Hiero; and secondly, if they would return the corn and other presents which they had received from him from the first day of their intercourse with him; and thirdly, if they would

acknowledge all Sicily east of the Himera to be Syracusan territory. At these propositions of course the ambassadors and council separated; and from that time forth Hieronymus began pushing on his preparations for war with energy: collected and armed his forces, and got ready the other necessary provisions. . . .

War with Rome decided upon.

6. The city of Leontini taken as a whole faces north, and is divided in half by a valley of level ground, in which are the state buildings, the court-houses, and market-place. Along each side of this valley run hills with steep banks all the way, the flat tops of which, reached after crossing their brows, are covered with houses and temples. The city has two gates, one on the southern extremity of this valley leading to Syracuse, the other at the northern leading on to the "Leontine plains," and the arable district. Close under the westernmost of the steep cliffs runs a river called Lissus; parallel to which are built continuous rows of houses, in great numbers, close under the cliff, between which and the river runs the road I have mentioned. . . .

Description of Leontini, where Hieronymus was murdered. See Livy, 24, 7.

7. Some of the historians who have described the fall of Hieronymus have written at great length and in terms of mysterious solemnity. They tell us of prodigies preceding his coming to the throne, and of the misfortunes of Syracuse. They describe in dramatic language the cruelty of his character and the impiety of his actions; and crown all with the sudden and terrible nature of the circumstances attending his fall. One would think from their description that neither Phalaris, nor Apollodorus, nor any other tyrant was ever fiercer than he. Yet he was a mere boy when he succeeded to power, and only lived thirteen months after. In this space of time it is possible that one or two men may have been put to the rack, or certain of his friends, or other Syracusan citizens, put to death; but it is improbable that his tyranny could have been extravagantly wicked, or his impiety outrageous. It must be confessed that he was reckless and unscrupulous in disposition; still we cannot compare him with either of the tyrants I have named. The fact is that those who write the histories of particular episodes,

Fall of Hieronymus, B.C 214.

having undertaken limited and narrow themes, appear to me to be compelled from poverty of matter to exaggerate insignificant incidents, and to speak at inordinate length on subjects that scarcely deserve to be recorded at all. There are some, too, who fall into a similar mistake from mere want of judgment. With how much more reason might the space employed on these descriptions,—which they use merely to fill up and spin out their books,—have been devoted to Hiero and Gelo, without mentioning Hieronymus at all! It would have given greater pleasure to readers and more instruction to students.

Character of Hiero II., King of Syracuse, from B.C. 269 to B.C. 215.

8. For, in the first place, Hiero gained the sovereignty of Syracuse and her allies by his own unaided abilities without inheriting wealth, or reputation, or any other advantage of fortune. And, in the second place, was established king of Syracuse without putting to death, banishing, or harassing any one of the citizens,—which is the most astonishing circumstance of all. And what is quite as surprising as the innocence of his acquisition of power is the fact that it did not change his character. For during a reign of fifty-four years he preserved peace for the country, maintained his own power free from all hostile plots, and entirely escaped the envy which generally follows greatness; for though he tried on several occasions to lay down his power, he was prevented by the common remonstrances of the citizens. And having shown himself most beneficent to the Greeks, and most anxious to earn their good opinion, he left behind him not merely a great personal reputation but also a universal feeling of goodwill towards the Syracusans. Again, though he passed his life in the midst of the greatest wealth, luxury, and abundance, he survived for more than ninety years, in full possession of his senses and with all parts of his body unimpaired; which, to my mind, is a decisive proof of a well-spent life. . . .

Gelo, son of Hiero II., associated with his father in the kingdom, B.C. 216. See 5, 88, Livy, 23, 30.

Gelo, his son, in a life of more than fifty years regarded it as the most honourable object of ambition to obey his father, and to regard neither wealth, nor sovereign power, nor anything else as of higher value than love and loyalty to his parents. . . .

TREATY BETWEEN HANNIBAL AND KING PHILIP V. OF MACEDON

9. This is a sworn treaty made between Hannibal, Mago, Barmocarus, and such members of the Carthaginian Gerusia as were present, and all Carthaginians serving in his army, on the one part; and Xenophanes, son of Cleomachus of Athens, sent to us by King Philip, as his ambassador, on behalf of himself, the Macedonians, and their allies, on the other part.

Preamble of a treaty made between Philip and Hannibal, by envoys sent after the battle of Cannae. Ratified subsequently to March 13, B.C. 215 See Livy, 23, 33-39. *Ante* 3, 2.

The oath is taken in the presence of Zeus, Here, and Apollo: of the god of the Carthaginians, Hercules, and Iolaus: of Ares, Triton, Poseidon: of the gods that accompany the army, and of the sun, moon, and earth: of rivers, harbours, waters: of all the gods who rule Carthage: of all the gods who rule Macedonia and the rest of Greece: of all the gods of war that are witnesses to this oath.

Gods by whom the oath is taken on either side.

Hannibal, general, and all the Carthaginian senators with him, and all Carthaginians serving in his army, subject to our mutual consent, proposes to make this sworn treaty of friendship and honourable good-will. Let us be friends, close allies, and brethren, on the conditions herein following:—

Declaration on the part of Hannibal of the objects of the treaty.

(1) Let the Carthaginians, as supreme, Hannibal their chief general and those serving with him, all members of the Carthaginian dominion living under the same laws, as well as the people of Utica, and the cities and tribes subject to Carthage, and their soldiers and allies, and all cities and tribes in Italy, Celt-land, and Liguria, with whom we have a compact of friendship, and with whomsoever in this country we may hereafter form such compact, be supported by King Philip and the Macedonians, and all other Greeks in alliance with them.

1st article sworn to by Philip's representative.

(2) On their parts also King Philip and the Macedonians, and such other Greeks as are his allies, shall be supported and protected by the Carthaginians

1st article sworn to by Hannibal

and the Carthaginians

now in this army, and by the people of Utica, and by all cities and tribes subject to Carthage, both soldiers and allies, and by all allied cities and tribes in Italy, Celt-land, and Liguria, and by all others in Italy as shall hereafter become allies of the Carthaginians.

2d article sworn to by Philip's representative.

(3) We will not make plots against, nor lie in ambush for, each other; but in all sincerity and good-will, without reserve or secret design, will be enemies to the enemies of the Carthaginians, saving and excepting those kings, cities, and ports with which we have sworn agreements and friendships.

2d article sworn to by Hannibal.

(4) And we, too, will be enemies to the enemies of King Philip, saving and excepting those kings, cities, and tribes, with which we have sworn agreements and friendships.

3d article sworn to by Philip's representative.

(5) Ye shall be friends to us in the war in which we now are engaged against the Romans, till such time as the gods give us and you the victory: and ye shall assist us in all ways that be needful, and in whatsoever way we may mutually determine.

3d article sworn to by Hannibal.

(6) And when the gods have given us victory in our war with the Romans and their allies, if Hannibal shall deem it right to make terms with the Romans, these terms shall include the same friendship with you, made on these conditions: (1) the Romans not to be allowed to make war on you; (2) not to have power over Corcyra, Apollonia, Epidamnum, Pharos, Dimale, Parthini, nor Atitania; (3) to restore to Demetrius of Pharos all those of his friends now in the dominion of Rome.

1st joint article.

(7) If the Romans ever make war on you or on us we will aid each other in such war, according to the need of either.

2d joint article.

(8) So also if any other nation whatever does so, always excepting kings, cities, and tribes, with whom we have sworn agreements and friendships.

3d joint article. Mutual consent required for an alteration.

(9) If we decide to take away from, or add to this sworn treaty, we will so take away, or add thereto, only as we both may agree. . . .

MESSENE AND PHILIP V. IN B C. 215

10. Democracy being established at Messene, and the men of rank having been banished, while those who had received allotments on their lands obtained the chief influence in the government, those of the old citizens who remained found it very hard to put up with the equality which these men had obtained. . . .

Political state of Messene.

Gorgus of Messene, in wealth and extraction, was inferior to no one in the town; and had been a famous athlete in his time, far surpassing all rivals in that pursuit. In fact he was not behind any man of his day in physical beauty, or the general dignity of his manner of life, or the number of prizes he had won. Again, when he gave up athletics and devoted himself to politics and the service of his country, he gained no less reputation in this department than in his former pursuit. For he was removed from the Philistinism that usually characterises athletes, and was looked upon as in the highest degree an able and clear-headed politician. . . .

The character of the Messenian athlete and statesman Gorgus. See *ante*, 5, 5.

11. Philip, king of the Macedonians, being desirous of seizing the acropolis of Messene, told the leaders of the city that he wished to see it and to sacrifice to Zeus, and accordingly walked up thither with his attendants and joined in the sacrifice. When, according to custom, the entrails of the slaughtered victims were brought to him, he took them in his hands, and, turning round a little to one side, held them out to Aratus and asked him "what he thought the sacrifices indicated? To quit the citadel or hold it?" Thereupon Demetrius struck in on the spur of the moment by saying, "If you have the heart of an augur,—to quit it as quick as you can: but if of a gallant and wise king, to keep it, lest if you quit it now you may never have so good an opportunity again: for it is by thus holding the two horns that you can alone keep the ox under your control." By the "two horns" he meant Ithome and the Acrocorinthus, and by

Philip V. of Macedon at Messene, B C. 215 See Plutarch, *Arat.* 49-50.

the "ox" the Peloponnese. Thereupon Philip turned to Aratus and said, "And do you give the same advice?" Aratus not making any answer at once, he urged him to speak his real opinion. After some hesitation he said, "If you can get possession of this place without treachery to the Messenians, I advise you to do so; but if, by the act of occupying this citadel with a guard, you shall ruin all the citadels, and the guard wherewith the allies were protected when they came into your hands from Antigonus" (meaning by that, *confidence*), "consider whether it is not better to take your men away and leave the confidence there, and with it guard the Messenians, and the other allies as well." As far as his own inclination was concerned, Philip was ready enough to commit an act of treachery, as his own subsequent conduct proved: but having been sharply rebuked a little while before by the younger Aratus for his destruction of human life; and seeing that, on the present occasion, the elder spoke with boldness and authority, and begged him not to neglect his advice, he gave in from sheer shame, and taking the latter by his right hand, said, "Then let us go back the same way we came."

Deterioration in the character of Philip V. See 4, 77.

12. I wish here to stop in my narrative in order to speak briefly of the character of Philip, because this was the beginning of the change and deterioration in it. For I think that no more telling example can be proposed to practical statesmen who wish to correct their ideas by a study of history. For the splendour of his early career, and the brilliancy of his genius, have caused the dispositions for good and evil displayed by this king to be more conspicuous and widely known throughout Greece than is the case with any other man; as well as the contrast between the results accompanying the display of those opposite tendencies.

Now that, upon his accession to the throne, Thessaly, Macedonia, and in fact all parts of his own kingdom were more thoroughly loyal and well disposed to him, young as he was on his succeeding to the government of Macedonia, than they had ever been to any of his predecessors, may be without difficulty inferred from the following fact. Though he was with extreme frequency forced to leave Macedonia by the Aetolian and

Lacedaemonian wars, not only was there no disturbance in these countries, but not a single one of the neighbouring barbarians ventured to touch Macedonia. It would be impossible, again, to speak in strong enough terms of the affection of Alexander, Chrysogonus, and his other friends towards him; or that of the Epirotes, Acarnanians, and all those on whom he had within a short time conferred great benefits. On the whole, if one may use a somewhat hyperbolical phrase, I think it has been said of Philip with very great propriety, that his beneficent policy had made him "The darling of all Greece." And it is a conspicuous and striking proof of the advantage of lofty principle and strict integrity, that the Cretans, having at length come to an understanding with each other and made a national alliance, selected Philip to arbitrate between them; and that this settlement was completed without an appeal to arms and without danger,—a thing for which it would be difficult to find a precedent in similar circumstances. From the time of his exploits at Messene all this was utterly changed. And it was natural that it should be so. For his purposes being now entirely reversed, it inevitably followed that men's opinions of him should be reversed also, as well as the success of his various undertakings. This actually was the case, as will become evident to attentive students from what I am now about to relate. . . .

13. Aratus seeing that Philip was now openly engaging in war with Rome, and entirely changed in his policy toward his allies, with difficulty diverted him from his intention by suggesting numerous difficulties and scruples.

I wish now to remind my readers of what, in my fifth Book, I put forward merely as a promise and unsupported statement, but which has now been confirmed by facts; in order that I may not leave any proposition of mine unproved or open to question. In the course of my history of the Aetolian war, where I had to relate the violent proceedings of Philip in destroying the colonnades and other sacred objects at Thermus; and added that, in consideration of his youth, the blame of these measures ought not to be referred to Philip so much as to his advisers; I then remarked that the life of Aratus sufficiently proved that he would not have

5, 12.

committed such an act of wickedness, but that such principles exactly suited Demetrius of Pharos; and I promised to make this clear from what I was next to narrate. I thereby designedly postponed the demonstration of the truth of my assertion, till I had come to the period of which I have just been speaking; that, namely, in which with the presence of Demetrius, and in the absence of Aratus, who arrived a day too late, Philip made the first step in his career of crime; and, as though from the first taste of human blood and murder and treason to his allies, was changed not into a wolf from a man, as in the Arcadian fable mentioned by Plato, but from a king into a savage tyrant. But a still more decisive proof of the sentiments of these two men is furnished by the plot against the citadel of Messene, and may help us to make up our minds which of the two were responsible for the proceedings in the Aetolian war; and, when we are satisfied on that point, it will be easy to form a judgment on the differences of their principles.

Recapitulation of the substance of book 7, viz. the treacherous dealings of Philip with the Messenians, B.C. 215.

Plato, *Rep.* 565 D.

14. For as in this instance, under the influence of Aratus, Philip refrained from actually breaking faith with the Messenians in regard to the citadel; and thus, to use a common expression, poured a little balm into the wide wound which his slaughters had caused: so in the Aetolian war, when under the influence of Demetrius, he sinned against the gods by destroying the objects consecrated to them, and against man by transgressing the laws of war; and entirely deserted his original principles, by showing himself an implacable and bitter foe to all who opposed him. The same remark applies to the Cretan business.[1] As long as he employed Aratus as his chief director, not only without doing injustice to a single islander, but without even causing them any vexation, he kept the whole Cretan people under control; and led all the Greeks to regard him with favour, owing to the greatness of character which he displayed. So again, when under the guidance of Demetrius, he became the cause of the misfortunes I have described to the Messenians, he at once

[1] Plutarch, *Aratus*, ch. 48.

lost the good-will of the allies and his credit with the rest of Greece. Such a decisive influence for good or evil in the security of their government has the choice by youthful sovereigns of the friends who are to surround them; though it is a subject on which by some unaccountable carelessness they take not the smallest care. . . .

THE WAR OF ANTIOCHUS WITH ACHAEUS

(See 5, 107)

15. Round Sardis ceaseless and protracted skirmishes were taking place and fighting by night and day, both armies inventing every possible kind of plot and counterplot against each other: to describe which in detail would be as useless as it would be in the last degree wearisome. At last, when the siege had already entered upon its second year, Lagoras the Cretan came forward. He had had a considerable experience in war, and had learnt that as a rule cities fall into the hands of their enemies most easily from some neglect on the part of their inhabitants, when, trusting to the natural or artificial strength of their defences, they neglect to keep proper guard and become thoroughly careless. He had observed too, that in such fortified cities captures were effected at the points of greatest strength, which were believed to have been despaired of by the enemy. So in the present instance, when he saw that the prevailing notion of the strength of Sardis caused the whole army to despair of taking it by storm, and to believe that the one hope of getting it was by starving it out, he gave all the closer attention to the subject; and eagerly scanned every possible method of making an attempt to capture the town. Having observed therefore that a portion of the wall was unguarded, near a place called the Saw, which unites the citadel and city, he conceived the hope and idea of performing this exploit. He had discovered the carelessness of the men guarding this wall from the following circumstance. The place was extremely precipitous: and there was a deep gully below, into which dead bodies from the city, and the offal of horses and beasts of burden that died, were accustomed

Siege of Sardis from the end of B.C. 216 to autumn of B.C. 215.

to be thrown, and in this place therefore there was always a great number of vultures and other birds collected. Having observed, then, that when these creatures were gorged, they always sat undisturbed upon the cliffs and the wall, he concluded that the wall must necessarily be left unguarded and deserted for the larger part of the day. Accordingly, under cover of night, he went to the spot and carefully examined the possibilities of approaching it and setting ladders; and finding that this was possible at one particular rock, he communicated the facts to the king.

16. Antiochus encouraged the attempt and urged Lagoras to carry it out. The latter promised to do his best, and desired the king to join with him Theodotus the Aetolian, and Dionysius the commander of his bodyguard, with orders to devote them to assist him in carrying out the intended interprise. The king at once granted his request, and these officers agreed to undertake it: and having held a consultation on the whole subject, they waited for a night on which there should be no moon just before daybreak. Such a night having arrived, on the day on which they intended to act, an hour before sunset, they selected from the whole army fifteen of the strongest and most courageous men to carry the ladders, and also to mount with them and share in the daring attempt. After these they selected thirty others, to remain in reserve at a certain distance; that, as soon as they had themselves climbed over the walls, and come to the nearest gate, the thirty might come up to it from the outside and try to knock off the hinges and fastenings, while they on the inside cut the cross bar and bolt pins.[1] They also selected two thousand men to follow behind the thirty, who were to rush into the town with them

[1] *βαλανάγρας* The *βαλανάγρα* was a straight piece of wood with upright pins corresponding with those that fall into the bolt (the *βάλανοι*), and which are pushed up by it. It was thus used as a key which could be taken out and kept by the Commandant, as in Herod. 3, 155; Thucyd. 2, 4 But Polybius here seems to use it as equivalent to *βάλανος*. See Aeneas, *Tact.* 18-20, who recommends that the *μόχλος* should be sheeted with iron to prevent this very operation. Cp. 4, 57. What he means by *ζύγωμα* on the outside (here translated "fastenings") is also somewhat doubtful. From Hesychius, s v *ἐπιξευκτήρ*, it might be conjectured that chains of some kind were intended. Casaubon supposed it to be a cross bar similar to the *μόχλος* inside, and Schw. to represent the posts and the lintel connecting them

and seize the area of the theatre, which was a favourable position to hold against those on the citadel, as well as those in the town. To prevent suspicion of the truth getting about, owing to the picking out of the men, the king gave out that the Aetolians were about to throw themselves into the town through a certain gully, and that it was necessary, in view of that information, to take energetic measures to prevent them.

17. When Lagoras and his party had made all their preparations, as soon as the moon set, they came stealthily to the foot of the cliffs with their scaling ladders, and ensconced themselves under a certain overhanging rock. When day broke, and the picket as usual broke up from that spot; and the king in the ordinary way told off some men to take their usual posts, and led the main body on to the hippodrome and drew them up; at first no one suspected what was going on. But when two ladders were fixed, and Dionysius led the way up one, and Lagoras up the other, there was excitement and a stir throughout the camp. For while the climbing party were not visible to the people in the town, or to Achaeus in the citadel, because of the beetling brow of the rock, their bold and adventurous ascent was in full view of the camp; which accordingly was divided in feeling between astonishment at the strangeness of the spectacle, and a nervous horror of what was going to happen next, all standing dumb with exulting wonder. Observing the excitement in the camp, and wishing to divert the attention both of his own men and of those in the city from what was going on, the king ordered an advance; and delivered an attack upon the gates on the other side of the town, called the Persian gates. Seeing from the citadel the unwonted stir in the camp, Achaeus was for some time at a loss to know what to do, being puzzled to account for it, and quite unable to see what was taking place. However he despatched a force to oppose the enemy at the gate; whose assistance was slow in arriving, because they had to descend from the citadel by a narrow and precipitous path. But Aribazus, the commandant of the town, went unsuspiciously to the gates on which he saw Antiochus advancing; and caused some of his men to mount the wall, and sent

The town of Sardis entered and sacked.

others out through the gate, with orders to hinder the approaching enemies, and come to close quarters with them.

18. Meanwhile Lagoras, Theodotus, Dionysius, and their men had climbed the rocks and had arrived at the gate nearest them; and some of them were engaged in fighting the troops sent from the citadel to oppose them, while others were cutting through the bars; and at the same time the party outside told off for that service were doing the same. The gates having thus been quickly forced open, the two thousand entered and occupied the area round the theatre. On this all the men from the walls, and from the Persian gate, to which Aribazus had already led a relieving force, rushed in hot haste to pass the word to attack the enemy within the gates. The result was that, the gate having been opened as they retreated, some of the king's army rushed in along with the retiring garrison; and, when they had thus taken possession of the gate, they were followed by an unbroken stream of their comrades; some of whom poured through the gate, while others employed themselves in bursting open other gates in the vicinity. Aribazus and all the men in the city, after a brief struggle against the enemy who had thus got within the walls, fled with all speed to the citadel. After that, Theodotus and Lagoras and their party remained on the ground near the theatre, determining with great good sense and soldier-like prudence to form a reserve until the whole operation was completed; while the main body rushed in on every side and occupied the town. And now by dint of some putting all they met to the sword, others setting fire to the houses, others devoting themselves to plunder and taking booty, the destruction and sacking of the town was completed. Thus did Antiochus become master of Sardis. . . .

BOOK VIII

THE NECESSITY OF CAUTION IN DEALING WITH AN ENEMY

1. TIBERIUS a Roman Pro-consul fell into an ambuscade, and, after offering with his attendants a gallant resistance to the enemy, was killed. Fall of Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus [Cons. B.C. 215 and 213] as he was advancing from Lucania to Capua, by the treachery of the Lucanian Flavius, B.C. 212. Livy, 25, 16

Now in regard to such catastrophes, whether it is right to blame or pardon the sufferers is by no means a safe matter on which to pronounce an opinion; because it has happened to several men, who have been perfectly correct in all their actions, to fall into these misfortunes, equally with those who do not scruple to transgress principles of right confirmed by the consent of mankind. We should not however idly refrain from pronouncing an opinion: but should blame or condone this or that general, after a review of the necessities of the moment and the circumstances of the case. And my observation will be rendered evident by the following instances. Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, alarmed at the love of power which he observed in Cleomenes, fled from Sparta; but being not long afterwards persuaded to return, put himself in the power of the latter. The consequence was that he lost his kingdom and his life together,[1] and left a character not to be defended before posterity on the score of prudence; for while affairs remained in the same state, and the ambition and power of Cleomenes remained in exactly the same position, how

Fall of Archidamus, B.C. 226-225.

[1] See 5, 37. According to Phylarchus the murder of Archidamus was against the wish of Cleomenes. Plut *Cleom* 5.

could he expect to meet any other fate than he did, if he put himself in the hands of the very men from whom he had before barely escaped destruction by flight?

Fall of Pelopidas in Thessaly, B.C 363.

Again Pelopidas of Thebes, though acquainted with the unprincipled character of the tyrant Alexander, and though he knew thoroughly well that every tyrant regards the leaders of liberty as his bitterest enemies, first took upon himself to persuade Epaminondas to stand forth as the champion of democracy, not only in Thebes, but in all Greece also; and then, being in Thessaly in arms, for the express purpose of destroying the absolute rule of Alexander, he yet twice ventured to undertake a mission to him. The consequence was that he fell into the hands of his enemies, did great damage to Thebes, and ruined the reputation he had acquired before; and all by putting a rash and ill advised confidence in the very last person in whom he ought to have done so. Very similar to these cases is that of the Roman Consul Gnaeus Cornelius who fell in the Sicilian war by imprudently putting himself in the power of the enemy. And many parallel cases might be quoted.

Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio Asina with his fleet surprised and captured at Lipara, B.C. 260. See 1, 21.

2. The conclusion, then, is that those who put themselves in the power of the enemy from want of proper precaution deserve blame; but those who use every practicable precaution not so: for to trust absolutely no one is to make all action impossible; but reasonable action, taken after receiving adequate security, cannot be censured. Adequate securities are oaths, children, wives, and, strongest of all, a blameless past. To be betrayed and entrapped by such a security as any of these is a slur, not on the deceived, but on the deceiver. The first object then should be to seek such securities as it is impossible for the recipient of the confidence to evade; but since such are rare, the next best thing will be to take every reasonable precaution one's self: and then, if we meet with any disaster, we shall at least be acquitted of wrong conduct by the lookers on. And this has been the case with many before now: of which the most conspicuous example, and the one nearest to the times on which we are engaged, will be the fate of Achaeus. He

omitted no possible precaution for securing his safety, but thought of everything that it was possible for human ingenuity to conceive: and yet he fell into the power of his enemies. In this instance his misfortune procured the pity and pardon of the outside world for the victim, and nothing but disparagement and loathing for the successful perpetrators. . . .

Betrayal of Achaeus by Bolis. See *infra*, ch. 17-23.

3. It appears to me not to be alien to my general purpose, and the plan which I originally laid down, to recall the attention of my readers to the magnitude of the events, and the persistency of purpose displayed by the two States of Rome and Carthage. For who could think it otherwise than remarkable that these two powers, while engaged in so serious a war for the possession of Italy, and one no less serious for that of Iberia; and being still both of them equally balanced between uncertain hopes and fears for the future of these wars, and confronted at the very time with battles equally formidable to either, should yet not be content with their existing undertakings: but should raise another controversy as to the possession of Sardinia and Sicily; and not content with merely hoping for all these things, should grasp at them with all the resources of their wealth and warlike forces? Indeed the more we examine into details the greater becomes our astonishment. The Romans had two complete armies under the two Consuls on active service in Italy; two in Iberia in which Gnaeus Cornelius commanded the land, Publius Cornelius the naval forces; and naturally the same was the case with the Carthaginians. But besides this, a Roman fleet was anchored off Greece, watching it and the movements of Philip, of which first Marcus Valerius, and afterward Publius Sulpicius was in command. Along with all

Sardinia reduced by T. Manlius Torquatus, B.C. 215. Marcellus took Leontini, B.C. 214 (autumn). Livy, 24, 30.

Marcus Valerius Laevinus commands a fleet off Greece, B.C. 215-214. Livy, 24, 10. Publius Sulpicius Galba Cos. (B.C. 211.) sent to Macedonia. Livy, 26, 22; 27, 31. Appius Claudius Pulcher, Praetor, sent to Sicily, B.C. 215. Livy, 23, 31, Pro-praetor, B.C. 214. Livy 24, 33

these undertakings Appius with a hundred quinqueremes, and Marcus Claudius with an army, were threatening Sicily; while Hamilcar was doing the same on the side of the Carthaginians.

Marcus Claudius Marcellus, Cos. III., B.C. 214.

4. By means of these facts I presume that what I more than once asserted at the beginning of my work is now shown by actual experience to deserve unmixed credit. I mean my assertion, that it is impossible for historians of particular places to get a view of universal history. For how is it possible for a man who has only read a separate history of Sicilian or Spanish affairs to understand and grasp the greatness of the events? Or, what is still more important, in what manner and under what form of polity fortune brought to pass that most surprising of all revolutions that have happened in our time, I mean the reduction of all known parts of the world under one rule and governance, a thing unprecedented in the history of mankind. In what manner the Romans took Syracuse or Iberia may be possibly learned to a certain extent by means of such particular histories; but how they arrived at universal supremacy, and what opposition their grand designs met with in particular places, or what on the other hand contributed to their success, and at what epochs, this it is difficult to take in without the aid of universal history. Nor, again, is it easy to appreciate the greatness of their achievements except by the latter method. For the fact of the Romans having sought to gain Iberia, or at another time Sicily; or having gone on a campaign with military and naval forces, told by itself, would not be anything very wonderful. But if we learn that these were all done at once, and that many more undertakings were in course of accomplishment at the same time,—all at the cost of one government and commonwealth; and if we see what dangers and wars in their own territory were, at the very time, encumbering the men who had all these things on hand: thus, and only thus, will the astonishing nature of the events fully dawn upon us, and obtain the attention which they deserve. So much for those who suppose that by studying an episode they have become acquainted with universal history. . . .

THE SIEGE OF SYRACUSE

Hieronymus succeeded his grandfather, Hiero, in B.C. 216, *and was assassinated in Leontini thirteen months afterwards, in* B.C. 215. *His death, however, did not bring more peaceful relations between Syracuse and Rome, but only gave the Syracusans more able leaders* (*Livy*, 24, 21). *After the slaughter of Themistius and Andramodorus, who had been elected on the board of Generals, and the cruel murder of all the royal family, Epicydes and Hippocrates,—Syracusans by descent, but born and brought up at Carthage, and who had been sent to Syracuse on a special mission by Hannibal,—were elected into the vacant places in the board of Generals. They became the leading spirits in the Syracusan government, and for a time kept up an appearance of wishing to come to terms with Rome; and legates were actually sent to Marcellus, at Morgantia* (*near Catana*). *But when the Carthaginian fleet arrived at Pachynus, Hippocrates and Epicydes threw off their mask, and declared that the other magistrates were betraying the town to the Romans. This accusation was rendered more specious by the appearance of Appius with a Roman fleet at the mouth of the harbour. A rush was made to the shore by the inhabitants to prevent the Romans landing; and the tumult was with difficulty composed by the wisdom of one of the magistrates, Apollonides, who persuaded the people to vote for the peace with Rome* (B.C. 215. *Livy*, 24, 21-28). *But Hippocrates and Epicydes determined not to acknowledge the peace: they therefore provoked the Romans by plundering in or near the Roman pale,*[1] *and then took refuge in Leontini. Marcellus complained at Syracuse, but was told that Leontini was not within Syracusan jurisdiction. Marcellus, therefore, took Leontini. Hippocrates and Epicydes managed to escape, and by a mixture of force and fraud contrived soon afterwards to force their way into Syracuse, seize and put to death most of the generals, and induce the excited mob, whom they had inspired with the utmost dread of being betrayed to Rome, to elect them*

[1] To which proceedings may be referred a sentence of Polybius preserved by Suidas, s.v. διεσκευασμένην—"They send out certain Cretans, as though on a raid, giving them a sham despatch to carry." See Livy, 24, 30-31.

sole generals (Livy, 24, 29-32). The Romans at once ordered Syracuse to be besieged, giving out that they were coming not to wage war with the inhabitants, but to deliver them.

5. When Epicydes and Hippocrates had occupied Syracuse, and had alienated the rest of the citizens with themselves from the friendship of Rome, the Romans who had already been informed of the murder of Hieronymus, tyrant of Syracuse, appointed Appius Claudius as Pro-praetor to command a land force, while Marcus Claudius Marcellus commanded the fleet. These officers took up a position not far from Syracuse, and determined to assault the town from the land at Hexapylus, and by sea at what was called Stoa Scytice in Achradina, where the wall has its foundation close down to the sea. Having prepared their wicker pent-houses, and darts, and other siege material, they felt confident that, with so many hands employed, they would in five days get their works in such an advanced state as to give them the advantage over the enemy. But in this they did not take into account the abilities of Archimedes; nor calculate on the truth that, in certain circumstances, the genius of one man is more effective than any numbers whatever.[1] However they now learnt it by experience. The city was strong from the fact of its encircling wall lying along a chain of hills with overhanging brows, the ascent of which was no easy task, even with no one to hinder it, except at certain definite points. Taking advantage of this, Archimedes had constructed such defences both in the town, and at the places where an attack might be made by sea, that the garrison would have everything at hand which they might require at any moment, and be ready to meet without delay whatever the enemy might attempt against them.

Siege of Syracuse, B.C. 215-214.

Archimedes.

6. The attack was begun by Appius bringing his pent-houses, and scaling ladders, and attempting to fix the latter against that part of the wall which abuts on Hexapylus towards the east. At the same time Marcus Claudius Marcellus with sixty quinqueremes was making a descent upon Achradina. Each

[1] Cp. 1, 35.

of these vessels were full of men armed with bows and slings and javelins, with which to dislodge those who fought on the battlements. As well as these vessels he had eight quinqueremes in pairs. Each pair had had their oars removed, one on the larboard and the other on the starboard side, and then had been lashed together on the sides thus left bare. On these double vessels, rowed by the outer oars of each of the pair, they brought up under the walls some engines called "Sambucae," the construction of which was as follows:—A ladder was made four feet broad, and of a height to reach the top of the wall from the place where its foot had to rest; each side of the ladder was protected by a railing, and a covering or pent-house was added overhead. It was then placed so that its foot rested across the sides of the lashed-together vessels, which touched each other with its other extremity protruding a considerable way beyond the prows. On the tops of the masts pulleys were fixed with ropes: and when the engines were about to be used, men standing on the sterns of the vessels drew the ropes tied to the head of the ladder, while others standing on the prows assisted the raising of the machine and kept it steady with long poles. Having then brought the ships close in shore by using the outer oars of both vessels they tried to let the machine down upon the wall. At the head of the ladder was fixed a wooden stage secured on three sides by wicker-shields, upon which stood four men who fought and struggled with those who tried to prevent the Sambuca from being made to rest on the battlements. But when they have fixed it and so got above the level of the top of the wall, the four men unfasten the wicker-shields from either side of the stage, and walk out upon the battlements or towers as the case may be; they are followed by their comrades coming up by the Sambuca, since the ladder's foot is safely secured with ropes and stands upon both the ships. This construction has got the name of "Sambuca," or "Harp," for the natural reason, that when it is raised the combination of the ship and ladder has very much the appearance of such an instrument.

Sambucae or Harps.

7. With such contrivances and preparations were the

Romans intending to assault the towers. But Archimedes had constructed catapults to suit every range; and as the ships sailing up were still at a considerable distance, he so wounded the enemy with stones and darts, from the lighter wound and longer engines, as to harass and perplex them to the last degree; and when these began to carry over their heads, he used smaller engines graduated according to the range required from time to time, and by this means caused so much confusion among them as to altogether check their advance and attack; and finally Marcellus was reduced in despair to bringing up his ships under cover of night. But when they had come close to land, and so too near to be hit by the catapults, they found that Archimedes had prepared another contrivance against the soldiers who fought from the decks. He had pierced the wall as high as a man's stature with numerous loop-holes, which, on the outside, were about as big as the palm of the hand. Inside the wall he stationed archers and cross-bows, or scorpions,[1] and by the volleys discharged through these he made the marines useless. By these means he not only baffled the enemy, whether at a distance or close at hand, but also killed the greater number of them. As often, too, as they tried to work their Sambucae, he had engines ready all along the walls, not visible at other times, but which suddenly reared themselves above the wall from inside, when the moment for their use had come, and stretched their beams far over the battlements, some of them carrying stones weighing as much as ten talents, and others great masses of lead. So whenever the Sambucae were approaching, these beams swung round on their pivot the required distance, and by means of a rope running through a pulley dropped the stone upon the Sambucae, with the result that it not only smashed the machine itself to pieces, but put the ship also and all on board into the most serious danger.

The engines invented by Archimedes. Cf Plut. *Marcellus*, 15.

570 lbs. av.

[1] *σκορπίδια*, mentioned among a number of similar engines in 1 Macc. 6, 51 Plutarch calls them *σκορπίοι*, and explains that they only carried a short distance, but, being concealed, gave wounds at close quarters; hence, doubtless, their name.

8. Other machines which he invented were directed against storming parties, who, advancing under the protection of pent-houses, were secured by them from being hurt by missiles shot through the walls. Against these he either shot stones big enough to drive the marines from the prow; or let down an iron hand swung on a chain, by which the man who guided the crane, having fastened on some part of the prow where he could get a hold, pressed down the lever of the machine inside the wall; and when he had thus lifted the prow and made the vessel rest upright on its stern, he fastened the lever of his machine so that it could not be moved; and then suddenly slackened the hand and chain by means of a rope and pulley. The result was that many of the vessels heeled over and fell on their sides: some completely capsized; while the greater number, by their prows coming down suddenly from a height, dipped low in the sea, shipped a great quantity of water, and became a scene of the utmost confusion. Though reduced almost to despair by these baffling inventions of Archimedes, and though he saw that all his attempts were repulsed by the garrison with mockery on their part and loss to himself, Marcellus could not yet refrain from making a joke at his own expense, saying that "Archimedes was using his ships to ladle out the sea-water, but that his 'harps' not having been invited to the party were buffeted and turned out with disgrace." Such was the end of the attempt at storming Syracuse by sea.

9. Nor was Appius Claudius more successful. He, too, was compelled by similar difficulties to desist from the attempt; for while his men were still at a considerable distance from the wall, they began falling by the stones and shots from the engines and catapults. The volleys of missiles, indeed, were extraordinarily rapid and sharp, for their construction had been provided for by all the liberality of a Hiero, and had been planned and engineered by the skill of an Archimedes. Moreover, when they did at length get near the walls, they were prevented from making an assault by the unceasing fire through the loop-holes, which I mentioned before; or if they tried to carry the place under cover of pent-houses, they were

The assault by land repulsed

killed by the stones and beams let down upon their heads. The garrison also did them no little damage with those hands at the end of their engines; for they used to lift the men, armour, and all, into the air, and then throw them down. At last Appius retired into the camp, and summoning the Tribunes to a council of war, decided to try every possible means of taking Syracuse except a storm. And this decision they carried out; for during the eight months of siege which followed, though there was no stratagem or measure of daring which they did not attempt, they never again ventured to attempt a storm. So true it is that one man and one intellect, properly qualified for the particular undertaking, is a host in itself and of extraordinary efficacy. In this instance, at any rate, we find the Romans confident that their forces by land and sea would enable them to become masters of the town, if only one old man could be got rid of; while as long as he remained there, they did not venture even to think of making the attempt, at least by any method which made it possible for Archimedes to oppose them. They believed, however, that their best chance of reducing the garrison was by a failure of provisions sufficient for so large a number as were within the town; they therefore relied upon this hope, and with their ships tried to cut off their supplies by sea, and with their army by land. But desiring that the time during which they were blockading Syracuse should not be entirely wasted, but that some addition should be made to their power in other parts of the country, the two commanders separated and divided the troops between them: Appius Claudius keeping two-thirds and continuing the blockade, while Marcus Marcellus with the remaining third went to attack the cities that sided with the Carthaginians. . . .

The siege turned into a blockade, B.C. 214. Coss. Q. Fabius Maximus IV. M. Claudius Marcellus III.

10. Upon arriving in Messenia Philip began devasting the country, like an open enemy, with more passion than reason; for while pursuing this continuous course of injurious actions, he expected, it

Philip's second devastation of Messene, B.C. 214.

appears to me, that the sufferers would feel no anger or hatred towards him. I was induced to speak of these proceedings in somewhat full detail in the present as well as in the last book, not alone by the same motives as those which I have assigned for other parts of my work, but also by the fact that of our historians, some have entirely omitted this Messenian episode; while others from love or fear of kings have maintained that, so far from the outrages committed by Philip in defiance of religion and law upon the Messenians being a subject of blame, his actions were on the contrary matters for praise and gratulation. But it is not only in regard to the Messenians that we may notice the historians of Philip acting thus; they have done much the same in other cases also. And the result is that their compositions have the appearance of a panegyric rather than of a history. I however hold that an historian ought neither to blame or praise kings untruly, as has often been done; but to make what we say consistent with what has been written before, and tally with the characters of the several persons in question. But it may be urged perhaps that this is easy to say, but very difficult to carry out; because situations and circumstances are so many and various, to which men have to give way in the course of their life, and which prevent them from speaking out their real opinions. This may excuse some, but not others.

See Plutarch, *Aratus*, ch. 51

Cp. *supra*, 7, 10-14.

11. I do not know any one who deserves more blame in this particular than Theopompus. In the beginning of his history of Philip he said that what chiefly induced him to undertake it was the fact that Europe had never produced such a man as Philip son of Amyntas; and then immediately afterwards, both in his preface and in the whole course of his history, he represents this king as so madly addicted to women, that he did all that in him lay to ruin his own family by this inordinate passion; as having behaved with the grossest unfairness and perfidy to his friends and allies; as having enslaved and treacherously seized a vast number of towns by force or fraud; and as having been besides so violently addicted to strong drink, that he was often seen by his friends drunk in open day.

The extravagance of Theopompus's account of Philip II.

But if any one will take the trouble to read the opening passage of his forty-ninth book, he would be indeed astonished at this writer's extravagance. Besides his other strange statements he has ventured to write as follows—for I here subjoin his actual words:—"If there was any one in all Greece, or among the Barbarians, whose character was lascivious and shameless, he was invariably attracted to Philip's court in Macedonia and got the title of 'the king's companion.' For it was Philip's constant habit to reject those who lived respectably and were careful of their property; but to honour and promote those who were extravagant, and passed their lives in drinking and dicing. His influence accordingly tended not only to confirm them in these vices, but to make them proficients in every kind of rascality and lewdness. What vice or infamy did they not possess? What was there virtuous or of good report that they did not lack? Some of them, men as they were, were ever clean shaven and smooth-skinned; and even bearded men did not shrink from mutual defilement. They took about with them two or three slaves of their lust, while submitting to the same shameful service themselves. The men whom they called companions deserved a grosser name, and the title of soldier was but a cover to mercenary vice; for, though bloodthirsty by nature, they were lascivious by habit. In a word, to make a long story short, especially as I have such a mass of matter to deal with, I believe that the so-called 'friends' and 'companions' of Philip were more bestial in nature and character than the Centaurs who lived on Pelion, or the Laestrygones who inhabited the Leontine plain, or in fact any other monsters whatever."[1]

12. Who would not disapprove of such bitterness and intemperance of language in an historian? It is not only because his words contradict his opening statement that he deserves stricture; but also because he has libelled the king and his friends; and still more because his falsehood is expressed in disgusting and unbecoming words. If he had been speaking of Sardanapalus, or one of his associates, he could hardly have ventured to use such foul language; and what that monarch's

[1] See also Athenaeus, 4, 166-167. Theopompus of Chius was a contemporary of Philip II. and Alexander, having been born about B.C. 376-372.

principles and debauchery were in his lifetime we gather from the inscription on his tomb, which runs thus:

> "The joys I had from love or wine
> Or dainty meats—those now are mine."

But when speaking of Philip and his friends, a man ought to be on his guard, not so much of accusing them of effeminacy and want of courage, or still more of shameless immorality, but on the contrary lest he should prove unequal to express their praises in a manner worthy of their manliness, indefatigable energy, and the general virtue of their character. It is notorious that by their energy and boldness they raised the Macedonian Empire from a most insignificant monarchy to the first rank in reputation and extent. And, putting aside the achievements of Philip, what was accomplished by them after his death, under the rule of Alexander, has secured for them a reputation for valour with posterity universally acknowledged. For although a large share of the credit must perhaps be given to Alexander, as the presiding genius of the whole, though so young a man; yet no less is due to his coadjutors and friends, who won many wonderful victories over the enemy; endured numerous desperate labours, dangers and sufferings; and, though put into possession of the most ample wealth, and the most abundant means of gratifying all their desires, never lost their bodily vigour by these means, or contracted tastes for violence or debauchery. On the contrary, all those who were associated with Philip, and afterwards with Alexander, became truly royal in greatness of soul, temperance of life, and courage. Nor is it necessary to mention any names: but after Alexander's death, in their mutual rivalries for the possession of various parts of nearly all the world, they filled a very large number of histories with the record of their glorious deeds. We may admit then that the bitter invective of the historian Timaeus against Agathocles, despot of Sicily, though it seems unmeasured, has yet some reason in it,—for it is directed against a personal enemy, a bad man, and a tyrant; but that of Theopompus is too scurrilous to be taken seriously.

The vigorous characters of the Diadochi.

13. For, after premising that he is going to write about a

king most richly endowed by nature with virtue, he has raked up against him every shameful and atrocious charge that he could find. There are therefore but two alternatives: either this writer in the preface to his work has shown himself a liar and a flatterer; or in the body of that history a fool and utter simpleton, if he imagined that by senseless and improper invective he would either increase his own credit, or gain great acceptance for his laudatory expressions about Philip.

But the fact is that the general plan of this writer is one also which can meet with no one's approval. For having undertaken to write a Greek History from the point at which Thucydides left off, when he got near the period of the battle of Leuctra, and the most splendid exploits of the Greeks, he threw aside Greece and its achievements in the middle of his story, and, changing his purpose, undertook to write the history of Philip. And yet it would have been far more telling and fair to have included the actions of Philip in the general history of Greece, than the history of Greece in that of Philip. For one cannot conceive any one, who had been preoccupied by the study of a royal government, hesitating, if he got the power and opportunity, to transfer his attention to the great name and splendid personality of a nation like Greece; but no one in his senses, after beginning with the latter, would have exchanged it for the showy biography of a tyrant. Now what could it have been that compelled Theopompus to overlook such inconsistencies? Nothing surely but this, that whereas the aim of his original history was honour, that of his history of Philip was expediency. As to this deviation from the right path however, which made him change the theme of his history, he might perhaps have had something to say, if any one had questioned him about it;* but as to his abominable language about the king's friends, I do not think that he could have said a word of defence, but must have owned to a serious breach of propriety. . . .

Thucydides breaks off in B.C. 411.

Battle of Leuctra, B.C. 371.

14. Though regarding the Messenians as open enemies, Philip was unable to inflict serious damage upon them, in spite of his setting to work to devastate their territory; but he was guilty of abominable conduct of the worst description to men

who had been his most intimate friends. For on the elder Aratus showing disapproval of his proceedings at Messene, he caused him not long afterwards to be made away with by poison, through the agency of Taurion who had charge of his interests in the Peloponnese. The crime was not known at the time by other people; for the drug was not one of those which kill on the spot, but was a slow poison producing a morbid state of the body. Aratus himself however was fully aware of the cause of his illness; and showed that he was so by the following circumstance. Though he kept the secret from the rest of the world, he did not conceal it from one of his servants named Cepholon, with whom he was on terms of great affection. This man waited on him during his illness with great assiduity, and having one day pointed out some spittle on the wall which was stained with blood, Aratus remarked, 'That is the reward I have got for my friendship to Philip." Such a grand and noble thing is disinterested virtue, that the sufferer was more ashamed, than the inflicter of the injury, of having it known, that, after so many splendid services performed in the interests of Philip, he had got such a return as that for his loyalty.[1]

Death of Aratus, B.C. 213.

In consequence of having been so often elected Strategus of the Achaean league, and of having performed so many splendid services for that people, Aratus after his death met with the honours he deserved, both in his own native city and from the league as a body. They voted him sacrifices and the honours of heroship, and in a word every thing calculated to perpetuate his memory; so that, if the departed have any consciousness, it is but reasonable to think that he feels pleasure at the gratitude of the Achaeans, and at the thought of the hardships and dangers he endured in his life. . . .

Seventeen times Strategus.

Plutarch, *Aratus*, 53.

[1] The accusation of administering slow poisons is a very common one, as readers of mediæval history know. But the ignorance of the conditions of health was too great to allow us to accept them without question. It is doubtful whether drugs, acting in this particular way, were known to the ancients; and certainly spitting blood would be no conclusive evidence of the presence of poison. See Creighton's *History of the Papacy*, vol IV. Append.

PHILIP TAKES LISSUS IN ILLYRIA, B.C. 213

15. Philip had long had his thoughts fixed upon Lissus and its citadel; and, being anxious to become master of those places, he started with his army, and after two days' march got through the pass and pitched his camp on the bank of the river Ardaxanus, not far from the town. He found on surveying the place that the fortifications of Lissus, both on the side of the sea and of the land, were exceedingly strong both by nature and art; and that the citadel, which was near it, from its extraordinary height and its other sources of strength, looked more than any one could hope to carry by storm. He therefore gave up all hope of the latter, but did not entirely despair of taking the town. He observed that there was a space between Lissus and the foot of the Acrolissus which was fairly well suited for making an attempt upon the town. He conceived the idea therefore of bringing on a skirmish in this space, and then employing a strategem suited to the circumstances of the case. Having given his men a day for rest; and having in the course of it addressed them in suitable words of exhortation; he hid the greater and most effective part of his light-armed troops during the night in some woody gulleys, close to this space on the land side; and next morning marched to the other side of the town next the sea, with his peltasts and the rest of his light-armed. Having thus marched round the town, and arrived at this spot, he made a show of intending to assault it at that point. Now as Philip's advent had been no secret, a large body of men from the surrounding country of Illyria had flocked into Lissus; but feeling confidence in the strength of the citadel, they had assigned a very moderate number of men to garrison it.

Lissus founded by Dionysius of Syracuse, B.C. 385. See Diod. Sic. 15, 13.

16. As soon therefore as the Macedonians approached, they began pouring out of the town, confident in their numbers and in the strength of the places. The king stationed his peltasts on the level ground, and ordered the light-armed troops to advance towards the hills and energetically engage the enemy.

The Acrolissus taken by a feint, and Lissus afterwards.

These orders being obeyed, the fight remained doubtful for a time; but presently Philip's men yielded to the inequality of the ground, and the superior number of the enemy, and gave way. Upon their retreating within the ranks of the peltasts, the sallying party advanced with feelings of contempt, and having descended to the same level as the peltasts joined battle with them. But the garrison of the citadel seeing Philip moving his divisions one after the other slowly to the rear, and believing that he was abandoning the field, allowed themselves to be insensibly decoyed out, in their confidence in the strength of their fortifications; and thus, leaving the citadel by degrees, kept pouring down by bye-ways into the lower plain, under the belief that they would have an opportunity of getting booty and completing the enemy's discomfiture. Meanwhile the division, which had been lying concealed on the side of the mainland, rose without being observed, and advanced at a rapid pace. At their approach the peltasts also wheeled round and charged the enemy. On this the troops from Lissus were thrown into confusion, and, after a straggling retreat, got safely back into the town; while the garrison which had abandoned the citadel got cut off from it by the rising of the troops which had been lying in ambush. The result accordingly was that what seemed hopeless, namely the capture of the citadel, was effected at once and without any fighting; while Lissus did not fall until next day, and then only after desperate struggles, the Macedonians assaulting with vigour and even terrific fury. Thus Philip having, beyond all expectation, made himself master of these places, reduced by this exploit all the neighbouring populations to obedience; so much so that the greater number of the Illyrians voluntarily surrendered their cities to his protection; for it had come to be believed that, after the storming of such strongholds as these, no fortification and no provision for security could be of any avail against the might of Philip.

THE CAPTURE OF ACHAEUS AT SARDIS

(See 7, 15-18)

17. Bolis was by birth a Cretan, who had long enjoyed

the honours of high military rank at King Ptolemy's court, and the reputation of being second to none in natural ability, adventurous daring, and experience in war. By repeated arguments Sosibius secured this man's fidelity; and when he felt sure of his zeal and affection he communicated the business in hand to him. He told him that he could not do the king a more acceptable service at the present crisis than by contriving some way of saving Achaeus. At the moment Bolis listened, and retired without saying more than that he would consider the suggestion. But after two or three days' reflection, he came to Sosibius and said that he would undertake the business; remarking that, having spent some considerable time at Sardis, he knew its topography, and that Cambylus, the commander of the Cretan contingent of the army of Antiochus, was not only a fellow citizen of his but a kinsmen and friend. It chanced moreover that Cambylus and his men had in charge one of the outposts on the rear of the acropolis, where the nature of the ground did not admit of siege-works, but was guarded by the permanent cantonment of troops under Cambylus. Sosibius caught at the suggestion, convinced that, if Achaeus could be saved at all from his dangerous situation, it could be better accomplished by the agency of Bolis than of any one else; and, this conviction being backed by great zeal on the part of Bolis, the undertaking was pushed on with despatch. Sosibius at once supplied the money necessary for the attempt, and promised a large sum besides in case of its success; at the same time raising the hopes of Bolis to the utmost by dilating upon the favours he might look for from the king, as well as from the rescued prince himself.

B.C. 214. Sosibius secures the help of Bolis to rescue Achaeus.

Full of eagerness therefore for success, Bolis set sail without delay, taking with him a letter in cipher and other credentials addressed to Nicomachus at Rhodes, who was believed to entertain a fatherly affection and devotion for Achaeus, and also to Melancomas at Ephesus; for these were the men formerly employed by Achaeus in his negotiations with Ptolemy, and in all other foreign affairs.

18. Bolis went to Rhodes, and thence to Ephesus; com-

municated his purpose to Nicomachus and Melancomas; and found them ready to do what they were asked. He then despatched one of his staff, named Arianus, to Cambylus, with a message to the effect that he had been sent from Alexandria on a recruiting tour, and that he wished for an interview with Cambylus on some matters of importance; he thought it therefore necessary to have a time and place arranged for them to meet without the privity of a third person. Arianus quickly obtained an interview with Cambylus and delivered his message; nor was the latter at all unwilling to listen to the proposal. Having appointed a day, and a place known to both himself and Bolis, at which he would be after nightfall, he dismissed Arianus. Now Bolis had all the subtlety of a Cretan, and he accordingly weighed carefully in his own mind every possible line of action, and patiently examined every idea which presented itself to him. Finally he met Cambylus according to the arrangement made with Arianus, and delivered his letter. This was now made the subject of discussion between them in a truly Cretan spirit. They never took into consideration the means of saving the person in danger, or their obligations of honour to those who had entrusted them with the undertaking, but confined their discussions entirely to the question of their own safety and their own advantage. As they were both Cretans they were not long in coming to an unanimous agreement: which was, first of all, to divide the ten talents supplied by Sosibius between themselves in equal shares; and, secondly, to discover the whole affair to Antiochus, and to offer with his support to put Achaeus into his hands, on condition of receiving a sum of money and promises for the future, on a scale commensurate with the greatness of the undertaking. Having settled upon this plan of action: Cambylus undertook the negotiation with Antiochus, while to Bolis was assigned the duty of sending Arianus within the next few days to Achaeus, bearing letters in cipher from Nicomachus and Melancomas: he bade Cambylus however take upon himself to consider how Arianus was to make his way into the acropolis and return with safety. "If," said Bolis, "Achaeus consents to make the attempt, and sends an

Bolis turns traitor.

answer to Nicomachus and Melancomas, I will be ready to act and will communicate with you." Having thus arranged the parts which each was to take in the plot, they separated and set about their several tasks.

The intended treason against Achaeus communicated to Antiochus.

19. At the first opportunity Cambylus laid the proposal before the king. It was as acceptable to Antiochus as it was unexpected: in the first flush of his exultation he promised everything they asked; but presently feeling some distrust, he questioned Cambylus on every detail of their plan, and their means of carrying it out. Being eventually satisfied on these points, and believing that the undertaking was under the special favour of Providence, he repeatedly begged and prayed Cambylus to bring it to a conclusion. Bolis was equally successful with Nicomachus and Melancomas. They entertained no doubt of his sincerity, and joined him in the composition of letters to Achaeus, — composed in a cipher which they had been accustomed to use, — to prevent any one who got hold of the letter from making out its contents, exhorting him to trust Bolis and Cambylus. So Arianus, having by the aid of Cambylus made his way into the acropolis, delivered the letters to Achaeus; and having had personal acquaintance with the whole business from its commencement, he was able to give an account of every detail when questioned and cross-questioned again and again by Achaeus about Sosibius and Bolis, about Nicomachus and Melancomas, and most particularly about the part which Cambylus was taking in the affair. He could of course stand this cross-examination with some air of sincerity and candour, because, in point of fact, he was not acquainted with the most important part of the plan which Cambylus and Bolis had adopted. Achaeus was convinced by the answers returned by Arianus, and still more by the cipher of Nicomachus and Melancomas; gave his answer; and sent Arianus back with it without delay. This kind of communication was repeated more than once: and at last Achaeus entrusted himself without reserve to Nicomachus, there being absolutely no other hope of saving himself left remaining, and bade him send Bolis with Arianus on a certain

Achaeus is deceived.

moonless night, promising to place himself in their hands. The idea of Achaeus was, first of all, to escape his immediate danger; and then by a circuitous route to make his way into Syria. For he entertained very great hopes that, if he appeared suddenly and unexpectedly to the Syrians, while Antiochus was still lingering about Sardis, he would be able to stir up a great movement, and meet with a cordial reception from the people of Antioch, Coele-Syria, and Phoenicia.

With such expectations and calculations Achaeus was waiting for the appearance of Bolis.

20. Meanwhile Arianus had reached Melancomas, who, on reading the letter which he brought, immediately despatched Bolis with many words of exhortation and great promises of profit if he succeeded in his enterprise. Bolis sent Arianus in advance to signify his arrival to Cambylus, and went after nightfall to their usual place of meeting. There they spent a whole day together settling every detail of their plan of operations; and having done this they went into the camp under cover of night. The arrangement made between them was this. If it turned out that Achaeus came from the acropolis alone with Bolis and Arianus, or with only one attendant, he would give them no cause for anxiety at all, but would be easily captured by the ambuscade set for him. If, on the other hand, he should be accompanied by a considerable number, the business would be one of some difficulty to those on whose good faith he relied; especially as they were anxious to capture him alive, that being what would most gratify Antiochus. In that case, therefore, Arianus, while conducting Achaeus, was to go in front, because he knew the path by which he had on several occasions effected his entrance and return; Bolis was to bring up the rear, in order that, when they arrived at the spot where Cambylus was to have his ambuscade ready, he might lay hold on Achaeus, and prevent his getting away through wooded ground, in the confusion and darkness of the night, or throwing himself in his terror from some precipice; thus they would secure that he fell, as they intended, into his enemies' hands alive.

These arrangements having been agreed upon, Bolis was taken by Cambylus on the very night of his arrival, without

any one else, and introduced to Antiochus. The king was alone and received them graciously; he pledged himself to the performance of his promises, and urged them both again and again not to postpone any longer the performance of their purpose. Thereupon they returned for the present to their own camp; but towards morning Bolis, accompanied by Arianus, ascended to the acropolis, and entered it before daybreak.

Achaeus takes vain precautions.

21. Achaeus received them with warmth and cordiality, and questioned Bolis at great length on every detail. From the expression of his face, and his conversation, he judged Bolis to be a man of a character weighty enough for so serious an undertaking; but while at one time he exulted in the prospect of his release, at another, he grew painfully excited, and was torn with an agony of anxiety at the gravity of the issues at stake. But no one had a clearer head or greater experience in affairs than he; and in spite of the good opinion he had formed of him, he still determined that his safety should not depend entirely on the good faith of Bolis. He accordingly told him that it was impossible for him to leave the acropolis at the moment: but that he would send some two or three of his friends with him, and by the time that they had joined Melancomas he would be prepared to depart. So Achaeus did all he could for his security; but he did not know that he was trying to do what the proverb declares to be impossible—out-cretan a Cretan. For there was no trick likely to be tried that Bolis had not anticipated. However when the night came, in which Achaeus said that he would send his friends with them, he sent on Arianus and Bolis to the entrance of the acropolis, with instructions to wait there until those who were to go with them arrived. They did as he bade them. Achaeus then, at the very moment of his departure, communicated his plan to his wife Laodice; and she was so terrified at his sudden resolve, that he had to spend some time in entreating her to be calm, in soothing her feelings, and encouraging her by pointing out the hopes which he entertained. This done he started with four companions, whom he dressed in ordinary clothes, while he himself put on a mean and common dress and disguised his rank as much as possible.

He selected one of his four companions to be always prepared to answer anything said by Arianus, and to ask any necessary question of him, and bade him say that the other four did not speak Greek.

22. The five then joined Arianus, and they all started together on their journey. Arianus went in front, as being acquainted with the way; while Bolis took up his position behind in accordance with the original plan, puzzled and annoyed at the way things were turning out. For, Cretan as he was, and ready to suspect every one he came near, he yet could not make out which of the five was Achaeus, or whether he was there at all. But the path was for the most part precipitous and difficult, and in some places there were abrupt descents which were slippery and dangerous; and whenever they came to one of these, some of the four gave Achaeus a hand down, and the others caught him at the bottom, for they could not entirely conceal their habitual respect for him; and Bolis was quick to detect, by observing this, which of them was Achaeus. When therefore they arrived at the spot at which it had been arranged that Cambylus was to be, Bolis gave the signal by a whistle, and the men sprang from their places of concealment and seized the other four, while Bolis himself caught hold of Achaeus, at the same time grasping his mantle, as his hands were inside it; for he was afraid that having a sword concealed about his person he would attempt to kill himself when he understood what was happening. Being thus quickly surrounded on every side, Achaeus fell into the hands of his enemies, and along with his four friends was taken straight off to Antiochus.

Achaeus made prisoner.

The king was in his tent in a state of extreme anxiety awaiting the result. He had dismissed his usual court, and, with the exception of two or three of the bodyguard, was alone and sleepless. But when Cambylus and his men entered, and placed Achaeus in chains on the ground, he fell into a state of speechless astonishment: and for a considerable time could not utter a word, and finally overcome by a feeling of pity burst into tears; caused, I have no doubt, by this exhibition of the capriciousness of Fortune, which defies

Achaeus brought to Antiochus, sentenced and executed

precaution and calculation alike. For here was Achaeus, a son of Andromachus, the brother of Seleucus's queen Laodice, and married to Laodice, a daughter of King Mithridates, and who had made himself master of all Asia this side of Taurus, and who at that very moment was believed by his own army, as well as by that of his enemy, to be safely ensconced in the strongest position in the world,—sitting chained upon the ground, in the hands of his enemies, before a single person knew of it except those who had effected the capture.

23. And, indeed, when at daybreak the king's friends assembled as usual at his tent, and saw this strange spectacle, they too felt emotions very like those of the king; while extreme astonishment made them almost disbelieve the evidence of their senses. However the council met, and a long debate ensued as to what punishment they were to inflict upon Achaeus. Finally, it was resolved that his extremities should be cut off, his head severed from his body and sewn up in the skin of an ass, and his body impaled. When this sentence had been carried out, and the army learnt what had happened, there was such excitement in the ranks and such a rush of the soldiers to the spectacle, that Laodice on the acropolis, who alone knew that her husband had left it, guessed what had happened from the commotion and stir in the camp. And before long a herald arrived, told Laodice what had happened to Achaeus, and ordered her to resign the command and quit the acropolis. At first any answer was prevented by an outburst of sorrow and overpowering lamentation on the part of the occupants of the acropolis; not so much from affection towards Achaeus, as from the suddenness and utter unexpectedness of the catastrophe. But this was succeeded by a feeling of hesitation and dismay; and Antiochus, having got rid of Achaeus, never ceased putting pressure on the garrison of the acropolis, feeling confident that a means of taking it would be put into his hands by those who occupied it, and most probably by the rank and file of the garrison. And this is just what did finally happen: for the soldiers split up into factions, one joining Ariobazus, the other Laodice. This produced mutual distrust, and before long both parties surren-

The citadel of Sardis surrendered.

dered themselves and the acropolis. Thus Achaeus, in spite of having taken every reasonable precaution, lost his life by the perfidy of those in whom he trusted. His fate may teach posterity two useful lessons, — not to put faith in any one lightly; and not to be over-confident in the hour of prosperity, knowing that, in human affairs, there is no accident which we may not expect. . . .

THE GALLIC KING, CAUARUS

24. Cauarus, king of the Gauls in Thrace, was of a truly royal and high-minded disposition, and gave the merchants sailing into the Pontus great protection, and rendered the Byzantines important services in their wars with the Thracians and Bithynians. . . .

Cauarus, king of the Gauls, settled on the Hellespont. See 4, 46 and 52.

This king, so excellent in other respects, was corrupted by a flatterer named Sostratus, who was a Chalchedonian by birth. . . .

ANTIOCHUS THE GREAT AT ARMOSATA

25. In the reign of Xerxes, prince of the city of Armosata, situated on the "Fair Plain," between the Tigris and Euphrates, King Antiochus encamped under its walls and prepared to attack it. When he saw the king's forces, Xerxes at first conveyed himself away; but feeling afterwards that, if his palace were seized by his enemies, his whole kingdom would be overthrown, he changed his mind, and sent a message to Antiochus declaring his wish for a conference. The most loyal of the friends of Antiochus were against letting the young prince go when they once got him into their hands, and advised Antiochus to take possession of the town, and hand over the principality to Mithridates, his own sister's son. The king, however, would not listen to any of these suggestions; but sent for the young prince and accommodated their differences, forgiving him the larger part of the

In the course of his campaigns for the recovering of the eastern provinces (B.C. 212-205), Antiochus makes a demonstration before the city of Armosata, in Armenia, to recover the arrears of tribute owed by the late king, B.C. 212.

money which he allowed to be owing from his father under the head of tribute, and accepting a present payment from him of three hundred talents, a thousand horses, and a thousand mules with their trappings. He then settled the government of the city, and gave the prince his sister Antiochis as a wife. By these proceedings, in which he was thought to have acted with true royal magnanimity, he won the affection and support of all the inhabitants of that part of the country.

THE HANNIBALIAN WAR — TARENTUM

26. It was in the wantonness of excessive prosperity that the Tarentines invited Pyrrhus of Epirus; for democratic liberty that has enjoyed a long and unchecked career comes naturally to experience a satiety of its blessings, and then it looks out for a master; and when it has got one, it is not long before it hates him, because it is seen that the change is for the worse. This is just what happened to the Tarentines on that occasion. . . .

On this news being brought to Tarentum and Thurii there was great popular indignation. . . .

The conspirators left the town at first under the pretext of a foray, and got near Hannibal's camp before daybreak. Then, while the rest crouched down on a certain wooded spot by the side of the road, Philemenus and Nicon went up to the camp. They were seized by the sentries and taken off to Hannibal, without saying a word as to where they came from or who they were, but simply stating that they wished for an interview with the general. Being taken without delay to Hannibal they said that they wished to speak with him privately. He assented with the utmost readiness; whereupon they explained to him their own position and that of their native city, charging the Romans with many various acts of oppression, that they might not seem to be entering on their present undertaking without good reason. For the present

Hannibal marched south early in B.C. 212 to renew his attempt upon Tarentum, on which he had wasted much of the previous summer (Livy, 25, 1).

The seventy of the punishment of the Tarentine hostages who tried to escape from Rome caused a conspiracy of Tarentines to betray the town to Hannibal. Livy, 25, 7-8.

Hannibal dismissed them with thanks and a cordial acceptance of their proposed movement, and charging them to come back very soon and have another interview with him. "This time," he added, "when you get at a sufficient distance from the camp, take possession of the first cattle you find being driven out to pasture in the early morning, and go off boldly with them and their herdsmen; for I will take care that you are unmolested." His object in doing this was to give himself time to inquire into the tale of the young men; and also to confirm their credit with their fellow-citizens, by making it appear that their expedition had really been for the purpose of foraging. Nicon and his companions did as they were bidden, and left Hannibal in great exultation at having at last got an opportunity of completing his enterprise: while they themselves were made all the more eager to carry out their plot by having been able to accomplish their interview with Hannibal without danger, and by having found him warmly disposed to their undertaking, and by having besides gained the confidence of their own people by the considerable amount of booty which they had brought home. This they partly sold and partly used in splendid entertainments, and thus not only were believed in by the Tarentines, but excited a considerable number to emulate their exploit.

27. On their next expedition, which they conducted in the same way as the first, they interchanged pledges of fidelity with Hannibal on the following conditions: "He was to set the Tarentines free; and the Carthaginians were neither to exact tribute of any sort from them, nor impose any burden upon them; but the houses and lodgings occupied by Romans should, on their taking possession of the town, be given up to the Carthaginians to plunder." They also arranged on a watch-word at which the sentries were to admit them without delay into the camp whenever they came. After making these arrangements, they got the opportunity of often having interviews with Hannibal: sometimes pretending to be going out of the town on a foray, and sometimes on a hunting expedition. Everything having thus been put in train, the greater part of the conspirators waited for the proper occasions for acting, while they assigned

Bargain made with Hannibal.

to Philemenus the part of leader of their hunting excursions; for, owing to his excessive taste for that amusement, he had the reputation of thinking hunting the most important thing in life. Accordingly they left it to him, first to win the favour of Gaius Livius the commander of the town by presents of game, and then that of the guards of the gate-tower which protected what were called the Temenid gates. Philemenus undertook the task: and partly by what he caught himself, and partly with what Hannibal supplied, always managed to bring in some game; which he divided between Livius and the guards of the gate, to induce them to be always ready to open the wicket to him. For he generally went and returned from his expeditions after nightfall, under the pretext of being afraid of the enemy, but really with a view of preparing for the plot. When Philemenus then had managed to make it a regular arranged thing with the picket at the gate, that the guards should have no hesitation; but that, whenever he came under the wall and whistled, they should open the wicket to him; he waited for a day on which the Roman commander of the town was engaged to be present at a large party, meeting early in the Musaeum, which is near the agora, and agreed with Hannibal to carry out their plot on that day.

Hannibal prepares to act.

28. For some time before this, Hannibal had given out that he was ill, to prevent the Romans wondering when they were told of his staying so long on the same ground; and he now made a greater pretence than ever of ill-health, and remained encamped three days' march from Tarentum. But when the time was come, he got ready the most conspicuous for their speed and daring in his cavalry and infantry, to the number of about ten thousand, and gave orders that they should take provisions for four days. He started just before daybreak, and marched at full speed; having told off eighty Numidian horsemen to keep thirty stades ahead, and to scour the country on both sides of the road; so that no one might get a sight of the main body, but might either be taken prisoners by this advanced guard, or, if he escaped, might carry a report of it into the city as if it were merely a raid of Numidian horsemen. When the Numidians were about a hundred and twenty stades from the town,

Hannibal halted his men for supper by the side of a river flowing through a deep gully, and offering excellent cover; and having summoned his officers, did not indeed tell them outright what the service was on which they were going, but simply exhorted them, first to show themselves brave men, as the prize awaiting them was the greatest they had ever had; and, secondly, that each should keep the men of his own company well together, and rebuke sharply all who left their own division on any pretext whatever; and, thirdly, to attend strictly to orders, and not attempt anything on their own account outside them. Dismissing the officers with these words, he got his troops on the march just after dark, being very anxious to reach the wall about midnight; having Philemenus to act as guide, and having got ready for him a wild-boar to enable him to sustain the part which he was to perform.

Gaius Livius thrown off the scent.

29. About sunset news was brought to Gaius Livius, who had been with his friends in the Musaeum since early in the day, just when the drinking was at its height, that the Numidians were scouring the country. He therefore took measures for that and nothing more, calling some of his officers and bidding them take half the cavalry, and sally out to stop the progress of the enemy, who were devasting the country: but this only made him still more unsuspicious of the whole extent of the movement. Nicon, Tragiscus, and their confederates collected together at nightfall in the town and waited for the return of Livius and his friends. As these last rose from table somewhat early, because the banquet had begun before the usual time, the greater number of the conspirators retired to a certain spot and there remained; but some of the younger men went to meet Gaius, imitating by their disorderly procession and mutual jests a company returning from a carouse. As Livius and his company were even more flustered with drink, as soon as they met laughter and joking were readily excited on both sides. Finally, they turned and conducted Gaius to his house; where he went to bed full of wine, as might be expected after a party beginning so early in the day, without any anxiety or trouble in his thoughts, but full of cheerfulness and idle content. Then Nicon and Tragiscus rejoined their com-

panions, and, dividing themselves into three companies, took up their positions at the most favourable points in the market-place, to keep themselves fully acquainted with everything reported from outside the walls, or that happened within the city itself. They posted some also close to the house of Livius: being well aware that, if any suspicion of what was coming arose, it would be to him that the news would be first brought, and that from him every measure taken would originate. So when the noise of the returning guests, and every disturbance of the sort, had subsided, and the great bulk of the citizens was asleep; and now the night was advancing, and nothing had happened to dash their hopes, they collected together and proceeded to perform their part of the undertaking.

30. The arrangements between these young men and Hannibal were these. Hannibal was to arrive at the town by the inland road and on the eastern side near the Temenid gates; and when there, was to light a fire on the tomb, which some called the tomb of Hyacinthus, and others of Apollo: Tragiscus and his confederates, when they saw this, were to light an answering fire from within the walls. This done, Hannibal was to put out his fire and advance slowly towards the gate. In pursuance of these arrangements, the young men marched through the inhabited part of the town and came to the tombs. For the eastern quarter of Tarentum is full of monuments, because those who die there are to this day all buried within the walls, in obedience to an ancient oracle. For it is said that the god delivered this answer to the Tarentines, "That it were better and more profitable for them if they made their dwelling with the majority"; and they thought therefore that they would be living in accordance with the oracle if they kept the departed within the walls. That is why to this day they bury inside the gates.

Why the Tarentines bury within the walls.

The young men, then, having gone as far as the tomb of Pythionicus, waited to see what would happen. Presently Hannibal arrived and did as arranged: whereupon Nicon and Tragiscus with renewed courage displayed their beacon also; and, as soon as they saw the fire of the Carthaginians being put out, they ran to the

Hannibal arrives and gets into the town.

gates as fast as they could go, wishing to get the picket at the gate tower killed before the Carthaginians arrived; as it had been agreed that they should advance leisurely and at a foot's pace. Everything went smoothly: the guards were overpowered; and while some of the young men were engaged in killing them, others were cutting the bolts. The gates having been quickly thrown open, Hannibal arrived at the right moment, having so timed his march that he never had to stop on the way to the town at all.

31. Having thus effected their intended entrance, without danger or any disturbance whatever, and thinking that the most important part of their undertaking was accomplished, the Carthaginians now began advancing boldly along the street leading up from what is called the Batheia or Deep Road. They left the cavalry however outside the walls, numbering as many as two thousand, intending them to act as a reserve both in case of any appearance of the enemy from without, and of any of those unforeseen casualities which do occur in such operations. But when they had come to the immediate neighbourhood of the market-place, they halted, and waited to see how the attempt of Philemenus would turn out: being anxious as to the success of this part of their plan as well as the other. For at the same moment that he lighted his fire, and was on the point of starting for the gates, Hannibal had despatched Philemenus also, with his boar on a litter, and a thousand Libyans, to the next gate; wishing, in accordance with his original design, not to depend solely on one chance, but to have several. When Philemenus, then, arrived at the wall and gave his customary signal by whistling, the sentry immediately appeared coming down to open the wicket; and when Philemenus told him from outside to open quickly because they had a great weight to carry, as they were bringing a wild boar, he made haste to open the wicket, expecting that some of the game which Philemenus was conveying would come his way, as he had always had a share of what was brought in.

Philemenus also gets in.

Thereupon Philemenus himself, being at the head of the litter, entered first; and with him another dressed like a shepherd, as though he were one of the country folk

of those parts; and after him two others besides who were carrying the dead beast behind. But when the four had got inside the wicket, they struck and killed the man who opened it, as he was unsuspiciously examining and feeling the boar, and then let the men who were just behind them, and were in advance of the main body of Libyan horsemen, to the number of thirty, leisurely and quietly through. This having been accomplished without a hitch, some set about cutting the bolts, others were engaged in killing the picket on duty at the gate, and others in giving the signal to the Libyans still outside to come in. These having also effected their entrance in safety, they began making their way towards the market-place according to the arrangement. As soon as he was joined by this division also, in great delight at the successful progress of the operation, Hannibal proceeded to carry out the next step.

32. He told off two thousand of his Celts: and, having divided them into three companies, he assigned two of the young men who had managed the plot to each company; and sent with them also certain of his own officers, with orders to close up the several most convenient streets that led to the market-place. And when he had done this, he bade the young men of the town pick out and save those of their fellow-citizens whom they might chance to meet, by shouting out before they came up with them, "That Tarentines should remain where they were, as they were in no danger"; but he ordered both Carthaginian and Celtic officers to kill all the Romans they met.

Escape of Livius into the citadel.

So these companies separated and proceeded to carry out their orders. But when the entrance of the enemy became known to the Tarentines, the city began to be full of shouting and extraordinary confusion. As for Gaius, when the enemy's entrance was announced to him, being fully aware that his drunkenness had incapacitated him, he rushed straight out of the house with his servants, and having come to the gate leading to the harbour, and the sentinel having opened the wicket for him, he got through that way; and having seized one of the boats lying at anchor there, went on board it with his servants and arrived

safely at the citadel. Meanwhile Philemenus had provided himself with some Roman bugles, and some men who were able to blow them, from being used to do so; and they stood in the theatre and sounded a call to arms. The Romans promptly rallying in arms, as was their custom at this sound, and directing their steps towards the citadel, everything happened exactly as the Carthaginians intended; for as the Roman soldiers came into the streets, without any order and in scattered groups, some of them came upon the Carthaginians and others upon the Celts; and by their being in this way put to the sword in detail, a very considerable number of them perished.

Massacre of Roman soldiers.

But when day began to break, the Tarentines kept quietly in their houses, not yet being able to comprehend what was happening. For thanks to the bugle, and the absence of all outrage or plundering in the town, they thought that the movement arose from the Romans themselves. But the sight of many of the latter lying killed in the streets, and the spectacle of some Gauls openly stripping the Roman corpses, suggested a suspicion of the presence of the Carthaginians.

33. Presently when Hannibal had marched his forces into the market-place, and the Romans had retired into the citadel, as having been previously secured by them with a garrison, and it had become broad daylight, the Carthaginian general caused a proclamation to be made to the Tarentines to assemble in full number in the market-place; while the young conspirators went meanwhile round the town talking loudly about liberty, and bidding everybody not to be afraid, for the Carthaginians had come to save them. Such of the Tarentines as held to their loyalty to Rome, upon learning the state of the case, went off to the citadel; but the rest came to the meeting, in obedience to the proclamation, without their arms: and to them Hannibal addressed a cordial speech. The Tarentines heartily cheered everything he said from joy at their unexpected safety; and he dismissed the crowd with an injunction to each man, to go with all speed to his own house, and write over the door, "A Tarentine's"; but if any one wrote the same word on a house where a Roman was living, he declared the penalty to be

Roman houses sacked, Tarentines spared.

death. He then personally told off the best men he had for the service, and sent them to plunder the houses of the Romans; giving them as their instructions to consider all houses which had no inscription as belonging to the enemy: the rest of his men he kept drawn up as a reserve.

Fortifications raised to preserve the town from attack from the citadel.

34. A vast quantity of miscellaneous property having been got together by this plundering, and a booty fully answering the expectations of the Carthaginians, they bivouacked for that night under arms. But the next day, after consulting with the Tarentines, Hannibal decided to cut off the city from the citadel by a wall, that the Tarentines might not any longer be under continual alarm from the Romans in possession of the citadel. His first measure was to throw up a palisade, parallel to the wall of the citadel and to the trench in front of it. But as he very well knew that the enemy would not allow this tamely, but would make a demonstration of their power in that direction, he got ready for the work a number of his best hands, thinking that the first thing necessary was to overawe the Romans and give confidence to the Tarentines. But as soon as the first palisade was begun, the Romans began a bold and determined attack; whereupon Hannibal, offering just enough resistance to induce the rest to come out, as soon as the greater part of them had crossed the trench, gave the word of command to his men and charged the enemy. A desperate struggle ensued; for the fight took place in a narrow space surrounded by walls; but at last the Romans were forced to turn and fly. Many of them fell in the actual fighting, but the larger number were forced over the edge of the trench and were killed by the fall over its steep bank.

Further works of security.

35. For the present Hannibal, after completing the palisade unmolested, was content to remain quiet, as his plan had succeeded to his wish; for he had shut in the enemy and compelled them to remain inside their wall, in terror for the safety of the citadel as well as for their own; while he had raised the courage of the citizens of Tarentum to such an extent, that they now imagined themselves to be a match for the Romans, even without the Carthaginians. A little later he made at a short

distance from the palisade, in the direction of the town, a trench parallel to the palisade and the wall of the citadel, and the earth dug out from it having been piled up on the other side along the edge nearest the town, he erected another palisade on the top, thus making a fortification no less secure than the wall itself. Once more, at a moderate distance, nearer the city, he commenced building a wall, starting from the street called Soteira up to that called Batheia; so that, even without a garrison, the Tarentines were adequately protected by the mere constructions themselves. Then leaving a sufficient garrison, and enough cavalry to serve on outpost duty for the protection of the wall, he encamped along the bank of the river which is called by some the Galaesus, but by most people the Eurotas, after the river which flows past Sparta. The Tarentines have many such derived names, both in town and country, from the acknowledged fact of their being a colony from Sparta and connected by blood with the Lacedaemonians. As the wall quickly approached completion, owing to the activity and zeal of the Tarentines, and the vigorous co-operation of the Carthaginians, Hannibal next conceived the idea of taking the citadel also.

36. But when he had already completed the preparation of the necessary engines for the assault, the Romans received some slight encouragement on a reinforcement throwing itself into the citadel by sea from Metapontium; and consequently they sallied out by night and attacked the works, and destroyed all Hannibal's apparatus and engines. After this Hannibal abandoned the idea of a storm: but as the new wall was now completed, he summoned a meeting of the Tarentines and pointed out to them that the most imperative necessity, in view of the present state of things, was to get command of the sea. For as the citadel commanded the entrance to the harbour, the Tarentines could not use their ships nor sail out of it; while the Romans could get supplies conveyed to them by sea without danger: and as long as that was the case, it was impossible that the city should have any security for its freedom. Hannibal saw this clearly, and explained to the Taren-

Hannibal's arrangements for storming the citadel frustrated.

Romans reinforced.

New plans for cutting off the

Roman supplies by sea.

tines that, if the enemy on the citadel were deprived of hope of succour by sea, they would at once give way, and abandon it of their own accord, without attempting to defend the place. The Tarentines were fully convinced by his words: but how it was to be brought about in the present state of affairs they could form no idea, unless a fleet should appear from Carthage; which at that time of the year was impossible. They therefore said that they could not understand what Hannibal was aiming at in these remarks to them. When he replied that it was plain that, even without the Carthaginians, they were all but in command of the sea, they were still more puzzled, and could not guess his meaning. The truth was that Hannibal had noticed that the broad street, which was at once within the wall separating the town from the citadel, and led from the harbour into the open sea, was well suited for the purpose; and he had conceived the idea of dragging the ships out of the harbour to the sea on the southern side of the town. Upon his disclosing his idea to the Tarentines, they not only expressed their agreement with the proposal, but the greatest admiration for himself; and made up their minds that there was nothing which his acuteness and daring could not accomplish. Trucks on wheels were quickly constructed: and it was scarcely sooner said than done, owing to the zeal of the people and the numbers who helped to work at it. In this way the Tarentines dragged their ships across into the open sea, and were enabled without danger to themselves to blockade the Romans on the citadel, having deprived them of their supplies from without. But Hannibal himself, leaving a garrison for the city, started with his army, and returned in a three days' march to his original camp; and there remained without further movements for the rest of the winter. . . .

B.C. 212-211.

FALL OF SYRACUSE, B.C. 212

The method taken by a Roman to estimate the height of the wall of Syracuse. Livy, 25, 23.

37. He counted the layers; for as the tower had been built of regular layers of stone, it was very easy to reckon the height of the battlements from the ground. . . .

Some days afterwards on information being given by a

deserter that the Syracusans had been engaged in a public sacrifice to Artemis for the last three days; and that they were using very scanty food in the festival though plenty of wine, both Epicydes and certain Syracusans having given a large supply; Marcus Marcellus selected a part of the wall somewhat lower than the rest, and thinking it probable that the men were drunk, owing to the license of the hour, and the short supply of food with their wine, he determined to attempt an escalade. Two ladders of the proper height for the wall having been quickly made, he pressed on the undertaking. He spoke openly to those who were fit to make the ascent and to face the first and most conspicuous risk, holding out to them brilliant prospects of reward. He also picked out some men to give them necessary help and bring ladders, without telling them anything except to bid them be ready to obey orders. His directions having been accurately obeyed, at the proper time in the night he put the first men in motion, sending with them the men with the ladders together with a maniple and a tribune, and having first reminded them of the rewards awaiting them if they behaved with gallantry. After this he got his whole force ready to start; and despatching the vanguard by maniples at intervals, when a thousand had been massed in this way, after a short pause, he marched himself with the main body. The men carrying the ladders having succeeded in safely placing them against the wall, those who had been told off to make the ascent mounted at once without hesitation. Having accomplished this without being observed, and having got a firm footing on the top of the wall, the rest began to mount by the ladders also, not in any fixed order, but as best they could. At first as they made their way upon the wall they found no one to oppose them, for the guards of the several towers, owing to it being a time of public sacrifice, were either still drinking or were gone to sleep again in a state of drunkenness. Consequently of the first and second companies of guards, which they came upon, they killed the greater number before they knew that they were being attacked. And when they came near Hexapyli, they descended from the wall, and forced open the first postern they came to which was

Fall of Syracuse by an escalade, autumn B.C. 212. Livy, 24, 23-31.

let into the wall, through which they admitted the general and the rest of the army. This is the way in which the Romans took Syracuse. . . .

Livy, 25, 24. None of the citizens knew what was happening because of the distance; for the town is a very large one. . . .

The first quarter occupied. Livy, 25, 24. But the Romans were rendered very confident by their conquest of Epipolae. . . .

38. He gave orders that the infantry should take the beasts of burden along with the baggage tied upon them from the rear and range them in front of themselves. This produced a defence of greater security than any palisade.[1] . . .

So entirely unable are the majority of mankind to submit to that lightest of all burdens—silence. . . .

Anything in the future seems preferable to what exists in the present. . . .

[1] This fragment is supposed, by comparison with Livy, 25, 36, to belong to the account of the fall of Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio in Spain, B.C. 212.

BOOK IX

EXTRACT FROM THE PREFACE

1. SUCH are the most conspicuous transactions of this Olympiad, that is, of the four years which an Olympiad must be reckoned to contain; and I shall endeavour to include the history of them in two books. 142d Olympiad, B C 212-208.

I am quite aware that my history has an element of austerity in it, and is adapted to, and will be approved by only one class of readers, owing to the uniformity of its plan. Nearly all other historians, or at any rate most, attract a variety of readers by entering upon all the various branches of history. The curious reader is attracted by the genealogical style; the antiquarian by the discussion of colonisations, origins of cities, and ties of blood, such as is found in Ephorus; the student of polities by the story of tribes, cities, and dynasties. It is to this last branch of the subject that I have had a single eye, and have devoted my whole work; and accordingly have, as I said before, accommodated all my plans to one particular class of narrative. The result is that I have made my work by no means attractive reading to the majority. Why I thus neglected other departments of history, and deliberately resolved to confine myself to chronicling actions, I have already stated at length; however, there is no reason why I should not briefly remind my readers of it again in this place, for the sake of impressing it upon them.

2. Seeing that many writers have discussed in many varieties of style the question of genealogies, myths, and colonisations, as well as of the foundations of cities and the

consanguinity of peoples, there was nothing left for a writer at this date but to copy the words of others and claim them as his own,—than which nothing could be more dishonourable; or, if he did not choose to do that, to absolutely waste his labour, being obliged to acknowledge that he is composing a history and bestowing thought on what has already been sufficiently set forth and transmitted to posterity by his predecessors. For these and sundry other reasons I abandoned such themes as these, and determined on writing a history of actions: first, because they are continually new and require a new narrative, —as of course one generation cannot give us the history of the next; and secondly, because such a narrative is of all others the most instructive. This it has always been: but it is eminently so now, because the arts and sciences have made such an advance in our day, that students are able to arrange every event as it happens according to fixed rules, as it were, of scientific classification. Therefore, as I did not aim so much at giving pleasure to my readers, as at profiting those who apply to such studies, I omitted all other themes and devoted myself wholly to this. But on these points, those who give a careful attention to my narrative will be the best witnesses to the truth of what I say. . . .

THE HANNIBALIAN WAR

In the previous year (212 B.C.) *Syracuse had fallen: the two Scipios had been conquered and killed in Spain: the siege-works had been constructed round Capua, at the very time of the fall of Syracuse, i.e. in the autumn, Hannibal being engaged in fruitless attempts upon the citadel of Tarentum. See Livy, 25, 22.*

3. Entirely surrounding the position of Appius Claudius, Hannibal at first skirmished, and tried all he could to tempt him to come out and give him battle. But as no one attended to him, his attack became very like an attempt to storm the camp; for his cavalry charged in their squadrons, and with loud cries hurled their

B.C. 211. Coss Gnaeus Fulvius Centumalus, P. Sulpicius Galba. The Romans were still engaged in the siege of Capua.

javelins inside the entrenchments, and the infantry attacked in their regular companies, and tried to pull down the palisading round the camp. But not even so could he move the Romans from their purpose: they employed their light-armed troops to repulse those who were actually attacking the palisade, but protecting themselves with their heavy shields against the javelins of the enemy, they remained drawn up near their standards without moving. Discomfited at being neither able to throw himself into Capua, nor induce the Romans to leave their camp, Hannibal retired to consult as to what was best to be done.

Q. Fulvius and Appius Claudius, the Consuls of the previous year, were continued in command there, with orders not to leave the place till it fell. Livy, 26, 1. Hannibal tries to raise the siege.

It is no wonder, in my opinion, that the Carthaginians were puzzled. I think any one who heard the facts would be the same. For who would not have received with incredulity the statement that the Romans, after losing so many battles to the Carthaginians, and though they did not venture to meet them on the field, could not nevertheless be induced to give up the contest or abandon the command of the country? Up to this time, moreover, they had contented themselves with hovering in his neighbourhood, keeping along the skirts of the mountains; but now they had taken up a position on the plains, and those the fairest in all Italy, and were besieging the strongest city in it; and that with an enemy attacking them, whom they could not endure even the thought of meeting face to face: while the Carthaginians, who beyond all dispute had won the battles, were sometimes in as great difficulties as the losers. I think the reason of the strategy adopted by the two sides respectively was, that they both had seen that Hannibal's cavalry was the main cause of the Carthaginian victory and Roman defeat. Accordingly the plan of the losers after the battles, of following their enemies at a distance, was the natural one to adopt; for the country through which they went was such that the enemy's cavalry would be unable to do them any damage. Similarly what now happened at Capua to either side was natural and inevitable.

The determination and cautious tactics of the Romans.

4. For the Roman army did not venture to come out and give battle, from fear of the enemy's horse, but remained resolutely within their entrenchment; well knowing that the cavalry, by which they had been worsted in the battles, could not hurt them there. While the Carthaginians, again, naturally could not remain any longer encamped with their cavalry, because all the pastures in the surrounding country had been utterly destroyed by the Romans with that very view; and it was impossible for animals to come from such a distance, carrying on their backs hay and barley for so large a body of cavalry, and so many beasts of burden; nor again did they venture, when encamped without their cavalry, to attack an enemy protected by a palisade and fosse, with whom a contest, even without these advantages in their favour, was likely to be a doubtful one if they had not got their cavalry. Besides this they were much alarmed about the new Consuls, lest they should come and encamp against them, and reduce them to serious straits by cutting off their supplies of provisions.

Carthaginian difficulties.

These considerations convinced Hannibal that it was impossible to raise the siege by an open attack, and he therefore changed his tactics. He imagined that if by a secret march he could suddenly appear in the neighbourhood of Rome, he might by the alarm which he would inspire in the inhabitants by his unexpected movement, perhaps do something worth while against the city itself; or, if he could not do that, would at least force Appius either to raise the siege of Capua, in order to hasten to the relief of his native town, or to divide the Roman forces; which would then be easier for him to conquer in detail.

Hannibal determines on creating a diversion by threatening Rome.

5. With this purpose in his mind he sent a letter-carrier into Capua. This he did by persuading one of his Libyans to desert to the Roman camp, and thence to Capua. He took this trouble to secure the safe delivery of his letter, because he was very much afraid that the Capuans, if they saw him departing, would consider that he despaired of them, and would therefore give up hope and surrender to the Romans. He wrote there-

Hannibal informs the Capuans of his purpose.

fore an explanation of his design, and sent the Libyan the day after, in order that the Capuans, being acquainted with the purpose of his departure, might go on courageously sustaining the siege.

When the news had arrived at Rome that Hannibal had encamped over against their lines, and was actually besieging their forces, there was a universal excitement and terror, from a feeling that the result of the impending battle would decide the whole war. Consequently, with one heart and soul, the citizens had all devoted themselves to sending out reinforcements and making preparations for this struggle. On their part, the Capuans were encouraged by the receipt of Hannibal's letter, and by thus learning the object of the Carthaginian movement, to stand by their determination, and to await the issue of this new hope. At the end of the fifth day, therefore, after his arrival on the ground, Hannibal ordered his men to take their supper as usual, and leave their watch-fires burning; and started with such secrecy, that none of the enemy knew what was happening. He took the road through Samnium, and marched at a great pace and without stopping, his skirmishers always keeping before him to reconnoitre and occupy all the posts along the route: and while those in Rome had their thoughts still wholly occupied with Capua and the campaign there, he crossed the Anio without being observed; and having arrived at a distance of not more than forty stades from Rome, there pitched his camp.

Excitement and activity at Rome.

Hannibal starts.

6. On this being known at Rome, the utmost confusion and terror prevailed among the inhabitants,—this movement of Hannibal's being as unexpected as it was sudden; for he had never been so close to the city before. At the same time their alarm was increased by the idea at once occurring to them, that he would not have ventured so near, if it were not that the armies at Capua were destroyed. Accordingly, the men at once went to line the walls, and the points of vantage in the defences of the town; while the women went round to the temples of the gods and implored their protection, sweeping

Terror at Rome.

the pavements of the temples with their hair: for this is their customary way of behaving when any serious danger comes upon their country. But just as Hannibal had encamped, and was intending to attempt the city itself next day, an extraordinary coincidence occurred which proved fortunate for the preservation of Rome.

The Consular levies fortunately being at Rome enable the Romans to make a counter-demonstration.

For Gnaeus Fulvius and Publius Sulpicius, having already enrolled one consular army, had bound the men with the usual oath to appear at Rome armed on that very day; and were also engaged on that day in drawing out the lists and testing the men for the other army:[1] whereby it so happened that a large number of men had been collected in Rome spontaneously in the very nick of time. These troops the Consuls boldly led outside the walls, and, entrenching themselves there, checked Hannibal's intended movement. For the Carthaginians were at first eager to advance, and were not altogether without hope that they would be able to take Rome itself by assault. But when they saw the enemy drawn up in order, and learnt before long from a prisoner what had happened, they abandoned the idea of attacking the city, and began devasting the country-side instead, and setting fire to the houses. In these first raids they collected an innumerable amount of booty, for the field of plunder upon which they were entered was one into which no one had ever expected an enemy to set foot.

Hannibal devastates the Campagna.

Hannibal starts on his return.

7. But presently, when the Consuls ventured to encamp within ten stades of him, Hannibal broke up his quarters before daylight. He did so for three reasons:—first, because he had collected an enormous booty; secondly, because he had given up all hope of taking Rome; and lastly, because he reckoned that the time had now come at which he expected, according to his original idea, that Appius would have learnt the danger threatening Rome, and would have raised the siege of Capua

[1] Or "legion," according to others. But as both Consuls are engaged in the business, it seems reasonable to refer it to the two consular armies of two legions each.

and come with his whole force to the relief of the city; or at any rate would hurry up with the greater part, leaving a detachment to carry on the siege. Publius had caused the bridges over the Anio to be broken down, and thus compelled Hannibal to get his army across by a ford; and he now attacked the Carthaginians as they were engaged in making the passage of the stream and caused them great distress. They were not able however to strike an important blow, owing to the number of Hannibal's cavalry, and the activity of the Numidians in every part of the field. But before retiring to their camp they wrested the greater part of the booty from them, and killed about three hundred men; and then, being convinced that the Carthaginians were beating a hasty retreat in a panic, they followed in their rear, keeping along the line of hills. At first Hannibal continued to march at a rapid pace, being anxious to meet the force which he expected; but at the end of the fifth day, being informed that Appius had not left the siege of Capua, he halted; and waiting for the enemy to come up, made an attack upon his camp before daylight, killed a large number of them, and drove the rest out of their camp. But when day broke, and he saw the Romans in a strong position upon a steep hill, to which they had retired, he decided not to continue his attack upon them; but marching through Daunia and Bruttium he appeared at Rhegium, so unexpectedly, that he was within an ace of capturing the city, and did cut off all who were out in the country; and during this excursion captured a very large number of the Rhegini.

The passage of the Anio.

Hannibal turns upon his pursuers.

8. It seems to me that the courage and determination both of the Carthaginians and Romans at this crisis were truly remarkable; and merit quite as much admiration as the conduct of Epaminondas, which I will describe here for the sake of pointing the comparison.

He reached Tegea with the allies, and when he saw that the Lacedaemonians with their own forces in full were come to Mantinea, and that their allies had mustered together in the same city, with the intention of offering the Thebans battle; having

The rapid march of Epaminondas to Sparta, and back again to Mantinea. See

Xenophon, *Hell.* 7, 5, 8 *sq.* B.C. 362.

given orders to his men to get their supper early, he led his army out immediately after nightfall, on the pretext of being anxious to seize certain posts with a view to the coming battle. But having impressed this idea upon the common soldiers, he led them along the road to Lacedaemon itself; and having arrived at the city about the third hour of his march, contrary to all expectation, and finding Sparta destitute of defenders, he forced his way right up to the market-place, and occupied the quarters of the town which slope down to the river. Then

A Cretan warns Agesilaus.

however a contretemps occurred: a deserter made his way into Mantinea and told Agesilaus what was going on. Assistance accordingly arrived just as the city was on the point of being taken; and Epaminondas was disappointed of his hope. But having caused his men to get their breakfast along the bank of the Eurotas, and recovered them from their fatigue, he started to march back again by the same road, calculating that, as the Lacedaemonians and their allies had come to the relief of Sparta, Mantinea would in its turn be left undefended: which turned out to be the case. So he exhorted the Thebans to exert themselves; and, after a rapid night march, arrived at Mantinea about mid-day, finding it entirely destitute of defenders.

But the Athenians, who were at that time zealously supporting the Lacedaemonians in their contest with the Thebans, had arrived in virtue of their treaty of alliance; and just as the Theban vanguard reached the temple of Poseidon, seven stades from the town, it happened that the Athenians showed themselves, by design, as if on the brow of the hill overhanging Mantinea. And when they saw them, the Mantineans who had been left behind at last ventured to man the wall and resist the attack of the Thebans. Therefore historians are justified in speaking with some dissatisfaction of these events,[1] when they say that the leader did everything which a good general could, but that, while conquering his enemies, Epaminondas was conquered by Fortune.

[1] That is "blaming Fortune or Providence." Schw. quotes Xenophon *Hellen* 7, 5, 12, *ἔξεστι μὲν τὸ θεῖον αἰτιᾶσθαι.*

9. Much the same remark applies to Hannibal. For who can refrain from regarding with respect and admiration a general capable of doing what he did? First he attempted by harassing the enemy with skirmishing attacks to raise the siege: having failed in this he made direct for Rome itself: baffled once more by a turn of fortune entirely independent of human calculation, he kept his pursuers in play,[1] and waited till the moment was ripe to see whether the besiegers of Capua stirred: and finally, without relaxing in his determination, swept down upon his enemies to their destruction, and all but depopulated Rhegium. One would be inclined however to judge the Romans to be superior to the Lacedaemonians at this crisis. For the Lacedaemonians rushed off *en masse* at the first message and relieved Sparta, but, as far as they were concerned, lost Mantinea. The Romans guarded their own city without breaking up the siege of Capua: on the contrary, they remained unshaken and firm in their purpose, and in fact from that time pressed the Capuans with renewed spirit.

I have not said this for the sake of making a panegyric on either the Romans or Carthaginians, whose great qualities I have already remarked upon more than once: but for the sake of those who are in office among the one or the other people, or who are in future times to direct the affairs of any state whatever; that by the memory, or actual contemplation, of exploits such as these they may be inspired with emulation. For in an adventurous and hazardous policy it often turns out that audacity was the truest safety and the finest sagacity;[2] and success or failure does not affect the credit and excellence of the original design, so long as the measures taken are the result of deliberate thought. . . .

[1] *συμπέμψαι*, a difficult word. See Strachan-Davidson's note. It seems to me to be opposed to *φυγεῖν* or some such idea. Hannibal was not in flight, but kept the enemy with him, as it were, in a kind of procession, until the moment for striking.

[2] There is some word wanting in the text here which has been variously supplied. I have ventured to conjecture *τὰ γὰρ δοκοῦντα παράβολον κ.τ.λ.*, and to translate accordingly. for it is the boldness and apparent rashness of Hannibal's movement that Polybius seems to wish to commend.

TARENTUM

When the Romans were besieging Tarentum, Bomilcar the admiral of the Carthaginian fleet came to its relief with a very large force; and being unable to afford efficient aid to those in the town, owing to the strict blockade maintained by the Romans, without meaning to do so he used up more than he brought; and so after having been constrained by entreaties and large promises to come, he was afterwards forced at the earnest supplication of the people to depart. . . .

The Carthaginian fleet invited from Sicily to relieve Tarentum does more harm than good, and departs to the joy of the people, B.C. 211. Livy, 26, 20.

THE SPOILS OF SYRACUSE

10. A city is not really adorned by what is brought from without, but by the virtue of its own inhabitants. . . .

The Romans, then, decided to transfer these things to their own city and to leave nothing behind. Whether they were right in doing so, and consulted their true interests or the reverse, is a matter admitting of much discussion; but I think the balance of argument is in favour of believing it to have been wrong then, and wrong now. If such had been the works by which they had exalted their country, it is clear that there would have been some reason in transferring thither the things by which they had become great. But the fact was that, while leading lives of the greatest simplicity themselves, as far as possible removed from the luxury and extravagance which these things imply, they yet conquered the men who had always possessed them in the greatest abundance and of the finest quality. Could there have been a greater mistake than theirs? Surely it would be an incontestable error for a people to abandon the habits of the conquerors and adopt those of the conquered; and at the same time involve itself in that jealousy which is the most dangerous concomitant of excessive prosperity. For the looker-on never congratulates those who take what belongs

Syracuse was taken in the autumn, B.C. 212. "The ornaments of the city, statues and pictures were taken to Rome." Livy, 25, 40, cp. 26, 21.

to others, without a feeling of jealousy mingling with his pity for the losers. But suppose such prosperity to go on increasing, and a people to accumulate into its own hands all the possessions of the rest of the world, and moreover to invite in a way the plundered to share in the spectacle they present, in that case surely the mischief is doubled. For it is no longer a case of the spectators pitying their neighbours, but themselves, as they recall the ruin of their own country. Such a sight produces an outburst, not of jealousy merely, but of rage against the victors. For the reminder of their own disaster serves to enhance their hatred of the authors of it. To sweep the gold and silver, however, into their own coffers was perhaps reasonable; for it was impossible for them to aim at universal empire without crippling the means of the rest of the world, and securing the same kind of resources for themselves. But they might have left in their original sites things that had nothing to do with material wealth; and thus at the same time have avoided exciting jealousy, and raised the reputation of their country: adorning it, not with pictures and statues, but with dignity of character and greatness of soul. I have spoken thus much as a warning to those who take upon themselves to rule over others, that they may not imagine that, when they pillage cities, the misfortunes of others are an honour to their own country. The Romans, however, when they transferred these things to Rome, used such of them as belonged to individuals to increase the splendour of private establishments, and such as belonged to the state to adorn the city. . . .

SPAIN

11. The leaders of the Carthaginians, though they had conquered their enemies, could not control themselves: and having made up their minds that they had put an end to the Roman war, they began quarrelling with each other, finding continual subjects of dispute through the innate covetousness and ambition of the Phoenician character; among whom Hasdrubal, son of Gesco, pushed his authority to such a pitch of iniquity as to

The two Scipios fall in B.C. 212.

Hasdrubal Gisconis tertius Cartha-

giniensium dux. Livy, 24, 41, cp. 25, 37.

demand a large sum of money from Andobales, the most faithful of all their Iberian friends, who had some time before lost his chieftainship for the sake of the Carthaginians, and had but recently recovered it through his loyalty to them. When Andobales, trusting to his long fidelity to Carthage, refused this demand, Hasdrubal got up a false charge against him and compelled him to give up his daughters as hostages. . . .

ON THE ART OF COMMANDING ARMIES

12. The chances and accidents that attend military expeditions require great circumspection; and it is possible to provide for all of them with precision, provided that a man gives his mind to the conduct of his plan of campaign. Now that fewer operations in war are carried out openly and by mere force, than by stratagem and the skilful use of opportunity, any one that chooses may readily learn from the history of the past. And again that operations depending on the choice of opportunity oftener fail than succeed is easily proved from experience. Nor can there be any doubt that the greater part of such failures are due to the folly or carelessness of the leaders. It is time therefore to inquire into the rules of this art of strategy.

Such things as occur in campaigns without having been calculated upon in any way we must not speak of as operations, but as accidents or casualties. It is the conduct of a campaign in accordance with an exact plan that I am to set forth: omitting all such things as do not fall under a scientfic rule, and have no fixed design.

The points of inherent importance in the conduct of a campaign,—time, place, secrecy, code of signals, agents, and method.

13. Every operation requires a time fixed for its commencement, a period and place for its execution, secrecy, definite signals, persons by whom and with whom it is to be executed, and a settled plan for conducting it. It is evident that the man who has rightly provided for each of these details will not fail in the ultimate result, while he who has neglected any single one of them will fail in the whole. Such is the order of nature, that one insignificant

circumstance will suffice for failure, while for success rigid perfection of every detail is barely enough.

Leaders then should neglect no single point in conducting such expeditions.

Now the head and front of such precautions is silence; and not to allow either joy at the appearance of an unexpected hope, or fear, or familiarity, or natural affection, to induce a man to communicate his plans to any one unconcerned, but to impart it to those and those alone without whom it is impossible to complete his plan; and not even to them a moment sooner than necessary, but only when the exigencies of the particular service make it inevitable. It is necessary, moreover, not only to be silent with the tongue, but much more so in the mind. For it has happened to many generals before now, while preserving an inviolable silence, to betray their thoughts either by the expression of their countenances or by their actions.

Things necessary. 1. Silence.

The second requisite is to know accurately the conditions under which marches by day or night may be performed, and the distances to which they can extend; and not only marches on land, but also voyages by sea.

2 Knowledge of the capabilities of the force in moving.

The third and most important is to have some knowledge of the seasons, and to be able to adapt the design to them.

Nor again is the selection of the ground for the operation to be regarded as unimportant, since it often happens that it is this which makes what seems impossible possible, and what seemed possible impossible.

Finally there must be no neglect of the subject of signals and counter signals; and the choice of persons by whom and with whom the operation is to be carried out.

3. Care in concerting signals.

4. Care in selecting men.

14. Of these points some are learnt by experience, some from history, and others by the study of scientific strategy. It is a most excellent thing too that the general should have a personal knowledge both of the roads, and the locality which he has to reach, and its natural features; as well as of the persons by

5. Knowledge of localities.

whom and with whom he is to act. If that is not possible, the next best thing is that he should make careful inquiries and not trust just any one: and men who undertake to act as guides to such places should always deposit security with those whom they are conducting.

These, and other points like them, it is perhaps possible that leaders may learn sufficiently from the mere study of strategy, whether practical or in books. But scientific investigation requires scientific processes and demonstrations, especially in astronomy and geometry; the working out of which is not much to our present point, though their results are important, and may contribute largely to the success of such undertakings.

6. Accurate knowledge of natural phenomena enabling a general to make accurate calculation of time.

The most important operation in astronomy is the calculation of the lengths of the days and nights. If these had been uniform it would not have been a matter requiring any study, but the knowledge would have been common to all the world: since however they not only differ with each other but also with themselves, it is plainly necessary to be acquainted with the increase and diminution of both the one and the other. How can a man calculate a march, and the distance practicable in a day or in a night, if he is unacquainted with the variation of these periods of time? In fact nothing can be done up to time without this knowledge,—it is inevitable otherwise that a man should be sometimes too late and sometimes too soon. And these operations are the only ones in which being too soon is a worse fault than being too late. For the general who overstays the proper hour of action only misses his chance, since he can find out that he has done so before he arrives, and so get off safely: but he that anticipates the hour is detected when he comes up; and so not only misses his immediate aim, but runs a risk of ruining himself altogether.

15. In all human undertakings opportuneness is the most important thing, but especially in operations of war. Therefore a general must have at his fingers' ends the season of the summer and winter solstice, the equinoxes, and the periods between them in which the days and nights increase and diminish. For it is by this knowledge alone that he can

compute the distance that can be done whether by sea or land. Again, he must necessarily understand the subdivisions both of the day and the night, in order to know at what hour to order the reveillé, or the march out; for the end cannot be attained unless the beginning be rightly taken. As for the periods of the day, they may be observed by the shadows or by the sun's course, and the quarter of the heaven in which it has arrived, but it is difficult to do the same for the night, unless a man is familiar with the phenomenon of the twelve signs of the Zodiac, and their law and order: and this is easy to those who have studied astronomy. For since, though the nights are unequal in length, at least six of the signs of the Zodiac are nevertheless above the horizon every night, it is plain that in the same portions of every night equal portions of the twelve signs of the Zodiac rise. Now as it is known what portion of the sphere is occupied by the sun during the day, it is evident that when he has set the arc subtended by the diameter of his arc must rise. Therefore the length of the night is exactly commensurate with the portion of the Zodiac which appears above the horizon after sunset. And, given that we know the number and size of the signs of the Zodiac, the corresponding divisions of the night are also known. If however the nights be cloudy, the moon must be watched, since owing to its size its light as a general rule is always visible, at whatsoever point in the heaven it may be. The hour may be guessed sometimes by observing the time and place of its rising, or again of its setting, if you only have sufficient acquaintance with this phenomenon to be familiar with the daily variation of its rising. And the law which it too follows admits of being easily observed; for its revolution is limited by the period of one month, which serves as a model to which all subsequent revolutions conform.

The divisions of the day, of the night.

16. And here one may mention with admiration that Homer represents Ulysses, that truest type of a leader of men, taking observations of the stars, not only to direct his voyages, but his operations on land also. For such accidents as baffle expectation,

The example of Ulysses. See Odyss. 5, 270 *sq.*

and are incapable of being accurately reckoned upon, are quite sufficient to bring us to great and frequent distress, for instance, downpours of rain and rise of torrents, excessive frosts and snows, misty and cloudy weather, and other things like these;—but if we also neglect to provide for those which can be foreseen, is it not likely that we shall have ourselves to thank for frequent failures? None of these means then must be neglected, if we wish to avoid those errors into which many others are said to have fallen, as well as the particular generals whom I am about to mention by way of examples.

Aratus fails at Cynaetha.

17. When Aratus, the Strategus of the Achaean league, attempted to take Cynaetha by treachery, he arranged a day with those in the town who were co-operating with him, on which he was to arrive on the banks of the river which flows past Cynaetha, and to remain there quietly with his forces: while the party inside the town about midday, when they got an opportunity, were to send out one of their men quietly, wrapped in a cloak, and order him to take his stand upon a tomb agreed upon in front of the city; the rest were to attack the officers who were accustomed to guard the gate while taking their siesta. This being done, the Achaeans were to rise from their ambush and to make all haste to occupy the gate. These arrangements made, and the time having come, Aratus arrived; and having concealed himself down by the river, waited there for the signal. But about an hour before noon, a man, whose profession it was to keep a fine kind of sheep near the town, wishing to ask some business question of the shepherd, came out of the gate with his cloak on, and standing upon the same tomb looked round to find the shepherd. Whereupon Aratus, thinking that the signal had been given, hurried with all his men as fast as he could towards the gate. But the gate being hurriedly closed by the guard, owing to no preparations having yet been made by the party in the town, the result was that Aratus not only failed in his attempt but was the cause of the worst misfortunes to his partisans. For being thus detected they were dragged forward and put to death. What is one to say was the cause of this catastrophe? Surely that the general arranged only for a single signal, and being then

quite young had no experience of the accuracy secured by double signals and counter-signals. On so small a point in war does the success or failure of an operation turn.

18. Again the Spartan Cleomenes, when proposing to take Megalopolis by a stratagem, arranged with the guards of that part of the wall near what is called the Cavern to come out with all their men in the third watch, the hour at which his partisans were on duty on the wall; but not having taken into consideration the fact that at the time of the rising of the Pleiads the nights are very short, he started his army from Sparta about sunset. The result was that he was not able to get there in time, but being overtaken by daybreak, made a rash and ill-considered attempt to carry the town, and was repulsed with considerable loss and the danger of a complete overthrow. Now if he had, in accordance with his arrangement, hit the proper time, and led in his men while his partisans were in command of the entrance, he would not have failed in his attempt.

Cleomenes. See 2, 55.

May 12.

Similarly, once more, King Philip, as I have already stated, when carrying on an intrigue in the city of Meliteia, made a mistake in two ways. The ladders which he brought were too short for their purpose, and he mistook the time. For having arranged to arrive about midnight, when every one was fast asleep, he started from Larissa and arrived in the territory of Meliteia too early, and was neither able to halt, for fear of his arrival being announced in the city, nor to get back again without being discovered. Being compelled therefore to continue his advance, he arrived at the city while the inhabitants were still awake. Consequently he could neither carry the wall by an escalade, because of the insufficient length of the ladders; nor enter by the gate, because it was too early for his partisans inside to help him. Finally, he did nothing but irritate the people of the town; and, after losing a considerable number of his own men, retired unsuccessful and covered with disgrace; having only given a warning to the rest of the world to distrust him and be on their guard against him.

Philip's attack on Meliteia. See 5, 97.

19. Again Nicias, the general of the Athenians, had it in

his power to have saved the army besieging Syracuse, and had selected the proper time of the night for escaping the observation of the enemy, and retiring to a place of safety. And then because the moon was eclipsed, regarding it superstitiously as of evil portent, he stopped the army from starting. Thanks to this it came about that, when he started the next day, the enemy had obtained information of his intention, and army and generals alike fell into the hands of the Syracusans. Yet if he had asked about this from men acquainted with such phenomena, he might not only have avoided missing his opportunity for such an absurd reason, but have also used the occurrence for his own benefit owing to the ignorance of the enemy. For the ignorance of their neighbours contributes more than anything else to the success of the instructed.

Nicias, B.C. 413. Thucyd. 7. 50.

Such then are examples of the necessity of studying celestial phenomena. But as for securing the proper length of scaling ladders, the following is the method of making the calculation. Suppose the height of the wall to be given by one of the conspirators within, the measurement required for the ladders is evident; for example, if the height of the wall is ten feet or any other unit, the ladders must be full twelve; and the interval between the wall and the foot of the ladder must be half the length of the ladder, that the ladders may not break under the weight of those mounting if they are set farther away, nor be too steep to be safe if set nearer the perpendicular. But supposing it not to be possible to measure or get near the wall: the height of any object which rises perpendicularly on its base can be taken by those who choose to study mathematics.

The method of judging of the length necessary for scaling ladders.

20. Once more, therefore, those who wish to succeed in military projects and operations must have studied geometry, not with professional completeness, but far enough to have a comprehension of proportion and equations. For it is not only in such cases that these are necessary, but also for raising the scale of the divisions of a camp. For sometimes the problem is to change the entire form of the camp, and yet to keep the same proportion between all the parts included: at

other times to keep the same shape in the parts, and to increase or diminish the whole area on which the camp stands, adding or subtracting from all proportionally. On which point I have already spoken in more elaborate detail in my Notes on Military Tactics For I do not think that any one will reasonably object to me that I add a great burden to strategy, in urging on those who endeavour to acquire it the study of astronomy and geometry: for, while rather rejecting all that is superfluous in these studies, and brought in for show and talk, as well as all idea of enjoining their prosecution beyond the point of practical utility, I am most earnest and eager for so much as is barely necessary. For it would be strange if those who aim at the sciences of dancing and flute-playing should study the preparatory sciences of rhythms and music, (and the like might be said of the pursuits of the palaestra), from the belief that the final attainment of each of these sciences requires the assistance of the latter; while the students of strategy are to feel aggrieved if they find that they require subsidiary sciences up to a certain point. That would mean that men practising common and inferior arts are more diligent and energetic than those who resolve to excel in the best and most dignified subject; which no man of sense would admit. . . .

THE COMPUTATION OF THE SIZE OF CITIES

21. Most people calculate the area merely from the length of the circumference [of towns or camps]. Accordingly, when one says that the city of Megalopolis has a circuit of fifty stades, and that of Sparta forty-eight, but that Sparta is twice the size of Megalopolis, they look upon the assertion as incredible. And if one, by way of increasing the difficulty, were to say that a city or camp may have a circuit of forty stades and yet be double the size of one having a perimeter of a hundred, the statement would utterly puzzle them. The reason of this is that we do not remember the lessons in geometry taught us at school. I was led to make these remarks because it is not only common people, but actually

Sparta and Megalopolis.

some statesmen and military commanders, who have puzzled themselves sometimes by wondering whether it were possible that Sparta should be bigger, and that too by a great deal, than Megalopolis, while having a shorter circuit; and at other times by trying to conjecture the number of men by considering the mere length of a camp's circuit. A similar mistake is also made in pronouncing as to the number of the inhabitants of cities. For most people imagine that cities in which the ground is broken and hilly contain more houses than a flat site. But the fact is not so; because houses are built at right angles not to sloping foundations but to the plains below, upon which the hills themselves are excrescences. And this admits of a proof within the intelligence of a child. For if one would imagine houses on slopes to be raised until they were of the same height; it is evident that the plane of the roofs of the houses thus united will be equal and parallel to the plane underlying the hills and foundations.

So much for those who aspire to be leaders and statesmen and are yet ignorant and puzzled about such facts as these. . . .

Those who do not enter upon undertakings with good will and zeal cannot be expected to give real help when the time comes to act. . . .

THE HANNIBALIAN WAR, B.C. 211

Such being the position of the Romans and Carthaginians, Fortune continually oscillating between the two, we may say with the poet

"Pain hard by joy possessed the souls of each."[1] . . .

There is profound truth in the observation which I have often made, that it is impossible to grasp or get a complete view of the fairest of all subjects of contemplation, the tendency of history as a whole, from writers of partial histories. . . .

THE CHARACTER OF HANNIBAL

22. Of all that befell the Romans and Carthaginians, good or bad, the cause was one man and one mind,—Hannibal.

[1] Cp. Homer, *Odyss.* 19, 471.

For it is notorious that he managed the Italian campaigns in person, and the Spanish by the agency of the elder of his brothers, Hasdrubal, and subsequently by that of Mago, the leaders who killed the two Roman generals in Spain about the same time. Again, he conducted the Sicilian campaign at first through Hippocrates and afterwards through Myttonus[1] the Libyan. So also in Greece and Illyria: and, by brandishing before their faces the dangers arising from these latter places, he was enabled to distract the attention of the Romans, thanks to his understanding with Philip. So great and wonderful is the influence of a Man, and a mind duly fitted by original constitution for any undertaking within the reach of human powers.

But since the position of affairs has brought us to an inquiry into the genius of Hannibal, the occasion seems to me to demand that I should explain in regard to him the peculiarities of his character which have been especially the subject of controversy. Some regard him as having been extraordinarily cruel, some exceedingly grasping of money. But to speak the truth of him, or of any person engaged in public affairs, is not easy. Some maintain that men's real natures are brought out by their circumstances, and that they are detected when in office, or as some say when ἀρχὴ ἀνδρα δείξει. in misfortunes, though they have up to that time completely maintained their secrecy. I, on the contrary, do not regard this as a sound dictum. For I think that men in these circumstances are compelled, not only occasionally but frequently, either by the suggestions of friends or the complexity of affairs, to speak and act contrary to their real principles. Bias, in Aristot. Eth. 5, 1

23. And there are many proofs of this to be found in past history if any one will give the necessary attention. Is it not universally stated by the historians that Agathocles, tyrant of Sicily, after having the reputation of extreme cruelty in his original measures for the establishment of his dynasty, when he had once become convinced that his power over the Siceliots was firmly established, is considered to have become Examples to the contrary. 1. Agathocles.

[1] Livy, 25, 40, calls him Mutines.

the most humane and mild of rulers? Again, was not
2. Cleomenes. Cleomenes of Sparta a most excellent king, a most cruel tyrant, and then again as a private individual most obliging and benevolent? And yet it is not reasonable to suppose the most opposite dispositions to exist in the same nature. They are compelled to change with the changes of circumstances: and so some rulers often display to the world a disposition as opposite as possible to their true nature. Therefore the natures of men not only are not brought out by such things, but on the contrary are rather obscured. The same effect is produced also not only in commanders, despots, and kings, but in states also, by the suggestions of
3. Athens. friends. For instance, you will find the Athenians responsible for very few tyrannical acts, and of many kindly and noble ones, while Aristeides and Pericles were at the head of the state: but quite the reverse when Cleon and Chares were so. And when the Lacedae-
4. Sparta. monians were supreme in Greece, all the measures taken by King Cleombrotus were conceived in the interests of their allies, but those by Agesilaus not so. The characters of states therefore vary
5. Philip V. with the variations of their leaders. King Philip again, when Taurion and Demetrius were acting with him, was most impious in his conduct, but when Aratus or Chrysogonus, most humane.

24. The case of Hannibal seems to me to be on a par
Hannibal mastered by circumstances with these. His circumstances were so extraordinary and shifting, his closest friends so widely different, that it is exceedingly difficult to estimate his character from his proceedings in Italy. What those circumstances suggested to him may easily be understood from what I have already said, and what is immediately to follow; but it is not right to omit the suggestions made by his friends either, especially as this matter may be rendered sufficiently clear by one instance of the advice offered him. At the time that Hannibal was meditating the march from Iberia to Italy with his army, he was confronted with the extreme difficulty of providing food and securing provisions, both because the journey

was thought to be of insuperable length, and because the barbarians that lived in the intervening country were so numerous and savage. It appears that at that time this difficulty frequently came on for discussion at the council; and that one of his friends, called Hannibal Monomachus, gave it as his opinion that there was one and only one way by which it was possible to get as far as Italy. Upon Hannibal bidding him speak out, he said that they must teach the army to eat human flesh, and make them accustomed to it. Hannibal could say nothing against the boldness and effectiveness of the idea, but was unable to persuade himself or his friends to entertain it. It is this man's acts in Italy that they say were attributed to Hannibal, to maintain the accusation of cruelty, as well as such as were the result of circumstances.

His cruelty

25. Fond of money indeed he does seem to have been to a conspicuous degree, and to have had a friend of the same character—Mago, who commanded in Bruttium. That account I got from the Carthaginians themselves; for natives know best not only which way the wind lies, as the proverb has it, but the characters also of their fellow-countrymen. But I heard a still more detailed story from Massanissa, who maintained the charge of money-loving against all Carthaginians generally, but especially against Hannibal and Mago called the Samnite. Among other stories, he told me that these two men had arranged a most generous subdivision of operations between each other from their earliest youth; and though they had each taken a very large number of cities in Iberia and Italy by force or fraud, they had never taken part in the same operation together; but had always schemed against each other, more than against the enemy, in order to prevent the one being with the other at the taking of a city: that they might neither quarrel in consequence of things of this sort, nor have to divide the profit on the ground of their equality of rank.

His avarice.

26. The influence of friends then, and still more that of circumstances, in doing violence to and changing the natural character of Hannibal, is shown by what I have narrated and

will be shown by what I have to narrate. For as soon as Capua fell into the hands of the Romans the other cities naturally became restless, and began to look round for opportunities and pretexts for revolting back again to Rome. It was then that Hannibal seems to have been at his lowest point of distress and despair. For neither was he able to keep a watch upon all the cities so widely removed from each other,—while he remained entrenched at one spot, and the enemy were manœuvering against him with several armies,—nor could he divide his force into many parts; for he would have put an easy victory into the hands of the enemy by becoming inferior to them in numbers, and finding it impossible to be personally present at all points. Wherefore he was obliged to completely abandon some of the cities, and withdraw his garrisons from others: being afraid lest, in the course of the revolutions which might occur, he should lose his own soldiers as well. Some cities again he made up his mind to treat with treacherous violence, removing their inhabitants to other cities, and giving their property up to plunder; in consequence of which many were enraged with him, and accused him of impiety or cruelty. For the fact was that these movements were accompanied by robberies of money, murders, and violence, on various pretexts at the hands of the outgoing or incoming soldiers in the cities, because they always supposed that the inhabitants that were left behind were on the verge of turning over to the enemy. It is, therefore, very difficult to express an opinion on the natural character of Hannibal, owing to the influence exercised on it by the counsel of friends and the force of circumstances. The prevailing notion about him, however, at Carthage was that he was greedy of money, at Rome that he was cruel.[1] . . .

Effect of the fall of Capua, B C. 211.

[1] See 3, 86, note. Cp. Cicero de Am § 8, cum duobus ducibus de imperio in Italia decertatum est, Pyrrho et Annibale Ab altero propter probitatem ejus non nimis alienos animos habemus; alterum *propter crudelitatem semper haec civitas oderit*

AGRIGENTUM

27. The city of Agrigentum is not only superior to most cities in the particulars I have mentioned, but above all in beauty and elaborate ornamentation. It stands within eighteen stades of the sea, so that it participates in every advantage from that quarter; while its circuit of fortification is particularly strong both by nature and art. For its wall is placed on a rock, steep and precipitous, on one side naturally, on the other made so artificially. And it is enclosed by rivers: for along the south side runs the river of the same name as the town, and along the west and south-west side the river called Hypsas. The citadel overlooks the city exactly at the south-east, girt on the outside by an impassable ravine, and on the inside with only one approach from the town. On the top of it is a temple of Athene and of Zeus Atabyrius as at Rhodes: for as Agrigentum was founded by the Rhodians, it is natural that this deity should have the same appellation as at Rhodes. The city is sumptuously adorned in other respects also with temples and colonnades. The temple of Zeus Olympius is still unfinished, but in its plan and dimensions it seems to be inferior to no temple whatever in all Greece. . . .

Agrigentum taken by Marcus Valerius Laevinus, late in the year B.C. 210, *jam magna parte anni circumacta.* Livy, 26, 40.

Marcus Valerius persuaded these refugees, on giving them a pledge for the security of their lives, to leave Sicily and go to Italy, on condition that they should receive pay from the people of Rhegium for plundering Bruttium, and retain all booty obtained from hostile territory. . . .

The treatment of the refugees and desperadoes who had collected at Agathyrna in Sicily. See Livy, 26, 40 *fin.*

GREECE

Speech of Chlaeneas, the Aetolian, at Sparta. In the autumn of B.C. 211 *the Consul-designate, M. Valerius Laevinus, induced the Aetolians, Scopas being their Strategus, to form an alliance with them against Philip. The treaty, as*

finally concluded, embraced also the Eleans, Lacedaemonians, King Attalus of Pergamum, the Thracian King Pleuratus, and the Illyrian Scerdilaidas. A mission was sent from Aetolia to persuade the Lacedaemonians to join. See Livy, 26, 24.

"That the Macedonian supremacy, men of Sparta, was the beginning of slavery to the Greeks, I am persuaded that no one will venture to deny; and you may satisfy yourselves by looking at it thus. There was a league of Greeks living in the parts towards Thrace who were colonists from Athens and Chalcis, of which the most conspicuous and powerful was the city of Olynthus. Having enslaved and made an example of this town, Philip not only became master of the Thraceward cities, but reduced Thessaly also to his authority by the terror which he had thus set up. Not long after this he conquered the Athenians in a pitched battle, and used his success with magnanimity, not from any wish to benefit the Athenians—far from it, but in order that his favourable treatment of them might induce the other states to submit to him voluntarily. The reputation of your city was still such that it seemed likely, that, if a proper opportunity arose, it would recover its supremacy in Greece. Accordingly, without waiting for any but the slightest pretext, Philip came with his army and cut down everything standing in your fields, and destroyed the houses with fire. And at last, after destroying towns and open country alike, he assigned part of your territory to the Argives, part to Tegea and Megalopolis, and part to the Messenians: determined to benefit every people in spite of all justice, on the sole condition of their injuring you. Alexander succeeded Philip on the throne, and how he destroyed Thebes, because he thought that it contained a spark of Hellenic life, however small, you all I think know well.

B.C. 347.

Battle of Chaeronea, B.C. 338.

Succession of Alexander the Great, B.C. 336.

Destruction of Thebes, B.C. 335.

29. "And why need I speak in detail of how the successors of this king have treated the Greeks? For surely there is no man living, so uninterested in public affairs, as not to have heard how Antipater in his victory at Lamia treated the un-

happy Athenians, as well as the other Greeks; and how he went so far in violence and brutality as to institute man-hunters, and send them to the various cities to catch all who had ever spoken against, or in any way annoyed, the royal family of Macedonia: of whom some were dragged by force from the temples, and others from the very altars, and put to death with torture, and others who escaped were forced to leave Greece entirely; nor had they any refuge save the Aetolian nation alone. For the Aetolians were the only people in Greece who withstood Antipater in behalf of those unjustly defrauded of safety to their lives: they alone faced the invasion of Brennus and his barbarian army: and they alone came to your aid when called upon, with a determination to assist you in regaining your ancestral supremacy in Greece.[1] Who again is ignorant of the deeds of Cassander, Demetrius, and Antigonus Gonatas? For owing to their recency the knowledge of them still remains distinct. Some of them by introducing garrisons, and others by implanting despots in the cities, effectually secured that every state should share the infamous brand of slavery. But passing by all these I will now come to the last Antigonus,[2] lest any of you, viewing his policy unsuspiciously, should consider that you are under an obligation to the Macedonians. For it was with no purpose of saving the Achaeans that he undertook the war against you, nor from any dislike of the tyranny of Cleomenes inducing him to free the Lacedaemonians. If any man among you holds this opinion, he must be simple indeed. No! It was because he saw that his own power would not be secure if you got the rule of the Peloponnese; and because he saw that Cleomenes was of a nature well calculated to secure this object, and that fortune was splendidly seconding your efforts, that he came in a tumult of fear and jealousy, not to help Peloponnesians, but to destroy your hopes and abase your

Battle of Crannon, ending the Lamian war, 7th Aug., B.C. 322.

Defeat of Brennus at Delphi, B.C. 279 Pausan. 10, 15; 20-23

[1] The paragraph "For the Aetolians . . . in Greece," follows "the Messenians" in ch. 30, in the Greek texts. But it is evidently out of place there, and falls naturally into this position.

[2] Antigonus Doson.

power. Therefore you do not owe the Macedonians so much gratitude for not destroying your city when they had taken it, as hostility and hatred, for having more than once already stood in your way, when you were strong enough to grasp the supremacy of Greece.

30. "Again, what need to speak more on the wickedness of Philip? For of his impiety towards the gods his outrages on the temples at Thermus are a sufficient proof; and of his cruelty towards man, his perfidy and treachery to the Messenians. Philip V.

"So much for the past. But as to the present resolution before you, it is in a way necessary to draft it, and vote on it, as though you were deciding on war, and yet in real truth not to regard it as a war. For it is impossible for the Achaeans, beaten as they are, to damage your territory: but I imagine that they will be only too thankful to heaven if they can but protect their own, when they find themselves surrounded by war with Eleans and Messenians as allied to us, and with ourselves at the same time. And Philip, I am persuaded, will soon desist from his attack, when involved in a war by land with Aetolians, and by sea with Rome and King Attalus. The future may be easily conjectured from the past. For if he always failed to subdue Aetolians when they were his only enemies, can we conceive that he will be able to support the war if all these combine?

31. "I have said thus much with the deliberate purpose of showing you that you are not hampered by previous engagements, but are entirely free in your deliberations as to which you ought to join—Aetolians or Macedonians. If you are under an earlier engagement, and have already made up your minds on these points, what room is there for further argument? For if you had made the alliance now existing between yourselves and us, previous to the good services done you by Antigonus, there might perhaps have been some reason for questioning whether it were right to neglect an old treaty in gratitude for recent favours. But since it was subsequent to this much vaunted freedom and security given you by Antigonus, and with which they are perpetually taunting you, that, after deliberation and frequent considera-

tion as to which of the two you ought to join, you decided to combine with us Aetolians; and have actually exchanged pledges of fidelity with us, and have fought by our side in the late war against Macedonia, how can any one entertain a doubt on the subject any longer? For the obligations of kindness between you and Antigonus and Philip were cancelled then. It now remains for you to point out some subsequent wrong done you by Aetolians, or subsequent favour by Macedonians: or if neither of these exist, on what grounds are you now, at the instance of the very men to whom you justly refused to listen formerly, when no obligation existed, about to undo treaties and oaths — the strongest bonds of fidelity existing among mankind."

Such was the conclusion of what was considered a very cogent speech by Chlaeneas.

32. After him the ambassador of the Acarnanians, Lyciscus, came forward: and at first he paused, seeing the multitude talking to each other about the last speech; but when at last silence was obtained, he began his speech as follows:—

"I and my colleagues, men of Sparta, have been sent to you by the common league of the Acarnanians; and as we have always shared in the same prospects as the Macedonians, we consider that this mission also is common to us and them. For just as on the field of war, owing to the superiority and magnitude of the Macedonian force, our safety is involved in their valour; so, in the controversies of diplomacy, our interests are inseparable from the rights of the Macedonians. Now Chlaeneas in the peroration of his address gave a summary of the obligations existing between the Aetolians and yourselves. For he said, 'If subsequent to your making the alliance with them any fresh injury or offence had been committed by Aetolians, or any kindness done by Macedonians, the present proposal ought properly to be discussed as a fresh start; but that if, nothing of the sort having taken place, we believe that by quoting the services of Antigonus, and your former decrees, we shall be able to annul existing oaths and treaties, we are the greatest simpletons in the world.' To this

Speech of Lyciscus, envoy from Acarnania, which country was to fall to the Aetolians by the proposed new treaty. See Livy, 26, 24.

I reply by acknowledging that I must indeed be the most foolish of men, and that the arguments I am about to put forward are indeed futile, if, as he maintains, nothing fresh has happened, and Greek affairs are in precisely the same position as before. But if exactly the reverse be the case, as I shall clearly prove in the course of my speech,—then I imagine that I shall be shown to give you some salutary advice, and Chlaeneas to be quite in the wrong. We are come, then, expressly because we are convinced that it is needful for us to speak on this very point: namely, to point out to you that it is at once your duty and your interest, after hearing of the evils threatening Greece, to adopt if possible a policy excellent and worthy of yourselves by uniting your prospects with ours; or if that cannot be, at least to abstain from this movement for the present.

33. "But since the last speaker has ventured to go back to ancient times for his denunciations of the Macedonian royal family, I feel it incumbent on me also to say a few words first on these points, to remove the misconception of those who have been carried away by his words.

"Chlaenaes said, then, that Philip son of Amyntas became master of Thessaly by the ruin of Olynthus. But I conceive that not only the Thessalians, but the other Greeks also, were preserved by Philip's means. For at the time when Onomarchus and Philomelus, in defiance of religion and law, seized Delphi and made themselves masters of the treasury of the god, who is there among you who does not know that they collected such a mighty force as no Greek dared any longer face? Nay, along with this violation of religion, they were within an ace of becoming lords of all Greece also. At that crisis Philip volunteered his assistance; destroyed the tyrants, secured the temple, and became the author of freedom to the Greeks, as is testified even to posterity by the facts. For Philip was unanimously elected general-in-chief by land and sea, not, as my opponent ventured to assert, as one who had wronged Thessaly; but on the ground of his being a benefactor of Greece: an honour which no one had previously obtained.

Sacred war, B.C. 357-346. Onomarchus killed near the gulf of Pagasae. B.C. 352. See Diodor. 16, 32-35.

Philip elected generalissimo against Persia in the congress of allies at Corinth, B.C. 338.

'Ay, but,' he says, 'Philip came with an armed force into Laconia.' Yes, but it was not of his own choice, as you know: he reluctantly consented to do so, after repeated invitations and appeals by the Peloponnesians, under the name of their friend and ally. And when he did come, pray observe, Chlaeneas, how he behaved. Though he could have availed himself of the wishes of the neighbouring states for the destruction of these men's territory and the humiliation of their city, and have won much gratitude too by his act, he by no means lent himself to such a policy; but, by striking terror into the one and the other alike, he compelled both parties to accommodate their differences in a congress, to the common benefit of all: not putting himself forward as arbitrator of the points in dispute, but appointing a joint board of arbitration selected from all Greece. Is that a proceeding which deserves to be held up to reproach and execration?

34. "Again, you bitterly denounced Alexander, because, when he believed himself to be wronged, he punished Thebes: but of his having exacted vengeance of the Persians for their outrages on all the Greeks you made no mention at all; nor of his having released us all in common from heavy miseries, by enslaving the barbarians, and depriving them of the supplies which they used for the ruin of the Greeks,—sometimes pitting the Athenians against the ancestors of these gentlemen here, at another the Thebans; nor finally of his having subjected Asia to the Greeks.

Alexander's services to Greece.

"As for Alexander's successors how had you the audacity to mention them? They were indeed, according to the circumstances of the time, on many occasions the authors of good to some and of harm to others: for which perhaps others might be allowed to bear them a grudge. But to *you* Aetolians it is in no circumstance open to do so,—you who have never been the authors of anything good to any one, but of mischief to many and on many occasions! Who was it that called in Antigonus son of Demetrius to the partition of the Achaean league? Who was it that made a sworn treaty with Alexander of Epirus for the enslaving and dismembering

The Diadochi.

The Aetolian policy.

of Acarnania? Was it not you? What nation ever sent out military commanders duly accredited of the sort that you have? Men that ventured to do violence to the sanctity of asylum itself! Timaeus violated the sanctuary of Poseidon on Taenarum, and of Artemis at Lusi. Pharylus and Polycritus plundered, the former the sacred enclosure of Here in Argos, the latter that of Poseidon at Mantinea. What again about Lattabus and Nicostratus? Did not they make a treacherous attack on the assembly of the Pan-boeotians in time of peace, committing outrages worthy of Scythians and Gauls? You will find no such crimes as these committed by the Diadochi.

35. "Not being able to say anything in defence of any of these acts, you talk pompously about your having resisted the invasion of Delphi by the barbarians, and allege that for this Greece ought to be grateful to you. But if for this one service some gratitude is owing to the Aetolians; what high honour do the Macedonians deserve, who throughout nearly their whole lives are ceaselessly engaged in a struggle with the barbarians for the safety of the Greeks? For that Greece would have been continually involved in great dangers, if we had not had the Macedonians and the ambition of their kings as a barrier, who is ignorant? And there is a very striking proof of this. For no sooner had the Gauls conceived a contempt for the Macedonians, by their victory over Ptolemy Ceraunus, than, thinking the rest of no account, Brennus promptly marched into the middle of Greece. And this would often have happened if the Macedonians had not been on our frontiers

B.C. 279.

Defeat and death of Ptolemy Ceraunus in the battle with the Gauls, B.C. 280. See Pausan. 10, 19, 7.

"However, though I have much that I could say on the past, I think this is enough. Of all the actions of Philip, they have selected his destruction of the temple, to fasten the charge of impiety upon him. They did not add a word about their own outrage and crime, which they perpetrated in regard to the temples in Dium, and Dodona, and the sacred enclosures of the gods. The speaker should have mentioned this first. But anything you Aetolians have suffered you recount to these gentlemen with exaggeration: but the things you have inflicted

unprovoked, though many times as numerous as the others, you pass over in silence; because you know full well that everybody lays the blame of acts of injustice and mischief on those who give the provocation by unjust actions themselves.

36. "Of Antigonus I will only make mention so far, as to avoid appearing to despise what was done, or to treat as unimportant so great an undertaking. For my part I think that history does not contain the record of a more admirable service than that which Antigonus performed for you: indeed it appears to me to be unsurpassable. And the following facts will show this. Antigonus went to war with you and conquered you in a pitched battle. By force of arms he became master of your territory and city at once. He might have exercised all the rights of war upon you: but he was so far from inflicting any hardships upon you, that, besides other benefits, he expelled your tyrant and restored your laws and ancestral constitution. In return for which, in the national assemblies, calling the Greeks to witness your words, you proclaimed Antigonus your benefactor and preserver.

"What then ought to have been your policy? I will speak what I really think, gentlemen of Sparta: and you will I am sure bear with me. For I shall do this now from no wish to go out of my way to bring railing accusations against you, but under the pressure of circumstances, and for the common good. What then am I to say? This: that both in the late war you ought to have allied yourselves not with Aetolians but with Macedonians; and now again, in answer to these invitations, you ought to join Philip rather than the former people. But, it may be objected, you will be breaking a treaty. Which will be the graver breach of right on your part,—to neglect a private arrangement made with Aetolians, or one that has been inscribed on a column and solemnly consecrated in the sight of all Greece? On what ground are you so careful of breaking faith with this people, from whom you have never received any favour, while you pay no heed to Philip and the Macedonians, to whom you owe even the very power of deliberating to-day? Do you regard it as a duty to keep faith with friends? Yet it is not so much a point of conscience to confirm written pledges of faith, as it is a violation of conscience to go to war with those

who preserved you: and this is what, in the present instance, the Aetolians are come to demand of you.

37. "Let it, however, be granted that what I have now said may in the eyes of severe critics be regarded as beside the subject. I will now return to the main point at issue, as they state it. It was this: 'If the circumstances are the same now as at the time when you made alliance with the Aetolians, then your policy ought to remain on the same lines.' That was their first proposition. 'But if they have been entirely changed, then it is fair that you should now deliberate on the demands made to you as on a matter entirely new and unprejudiced.' I ask you therefore, Cleonicus and Chlaeneas, who were your allies on the former occasion when you invited this people to join you? Were they not all the Greeks? But with whom are you now united, or to what kind of federation are you now inviting this people? Is it not to one with the foreigner? A mighty similarity exists, no doubt, in your minds, and no diversity at all! *Then* you were contending for glory and supremacy with Achaeans and Macedonians, men of kindred blood with yourselves, and with Philip their leader; *now* a war of slavery is threatening Greece against men of another race, whom you think to bring against Philip, but have really unconsciously brought against yourselves and all Greece. For just as men in the stress of war, by introducing into their cities garrisons superior in strength to their own forces, while successfully repelling all danger from the enemy, put themselves at the mercy of their friends,—just so are the Aetolians acting in the present case. For in their desire to conquer Philip and humble Macedonia, they have unconsciously brought such a mighty cloud from the west, as for the present perhaps will overshadow Macedonia first, but which in the sequel will be the origin of heavy evils to all Greece.

38. "All Greeks indeed have need to be on the alert for the crisis which is coming on: but Lacedaemonians above all. For why was it, do you suppose, men of Sparta, that your ancestors, when Xerxes sent an ambassador to your town demanding earth and water, thrust the man into a well, and, throwing earth upon him, bade him take back word to Xerxes

B C. 492. Herod. 6, 48; 7, 133.

that he had got from the Lacedaemonians what he had demanded from them,—earth and water? Why was it again, do you suppose, that Leonidas and his men started forth to a voluntary and certain death? B.C. 480. Was it not that they might have the glory of being the forlorn hope, not only of their own freedom, but of that of all Greece also? And it would indeed be a worthy action for descendants of such heroes as these to make a league with the barbarians now, and to serve with them; and to war against Epirotes, Achaeans, Acarnanians, Boeotians, Thessalians, and in fact against nearly every Greek state except Aetolians! To these last it is habitual to act thus: and to regard nothing as disgraceful, so long only as it is accompanied by an opportunity of plunder. It is not so, however, with you. And what must we expect these people to do, now that they have obtained the support of the Roman alliance? For when they obtained an accession of strength and support from the Illyrians, they at once set about acts of piracy at sea, and treacherously seized Pylus; while by land they stormed the city of Cleitor, and sold the Cynethans into slavery. Once before they made a treaty with Antigonus, as I said just now, for the destruction of the Achaean and Acarnanian races; and now they have done the same with Rome for the destruction of all Greece.

39. "With a knowledge of such transactions before his eyes who could help suspecting an attack from Rome, and feeling abhorrence at the abandoned conduct of the Aetolians in daring to make such a treaty? They have already wrested Oeniadae and Nesus from the Acarnanians, and recently seized the city of the unfortunate Anticyreans, whom, in conjunction with the Romans, they have sold into slavery.[1] Their children and women are led off by the Romans to suffer all the miseries which those must expect who fall into the hands of aliens; while the houses of the unhappy inhabitants are allotted among the Aetolians. Surely a noble alliance this to join deliberately! Especially for Lacedaemonians: who, after conquering the barbarians, Herod. 7, 132. decreed that the Thebans, for being the only Greeks that

[1] B.C. 211. See Livy, 26, 24-26

resolved to remain neutral during the Persian invasion, should pay a tenth of their goods to the gods.

"The honourable course then, men of Sparta, and the one becoming your character, is to remember from what ancestors you are sprung; to be on your guard against an attack from Rome; to suspect the treachery of the Aetolians. Above all to recall the services of Antigonus: and so once more show your loathing for dishonest men; and, rejecting the friendship of the Aetolians, unite your hopes for the future with those of Achaia and Macedonia. If, however, any of your own influential citizens are intriguing against this policy, then at least remain neutral, and do not take part in the iniquities of these Aetolians. . . ."

In the autumn of B.C. 211, *Philip being in Thrace, Scopas made a levy of Aetolians to invade Acarnania. The Acarnanians sent their wives, children, and old men to Epirus, while the rest of them bound themselves by a solemn execration never to rejoin their friends except as conquerors of the invading Aetolians. Livy, 26, 25.*

40. When the Acarnanians heard of the intended invasion of the Aetolians, in a tumult of despair and fury they adopted a measure of almost frantic violence . . .

If any one of them survived the battle and fled from the danger, they begged that no one should receive him in any city or give him a light for a fire. And this they enjoined on all with a solemn execration, and especially on the Epirotes, to the end that they should offer none of those who fled an asylum in their territory. . . .

When Philip was informed of the invasion he advanced promptly to the relief of Acarnania; hearing of which the Aetolians returned home. Livy, l. c.

Zeal on the part of friends, if shown in time, is of great service; but if it is dilatory and late, it renders the assistance nugatory,—supposing, of course, that they wish to keep the

terms of their alliance, not merely on paper, but by actual deeds.[1] . . .

INVESTMENT OF ECHINUS BY PHILIP

41. Having determined to make his approach upon the town at the two towers, he erected opposite to them diggers' sheds and rams; and opposite the space between the towers he erected a covered way between the rams, parallel to the wall. And when the plan was complete, the appearance of the works was very like the style of the wall. For the superstructures on the pent-houses had the appearance and style of towers, owing to the placing of the wattles side by side; and the space between looked like a wall, because the row of wattles at the top of the covered way were divided into battlements by the fashion in which they were woven. In the lowest division of these besieging towers the diggers employed in levelling inequalities, to allow the stands of the battering-rams to be brought up, kept throwing on earth, and the ram was propelled forward: in the second story were water vessels and other appliances for quenching fires, and along with them the catapults: and on the third a considerable body of men were placed to fight with all who tried to damage the rams; and they were on a level with the city towers. From the covered way between the besieging towers a double trench was to be dug towards the wall, between the city towers. There were also three batteries for stone-throwing machines, one of which carried stones of a talent weight, and the other two half that weight. From the camp to the pent-houses and diggers' sheds underground tunnels had been constructed, to prevent men, going to the works from the camp or returning from the works, being wounded in any way by missiles

In the campaigns of Philip, during the time that Publius Sulpicius Galba as Pro-consul commanded a Roman fleet in Greek waters, *i.e.* from B.C. 209 to B.C. 206. See Livy, 26, 22, 28; 28, 5-7; 29, 12.

[1] On the margin of one MS. is written "For such is the characteristic always maintained by the Athenian State." But its relevancy is not very apparent, and at any rate it seems more likely to be a comment of the Epitomator, than a sentence from Polybius.

from the town. These works were completed in a very few days, because the district round produced what was wanted for this service in abundance. For Echinus is situated on the Melian Gulf, facing south, exactly opposite the territory of Thronium, and enjoys a soil rich in every kind of produce; thanks to which circumstance Philip had no scarcity of anything he required for his purpose. Accordingly, as I said, as soon as the works were completed, they begun at once pushing the trenches and the siege machinery towards the walls. . . .

42. While Philip was investing Echinus, and had secured his position excellently on the side of the town, and had strengthened the outer line of his camp with a trench and wall, Publius Sulpicius, the Roman pro-consul, and Dorimachus, Strategus of the Aetolians, arrived in person,—Publius with a fleet, and Dorimachus with an army of infantry and cavalry,—and assaulted Philip's entrenchment. Their repulse led to greater exertions on Philip's part in his attack upon the Echinaeans, who in despair surrendered to him. For Dorimachus was not able to reduce Philip by cutting off his supplies, as he got them by sea. . . .

Spring of B.C. 209.[1]

When Aegina was taken by the Romans, such of the inhabitants as had not escaped crowded together at the ships, and begged the pro-consul to allow them to send ambassadors to cities of their kinsmen to obtain ransom. Publius at first returned a harsh answer, saying, that "When they were their own masters was the time that they ought to have sent ambassadors to their betters to ask for mercy, not now when they were slaves. A little while ago they had not thought an ambassador from him worthy of even a word; now that they were captives they expected to be allowed to send ambassadors to their kinsfolk: was that not sheer folly?" So at the time he dismissed those who came to him with these words. But next morning he called all the captives together and said that, as to the Aeginetans, he owed them no favour;

Aegina taken before the end of 208 B.C., for Sulpicius wintered there between 208-207 B.C. See Livy, 27, 32.

[1] Scopas (B.C. 211-210) must have gone out of office, *i.e.* it was after autumn of 210 B.C.

but for the sake of the rest of the Greeks he would allow them to send ambassadors to get ransom, since that was the custom of their country. . . .



43. The Euphrates rises in Armenia and flows through Syria and the country beyond to Babylonia. It seems to discharge itself into the Red Sea; but in point of fact it does not do so: for its waters are dissipated among the ditches dug across the fields before it reaches the sea. Accordingly the nature of this river is the reverse of that of others. For in other rivers the volume of water is increased in proportion to the greater distance traversed, and they are at their highest in winter and lowest in midsummer; but this river is fullest of water at the rising of the dog-star, and has the largest volume of water in Syria, which continually decreases as it advances. The reason of this is that the increase is not caused by the collection of winter rains, but by the melting of the snows; and its decrease by the diversion of its stream into the land, and its subdivision for the purposes of irrigation. It was this which on this occasion made the transport of the army slow, because as the boats were heavily laden, and the stream very low, the forces of the current did exceedingly little to help them down. . . .

July 26.

The transport of the army of Antiochus in his eastern campaigns. See *supra*, 8, 25.

EMBASSY FROM ROME TO PTOLEMY

44. The Romans sent ambassadors to Ptolemy, wishing to be supplied with corn, as they were suffering from a great scarcity of it at home; and, moreover, when all Italy had been laid waste by the enemy's troops up to the gates of Rome, and when all supplies from abroad were stopped by the fact that war was raging, and armies encamped, in all parts of the world except in Egypt. In fact the scarcity at Rome had come to such a

M. Atilius and Manius Glabrio sent to Alexandria with presents to Ptolemy Philopator and Queen Cleopatra. Livy, 27, 4, B.C. 210.

pitch, that a Sicilian medimnus was sold for fifteen drachmae.[1] But in spite of this distress the Romans did not relax in their attention to the war.

[1] That is, 10s. 3¾d for about a bushel and a half. See on 2, 15

END OF VOL. I

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THE

HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

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THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

BOOK X

THE HANNIBALIAN WAR—THE RECOVERY OF TARENTUM

1. THE distance from the strait and town of Rhegium to Tarentum is more than two thousand stades; and that portion of the shore of Italy is entirely destitute of harbours, except those of Tarentum: I mean the coast facing the Sicilian sea, and verging towards Greece, which contains the most populous barbarian tribes as well as the most famous of the Greek cities. For the Bruttii, Lucani, some portions of the Daunii, the Cabalii, and several others, occupy this quarter of Italy. So again this coast is lined by the Greek cities of Rhegium, Caulon, Locri, Croton, Metapontum, and Thurii: so that voyagers from Sicily or from Greece to any one of these cities are compelled to drop anchor in the harbours of Tarentum; and the exchange and commerce with all who occupy this coast of Italy take place in this city. One may judge of the excellence of its situation from the prosperity attained by the people of Croton; who, though only possessing roadsteads suitable for the summer, and enjoying therefore but a short season of mercantile activity, still have acquired great wealth, entirely owing, it seems, to the favourable situation of their town and harbour, which yet cannot be compared with those of Tarentum. For, even at this day, Tarentum is in a most convenient position in respect to the harbours of the Adriatic, and was formerly still more so. Since, from the

B.C. 209, Coss. Q. Fabius Maximus V. Q. Fulvius Flaccus IV.

Iapygian promontory as far as Sipontum, every one coming from the other side and dropping anchor at Italy always crossed to Tarentum, and used that city for his mercantile transactions as an emporium; for the town of Brundisium had not yet been founded in these times.[1] Therefore Fabius regarded the recovery of it as of great importance, and, omitting everything else, turned his whole thoughts to this. . . .

PUBLIUS CORNELIUS SCIPIO AFRICANUS IN SPAIN, B.C. 210-206

A common mistake as to Scipio's character.

2. Being about to narrate the exploits of Publius Scipio in Iberia, and in fact all the achievements in his life, I think it necessary to direct my readers' attention, to begin with, to his moral and mental qualities. For as he is perhaps the most illustrious man of any born before the present generation, everybody seeks to know what kind of man he was, and what advantages from natural ability or experience he enjoyed, to account for a career so crowded with brilliant achievement; and yet is compelled to remain in the dark, or to entertain false opinions, because those who write about him have not kept to the truth. The soundness of this assertion will be rendered evident in the course of my narrative to all who are capable of estimating the noblest and most gallant of his exploits. Now all other writers represent him as a man favoured by fortune, who succeeded in his undertakings contrary to rational expectation, and by the mere force of circumstances. They consider apparently such men to be, so to speak, more god-like and worthy of admiration, than those who act in every case by calculation. They do not seem to be aware of the distinction between credit for good fortune and credit for good conduct in the case of such men; and that the former may be assigned to any one however commonplace, while the latter belongs to those alone who act from prudent calculation and clear intelligence: and it is these last whom we should look upon as the most god-like and god-beloved.

Now it seems to me that in his character and views

[1] The port of Brundisium was known long before. See Herod. 4, 99. The Romans colonised the town in B.C. 244. See Livy, epit. 19.

Publius was very like Lycurgus the legislator of the Lacedaemonians. For we must not suppose that it was from superstition that Lycurgus continually consulted the Pythian priestess in the establishment of the Lacedaemonian constitution; nor that Publius depended on dreams and ominous words for his success in securing empire for his country. But as both saw that the majority of mankind cannot be got to accept contentedly what is new and strange, nor to face dangers with courage, without some hope of divine favour,—Lycurgus, by always supporting his own schemes by an oracular response from the Pythia, secured better acceptation and credit for his ideas; and Publius, by always in like manner instilling into the minds of the vulgar an opinion of his acting on some divine suggestion in the formation of his designs, caused those under his command to confront dangerous services with greater courage and cheerfulness. But that he invariably acted on calculation and with foresight, and that the successful issue of his plans was always in harmony with rational expectation, will be evident by what I am about to relate.

Scipio's use of religion compared with that of Lycurgus.

3. For that he was beneficent and high-minded is acknowledged; but that he was acute, sober-minded, and earnest in pursuit of his aims, no one will admit, except those who have lived with him, and contemplated his character, so to speak, in broad daylight. Of such Gaius Laelius was one. He took part in everything he did or said from boyhood to the day of his death; and he it was who convinced me of this truth: because what he said appeared to me to be likely in itself, and in harmony with the achievements of that great man. He told me that the first brilliant exploit of Publius was when his father fought the cavalry engagement with Hannibal near the Padus. He was then, as it seems, eighteen years old and on his first campaign. His father had given him a squadron of picked cavalry for his protection; but when in the course of the battle he saw his father surrounded by the enemy, with only two or three horsemen near him, and dangerously wounded, he first tried to cheer on his own squadron to go to his father's assistance, but when he found

Scipio's first exploit, B.C. 218.

them considerably cowed by the numbers of the enemy surrounding them, he appears to have plunged by himself with reckless courage into the midst of the enemy: whereupon, his comrades being forced to charge also, the enemy were everawed and divided their ranks to let them pass; and Publius the elder, being thus unexpectedly saved, was the first to address his son as his preserver in the hearing of the whole army.[1] Having gained an acknowledged reputation for bravery by this exploit, he ever afterwards freely exposed himself to every sort of personal danger, whenever his country rested its hope of safety on him. And this is not the conduct of a general who trusts to luck, but of one who has a clear head.

4. Subsequently, when his elder brother Lucius was a candidate for the Aedileship, which is about the most honourable office open to a "young" man at Rome: it being the custom for two patricians to be appointed, and there being many candidates, for some time he did not venture to stand for the same office as his brother. But as the day of election drew near, judging from the demeanour of the people that his brother would easily obtain the office, and observing that his own popularity with the multitude was very great, he made up his mind that the only hope of his brother's success was that they should combine their candidatures. He therefore resolved to act as follows: His mother was going round to the temples and sacrificing to the gods in behalf of his brother, and was altogether in a state of eager expectation as to the result. She was the only parent whose wishes he had to consult; for his father was then on his voyage to Iberia, having been appointed to command in the war there. He therefore said to her that he had seen the same dream twice: for he thought that he was coming home from the Forum after being elected Aedile with his brother, and that she met them at the door and threw her arms round them and kissed them. His mother with true womanly feeling exclaimed, "Oh, that I might see that day!" He replied, "Do you wish us to try"? Upon her assenting, under the idea that he would not venture, but was only jesting on the spur of the moment (for of course he was quite a young man), he

Elected aedile, end of B.C. 217.

[1] See on 3, 66.

begged her to prepare him at once a white toga, such as it is the custom for candidates for office to wear.

5. His mother thought no more about it: but Publius, having obtained a white toga, went to the Forum before his mother was awake. His boldness, as well as his previous popularity, secured him a brilliant reception from the people; and when he advanced to the spot assigned for candidates, and took his place by the side of his brother, the people not only invested him with the office, but his brother also for his sake; and both brothers returned home Aediles designate. The news having been suddenly brought to their mother, she rushed in the utmost delight to meet them at the door, and kissed the young men in an ecstasy of joy. Accordingly Publius was believed by all who had heard previously about his dream to have held commune with the gods, not merely in his sleep, but rather in a waking vision, and by day. But in point of fact there was no dream at all: Scipio was kind, open-handed, and courteous, and by these means had conciliated the favour of the multitude. But by a dexterous use of the occasion, both with the people and his mother, he obtained his purpose, and moreover got the reputation of acting under divine inspiration. For those persons, who, from dulness or want of experience, or idleness, can never take a clear view of the occasions or causes or connexion of events, are apt to give the gods and chance the credit for what is really effected by sagacity and far-seeing calculation. I have thought it worth while to say thus much, that my readers may not be misled by unfounded gossip to pass over this great man's finest and most splendid qualities, I mean his wealth of resource and untiring diligence; which will become still more apparent when we come to recount his actual achievements.

6. Such was the man who now assembled the soldiers and exhorted them not to be dismayed by the disaster which had befallen them. "For," said he, "Romans have never been beaten by Carthaginians in a trial of valour. It was the result of treachery on the part of the Celtiberians, and of rashness, the two commanders getting cut off from each other owing to their trust in the alliance of these men. But now

Speech of Publius Scipio to the soldiers in Spain, B.C. 210.

these two disadvantages are on the side of the enemy: for they are encamped at a wide distance from each other; and by their tyrannical conduct to their allies have alienated them all, and made them hostile to themselves. The consequence is that some of them are already sending messages to us; while the rest, as soon as they dare, and see that we have crossed the river, will gladly join us; not so much because they have any affection for us, as because they are eager to punish the outrages of the Carthaginians. Most important of all is the fact that the enemy are at variance with each other, and will refuse to fight against us in a body, and by thus engaging in detail will be more easily dealt with by us." Looking to these facts, therefore, he bade them cross the river with confidence, and undertook that he and the other officers would see to the next step to be taken. With these words he left his colleague, Marcus Silanus, with five hundred horse to guard the ford, and to protect the allies on the north of the river, while he himself began taking his army across, without revealing his design to any one. As a matter of fact he had resolved to do nothing of what he gave out publicly, and had made up his mind to make a rapid attack upon the town called Iberian Carthage. This may be looked upon as the first and strongest proof of the judgment which I lately passed upon him. He was now only in his twenty-seventh year: and yet he, in the first place, undertook to accomplish what the magnitude of the previous disasters had made the world look upon as completely hopeless; and, in the second place, having undertaken it, he left on one side the plain and obvious course, and conceived and carried out a plan which was a surprise to the enemy himself. This could only be the result of the closest calculation.

Scipio crosses the Ebro, and swoops down upon New Carthage.

7. The fact is that he had made minute inquiries, before leaving Rome, both about the treason of the Celtiberians, and the separation of the two Roman armies; and had inferred that his father's disaster was entirely attributable to these. He had not therefore shared the popular terror of the Carthaginians, nor allowed himself to be overcome by the general panic.

Scipio's careful inquiries as to the state of things in Spain.

And when he subsequently heard that the allies of Rome north of the Ebro were remaining loyal, while the Carthaginian commanders were quarrelling with each other, and maltreating the natives subject to them, he began to feel very cheerful about his expedition, not from a blind confidence in Fortune, but from deliberate calculation. Accordingly, when he arrived in Iberia, he learnt, by questioning everybody and making inquiries about the enemy from every one, that the forces of the Carthaginians were divided into three. Mago, he was informed, was lingering west of the pillars of Hercules among the Conii; Hasdrubal, the son of Gesco, in Lusitania, near the mouth of the Tagus; while the other Hasdrubal was besieging a certain city of the Caspetani; and none of the three were less than ten days' march from the New Town. Now he calculated that, if he decided to give the enemy battle, it would be risking too much to do so against all three at once, because his predecessors had been beaten, and because the enemy would vastly out-number him; if, on the other hand, he were to march rapidly to engage one of the three, and should then find himself surrounded—which might happen by the one attacked retreating, and the others coming up to his relief,—he dreaded a disaster like that of his uncle Gnaeus and his father Publius.

8. He therefore rejected that idea altogether: but being informed that New Carthage was the most important source of supplies to the enemy and of damage to the Romans in the present war, he had taken the trouble to make minute inquiries about it during the winter from those who were well informed. He learnt that it was nearly the only town in Iberia which possessed a harbour suitable for a fleet and naval force; that it lay very conveniently for the Carthaginians to make the sea passage from Libya; that they in fact had the bulk of their money and war material in it, as well as their hostages from the whole of Iberia; that, most important of all, the number of fighting men garrisoning the citadel only amounted to a thousand,—because no one would ever suppose that, while the Carthaginians commanded nearly the whole of Iberia, any one would conceive the idea of assaulting this

He determines to attempt New Carthage.

town; that the other inhabitants were exceedingly numerous, but all consisted of craftsmen, mechanics, and fisher-folk, as far as possible removed from any knowledge of warfare. All this he regarded as being fatal to the town, in case of the sudden appearance of an enemy. Nor did he moreover fail to acquaint himself with the topography of New Carthage, or the nature of its defences, or the lie of the lagoon: but by means of certain fishermen who had worked there he had ascertained that the lagoon was quite shallow and fordable at most points; and that, generally speaking, the water ebbed every day towards evening sufficiently to secure this. These considerations convinced him that, if he could accomplish his purpose, he would not only damage his opponents, but gain a considerable advantage for himself; and that, if on the other hand he failed in effecting it, he would yet be able to secure the safety of his men owing to his command of the sea, provided he had once made his camp secure,—and this was easy, because of the wide dispersion of the enemy's forces. He had therefore, during his residence in winter quarters, devoted himself to preparing for this operation to the exclusion of every other: and in spite of the magnitude of the idea which he had conceived, and in spite of his youth, he concealed it from all except Gaius Laelius, until he had himself decided to reveal it.

9. But although historians agree in attributing these calculations to him; yet, when they come to narrate their issue, they somehow or another attribute the success obtained not to the man and his foresight, but to the gods and to Fortune, and that, in spite of all probability, and the evidence of those who lived with him; and in spite of the fact that Publius himself in a letter addressed to Philip has distinctly set forth that it was upon the deliberate calculations, which I have just set forth, that he undertook the Iberian campaign generally, and the assault upon New Carthage in particular.

Gaius Laelius proceeds to New Carthage with the fleet,

However that may be, at the time specified he gave secret instructions to Gaius Laelius, who was in command of the fleet, and who, as I have said, was the only man in the secret, to sail to this town; while he himself marched his army at a rapid

pace in the same direction. His force consisted of twenty-five thousand infantry and two thousand five hundred cavalry; and arriving at New Carthage on the seventh day he pitched his camp on the north of the town;[1] defended its rear by a double trench and rampart stretching from sea to sea,[2] while on the side facing the town he made absolutely no defences, for the nature of the ground made him sufficiently secure. Scipio by land. B.C. 209.

But as I am now about to describe the assault and capture of the town, I think I must explain to my readers the lie of the surrounding country, and the position of the town itself.

10. It stands about half-way down the coast of Iberia in a gulf which faces south-west, running about twenty stades inland, and about ten stades broad at its entrance. The whole gulf is made a harbour by the fact that an island[3] lies at its mouth and thus makes the entrance channels on each side of it exceedingly narrow. It breaks the force of the waves also, and the whole gulf has thus smooth water, except when south-west winds setting down the two channels raise a surf: with all other winds it is perfectly calm, from being so nearly landlocked. In the recess of the gulf a mountain juts out in the form of a chersonese, and it is on this mountain that the city stands, surrounded by the sea on the east and south, and on the west by a lagoon extending so far northward that the remaining space to the sea on the other side, to connect it with the continent, is not more than two stades. The city itself has a deep depression in its centre, presenting on its south side a level approach from the sea; while the rest of it is hemmed in by hills, two of them mountainous and rough, three others much lower, but rocky and difficult of ascent; the largest of which lies on the east of the town run- Description of New Carthage.

[1] Dr. Arnold declares it "all but an impossibility that an army should have marched the distance (not less than 325 Roman miles) in a week." Livy (26, 42) accepts the statement without question.

[2] Mr. Strachan-Davidson explains this to mean from the sea to the lake, as Scipio's lines would not have extended right round the lake to the other sea.

[3] Escombrera (Σκομβραρία). I must refer my readers to Mr. Strachan-Davidson's appendix on *The Site of the Spanish Carthage* for a discussion of these details. See above 2, 13; Livy, 26, 42.

ning out into the sea, on which stands a temple of Asclepius. Exactly opposite this lies the western mountain in a closely-corresponding position, on which a palace had been erected at great cost, which it is said was built by Hasdrubal when he was aiming at establishing royal power. The remaining three lesser elevations bound it on the north, of which the westernmost is called the hill of Hephaestus, the next to it that of Aletes,—who is believed to have attained divine honours from having been the discoverer of the silver mines,—and the third is called the hill of Cronus. The lagoon has been connected with the adjoining sea artificially for the sake of the maritime folk; and over the channel thus cut between it and the sea a bridge has been built, for beasts of burden and carts to bring in provisions from the country.

11. Such is the nature of this city's situation. The side of the Roman camp which faced the city therefore was secured, without any artificial means, by the lagoon and the sea. The neck of land lying between these two, and connecting the city with the continent, Scipio did not fence off with a stockade, although it abutted on the middle of his camp,—either for the sake of making an impression upon the enemy, or by way of suiting the arrangement to his own design,—that he might have nothing to hamper the free egress and return of his troops to and from the camp. The circuit of the city wall was not more than twenty stades formerly,—though I am aware that it has been stated at forty stades; but this is false, as I know from personal inspection and not from mere report,—and in our day it has been still farther contracted.

Scipio discloses his intention of assaulting New Carthage.

The fleet arrived to the hour, and Publius then thought it time to summon a meeting of his men and to encourage them to the undertaking by the use of the same arguments by which he had convinced himself, and which I have just now detailed. He pointed out to them that the plan was practicable; and briefly summing up the blow which their success would be to their enemies, and the advantage it would be to themselves, he ended by promising crowns of gold to those who first mounted the walls, and the usual rewards to those who

displayed conspicuous gallantry. And finally he declared that "Poseidon had appeared to him in his sleep, and originally suggested his plan to him; and had promised to give him such signal aid in the actual hour of battle that his assistance should be made manifest to all." The skilful mixture in this speech of accurate calculation with promises of gold crowns, and a reference to Divine Providence, created a great impression and enthusiasm in the minds of the young soldiers.

12. Next morning he stationed ships supplied with missiles of every sort, all along the seaboard, under the command of Gaius Laelius; and having told off two thousand of his strongest men to accompany the ladder-carriers, he begun the assault about the third hour. The commandant of the town, Mago, divided his garrison of a thousand men into two companies; half he left upon the citadel, and the rest he stationed upon the eastern hill. Of the other inhabitants he accoutred about two thousand of the strongest men with such arms as there were in the city, and stationed them at the gate leading to the isthmus and the enemy's camp: the rest he ordered to assist to the best of their power at all points in the wall. As soon as the bugles of Publius sounded the moment of the assault, Mago caused those whom he had armed to sally from the gate, feeling confident that he should create a panic among the assailants and entirely baffle their design. These men vigorously attacked those of the Roman army who were drawn up opposite the isthmus, and a sharp engagement took place accompanied by loud cries of encouragement on both sides: the Romans in the camp cheering on their men, and the people in the city theirs. But the contest was an unequal one in the respect of the facility of bringing up reserves. The Carthaginians had all to come out by one gate, and had nearly two stades to march before they got on the ground; whereas the Romans had their supports close at hand and able to come out over a wide area; for Publius had purposely stationed his men close to the camp in order to induce the enemy to come out as far as possible: being quite aware that if he succeeded in destroying these, who were so to speak the sharp edge of the urban

The assault.

A sally of the defenders

population, universal consternation would be the result, and no more of those in the town would have the courage to come out of the gate. The contest however for a certain time was undecided, for it was between picked men on both sides; but finally the Carthaginians were overpowered by the superior weight of their opponents, owing to the constant reinforcements from the camp, and turned to flight. A large number of them fell in the actual engagement, and during the retreat; but the greater number were trampled to death by each other as they crowded through the gate. The city people were thrown into such a panic by these events, that even those who were guarding the walls fled. The Romans very nearly succeeded in forcing their way in through the gates with the fugitives; and of course fixed their scaling-ladders against the wall in perfect security.

repulsed.

13. Meanwhile Publius, though throwing himself heartily into the struggle, yet took all possible precautions to protect his life. He had three men with him carrying large shields, which they held in such a position as to completely protect him from the side of the wall; and accordingly he went along the lines, or mounted on elevated ground, and contributed greatly to the success of the day. For he was enabled to see all that was going on, and at the same time, by being himself in view of all, inspired great zeal in the hearts of the combatants. The result was that nothing was omitted which could contribute to the success of the battle; but any help he saw to be at any moment required was rapidly and thoroughly supplied.

But though the leaders of the escalade had begun mounting the walls with great spirit, they found the operation accompanied by some danger: not so much from the number of the defenders, as from the height of the walls. The defenders accordingly plucked up courage considerably when they saw the distress of the assailants: for some of the ladders were breaking under the weight of the numbers which, owing to their length, were on them at the same time; while on others the first to mount turned giddy owing to their great height, and without requiring much resistance from the defenders threw themselves from

Difficulties of the escalade.

the ladders: and when beams, or anything of that sort, were hurled upon them from the battlements, they were swept off *en masse* and fell to the ground. In spite however of these difficulties nothing could check the zeal and fury of the Roman attack; but as the first fell their place was always taken at once by the next in order. And now, as the day was far advanced, and the soldiers were worn out with fatigue, Scipio sounded a recall for the assaulting party.

14. The men in the town were accordingly in high spirits at having, as they thought, repulsed the assault. But Scipio, who was conscious that the time was now approaching for the ebb of the lagoon, had five hundred men stationed ready by its edge with ladders; and meanwhile massed some fresh soldiers upon the gate and isthmus, and, after urging them to undertake the work, furnished them with a larger number of ladders than before: so that the wall was almost covered with men scaling it. When the signal for attack was sounded, and the men placed their ladders against the wall, and began ascending at every point, the excitement and consternation inside the walls was extreme; for when they thought themselves released from the threatened danger, they saw it beginning all over again by another assault. Besides, their missiles were beginning to fall short; and the number of men they had lost greatly disheartened them. Still, though they were in great distress, they continued the defence as well as they could.

Towards evening Scipio renews the assault on the gate, to distract attention from his attack by way of the lagoon.

Just when the struggle at the ladders was at its hottest the ebb of the tide began. The water began gradually to leave the edges of the lagoon, and the current ran with such violence, and in such a mass through its channel into the adjoining sea, that to those who were unprepared for the sight it appeared incredible. Being provided with guides, Scipio at once ordered his men, who had been stationed ready for this service, to step in and to fear nothing. His was a nature especially fitted to inspire courage and sympathy with his own feelings. So now the men at once obeyed him, and when the army saw them racing each other across the marsh, it

Scipio crosses the lagoon and gets his men upon the wall.

could not but suppose that the movement was a kind of heaven-sent inspiration. This reminded them of the reference Scipio had made to Poseidon, and the promises contained in his harangue: and their enthusiasm rose to such a height that they locked their shields above their heads, and, charging up to the gate, they began trying to hew their way through the panels of the doors with their axes and hatchets.

Meanwhile the party which had crossed the marsh had approached the wall. They found the battlements unguarded: and therefore, not only fixed their ladders against the wall, but actually mounted and took it without striking a blow; for the attention of the garrison was distracted to other points, especially to the isthmus and the gate leading to it, and they never expected that the enemy were likely to attack on the side of the lagoon: besides, and above all, there was such disorderly shouting, and such a scene of confusion within the wall, that they could neither hear nor see to any purpose.

The city entered and given up to the sword.

15. As soon as they found themselves in possession of the wall, the Romans began making their way along the top of it, hurling off such of the enemy as they met, the nature of their arms being especially suited for an operation of that sort. But when they arrived at the gate they descended and began cutting through the bolts, while those without began forcing their way in, and those who were mounting the walls in the direction of the isthmus, beginning by this time to get the better of their opponents, were getting a footing on the battlements. Thus the walls were finally in possession of the enemy: and the troops, which entered by the gate, carried the eastern hill and drove off the garrison occupying it.

When Scipio thought that a sufficient number of troops had entered the town, he gave leave to the larger number of them to attack those in it, according to the Roman custom, with directions to kill everything they met, and to spare nothing; and not to begin looting until they got the order to do so. The object of this is, I suppose, to strike terror. Accordingly, one may often see in towns captured by the Romans, not only human beings who have been put to the sword, but even dogs cloven down the middle, and the limbs

of other animals hewn off. On this occasion the amount of such slaughter was exceedingly great, because of the numbers included in the city.

Scipio himself with about a thousand men now pressed on towards the citadel. When he arrived there, Mago at first thought of resistance; but afterwards, when he was satisfied that the city was completely in the power of the enemy, he sent to demand a promise of his life, and then surrendered. This being concluded, the signal was given to stop the slaughter: whereupon the soldiers left off slaying, and turned to plunder. When night fell those of the soldiers to whom this duty had been assigned remained in the camp, while Scipio with his thousand men bivouacked in the citadel; and summoning the rest from the dwelling-houses by means of the Tribunes, he ordered them to collect all their booty into the market-place by maniples, and to take up their quarters for the night by these several heaps. He then summoned the light-armed from the camp, and stationed them upon the eastern hill.

Mago surrenders the citadel.

Sack of the city.

Thus did the Romans become masters of Carthage in Iberia.

16. Next morning the baggage of those who had served in the Carthaginian ranks, as well as the property of the city-folk and the craftsmen, having been collected together in the market-place, the Tribunes divided it according to the Roman custom among their several legions. Now the Roman method of procedure in the capture of cities is the following: Sometimes certain soldiers taken from each maniple are told off for this duty, their numbers depending on the size of the city; sometimes maniples are told off in turn for it: but there are never more than half the whole number assigned to the work. The rest remain in their own ranks in reserve, sometimes outside, at others inside the city, for taking such precautions as may be from time to time necessary. Sometimes, though rarely, four legions are massed together; but generally speaking the whole force is divided into two legions of Romans and two of allies. This being settled, all who are

The Roman customs in the distribution of booty.

told off for plundering carry all they get, each to his own legion; and when this booty has been sold, the Tribunes distribute the proceeds among all equally, including not only those who were thus held in reserve, but even those who were guarding the tents, or were invalided, or had been sent away anywhere on any service. But I have spoken fully before, when discussing the Roman constitution, on the subject of the distribution of booty, showing how no one is excluded from a share in it, in accordance with the oath which all take upon first joining the camp. I may now add that the arrangement whereby the Roman army is thus divided, half being engaged in gathering booty and half remaining drawn up in reserve, precludes all danger of a general catastrophe arising from personal rivalry in greed. For as both parties feel absolute confidence in the fair dealing of each in respect to the booty,—the reserves no less than the plunderers,—no one leaves the ranks, which has been the most frequent cause of disaster in the case of other armies.

See 6, 33.

17. For, as the majority of mankind encounter miseries and embrace dangers for the sake of gain, it is plain that when such opportunity is presented to them as this, the men in the reserve or in the camp would be with difficulty induced to abstain from taking advantage of it; because the usual idea is that everything belongs to the man who actually takes it: and though a general or king may be careful to order all booty to be brought into the common stock, yet everybody considers that what he can conceal is his own. The result is that, while the ruck of the army cannot be prevented from eagerly devoting themselves to plunder, they often run the risk of a complete overthrow: and it has often in fact happened that after a successful movement, such as the carrying of an entrenched camp or the capture of a city, the victorious army has, from no other cause but this, been not only ejected but even utterly defeated. Therefore there is nothing about which leaders ought to exercise more care or foresight, than that, on such an occasion, all may have an absolutely equal prospect of sharing in the booty.

Thus on the present occasion, while the Tribunes were busied in the distribution of the spoil; the Roman com-

mander caused the prisoners, who numbered little short of ten thousand, to be assembled; and having first ordered them to be divided into two groups, one containing the citizens and their wives and children, the other the craftsmen, he exhorted the first of these to be loyal to the Romans, and to remember the favour which they were now receiving, and allowed them all to depart to their own houses. With tears of joy at this unexpected preservation, they bowed in reverence to Scipio and dispersed. He then told the craftsmen that they were for the present public slaves of Rome, but that, if they showed themselves loyal and zealous in their several crafts, he promised them their freedom, as soon as the war with the Carthaginians had been brought to a successful issue. He then bade them go get their names enrolled in the office of the Quaestor, and appointed a Roman overseer for every thirty of them, their whole number being about two thousand. From the remaining captives he selected the strongest, those who were in the prime of youth and physical vigour, and assigned them to serve on board ship: and having thus increased the number of his naval allies by one half, he manned the ships taken from the enemy as well as his own; so that the number of men on board each vessel were now little short of double what it was before. For the captured ships numbered eighteen, his original fleet thirty-five. These men he also promised their freedom, if they showed themselves loyal and zealous, as soon as they had conquered the Carthaginians. By this treatment of the captives he inspired the citizens with warm feelings of loyalty and fidelity, and the handicraftsmen with great readiness to serve, from the hope held out to them of recovering their freedom.

Scipio's treatment of the prisoners. The citizens are dismissed to their homes.

The skilled slaves are promised their freedom at the end of the war.

Some are drafted into the navy.

18. He next took Mago and the Carthaginians with him separately, consisting of one member of the Council of ancients and fifteen of the Senate.[1] These he put under the charge of Gaius Laelius, with orders that he should take due care of them. He next

Mago is entrusted to Laelius.

[1] This seems to be the distinction between the words γερουσιά and

summoned the hostages, who numbered more than three hundred. Such of them as were children he called to him one by one, and stroking their heads told them not to be afraid, for in a few days they would see their parents. The others also he exhorted to be of good cheer, and to write word to their relations in their several cities, first, that they were safe and well; and, secondly, that the Romans were minded to restore them all unharmed to their homes, if only their relations adopted the Roman alliance. With these words, having already selected from the spoils such articles as were fitting for his purpose, he presented each with what was suitable to their sex and age: the girls with ear-rings and bracelets, the young men with daggers and swords. Among the captive women was the wife of Mandonius, brother of Andobalus king of the Ilergētes. This woman fell at his feet and besought him with tears to protect their honour better than the Carthaginians had done. Touched by her distress Scipio asked her in what respect she and the other women were left unprovided. She was a lady of advanced years and of a certain majestic dignity of appearance: and upon her meeting his question by perfect silence, he summoned the men who had been appointed to take charge of the women; and when they reported that they had supplied them with all necessaries in abundance, and when the woman again clasped his knees and repeated the same request, Scipio felt still more embarrassed; and, conceiving the idea that their guardians had neglected them, and were now making a false report, he bade the women fear nothing, for that he would appoint different men to see to their interests, and secure that they were not left in want of anything. Then after a brief hesitation the woman said, "You mistake my meaning, General, if you think that we are asking you for food." Scipio then at length began to understand what she wished to convey; and seeing under his eyes the youthful beauty of the daughters of Andobalus, and of many of the other nobles, he could not

The hostages.

The women.

σύγκλητος. Cp. 36, 4. The latter is the word used by Polybius for the Roman Senate: for the nature of the first see Bosworth Smith, *Carthage and the Carthaginians*, p. 27. It was usually called "The Hundred." Mommsen (*Hist. of Rome*, vol. ii. p. 15) seems to doubt the existence of the larger council: its authority at any rate had been superseded by the oligarchical gerusia.

refrain from tears, while the aged lady indicated in a few words the danger in which they were. He showed at once that he understood her words: and taking her by the hand, he bade her and the others also be of good cheer, for that he would watch over them as he would over his own sisters and daughters, and would accordingly put men in charge of them on whom he could rely.

19. His next business was to pay over to the Quaestors such public money of the Carthaginians as had been captured. It amounted to more than six hundred talents, so that when this was added to the four hundred which he had brought with him from Rome, he found himself in possession of more than one thousand talents. The money.

It was on this occasion that some young Romans fell in with a girl surpassing all the other women in bloom and beauty; and seeing that Scipio was fond of the society of women, they brought her to him, and, placing her before him, said that they desired to present the damsel to him. He was struck with admiration for her beauty, and replied that, if he had been in a private position, he could have received no present that would have given him greater pleasure; but as general it was the last in the world which he could receive. He meant to convey, I presume, by this ambiguous answer that, in hours of rest and idleness, such things are the most delightful enjoyments and pastimes for young men; whereas in times of activity they are hindrances physically and mentally. However that may be, he thanked the young men; but called the girl's father, and handing her over at once to him, told him to bestow her in marriage on whichever of the citizens he chose. By this display of continence and self-control he gained the warm respect of his men. Scipio's continence.

Having made these arrangements, and handed over the rest of the captives to the Tribunes, he despatched Gaius Laelius on board a quinquereme to Rome, with the Carthaginian prisoners and the noblest of the others, to announce at home what had taken place. For as the prevailing feeling at Rome was one of despair of success in Iberia, he felt certain that on this news their spirits Laelius sent to Rome with the news. B.C. 209.

would revive, and that they would make much more strenuous efforts to support him.

Preparations for an advance.

20. Scipio himself stayed a certain time in New Carthage and assiduously practised his fleet; and drew up the following scheme for his military Tribunes for training their men. The first day he ordered the men to go at the double for thirty stades in their full arms; and on the second all of them to rub down, clean, and thoroughly examine their whole equipments; on the third to rest and do nothing; on the fourth to have a sham fight, some with wooden swords covered with leather and with a button at the end, others with javelins also buttoned at the end; on the fifth the same march at the double as on the first. That there might be no lack of weapons for the practises, or for the real fighting, he took the greatest pains with the handicraftsmen. He had, as I have already stated, appointed overseers over them in regular divisions to secure that this was done; but he also personally inspected them every day, and saw that they were severally supplied with what was necessary. Thus while the legions were practising and training in the vicinity of the town, and the fleet manœuvring and rowing in the sea, and the city people sharpening weapons or forging arms or working in wood, every one in short busily employed in making armour, the whole place must have presented the appearance of what Xenophon called "a work-shop of war." When he thought all these works were sufficiently advanced for the requirements of the service, he secured the town by posting garrisons and repairing the walls, and got both his army and navy on the move, directing his advance upon Tarraco, and taking the hostages with him. . . .

Xen. *Hellen.* 3, 4, 17: *Aegsil.* 1, 26.

PHILOPOEMEN OF MEGALOPOLIS

Euryleon Achaean Strategus, B.C. 210-209.

21. Euryleon, the Strategus of the Achaeans, was a man of timid character, and quite unsuited for service in the field.

But as my history has now arrived at a point at which the achievements of Philopoemen begin, I think it only

proper that, as I have attempted to describe the habits and characters of the other men of eminence with whom we have had to deal, I should do the same for him. It is strangely inconsistent in historians to record in elaborate detail the founding of cities, stating when and how and by whom they were established, and even the circumstances and difficulties which accompanied the transaction, and yet to pass over in complete silence the characteristics and aims of the men by whom the whole thing was done, though these in fact are the points of the greatest value. For as one feels more roused to emulation and imitation by men that have life, than by buildings that have none, it is natural that the history of the former should have a greater educational value. If I had not therefore already composed a separate account of him, clearly setting forth who he was, his origin, and his policy as a young man, it would have been necessary to have given an account now of each of these particulars. But since I have done this in a work in three books, unconnected with my present history, detailing the circumstances of his childhood and his most famous achievements, it is clear that in my present narrative my proper course will be to remove anything like details from my account of his youthful characteristics and aims; while I am careful to *add* details to the story of the achievements of his manhood, which in that treatise were only stated summarily. I shall thus preserve the proper features of both works. The former being in the nature of a panegyric demanded an account of his actions, put briefly and in a style deliberately intended to enhance their merits; my present work, which is history, and therefore absolutely uncommitted to praise or blame, requires only a true statement, which puts the facts clearly, and traces the policy which dictated the several actions.

Birth, parentage, and education of Philopoemen, b. B.C. 252.

22. Philopoemen, then, to begin with, was of good birth, descended from one of the noblest families in Arcadia. He was also educated under that most distinguished Mantinean, Cleander, who had been his father's friend before, and happened at that time to be in exile. When he came to man's estate he attached himself to Ecdemus and Demophanes, who were by birth natives of Megalopolis, but who having been exiled by the

tyrant, and having associated with the philosopher Arcesilaus during their exile, not only set their own country free by entering into an intrigue against Aristodemus the tyrant, but also helped in conjunction with Aratus to put down Nicocles, the tyrant of Sicyon. On another occasion also, on the invitation of the people of Cyrene, they stood forward as their champions and preserved their freedom for them. Such were the men with whom he passed his early life; and he at once began to show a superiority to his contemporaries, by his power of enduring hardships in hunting, and by his acts of daring in war. He was moreover careful in his manner of life, and moderate in the outward show which he maintained; for he had imbibed from these men the conviction, that it was impossible for a man to take the lead in public business with honour who neglected his own private affairs; nor again to abstain from embezzling public money if he lived beyond his private income.

Elected Hipparch, B.C. 210. Cp. Plut. *Phil.* 7. *συχνὸς χρόνος* after the battle of Sallasia, B.C. 222.

Being then appointed Hipparch by the Achaean league at this time, and finding the squadrons in a state of utter demoralisation, and the men thoroughly dispirited, he not only restored them to a better state than they were, but in a short time made them even superior to the enemy's cavalry, by bringing them all to adopt habits of real training and genuine emulation. The fact is that most of those who hold this office of Hipparch, either, from being without any genius themselves for cavalry tactics, do not venture to enforce necessary orders upon others; or, because they are aiming at being elected Strategus, try all through their year of office to attach the young men to themselves and to secure their favour in the coming election: and accordingly never administer necessary reprimands, which are the salvation of the public interests, but hush up all transgressions, and, for the sake of gaining an insignificant popularity, do great damage to those who trust them. Sometimes again, commanders, though neither feeble nor corrupt, do more damage to the soldiers by intemperate zeal than the negligent ones, and this is still oftener the case with regard to the cavalry. . . .

23. Now the movements which he undertook to teach the

horsemen as being universally applicable to cavalry warfare were these. In the first place each separate horse was to be practised in wheeling first to the left and then to the right, and also to face right-about; and in the next place they were to be taught to wheel in squadrons, face-about, and by a treble movement to face-about right-turn. Next they were to learn to throw out flying columns of single or double companies at full speed from both wings or from the centre; and then to pull up and fall in again into troops, or squadrons, or regiments: next to deploy into line on both wings, either by filling up the intervals in the line or by a lateral movement on the rear. Simply to form an oblique line, he said, required no practice, for it was exactly the same order as that taken up on a march. After this they were to practice charging the enemy and retreating by every kind of movement, until they were able to advance at an alarming pace; provided only that they kept together, both line and column, and preserved the proper intervals between the squadrons: for nothing is more dangerous and unserviceable than cavalry that have broken up their squadrons, and attempt to engage in this state.

The cavalry tactics of Philopoemen, B.C. 210-209.[1]

After giving these instructions both to the people and their magistrates, he went on a round of inspection through the towns, and inquired, first, whether the men obeyed the words of command; and, secondly, whether the officers in the several towns knew how to give them clearly and properly: for he held that the first thing requisite was technical knowledge on the part of the commanders of each company.

24. When he had thus made the proper preliminary preparations, he mustered the cavalry from the various cities into one place, and set about perfecting their evolutions under his own command, and personally directed the whole drill. He did not ride in front of the army, as generals nowadays do, from the notion that this is the proper position for

[1] This and the following chapter were formerly assigned to the description of Scipio's proceedings in Spain and followed, ch. 20. Hultsch, however, seems right in placing them thus, and assigning them to the account of the tactics of Philopoemen.

a commander. For what can be less scientific or more dangerous than for a commander to be seen by all his men, and yet not to see one of them? In such manœuvres a Hipparch should not make a display not of mere military dignity, but of the skill and ability of an officer, appearing at one time in the front, at another on the rear, and at another in the centre. This is what he did, riding along the lines, and personally seeing to all the men, giving them directions when they were at a loss what to do, and correcting at once every mistake that was being made. Such mistakes, however, were trifling and rare, owing to the previous care bestowed on every individual and company. Demetrius of Phalerum has, as far as words go, given expression to the same idea: "As in the case of building, if you lay each single brick rightly, and if proper care is taken in placing each successive course, all will be well; so in an army, accuracy in the arrangement of each soldier and each company makes the whole strong. . . ."

A fragment of a speech of some Macedonian orator as to the Aetolians making an alliance with Rome.

25. "The case is just like that of the disposition of the various kinds of troops on the field of battle. The light-armed and most active men bear the brunt of the danger, are the first to be engaged and the first to perish, while the phalanx and the heavy-armed generally carry off the glory. So in this case, the Aetolians, and such of the Peloponnesians as are in alliance with them, are put in the post of danger; while the Romans, like the phalanx, remain in reserve. And if the former meet with disaster and perish, the Romans will retire unharmed from the struggle; while if they are victorious, which Heaven forbid! the Romans will get not only them but the rest of the Greeks also into their power. . . ."[1]

Alliance between Aetolians and Rome against Philip, negotiated by Scopas and Dorimachus, B.C. 211. See Livy, 26, 24.

[1] On the margin of one MS. the following is written, which may be a sentence from the same speech, or a comment of the Epitomator: "A confederacy with democratic institutions always stands in need of external support, owing to the fickleness of the multitude."

PHILIP V.

26. After finishing the celebration of the Nemean games, King Philip of Macedon returned to Argos and laid aside his crown and purple robe, with the view of making a display of democratic equality and good nature. But the more democratic the dress which he wore, the more absolute and royal were the privileges which he claimed. He was not now content with seducing unmarried women, or even with intriguing with married women, but assumed the right of sending authoritatively for any woman whose appearance struck him; and offered violence to those who did not at once obey, by leading a band of revellers to their houses; and, summoning their sons or their husbands, he trumped up false pretexts for menacing them. In fact his conduct was exceedingly outrageous and lawless. But though this abuse of his privileges as a guest was exceedingly annoying to many of the Achaeans, and especially to the orderly part of them, the wars that threatened them on every side compelled them to show a patience under it uncongenial to their character. . . .

King Philip's conduct at Argos after presiding at the Nemean games, B.C. 208. See Livy, 27, 30, 31.

None of his predecessors had better qualifications for sovereignty, or more important defects, than this same Philip. And it appears to me that the good qualities were innate, while the defects grew upon him as he advanced in years, as happens to some horses as they grow old. Such remarks I do not, following some other historians, confine to prefaces; but when the course of my narrative suggests it, I state my opinion of kings and eminent men, thinking that most convenient for writer and reader alike. . . .

War between Antiochus the Great (III.) and Arsaces III., King of the Parthians. B.C. 212-205. *See above* 8, 25.

27. In regard to extent of territory Media is the most considerable of the kingdoms in Asia, as also in respect of

the number and excellent qualities of its men, and not less so of its horses. For, in fact, it supplies nearly all Asia with these animals, the royal studs being entrusted to the Medes because of the rich pastures in their country.[1] To protect it from the neighbouring barbarians a ring of Greek cities was built round it by the orders of Alexander. The chief exception to this is Ecbatana, which stands on the north of Media, in the district of Asia bordering on the Maeotis and Euxine. It was originally the royal city of the Medes, and vastly superior to the other cities in wealth and the splendour of its buildings. It is situated on the skirts of Mount Orontes, and is without walls, though containing an artificially formed citadel fortified to an astonishing strength. Beneath this stands the palace, which it is in some degree difficult to describe in detail, or to pass over in complete silence. To those authors whose aim is to produce astonishment, and who are accustomed to deal in exaggeration and picturesque writing, this city offers the best possible subject; but to those who, like myself, are cautious when approaching descriptions which go beyond ordinary notions, it presents much difficulty and embarrassment. However, as regards size, the palace covers ground the circuit of which is nearly seven stades; and by the costliness of the structure in its several parts it testifies to the wealth of its original builders: for all its woodwork being cedar or cypress not a single plank was left uncovered; beams and fretwork in the ceilings, and columns in the arcades and peristyle, were overlaid with plates of silver or gold, while all the tiles were of silver. Most of these had been stripped off during the invasion of Alexander and the Macedonians, and the rest in the reigns of Antigonus and Seleucus Nicanor. However, even at the time of Antiochus's arrival, the temple of Aena[2] still had its columns covered with gold, and a considerable number of silver tiles had been piled up in it, and some few gold bricks and a good many silver ones were still remaining. It was

Description of Media, and of the palace at Ecbatana.

[1] See 5, 44.

[2] This goddess is variously called Anaitis (Plut. *Artax.* 27) and Nanea (2 Macc. 1, 13). And is identified by Plutarch with Artemis, and by others with Aphrodite.

from these that the coinage bearing the king's impress was collected and struck, amounting to little less than four thousand talents. . . .

28. Arsaces expected that Antiochus would come as far as this district (of Media), but that he would not venture to proceed across the adjoining desert with so large a force, if for no other reason, yet from the scarcity of water. For in this tract of country there is no water appearing on the surface, though there are many subterranean channels which have well-shafts sunk to them, at spots in the desert unknown to persons unacquainted with the district. A true account of these channels has been preserved among the natives to the effect that, during the Persian ascendency, they granted the enjoyment of the profits of the land to the inhabitants of some of the waterless districts for five generations, on condition of their bringing fresh water in; and that, there being many large streams flowing down Mount Taurus, these people at infinite toil and expense constructed these underground channels through a long tract of country, in such a way, that the very people who now use the water are ignorant of the sources from which the channels are originally supplied.

The nature of the desert between Media and Parthia.

When, however, Arsaces saw that Antiochus was determined to attempt to cross the desert, he endeavoured at once to choke up and spoil the wells. But King Antiochus, upon this being reported to him, despatched Nicomedes with a thousand horse; who found that Arsaces had retired with his main army, but came upon some of his cavalry in the act of choking up the shafts which went down into the underground channels. They promptly attacked these men, and, having routed and forced them to fly, returned back again to Antiochus. The king, having thus accomplished the journey across the desert, arrived before the city Hecatompylos, which is situated in the centre of Parthia, and derives its name from the fact that the roads which lead to all the surrounding districts converge there.

Antiochus prepares to cross it: Arsaces orders the wells to be choked.

Antiochus arrives at Hecatompylos.

29. Having rested his army at this place, and having convinced himself that, had Arsaces been able to give him

battle, he would not have abandoned his own country, nor have sought a ground more favourable to his own army for fighting him than the district round Hecatompylos; he concluded that, since he had done so, it stood to reason that he had entirely changed his mind. He therefore decided to advance into Hyrcania. But having arrived at Tagae, he learnt from the natives that the country he had to cross, until he reached the ridges of Mount Labus sloping down into Hyrcania, was exceedingly rough and difficult, and that large numbers of barbarians were stationed at the narrowest points. He therefore resolved to divide his light-armed troops into companies, and distribute their officers among them, giving them directions as to the route they were severally to take. He did the same with the pioneers, whose business it was to make the positions occupied by the light-armed possible of approach for the phalanx and beasts of burden. Having made these arrangements, he entrusted the first division to Diogenes, strengthening him with bowmen and slingers and some mountaineers skilled in throwing javelines and stones, and who, without keeping any regular order, were always ready to skirmish at a moment's notice, and in any direction, and rendered the most effective assistance at the narrow passes. Next to these he ordered a company of about two thousand Cretans armed with shields to advance, under the command of Polyxenidas of Rhodes. The rear was to be brought up by companies armed with breastplate and shield, and commanded by Nicomedes of Cos, and Nicolaus the Aetolian.

Antiochus determines to follow Arsaces into Hyrcania.

30. But as they advanced, the ruggedness of the ground and the narrowness of the passes were found to far exceed the king's expectations. The length of the ascent was altogether about three hundred stades; and a great part had to be made up the bed of a winter torrent of great depth, into which numerous rocks and trees had been hurled by natural causes from the overhanging precipices, and made a passage up it difficult, to say nothing of the obstacles which the barbarians had helped to construct expressly to impede them. These latter had felled a large number of trees and piled up heaps of huge rocks; and had

The ascent of Mount Labus.

besides occupied all along the gully the high points, which were at once convenient for attack and capable of covering themselves; so that, if it had not been for one glaring error on their part, Antiochus would have found the attempt beyond his powers, and would have desisted from it. The error was this. They assumed that the whole army would be obliged to march the entire way up the gully, and they accordingly occupied the points of vantage. But they did not perceive this fact, that, though the phalanx and the baggage could not possibly go by any other route than the one they supposed, there was yet nothing to make it impossible for the light-armed and active troops to accomplish the ascent of the bare rocks. Consequently, as soon as Diogenes had come upon the first outpost of the enemy, he and his men began climbing out of the gully, and the affair at once took a different aspect. For no sooner had they come to close quarters, than, acting on the suggestion of the moment, Diogenes avoided the engagement by ascending the mountains that flanked the enemy's position, and so got above him; and by pouring down volleys of darts and stones he seriously harassed the barbarians. Their most deadly weapons however proved to be the slings, which could carry a great distance; and when by these means they had dislodged the first outpost and occupied their position, an opportunity was secured for the pioneers to clear the way and level it, without being exposed to danger. Owing to the number of hands the work went on rapidly; and meanwhile the slingers, bowmen, and javelin-men advanced in skirmishing order along the higher ground, every now and then reforming and seizing on strong points of vantage; while the men with shields formed a reserve, marching in order and at a regular pace along the side of the gully itself. The barbarians thereupon abandoned their positions, and, ascending the mountain, mustered in full force on the summit.

31. Thus Antiochus effected this ascent without loss, but slowly and painfully, for it was not until the eighth day that his army made the summit of Labus. The barbarians being mustered there, and resolved to dispute his passage, a severe engagement took place, in which the barbarians were eventually dislodged, and

The battle on the summit of Mount Labus.

by the following manœuvre. As long as they were engaged face to face with the phalanx, they kept well together and fought desperately; but before daybreak the light-armed troops had made a wide circuit, and seized some high ground on the rear of the enemy, and as soon as the barbarians perceived this they fled in a panic. King Antiochus exerted himself actively to prevent a pursuit, and caused a recall to be sounded, because he wished his men to make the descent into Hyrcania, without scattering, and in close order. He accomplished his object: reached Tambrax, an unwalled city of great size and containing a royal palace, and there encamped. Most of the natives fled from the battle-field, and its immediate neighbourhood, into a city called Sirynx, which was not far from Tambrax, and from its secure and convenient situation was considered as the capital of Hyrcania. Antiochus therefore determined to carry this town by assault; and having accordingly advanced thither, and pitched his camp under its walls, he commenced the assault. The operation consisted chiefly of mining under pent-houses. For the city was defended by three trenches, thirty cubits broad and fifteen deep, with a double vallum on the edge of each; and behind these there was a strong wall. Frequent struggles took place at the works, in which neither side were strong enough to carry off their killed and wounded: for these hand-to-hand battles took place, not above ground only, but underground also in the mines. However, owing to the numbers employed and the activity of the king, it was not long before the trenches were choked up and the walls were undermined and fell. Upon this the barbarians, giving up all as lost, put to death such Greeks as were in the town; and having plundered all that was most worth taking, made off under cover of night. When the king saw this, he despatched Hyperbasus with the mercenaries; upon whose approach the barbarians threw down their booty and fled back again into the city; and when they found the peltasts pouring in energetically through the breach in the walls they gave up in despair and surrendered.

He reaches Tambrax.

Capture of Sirynx.

THE HANNIBALIAN WAR

32. The Consuls, wishing to reconnoitre the slope of the hill towards the enemy's camp, ordered their main force to remain in position; while they themselves with two troops of cavalry, their lictors, and about thirty velites advanced to make the reconnaisance. Now some Numidians, who were accustomed to lie in ambush for those who came on skirmishes, or any other services from the Roman camp, happened, as it chanced, to have ensconced themselves at the foot of the hill. Being informed by their look-out man that a body of men was coming over the brow of the hill above them, they rose from their place of concealment, ascended the hill by a side road, and got between the Consuls and their camp. At the very first charge they killed Claudius and some others, and having wounded the rest, forced them to fly in different directions down the sides of the hill. Though the men in camp saw what was happening, they were unable to come to the relief of their endangered comrades; for while they were still shouting out to get ready, and before they had recovered from the first shock of their surprise, while some were putting the bridles on their horses and others donning their armour, the affair was all over. The son of Claudius, though wounded, narrowly escaped with his life.

B.C. 208. Coss. M. Claudius Marcellus, T. Quinctius Crispinus. The two Consuls were encamped within three miles of each other, between Venusia and Bantia, Hannibal had been at Lacinium in Bruttii, but had advanced into Apulia. Livy, 27, 25-27.

Death of the Consul M. Claudius Marcellus.

Thus fell Marcus Marcellus from an act of incautiousness unworthy of a general. I am continually compelled in the course of my history to draw the attention of my readers to occurrences of this sort; for I perceive that it is this, more than anything else connected with the science of tactics, that ruins commanders. And yet the blunder is a very obvious one. For what is the use of a commander or general, who has not learnt that the leader ought to keep as far as possible aloof from those minor operations, in which the whole fortune of the campaign is not involved? Or of one who does not know that,

even if circumstances should at times force them to engage in such subordinate movements, the commanders-in-chief should not expose themselves to danger until a large number of their company have fallen? For, as the proverb has it, the experiment should be made "on the worthless Carian"[1] not on the general. For to say "I shouldn't have thought it,"—"Who would have expected it?" seems to me the clearest proof of strategical incompetence and dulness.

Fiat experimentum in corpore vili.

33. And so, though Hannibal's claims to be reckoned a great general are manifold, there is none more conspicuous than this, that though engaged for a great length of time in an enemy's country, and though he experienced a great variety of fortune, he again and again inflicted a disaster on his opponents in minor encounters, but never suffered one himself, in spite of the number and severity of the contests which he conducted: and the reason, we may suppose was, that he took great care of his personal safety. And very properly so: for if the leader escapes uninjured and safe, though a decisive defeat may have been sustained, fortune offers many opportunities for retrieving disasters; but if he has fallen, the pilot as it were of the ship, even should fortune give the victory to the army, no real advantage is gained; because all the hopes of the soldiers depend upon their leaders. So much for those who fall into such errors from foolish vanity, childish parade, ignorance, or contempt. For it is ever one or the other of these that is at the bottom of such disasters. . . .

An incident in the attempt of Hannibal to enter Salapia, under cover of a letter sealed by the ring of the dead Consul Marcus. Livy, 27, 28.

They suddenly let down the portcullis, which they had raised somewhat by pulleys, and thus closed up the gateway. Then they took the men and crucified them before the walls. . . .

[1] This proverb perhaps arose from the frequent employment of the non-Hellenic Carians as mercenaries. Cp. Plato, *Laches*, 187 B; *Euthydemus*, 285 B; Euripides, *Cyclops*, 654.

SCIPIO IN SPAIN

34. In Iberia Publius Scipio took up his winter quarters at Tarraco, as I have already stated; and secured the fidelity and affection of the Iberians, to begin with, by the restoration of the hostages to their respective families. He found a voluntary supporter of his measures in the person of Edeco, the prince of the Edetani; who no sooner heard that New Carthage had been taken, and that Scipio had got his wife and children into his hands, than, concluding that the Iberians would change sides, he resolved to take the lead in the movement: conceiving that, by acting thus, he would best be able to get back his wife and children, and at the same time have the credit of joining the Romans by deliberate choice, and not under compulsion. And so it turned out. For as soon as the armies were dismissed to their winter quarters, he came to Tarraco, accompanied by his kinsfolk and friends; and there being admitted to an interview with Scipio, he said that "he thanked the gods heartily that he was the first of the native princes to come to him; for whereas the others were still sending ambassadors to the Carthaginians and looking to them for support,—even while stretching out their hands to the Romans,—he was come there to offer not only himself, but his friends and kinsfolk also, to the protection of Rome. If therefore he should have the honour to be regarded by him as a friend and ally, he would be able to render him important service both in the present and the future. For as soon as the Iberians saw that he had been admitted to Scipio's friendship, and had obtained what he asked, they would all come in with a similar object, hoping to have their relatives restored, and to enjoy the alliance of Rome. Their affection being secured for the future by receiving such a mark of honour and benevolence, he would have in them sincere and ready coadjutors in all his future undertakings. He therefore asked to have his wife and children restored to him, and to be allowed to return home an acknowledged friend of Rome; in order that he might have a reasonable pretext

Winter of B.C. 209-208. See *supra*. ch. 20.

The adhesion of Edeco, prince of the Edetani.

for showing, to the best of his power, his own and his friends' affection for Scipio himself and for the Roman cause."

Edeco is followed by other tribes. B.C. 209-8.

35. When Edeco had finished his speech, Scipio, who had been ready to gratify him from the first, and took the same view as to the policy of the proceeding, delivered him his wife and children, and granted the friendship which he asked. More than this, his subtle intellect made an extraordinary impression on the Iberian in the course of the interview; and having held out splendid hopes to all his companions for the future, he allowed him to return to his own country. This affair having rapidly got wind, all the tribes living north of the Ebro, such as had not done so before, joined the Romans with one consent.

Thus so far everything was going well with Scipio. After the departure of these people, he broke up his naval force, seeing that there was nothing to resist him at sea; and selecting the best of the crews, he distributed them among the maniples, and thus augmented his land forces.

Andobales and Mandonius abandon Hasdrubal.

But Andobales and Mandonius, the most powerful princes of the day in Iberia, and believed to be the most sincerely devoted to the Carthaginians, had long been secretly discontented and on the look-out for an opportunity: ever since Hasdrubal, under a pretence of having a doubt of their loyalty, had demanded a large sum of money, and their wives and daughters as hostages, as I have already narrated.[1] And thinking that a convenient opportunity had now come, they got together their own forces, and, quitting the Carthaginian camp under cover of night, occupied a position sufficiently strong to secure their safety. Upon this, most of the other Iberians also abandoned Hasdrubal: having long been annoyed at the overbearing conduct of the Carthaginians, and now seizing the first opportunity to manifest their feelings.

36. This has often happened to people before. For though, as I have many times remarked, success in a campaign and victory over one's enemies are great things, it requires much greater skill and caution to use such successes well. Accord-

[1] See 9, 11.

ingly, you will find that those who have gained victories are many times more numerous than those who have made good use of them. The Carthaginians at this crisis are an instance in point. After conquering the Roman armies, and slaying both the generals, Publius and Gnaeus Scipio, imagining that Iberia was their own without dispute, they began treating the natives tyrannically; and accordingly found enemies in their subjects instead of allies and friends. And they were quite rightly served, for imagining that the conduct necessary for keeping power was something different from that necessary for obtaining it; and for failing to understand that they keep empire best, who best maintain the same principles in virtue of which they gained it. And yet it is obvious enough, and has been again and again demonstrated, that men gain power by beneficent actions, and by holding out hopes of advantage to those with whom they are dealing; but that, as soon as they have got what they wanted, and begin to act wickedly and rule despotically, it is but natural that, as their rulers have changed, the feelings of the subjects should change too. So it was with the Carthaginians.

37. Surrounded by such difficulties Hasdrubal was agitated by many conflicting emotions and anxieties. He was vexed by the desertion of Andobales; vexed by the opposition and feud between himself and the other commanders; and greatly alarmed as to the arrival of Scipio, expecting that he would immediately bring his forces to attack him. Perceiving therefore that he was being abandoned by the Iberians, and that they were joining the Romans with one accord, he decided upon the following plan of action. He resolved that he must collect the best force he could, and give the enemy battle: if fortune declared in his favour he could then consider his next step in safety, but if the battle turned out unfavourably for him, he would retreat with those that survived into Gaul; and collecting from that country as many of the natives as he could, would go to Italy, and take his share in the same fortune as his brother Hannibal.

While Hasdrubal was arriving at this resolution, Publius Scipio was rejoined by Gaius Laelius; and, being informed by him of the orders of the Senate, he

Early in B.C. 208, Scipio moves

southward to attack Hasdrubal in the valley of the Baetis. Livy, 27, 18-19.

collected his forces from their winter quarters and began his advance: the Iberians joining him on the march with great promptness and hearty enthusiasm. Andobales had long been in communication with Scipio: and, on the latter approaching the district in which he was entrenched, he left his camp with his friends and came to Scipio. In this interview he entered upon a defence of himself in regard to his former friendship with the Carthaginians, and spoke of the services he had done them, and the fidelity which he had shown to them. He then went on to narrate the injustice and tyranny which he had experienced at their hands; and demanded that Scipio himself should be the judge of his pleas. If he were shown to be making ungrounded complaints against the Carthaginians, he might justly conclude him incapable of keeping faith with the Romans either: but if, on a review of these numerous acts of injustice he were proved to have had no other course than to desert the Carthaginians, Scipio might confidently expect that, if he now elected to join the Romans, he would be firm in his loyalty to them.

38. Andobales added many more arguments before finishing his speech; and when he had done, Scipio answered by saying that "he quite believed what he had said; and that he had the strongest reason for knowing about the insolent conduct of the Carthaginians, both from their treatment of the other Iberians, and conspicuously from their licentious behaviour to their wives and daughters, whom he had found occupying the position, not of hostages, but of captives and slaves; and to whom he had preserved such inviolable honour as could scarcely have been equalled by their very fathers themselves." And upon Andobales and his companions acknowledging that they were quite aware of this, and falling at his feet and calling him king, all present expressed approval. Whereupon Scipio with emotion bade them "fear nothing, for they would experience nothing but kindness at the hands of the Romans." He at once handed over his daughters to Andobales; and next day made the treaty with him, the chief provision of which was that he should follow the Roman commanders and obey their

Andobales joins Scipio.

commands. This being settled, he returned to his camp; brought over his army to Scipio; and, having joined camps with the Romans, advanced with them against Hasdrubal.

Now the Carthaginian general was encamped at Baecula, in the district of Castulo, not far from the silver mines. But when he learnt the approach of the Romans, he shifted his quarters; and his rear being secured by a river, and having a stretch of tableland in front of his entrenchment of sufficient extent for his troops to manœuvre, and bounded by a steep descent sufficiently deep for security, he stayed quietly in position: always taking care to post pickets on the brow of the descent. As soon as he came within distance, Scipio was eager to give him battle, but was baffled by the strength of the enemy's position. After waiting two days, however, he became anxious, lest by the arrival of Mago and Hasdrubal, son of Gesco, he should find himself surrounded by hostile forces: he therefore determined to venture on an attack and make trial of the enemy.

Hasdrubal changes his position to one of superior strength.

Scipio arrives.

39. His whole army having been got ready for battle, he confined the main body within his camp, but sent out the velites and some picked men of the infantry with orders to assault the brow of the hill and attack the enemy's pickets. His orders were carried out with great spirit. At first the Carthaginian commander watched what was happening without stirring: but when he saw that, owing to the fury of the Roman attack, his men were being hard pressed, he led out his army and drew them up along the brow of the hill, trusting to the strength of the position. Meanwhile Scipio despatched all his light-armed troops with orders to support the advanced guard: and the rest of his army being ready for action, he took half of them under his own command, and going round the brow of the hill to the enemy's left, began assaulting the Carthaginians; while he entrusted the other half to Laelius, with orders to make a similar attack on the right of the enemy. While this was going on, Hasdrubal was still engaged in getting his troops out of camp: for hitherto he had been waiting, because he trusted in the strength of the position, and felt confident that

Scipio successfully assaults Hasdrubal's position.

the enemy would never venture to attempt it. The attack, therefore, took him by surprise, before he was able to get his men on to the ground. As the Romans were now assaulting the two wings of the position which the enemy had not yet occupied, they not only mounted the brow of the hill in safety, but actually advanced to the attack while their opponents were still in all the confusion and bustle of falling in. Accordingly they killed some of them on their exposed flank; while others, who were actually in the act of falling in, they forced to turn and flee. Seeing his army giving way and retreating, Hasdrubal reverted to his preconceived plan; and determining not to stake his all upon this one desperate hazard, he secured his money and his elephants, collected as many of his flying soldiers as he could, and commenced a retreat towards the Tagus, with a view of reaching the passes of the Pyrenees and the Gauls in that neighbourhood.

Hasdrubal retreats, and makes for the Pyrenees.

Scipio did not think it advisable to pursue Hasdrubal at once, for fear of being attacked by the other Carthaginian generals; but he gave up the enemy's camp to his men to pillage.

40. Next morning he collected the prisoners, amounting to ten thousand foot and more than two thousand horse, and busied himself in making arrangements about them. All the Iberians of that district, who were in alliance at that time with the Carthaginians, came in and submitted to the Roman obedience, and in addressing Scipio called him "king." The first to do this and to bow the knee before him had been Edeco, and the next Andobales. On these occasions Scipio had passed the word over without remark; but after the battle, when all alike addressed him by that title, his attention was drawn to it; and he therefore summoned the Iberians to a meeting, and told them that "he quite wished to be called a man of royal liberality by them all, and to be so in the truest sense, but that he had no wish to be a 'king,' nor to be called one by any one; they should address him as general."

Scipio's self-restraint.

Even at this early period of his career, an observer might have remarked the loftiness of Scipio's character. He was

still quite young. His good fortune had been so persistent, that all who came under his rule were led naturally to think and speak of him as a king. Yet he did not lose his self-control; but deprecated this popular impulse and this show of dignity. But this same loftiness of character was still more admirable in the closing scenes of his life, when, in addition to his achievements in Iberia, he crushed the Carthaginians; reduced the largest and fairest districts of Libya, from the Altars of Philaenus to the Pillars of Hercules, under the power of his country; conquered Asia and the kings of Syria; made the best and largest part of the world subject to Rome; and in doing so had numerous opportunities of acquiring regal sway, in whatever parts of the world suited his purpose or wish. For such achievements were enough to have kindled pride, not merely in any human breast, but even, if I may say so without irreverence, in that of a god. But Scipio's greatness of soul was so superior to the common standard of mankind, that he again and again rejected what Fortune had put within his grasp, that prize beyond which men's boldest prayers do not go—the power of a king: and he steadily preferred his country and his duty to that royalty, which men gaze at with such admiration and envy.

Scipio occupies the position evacuated by the Carthaginians.

Scipio next proceeded to select from the captives the native Iberians, and all these he dismissed to their homes without ransom; and bidding Andobales select three hundred of the horses, he distributed the remainder among those who had none. For the rest, he at once occupied the entrenchment of the Carthaginians, owing to its excellent situation; and there he remained himself, waiting to see the movements of the other Carthaginian generals; while he detached a body of men to the passes of the Pyrenees to keep a look-out for Hasdrubal. After this, as it was getting late in the season, he retired with his army to Tarraco being bent on wintering there. . . .

Winter of B.C. 208-207.

AFFAIRS IN GREECE

41. The Aetolians had recently become greatly encouraged by the arrival of the Romans and King Attalus: and accordingly began menacing every one, and threatening all with an attack by land, while Attalus and Publius Sulpicius did the same by sea. Wherefore Achaean legates arrived at the court of King Philip entreating his help: for it was not the Aetolians alone of whom they were standing in dread, but Machanidas also, as he was encamped with his army on the frontier of Argos. The Boeotians also, in fear of the enemy's fleet, were demanding a leader and help from the king. Most urgent of all, however, were the Euboeans in their entreaties to him to take some precaution against the enemy. A similar appeal was being made by the Acarnanians; and there was an embassy even from the Epirotes. News had arrived that both Scerdilaidas and Pleuratus were leading out their armies: and, over and above this, that the Thracian tribes on the frontier of Macedonia, especially the Maedi, were planning to invade Macedonia, if the king were induced to stir from his realm however short a distance. Moreover the Aetolians were already securing the pass of Thermopylae with trenches and stockades and a formidable garrison, satisfied that they would thus shut out Philip, and entirely prevent him from coming to the assistance of his allies south of the pass. It appears to me that a crisis of this sort is well worth the observation and attention of my readers; for it affords a trial and test of the vigour of the leader affected. As in the hunting-field the wild animals never show their full courage and strength until surrounded and brought to bay,—so it is with leaders. And no more conspicuous instance could be found than this of Philip. He dismissed the various embassies, promising each that he would do his best: and then devoted his attention to the war which surrounded him on all sides, watching to see in what direction, and against which enemy, he had best direct his first attack.

King Philip undertakes to aid the Achaean league, and other Greek states, against a threatened attack of the Aetolians in alliance with Rome, B.C. 208. Cp. Livy, 27, 30. See above Bk. 9, ch. 28-42.

42. Just then intelligence reached him that Attalus had crossed the sea and, dropping anchor at Peparethos, had occupied the island. He therefore despatched a body of men to the islanders to garrison their city; and at the same time despatched Polyphontes with an adequate force into Phocis and Boeotia; and Menippus, with a thousand peltasts and five hundred Agrianes to Chalcis and the rest of Euboea; while he himself advanced to Scotusa, and sent word at the same time to the Macedonians to meet him at that town. But when he learnt that Attalus had sailed into the port of Nicaea, and that the leaders of the Aetolians were collecting at Heraclea, with the purpose of holding a conference together on the immediate steps to be taken, he started with his army from Scotusa, eager to hurry thither and break up their meeting. He arrived too late to interrupt the conference: but he destroyed or carried off the corn belonging to the people along the Aenianian gulf, and then returned. After this he left his army in Scotusa once more; and, with the light-armed troops and the royal guard, went to Demetrias, and there remained, waiting to see what the enemy would attempt. To secure that he should be kept perfectly acquainted with all their movements, he sent messengers to the Peparethii, and to his troops in Phocis and Euboea, and ordered them to telegraph to him everything which happened, by means of fire signals directed to Mount Tisaeum, which is a mountain of Thessaly conveniently situated for commanding a view of those places.

43. The method of signalling by fire, which is of the highest utility in the operations of war, has never before been clearly expounded; and I think I shall be doing a service if I do not pass it over, but give an account of it adequate to its importance. Now that opportuneness is of the utmost moment in all undertakings, and pre-eminently so in those of war, no one doubts; and of all the things which contribute to enable us to hit the proper time nothing is more efficacious than fire signals. For they convey intelligence sometimes of what has just happened, sometimes of what is actually going on; and by paying proper attention to them one can get this information at three or four days' journey off, and even more: so that it continually happens that the help

Fire signals.

required may be unexpectedly given, thanks to a message conveyed by fire signals. Now, formerly, as the art of signalling by fire was confined to a single method, it proved in very many cases unserviceable to those employing it. For as it was necessary to employ certain definite signals which had been agreed upon, and as possible occurrences are unlimited, the greater number of them were beyond the competence of the fire signals to convey. To take the present instance: it was possible by means of the signals agreed upon to send the information that a fleet had arrived at Oreus or Peparethos or Chalcis; but it was impossible to express that "certain citizens had gone over to the enemy," or "were betraying the town," or that "a massacre had taken place," or any of those things which often occur, but which cannot be all anticipated. Yet it is precisely the unexpected occurrences which demand instant consideration and succour. All such things then were naturally beyond the competence of fire signalling, inasmuch as it was impossible to adopt an arbitrary sign for things which it was impossible to anticipate.

The improvement introduced by Aeneas Tactitus.

44. Aeneas, therefore, the writer of the treatise on tactics, wished to correct this defect, and did in fact make some improvement; but his invention still fell very far short of what was wanted, as the following passage from his treatise will show.[1] "Let those who wish," he says, "to communicate any matter of pressing importance to each other by fire-signals prepare two earthenware vessels of exactly equal size both as to diameter and depth. Let the depth be three cubits, the diameter one. Then prepare corks of a little shorter diameter than that of the vessels: and in the middle of these corks fix rods divided into equal portions of three fingers' breadth, and let each of these portions be marked with a clearly distinguishable line: and in each let there be written one of the most obvious and universal of those events which occur in war; for instance in the first 'cavalry have entered the country,' in the second 'hoplites,' in the third 'light-armed,' in the next

[1] This passage does not occur in the extant treatise of Aeneas; but is apparently referred to (ch. 7, § 4) as being contained in a preparatory treatise (παρασκευαστικὴ βίβλος).

'infantry and cavalry,' in another 'ships,' in another 'corn,' and so on, until all the portions have written on them the events which may reasonably be expected to occur in the particular war. Then carefully pierce both the vessels in such a way that the taps shall be exactly equal and carry off the same amount of water. Fill the vessels with water and lay the corks with their rods upon its surface, and set both taps running together. This being done, it is evident that if there is perfect equality in every respect between them, both corks will sink exactly in proportion as the water runs away, and both rods will disappear to the same extent into the vessels. When they have been tested, and the rate of the discharge of water has been found to be exactly equal in both, then the vessels should be taken respectively to the two places from which the two parties intend to watch for fire signals. As soon as any one of those eventualities which are inscribed upon the rods takes place, raise a lighted torch, and wait until the signal is answered by a torch from the others: this being raised, both parties are to set the taps running together. When the cork and rod on the signalling side has sunk low enough to bring the ring containing the words which give the desired information on a level with the rim of the vessel, a torch is to be raised again. Those on the receiving side are then at once to stop the tap, and to look at the words in the ring of the rod which is on a level with the rim of their vessel. This will be the same as that on the signalling side, assuming everything to be done at the same speed on both sides."

45. Now this method, though introducing a certain improvement in the system of fire signalling, is still wanting in definiteness: for it is evident that it is neither possible to anticipate, or, if you could anticipate, to write upon the rod every possible thing that may happen: and therefore, when anything unexpected in the chapter of accidents does occur, it is plainly impossible to communicate it by this method. Besides, even such statements as are written on the rods are quite indefinite; for the number of cavalry or infantry that have come, or the particular point in the territory which they have entered, the number of ships, or the amount of corn, cannot be expressed. For

The drawbacks to this method.

what cannot be known before it happens cannot have an arrangement made for expressing it. And this is the important point. For how is one to take proper measures for relief without knowing the number or direction of the enemy? Or how can the party to be relieved feel confidence or the reverse, or indeed have any conception at all of the situation, if it does not know how many ships or how much corn have been despatched by the allies?

The improved method of Cleoxenus and Democlitus.

But the last method which was hit upon by Cleoxenus and Democlitus, and further elaborated by myself, is above all things definite, and made capable of indicating clearly whatever is needed at the moment; but in its working it requires attention and more than ordinarily close observation. It is as follows: Divide the alphabet into five groups of five letters each (of course the last group will be one letter short, but this will not interfere with the working of the system). The parties about to signal to each other must then prepare five tablets each, on which the several groups of letters must be written. They must then agree that the party signalling shall first raise two torches, and wait until the other raises two also. The object of this is to let each other know that they are attending. These torches having been lowered, the signalling party raises first torches on the left to indicate which of the tablets he means: for instance, one if he means the first, two if he means the second, and so on. He next raises torches on the right showing in a similar manner by their number which of the letters in the tablet he wishes to indicate to the recipient.

46. This matter being agreed upon, the two parties must go to their respective points of observation; and each must have, to begin with, a stenoscope with two funnels, to enable him to distinguish through one the right, through the other the left position of the signaller opposite him. Near this stenoscope the tablets must be fixed, and both points, to the right and to the left, must be defended by a fence ten feet long and about the height of a man, in order to make it clear on which side the torches are raised, and to hide them entirely when they are lowered. These preparations completed on both sides, when a man wishes, for instance, to send the

message "Some of our soldiers to the number of a hundred have deserted to the enemy,"—the first thing to do is to select words that may give the same information with the fewest letters, for instance, "A hundred Cretans have deserted," for thus the number of letters is diminished by more than a half and the same information is given. This sentence having been written on a tablet will be transmitted by five signals thus: The first letter is κ, this comes in the second group of letters and therefore on the second tablet; the signaller therefore must raise two torches on the left to show the recipient that he must look at the second tablet; then he will raise five on the right, because κ is the fifth letter in the group,[1] which the recipient must thereupon write on his tablet. Then the signaller must raise four torches on the left, for ρ is in that group, and two on the right, because it is the second in the fourth group, and the recipient will write ρ on his tablet: and so on for the other letters.

47. Now everything that happens can be definitely imparted by means of this invention; but the number of torches employed is large, because each letter has to be indicated by two series of them: still, if proper preparations are made, the thing can be adequately carried out. But whichever method is employed, those who use it must practise beforehand, in order that when the actual occasion for putting it in use arises they may be able to give each other the information without any hitch. For there are plenty of instances to show what a wide difference there is between the way an operation is carried out by men who hear of it for the first time, and by men who have become habituated to it. Many things which were considered not only difficult, but impossible at first, are, after an interval of time and practice, performed with the greatest ease. I could give many illustrations of the truth of this remark, but the clearest may be found in the art of reading. Put side by side

[1] The grouping of these letters will be as follows:—

	1	2	3	4	5
1	α	ζ	λ	π	ϕ
2	β	η	μ	ρ	χ
3	γ	θ	ν	σ	ψ
4	δ	ι	ξ	τ	ω
5	ϵ	κ	o	υ	

a man who has never learnt his letters, though otherwise acute, and a child who has acquired the habit, and give the latter a book, and bid him read it: the former will clearly not be induced to believe that the reader has first to attend to the look of each of the letters, secondly to their sound-value, and thirdly to their combinations with others, each of which operation requires a certain time. Therefore when he sees the boy, without a pause for thought, reading off seven or five lines at a breath, he will not easily be induced to believe that he has not read the book before; and certainly not, if he is able also to observe the appropriate enunciation, the proper separations of the words, and the correct use of the rough and smooth breathings. The moral is, not to give up any useful accomplishment on account of its apparent difficulties, but to persevere till it becomes a matter of habit, which is the way mankind have obtained all good things. And especially is this right when the matters in question are such as are often of decisive importance to our safety.

I was led to say this much in connexion with my former assertion that "all the arts had made such progress in our age that most of them were reduced in a manner to exact sciences." And therefore this too is a point in which history properly written is of the highest utility. . . .

ANTIOCHUS IN PARTHIA, B.C. 209-5. See ch. 31.

48. The Apasiacae live between the rivers Oxus and Tanais, the former of which falls into the Hyrcanian Sea, the latter into the Palus Maeotis.[1] Both are large enough to be navigable; and it seems surprising how the Nomads managed to come by land into Hyrcania along with their horses. Two accounts are given of this affair, one of them probable, the other very surprising yet not impossible. The Oxus rises in the Caucasus, and being much augmented by tributaries in Bactria, it rushes through the level plain with a violent and turbid stream. When it reaches the desert it dashes its

The entrance of the Nomad Scythians into Hyrcania.

[1] Polybius confuses the Tanais (Don) with another Tanais or Iaxartes flowing into the south-east part of the Caspian.

stream against some precipitous rocks with a force raised to such tremendous proportions by the mass of its waters, and the declivity down which it has descended, that it leaps from the rocks to the plain below leaving an interval of more than a stade between the rock and its falls. It is through this space that they say the Apasiacae went on foot with their horses into Hyrcania, under the fall, and keeping close to the rock. The other account is more probable on the face of it. It is said that, as the basin of the river has extensive flats into which it descends with violence, the force of the stream makes hollows in them, and opens chasms into which the water descends deep below the surface, and so is carried on for a short way, and then reappears: and that the barbarians, being well acquainted with the facts, make their way on horseback, over the space thus left dry, into Hyrcania. . . .

Battle on the river Arius between Antiochus and the Bactrians.

49. News being brought that Euthydemus[1] with his force was at Tapuria, and that a body of ten thousand horsemen were keeping guard at the passage of the river Arius, he decided to abandon the siege and attack these last. The river was three days' march away. For two days therefore he marched at a moderate speed; but on the third, after dinner, he gave orders for the rest of his army to start next day at daybreak; while he himself, with the cavalry and light-armed troops and ten thousand peltasts, started in the night and pushed on at a great rate. For he was informed that the cavalry of the enemy kept guard by day on the bank of the river, but at night retired to a city more than twenty stades off. Having completed therefore the rest of the way under cover of night, the plains being excellent for riding, he got the greater part of his army across the river by daybreak, before the enemy came back. When their scouts told them what had happened, the horsemen of the Bactrians hastened to the rescue, and fell in with their opponents while on the march. Seeing that he must stand the first charge of the enemy, the king summoned the two thousand horsemen who were accustomed to fight round his own person; and issuing orders that the rest were to form their companies and squadrons, and take up their

[1] King of Bactria, see 11, 34.

usual order on the ground on which they already were, he advanced with the two thousand cavalry, and met the charge of the advanced guard of the Bactrians. In this engagement Antiochus is reputed to have shown the greatest gallantry of any of his men. There was heavy loss on both sides: the king's men conquered the first squadron, but when a second and a third charged, they began to be hard pressed and to suffer seriously. At that juncture, most of the cavalry being by this time on the ground, Panaetolus ordered a general advance; relieved the king and his squadrons; and, upon the Bactrians charging in loose order, forced them to turn and fly in confusion. They never drew rein before the charge of Panaetolus, until they rejoined Euthydemus, with a loss of more than half their number. The king's cavalry on the contrary retired, after killing large numbers and taking a great many prisoners, and bivouacked by the side of the river. In this action the king had a horse killed under him, and lost some of his teeth by a blow on the mouth; and his whole bearing obtained him a reputation for bravery of the highest description. After this battle Euthydemus retreated in dismay with his army to the city of Zariaspa in Bactria. . . .

BOOK XI

1. My reason for prefixing a table of contents to each book, rather than a preface, is not because I do not recognise the usefulness of a preface in arresting attention and rousing interest, and also giving facilities for finding any passage that is wanted, but because I find prefaces viewed, though from many inadequate reasons, with contempt and neglect. I therefore had recourse to a table of contents throughout my history, except the first six books, arranged according to Olympiads, as being as effective, or even more so, than a preface, and at the same time as less subject to the objection of being out of place, for it is closely connected with the subject-matter. In the first six books I wrote prefaces, because I thought a mere table of contents less suitable. . . .

After the battle at Baecula, Hasdrubal made good his passage over the Western Pyrenees, and thence through the Cevennes, B.C. 208. *In the spring of* B.C. 207 *he crossed the Alps and descended into Italy, crossed the Po, and besieged Placentia. Thence he sent a letter to his brother Hannibal announcing that he would march southward by Ariminum and meet him in Umbria. The letter fell into the hands of the Consul Nero, who was at Venusia, and who immediately made a forced march northward, joined his colleague at Sena, and the next day attacked Hasdrubal. See above,* 10, 39; *Livy,* 27, 39-49.

Much easier and shorter was Hasdrubal's journey into Italy. . . .[1]

Never at any other time had Rome been in a greater state of excitement and terrified expectation of the result. . . .[2]

[1] See Livy, 27, 39.

[2] Livy, 27, 44.

None of these arrangements satisfied Hasdrubal. But circumstances no longer admitted of delay. He saw the enemy drawn out in battle array and advancing; and he was obliged to get the Iberians and the Gauls who were serving with him into line. He therefore stationed his ten elephants on the front, increased the depth of his lines, and so had his whole army covering a somewhat small ground. He took up a position himself in the centre of the line, immediately behind the elephants, and commenced an advance upon the Roman left, with a full resolution that in this battle he must either conquer or die. Livius advanced to meet the enemy with proud confidence, and having come to close quarters with him was fighting with great gallantry. Meanwhile Claudius, who was stationed on the right wing, found himself unable to advance and outflank the enemy, owing to the rough ground in front of him, relying on which Hasdrubal had directed his advance upon the Roman left: and being embarrassed by his inability to strike a blow, he promptly decided what the circumstances pointed out as the tactics to pursue. He withdrew his men from the right wing, and marched them on the rear of the field of battle; and, after passing the left of the Roman line, fell upon the flank of the Carthaginians who were fighting near the elephants. Up to this point the victory had been doubtful; for both sides fought with desperation, the Romans believing that all would be over with them if they failed, and the Iberians and Carthaginians holding exactly the same conviction for themselves. Moreover the elephants were being of disservice to both sides alike; for finding themselves between two forces, and exposed to a cross-fire of javelins, they kept throwing both the Carthaginian and Roman lines into confusion. But as soon as Claudius fell upon the rear of the enemy the battle ceased to be equal: for the Iberians found themselves attacked on front and rear at once, which resulted in the greater part of them being cut down on the ground. Six of the elephants were killed with the men on them, four forced their way through the lines and were afterwards captured, having been abandoned by their Indian drivers.

Battle of the Metaurus, B.C. 207. Coss. C. Claudius Nero, M. Livius Salinator II.

2. Hasdrubal had behaved on this occasion, as throughout his whole life, like a brave man, and died fighting: and he deserves not to be passed over without remark. I have already stated that Hannibal was his brother, and on his departure to Italy entrusted the command in Iberia to him. I have also described his many contests with the Romans, and the many embarrassing difficulties with which he had to struggle, caused by the generals sent from Carthage to Iberia; and how in all these matters he had supported these vicissitudes and reverses in a noble spirit worthy of a son of Barcas. But I will now speak of his last contest, and explain why he seems to me pre-eminently to deserve respectful attention and imitation. Most generals and kings, when entering upon decisive battles, place before their eyes the glory and advantages to be obtained from victory, and frequently consider and contrive what use they will make of every success; but they do not go on to review the chances of failure, nor contemplate the plan to be adopted, or the action to be taken, in the case of reverse. Yet the former is obvious, the latter requires foresight. Therefore it is that most of them, though in many instances their soldiers have fought nobly, by their own folly and imprudence in this respect have added dishonour to defeat: have disgraced their previous achievements, and rendered themselves, during the remainder of their lives, objects of reproach and contempt. It is easy to see that many leaders make this fatal mistake, and that the difference between one man and another in these points is most signal; for history is full of such instances. Hasdrubal, on the contrary, as long as there was reasonable hope of being able to accomplish anything worthy of his former achievements, regarded his personal safety in battle as of the highest consequence; but when Fortune deprived him of all hopes for the future, and reduced him to the last extremities, though neglecting nothing either in his preparations or on the field that might secure him the victory, nevertheless considered how, in case of total overthrow, he might face his fate and suffer nothing unworthy of his past career.

Hasdrubal falls in the battle.

These remarks are meant for those engaged in active operations, that they may neither dash the hopes of those who

rely upon them by a heedless seeking of danger, nor by an unworthy clinging to life add disgrace and shame to the catastrophies which befall them.

3. Having won the victory, the Romans began pillaging the enemy's camp; and killed a number of the Celts, as they lay stupefied with drunkenness in their beds, like unresisting victims. Then they collected the rest of the booty, from which more than three hundred talents were paid into the treasury. Taking Carthaginians and Celts together, not less than ten thousand were killed, and about two thousand Romans. Some of the principal Carthaginians were taken prisoners, but the rest were put to the sword. When the report reached Rome, people at first could not believe it, from the intensity of their wish that it might be true; but when still more men arrived, not only stating the fact, but giving full details, then indeed the city was filled with overpowering joy; every temple-court was decked, and every shrine full of sacrificial cakes and victims: and, in a word, they were raised to such a pitch of hopefulness and confidence, that every one felt sure that Hannibal, formerly the object of their chief terror, could not after that stay even in Italy. . . .

A speech of the legate from Rhodes[1] *before an assembly of Aetolians at Heraclea in the autumn of* B.C. 207 (*see Livy*, 28, 7), *at the end of the summer campaign.*

4. "Facts I imagine, Aetolians, have made it clear to you that neither King Ptolemy nor the community of Rhodes, Byzantium, Chios, or Mitylene, regard a composition with you as unimportant. For this is not the first or the second time that we have introduced the subject of peace to your assembly; but ever since you entered upon the war we have beset you with entreaties, and have never desisted from warning you on this subject; because we saw that its immediate result would be the destruction of yourselves and of Macedonia, and because

[1] There is nothing to show positively that a Rhodian is the speaker: but Livy mentions envoys from Rhodes and Ptolemy this year. For the special attempts of the Rhodians to bring about a peace between Philip and the Aetolians, see 5, 24, 100.

we foresaw in the future danger to our own countries and to that of all other Greeks. For as, when a man has once set a fire alight, the result is no longer dependent upon his choice, but it spreads in whatever direction chance may direct, guided for the most part by the wind and the combustible nature of the material, and frequently attacks the first author of the conflagration himself: so too, war, when once it has been kindled by a nation, sometimes devours the first those who kindled it; and soon rushes along destroying everything that falls in its way, continually gathering fresh strength, and blown into greater heat by the folly of the people in its neighbourhood, as though by the wind. Wherefore, men of Aetolia, considering that we, as representatives of the whole body of the islanders and of the Greek inhabitants of Asia, are here to beseech you to put an end to war and to choose peace, because the matter affects us as well as you, show your wisdom by listening to us and yielding to our entreaties. For if you were carrying on a war which, though profitless (and most wars are that), was yet glorious from the motive which prompted it, and the reputation likely to accrue from it, you might be pardoned perhaps for a fixed determination to continue it; but if it is a war of the most signal infamy, which can bring you nothing but discredit and obloquy,—does not such an undertaking claim considerable hesitation on your part? We will speak our opinion frankly; and you, if you are wise, will give us a quiet hearing. For it is much better to hear a disagreeable truth now and thereby be preserved, than to listen to smooth things now, and soon afterwards to be ruined yourselves, and to ruin the rest of the Greeks with you.

5. "Put then before your eyes your own folly. You profess to be at war against Philip on behalf of the Greeks, that they may escape from servitude to him; but your war is really for the enslavement and ruin of Greece. That is the tale told by your treaty with Rome, which formerly existed only in written words, but is now seen in full operation. Heretofore, though mere written words, it was a disgrace to you: but now your execution of it has made that disgrace palpable to the eyes of all the world. Moreover, Philip merely lends his name and serves as a pretext for the war: he is not

exposed to any attack: it is against his allies,—the majority of the Peloponnesian states, Boeotia, Euboea, Phocis, Locris, Thessaly, Epirus,—that you have made this treaty, bargaining that their bodies and their goods shall belong to the Romans, their cities and their territory to the Aetolians. And though personally, if you took a city, you would not stoop to violate the freeborn, or to burn the buildings, because you look upon such conduct as cruel and barbarous; yet you have made a treaty by which you have handed over all other Greeks to the barbarians, to be exposed to the most shameful violence and lawlessness. And all this was hitherto kept a secret. But now the fate of the people of Oreus, and of the miserable Aeginetans, has betrayed you to every one,—Fortune having, as though of set purpose, suddenly brought your infatuation before the scenes.

Cp. 9, 39.

"So much for the origin of the war and its events up to now. But as to its result,—supposing everything to go to your wish,—what do you expect that to be? Will it not be the beginning of great miseries to all Greece?

6. "For I presume no one can fail to see that, if once the Romans get rid of the war in Italy,—and this is all but done, now that Hannibal has been confined to a narrow district in Bruttii,—they will direct their whole power upon Greece: professedly, indeed, in aid of the Boeotians against Philip, but really with the view of reducing it entirely under their own power. And if they design to treat it well when they have conquered it, theirs will be the honour and glory; and if badly, theirs too will be the plunder from the states they destroy, and the power over those which they allow to survive: while you will be calling upon the gods to witness your wrongs, when no god will be any longer willing, nor any man be able to help you. Now, perhaps, you ought to have foreseen all this from the first, for that would have been your best course. But since the future often escapes human foresight, now, at any rate, that you have seen by actual experience what has happened, it must be your duty to take better measures for the future. In any case we have omitted nothing which it becomes sincere friends to say or do. We have spoken our opinion about the future with absolute frankness; and you we

urge and entreat not to stand in the way of the freedom and safety of yourselves or of the rest of Greece."

This speaker having, as it seemed, made a considerable impression, he was followed by the ambassadors of Philip, who, without making a long speech, merely said that they were commissioned to do one of two things,—if the Aetolians chose peace, to accept it readily: if not, to call the gods and the ambassadors from Greece to witness that the Aetolians, and not Philip, ought to be held responsible for what happened thereafter, and so to depart. . . .

7. Philip loudly lamented his ill-fortune in having so narrowly missed getting Attalus into his hands. . . . Attalus eludes Philip. Livy, 28, 7, 8, B.C. 207.

On his way to the lake Trichonis Philip arrived at Thermus, where there was a temple of Apollo; and there he once more defaced all the sacred buildings which he had spared on his former occupation of the town. In both instances it was an ill-advised indulgence of temper: for it is a mark of utter unreasonableness to commit an act of impiety against heaven in order to gratify one's wrath against man. . . . Philip at Thermus. See 5, 6-18.

PHILOPOEMEN IN THE PELOPONNESE, B.C. 207

8. There are three methods followed by those who wish to arrive at an intelligent knowledge of tactics. The first is by the study of history, the second by the use of scientific treatises composed by specialists, the third by actual experience on the field. But of all three of these methods the Achaean commanders were equally ignorant. . . . Defects of the Achaean officers.

A very general fault in the men was an unfortunate rivalry, engendered by the ostentation and bad taste of the others. They were very particular about their attendants and their dress; and there was a show of splendour in this, kept up by the majority beyond their means. But to their arms they paid no attention whatever. . . .

Most people, indeed, do not so much as attempt to imitate the real achievements of those who obtain success, but, while trying to reproduce their unimportant peculiarities, succeed only in displaying their own frivolity. . . .

Speech of Philopoemen urging reform.

9. "Brightness in the armour," he said, "contributes much to inspire dismay in the enemy; and care bestowed on having it made to fit properly is of great service in actual use. This will best be secured if you give to your arms the attention which you now bestow on your dress, and transfer to your dress the neglect which you now show of your arms. By thus acting, you will at once save your money, and be undoubtedly able to maintain the interests of your country. Therefore the man who is going to take part in manœuvres or a campaign ought, when putting on his greaves, to see that they are bright and well-fitting, much more than that his shoes and boots are; and when he takes up his shield and helmet, to take care that they are cleaner and more costly than his cloak and shirt: for when men take greater care of what is for show, than of what is for use, there can be no doubt of what will happen to them on the field. I beg you to consider that elaboration in dress is a woman's weakness, and a woman of no very high character either; but costliness and splendour in armour are the characteristics of brave men who are resolved on saving themselves and their country with glory."

The whole audience were so convinced by this speech and so much struck with the wisdom of the advice, that, immediately after leaving the council-chamber, they began pointing with scorn at the over-dressed dandies, and forced some of them to quit the market-place; and what is more, in future manœuvres and campaigns they kept a stricter watch on each other in these points.

Philopoemen's own example.

10. So true it is that a single word spoken by a man of credit is often sufficient not only to turn men from the worst courses, but even to incite them to the noblest. But when such a speaker can appeal to his own life as in harmony with his words, then indeed his exhortation carries a weight which nothing can exceed. And this was above all others the case

with Philopoemen. For in his dress and eating, as well as in all that concerned his bodily wants, he was plain and simple; in his manners to others without ceremony or pretence; and throughout his life he made it his chief aim to be absolutely sincere. Consequently a few unstudied words from him were sufficient to raise a firm conviction in the minds of his hearers; for as he could point to his own life as an example, they wanted little more to convince them. Thus it happened on several occasions, that the confidence he inspired, and the consciousness of his achievements, enabled him in a few words to overthrow long and, as his opponents thought, skilfully argued speeches.

So on this occasion, as soon as the council of the league separated, all returned to their cities deeply impressed both by the words and the man himself, and convinced that no harm could happen to them with him at their head. Immediately afterwards Philopoemen set out on a visitation of the cities, which he performed with great energy and speed. He then summoned a levy of citizens and began forming them into companies and drilling them; and at last, after eight months of this preparation and training, he mustered his forces at Mantinea, prepared to fight the tyrant Machanidas in behalf of the freedom of all the Peloponnesians.

War against Machanidas, tyrant of Sparta. B.C. 208-207.

11. Machanidas had now acquired great confidence, and looked upon the determination of the Achaeans as extremely favourable to his plans. As soon as he heard of their being in force at Mantinea, he duly harangued his Lacedaemonians at Tegea, and the very next morning at daybreak advanced upon Mantinea. He led the right wing of the phalanx himself; his mercenaries marched in two parallel columns on each side of his front; and behind them were carts carrying quantities of field artillery and bolts for the catapults. Meanwhile Philopoemen too had arranged his army in three divisions, and was leading them out of Mantinea, the Illyrians and the men with body armour by the gate leading to the temple of Poseidon, and with them all the rest of the foreign contingent and light-armed troops; by the next gate, toward the west,

Battle of Mantinea, B.C. 207.

The road to Tegea. See Paus. 8, 10 *sq.*

the phalanx; and by the next the Achaean cavalry. He sent his light-armed men forward to occupy the hill, which rises to a considerable height above the road called Xenis and the above-mentioned temple: he stationed the men with body armour next, resting on this hill to the south; next them the Illyrians; next them, in the same straight line, the phalanx, drawn up in companies, with an interval between each, along the ditch which runs towards the temple of Poseidon, right through the middle of the plain of Mantinea, until it touches the range of mountains that forms the boundary of the territory of the Elisphasii. Next to them, on the right wing, he stationed the Achaean cavalry, under the command of Aristaenetus of Dyme; while on the left wing he led the whole of the foreign contingent, drawn up in lines one behind the other.

12. As soon as the enemy were well in sight, Philopoemen went down the ranks of the phalanx, and addressed to them an exhortation which, though short, clearly pointed out to them the nature of the battle in which they were engaged. But most of what he said was rendered inaudible by the answering shouts of the troops. The affection and confidence of the men rose to such a pitch of enthusiasm and zeal that they seemed to be almost acting under a divine inspiration, as they cried out to him to lead them on and fear nothing. However he tried, when he could get the opportunity, to make this much clear to them, that the battle on the one side was to establish a shameful and ignominious servitude, on the other to vindicate an ever-memorable and glorious liberty.

The attack of Machanidas.

Machanidas at first looked as though he meant to attack the enemy's right wing in column; but when he got within moderate distance he deployed into line by the right, and by this extension movement made his right wing cover the same amount of ground as the left wing of the Achaeans, and fixed his catapults in front of the whole force at intervals. Philopoemen understood that the enemy's plan was, by pouring volleys from the catapults into his phalanx, to throw the ranks into confusion: he therefore gave him no time or interval of repose, but opened the

engagement by a vigorous charge of his Tarentines[1] close to the temple of Poseidon, where the ground was flat and suitable for cavalry. Whereupon Machanidas was constrained to follow suit by sending his Tarentines forward also.

The battle begun by light-cavalry charges.

13. At first the struggle was confined to these two forces, and was maintained with spirit. But the light-armed troops coming gradually to the support of such of them as were wavering, in a very short time the whole of the mercenaries on either side were engaged. They fought sometimes in close order, sometimes in pairs: and for a long time so entirely without decisive result, that the rest of the two armies, who were watching in which direction the cloud of dust inclined, could come to no conclusion, because both sides maintained for a long while exactly their original ground. But after a time the mercenaries of the tyrant began to get the better of the struggle, from their numbers, and the superiority in skill obtained by long practice. And this is the natural and usual result. The citizens of a democracy no doubt bring more enthusiasm to their battles than the subjects of a tyrant; but in the same proportion the mercenaries of sovereigns are naturally superior and more efficient than those of a democracy. For in the former case one side is fighting for liberty, the other for a condition of servitude; but in the case of mercenaries, those of the tyrant are encouraged by the certain prospect of reward, those of a democracy know that they must lose by victory: for as soon as a democracy has crushed its assailants, it no longer employs mercenaries to protect its liberties; while a tyranny requires more mercenaries in proportion as its field of ambition is extended: for as the persons injured by it are more numerous, those who plot against it are more numerous also; and the security of despots rests entirely on the loyalty and power of mercenaries.

Defeat of the Achaean right wing.

14. Thus it came about that the mercenaries in the army of Machanidas fought with such fury and violence, that even

[1] The "Tarentines" were horsemen armed with light skirmishing javelins. See 4, 77; 16, 18; and cp. Arrian, *Tact.* 4, § 5; 18, § 2. Livy, 35, 28; 37, 40.

the Illyrians and men with body armour, who formed the reserve supporting the mercenaries of the Achaean army, were unable to withstand their assault; but were all driven from their position, and fled in confusion towards the city of Mantinea, which was about seven stades distant.

And now there occurred an undoubted instance of what some doubt, namely, that the issues in war are for the most part decided by the skill or want of skill of the commanders. For though perhaps it is a great thing to be able to follow up a first success properly, it is a greater thing still that, when the first step has proved a failure, a man should retain his presence of mind, keep a good look-out for any error of judgment on the part of the victors, and avail himself of their mistakes. At any rate one often sees the side, which imagines itself to have obtained a clear victory, ultimately lose the day; while those who seemed at first to have failed recover themselves by presence of mind, and ultimately win an unexpected victory. Both happened on this occasion to the respective leaders.

Machanidas pursues the fugitives, and thus allows the Achaean hoplites to get between him and his quarters.

The whole of the Achaean mercenaries having been driven from their ground, and their left wing having been thoroughly broken up, Machanidas abandoned his original plan of winning the day by outflanking the enemy with some of his forces and charging their front with others, and did neither; but, quite losing his head, rushed forward heedlessly with all his mercenaries in pursuit of the fugitives, as though the panic was not in itself sufficient to drive those who had once given way up to the town gates.

15. Meanwhile the Achaean general was doing all he could to rally the mercenaries, addressing the officers by name, and urging them to stand; but when he saw that they were hopelessly beaten, he did not run away in a panic nor give up the battle in despair, but, withdrawing under cover of his phalanx, waited until the enemy had passed him in their pursuit, and left the ground on which the fighting had taken place empty, and then immediately gave the word to the front companies of the phalanx to wheel to the left, and advance at the double, without breaking their ranks. He thus swiftly occupied the ground abandoned by his mercenaries, and at once cut off the pursuers

from returning, and got on higher ground than the enemy's right wing. He exhorted the men to keep up their courage, and remain where they were, until he gave the word for a general advance; and he ordered Polybius of Megalopolis [1] to collect such of the Illyrians and body armour men and mercenaries as remained behind and had not taken part in the flight, and form a reserve on the flank of the phalanx, to keep a look-out against the return of the pursuers. Thereupon the Lacedaemonians, excited by the victory gained by the light-armed contingent, without waiting for the word of command, brought their sarissae to the charge and rushed upon the enemy. But when in the course of their advance they reached the edge of the dyke, being unable at that point to change their purpose and retreat when at such close quarters with the enemy, and partly because they did not consider the dyke a serious obstacle, as the slope down to it was very gradual, and it was entirely without water or underwood growing in it, they continued their advance through it without stopping to think.

The fight at the dyke.

16. The opportunity for attack which Philopoemen had long foreseen had now arrived. He at once ordered the phalanx to bring their sarissae to the charge and advance. The men obeyed with enthusiasm, and accompanied their charge with a ringing cheer. The ranks of the Lacedaemonians had been disorganised by the passage of the dyke, and as they ascended the opposite bank they found the enemy above them They lost courage and tried to fly; but the greater number of them were killed in the ditch itself, partly by the Achaeans, and partly by trampling on each other. Now this result was not unpremeditated or accidental, but strictly owing to the acuteness of the general. For Philopoemen originally took ground behind the dyke, not to avoid fighting, as some supposed, but from a very accurate and scientific calculation of strategical advantages. He reckoned either that Machanidas when he arrived would advance without thinking of the dyke, and that then his phalanx would get entangled, just as I have described their actually doing; or that if he advanced with a full apprehension of the difficulty

[1] See on 27, 4.

presented by the dyke, and then changing his mind and deciding to shrink from the attempt, were to retire in loose order and a long straggling column,[1] the victory would be his, without a general engagement, and the defeat his adversary's. For this has happened to many commanders, who having drawn up their men for battle, and then concluded that they were not strong enough to meet their opponents, either from the nature of the ground, the disparity of their numbers, or for other reasons, have drawn off in too long a line of march, and hoped in the course of the retreat to win a victory, or at least get safe away from the enemy, by means of their rear guard alone.

17. However, Philopoemen was not deceived in his prognostication of what would happen; for the Lacedaemonians were thoroughly routed. Seeing therefore that his phalanx was victorious and that he had gained a complete and brilliant success, he set himself vigorously to secure the only thing wanting to complete it, that is, to prevent the escape of Machanidas. Seeing therefore that, in the course of the pursuit, he was caught between the dyke and the town with his mercenaries, he waited for him to attempt a return. But when Machanidas saw that his army was in full retreat, with the enemy at their heels, he knew that he had advanced too far, and had lost his chance of victory: he therefore rallied the mercenaries that he had with him, and tried to form close order, and cut his way through the enemy, while they were still scattered and engaged in the pursuit. Some of his men, understanding his plan and seeing no other hope of safety, kept by him at first; but when they came upon the ground, and saw the Achaeans guarding the bridge over the dyke, they lost heart; and the whole company began falling away from him, each doing the best he could to preserve his own life. Thereupon the tyrant gave up all hope of making his way over the bridge; and rode along the edge of the dyke, trying with all his might to find a place which he could cross.

Machanidas, returning from the pursuit, is killed while trying to recross the dyke.

[1] The text is certainly corrupt here, and it is not clear what the general sense of the passage is beyond this,—that Philopoemen calculated on defeating the enemy, as he did, while struggling through the dyke: or on their exposing themselves to attack if they retreated from the dyke without crossing it.

18. Philopoemen recognised Machanidas by his purple cloak and the trappings of his horse. He at once left Anaxidamus, with orders to guard the bridge with vigilance, and give no quarter to any of the mercenaries; because they were the men on whom the despots of Sparta always depended for supporting their power. Then taking Polyaenus of Cyprus and Simias, who were attending on him at the time, he rode along the edge of the ditch opposite to that in which the tyrant and his attendants were; for Machanidas had still two men with him, Arexidamus and one of the mercenaries. As soon as Machanidas had found a spot in the dyke which could be crossed, he put spurs to his horse, and tried to force it to go on and get over. Then Philopoemen turned suddenly round upon him and dealt him a mortal wound with his spear, and a second with a stab from the spike at the butt end of it, and thus killed the tyrant in a hand-to-hand encounter. Those who were riding with him did the same to Arexidamus; but the third man seeing their fall gave up the idea of crossing the dyke and escaped. Simias immediately stripped the bodies of the two who had fallen, and with their armour carried off also the tyrant's head, and then hurried off to overtake the pursuing party; being eager to give the soldiers ocular evidence of the fall of the enemy's commander, that they might continue the pursuit of their opponents with all the more confidence and spirit right up to Tegea. And this in fact added so greatly to the spirit of the men that it contributed more than anything else to their carrying Tegea by assault, and pitching their camp next day on the Eurotas, undisputed masters of all the open country. For many years past they had been vainly trying to drive the enemy from their own borders, but now they were themselves devastating Laconia without resistance, without having lost any great number of their own men in the battle; while they had killed not less than four thousand Lacedaemonians, taken even more prisoners, and possessed themselves of all their baggage and arms. . . .

Death of Machanidas and capture of Tegea.

Achaeans in Laconia.

19. What profit is it to our readers to describe wars and

battles, the storming of cities and the enslavement of their inhabitants, if they are to know nothing of the causes which conduce to success and failure? The results of such operations merely touch the fancy: it is the tracing of the designs of the actors in such scenes that is really instructive; and above all it is the following in detail of each step that can educate the ideas of the student. . . .

ABILITY OF HANNIBAL. See Livy, 28, 12

Who could refrain from speaking in terms of admiration of this great man's strategic skill, courage, and ability, when one looks to the length of time during which he displayed those qualities; and realises to one's self the pitched battles, the skirmishes and sieges, the revolutions and counter-revolutions of states, the vicissitudes of fortune, and in fact the course of his design and its execution in its entirety? For sixteen continuous years Hannibal maintained the war with Rome in Italy, without once releasing his army from service in the field, but keeping those vast numbers under control, like a good pilot, without any sign of disaffection towards himself or towards each other, though he had troops in his service who, so far from being of the same tribe, were not even of the same race. He had Libyans, Iberians, Ligurians, Celts, Phoenicians, Italians, Greeks, who had naturally nothing in common with each other, neither laws, nor customs, nor language. Yet the skill of the commander was such, that these differences, so manifold and so wide, did not disturb the obedience to one word of command and to a single will. And yet circumstances were not by any means unvarying: for though the breeze of fortune often set strongly in his favour, it as often also blew in exactly the opposite direction. There is therefore good ground for admiring Hannibal's display of ability in campaign; and there can be no fear in saying that, if he had reserved his attack upon the Romans until he had first subdued other parts of the world, there is not one of his projects which would have eluded his grasp. As it was, he began with those whom he should have attacked last, and accordingly began and ended his career with them. . . .

B.C. 218-202.

SCIPIO IN SPAIN, AFTER THE BATTLE OF THE METAURUS

20. Hasdrubal having collected his forces from the various towns in which they had wintered, advanced to within a short distance of Ilipa and there encamped; forming his entrenchment at the foot of the mountains, with a plain in front of him well suited for a contest and battle. His infantry amounted to seventy thousand, his cavalry to four thousand, and his elephants to thirty-two. On his part, Scipio sent M. Junius Silanus to visit Colichas and take over from him the forces that had been prepared by him. These amounted to three thousand infantry and five hundred horse. The other allies he received personally in the course of his march up the country to his destination. When he approached Castalo and Baecula, and had there been joined by Marcus Junius and the troops from Colichas, he found himself in a position of great perplexity. For without their allies the Roman forces were not strong enough to risk a battle; yet to do so, in dependence upon the allies for his hopes of ultimate success, appeared to him to be dangerous and too venturesome. In spite however of his perplexity, he was obliged to yield to the force of circumstances so far as to employ the Iberians; but he resolved to do so only to make a show of numbers to the enemy, while he really fought the action with his own legions. With this purpose in his mind he got his whole army on the march, forty-five thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry; and when he had come within the view of the Carthaginians, he pitched his camp on some low hills exactly opposite the enemy.

Hasdrubal son of Gesco encamps near Ilipa (or Silpia) in Baetica, B.C. 206. Livy 28, 13-6.

Scipio advances into Baetica, and encamps close to the Carthaginian forces.

21. Mago thought that it would be an excellent moment to attack the Romans while actually engaged in making their camp; he therefore rode up to the entrenchment with the greater part of his own cavalry and Massanissa with the Numidians, persuaded that he should catch Scipio off his guard. Scipio had how-

Futile attack by Mago.

ever all along foreseen this, and had placed some cavalry equal in number to those of the Carthaginians under cover of some hills. Upon these making an unexpected charge, many of the enemy's horsemen at once took to flight at the startling appearance, and began to make off; while the rest closed with their opponents and fought with great gallantry. But the Carthaginians were disconcerted by the agility of some of the Roman horsemen in dismounting, and after a short resistance they retreated with considerable loss. The retreat was at first conducted in good order: but as the Romans pressed them hard, they broke up their squadrons, and fled for safety to their own camp. This affair gave the Romans better spirits for engaging in a pitched battle, and had the contrary effect on the Carthaginians. However, during the next few days they both drew out on the intervening plain; skirmished with their cavalry and light-armed troops; and, after thus trying each other's mettle, were resolved to bring the matter to the test of a general engagement.

22. On this occasion Scipio appears to have employed a two-fold stratagem. Hasdrubal had been accustomed to make his demonstrations in force somewhat late in the day, with the Libyans in his centre, and the elephants on either wing; while his own practice had been to make his counter-movements somewhat later still, with the Roman soldiers on his centre opposite the Libyans, and the Iberians on his two wings; but the day on which he resolved upon a general engagement, by reversing this arrangement, he greatly contributed to secure the victory for his own men, and succeeded in putting the enemy at a considerable disadvantage. For directly it was light he sent his aides with orders to the tribunes and men to arm, as soon as they had got their breakfasts, and parade outside the camp. The order was obeyed with alacrity because the men suspected what was going to take place. He then sent the cavalry and light-armed forward, with orders to advance close to the enemy's camp, and skirmish boldly up to it; while he himself marched out with the infantry, just as the sun was appearing above the horizon; and on reaching the middle of

Scipio resolves on a general engagement, and alters his disposition so as to make the battle depend upon the Italians rather than the Spaniards.

the plain, made his dispositions in the reverse order to his usual arrangement, placing the Iberians in the centre and the Roman legionaries on the two wings.

The sudden approach of the cavalry to their camp, and the simultaneous appearance of the rest of the army getting into order, left the Carthaginians barely time to get under arms. Hasdrubal was therefore obliged, without waiting for the men to get breakfast, or making any preparations, to despatch his cavalry and light-armed troops at once against the enemy's cavalry on the plain, and to get his infantry into order on some level ground not far from the skirts of the mountains, as was their custom. For a time the Romans remained quiet; but when the morning was getting on, and the engagement between the light-armed troops still continued undecided, because such of them as were forced from their ground retired on their own heavy infantry and then formed again for attack, Scipio at length thought that the time was come. He withdrew his skirmishers through the intervals of the maniples, and then distributed them equally between the two wings on rear of his line, first the velites and behind them the cavalry. He then advanced, at first in line direct; but when he was about a stade [1] from the enemy, he ordered the Iberians to continue the advance in the same order, while he commanded the maniples and squadrons on the right wing to turn outwards to the right, and those on the left wing to the left.

23. Scipio with the three leading squadrons of cavalry from the right wing, preceded by the usual number of velites and three maniples (a combination of troops which the Romans call a cohort), and Lucius Marcius and Marcus Junius with a similar force from the left wing, turned the one to the left the other to the right, and advanced at a great speed in column upon the enemy, the troops in succession forming up and following in column as they wheeled. When these troops were within a short distance of the enemy,—the Iberians in the line direct being still a considerable distance behind, because they were advancing at a deliberate pace,—they came into contact with the two wings of the enemy simultaneously, the Roman forces being in

[1] Or, according to another reading "five stades." Livy, 28, 14, says *quingentos passus*.

column, according to Scipio's original plan. The movements subsequent to this, which resulted in the troops on the rear finding themselves in the same line as the troops in front, and engaged like them with the enemy, were exactly the converse of each other—taking the right and left wings in general, and the cavalry and infantry in particular. For the cavalry and velites on the right wing came into line on the right and tried to outflank the enemy, while the heavy infantry came into line on the left; but on the left wing the heavy infantry came into line by the right, the cavalry and velites by the left. The result of this movement was that, as far as the cavalry and light infantry were concerned, their right became their left. Scipio cared little for this, but was intent on something more important, namely, the outflanking of the enemy. For while a general ought to be quite alive to what is taking place, and rightly so, he ought to use whatever movements suit the circumstances.

The elephants.

24. When these troops were at close quarters the elephants were severely handled, being wounded and harassed on every side by the velites and cavalry, and did as much harm to their friends as to their foes; for they rushed about promiscuously and killed every one that fell in their way on either side alike. As to the infantry,—the Carthaginian wings began to be broken, but the centre occupied by the Libyans, and which was the best part of the army, was never engaged at all. It could not quit its ground to go to the support of the wings for fear of the attack of the Iberians, nor could it by maintaining its position do any actual fighting, because the enemy in front of it did not come to close quarters. However, for a certain time the two wings fought gallantly, because it was for them, as for the enemy, a struggle for life and death. But now the midday heat was become intense, and the Carthaginians began to feel faint, because the unusual time at which they had been forced to come on the field had prevented them from fortifying themselves with the proper food; while the Romans had the advantage in physical vigour as well as in cheerfulness, which was especially promoted by the fact that the prudence of their general had secured his best men being pitted against the weakest troops of the enemy.

Thus hard pressed Hasdrubal's centre began to retreat: at first step by step; but soon the ranks were broken, and the men rushed in confusion to the skirts of the mountain; and on the Romans pressing in pursuit with still greater violence, they began a headlong flight into their entrenchments. Had not Providence interfered to save them, they would promptly have been driven from their camp too; but a sudden storm gathered in the air, and a violent and prolonged torrent of rain descended, under which the Romans with difficulty effected a return to their own camp. . . .

Many Romans lost their lives by the fire in trying to get the silver and gold which had been melted and fused. . . . The Romans in the mining district of Spain.

SCIPIO ON THE EXPULSION OF THE CARTHAGINIANS FROM SPAIN IN CONSEQUENCE OF THE ABOVE VICTORY

When every one complimented Scipio after he had driven the Carthaginians from Iberia, and advised him straightway to take some rest and ease, as having put a period to the war, he answered that he "congratulated them on their sanguine hopes; for himself he was now more than ever revolving in his mind how to begin the war with Carthage. Up to that time the Carthaginians had waged war upon the Romans; but that now fortune put it in the power of the Romans to make war upon them. . . ." Scipio's idea of transferring the war to Africa.

SCIPIO'S VISIT TO SYPHAX, KING OF MASAESYLIANS.

See Livy, 28, 17, 18

In his conversation with Syphax, Scipio, who was eminently endowed by nature in this respect, conducted himself with so much kindness and tact, that Hasdrubal afterwards remarked to Syphax that "Scipio appeared more formidable to him in such an interview than in the field. . . ." Scipio's influence over Syphax.

A MUTINY IN SPAIN

25. When a mutiny broke out among part of the troops in the Roman camp, Scipio, though he had now had a very adequate experience of the difficulties of administration, never felt himself more at a loss how to act or in greater embarrassment. And naturally so. For as in the case of the body, causes of mischief, such as cold, heat, fatigue, or wounds, may be avoided by precautions, or easily relieved when they occur; while those which arise from within the body itself, such as tumours or diseases, are difficult to foresee and difficult to relieve when they do exist, so it is, we must believe, with political and military administration. Against plots from without, and the attacks of enemies, the precautions to be taken and the measures for relief may readily be learned by those who pay the requisite attention; but to decide on the right method of resisting intestine factions, revolutions, and disturbances is difficult, and requires great tact and extreme acuteness; and, moreover, the observation of one maxim suitable in my opinion to all armies, states, and bodies alike, which is this: never in such cases to allow any lengthened idleness or repose, and least of all at a time of success and when provisions are abundant.

Scipio appeases a mutiny in the Roman camp, at Sucro. Livy, 28, 24. In the autumn of B.C. 206.

Being, then, as I have all along said, a man eminently careful, acute, and prompt, Scipio summoned a meeting of the military tribunes and proposed a solution of the existing troubles as follows. He said that "he must promise the soldiers the settlement of their pay; and, in order to create a belief in his promise, he must now take public steps to exact with all speed the contributions which had been already imposed upon the cities for the support of the whole army, with the distinct understanding that the object of that measure was the settlement of the pay: and these same tribunes should return to the army and urge and entreat the men to abandon their rebellious spirit, and come to him to receive their pay, either singly or, if they preferred it, in a body. And

when this was done he would consider, as circumstances arose, what measures it was necessary to take."

26. With this suggestion in their minds these officers deliberated on the means of raising money; and having communicated their decisions to Scipio, he said that he would now consult them on the next necessary step. They accordingly resolved that they would name a day on which all were to appear; and that then they would pardon the general body of the men, but severely punish the instigators of the mutiny, who were as many as thirty-five. The day having arrived, and the mutineers having appeared to make terms and receive their pay, Scipio gave secret instructions to the tribunes, who had been sent on the mission to them, to meet them; and, each of them selecting five of the ringleaders, to greet them with politeness and invite them, if possible, to their own tent, or, if they could not do that, to dinner or some such entertainment. But to the troops with him he sent round orders to have provisions for a considerable period ready in three days' time, because they were to march against the deserter Andobales under Marcus Silanus. When they heard this the mutineers were much emboldened, because they imagined that they would have everything in their own hands, as the other troops would be gone by the time they joined the general.

The mutiny suppressed and the ringleaders executed at New Carthage.

27. Upon the approach of the mutineers, Scipio gave orders to his army to march out the next morning at daybreak with their baggage. But he instructed the tribunes and praefects that, as soon as they met the mutineers, they should order their men to put down their baggage, and keep them under arms at the city gate; and then, placing a detachment at each of the gates, take good care that none of the mutineers should leave the city. The officers who had been sent to meet the men fell in with them on their arrival, and took the ringleaders with every appearance of civility to their own tents, in accordance with the arrangement that had been made. At the same time orders had been given to them to arrest the thirty-five immediately after dinner, and to keep them in fetters: without allowing any one in the tent to go out, except the

messenger who was to inform the general from each of them that this had been accomplished.

The tribunes having done as they were ordered, at daybreak next morning, seeing that the new arrivals were collected in the market-place, the general gave the signal for the assembly of the army. The signal was as usual promptly obeyed by all, for they were curious to see how the general would demean himself in their presence, and what he would say to them about the business in hand. As soon as they were come together, Scipio sent word to the tribunes to bring their soldiers under arms, and station them round the assembled men. He then came forward himself. His first appearance caused an immediate change of feeling. The soldiers supposed that he was still unwell, and when they suddenly saw him, contrary to all expectations, with all the appearance of full health and strength, they were struck with terror.

Scipio's speech to the mutineers.

28. He began his speech by saying that he wondered what their grievances were, or what they looked for forward that induced them to mutiny. For that there were three motives only on which men usually venture to rebel against their country and their commanders,—discontent and anger with their officers; dissatisfaction with their present position; or, lastly, hopes of something better and more glorious. "Now, I ask you," he continued, "which of these can you allege? It is with me, I presume, that you are dissatisfied, because I did not pay you your wages. But this cannot be laid to my charge; for while I was in office your pay was never short. The fault then may lie with Rome that the accumulated arrears have not been settled. Which was your proper course then in that case? To have brought forward your complaint thus, as rebels and enemies to the country that nurtured you, or to have come personally to me and stated your case, and to have begged your friends to support and help you? The latter would have been the better plan in my opinion. In those who serve others for pay it is sometimes pardonable to revolt against their paymasters; but in the case of those who are fighting for themselves, for their own wives and children, it can in no circumstances be conceded. It is just as though, on

the plea of being wronged in money matters by his own father, a man were to come in arms to slay him from whom he received his own life. Or perhaps you may allege that I imposed greater hardships and dangers on you than on the others, and gave the rest more than their share of profits and booty. But you can neither venture to say this, nor, if you did venture, could you prove it. What then is your grievance against me at this moment, I should like to ask, that you have mutinied? I believe that not one of you will be able to express or even conceive it.

29. "Nor again can it have been any dissatisfaction with the position of affairs. For when was any prosperity greater? When has Rome won more victories, when have her arms had brighter prospects than now? But perhaps some faint-heart will say that our enemies have more numerous advantages, fairer and more certain prospects than ourselves. Which, pray, of these enemies? Is it Andobales and Mandonius? But which of you is ignorant of the fact that these men first betrayed the Carthaginians and joined us, and now once more, in defiance of their oaths and pledges, have come forward as our opponents? It is a fine thing surely to become the enemies of your country in reliance on such men as these! Nor again had you any prospect of becoming masters of Iberia by your own prowess: for you would not have been strong enough, even in conjunction with Andobales, to meet us in the field, to say nothing of doing so without such aid. I should like then to ask,—what was it in which you trusted? Surely not in the skill and valour of the leaders whom you have now elected, or in the fasces and axes which were borne in front of them,—men of whom I will not deign to say even another word. All this, my men, is absolutely futile; nor will you be able to allege even the smallest just complaint against me or your country. Wherefore I will undertake your defence to Rome and myself, by putting forward a plea which all the world will acknowledge to hold good. And it is that, *a crowd is ever easily misled and easily induced to any error.* Therefore it is that crowds are like the sea, which in its own nature is safe and quiet; but, when winds fall violently upon it, assumes the character of the blasts which

lash it into fury: thus a multitude also is ever found to be what its leaders and counsellors are. Acting on this consideration, I and all my fellow-officers hereby offer you pardon and amnesty for the past: but to the guilty authors of the mutiny we are resolved to show no mercy, but to punish them as their misconduct to their country and to ourselves deserves."

30. Just as he said these words, the soldiers, who were posted under arms round the assembly, clashed their swords against their shields; and at the same instant the ringleaders of the mutiny were brought in, stripped and in chains. But such terror was inspired in the men by the threatening aspect of the surrounding troops, and by the dreadful spectacle before them, that, while the ringleaders were being scourged and beheaded, they neither changed countenance nor uttered a sound, but remained all staring open-mouthed and terrified at what was going on. So the ringleaders of the mischief were scourged and dragged off through the crowd dead; but the rest of the men accepted with one consent the offer of an amnesty from the general and officers; and then voluntarily came forward, one by one, to take an oath to the tribunes that they would obey the orders of their commanders and remain loyal to Rome.

Execution of the ringleaders.

Having thus crushed what might have been the beginning of serious danger, Scipio restored his troops to their former good disposition. . . .

Scipio at New Carthage has heard of hostile movements on the part of Andobales north of the Ebro, B.C. 206. *See Livy,* 28, 31-34

31. Scipio at once summoned a meeting of the soldiers in New Carthage, and addressed them on the subject of the audacious proceedings of Andobales, and his treachery to them; and by dwelling at great length on these topics he inspired the men with a very great eagerness to attack these princes. He then proceeded to enumerate the battles they had already fought against the Iberians and Carthaginians combined, the Carthaginians act-

Scipio's address to his soldiers.

ing as leaders in the campaigns. "Seeing," he added, "that you always beat them, it does not now become you to fear defeat in a war against Iberians by themselves, and led by Andobales. I will not therefore even accept any Iberian of them all as a partner in the struggle, but I will undertake the campaign by the unassisted services of my Roman soldiers: in order to make it plain to all that it was not, as some assert, by the aid of Iberians that we defeated the Carthaginians and drove them from Iberia; but that it was by Roman valour and your own gallantry that we have conquered Carthaginian and Celtiberian combined. Let nothing therefore disturb your confidence in each other: but, if you have ever done it before, approach this undertaking with courage undismayed. For securing the victory I will with God's help make every necessary provision." This speech filled the troops with such zeal and confidence, that they presented all the appearance of men whose enemies are in full view, and who are on the very point of closing with them.

32. Scipio then dismissed the assembly, but on the next day got his troops on the march, and having reached the Ebro in ten days and crossed it, on the fourth day after that pitched his camp near that of the enemy, with a valley between his own and the enemy's lines. Next day he turned some cattle that had accompanied his army into this valley, after giving Caius Laelius instructions to have the cavalry ready, and some of the tribunes to prepare the velites. The Iberians having at once made an onslaught upon the cattle, he despatched some of the velites against them. These two forces became engaged, and reinforcements being sent to either party from time to time, a severe infantry skirmishing took place in the valley. The proper moment for attack being now come, Caius Laelius, having the cavalry prepared as directed, charged the skirmishers of the enemy, getting between them and the high ground, so that the greater number of them were scattered about the valley and killed by the cavalry. This event roused the barbarians to a furious desire to engage, that they might not appear to be entirely reduced to despair

Scipio marches to the Ebro, crosses it, and in fourteen days is in the presence of the enemy.

A skirmish.

by their previous defeat; and accordingly by daybreak next day they drew out their whole army for battle. Scipio was quite ready to give them battle; but when he saw that the Iberians had come down into the valley in an imprudent manner, and were stationing, not only their cavalry, but their infantry also on the level ground, he waited for a time, because he wished as many of the enemy as possible to take up a position like that. He felt confidence in his cavalry, and still more in his infantry; because, in such deliberate and hand-to-hand battles as this, his men were vastly superior to the Iberians both in themselves and in their arms.

Decisive victory of Scipio.

33. When he thought the right time had come he drew out [the velites][1] to oppose those of the enemy who occupied the foot of the hills; while against those who had descended into the valley he led his main force from the camp in four cohorts, and attacked the infantry. Caius Laelius at the same time made a détour with the cavalry by the hills, which stretched from the camp to the valley, and charged the enemy's horse on the rear; and so kept them occupied with fighting him. The enemy's infantry therefore, being thus deprived of the support of the cavalry, on which they had relied in descending into the valley, were distressed and overmatched in the battle; while their cavalry was in much the same plight: for, being surprised on ground of insufficient extent, they fell into confusion, and lost more men by hurting each other than by the hands of the enemy; for their own infantry was pressing upon their flank, and the enemy's infantry on their front, while his cavalry were attacking on their rear. The battle having taken this course, the result was that nearly all those who had descended into the valley lost their lives; while those who had been stationed on the foot of the hills managed to escape. These last were the light-armed troops, and formed about a third of the whole army: with whom Andobales himself contrived to make good his escape to a certain stronghold of great security. . . .

[1] The text is imperfect.

By further operations in this year, B.C. 206, *Scipio had compelled Mago to abandon Spain: and towards the winter the Roman army went into winter-quarters at Tarraco.*

Having thus put a finishing stroke to his campaigns in Iberia, Scipio arrived at Tarraco in high spirits, bringing with him the materials of a brilliant triumph for himself, and a glorious victory for his country. But being anxious to arrive in Rome before the consular elections, he arranged for the government of Iberia,[1] and, having put the army into the hands of Junius Silanus and L. Marcius, embarked with Caius Laelius and his other friends for Rome. . . .

Scipio returns to Rome in the autumn of B.C. 206.

ANTIOCHUS IN BACTRIA. See 10, 48, 49

34. Euthydemus was himself a Magnesian, and he answered the envoy by saying that "Antiochus was acting unjustly in trying to expel him from his kingdom. He was not himself a revolted subject, but had destroyed the descendant of some who had been such, and so had obtained the kingdom of Bactria." After adding more arguments to the same effect, he urged Teleas to act as a sincere mediator of peace, by urging Antiochus not to grudge him the royal title and dignity, "for if he did not yield to this demand, neither of them would be safe: seeing that great hords of Nomads were close at hand, who were a danger to both; and that if they admitted them into the country, it would certainly be utterly barbarised." With these words he sent Teleas back to Antiochus. The king had long been looking about for some means of ending the controversy; and when he was informed by Teleas of what Euthydemus had said, he readily admitted these pleas for a pacification. And after several journeys of Teleas to and fro between the two, Euthydemus at last sent his son Demetrius to confirm the

The answer of Euthydemus (a Magnesian), king of Bactria, to Teleas, the envoy of Antiochus.

[1] Handing it over to L. Lentulus and L. Manlius Acidinus, Livy, 28, 38.

terms of the treaty. Antiochus received the young prince; and judging from his appearance, conversation, and the dignity of his manners that he was worthy of royal power, he first promised to give him one of his own daughters, and secondly conceded the royal title to his father. And having on the other points caused a written treaty to be drawn up, and the terms of the treaty to be confirmed on oath, he marched away; after liberally provisioning his troops, and accepting the elephants belonging to Euthydemus. He crossed the Caucasus[1] and descended into India; renewed his friendship with Sophagasenus the king of the Indians; received more elephants, until he had a hundred and fifty altogether; and having once more provisioned his troops, set out again personally with his army: leaving Androsthenes of Cyzicus the duty of taking home the treasure which this king had agreed to hand over to him. Having traversed Arachosia and crossed the river Enymanthus, he came through Drangene to Carmania; and, as it was now winter, he put his men into winter quarters there. This was the extreme limit of the march of Antiochus into the interior: in which he not only reduced the up-country Satraps to obedience to his authority, but also the coast cities, and the princes on this side Taurus; and, in a word, consolidated his kingdom by overawing all his subjects with the exhibition of his boldness and energy. For this campaign convinced the Europeans as well as the Asiatics that he was worthy of royal power. . . .

Antiochus continues his march into the interior of Asia.

B.C. 212-205

[1] That is the *Caucasus Indicus* or Paropamisus: mod. Hindú Kúsh.

BOOK XII

CRITICISM OF TIMAEUS

1. BYZACIA is near the Syrtes; it has a circumference of two thousand stades, and is circular in shape. . . .

Hippo, Singa, Tabraca, are cities in Libya. Chalkeia, however, is not, as Demosthenes ignorantly states, the name of a city, but means only a "bronze-factory." . . .

2. The lotus is not a large tree; but it is rough and thorny, and has a green leaf, like the rhamnus (black or white thorn), a little longer and broader. The fruit is like white myrtle-berries when they are come to perfection; but, as it grows, it becomes purple in colour, and in size about equal to round olives, and has a very small stone. When it is ripe they gather it: and some of it they pound up with groats of spelt, and store in vessels for their slaves; and the rest they also preserve for the free inhabitants, after taking out the stones, and use it for food. It tastes like a fig or a date, but is superior to them in aroma. A wine is made of it also by steeping it in water and crushing it, sweet and pleasant to the taste, like good mead; and they drink it without mixing it with water. It will not keep, however, more than ten days, and they therefore only make it in small quantities as they want it. Vinegar also is made out of it. . . .

The lotus. See Herodotus, 2, 92.

3. The excellence of the soil of Libya must excite our

admiration. But one would feel inclined to say of Timaeus, not merely that he had never studied the country, but that he was childish and entirely unintelligent in his notions; completely enslaved to those old traditional stories of Libya being wholly sandy, parched, and barren. The same too holds good about its animals. The supply of horses, oxen, sheep, and goats in it is beyond anything to be found in any other part of the world; because many of the tribes in Libya do not use cultivated crops, but live on and with their flocks and herds. Again what writer has failed to mention the vast number and strength of its elephants, lions, and panthers, or the beauty of its buffalos, or the size of its ostriches? Of these not one is to be found in Europe, while Libya is full of them. But Timaeus, by passing them over without a word, gives, as though purposely, an impression exactly the reverse of the truth.

Misstatements of Timaeus about Libya,

And just in the same random way in which he has spoken about Libya, he has also done about the island called Cyrnus. For, when mentioning it in his second book, he says that wild goats, sheep, wild oxen, stags, hares, wolves, and some other animals are plentiful in it; and that the inhabitants employ themselves in hunting them, and in fact spend most of their time in that pursuit. Whereas in this island there are not only no wild goats or wild oxen, but not even hare, wolf, or stag, or any animal of the sort, except some foxes, rabbits, and wild sheep. The rabbit indeed at a distance looks like a small hare; but when taken in the hand, it is found to be widely different both in appearance and in the taste of its flesh; and it also lives generally underground.

and Corsica,

4. The idea, however, of all the animals in the island being wild, has arisen in the following way: The caretakers cannot keep up with their animals, owing to the thick woods and rocky broken nature of the country; but, whenever they wish to collect them, they stand on some convenient spots and call the beasts together by the sound of a trumpet; and all of them flock without fail to their own trumpets. Now, when ships arrive at the coast, and the sailors see goats or cattle grazing without

the reason of his mistake.

any one with them, and thereupon try to catch them, the animals will not let them come near them, because they are not used to them, but will scamper off. But as soon as the keeper sees the men disembarking and sounds his trumpet, they all set off running at full speed and collect round the trumpet. This gives the appearance of wildness; and Timaeus, who made only careless and perfunctory inquiries, committed himself to a random statement.

Swine-keeping in Italy.

Now this obedience to the sound of a trumpet is nothing astonishing. For in Italy the swineherds manage the feeding of their pigs in the same way. They do not follow close behind the beasts, as in Greece, but keep some distance in front of them, sounding their horn every now and then; and the animals follow behind and run together at the sound. Indeed, the complete familiarity which the animals show with the particular horn to which they belong seems at first astonishing and almost incredible. For owing to the populousness and wealth of the country, the droves of swine in Italy are exceedingly large, especially along the sea coast of the Tuscans and Gauls: for one sow will bring up a thousand pigs, or sometimes even more. They therefore drive them out from their night styes to feed, according to their litters and ages. Whence, if several droves are taken to the same place, they cannot preserve these distinction of litters; but they of course get mixed up with each other, both as they are being driven out, and as they feed, and as they are being brought home. Accordingly the device of the horn-blowing has been invented to separate them, when they have got mixed up together, without labour or trouble. For as they feed, one swineherd goes in one direction sounding his horn, and another in another: and thus the animals sort themselves of their own accord, and follow their own horns with such eagerness that it is impossible by any means to stop or hinder them. But in Greece, when the swine get mixed up in the oak forests in their search for the mast, the swineherd who has most assistants and the best help at his disposal, when collecting his own animals, drives off his neighbour's also. Sometimes too a thief lies in wait, and drives them off without the swineherd knowing how he lost

them; because the beasts straggle a long way from their drivers, in their eagerness to find acorns, when they are just beginning to fall. . . .

False criticisms of Timaeus on Theopompus and Ephorus.

4. (*a*) It is difficult to pardon such errors in Timaeus, considering how severe he is in criticising the slips of others. For instance he finds fault with Theopompus for stating that Dionysius sailed from Sicily to Corinth in a merchant vessel, whereas he really arrived in a ship of war. And again he falsely charges Ephorus with contradicting himself, on the ground that he asserts that Dionysius the Elder ascended the throne at the age of twenty-three, reigned forty-two years, and died at sixty-three. Now no one would say, I think, that this was a blunder of the historian, but clearly one of the transcriber. For either Ephorus must be more foolish than Coroebus and Margites, if he were unable to calculate that forty-two added to twenty-three make sixty-five; or, if that is incredible in the case of a man like Ephorus, it must be a mere mistake of the transcriber, and the carping and malevolent criticism of Timaeus must be rejected.

His false account of the October horse.

(*b*) Again, in his history of Pyrrhus, he says that the Romans still keep up the memory of the fall of Troy by shooting to death with javelins a war-horse on a certain fixed day, because the capture of Troy was accomplished by means of the "Wooden Horse." This is quite childish. On this principle, all non-Hellenic nations must be put down as descendants of the Trojans; for nearly all of them, or at any rate the majority, when about to commence a war or a serious battle with an enemy, first kill and sacrifice a horse. In making this sort of ill-founded deduction, Timaeus seems to me to show not only want of knowledge, but, what is worse, a trick of misapplying knowledge. For, because the Romans sacrifice a horse, he immediately concludes that they do it because Troy was taken by means of a horse.

(*c*) These instances clearly show how worthless his account of Libya, Sardinia, and, above all, of Italy is; and that, speak-

ing generally, he has entirely neglected the most important element in historical investigation, namely, the making personal inquiries. For as historical events take place in many different localities, and as it is impossible for the same man to be in several places at the same time, and also impossible for him to see with his own eyes all places in the world and observe their peculiarities, the only resource left is to ask questions of as many people as possible; and to believe those who are worthy of credit; and to show critical sagacity in judging of their reports.

The reason of his mistakes a want of care in making inquiries.

(*d*) And though Timaeus makes great professions on this head, he appears to me to be very far from arriving at the truth. Indeed, so far from making accurate investigations of the truth through other people, he does not tell us anything trustworthy even of events of which he has been an eye-witness, or of places he has personally visited. This will be made evident, if we can convict him of being ignorant, even in his account of Sicily, of the facts which he brings forward. For it will require very little further proof of his inaccuracy, if he can be shown to be ill-informed and misled about the localities in which he was born and bred, and that too the most famous of them. Now he asserts that the fountain Arethusa at Syracuse has its source in the Peloponnese, from the river Alpheus, which flows through Arcadia and Olympia. For that this river sinks into the earth, and, after being carried for four thousand stades under the Sicilian Sea, comes to the surface again in Syracuse; and that this was proved from the fact that on a certain occasion a storm of rain having come on during the Olympic festival, and the river having flooded the sacred enclosure, a quantity of dung from the animals used for sacrifice at the festival was thrown up by the fountain Arethusa; as well as a certain gold cup, which was picked up and recognised as being one of the ornaments used at the festival. . . .

Nor is he to be trusted even in matters that fell under his own observation.

Arethusa.

5. I happened to have visited the city of the Locrians on

several occasions, and to have been the means of doing them important services. For it was I that secured their exemption from the service in Iberia and Dalmatia, which, in accordance with the treaty, they were bound to supply to the Romans. And being released thereby from considerable hardship, danger, and expense, they rewarded me with every mark of honour and kindness. I have therefore reason to speak well of the Locrians rather than the reverse. Still I do not shrink from saying and writing that the account of their colonisation given by Aristotle is truer than that of Timaeus. For I know for certain that the inhabitants themselves acknowledge that the report of Aristotle, and not of Timaeus, is the one which they have received from their ancestors. And they give the following proofs of this. In the first place, they stated that every ancestral distinction existing among them is traced by the female not the male side.[1] For instance, those are reckoned noble among them who belong to "the hundred families"; and these "hundred families" are those which were marked out by the Locrians, before embarking upon their colonisation, as those from which they were in accordance with the oracle to select the virgins to be sent to Ilium. Further, that some of these women joined the colony: and that it is their descendants who are now reckoned noble, and called "the men of the hundred families." Again, the following account of the "cup-bearing" priestess had been received traditionally by them. When they ejected the Sicels who occupied this part of Italy, finding that it was a custom among them for the processions at their sacrifices to be led by a boy of the most illustrious and high-born family obtainable, and not having any ancestral custom of their own on the subject, they adopted this one, with no other improvement than that of substituting a girl for one of their boys as cup-bearer, because nobility with them went by the female line.

The traditions of the colonisation of Locri Epizephyrii agree with the account in Aristotle, rather than with that of Timaeus.

6. And as to a treaty, none ever existed, or was said to have existed, between them and the Locrians in Greece; but they all knew by tradition of one with the Sicels: of which they give the follow-

The trick of the Locrians.

[1] Cp. a similar custom of the Lycians, Herod. 1, 173.

ing account. When they first appeared, and found the Sicels occupying the district in which they are themselves now dwelling, these natives were in terror of them, and admitted them through fear into the country; and the newcomers made a sworn agreement with them that "they would be friendly and share the country with them, as long as they stood upon the ground they then stood upon, and kept heads upon their shoulders." But, while the oaths were being taken, they say that the Locrians put earth inside the soles of their shoes, and heads of garlic concealed on their shoulders, before they swore; and that then they shook the earth out of their shoes, and threw the heads of garlic off their shoulders, and soon afterwards expelled the Sicels from the country. This is the story current at Locri. . . .

By an extraordinary oversight Timaeus of Tauromenium commits himself to the statement that it was not customary with the Greeks to possess slaves.[1] . . .

These considerations would lead us to trust Aristotle rather than Timaeus. His next statement is still more strange. For to suppose, with Timaeus, that it was unlikely that men, who had been the slaves of the allies of the Lacedaemonians, would continue the kindly feelings and adopt the friendships of their late masters is foolish. For when they have had the good fortune to recover their freedom, and a certain time has elapsed, men, who have been slaves, not only endeavour to adopt the friendships of their late masters, but also their ties of hospitality and blood: in fact, their aim is to keep them up even more than the ties of nature, for the express purpose of thereby wiping out the remembrance of their former degradation and humble position; because they wish to pose as the descendants of their masters rather than as their freedmen. And this is what in all probability happened in the case of the Locrians. They had removed to a great distance from all who knew their secret; the lapse of time favoured their pretensions; and they were not therefore so foolish as to maintain any customs likely to revive the memory of their own degradation,

Locri Epizephyrii colonised by certain slaves who had obtained their freedom, and by some free born women.

[1] He may have been referring to pre-homeric times, cp. Herod. 6, 137, οὐ γὰρ εἶναι τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον σφίσι κω οὐδὲ τοῖσι ἄλλοισι Ἕλλησι οἰκέτας.

rather than such as would contribute to conceal it. Therefore they very naturally called their city by the name of that from which the women came; and claimed a relationship with those women: and, moreover, renewed the friendships which were ancestral to the families of the women.

The Locrians then were naturally friends of Sparta and enemies of Athens.

And this also indicates that there is no sign of Aristotle being wrong in saying that the Athenians ravaged their territory. For it being quite natural, as I have shown, that the men who started from Locri and landed in Italy, if they were slaves ten times over, should adopt friendly relations with Sparta, it becomes also natural that the Athenians should be rendered hostile to them, not so much from regard to their origin as to their policy.

The reason of the women of Locris (in Greece) leaving their homes with the slaves.

It is not, again, likely that the Lacedaemonians should themselves send their young men home from the camp for the sake of begetting children, and should refuse to allow the Locrians to do the same. Two things in such a statement are not only improbable but untrue. In the first place, they were not likely to have prevented the Locrians doing so, when they did the same themselves, for that would be wholly inconsistent: nor were the Locrians, in obedience to orders from them, likely to have adopted a custom like theirs. (For in Sparta it is a traditional law, and a matter of common custom, for three or four men to have one wife, and even more if they are brothers; and when a man has begotten enough children, it is quite proper and usual for him to sell his wife to one of his friends.) The fact is, that though the Locrians, not being bound by the same oath as the Lacedaemonians, that they would not return home till they had taken Messene, had a fair pretext for not taking part in the common expedition; yet, by returning home only one by one, and at rare intervals, they gave their wives an opportunity of becoming familiar with the slaves instead of their original husbands, and still more so the unmarried women. And this was the reason of the migration. . . .

7. Timaeus makes many untrue statements; and he appears

to have done so, not from ignorance, but because his view was distorted by party spirit. When once he has made up his mind to blame or praise, he forgets everything else and outsteps all bounds of propriety. Timaeus and Aristotle. So much for the nature of Aristotle's account of Locri, and the grounds on which it rested. But this naturally leads me to speak of Timaeus and his work as a whole, and generally of what is the duty of a man who undertakes to write history. Now I think that I have made it clear from what I have said, first, that both of them were writing conjecturally; and, secondly, that the balance of probability was on the side of Aristotle. It is in fact impossible in such matters to be positive and definite. But let us even admit that Timaeus gives the more probable account. Are the maintainers of the less probable theory, therefore, to be called by every possible term of abuse and obloquy, and all but be put on trial for their lives? Certainly not. Those who make untrue statements in their books from ignorance ought, I maintain, to be forgiven and corrected in a kindly spirit: it is only those who do so from deliberate intention that ought to be attacked without mercy.

8. It must then either be shown that Aristotle's account of Locri was prompted by partiality, corruption, or personal enmity; or, if no one ventures to say that, then it must be acknowledged that those who display such personal animosity and bitterness to others, as Timaeus does to Aristotle, are wrong and ill advised.

The epithets which he applies to him are "audacious," "unprincipled," "rash"; and besides, he says that he "has audaciously slandered Locri by affirming that the colony was formed by runaway slaves, adulterers, and man-catchers." The vulgar abuse of Timaeus. Further, he asserts that Aristotle made this statement, "in order that men might believe him to have been one of Alexander's generals, and to have lately conquered the Persians at the Cilician Gates in a pitched battle by his own ability; and not to B.C. 333. be a mere pedantic sophist, universally unpopular, who had a short time before shut up that admirable doctor's shop." Again, he says that he "pushed his way into every palace and tent:" and that he was "a glutton and a gourmand, who thought

only of gratifying his appetite." Now it seems to me that such language as this would be intolerable in an impudent vagabond bandying abuse in a law court; but an impartial recorder of public affairs, and a genuine historian, would not think such things to himself, much less venture to put them in writing.

Timaeus's account of his investigations in the history of the colony of Locri.

9. Let us now, then, examine the method of Timaeus, and compare his account of this colony, that we may learn which of the two better deserves such vituperation. He says in the same book: "I am not now proceeding on conjecture, but have investigated the truth in the course of a personal visit to the Locrians in Greece. The Locrians first of all showed me a written treaty which began with the words, 'as parents to children.' There are also existing decrees securing mutual rights of citizenship to both. In fine, when they were told of Aristotle's account of the colony, they were astonished at the audacity of that writer. I then crossed to the Italian Locri and found that the laws and customs there accorded with the theory of a colony of free men, not with the licentiousness of slaves. For among them there are penalties assigned to man-catchers, adulterers, and run-away slaves. And this would not have been the case if they were conscious of having been such themselves."

Criticism of the above statement of Timaeus.

10. Now the first point one would be inclined to raise is, as to what Locrians he visited and questioned on these subjects. If it had been the case that the Locrians in Greece all lived in one city, as those in Italy do, this question would perhaps have been unnecessary, and everything would have been plain. But as there are two clans of Locrians, we may ask, Which of the two did he visit? What cities of the one or the other? In whose hands did he find the treaty? Yet we all know, I suppose, that this is a speciality of Timaeus's, and that it is in this that he has surpassed all other historians, and rests his chief claim to credit,—I mean his parade of accuracy in studying chronology and ancient monuments, and his care in that department of research. Therefore we may well wonder how he came to omit telling us the name of the city in which he found the treaty, the place in which it was inscribed, or the magistrates

who showed him the inscription, and with whom he conversed: to prevent all cavil, and, by defining the place and city, to enable those who doubted to ascertain the truth. By omitting these details he shows that he was conscious of having told a deliberate falsehood. For that Timaeus, if he really had obtained such proofs, would not have let them slip, but would have fastened upon them with both hands, as the saying is, is proved by the following considerations. Would a writer who tried to establish his credit on that of Echecrates,—he mentioning him by name as the person with whom he had conversed, and from whom he had obtained his facts about the Italian Locri,—taking the trouble to add, by way of showing that he had been told them by no ordinary person, that this man's father had formerly been entrusted with an embassy by Dionysius,—would such a writer have remained silent about it if he had really got hold of a public record or an ancient tablet?

Timaeus and the Olympic registers.

11. This is the man forsooth who drew out a comparative list of the Ephors and the kings of Sparta from the earliest times; as well as one comparing the Archons at Athens and priestesses in Argos with the list of Olympic victors, and thereby convicted those cities of being in error about those records, because there was a discrepancy of three months between them! This again is the man who discovered the engraved tablets in the inner shrines, and the records of the guest-friendships on the door-posts of the temples. And we cannot believe that such a man could have been ignorant of anything of this sort that existed, or would have omitted to mention it if he had found it. Nor can he on any ground expect pardon, if he has told an untruth about it: for, as he has shown himself a bitter and uncompromising critic of others, he must naturally look for equally uncompromising attacks from them.

Being then clearly convicted of falsehood in these points, he goes to the Italian Locri: and, first of all, says that the two Locrian peoples had a similar constitution and the same ties of amity, and that Aristotle and Theophrastus have maligned the city. Now I am fully aware that in going into minute particulars and proofs on this point I shall be forced

to digress from the course of my history. It was for that reason however that I postponed my criticism of Timaeus to a single section of my work, that I might not be forced again and again to omit other necessary matter. . . .

12. Timaeus says that the greatest fault in history is want of truth; and he accordingly advises all, whom he may have convicted of making false statements in their writings, to find some other name for their books, and to call them anything they like except history. . . .

Timaeus condemned out of his own mouth.

For example, in the case of a carpenter's rule, though it may be too short or too narrow for your purpose, yet if it have the essential feature of a rule, that of straightness, you may still call it a rule; but if it has not this quality, and deviates from the straight line, you may call it anything you like except a rule. "On the same principle," says he, "historical writings may fail in style or treatment or other details; yet if they hold fast to truth, such books may claim the title of history, but if they swerve from that, they ought no longer to be called history." Well, I quite agree that in such writings truth should be the first consideration: and, in fact, somewhere in the course of my work I have said "that as in a living body, when the eyes are out, the whole is rendered useless, so if you take truth from history what is left is but an idle tale." I said again, however, that "there were two sorts of falsehoods, the ignorant and the intentional; and the former deserved indulgence, the latter uncompromising severity." . . . These points being agreed upon—the wide difference between the ignorant and intentional lie, and the kindly correction due to the one and the unbending denunciation to the other—it will be found that it is to the latter charge that Timaeus more than any one lays himself open. And the proof of his character in this respect is clear. . . .

See 1, 14.

There is a proverbial expression for the breakers of an agree-

ment, "Locrians and a treaty." An explanation given of this, equally accepted by historians and the rest of the world, is that, at the time of the invasion of the Heracleidae, the Locrians agreed with the Peloponnesians that, if the Heracleidae did not enter by way of the isthmus, but crossed at Rhium, they would raise a war beacon, that they might have early intelligence and make provisions to oppose their entrance. The Locrians, however, did not do this, but, on the contrary, raised a beacon of peace; and therefore, when the Heracleidae arrived opposite Rhium, they crossed without resistance; while the Peloponnesians, having taken no precautions, found that they had allowed their enemies to enter their country, because they had been betrayed by the Locrians. . . .

The proverb Λοκροὶ τὰς συνθήκας.

Many remarks depreciatory of divination and dream interpretation may be found in his writings.[1] But writers who have introduced into their books a good deal of such foolish talk, so far from running down others, should think themselves fortunate if they escape attack themselves. And this is just the position in which Timaeus stands. He remarks that "Callisthenes was a mere sycophant for writing stuff of this sort; and acted in a manner utterly unworthy of his philosophy in giving heed to ravens and inspired women; and that he richly deserved the punishment which he met with at the hands of Alexander, for having corrupted the mind of that monarch as far as he could." On the other hand, he commends Demosthenes, and the other orators who flourished at that time, and says that "they were worthy of Greece for speaking against the divine honours given to Alexander; while this philosopher, for investing a mere mortal with the aegis and thunderbolt, justly met the fate which befel him from the hands of providence. . . ."

Timaeus's attitude towards the art of divination.

Callisthenes.

13. Timaeus asserts that Democharès was guilty of unnatural lust, and that his lips therefore were unfit to blow the sacred fire; and that in morals

Democharès.

[1] The text is very imperfect here.

he went beyond any stories told by Botrys and Philaenis and all other writers of indecent tales. Foul abuse and shameless accusations of this sort are not only what no man of cultivation would have uttered, they go beyond what you might expect from the lowest brothels. It is, however, to get credit for the foul and shameless accusations, which he is always bringing, that he has maligned this man: supporting his charge by dragging in an obscure comic poet. Now on what grounds do I conjecture the falsity of the accusation? Well, first, from the fact of the good birth and education of Demochares; for he was a nephew of Demosthenes. And in the second place, from the fact that he was thought worthy at Athens, not only of being a general, but of the other offices also; which he certainly would not have obtained, if he had got into such troubles as these. Therefore it seems to me that Timaeus is accusing the people of Athens more than Demochares, if it is the fact that they committed the interests of the country and their own lives to such a man. For if it had been true, the comic poet Archedicus would not have been the only one to have made this statement concerning Demochares, as Timaeus alleges: it would have been repeated by many of the partisans of Antipater, against whom he has spoken with great freedom, and said many things calculated to annoy, not only Antipater himself, but also his successors and friends. It would have been repeated also by many of his political opponents: and among them, by Demetrius of Phalerum, against whom Demochares has inveighed with extraordinary bitterness in his History, alleging that "his conduct as a prince, and the political measures on which he prided himself, were such as a petty tax-gatherer might be proud of; for he boasted that in his city things were abundant and cheap, and every one had plenty to live upon." And he tells another story of Demetrius, that "He was not ashamed to have a procession in the theatre led by an artificial snail, worked by some internal contrivance, and emitting slime as it crawled, and behind it a string of asses; meaning by this to indicate the slowness and stupidity of the Athenians, who had yielded to others the honour of defending Greece, and were tamely submissive to Cassander." Still, in spite of these taunts,

neither Demetrius nor any one else has ever brought such a charge against Democharés.

14. Relying therefore on the testimony of his own countrymen, as safer ground than the virulence of Timaeus, I feel no hesitation in declaring that the life of Democharés is not chargeable with such enormities. But even supposing that Democharés had ever so disgraced himself, what need was there for Timaeus to insert this passage in his History? Men of sense, when resolved to retaliate upon a personal enemy, think first, not of what he deserves, but of what it is becoming in them to do. So in the case of abusive language: the first consideration should be, not what our enemies deserve to be called, but what our self respect will allow us to call them. But if men measure everything by their own ill temper and jealousy, we are forced to be always suspicious of them, and to be ever on our guard against their exaggeration. Wherefore, in the present instance, we may fairly reject the stories to the discredit of Philochares told by Timaeus; for he has put himself out of the pale of indulgence or belief, by so obviously allowing his native virulence to carry him beyond all bounds of propriety in his invectives.

15. For my part I cannot feel satisfied with his abuse of Agathocles either, even admitting him to have been the worst of men. I refer to the passage at the end of his History in which he asserts that in his youth Agathocles was "a common stale, extravagantly addicted to every unnatural vice," and that "when he died, his wife in the course of her lamentations exclaimed 'Ah, what have I not done for you! what have you not done to me?'" To such language one can only repeat what has been already said in the case of Democharés, and express one's astonishment at such extravagant virulence. For that Agathocles must have had fine natural qualities is evident from the narrative of Timaeus itself. That a man who came as a runaway slave to Syracuse, from the potter's wheel and smoke and clay, at the early age of eighteen, should have within a short time advanced from that humble beginning to be master of all Sicily, and after being a terror to the Carthaginians, should have grown old in office and died in enjoyment of

Agathocles defended against the aspersions of Timaeus.

the royal title,—does not this prove that Agathocles had some great and admirable qualities, and many endowments and talents for administration? In view of these the historian ought not to have recounted to posterity only what served to discredit and defame this man, but those facts also which were to his honour. For that is the proper function of history. Blinded, however, by personal malignity, he has recorded for us with bitterness and exaggeration all his defects; while his eminent achievements he has passed over in entire silence: seeming not to be aware that in history such silence is as mendacious as misstatement. The part of his history, therefore, which was added by him for the gratification of his personal spite I have passed over, but not what was really germane to his subject. . . .

The laws of Zaleucus, and an incident in their working at Locri (for which he legislated, see Arist. *Pol.* 2, 12).

16. Two young men had a dispute about the ownership of a slave. This slave had been in the possession of one of them for a long time; but two days before, as he was going to the farm without his master, the other laid violent hands upon him and dragged him to his house. When the first young man heard of this, he came to the house, seized the slave, and taking him before the magistrate asserted his ownership and offered sureties. For the law of Zaleucus ordained that the party from whom the abduction was made should have possession of the property in dispute, pending the decision of the suit. But the other man in accordance with the same law, alleged that he was the party from whom the abduction had been made, for the slave had been brought before the magistrate from his house. The magistrates who were trying the case were in doubt, and calling in the Cosmopolis [1] referred the point to him. He interpreted the law as meaning that "the abduction was always from that party in whose possession the property in dispute had last been for a certain period unquestioned; but that if another abducted this property from a holder, and then the original holder repossessed himself of it from the abductor, this was not abduction in the

[1] For this title see on 22, 19. It is found in inscriptions in Thasos, Crete, and Cibyra. C. I. G. 2163, *c*; 2583; 4380, *b*.

sense of the law." The young man, who thus lost his case, was not satisfied, and alleged that such was not the intention of the legislator. Thereupon the Cosmopolis summoned him to discuss the interpretation in accordance with the law of Zaleucus; that is, to argue on the interpretation of the law with him before the court of the one thousand, and with a halter round the neck of each: whichever should be shown to be wrong in his interpretation was to lose his life in the sight of the thousand. But the young man asserted that the compact was not a fair one, for the Cosmopolis, who happened to be nearly ninety, had only two or three years of life left, while in all reasonable probability he had not yet lived half his life. By this adroit rejoinder the young man turned off the affair as a jest: but the magistrates adjudged the question of abduction in accordance with the interpretation of the Cosmopolis. . . .

A CRITICISM ON EPHORUS AND CALLISTHENES

17. That I may not be thought to detract wantonly from the credit of such great writers, I will mention one battle, which is at once one of the most famous ever fought, and not too remote in point of time; and at which, above everything else, Callisthenes was himself present. I mean the battle between Alexander and Darius in Cilicia. He says that "Alexander had already got through the pass called the Cilician Gates: and that Darius, availing himself of that by the Amanid Gates, made his way with his army into Cilicia; but on learning from the natives that Alexander was on his way into Syria, he followed him; and having arrived at the pass leading to the south, pitched his camp on the bank of the river Pinarus. The width of the ground from the foot of the mountain to the sea was not more than fourteen stades, through which this river ran diagonally. On first issuing from the mountains its banks were broken, but in its course through the level down to the sea it ran between precipitous and steep hills." Starting with this description of the ground, he goes on to say that "When Alexander's army faced about, and,

Callisthenes and the battle of Issus, B.C. 333.

retracing its steps, was approaching to attack them, Darius and his officers determined to draw up their whole phalanx on the ground occupied by his encampment, as it then was, and to defend his front by the river, which flowed right along his camp." But he afterwards says that Darius "stationed his cavalry close to the sea, his mercenaries next along the river, and his peltasts next resting on the mountains."

18. Now it is difficult to understand how he could have drawn up these troops in front of his phalanx, considering that the river ran immediately under the camp:[1] especially as their numbers were so great, amounting, on Callisthenes's own showing, to thirty thousand cavalry and thirty thousand mercenaries. Now it is easy to calculate how much ground such a force would require. At the most cavalry in a regular engagement is drawn up eight deep, and between each squadron a clear space must be left in the line to enable them to turn or face about. Therefore eight hundred will cover a stade of front; eight thousand, ten stades;[2] three thousand two hundred, four stades; and so eleven thousand two hundred would cover the whole of fourteen stades. If therefore he were to put his whole thirty thousand on the ground, he would have to mass his cavalry alone nearly three times the usual depth; and then what room is left for his large force of mercenaries? None, indeed, unless on the rear of the cavalry. But Callisthenes says this was not the case, but that these latter engaged the Macedonians first. We must therefore understand half the front, that nearest the sea, to have been occupied by the cavalry; the other half, that nearest the mountains, by the mercenaries. We may by these data easily calculate the depth of the cavalry, and the distance the river must have been from the camp to allow of it.

Again, he says that "on the approach of the enemy Darius himself, who was on the centre, ordered up the mercenaries from the wing." It is difficult to see what he means by this: for the point of junction of the mercenaries and the cavalry

[1] Both Curtius and Arrian seem to have found in their authorities that Darius crossed the Pinarus. Curt. 3, 8; Arrian, 2, 8.

[2] Reckoning the stade at 600 feet (Greek).

must have been at the centre. Where and how then, and to what point could Darius, who was himself actually among the mercenaries, be said to "order them up"?

Lastly, he says that "the cavalry on the right wing charged Alexander; and that his men stood the charge gallantly, and, making a counter charge, kept up an obstinate fight." But he quite forgets that there was a river between them, a river, too, of the nature that he had just himself described.[1]

19. His account of the movements of Alexander are equally vague. He says that "he crossed into Asia with forty thousand infantry and four thousand five hundred cavalry; but that when he was about to enter Cilicia he was joined by a reinforcement of five thousand infantry and eight hundred cavalry." From these numbers, if one were to make the liberal allowance of three thousand absentees from the infantry and three hundred from the cavalry on various services, there would still remain forty-two thousand infantry and five thousand cavalry. Starting with these numbers, he goes on to say "that Alexander heard of the entrance of Darius into Cilicia when he was a hundred stades away from him, having already marched through the pass:[2] that he therefore retraced his steps through the pass, his phalanx on the van, his cavalry next, and his baggage on the rear. But that as soon as he had debouched upon the open country, he gave general orders to form up into a phalanx, at first thirty-two deep; then sixteen; and lastly, when they were nearing the enemy, eight deep." Now this is a worse blunder than the last. A stade, allowing for the distances which must be kept on a march, and reckoning the depth at sixteen, admits of one thousand six hundred men, each man covering six feet. It is plain, therefore, that ten stades will admit of only sixteen thousand men, and twenty twice that number. Hence, when Alexander caused his men to form sixteen deep, he would have wanted a width of ground of twenty stades; and even then, the whole of the cavalry and ten thousand infantry would have been unaccounted for.

20. Again, he says that Alexander was marching in line

[1] See note to previous chapter.
[2] The Cilician gates.

when he was about forty stades from the enemy. A greater blunder it is difficult to conceive. For where could one find a ground, and especially in Cilicia, twenty stades broad by forty deep, for a phalanx armed with sarissae to march in line? It would not be easy to count all the impossibilities in the way of such an arrangement and such a movement. One that is mentioned by Callisthenes himself is sufficient to establish the point. For he remarks that the winter torrents which descend from the hills make so many gullies in the plain, that, in the course of the flight, the chief part of the Persians are said to have lost their lives in deep places of that kind. But, it may be urged, Alexander wished to be ready for battle as soon as the enemy were in sight. But what could be less ready than a phalanx in a disordered and straggling line? Is it not much easier to form up a phalanx from a proper column of route, than to bring a disordered and straggling line back into the same alignment, and get it into order of battle on a broken and woody ground? It was, therefore much better to march twice or four times the ordinary depth of a phalanx[1] in good order, for which sufficient ground could possibly be found. And it was easy to deploy his men quickly into the line of the phalanx, because he was able by means of scouts to ascertain the presence of the enemy in plenty of time. But in this case, beside other absurdities, while bringing his men in line across the level, he did not even (we are told) put the cavalry in front, but marched with them in the same alignment.

21. But the greatest blunder is still to come. "As soon as Alexander," he says, "was within distance of the enemy he caused his men to take up order eight deep," which would have necessitated ground forty stades wide for the length of the line; and even had they, to use the poet's expression, "laid shield to shield and on each other leaned," still ground twenty stades wide would have been wanted, while he himself says that it was less than fourteen. [We have also to deduct from these fourteen stades the space occupied by the two divisions of the cavalry, one on the left next the sea, the other on the right]; [2] and to allow for the fact that the whole force

[1] That is, sixteen or thirty-two deep. [2] The text here is in hopeless confusion.

was kept a considerable distance from the hills, to avoid being exposed to the enemy occupying the skirts of the mountains; for we know that Callisthenes represents the wing to have been facing these, at an angle with the centre. We are also leaving out of account the ten thousand foot, whom we showed to be too many according to his own calculation.

The upshot is that eleven stades at most is left for the whole length of the phalanx, even taking Callisthenes's own account, in which thirty-two thousand men standing shield to shield must necessarily be drawn up thirty deep; while he asserts that they fought eight deep. Such blunders admit of no defence: for the facts at once demonstrate the impossibility of the assertion. We have only to compare the space occupied by each man, the width of the whole ground, and the number of the men, to prove its falsity.

22. It would be tedious to mention all his other absurdities in connexion with this battle. I must be content with a very few. He says, for instance, that "Alexander took care in arranging his order of battle to be himself personally opposed to Darius; and that at first Darius was equally anxious to be opposite Alexander, but afterwards altered his mind." But he does not vouchsafe to tell us how these kings learnt at what part of their respective forces they were each posted, or to what point in his own line Darius re-transferred himself. Again, how could a phalanx mount to the edge of the river bank, when it was precipitous and covered with brushwood? Such a piece of bad generalship must not be attributed to Alexander, because he is acknowledged by all to have been a skilful strategist and to have studied the subject from childhood: we must rather attribute it to the historian's want of ability to descern between what is or is not practicable in such movements. So much for Ephorus and Callisthenes. . . .

23. Timaeus attacks Ephorus with great severity, though he is himself liable to two grave charges—bitterness in attacking others for faults of which he is himself guilty, and complete demoralisation, shown by the opinions which he expresses in his memoirs, and which he endeavours to implant in the minds of his readers. If we are to lay it down that Callisthenes deserved his death, what

Timaeus's over-estimate of Timoleon.

ought to happen to Timaeus? Surely there is much more reason for Providence to be wroth with him than with Callisthenes. The latter wished to deify Alexander; but Timaeus exalts Timoleon above the most venerable gods. The hero of Callisthenes, again, was a man by universal consent of a superhuman elevation of spirit; while Timoleon, far from having accomplished any action of first-rate importance, never even undertook one. The one expedition which he achieved in the course of his life took him no farther than from Corinth to Syracuse; and how paltry is such a distance when compared with the extent of the world! I presume that Timaeus believed that if Timoleon, by gaining glory in such a mere saucer of a place as Sicily, should be thought comparable to the most illustrious heroes, he too himself, as the historian of only Italy and Sicily, might properly be considered on a par with the writers of universal history. This will be sufficient defence of Aristotle, Theophrastus, Callisthenes, Ephorus, and Democharés against the attacks of Timaeus: and it is addressed to those who believe that this historian is impartial and truthful. . . .

The incapacity of Timaeus for forming a judgment.

24. We may fairly judge Timaeus on the principles which he has himself laid down. According to him, "poets and historians betray their own tastes by the incidents which they repeatedly record in their writings. Thus the poet[1] by his fondness for banqueting scenes shows that he is a glutton; and in the same way Aristotle, by frequently describing rich food in his writings, betrays his love of dainty living and his greediness." On the same principle he judges Dionysius the tyrant because he "was always very particular in the ornamentation of his dining-couches, and had hangings of exquisite make and variegated colours." If we apply this principle to Timaeus, we shall have abundant reason to think badly of him. In attacking others he shows great acuteness and boldness; when he comes to independent narrative he is full of dreams, miracles, incredible myths,—in a word, of miserable superstition and old wives' tales. The truth is that Timaeus is a proof

[1] Homer, who is generally spoken of as "the poet." We may remember Horace (*Ep.* 1, 19, 6) *Laudibus arguitur vini vinosus Homerus.*

of the fact, that at times, and in the case of many men, want of skill and want of judgment so completely destroy the value of their evidence, that though present at and eye-witnesses of the facts which they record, they might just as well have been absent or had no eyes. . . .

25. The story of the brazen bull is this. It was made by Phalaris at Agrigentum; and he used to force men to get into it, and then by way of punishment light a fire underneath. The metal becoming thus red hot, the man inside was roasted and scorched to death; and when he screamed in his agony, the sound from the machine was very like the bellowing of a bull. When the Carthaginians conquered Sicily this bull was removed from Agrigentum to Carthage. The trap door between the shoulders, through which the victims used to be let down, still remains; and no other reason for the construction of such a bull in Carthage can be discovered at all: yet Timaeus has undertaken to upset the common story, and to refute the declarations of poets and historians, by alleging that the bull at Carthage did not come from Agrigentum, and that no such figure ever existed there; and he has composed a lengthy treatise to prove this. . . .

The brazen bull of Phalaris.

GENERAL REMARKS ON TIMAEUS AS AN HISTORIAN

What epithet ought one to apply to Timaeus, and what word will properly characterise him? A man of his kind appears to me to deserve the very bitterest of the terms which he has applied to others. It has already been sufficiently proved that he is a carping, false and impudent writer; and from what remains to be said he will be shown to be unphilosophical, and, in short, utterly uninstructed. For towards the end of his twenty-first book, in the course of his "harangue of Timoleon," he remarks that "the whole sublunary world being divided into three parts —Asia, Libya, and Europe. . . ."[1] One could scarcely believe such a remark to have come, I don't say from Timaeus, but even from the proverbial Margites. . . .

[1] See 3, 37. The point seems to be that the remark was too commonplace to put into the mouth of a hero.

25. (*a*) The proverb tells us that one drop from the largest vessel is sufficient to show the whole contents. This is applicable to the present case. When one or two false statements have been discovered in a history, and they have been shown to be wilful, it is clear that nothing which such an historian may say can be regarded as certain or trustworthy. But in order to convince the more careful student, I must speak on his method and practice in regard to public speeches, military harangues, ambassador's orations, and all compositions of that class; which are, as it were, a compendium of events and an epitome of all history. Now that he has given these in his writings with entire disregard of truth, and that of set purpose, can any reader of Timaeus fail to be aware? He has not written down the words actually used, nor the real drift of these speeches; but imagining how they ought to have been expressed, he enumerates all the arguments used, and makes the words tally with the circumstances, like a school-boy declaiming on a set theme: as though his object were to display his own ability, not to give a report of what was in reality said. . . .

(*b*) The special province of history is, first, to ascertain what the actual words used were; and secondly, to learn why it was that a particular policy or argument failed or succeeded. For a bare statement of an occurrence is interesting indeed, but not instructive: but when this is supplemented by a statement of cause, the study of history becomes fruitful. For it is by applying analogies to our own circumstances that we get the means and basis for calculating the future; and for learning from the past when to act with caution, and when with greater boldness, in the present. The historian therefore who omits the words actually used, as well as all statement of the determining circumstances, and gives us instead conjectures and mere fancy compositions, destroys the special use of history. In this respect Timaeus is an eminent offender, for we all know that his books are full of such writing.

(*c*) But perhaps some one may raise the question as to how it comes about that, being the sort of writer that I am showing him to be, he has obtained acceptance and credit among certain people. The reason is that his work abounds with hostile criticism and invective against others: and he has been

judged, not by the positive merits of his own composition and his independent narrative, but by his skill in refuting his fellow historians; to which department he appears to me to have brought great diligence and an extraordinary natural aptitude. The case of the physicist Strato is almost precisely similar. As long as this man is endeavouring to discredit and refute the opinions of others, he is admirable: directly he brings forward anything of his own, or expounds any of his own doctrines, he at once seems to men of science to lose his faculties and become stupid and unintelligent. And for my part, I look upon this difference in writers as strictly analogous to the facts of everyday life. In this too it is easy to criticise our neighbours, but to be faultless ourselves is hard. One might almost say that those who are most ready at finding fault with others are most prone to errors in their own life.

(*d*) Besides these I may mention another error of Timaeus. Having stayed quietly at Athens for about fifty years, during which he devoted himself to the study of written history, he imagined that he was in possession of the most important means of writing it. To my mind this was a great mistake. History and the science of medicine are alike in this respect, that both may be divided broadly into three departments; and therefore those who study either must approach them in three ways. For instance the three departments of medicine are the rhetorical, the dietetic, and the surgical and pharmaceutical. [The second of these though important is discredited by some.][1] The first, which takes its rise from the school of Herophilus and Callimachus of Alexandria, does indeed rightly claim a certain position in medical science; but by its speciousness and liberal promises acquires so much reputation that those who are occupied with other branches of the art are supposed to be completely ignorant. But just bring one of these professors to an actual invalid: you will find that they are as completely wanting in the necessary skill as men who have never read a medical treatise. Nay, it has happened before now that certain persons, who had really nothing serious the matter with them, have been persuaded by their powerful arguments to commit themselves to their treatment, and have thereby endangered

[1] The text is again hopeless.

their lives: for they are like men trying to steer a ship out of a book. Still such men go from city to city with great *éclât*, and get the common people together to listen to them. But if, when this is done, they induce certain people to submit as a specimen to their practical treatment; they only succeed in reducing them to a state of extreme discomfort, and making them a laughing stock to the audience.[1] So completely does a persuasive address frequently get the advantage over practical experience. The third branch of the medical science, though it involves genuine skill in the treatment of the several cases, is not only rare in itself, but is also frequently cast into the shade, thanks to the folly of popular judgment, by volubility and impudence.

25. (*e*) In the same way the science of genuine history is threefold: first, the dealing with written documents and the arrangement of the material thus obtained; second, topography, the appearance of cities and localities, the description of rivers and harbours, and, speaking generally, the peculiar features of seas and countries and their relative distances; thirdly, political affairs. Now, as in the case of medicine, it is the last branch that many attach themselves to, owing to their preconceived opinions on the subject. And the majority of writers bring to the undertaking no spirit of fairness at all: nothing but dishonesty, impudence and unscrupulousness. Like vendors of drugs, their aim is to catch popular credit and favour, and to seize every opportunity of enriching themselves. About such writers it is not worth while to say more.

(*f*) But some of those who have the reputation of approaching history in a reasonable spirit are like the theoretical physicians. They spend all their time in libraries, and acquire generally all the learning which can be got from books, and then persuade themselves that they are adequately equipped for their task. . . . Yet in my opinion they are only partially qualified for the production of genuine history. To inspect ancient records indeed, with the view of ascertaining the notions entertained by the ancients of certain places, nations, polities

[1] The text is uncertain, and I am not at all sure of the meaning of *ἐπ' ὀνόματος*, cp. 25 *k*, 27. These public harangues of doctors to attract patients are noticed in Xenophon, *Memorab.* 4, 2, 5.

and events, and of understanding the several circumstances and contingencies experienced in former times, is useful; for the history of the past directs our attention in a proper spirit to the future, if a writer can be found to give a statement of facts as they really occurred. But to persuade one's self, as Timaeus does, that such ability in research is sufficient to enable a man to describe subsequent transactions with success is quite foolish. It is as though a man were to imagine that an inspection of the works of the old masters would enable him to become a painter and a master of the art himself.

This will be rendered still more evident from what I have now to say, particularly from certain passages in the history of Ephorus. This writer in his history of war seems to me to have had some idea of naval tactics, but to be quite unacquainted with fighting on shore. Accordingly, if one turns one's attention to the naval battles at Cyprus and Cnidus, in which the generals of the king were engaged against Evagoras of Salamis[1] and then against the Lacedaemonians, one will be struck with admiration of the historian, and will learn many useful lessons as to what to do in similar circumstances. But when he tells the story of the battle of Leuctra between the Thebans and Lacedaemonians, or again that of Mantinea between the same combatants, in which Epaminondas lost his life, if in these one examines attentively and in detail the arrangements and evolutions in the line of battle, the historian will appear quite ridiculous, and betray his entire ignorance and want of personal experience of such matters. The battle of Leuctra indeed was simple, and confined to one division of the forces engaged, and therefore does not make the writer's lack of knowledge so very glaring: but that of Mantinea was complicated and technical, and is accordingly unintelligible, and indeed completely inconceivable, to the historian. This will be rendered clear by first laying down a correct plan of the ground, and then measuring the extent of the movements as described by him. The same is the case with Theopompus, and above all with Timaeus, the subject of this book. These

Ephorus was fairly acquainted with naval, but not with military tactics.

B.C. 371. B.C. 362.

[1] Tyrant of Salamis in Cyprus, B.C. 404-374. See Isocrates, *Orat.* x.

latter writers also can conceal their ignorance, so long as they deal with generalities; but directly they attempt minute and detailed description, they show that they are no better than Ephorus. . . .

25. (*g*) It is in fact as impossible to write well on the operations in a war, if a man has had no experience of actual service, as it is to write well on politics without having been engaged in political transactions and vicissitudes. And when history is written by the book-learned, without technical knowledge, and without clearness of detail, the work loses all its value. For if you take from history its element of practical instruction, what is left of it has nothing to attract and nothing to teach. Again, in the topography of cities and localities, when such men attempt to go into details, being entirely without personal knowledge, they must in a similar manner necessarily pass over many points of importance; while they waste words on many that are not worth the trouble. And this is what his failure to make personal inspection brings upon Timaeus. . . .

Timaeus's want of practical knowledge.

(*h*) In his thirty-fourth book Timaeus says that "he spent fifty continuous years at Athens as an alien, and never took part in any military service, or went to inspect the localities." Accordingly, when he comes upon any such matters in the course of his history, he shows much ignorance and makes many misstatements; and if he ever does come near the truth, he is like one of those animal-painters who draw from models of stuffed skins. Such artists sometimes preserve the correct outline, but the vivid look and life-like portraiture of the real animal, the chief charm of the painter's art, are quite wanting. This is just the case with Timaeus, and in fact with all who start with mere book-learning; there is nothing vivid in their presentment of events, for that can only come from the personal experience of the writers. And hence it is, that those who have gone through no such course of actual experience produce no genuine enthusiasm in the minds of their readers. Former historians showed their sense of the necessity of making professions to this effect in their writings. For when their subject was political, they were careful to state that the writer had of course been engaged in politics, and had had

experience in matters of the sort; or if the subject was military, that he had served a campaign and been actually engaged; and again, when the matter was one of everyday life, that he had brought up children and had been married; and so on in every department of life, which we may expect to find adequately treated by those writers alone who have had personal experience, and have accordingly made that branch of history their own. It is difficult perhaps for a man to have been actually and literally engaged in everything: but in the most important actions and most frequently occurring he must have been so.

(*i*) And that this is no impossibility, Homer is a convincing instance; for in him you may see this quality of personal knowledge frequently and conspicuously displayed. The upshot of all this is that the study of documents is only one of three elements in the preparation of an historian, and is only third in importance. And no clearer proof of this could be given than that furnished by the deliberative speeches, harangues of commanders, and orations of ambassadors as recorded by Timaeus. For the truth is, that the occasions are rare which admit of all possible arguments being set forth; as a rule, the circumstances of the case confine them to narrow limits. And of such speeches one sort are regarded with favour by men of our time, another by those of an earlier age; different styles again are popular with Aetolians, Peloponnesians, and Athenians. But to make digressions, in season and out of season, for the purpose of setting forth every possible speech that could be made, as Timaeus does by his trick of inventing words to suit every sort of occasion, is utterly misleading, pedantic, and worthy of a schoolboy essayist. And this practice has brought failure and discredit on many writers. Of course to select from time to time the proper and appropriate language is a necessary part of our art: but as there is no fixed rule to decide the quantity and quality of the words to be used on a particular occasion, great care and training is required if we are to instruct and not mislead our readers. The exact nature of the situation is difficult to communicate always; still it may be brought home to the mind by means of systematic demonstration, founded on personal and habitual

experience. The best way of securing that this should be realised is for historians, first, to state clearly the position, the aims, and the circumstances of those deliberating; and then, recording the real speeches made, to explain to us the causes which contributed to the success or failure of the several speakers. Thus we should obtain a true conception of the situation. and by exercising our judgment upon it, and drawing analogies from it, should be able to form a thoroughly sound opinion upon the circumstances of the hour. But I suppose that tracing causes is difficult, while stringing words together in books is easy. Few again have the faculty of speaking briefly to the point, and getting the necessary training for doing so; while to produce a long and futile composition is within most people's capacity and is common enough.

Timaeus on Sicilian history.

25. (*k*) To confirm the judgment I have expressed of Timaeus, on his wilful misstatements as well as his ignorance, I shall now quote certain short passages from his acknowledged works as specimens. . . . Of all the men who have exercised sovereignty in Sicily, since the elder Gelo, tradition tells us that the most able have been Hermocrates, Timoleon, and Pyrrhus of Epirus, who are the last persons in the world on whom to father pedantic and scholastic speeches. Now Timaeus tells us in his twenty-first book that on his arrival in Sicily Eurymedon urged the cities there to undertake the war against Syracuse; that subsequently the people of Gela becoming tired of the war, sent an embassy to Camarina to make a truce; that upon the latter gladly welcoming the proposal, each state sent ambassadors to their respective allies begging them to despatch men of credit to Gela to deliberate on a pacification, and to secure the common interests. Upon the arrival of these deputies in Gela and the opening of the conference, he represents Hermocrates as speaking to the following effect: "He praised the people of Gela and Camarina first, for having made the truce; secondly, because they were the cause of the assembling of this peace congress; and thirdly because they had taken precautions to prevent the mass of the citizens from taking part in the discussion, and had secured that it should be confined to the leading men in the states, who

B.C. 413. Thucyd. 7, 42 *sqq.*

knew the difference between peace and war." Then after making two or three practical suggestions, Hermocrates is represented as expressing an opinion that "if they seriously consider the matter they will learn the profound difference between peace and war,"—although just before he had said that it was precisely this which moved his gratitude to the men of Gela, that "the discussion did not take place in the mass assembly, but in a congress of men who knew the difference between peace and war." This is an instance in which Timaeus not only fails to show the ability of an historian, but sinks below the level of a school theme. For, I presume, it will be universally admitted that what an audience requires is a demonstration of that about which they are in ignorance or uncertainty; but to exhaust one's ingenuity in finding arguments to prove what is known already is the most futile waste of time. But besides his cardinal mistake of directing the greater part of the speech to points which stood in need of no arguments at all, Timaeus also puts into the mouth of Hermocrates certain sentences of which one could scarcely believe that any commonplace youth would have been capable, much less the colleague of the Lacedaemonians in the battle of Aegospotami, and the sole conqueror of the Athenian armies and generals in Sicily.

B.C. 405. Hermocrates was not there. Xen. *Hellen.* 1, 1, 27-31.

26. For first he "thinks that he should remind the congress that in war sleepers are woke at dawn by bugles, in peace by cocks."[1] Then he says that "Hercules established the Olympic games and the sacred truce during them, as an exemplification of his own principles;" and that "he had injured all those persons against whom he waged war, under compulsion and in obedience to the order of another, but was never voluntarily the author of harm to any man."[2] Next he quotes the instance of Zeus in Homer as being displeased with Ares, and saying[3]—

> "Of all the gods that on Olympus dwell
> I hold thee most detested; for thy joy
> Is ever strife and war and battle."

And again the wisest of the heroes says[4]—

[1] For this proverb see Plutarch, *Nicias*, ch. 9, ἡδέως μεμνημένοι τοῦ εἰπόντος ὅτι τοὺς ἐν εἰρήνῃ καθεύδοντας οὐ σάλπιγγες ἀλλ' ἀλεκτρυόνες ἀφυπνίζουσι.
[2] *Ib.* ch. 25. [3] Homer, *Il.* 5, 890. [4] Homer, *Il.* 9, 63.

"He is a wretch, insensible and dead
To all the charities of social life,
Whose pleasure is in civil broil and war."

Then he goes on to allege that Euripides agrees with Homer in the lines[1]—

"O well of infinite riches!
O fairest of beings divine!
O Peace, how alas! thou delayest;
My heart for thy coming is fain.
I tremble lest age overtake me,
Ere thy beauty and grace I behold;
Ere the maidens shall sing in their dancing,
And revels be gladsome with flowers."

Next he remarks that "war is like disease, peace like health; for that the latter restores those that are sick, while in the former even the healthy perish. Moreover, in time of peace, the old are buried by the young as nature directs, while in war the case is reversed; and above all in war there is no security even as far as the city walls, while in peace it extends to the frontier of the territory"—and so on. I wonder what other arguments would have been employed by a youth who had just devoted himself to scholastic exercises and studies in history; and who wished, according to the rules of the art, to adapt his words to the supposed speakers? Just these I think which Timaeus represents Hermocrates as using.

Timoleon's victory over the Carthaginians, B.C. 344.

(*a*) Again, in the same book, Timoleon is exhorting the Greeks to engage the Carthaginians;[2] and when they are on the very point of coming to close quarters with the enemy, who are many times superior to them in number, Timaeus represents him as saying, "Do not look to the numbers of the foe, but to their cowardice. For though Libya is fully settled and abounds in inhabitants, yet when we wish to express complete desolation we say 'more desolate than Libya,' not meaning to refer to its emptiness, but to the poor spirit of its inhabitants. And after all, who would be afraid of men who, when nature gives hands as the distinctive feature of man among all living creatures, carry

[1] Euripides, fr. [2] Battle of the Crimesus. See Plutarch, *Timol.* ch. 27.

them about all their life inside their tunics idle?[1] And more than all, who wear shirts under their inner tunics, that they may not even when they fall in battle show their nakedness to their enemies? . . ."

(*b*) When Gelo promised to help the Greeks with twenty thousand land forces and two hundred decked ships, if they would concede to him the chief command either by land or sea, they say that the congress of Greeks, sitting at Corinth, gave Gelo's envoys a most spirited answer. They urged Gelo to come to their aid with his forces, and observed that the logic of facts would give the command to the bravest. This is not the language of men depending for succour on the Syracusans, as a last resource; but of men who felt confidence in themselves, and challenged all comers to a rivalry of courage and for the crown of valour. In spite of this, Timaeus spends such a wealth of rhetoric and earnestness on these points, in his desire to exalt the importance of Sicily above all the rest of Greece, to represent its history as the most splendid and glorious of all the world, its men as the wisest of all who have been great in philosophy, and the Syracusans as the most consummate and divine of statesmen, that he could scarcely be surpassed by the cleverest schoolboy declaimers when undertaking to prove such paradoxes as that "Thersites was an excellent man," or "Penelope a bad wife," or other thesis of that description.

Gelo. See Herod. 7, 157-165, B.C. 481.

(*c*) However, the only effect of such extravagant exaggeration is to bring ridicule upon the men and the transactions which it is his intention to champion; while he himself incurs the same discredit as ill-trained disputants in the Academy; some of whom, in their desire to embarrass their opponents on all subjects, possible or impossible alike, carry their paradoxical and sophistical arguments to such a length as to dispute whether it is possible for people at Athens to smell eggs cooking at Ephesus: and to offer to maintain that, while they are discussing these points, they are lying on their couches at home and carrying on a second discussion on other subjects. This extravagance of paradox has brought the whole school

[1] He refers to the habit of Eastern nations thrusting their hands into long sleeves in the presence of their rulers. See Xenophon, *Hellen.* 2, 1, 8.

into such disrepute, that even reasonable discussions have lost credit with the world. And apart from their own futility, these persons have inspired our young men with so depraved a taste, that they pay no attention whatever to questions of ethics and politics, which bring benefit to those who study them; but spend their lives in pursuit of an empty reputation for useless and paradoxical verbiage.

(*d*) This is just the case with Timaeus and his imitators in history. Paradoxical and tenacious, he has dazzled the multitude by skill in words; and has forced attention to himself by a show of veracity, or has conciliated confidence by a pretence of producing proof of his assertions. The most conspicuous instances of his success in inspiring this confidence are those parts of his work which treat of colonies, founding of cities, and the relationships of nations. In these points he makes such a parade of minute accuracy, and inveighs so bitterly when refuting others, that people came to imagine that all other historians have been mere dreamers, and have spoken at random in describing the world; and that he is the only man who has made accurate investigations, and unravelled every history with intelligence.

(*e*) As a matter of fact, his books contain much that is sound, but also much that is false. Those, however, who have spent much time on his earlier books, in which the passages I have alluded to occur, when the confidence which they have fully given to his exaggerated professions is disturbed by some one pointing out that Timaeus is obnoxious to the same reproaches which he has brought with such bitterness against others (as, for instance, in the misstatements as to the Locrians, and other instances lately mentioned by me), become angry and obstinate in controversy, and difficult to convince. And that, I might almost say, is all the benefit which the most diligent students of his history get from their reading. While those who devote their attention to his speeches, and generally to the didactic part of his work, become pedantic, sophistical, and wholly insensible to truth, for reasons which I have already stated.

27. Moreover, when he comes to deal with facts in his history, we find a combination of all the faults which I have mentioned. The reason I will now proceed to state. It will

not, perhaps, to most people seem to his credit, and it is in truth the real source of his errors. For whereas he is thought to have possessed great and wide knowledge, a faculty for historical inquiry, and extraordinary industry in the execution of his work, in certain cases he appears to have been the most ignorant and indolent person that ever called himself an historian. And the following considerations will prove it. Nature has bestowed on us two instruments of inquiry and research, hearing and sight. Of these sight is, according to Heracleitus, by far the truer; for eyes are surer witnesses than ears. And of these channels of learning Timaeus has chosen the pleasanter and the worse; for he entirely refrained from looking at things with his own eyes, and devoted himself to learning by hearsay. But even the ear may be instructed in two ways, reading and answers to personal inquiries: and in the latter of these he was very indolent, as I have already shown. The reason of his preference for the other it is easy to divine. Study of documents involves no danger or fatigue, if one only takes care to lodge in a city rich in such records, or to have a library in one's neighbourhood. You may then investigate any question while reclining on your couch, and compare the mistakes of former historians without any fatigue to yourself. But personal investigation demands great exertion and expense; though it is exceedingly advantageous, and in fact is the very corner-stone of history. This is evident from the writers of history themselves. Ephorus says, "if writers could only be present at the actual transactions, it would be far the best of all modes of learning." Theopompus says, "the best military historian is he who has been present at the greatest number of battles; the best speech maker is he who has been engaged in most political contests." The same might be said of the art of healing and of steering. Homer has spoken even more emphatically than these writers on this point. For when he wishes to describe what the man of light and leading should be, he introduces Odysseus in these words—

Cp. Herod. 1, 8. Hor. A. P. 180.

> "Tell me, oh Muse, the man of many shifts
> Who wandered far and wide."

and then goes on—

"And towns of many saw, and learnt their mind,
And suffered much in heart by land and sea."

and again [1]—

"Passing through wars of men and grievous waves."

28. It is such a man that the dignity of history appears to me to require. Plato says that "human affairs will not go well until either philosophers become kings or kings become philosophers." [2] So I should say that history will never be properly written, until either men of action undertake to write it (not as they do now, as a matter of secondary importance; but, with the conviction that it is their most necessary and honourable employment, shall devote themselves through life exclusively to it), or historians become convinced that practical experience is of the first importance for historical composition. Until that time arrives there will always be abundance of blunders in the writings of historians. Timaeus, however, quite disregarded all this. He spent his life in one place, of which he was not even a citizen; and thus deliberately renounced all active career either in war or politics, and all personal exertion in travel and inspection of localities: and yet, somehow or another, he has managed to obtain the reputation of a master in the art of history. To prove that I have not misrepresented him, it is easy to bring the evidence of Timaeus himself. In the preface to his sixth book he says that "some people suppose that more genius, industry, and preparation are required for rhetorical than for historical composition." And that "this opinion had been formerly advanced against Ephorus." Then because this writer had been unable to refute those who held it, he undertakes himself to draw a comparison between history and rhetorical compositions: a most unnecessary proceeding altogether. In the first place he misrepresents Ephorus. For in truth, admirable as Ephorus is throughout his whole work, in style, treatment, and argumentative acuteness, he is never more brilliant than in his digressions and statements of his personal views: in fact, whenever he is adding anything in the shape of a commentary or a

Historians must be practical men.

Timaeus on Ephorus.

[1] Homer, *Odyss.* 1, 1-4; 8, 183.
[2] *Republic*, v. 473 C. vi. 499 B.

note. And it so happens that his most elegant and convincing digression is on this very subject of a comparison between historians and speech-writers. But Timaeus is anxious not to be thought to follow Ephorus. Therefore, in addition to misrepresenting him and condemning the rest, he enters upon a long, confused, and in every way inferior, discussion of what had been already sufficiently handled by others; and expected that no one living would detect him.

(*a*) However, he wished to exalt history; and, in order to do so, he says that "history differs from rhetorical composition as much as real buildings differ from those represented in scene-paintings." And again, that "to collect the necessary materials for writing history is by itself more laborious than the whole process of producing rhetorical compositions." He mentions, for instance, the expense and labour which he underwent in collecting records from Assyria, and in studying the customs of the Ligures, Celts, and Iberians. But he exaggerates these so much, that he could not have himself expected to be believed. One would be glad to ask the historian which of the two he thinks is the more expensive and laborious,—to remain quietly at home and collect records and study the customs of Ligures and Celts, or to obtain personal experience of all the tribes possible, and see them with his own eyes? To ask questions about manœuvres on the field of battle and the sieges of cities and fights at sea from those who were present, or to take personal part in the dangers and vicissitudes of these operations as they occur? For my part I do not think that real buildings differ so much from those in stage-scenery, nor history from rhetorical compositions, as a narrative drawn from actual and personal experience differs from one derived from hearsay and the report of others. But Timaeus had no such experience: and he therefore naturally supposed that the part of an historian's labour which is the least important and lightest, that namely of collecting records and making inquiries from those who had knowledge of the several events, was in reality the most important and most difficult. And, indeed, in this particular department of research, men who have had no personal experience must necessarily fall into grave errors. For how is a

man, who has no knowledge of such things, to put the right questions as to manœuvering of troops, sieges of cities, and fights at sea? And how can he understand the details of what is told him? Indeed, the questioner is as important as the narrator for getting a clear story. For in the case of men who have had experience of real action, memory is a sufficient guide from point to point of a narrative: but a man who has had no such experience can neither put the right questions, nor understand what is happening before his eyes. Though he is on the spot, in fact, he is as good as absent. . . .

BOOK XIII

THE AETOLIANS

1. FROM the unbroken continuity of their wars, and the extravagance of their daily lives, the Aetolians became involved in debt, not only without others noticing it, but without being sensible of it themselves. Being therefore naturally disposed to a change in their constitution, they elected Dorimachus and Scopas to draw out a code of laws, because they saw that they were not only innovators by disposition, but were themselves deeply involved in private debt. These men accordingly were admitted to the office and drew up the laws. . . .

Straitened finances in Aetolia cause a revolution, B.C. 204.

When they produced them they were opposed by Alexander of Aetolia, who tried to show by many instances that innovation was a dangerous growth which could not be checked, and invariably ended by inflicting grave evils upon those who fostered it. He urged them therefore not to look solely to the exigencies of the hour, and the relief from their existing contracts, but to the future also. For it was a strange inconsistency to be ready to forfeit their very lives in war to preserve their children, and yet in their deliberations to be entirely careless of the future. . . .

2. Having failed to obtain the office, for the sake of which he had had the boldness to draw up these laws, Scopas turned his hopes to Alexandria, in the expectation of finding means there of restoring his broken fortunes, and satisfying to a fuller extent his grasping spirit. He little knew that it is impossible to assuage the ever-rising desires of the soul without correcting this passion by reason, any more than it is to stay or quench

Scopas goes to Egypt. See 16, 18-19; 18, 53.

the thirst of the dropsical body by supplying it with drink, without radically restoring its healthy condition. Scopas, indeed, is a conspicuous example of this truth; for though on his arrival at Alexandria, in addition to his military pay, which he possessed independently as commander-in-chief, the king assigned him ten minae a day, and one mina a day to those next him in rank, still he was not satisfied; but continued to demand more, until he disgusted his paymasters by his cupidity, and lost his life and his gold together.

PHILIP'S TREACHEROUS CONDUCT, B.C. 204

3. Philip now entered upon a course of treachery which no one would venture to say was worthy of a king; but which some would defend on the ground of its necessity in the conduct of public affairs, owing to the prevailing bad faith of the time. For the ancients, so far from using a fraudulent policy towards their friends, were scrupulous even as to using it to conquer their enemies; because they did not regard a success as either glorious or secure, which was not obtained by such a victory in the open field as served to break the confidence of their enemies. They therefore came to a mutual understanding not to use hidden weapons against each other, nor such as could be projected from a distance; and held the opinion that the only genuine decision was that arrived at by a battle fought at close quarters, foot to foot with the enemy. It was for this reason also that it was their custom mutually to proclaim their wars, and give notice of battles, naming time and place at which they meant to be in order of battle. But nowadays people say that it is the mark of an inferior general to perform any operation of war openly. Some slight trace, indeed, of the old-fashioned morality still lingers among the Romans; for they do proclaim their wars, and make sparing use of ambuscades, and fight their battles hand to hand and foot to foot. So much for the unnecessary amount of artifice which it is the fashion for commanders in our days to employ both in politics and war.

4. Philip gave Heracleides a kind of problem to work out, —how to circumvent and destroy the Rhodian fleet. At the

same time he sent envoys to Crete to excite and provoke them to go to war with the Rhodians. Heracleides, who was a born traitor, looked upon the commission as the very thing to suit his plans; and after revolving various methods in his mind, presently started and sailed to Rhodes. He was by origin a Tarentine, of a low family of mechanics, and he had many qualities which fitted him for bold and unscrupulous undertakings. His boyhood had been stained by notorious immorality; he had great acuteness and a retentive memory; in the presence of the vulgar no one could be more bullying and audacious; to those in high position no one more insinuating and servile. He had been originally banished from his native city from a suspicion of being engaged in an intrigue to hand over Tarentum to the Romans: not that he had any political influence, but being an architect, and employed in some repairs of the walls, he got possession of the keys of the gate on the landward side of the town. He thereupon fled for his life to the Romans. From them, being detected in making communications by letters and messages with Tarentum and Hannibal, he again fled for fear of consequences to Philip. With him he obtained so much credit and influence that he eventually was the most powerful element in the overthrow of that great monarchy.

Philip employs Heracleides of Tarentum.

5. The Prytanies of Rhodes were now distrustful of Philip, owing to his treacherous policy in Crete,[1] and they began to suspect that Heracleides was his agent. . . .

But Heracleides came before them and explained the reasons which had caused him to fly from Philip. . . .

The false pretences of Heracleides at Rhodes.

Philip was anxious above everything that the Rhodians should not discover his purpose in these transactions; whereby he succeeded in freeing Heracleides from suspicion. . . .

Nature, as it seems to me, has ordained that Truth should be a most mighty goddess among men, and has endowed her with extraordinary power. At least, I notice that though at times everything combines to

Magna est veritas.

[1] The Rhodians had proclaimed war against the Cretan pirates. Philip had secretly commissioned one of his agents, the Aetolian Dicaearchus, to aid the Cretans. Diodor. fr. xxviii.

crush her, and every kind of specious argument is on the side of falsehood, she somehow or another insinuates herself by her own intrinsic virtue into the souls of men. Sometimes she displays her power at once; and sometimes, though obscured for a length of time, she at last prevails and overpowers falsehood. Such was the case with Heracleides when he came from king Philip to Rhodes.[1] . . .

Damocles, who was sent with Pythio as a spy upon the Romans, was a person of ability, and possessed of many endowments fitting him for the conduct of affairs. . . .

NABIS, TYRANT OF SPARTA, B.C. 207-192

6. Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, being now in the third year of his reign, ventured upon no undertaking of importance, owing to the recent defeat of Machanidas by the Achaeans; but employed himself in laying the foundations of a long and grinding tyranny. He destroyed the last remains of the old Spartan nobles; drove into banishment all men eminent for wealth or ancestral glory; and distributed their property and wives among the chief men of those who remained, or among his own mercenary soldiers. These last were composed of murderers, housebreakers, footpads, and burglars. For this was, generally speaking, the class of men which he collected out of all parts of the world, whose own country was closed to them owing to their crimes and felonies. As he put himself forward as the patron and king of such wretches, and employed them as attendants and bodyguards, there is evidently no cause for surprise that his impious character and reign should have been long remembered. For, besides this, he was not content with driving the citizens into banishment, but took care no place should be secure, and no refuge safe for the exiles. Some he caused to be pursued and killed on the road, while others he dragged from their place of retreat and murdered. Finally, in the cities where they were living, he hired the houses next door to these banished men,

The character of Nabis's tyranny.

[1] Heracleides having gained credence at Rhodes by pretending to betray Philip's intrigue with the Cretans, waited for an opportunity, and, setting fire to their arsenal, escaped in a boat. Polyaen. 5, 17, 2.

wherever they might be, by means of agents who were not suspected; and then sent Cretans into these houses, who made breaches in the party walls, and through them, or through such windows as already existed, shot down the exiles as they stood or lay down in their own houses; so that there was no place of retreat, and no moment of security for the unfortunate Lacedaemonians.

7. When he had by these means put the greater number of them out of the way, he next had constructed a kind of machine, if machine it may be called, which was the figure of a woman, clothed in costly garments, and made to resemble with extraordinary fidelity the wife of Nabis. Whenever then he summoned one of the citizens with a view of getting some money from him, he used first to employ a number of arguments politely expressed, pointing out the danger in which the city stood from the threatening attitude of the Achaeans, and explaining what a number of mercenaries he had to support for their security, and the expenses which fell upon him for the maintenance of the national religion and the needs of the State. If the listeners gave in he was satisfied; but if they ever refused to comply with his demand, he would say, "Perhaps I cannot persuade you, but I think this lady Apéga will succeed in doing so." Apéga was the name of his wife. Immediately on his saying these words, the figure I have described was brought in. As soon as the man offered his hand to the supposed lady to raise her from her seat, the figure threw its arms round him and began drawing him by degrees towards its breasts. Now its arms, hands, and breasts were full of iron spikes under its clothes. When the tyrant pressed his hands on the back of the figure, and then by means of the works dragged the man by degrees closer and closer to its breasts, he forced him under this torture to say anything. A good number of men who refused his demands he destroyed in this way.[1] Nabis's wife.

8. The rest of his conduct was on a par with this beginning. He made common cause with the Cretan pirates, and kept temple-breakers, highway-robbers, and The beginning of the war between

[1] The text of these last sentences is so corrupt that it is impossible to be sure of having rightly represented the meaning of Polybius.

Nabis and the Achaeans.

murderers all over the Peloponnese; and as he shared in the profits of their nefarious trades, he allowed them to use Sparta as their base of operations. Moreover, about this time some visitors from Boeotia, who happened to be staying at Lacedaemon, enticed one of his grooms to make off with them, taking a certain white horse which was considered the finest in the royal stud. They were pursued by a party sent by Nabis as far as Megalopolis, where the tyrants found the horse and groom, and took them off without any one interfering. But they then laid hands on the Boeotians, who at first demanded to be taken before the magistrate; but as no attention was paid to the demand, one of them shouted out "Help!" Upon a crowd of the people of the place collecting and protesting that the men should be taken before the magistrate, Nabis's party were obliged to let them go and retire. Nabis, however, had been long looking out for a ground of complaint and a reasonable pretext for a quarrel, and having seized on this one, he harried the cattle belonging to Proagoras and some others; which was a commencement of the war.[1] . . .

ANTIOCHUS IN ARABIA, B.C. 205-204

9. Labae, like Sabae, is a city of Chattenia, which is a territory of the Gerraei. . . . In other respects, Chattenia is a rugged country, but the wealth of the Gerraei who inhabit it has adorned it with villages and towers. It lies along the Arabian Sea, and Antiochus gave orders to spare it. . . .

In a letter to Antiochus the Gerraei demanded that he should not destroy what the gods had given them—perpetual peace and freedom; and this letter having been interpreted to him he granted the request. . . .

Their freedom having been confirmed to the Gerraei, they presented King Antiochus at once with five hundred talents of silver, one thousand of frankincense, and two hundred of oil of cinnamon, called stacte, all of them spices of the country on the Arabian Sea. He then sailed to the island of Tylos, and thence to Seleucia. . . .

[1] These raids on the territory of Megalopolis, however, did not lead to open war till B.C. 202. See 16, 16.

BOOK XIV

PREFACE

PERHAPS a *resumé* of events in each Olympiad may arrest the attention of my readers both by their number and importance, the transactions in every part of the world being brought under one view. However, I think the events of this Olympiad especially will do so; because in it the wars in Italy and Libya came to an end; and I cannot imagine any one not caring to inquire what sort of catastrophe and conclusion they had. For everybody, though extremely interested in details and particulars, naturally longs to be told the end of a story. I may add that it was in this period also that the kings gave the clearest indication of their character and policy. For what was only rumour in regard to them before was now become a matter of clear and universal knowledge, even to those who did not care to take part in public business. Therefore, as I wished to make my narrative worthy of its subject, I have not, as in former instances, included the history of two years in one book. . . .

144th Olympiad, B.C. 204-200.

Elected Consul for B.C. 205 (*see* 11, 33) *Scipio had Sicily assigned as his* provincia, *with leave to cross to Africa if necessary* (*Livy*, 28, 45). *He sent Laelius to Africa in* B.C. 205, *but remained himself in Sicily. Next spring* (B.C. 204) *he crossed to Africa with a year's additional imperium. In the course of this year he ravaged the Carthaginian territory and besieged Utica* (*Livy*, 29, 35), *and at the beginning of* B.C. 203 *his imperium was prolonged till he should have finished the war* (*id.* 30, 1).

1. While the Consuls were thus engaged,[1] Scipio in Libya

[1] Caepio was commanding in Bruttium, Servilius in Etruria and Liguria. Livy, 30, 1.

learnt during the winter that the Carthaginians were fitting out a fleet; he therefore devoted himself to similar preparations as well as to pressing on the siege of Utica. He did not, however, give up all hopes of Syphax; but as their forces were not far apart he kept sending messages to him, convinced that he would be able to detach him from the Carthaginians. He still cherished the belief that Syphax was getting tired of the girl[1] for whose sake he had joined the Carthaginians, and of his alliance with the Punic people generally; for the Numidians, he knew, were naturally quick to feel satiety, and constant neither to gods nor men. Scipio's mind, however, was distracted with various anxieties, and his prospects were far from seeming secure to him; for he shrank from an engagement in the open field on account of the enemy's great superiority in numbers. He therefore seized an opportunity which now presented itself. Some of his messengers to Syphax reported to him that the Carthaginians had constructed their huts in their winter camp of various kinds of wood and boughs without any earth; while the old army of the Numidians made theirs of reeds, and the reinforcements which were now coming in from the neighbouring townships constructed theirs of boughs only, some of them inside the trench and palisade, but the greater number outside. Scipio therefore made up his mind that the manner of attacking them, which would be most unexpected by the enemy and most successful for himself, would be by fire. He therefore turned his attention to organising such an attack. Now, in his communications with Scipio, Syphax was continually harping upon his proposal that the Carthaginians should evacuate Italy and the Romans Libya; and that the possessions held by either between these two countries should remain in *statu quo*. Hitherto Scipio had refused to listen to this suggestion, but he now gave Syphax a hint by the mouth of his messengers that the course he wished to see followed was not impossible. Greatly elated at this, Syphax became much bolder than before in his communications with Scipio;

B.C. 203. Cn. Servilius Caepio, C. Servilius Geminus Coss. Livy, 30, 1.

The proposal of Syphax.

[1] Sophanisba, the daughter of Hasdrubal son of Gesco. Livy, 29, 23; 30, 12, 15.

the numbers of the messengers sent backwards and forwards, and the frequency of their visits, were redoubled; and they sometimes even stayed several days in each other's camps without any thought of precaution. On these occasions Scipio always took care to send, with the envoys, some men of tried experience or of military knowledge, dressed up as slaves in rough and common clothes, that they might examine and investigate in security the approaches and entrances to both the entrenchments. For there were two camps, one that of Hasdrubal, containing thirty thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry; and another about ten stades distant from it of the Numidians, containing ten thousand cavalry and about fifty thousand infantry. The latter was the easier of approach, and its huts were well calculated for being set on fire, because, as I said before, the Numidians had not made theirs of timber and earth, but used simply reeds and thatch in their construction.

2. By the beginning of spring Scipio had completed the reconnaissances necessary for this attempt upon the enemy; and he began launching his ships, and getting the engines on them into working order, as though with the purpose of assaulting Utica by sea. With his land forces he once more occupied the high ground overlooking the town, and carefully fortified it and secured it by trenches. He wished the enemy to believe that he was doing this for the sake of carrying on the siege; but he really meant it as a cover for his men, who were to be engaged in the undertaking described above, to prevent the garrison sallying out, when the legions were separated from their lines, assaulting the palisade which was so near to them, and attacking the division left in charge of it. Whilst in the midst of these preparations, he sent to Syphax inquiring whether, "in case he agreed to his proposals, the Carthaginians would assent, and not say again that they would deliberate on the terms?" He ordered these legates at the same time not to return to him, until they had received an answer on these points. When the envoys arrived, the Numidian king was convinced that Scipio was on the point of concluding the agreement, partly from the fact that the ambassadors said that they would not go away until they got his answer, and partly

Spring of B.C. 203.

because of the anxiety expressed as to the disposition of the Carthaginians. He therefore sent immediately to Hasdrubal, stating the facts and urging him to accept the peace. Meanwhile he neglected all precautions himself, and allowed the Numidians, who were now joining, to pitch their tents where they were, outside the lines. Scipio in appearance acted in the same way, while in reality he was pushing on his preparations with the utmost care. When a message was returned from the Carthaginians bidding Syphax complete the treaty of peace, the Numidian king, in a state of great exaltation, communicated the news to the envoys; who immediately departed to their own camp to inform Scipio from the king of what had been done. As soon as he heard it, the Roman general at once sent fresh envoys to inform Syphax that Scipio was quite satisfied and was anxious for the peace; but that the members of his council differed from him, and held that they should remain as they were. The ambassadors duly arrived and informed the Numidians of this. Scipio sent this mission to avoid the appearance of a breach of truce, if he should perform any act of hostility while negotiations for peace were still going on between the parties. He considered that, by making this statement, he would be free to act in whatever way he chose without laying himself open to blame.

Scipio's ruse to deceive Syphax.

3. Syphax's annoyance at this message was great, in proportion to the hopes he had previously entertained of making the peace. He had an interview with Hasdrubal, and told him of the message he had received from the Romans; but though they deliberated long and earnestly as to what they ought to do, they neither had any idea or conjecture as to what was really going to happen. For they had no anticipation whatever as to the need of taking precautions, or of any danger threatening them, but were all eagerness and excitement to strike some blow, and thus provoke the enemy to descend into the level ground. Meanwhile Scipio allowed his army generally, by the preparations he was making and the orders he was issuing, to imagine that his aim was the capture of Utica; but summoning the most able and trusty Tribunes at noon, he im-

Scipio discloses his project.

parted to them his design, and ordered them to cause their men to get their supper early, and then to lead the legions outside the camp as soon as the buglers gave the usual signal by a simultaneous blast of their bugles. For it is a custom in the Roman army for the trumpeters and buglers to sound a call near the commander's tent at supper time, that the night pickets may then take up their proper positions. Scipio next summoned the spies whom he had sent at different times to reconnoitre the enemy's quarters, and carefully compared and studied the accounts they gave about the roads leading to the hostile camps and the entrances to them, employing Massanissa to criticise their words and assist him with his advice, because he was acquainted with the locality.

4. Everything being prepared for his expedition, Scipio left a sufficiently strong guard in the camp, and got the rest of the men on the march towards the end of the first watch, the enemy being about sixty stades distant. Arrived in the neighbourhood of the enemy, about the end of the third watch, he assigned to Gaius Laelius and Massanissa half his Roman soldiers and all his Numidians, with orders to attack the camp of Syphax, urging them to quit themselves like brave men and do nothing carelessly; with the clear understanding that, as the darkness hindered and prevented the use of the eyes, a night attack required all the more the assistance of a cool head and a firm heart. The rest of the army he took the command of in person, and led against Hasdrubal. He had calculated on not beginning his assault until Laelius's division had set fire to the enemy's huts; he therefore proceeded slowly. The latter meanwhile advanced in two divisions, which attacked the enemy simultaneously. The construction of the huts being as though purposely contrived to be susceptible of a conflagration, as I have already explained, as soon as the front rank men began to set light to them, the fire caught all the first row of huts fiercely, and soon got beyond all control, from the closeness of the huts to each other, and the amount of combustible material which they contained. Laelius remained in the rear as a reserve; but Massanissa, knowing the localities through which those who fled from the fire would be sure to retreat, stationed his

Destruction of the camp of Syphax by C. Laelius and Massanissa,

own soldiers at those spots. Not a single Numidian had any suspicion of the true state of the case, not even Syphax himself; but thinking that it was a mere accidental conflagration of the rampart, some of them started unsuspiciously out of bed, others sprang out of their tents in the midst of a carouse and with the cup actually at their lips. The result was that numbers of them got trampled to death by their own friends at the exits from the camp; many were caught by the flames and burnt to death; while all those who escaped the flame fell into the hands of the enemy, and were killed, without knowing what was happening to them or what they were doing.

and of Hasdrubal.

5. At the same time the Carthaginians, observing the proportions of the conflagration and the hugeness of the flame that was rising, imagined that the Numidian camp had been accidentally set on fire. Some of them therefore started at once to render assistance, and all the rest hurried outside their own camp unarmed, and stood there gazing in astonishment at the spectacle. Everything having thus succeeded to his best wishes, Scipio fell upon these men outside their camp, and either put them to the sword, or, driving them back into the camp, set fire to their huts. The disaster of the Punic army was thus very like that which had just befallen the Numidians, fire and sword in both cases combining to destroy them. Hasdrubal immediately gave up all idea of combating the fire, for he knew from the coincidence of the two that the fire in the Numidian camp was not accidental, as he had supposed, but had originated from some desperate design of the enemy. He therefore turned his attention to saving his own life, although there was now little hope left of doing so. For the fire was spreading rapidly and was catching everywhere; while the camp gangways were full of horses, beasts of burden, and men, some of them half dead and devoured by the fire, and others in a state of such frantic terror and mad excitement that they prevented any attempts at making a defence, and by the utter tumult and confusion which they created rendered all chance of escape hopeless. The case of Syphax was the same as that of Hasdrubal, as it was also that

of the other officers. The two former, however, did manage to escape, accompanied by a few horsemen: but all those myriads of men, horses, and beasts of burden, either met a miserable and pitiable death from the fire, or, if they escaped the violence of that, some of the men perished ignominiously at the hands of the enemy, cut down naked and defenceless, not only without their arms, but without so much as their clothes to cover them. The whole place was filled with yells of pain, confused cries, terror, and unspeakable din, mingled with a conflagration which spread rapidly and blazed with the utmost fierceness. It was the combination and suddenness of these horrors that made them so awful, any one of which by itself would have been sufficient to strike terror into the hearts of men. It is accordingly impossible for the imagination to exaggerate the dreadful scene, so completely did it surpass in horror everything hitherto recorded. Of all the brilliant achievements of Scipio this appears to me to have been the most brilliant and the most daring. . . .

6. When day broke, and he found the enemy either killed or in headlong flight, Scipio exhorted his Tribunes to activity, and at once started in pursuit. At first the Carthaginian general seemed inclined to stand his ground, though told of Scipio's approach, trusting in the strength of the town [of Anda]; but when he saw that the inhabitants were in a mutinous state, he shrank from meeting the attack of Scipio, and fled with the relics of his army, which consisted of as many as five hundred cavalry and about two thousand infantry. The inhabitants of the town thereupon submitted unconditionally to the Romans, and were spared by Scipio, who, however, gave up two neighbouring towns to the legions to plunder. This being done he returned to his original entrenchment. Baffled in the hopes which they had entertained of the course which the campaign would take, the Carthaginians were deeply depressed. They had expected to shut up the Romans on the promontory near Utica, which had been the site of their winter quarters, and besiege them there with their army and fleet both by sea and land. With this view all their preparations had been made; and when they

Hasdrubal at Anda, see Appian, 8, 24.

Dismay at Carthage.

saw, quite contrary to their calculations, that they were not only driven from the open country by the enemy, but were in hourly expectation of an attack upon themselves and their city, they became completely disheartened and panic-stricken. Their circumstances, however, admitted of no delay. They were compelled at once to take precautions and adopt some measures for the future. But the senate was filled with doubt and varied and confused suggestions. Some said that they ought to send for Hannibal and recall him from Italy, their one hope of safety being now centred in that general and his forces. Others were for an embassy to Scipio to obtain a truce and discuss with him the terms of a pacification and treaty. Others again were for keeping up their courage and collecting their forces, and sending a message to Syphax; who, they said, was at the neighbouring town of Abba, engaged in collecting the remnants of his army. This last suggestion was the one which ultimately prevailed. The Government of Carthage accordingly set about collecting troops, and sent a despatch to Syphax begging him to support them and abide by his original policy, as a general with an army would presently join him.

The Senate, however, resolves to continue their resistance.

7. Meanwhile the Roman commander was pressing on the seige of Utica. But when he heard that Syphax was still in position, and that the Carthaginians were once more collecting an army, he led out his forces and pitched his camp close under the walls of Utica. At the same time he divided the booty among the soldiers. . . .[1] The merchants who purchased them from the soldiers went away with very profitable bargains; for the recent victory inspired the soldiers with high hopes of a successful conclusion of the campaign, and they therefore thought little of the spoils already obtained, and made no difficulties in selling them to the merchants.

The Numidian king and his friends were at first minded to continue their retreat to their own land. But while deliberating on this, certain Celtiberes, over four thousand in number, who had been hired as soldiers by the Carthaginians arrived in the vicinity of Abba. Encouraged by this addi

Syphax is persuaded by Sophanisba to stand by the Carthaginians still.

[1] Some words are lost from the text.

tional strength the Numidians stopped on their retreat. And when the young lady, who was daughter of Hasdrubal and wife of Syphax, added her earnest entreaties that he would remain and not abandon the Carthaginians at such a crisis, the Numidian king gave way and consented to her prayer. The approach of these Celtiberes did a great deal also to encourage the hopes of the Carthaginians: for instead of four thousand, it was reported at Carthage that they were ten thousand, and that their bravery and the excellency of their arms made them irresistible in the field. Excited by this rumour, and by the boastful talk which was current among the common people, the Carthaginians felt their resolution to once more take the field redoubled. And finally, within thirty days, they pitched a camp in conjunction with the Numidians and Celtiberes on what are called the Great Plains, with an army amounting to no less than thirty thousand.

The Carthaginians again take the field.

8. When news of these proceedings reached the Roman camp Scipio immediately determined to attack. Leaving orders, therefore, to the army and navy, which were besieging Utica, as to what they were to do, he started with all his army in light marching order. On the fifth day he reached the Great Plains, and during the first day after his arrival encamped on a piece of rising ground about thirty stades from the enemy. Next day he descended into the plain and drew up his army[1] at a distance of seven stades from the enemy, with his cavalry forming an advanced guard. After skirmishing attacks carried on by both sides during the next two days, on the fourth both armies were deliberately brought out into position and drawn up in order of battle. Scipio followed exactly the Roman system, stationing the maniples of hastati in the front, behind them the principes, and lastly the triarii in the rear. Of his cavalry he stationed the Italians on the right wing, the Numidians and Massanissa on the left. Syphax and Hasdrubal

The battle on the Great Plains. 24th June, B.C. 203.

[1] παρενέβαλλε, which Schweig. translates *castra locavit*: but though the word does sometimes bear that meaning, I cannot think that it does so here. Scipio seems to have retained his camp on the hill, only two and a half miles' distant, and to have come down into the plain to offer battle each of the three days. Hence the imperfect.

stationed the Celtiberes in the centre opposite the Roman cohorts, the Numidians on the left, and the Carthaginians on the right. At the very first charge the Numidians reeled before the Italian cavalry, and the Carthaginians before those under Massanissa; for their many previous defeats had completely demoralised them. But the Celtiberes fought gallantly, for they had no hope of saving themselves by flight, being entirely unacquainted with the country; nor any expectation of being spared if they were taken prisoners on account of their perfidy to Scipio: for they were regarded as having acted in defiance of justice and of their treaty in coming to aid the Carthaginians against the Romans, though they had never suffered any act of hostility at Scipio's hands during the campaigns in Iberia. When, however, the two wings gave way these men were surrounded by the principes and triarii, and cut to pieces on the field almost to a man. Thus perished the Celtiberes, who yet did very effective service to the Carthaginians, not only during the whole battle, but during the retreat also; for, if it had not been for the hindrance caused by them, the Romans would have pressed the fugitives closely, and very few of the enemy would have escaped. As it was, owing to the delay caused by these men, Syphax and his cavalry effected their retreat to his own kingdom in safety; while Hasdrubal with the survivors of his army did the same to Carthage.

The Roman wings are both victorious.

The Celtiberes, on the centre, are cut to pieces after a gallant resistance.

Syphax and Hasdrubal escape.

9. After making the necessary arrangements as to the booty and prisoners, Scipio summoned a council of war to consult as to what to do next. It was resolved that Scipio himself and one part of the army should stay in the country and visit the various towns; while Laelius and Massanissa, with the Numidians and the rest of the Roman legions, should pursue Syphax and give him no time to deliberate or make any preparations. This being settled the commanders separated; the two latter going with their division in pursuit of Syphax, Scipio on a round of the townships. Some of these were terrified into a voluntary submission to the Romans,

Scipio receives the submission of the country, while Laelius goes in pursuit of Syphax.

others he promptly took by assault. The whole country was ripe for a change, owing to the constant series of miseries and contributions, under which it had been groaning from the protracted wars in Iberia.

A panic at Carthage.

In Carthage meanwhile, where the panic had been great enough before, a still wilder state of excitement prevailed, after this second disaster, and the disappointment of the hopes of success which they had entertained. However, those of the counsellors who claimed the highest character for courage urged that they should go on board their ships and attack the besiegers of Utica, try to raise the blockade, and engage the enemy at sea, who were not in a forward state of preparation in that department; that they should recall Hannibal, and without delay test to the utmost this one more chance: for both these measures offered great and reasonable opportunities of securing their safety. Others declared that their circumstances no longer admitted of these measures: what they had to do was to fortify their town and prepare to stand a siege; for chance would give them many occasions of striking a successful blow if they only held together. At the same time they advised that they should deliberate on coming to terms and making a treaty, and see on what conditions and by what means they might extricate themselves from the danger. After a long debate, all these proposals were adopted together.

10. Upon this decision being come to, those who were to sail to Italy went straight from the council chamber to the sea, while the Navarch went to prepare the ships. The rest began to take measures for securing the city, and remained in constant consultation on the measures necessary for the purpose.

Meanwhile Scipio's camp was getting gorged with booty; for he found no one to resist him, and everybody yielded to his attacks. He therefore determined to despatch the greater part of the booty to his original camp; while he advanced with his army in light marching order to seize the entrenchment near Tunes, and pitched his camp within the view of the inhabitants of Carthage, thinking that this would do more than anything else to strike terror into their hearts and lower their courage.

The Carthaginians had in a few days manned and provisioned their ships, and were engaged in getting under sail and carrying out their plan of operations, when Scipio arrived at Tunes, and, the garrison flying at his approach, occupied the town, which is about a hundred stades from Carthage, of remarkable strength both natural and artificial, and visible from nearly every point of Carthage.

Scipio recalled to Utica by the fear of an attack upon his fleet.

Just as the Romans pitched their camp there, the Carthaginians were putting out to sea on board their ships to sail to Utica. Seeing the enemy thus putting out, and fearing some misfortune to his own fleet, Scipio was rendered exceedingly anxious, because no one there was prepared for such an attack, or had anything in readiness to meet the danger. He therefore broke up his camp and marched back in haste to support his men. There he found his decked ships thoroughly well fitted out for raising siege-engines and applying them to walls, and generally for all purposes of an assault upon a town, but not in the least in the trim for a sea-fight; while the enemy's fleet had been under process of rigging for this purpose the whole winter. He therefore gave up all idea of putting to sea to meet the enemy and accepting battle there; but anchoring his decked ships side by side he moored the transports round them, three or four deep; and then, taking down the masts and yard-arms, he lashed the vessels together firmly by means of these, keeping a space between each sufficient to enable the light craft to sail in and out. . . .

PTOLEMY PHILOPATOR, B.C. 222-205

11. Philo was a parasite of Agathocles, the son of Oenanthe, and the friend of king Philopator. . . .

The extraordinary influence of women of low character at Alexandria.

Many statues of Cleino, the girl who acted as cupbearer to Ptolemy Philadelphus, were set up at Alexandria, draped in a single tunic and holding a cup in the hands. And are not the most splendid houses there those which go by the names of Murtium, Mnesis, and Pothine? And yet Mnesis was a flute-girl, as was Pothine, and Murtium was a

public prostitute. And was not Agathocleia, the mistress of king Ptolemy Philopator, an influential personage,—she who was the ruin of the whole kingdom? . . .

12. The question may be asked, perhaps, why I have chosen to give a sketch of Egyptian history here, going back a considerable period; whereas, in the case of the rest of my history, I have recorded the events of each year in the several countries side by side? I have done so for the following reasons: Ptolemy Philopator, of whom I am now speaking, after the conclusion of the war for the possession of Coele-Syria,[1] abandoned all noble pursuits and gave himself up to the life of debauchery which I have just described. But late in life he was compelled by circumstances to engage in the war I have mentioned,[2] which, over and above the mutual cruelty and lawlessness with which it was conducted, witnessed neither pitched battle, sea fight, siege, or anything else worth recording. I thought, therefore, that it would be easier for me as a writer, and more intelligible to my readers, if I did not touch upon everything year by year as it occurred, or give a full account of transactions which were insignificant and undeserving of serious attention; but should once for all sum up and describe the character and policy of this king.

The feeble character of Ptolemy Philopator.

[1] The war with Antiochus, B.C. 218-217. See 5, 40, 58-71, 79-87.

[2] A civil war, apparently in a rebellion caused by his own feeble and vicious character. It seems to be that referred to in 5, 107.

BOOK XV

A slight success on the part of the Carthaginian fleet at Utica (14, 10) *had been more than outweighed by the capture of Syphax by Laelius* [*Livy*, 39, 11]. *Negotiations for peace followed, and an armistice, in the course of which occurred the incident referred to in the first extract of this book.*

1. THE Carthaginians having seized the transports as prizes of war, and with them an extraordinary quantity of provisions, Scipio was extremely enraged, not so much at the loss of the provisions, as by the fact that the enemy had thereby obtained a vast supply of necessaries; and still more at the Carthaginians having violated the sworn articles of truce, and commenced the war afresh. He therefore at once selected Lucius Sergius, Lucius Baebius, and Lucius Fabius to go to Carthage, to remonstrate on what had taken place, and at the same time to announce that the Roman people had ratified the treaty; for he had lately received a despatch from home to that effect. Upon their arrival in Carthage these envoys first had an audience of the Senate, and then were introduced to a meeting of the people. On both occasions they spoke with great freedom on the situation of affairs, reminding their hearers that "Their ambassadors who had come to the Roman camp at Tunes, on being admitted to the council of officers, had not been content with appealing to the gods and kissing the ground, as other people do, but had thrown themselves upon the earth, and in abject humiliation had kissed the feet of the assembled officers; and then, rising

Some transports under Cn. Octavius wrecked in the Bay of Carthage, and taken possession of by the Carthaginians in spite of the truce. Autumn of B.C. 203. See Livy, 30, 24.

Speech of the Roman envoys.

from the ground, had reproached themselves for breaking the existing treaty between the Romans and Carthaginians, and acknowledged that they deserved every severity at the hands of the Romans; but intreated to be spared the last severities, from a regard to the vicissitudes of human fortune, for their folly would be the means of displaying the generosity of the Romans. Remembering all this, the general and the officers then present in the council were at a loss to understand what had encouraged them to forget what they then said, and to venture to break their sworn articles of agreement. Plainly it was this—they trusted in Hannibal and the forces that had arrived with him. But they were very ill advised. All the world knew that he and his army had been driven these two years past from every port of Italy, and had retreated into the neighbourhood of the Lacinian promontory, where they had been so closely shut up and almost besieged, that they had barely been able to get safe away home. Not that, even if they had come back," he added, "as conquerors, and were minded to engage us who have already defeated you in two consecutive battles, ought you to entertain any doubt as to the result, or to speculate on the chance of victory. The certainty of defeat were a better subject for your reflections: and when that takes place, what are the gods that you will summon to your aid? And what arguments will you use to move the pity of the victors for your misfortunes? You must needs expect to be debarred from all hope of mercy from gods and men alike by your perfidy and folly."

Hannibal leaves Italy, 23d June, B.C. 203.

2. After delivering this speech the envoys retired. Some few of the citizens were against breaking the treaty; but the majority, both of the politicians and the Senate, were much annoyed by its terms, and irritated by the plain speaking of the envoys; and, moreover, could not make up their minds to surrender the captured transports and the provisions which were on board them. But their main motive was a confident hope that they might yet conquer by means of Hannibal. The people therefore voted to dismiss the envoys without an answer. Moreover, the political party, whose aim it was to

Treacherous attempt on the lives of the Roman envoys.

bring on the war at all hazards, held a meeting and arranged the following act of treachery. They gave out that it was necessary to make provision for conducting the envoys back to their camp in safety. They therefore at once caused two triremes to be got ready to convoy them; but at the same time sent a message to the Navarch Hasdrubal to have some vessels ready at no great distance from the Roman camp, in order that, as soon as the convoys had taken leave of the Roman envoys, he might bear down upon their ships and sink them; for the Carthaginian fleet was stationed at the time close under Utica. Having made this arrangement with Hasdrubal, they despatched the envoys, with instructions to the officers of the convoys to leave them and return, as soon as they had passed the mouth of the River Macara; for it was from this point that the enemy's camp came into sight. Therefore, according to their instructions, as soon as they had passed this point, the officers of the convoys made signs of farewell to the Roman envoys and returned. Lucius and his colleagues suspected no danger, and felt no other annoyance at this proceeding than as regarding it as a mark of disrespect. But no sooner were they left thus alone, than three Carthaginian vessels suddenly started out to attack them, and came up with the Roman quinquereme. They failed, indeed, to stave her in, because she evaded them; nor did they succeed in boarding her, because the men resisted them with great spirit. But they ran up alongside of the vessel, and kept attacking her at various points, and managed to wound the marines with their darts and kill a considerable number of them; until at last the Romans, observing that their forage parties along the shore were rushing down to the beach to their assistance, ran their ships upon land. Most of the marines were killed, but the envoys had the unexpected good fortune to escape with their lives.

Renewal of hostilities.

8. This was the signal for the recommencement of the war in a fiercer and more angry spirit than before. The Romans on their part, looking upon themselves as having been treated with perfidy, were possessed with a furious determination to conquer the Carthaginians; while the latter, conscious of the consequences of what they had done, were ready to go all lengths to avoid

falling under the power of the enemy. With such feelings animating both sides, it was quite evident that the result would have to be decided on the field of battle. Consequently everybody, not only in Italy and Libya, but in Iberia, Sicily, and Sardinia, was in a state of excited expectation, watching with conflicting feelings to see what would happen. But meanwhile Hannibal, finding himself too weak in cavalry, sent to a certain Numidian named Tychaeus, who was a friend of Syphax, and was reputed to possess the most warlike cavalry in Libya, urging him "to lend his aid, and not let the present opportunity slip; as he must be well aware that, if the Carthaginians won the day, he would be able to maintain his rule; but if the Romans proved victorious, his very life would be in danger, owing to the ambition of Massanissa." This prince was convinced by these arguments, and joined Hannibal with two thousand horsemen.

Hannibal's cavalry reinforced by Tychaeus.

4. Having secured his fleet, Scipio left Baebius in command of it in his place, while he himself went a round of the cities. This time he did not admit to mercy those who voluntarily surrendered, but carried all the towns by force, and enslaved the inhabitants, to show his anger at the treachery of the Carthaginians. To Massanissa he sent message after message, explaining to him how the Punic government had broken the terms, and urging him to collect the largest army he was able and join him with all speed. For as soon as the treaty had been made, Massanissa, as I have said, had immediately departed with his own army and ten Roman cohorts, infantry and cavalry, accompanied by some commissioners from Scipio, that he might not only recover his own kingdom, but secure the addition of that of Syphax also, by the assistance of the Romans. And this purpose was eventually effected.

B.C. 202. Scipio traverses the Carthaginian territory, and summons Massanissa to his aid.

It happened that just at this time the envoys from Rome arrived at the naval camp. Those of them who had been sent by the Roman government, Baebius at once caused to be escorted to Scipio, while he retained those who were Carthaginians. The latter were much cast down, and regarded

Scipio orders the Carthaginian envoys to be released.

their position as one of great danger; for when they were informed of the impious outrage committed by their countrymen on the persons of the Roman envoys, they thought there could be no doubt that the vengeance for it would be wreaked upon themselves. But when Scipio learnt from the recently-arrived commissioners that the senate and people accepted with enthusiasm the treaty which he had made with the Carthaginians, and were ready to grant everything he asked, he was highly delighted, and ordered Baebius to send the envoys home with all imaginable courtesy. And he was very well advised to do so, in my opinion. For as he knew that his countrymen made a great point of respecting the rights of ambassadors, he considered in his own mind, not what the Carthaginians deserved to have done to them, but what it was becoming in Romans to inflict. Therefore, though he did not relax his own indignation and anger at what they had done, he yet endeavoured, in the words of the proverb, "to maintain the good traditions of his sires." The result was that, by this superiority in his conduct, a very decided impression was made upon the spirits of the Carthaginians and of Hannibal himself.

5. When the people of Carthage saw the cities in their territory being sacked, they sent a message to Hannibal begging him to act without delay, to come to close quarters with the enemy, and bring the matter to the decision of battle. He bade the messengers in answer "to confine their attention to other matters, and to leave such things to him, for he would choose the time for fighting himself." Some days afterwards he broke up his quarters at Adrumetum, and pitched his camp near ZAMA, a town about five days' march to the west of Carthage. From that place he sent spies to ascertain the place, nature, and strength of the Roman general's encampment. These spies were caught and brought to Scipio, who, so far from inflicting upon them the usual punishment of spies, appointed a tribune to show them everything in the camp thoroughly and without reserve; and when this had been done, he asked the men whether the appointed officer had been careful to point out everything to them. Upon their replying that

Hannibal moves to Zama.

he had, he gave them provisions and an escort, and despatched them with injunctions to be careful to tell Hannibal everything they had seen. On their return to his camp, Hannibal was so much struck with the magnanimity and high courage of Scipio, that he conceived a lively desire for a personal interview with him. With this purpose he sent a herald to say that he was desirous of a parley to discuss the matters at issue. When the herald had delivered his message, Scipio at once expressed his consent, and said that he would himself send him a message when it suited him to meet, naming the time and place. The herald returned to Hannibal with this answer. Next day Massanissa arrived with six thousand infantry and about four thousand cavalry. Scipio received him with cordiality, and congratulated him on having added to his sway all those who had previously been subject to Syphax. Thus reinforced, he removed his camp to Naragara: selecting it as a place which, among other advantages, enabled him to get water within a javelin's throw.

Arrival of Massanissa.

6. From this place he sent to the Carthaginian general, informing him that he was ready to meet him, and discuss matters with him. On hearing this, Hannibal moved his quarters to within thirty stades of Scipio, and pitched his camp on a hill, which seemed a favourable position for his present purpose, except that water had to be fetched from a considerable distance, which caused his soldiers great fatigue.

Next day both commanders advanced from their camps attended by a few horsemen. Presently they left these escorts and met in the intervening space by themselves, each accompanied by an interpreter. Hannibal was the first to speak, after the usual salutation. He said that "He wished that the Romans had never coveted any possession outside Italy, nor the Carthaginians outside Libya; for these were both noble empires, and were, so to speak, marked out by nature. But since," he continued, "our rival claims to Sicily first made us enemies, and then those for Iberia; and since, finally, unwarned by the lessons of misfortune, we have gone so far that the one nation has en-

Meeting of Scipio and Hannibal.

Hannibal's speech.

dangered the very soil of its native land, and the other is now actually doing so, all that there remains for us to do is to try our best to deprecate the wrath of the gods, and to put an end, as far as in us lies, to these feelings of obstinate hostility. I personally am ready to do this, because I have learnt by actual experience that Fortune is the most fickle thing in the world, and inclines with decisive favour now to one side and now to the other on the slightest pretext, treating mankind like young children.

7. "But it is about you that I am anxious, Scipio. For you are still a young man, and everything has succeeded to your wishes both in Iberia and Libya, and you have as yet never experienced the ebb tide of Fortune; I fear, therefore, that my words, true as they are, will not influence you. But do look at the facts in the light of one story, and that not connected with a former generation, but our own. Look at me! I am that Hannibal who, after the battle of Cannae, became master of nearly all Italy; and presently advancing to Rome itself, and pitching my camp within forty stades of it, deliberated as to what I should do with you and your country; but now I am in Libya debating with you, a Roman, as to the bare existence of myself and my countrymen. With such a reverse as that before your eyes, I beg you not to entertain high thoughts, but to deliberate with a due sense of human weakness on the situation; and the way to do that is among good things to choose the greatest, among evils the least. What man of sense, then, would deliberately choose to incur the risk which is now before you. If you conquer, you will add nothing of importance to your glory or to that of your country; while, if you are worsted, you will have been yourself the means of entirely cancelling all the honours and glories you have already won. What then is the point that I am seeking to establish by these arguments? It is that the Romans should retain all the countries for which we have hitherto contended—I mean Sicily, Sardinia, and Iberia; and that the Carthaginians should engage never to go to war with Rome for these; and also that all the islands lying between Italy and Libya should belong to Rome. For I am persuaded that such a treaty will be at once safest for the

Carthaginians, and most glorious for you and the entire people of Rome."

Scipio's reply.

8. In reply to this speech of Hannibal, Scipio said "That neither in the Sicilian nor Iberian war were the Romans the aggressors, but notoriously the Carthaginians, which no one knew better than Hannibal himself. That the gods themselves had confirmed this by giving the victory, not to those who struck the first and unprovoked blow, but to those who only acted in self-defence. That he was as ready as any one to keep before his eyes the uncertainty of Fortune, and tried his best to confine his efforts within the range of human infirmity. But if," he continued, "you had yourself quitted Italy before the Romans crossed to Libya with the offer of these terms in your hands, I do not think that you would have been disappointed in your expectation. But now that your departure from Italy has been involuntary, and we have crossed into Libya and conquered the country, it is clear that matters stand on a very different footing. But above all, consider the point which affairs have reached now. Your countrymen have been beaten, and at their earnest prayer we arranged a written treaty, in which, besides the offer now made by you, it was provided that the Carthaginians should restore prisoners without ransom, should surrender all their decked vessels, pay five thousand talents, and give hostages for their performance of these articles. These were the terms which I and they mutually agreed upon; we both despatched envoys to our respective Senates and people,—we consenting to grant these terms, the Carthaginians begging to have them granted. The Senate agreed: the people ratified the treaty. But though they had got what they asked, the Carthaginians annulled the compact by an act of perfidy towards us. What course is left to me? Put yourself in my place and say. To withdraw the severest clauses of the treaty? Are we to do this, say you, not in order that by reaping the reward of treachery they may learn in future to outrage their benefactors, but in order that by getting what they ask for they may be grateful to us? Why, only the other day, after obtaining what they begged for as suppliants, because your presence gave them a slender hope of success, they at once

treated us as hated foes and public enemies. In these circumstances, if a still severer clause were added to the conditions imposed, it might be possible to refer the treaty back to the people; but, if I were to withdraw any of these conditions, such a reference does not admit even of discussion. What then is the conclusion of my discourse? It is, that you must submit yourselves and your country to us unconditionally, or conquer us in the field."

The momentous issues depending on the battle of Zama, B.C. 202.

9. After these speeches Hannibal and Scipio parted without coming to any terms; and next morning by daybreak both generals drew out their forces and engaged. To the Carthaginians it was a struggle for their own lives and the sovereignty of Libya; to the Romans for universal dominion and supremacy. And could any one who grasped the situation fail to be moved at the story? Armies more fitted for war than these, or generals who had been more successful or more thoroughly trained in all the operations of war, it would be impossible to find, or any other occasion on which the prizes proposed by destiny to the combatants were more momentous. For it was not merely of Libya or Europe that the victors in this battle were destined to become masters, but of all other parts of the world known to history,—a destiny which had not to wait long for its fulfilment.

Scipio's order of battle.

Scipio placed his men on the field in the following order: the *hastati* first, with an interval between their maniples; behind them the *principes*, their maniples not arranged to cover the intervals between those of the *hastati* as the Roman custom is, but immediately behind them at some distance, because the enemy was so strong in elephants. In the rear of these he stationed the *triarii*. On his left wing he stationed Gaius Laelius with the Italian cavalry, on the right Massanissa with all his Numidians. The intervals between the front maniples he filled up with maniples of *velites*, who were ordered to begin the battle; but if they found themselves unable to stand the charge of the elephants, to retire quickly either to the rear of the whole army by the intervals between the maniples, which went straight through the ranks, or, if they got entangled with

the elephants, to step aside into the lateral spaces between the maniples.

Scipio's speech to his men.

10. These dispositions made, he went along the ranks delivering an exhortation to the men, which, though short, was much to the point in the circumstances in which they were placed. He called upon them, "Remembering their former victories, to show themselves to be men of mettle and worthy their reputation and their country. To put before their eyes that the effect of their victory would be not only to make them complete masters of Libya, but to give them and their country the supremacy and undisputed lordship of the world. But if the result of the battle were unfavourable, those who fell fighting gallantly would have the record of having died for their country, while those that saved themselves by flight would spend the rest of their days as objects of pitying contempt and scorn. For there was no place in Libya which could secure their safety if they fled; while, if they fell into the hands of the Carthaginians, no one who looked facts in the face could doubt what would happen to them. May none of you," he added, "learn that by experience! Since, then, Fortune puts before us the most glorious of rewards, in whichever way the battle is decided, should we not be at once the most mean-spirited and foolish of mankind if we abandon the most glorious alternative, and from a paltry clinging to life deliberately choose the worst of misfortunes? Charge the enemy then with the steady resolve to do one of two things, to conquer or to die! For it is men thus minded who invariably conquer their opponents, since they enter the field with no other hope of life."

Hannibal's order of battle.

11. Such was Scipio's address to his men. Meanwhile Hannibal had put his men also into position. His elephants, which numbered more than eighty, he placed in the van of the whole army. Next his mercenaries, amounting to twelve thousand, and consisting of Ligurians, Celts, Baliarians, and Mauretani; behind them the native Libyans and Carthaginians; and on the rear of the whole the men whom he had brought from Italy, at a distance of somewhat more than a stade. His wings he strengthened

with cavalry, stationing the Numidian allies on the left wing, and the Carthaginian horsemen on the right. He ordered each officer to address his own men, bidding them rest their hopes of victory on him and the army he had brought with him; while he bade their officers remind the Carthaginians in plain terms what would happen to their wives and children if the battle should be lost. While these orders were carried out by the officers, Hannibal himself went along the lines of his Italian army and urged them "to remember the seventeen years during which they had been brothers-in-arms, and the number of battles they had fought with the Romans, in which they had never been beaten or given the Romans even a hope of victory. Above all, putting aside minor engagements and their countless successes, let them place before their eyes the battle of the River Trebia against the father of the present Roman commander; and again the battle in Etruria against Flaminius; and lastly that at Cannae against Aemilius, with none of which was the present struggle to be compared, whether in regard to the number or excellence of the enemy's men. Let them only raise their eyes and look at the ranks of the enemy; they would see that they were not merely fewer, but many times fewer than those with whom they had fought before, while, as to their soldierly qualities, there was no comparison. The former Roman armies had come to the struggle with them untainted by memories of past defeats: while these men were the sons or the remnants of those who had been beaten in Italy, and fled before him again and again. They ought not therefore," he said, "to undo the glory and fame of their previous achievements, but to struggle with a firm and brave resolve to maintain their reputation of invincibility."

Hannibal's speech to the "army of Italy."

Such were the addresses of the two commanders.

12. All arrangements for the battle being complete, and the two opposing forces of Numidian cavalry having been for some time engaged in skirmishing attacks upon each other, Hannibal gave the word to the men on the elephants to charge the enemy. But as they heard the horns and trumpets braying all round them, some of the elephants became unmanageable and rushed back

A stampede of the elephants.

upon the Numidian contingents of the Carthaginian army; and this enabled Massanissa with great speed to deprive the Carthaginian left wing of its cavalry support. The rest of the elephants charged the Roman velites in the spaces between the maniples of the line, and while inflicting much damage on the enemy suffered severely themselves; until, becoming frightened, some of them ran away down the vacant spaces, the Romans letting them pass harmlessly along, according to Scipio's orders, while others ran away to the right under a shower of darts from the cavalry, until they were finally driven clear off the field. It was just at the moment of this stampede of the elephants, that Laelius forced the Carthaginian cavalry into headlong flight, and along with Massanissa pressed them with a vigorous pursuit. While this was going on, the opposing lines of heavy infantry were advancing to meet others with deliberate step and proud confidence, except Hannibal's "army of Italy," which remained in its original position. When they came within distance the Roman soldiers charged the enemy, shouting as usual their war-cry, and clashing their swords against their shields: while the Carthaginian mercenaries uttered a strange confusion of cries, the effect of which was indescribable, for, in the words of the poet,[1] the "voice of all was not one"—

Flight of the Carthaginian cavalry.

"nor one their cry:
But manifold their speech as was their race."

13. The whole affair being now a trial of strength between man and man at close quarters, as the combatants used their swords and not their spears, the superiority was at first on the side of the dexterity and daring of the mercenaries, which enabled them to wound a considerable number of the Romans. The latter, however, trusting to the steadiness of their ranks and the excellence of their arms, still kept gaining ground, their rear ranks keeping close up with them and encouraging them to advance; while the Carthaginians did not keep up with their mercenaries nor support them, but showed a thoroughly cowardly spirit. The result was that the foreign soldiers gave way: and, believing that they had been shamelessly abandoned by their own side, fell

The fight of the heavy infantry.

[1] Homer, *Iliad*, 4, 437.

upon the men on their rear as they were retreating, and began killing them; whereby many of the Carthaginians were compelled to meet a gallant death in spite of themselves. For as they were being cut down by their mercenaries they had, much against their inclination, to fight with their own men and the Romans at the same time; and as they now fought with desperation and fury they killed a good many both of their own men and of the enemy also. Thus it came about that their charge threw the maniples of the *hastati* into confusion; whereupon the officers of the *principes* caused their lines to advance to oppose them. However, the greater part of the mercenaries and Carthaginians had fallen either by mutual slaughter or by the sword of the *hastati*. Those who survived and fled Hannibal would not allow to enter the ranks of his army, but ordered his men to lower their spears and keep them back as they approached; and they were therefore compelled to take refuge on the wings or make for the open country.

14. The space between the two armies that still remained in position was full of blood, wounded men, and dead corpses; and thus the rout of the enemy proved an impediment of a perplexing nature to the Roman general. Everything was calculated to make an advance in order difficult,—the ground slippery with gore, the corpses lying piled up in bloody heaps, and with the corpses arms flung about in every direction. However Scipio caused the wounded to be carried to the rear, and the *hastati* to be recalled from the pursuit by the sound of a bugle, and drew them up where they were in advance of the ground on which the fighting had taken place, opposite the enemy's centre. He then ordered the *principes* and *triarii* to take close order, and, threading their way through the corpses, to deploy into line with the *hastati* on either flank. When they had surmounted the obstacles and got into line with the *hastati*, the two lines charged each other with the greatest fire and fury. Being nearly equal in numbers, spirit, courage, and arms, the battle was for a long time undecided, the men in their obstinate valour falling dead without giving way a step; until at last the divisions of Massanissa and Laelius, returning from the

Final struggle between Hannibal's reserves, his "army of Italy," and the whole Roman infantry.

The battle is decided by the

pursuit, arrived providentially in the very nick of time. Upon their charging Hannibal's rear, the greater part of his men were cut down in their ranks; while of those who attempted to fly very few escaped with their life, because the horsemen were close at their heels and the ground was quite level. On the Roman side there fell over fifteen hundred, on the Carthaginian over twenty thousand, while the prisoners taken were almost as numerous.

return of the Roman and Numidian cavalry.

15. Such was the end of this battle, fought under these famous commanders: a battle on which everything depended, and which assigned universal dominion to Rome. After it had come to an end, Scipio pushed on in pursuit as far as the Carthaginian camp, and, after plundering that, returned to his own. Hannibal, escaping with a few horsemen, did not draw rein until he arrived safely at Adrumetum. He had done in the battle all that was to be expected of a good and experienced general. First, he had tried by an interview with his opponent to see what he could do to procure a pacification; and that was the right course for a man, who, while fully conscious of his former victories, yet mistrusts Fortune, and has an eye to all the possible and unexpected contingencies of war. Next, having accepted battle, the excellence of his dispositions for a contest with the Romans, considering the identity of the arms on each side, could not have been surpassed. For though the Roman line is hard to break, yet each individual soldier and each company, owing to the uniform tactic employed, can fight in any direction, those companies, which happen to be in nearest contact with the danger, wheeling round to the point required. Again, the nature of their arms gives at once protection and confidence, for their shield is large and their sword will not bend: the Romans therefore are formidable on the field and hard to conquer.

Hannibal escapes to Adrumetum.

16. Still Hannibal took his measures against each of these difficulties in a manner that could not be surpassed. He provided himself with those numerous elephants, and put them in the van, for the express purpose of throwing the enemy's ranks into confusion and breaking their order. Again he stationed the mercenaries in front and the Carthaginians behind them, in

order to wear out the bodies of the enemy with fatigue beforehand, and to blunt the edge of their swords by the numbers that would be killed by them; and moreover to compel the Carthaginians, by being in the middle of the army, to stay where they were and fight, as the poet says[1]—

"That howsoe'er unwilling fight he must."

But the most warlike and steady part of his army he held in reserve at some distance, in order that they might not see what was happening too closely, but, with strength and spirit unimpaired, might use their courage to the best advantage when the moment arrived. And, if in spite of having done everything that could be done, he who had never been beaten before failed to secure the victory now, we must excuse him. For there are times when chance thwarts the plans of the brave; and there are others again, when a man

"Though great and brave has met a greater still."[2]

And this we might say was the case with Hannibal on this occasion. . . .

Scipio's answer to the envoys from Carthage after Zama, who made extravagant displays of sorrow.

17. Manifestations of emotion which go beyond what is customary among a particular people, if they are thought to be the result of genuine feeling evoked by extraordinary disasters, excite pity in the minds of those who see or hear them; and we are all in a manner moved by the novelty of the spectacle. But when such things appear to be assumed for the purpose of taking in the spectators and producing a dramatic effect, they do not provoke pity, but anger and dislike. And this was the case in regard to the Carthaginian envoys. Scipio deigned to give a very brief answer to their prayers, saying that "They, at any rate, deserved no kindness at the hands of the Romans, since they had themselves confessed that they were the aggressors in the war, by having, contrary to their treaty obligations, taken Saguntum and enslaved its inhabitants, and had recently been guilty of treachery and breaking the terms of a treaty to which they had subscribed and sworn. It was from

[1] Homer, *Iliad*, 4, 300.

[2] A line of which the author is unknown; perhaps it was Theognis.

a regard to their own dignity, to the vicissitudes of Fortune, and to the dictates of humanity that the Romans had determined to treat them with lenity and behave with magnanimity. And of this they would be convinced if they would take a right view of the case. For they ought not to consider it a hardship if they found themselves charged to submit to any punishment, to follow a particular line of conduct, or to give up this or that; they ought rather to regard it as an unexpected favour that any kindness was conceded to them at all; since Fortune, after depriving them of all right to pity and consideration, owing to their own unrighteous conduct, had put them in the power of their enemies." After this preamble he mentioned the concessions to be made to them, and the penalties to which they were to submit.

18. The following are the heads of the terms offered them :—*The Carthaginians to retain the towns in Libya, of which they were possessed before they commenced the last war against Rome, and the territory which they also heretofore held, with its cattle, slaves, and other stock: and from that day should not be subject to acts of hostility, should enjoy their own laws and customs, and not have a Roman garrison in their city.* These were the concessions favourable to them. The clauses of an opposite character were as follows :—*The Carthaginians to pay an indemnity to the Romans for all wrongs committed during the truce; to restore all captives and runaway slaves without limit of time; to hand over all their ships of war except ten triremes, and all elephants; to go to war with no people outside Libya at all, and with none in Libya without consent from Rome; to restore to Massanissa all houses, territory, and cities belonging to him or his ancestors within the frontiers assigned to that king; to supply the Roman army with provisions for three months, and with pay, until such time as an answer shall be returned from Rome on the subject of the treaty; to pay ten thousand talents of silver in fifty years, two hundred Euboic talents every year; to give a hundred hostages of their good faith, —such hostages to be selected from the young men of the country by the Roman general, and to be not younger than fourteen or older than thirty years.*

Terms imposed on Carthage after the battle of Zama, B.C. 202-201.

19. This was the nature of Scipio's answer to the envoys, who hastened home and communicated its terms to their countrymen. It was then that the story goes that, upon a certain Senator intending to speak against accepting the terms and actually beginning to do so, Hannibal came forward and pulled the man down from the tribune; and when the other senators showed anger at this breach of custom, Hannibal rose again and "owned that he was ignorant of such things; but said that they must pardon him if he acted in any way contrary to their customs, remembering that he had left the country when he was but fourteen, and had only returned when now past forty-five. Therefore he begged them not to consider whether he had committed a breach of custom, but much rather whether he were genuinely feeling for his country's misfortunes; for that was the real reason for his having been guilty of this breach of manners. For it appeared to him to be astonishing, and, indeed, quite unaccountable, that any one calling himself a Carthaginian, and being fully aware of the policy which they had individually and collectively adopted against the Romans, should do otherwise than adore the kindness of Fortune for obtaining such favourable terms, when in their power, as a few days ago no one—considering the extraordinary provocation they had given—would have ventured to mention, if they had been asked what they expected would happen to their country, in case of the Romans proving victorious. Therefore he called upon them now not to debate, but unanimously to accept the terms offered, and with sacrifices to the gods to pray with one accord that the Roman people might confirm the treaty." His advice being regarded as both sensible and timely, they resolved to sign the treaty on the conditions specified; and the senate at once despatched envoys to notify their consent. . . .

A scene in the Carthaginian assembly. Hannibal persuades them to accept the treaty.

The intrigues of Philip V. and Antiochus the Great to divide the dominions of the infant king of Egypt, Ptolemy Epiphanes, B.C. 204.

20. Is it not astonishing that while Ptolemy Philopator was alive and did not need such assistance, these two kings

were ready with offers of aid, but that as soon as he was dead, leaving his heir a mere child, whose kingdom they were bound by the ties of nature to have defended, they then egged each other on to adopt the policy of partitioning the boy's kingdom between themselves, and getting rid entirely of the heir; and that too without putting forward any decent pretext to cover their iniquity, but acting so shamelessly, and so like beasts of prey, that one can only compare their habits to those ascribed to fishes, among which, though they may be of the same species, the destruction of the smaller is the food and sustenance of the larger. This treaty of theirs shows, as though in a mirror, the impiety to heaven and cruelty to man of these two kings, as well as their unbounded ambition. However, if a man were disposed to find fault with Fortune for her administration of human affairs, he might fairly become reconciled to her in this case; for she brought upon those monarchs the punishment they so well deserved, and by the signal example she made of them taught posterity a lesson in righteousness. For while they were engaged in acts of treachery against each other, and in dismembering the child's kingdom in their own interests, she brought the Romans upon them, and the very measures which they had lawlessly designed against another, she justly and properly carried out against them. For both of them, being promptly beaten in the field, were not only prevented from gratifying their desire for the dominions of another, but were themselves made tributary and forced to obey orders from Rome. Finally, within a very short time Fortune restored the kingdom of Ptolemy to prosperity; while as to the dynasties and successors of these two monarchs, she either utterly abolished and destroyed them, or involved them in misfortunes which were little short of that. . . .

Shameless ambition of Philip and Antiochus.

B.C. 197.
B.C. 191.

21. There was a certain man at Cius named Molpagoras, a ready speaker and of considerable ability in affairs, but at heart a mere demagogue and selfish intriguer. By flattering the mob, and putting the richer citizens into its power, he either got them put to death right out, or drove them into exile

The intrigues and tyranny of Molpagoras at Cius, in Bithynia.

and distributed their confiscated goods among the common people, and thus rapidly secured for himself a position of despotic power. . . .

The causes of the ruin of Cius.

The miseries which befel the Cians were not so much owing to Fortune or the aggressions of their neighbours, as to their own folly and perverse policy. For by steadily promoting their worst men, and punishing all who were opposed to these, that they might divide their property among themselves, they seemed as it were to court the disasters into which they fell. These are disasters into which, somehow or another, though all men fall, they yet not only cannot learn wisdom, but seem not even to acquire the cautious distrust of brute beasts. The latter, if they have once been hurt by bait or trap, or even if they have seen another in danger of being caught, you would find it difficult to induce to approach anything of the sort again: they are shy of the place, and suspicious of everything they see. But as for men, though they have been told of cities utterly ruined by their policy, and see others actually doing so before their eyes, yet directly any one flatters their wishes by holding out to them the prospect of recruiting their fortunes at the cost of others, they rush thoughtlessly to the bait: although they know quite well that no one, who has ever swallowed such baits, has ever survived; and that such political conduct has notoriously been the ruin of all who have adopted it.

Capture of Cius by Philip V. B.C. 202.[1]

22. Philip was delighted at taking the city, as though he had performed a glorious and honourable achievement; for while displaying great zeal in behalf of his brother-in-law (Prusias), and overawing all who opposed his policy, he had secured for himself in fair warfare a large supply of slaves and money. But the reverse of this picture he did not see in the least, although it was quite plain. In the first place, that he was assisting his brother-in-law, who, without receiving any provocation, was treacherously assailing his neighbours. In the second place, that by involving a Greek city without just cause in the most dreadful misfortunes, he was sure to confirm the report, which had been widely spread, of his severity to his friends; and by both of these

[1] See Livy, 31, 31; Strabo, 12, c. 4. Philip handed over Cius to Prusias.

actions would justly gain throughout Greece the reputation of a man reckless of the dictates of piety. In the third place, that he had outraged the envoys from the above-mentioned states,[1] who had come with the hope of saving the Cians from the danger which threatened them, and who, after being day after day mocked by his professions, had been at length compelled to witness what they most abhorred. And lastly, that he had so infuriated the Rhodians, that they would never henceforth listen to a word in his favour: a circumstance for which Philip had to thank Fortune as well as himself.

23. For it happened that just when his ambassador was defending his master before the Rhodians in the theatre,—enlarging on "the magnanimity of Philip," and announcing that "though already in a manner master of Cius, he conceded its safety to the wishes of the Rhodian people; and did so because he desired to refute the calumnies of his enemies, and to establish the honesty of his intentions in the eyes of Rhodes,"—just then a man entered the Prytaneum who had newly arrived in the island, and brought the news of the enslavement of the Cians and the cruelty which Philip had exercised upon them. The Prytanis coming into the theatre to announce this news, while the ambassador was absolutely in the middle of his speech, the Rhodians could scarcely make up their minds to believe a report which involved such monstrous treachery.

The anger of the Rhodians at the fall of Cius.

He had then betrayed himself quite as grossly as the Cians; and so blind or misguided had he become as to the principles of right and wrong, that he boasted of actions of which he ought to have been most heartily ashamed, and plumed himself upon them as though they were to his credit. But the people of Rhodes from that day forth regarded Philip as their enemy, and made their preparations with that view. And no less by this course had he gained the hatred of the Aetolians. He had but lately made terms with, and held out the hand of friendship to that nation: no excuse for a breach had arisen; and the Lysimachians, Calchedonians, and Cianians were friends and allies of the Aetolians. Nevertheless only a

It causes a breach with the Aetolians.

[1] That is, from Rhodes and other states.

short time before he had separated Lysimachia from the Aetolian alliance, and induced it to submit to him: then he had done the same to Calchedon: and lastly he had enslaved the Cians, though there was an Aetolian officer actually in Cius and conducting the government. Prusias, however, in so far as his policy was accomplished, was delighted; but inasmuch as another was in possession of the prizes of the operations, while he himself got as his share nothing but the bare site of a city, was extremely annoyed, but was yet unable to do anything. . . .

Philip at Thasos, B.C. 202-201.

24. During his return voyage Philip engaged in one act of treachery after another, and among others put in about mid-day at the town of Thasos, and though it was on good terms with him, took it and enslaved its inhabitants. . . .

The Thasians answered Philip's general Metrodorus, that they would surrender their city, on condition that he would guarantee them freedom from a garrison, tribute, or billeting of soldiers, and the enjoyment of their own laws. Metrodorus having declared the king's consent to this, the whole assembly signified their approval of the words by a loud shout, whereupon they admitted Philip into the town. . . .

All kings perhaps at the beginning of their reign dangle the name of liberty before their subjects' eyes, and address as friends and allies those who combine in pursuing the same objects as themselves; but when they come to actual administration of affairs they at once cease to treat these as allies, and assume the airs of a master. Such persons accordingly find themselves deceived as to the honourable position they expected to occupy, though as a rule not as to the immediate advantage which they sought. But if a king is meditating undertakings of the greatest importance, and only bounding his hopes by the limits of the world, and has as yet had nothing to cast a damp upon his projects, would it not seem the height of folly and madness to proclaim his own fickleness and untrustworthiness in matters which are of the smallest consequence, and lie at the very threshold of his enterprise? . . .

EGYPT

24 (*a*). My plan being to narrate under each year all the events in the several parts of the world which were contemporary, it is clear that in some cases it will be necessary to mention the end before the beginning; when, that is to say, that particular part of the subject calls for mention, first as being in place in the general course of my narrative, and the events which embrace the end of an episode fit in sooner than those which belong to its beginning and first conception. . . .

25. Sosibius, the unfaithful guardian of Ptolemy Epiphanes, was a creature of extraordinary cunning, who long retained his power, and was the instrument of many crimes at court: he contrived first the murder of Lysimachus, son of Arsinoe, daughter of Ptolemy and Berenice; secondly, that of Maga, son of Ptolemy and Berenice the daughter of Maga; thirdly, that of Berenice the mother of Ptolemy Philopator; fourthly, that of Cleomenes of Sparta; and fifthly, that of Arsinoe the daughter of Berenice. . . .

The previous career of Sosibius.

Three or four days after the death of Ptolemy Philopator, having caused a platform to be erected in the largest court of the palace Agathocles and Sosibius summoned a meeting of the foot-guards and the household, as well as the officers of the infantry and cavalry. The assembly being formed, they mounted the platform, and first of all announced the deaths of the king and queen, and proclaimed the customary period of mourning for the people. After that they placed a diadem upon the head of the child, Ptolemy Epiphanes, proclaimed him king, and read a forged will, in which the late king nominated Agathocles and Sosibius guardians of his son. They ended by an exhortation to the officers to be loyal to the boy and maintain his sovereignty. They next brought in two silver urns, one of which they declared contained the ashes of the king, the other those of Arsinoe. And in fact one of them did really contain the king's ashes, the other was filled with spices. Having done this they proceeded to complete the funeral ceremonies. It was then that all the world at last learnt the truth about the

B.C. 205. The death of Ptolemy Philopator announced, and Epiphanes crowned.

death of Arsinoe. For now that her death was clearly established, the manner of it began to be a matter of speculation. Though rumours which turned out to be true had found their way among the people, they had up to this time been disputed; now there was no possibility of hiding the truth, and it became deeply impressed in the minds of all. Indeed there was great excitement among the populace: no one thought about the king; it was the fate of Arsinoe that moved them. Some recalled her orphanhood; others the tyranny and insult she had endured from her earliest days; and when her miserable death was added to these misfortunes, it excited such a passion of pity and sorrow that the city was filled with sighs, tears, and irrepressible lamentation. Yet it was clear to the thoughtful observer that these were not so much signs of affection for Arsinoe as of hatred towards Agathocles.

Agathocles propitiates the army and gets rid of rivals.

The first measure of this minister, after depositing the urns in the royal mortuary, and giving orders for the laying aside of mourning, was to gratify the army with two months' pay; for he was convinced that the way to deaden the resentment of the common soldiers was to appeal to their interests. He then caused them to take the oath customary at the proclamation of a new king; and next took measures to get all who were likely to be formidable out of the country. Philammon, who had been employed in the murder of Arsinoe, he sent out as governor of Cyrene, while he committed the young king to the charge of Oenanthe and Agathocleia. Next, Pelops the son of Pelops he despatched to the court of Antiochus in Asia, to urge him to maintain his friendly relations with the court of Alexandria, and not to violate the treaty he had made with the young king's father. Ptolemy, son of Sosibius, he sent to Philip to arrange for a treaty of intermarriage between the two countries, and to ask for assistance in case Antiochus should make a serious attempt to play them false in any matter of importance.

He also selected Ptolemy, son of Agesarchus, as ambassador to Rome: not with a view of his seriously prosecuting the embassy, but because he thought that, if he once entered Greece, he would find himself among friends and kinsfolk,

and would stay there; which would suit his policy of getting rid of eminent men. Scopas the Aetolian also he sent to Greece to recruit foreign mercenaries, giving him a large sum in gold for bounties. He had two objects in view in this measure: one was to use the soldiers so recruited in the war with Antiochus; another was to get rid of the mercenary troops already existing, by sending them on garrison duty in the various forts and settlements about the country; while he used the new recruits to fill up the numbers of the household regiments with new men, as well as the pickets immediately round the palace, and in other parts of the city. For he believed that men who had been hired by himself, and were taking his pay, would have no feelings in common with the old soldiers, with whom they would be totally unacquainted; but that, having all their hopes of safety and profit in him, he would find them ready to co-operate with him and carry out his orders.

Now all this took place before the intrigue of Philip, though it was necessary for the sake of clearness to speak of that first, and to describe the transactions which took place, both at the audience and the dispatch of the ambassadors.

The debauchery of Agathocles.

To return to Agathocles: when he had thus got rid of the most eminent men, and had to a great degree quieted the wrath of the common soldiers by his present of pay, he returned quickly to his old way of life. Drawing round him a body of friends, whom he selected from the most frivolous and shameless of his personal attendants or servants, he devoted the chief part of the day and night to drunkenness and all the excesses which accompany drunkenness, sparing neither matron, nor bride, nor virgin, and doing all this with the most offensive ostentation. The result was a widespread outburst of discontent; and when there appeared no prospect of reforming this state of things, or of obtaining protection against the violence, insolence and debauchery of the court, which on the contrary grew daily more outrageous, their old hatred blazed up once more in the hearts of the common people, and all began again to recall the misfortunes which the kingdom already owed to these very men. But the absence of any one fit to take the lead, and

by whose means they could vent their wrath upon Agathocles and Agathocleia, kept them quiet. Their one remaining hope rested upon Tlepolemus, and on this they fixed their confidence.

Tlepolemus, governor of Pelusium, determines to depose Agathocles, B.C. 205-204.

As long as the late king was alive Tlepolemus remained in retirement; but upon his death he quickly propitiated the common soldiers, and became once more governor of Pelusium. At first he directed all his actions with a view to the interest of the king, believing that there would be some council of regency to take charge of the boy and administer the government. But when he saw that all those who were fit for this charge were got out of the way, and that Agathocles was boldly monopolising the supreme power, he quickly changed his purpose; because he suspected the danger that threatened him from the hatred which they mutually entertained. He therefore began to draw his troops together, and bestir himself to collect money, that he might not be an easy prey to any one of his enemies. At the same time he was not without hope that the guardianship of the young king, and the chief power in the state might devolve upon him; both because, in his own private opinion, he was much more fit for it in every respect than Agathocles, and because he was informed that his own troops and those in Alexandria were looking to him to put an end to the minister's outrageous conduct. When such ideas were entertained by Tlepolemus, it did not take long to make the quarrel grow, especially as the partisans of both helped to inflame it. Being eager to secure the adhesion of the generals of divisions and the captains of companies, he frequently invited them to banquets; and at these assemblies, instigated partly by the flattery of his guests and partly by his own impulse (for he was a young man and the conversation was over the wine), he used to throw out sarcastic remarks against the family of Agathocles. At first they were covert and enigmatic, then merely ambiguous, and finally undisguised, and containing the bitterest reflections. He proposed the health of the scribbler of pasquinades, the sackbut-girl and waiting-woman; and spoke of his shameful boyhood, when as cupbearer of the king he had submitted

to the foulest treatment. His guests were always ready to laugh at his words and add their quota to the sum of vituperation. It was not long before this reached the ears of Agathocles: and the breach between the two thus becoming an open one, Agathocles immediately began bringing charges against Tlepolemus, declaring that he was a traitor to the king, and was inviting Antiochus to come and seize the government. And he brought many plausible proofs of this forward, some of which he got by distorting facts that actually occurred, while others were pure invention. His object in so doing was to excite the wrath of the common people against Tlepolemus. But the result was the reverse; for the populace had long fixed their hopes on Tlepolemus, and were only too delighted to see the quarrel growing hot between them. The actual popular outbreak which did occur began from the following circumstances. Nicon, a relation of Agathocles, was in the lifetime of the late king commander of the navy. . . .

Agathocles will anticipate him.

26 (*a*). Another murder committed by Agathocles was that of Deinon, son of Deinon. But this, as the proverb has it, was the fairest of his foul deeds. For the letter ordering the murder of Arsinoe had fallen into this man's hands, and he might have given information about the plot and saved the Queen; but at the time he chose rather to help Philammon, and so became the cause of all the misfortunes which followed; while, after the murder was committed, he was always recalling the circumstances, commiserating the unhappy woman, and expressing repentance at having let such an opportunity slip: and this he repeated in the hearing of many, so that Agathocles heard of it, and he met with his just punishment in losing his life. . . .

A fragment from the earlier history of Agathocles.

THE DEATH OF AGATHOCLES AND HIS FAMILY

26. (*b*) The first step of Agathocles was to summon a meeting of the Macedonian guards. He entered the assembly accompanied by the young king and his own sister Agathocleia. At first he feigned not to be able to say what he wished for tears; but after again and again wiping his eyes with his chlamys he

Agathocles pretends a plot of Tlepolemus against the king, B.C. 202.

at length mastered his emotion, and, taking the young king in his arms, spoke as follows: "Take this boy, whom his father on his death-bed placed in this lady's arms" (pointing to his sister) "and confided to your loyalty, men of Macedonia! That lady's affection has but little influence in securing the child's safety: it is on you that that safety now depends; his fortunes are in your hands. It has long been evident to those who had eyes to see, that Tlepolemus was aiming at something higher than his natural rank; but now he has named the day and hour on which he intends to assume the crown. Do not let your belief of this depend upon my words; refer to those who know the real truth and have but just come from the very scene of his treason." With these words he brought forward Critolaus, who deposed that he had seen with his own eyes the altars being decked, and the victims being got ready by the common soldiers for the ceremony of a coronation.

Anger of the populace and soldiers against Agathocles.

When the Macedonian guards had heard all this, far from being moved by his appeal, they showed their contempt by hooting and loud murmurs, and drove him away under such a fire of derision that he got out of the assembly without being conscious how he did it. And similar scenes occurred among other corps of the army at their meetings. Meanwhile great crowds kept pouring into Alexandria from the up-country stations, calling upon kinsmen or friends to help the movement, and not to submit to the unbridled tyranny of such unworthy men. But what inflamed the populace against the government more than anything else was the knowledge that, as Tlepolemus had the absolute command of all the imports into Alexandria, delay would be a cause of suffering to themselves.

27. Moreover, an action of Agathocles himself served to heighten the anger of the multitude and of Tlepolemus. For he took Danae, the latter's mother-in-law, from the temple of Demeter, dragged her through the middle of the city unveiled, and cast her into prison. His object in doing this was to manifest his hostility to Tlepolemus; but its effect was to loosen the tongues of the people. In their anger they no longer confined themselves to secret murmurs: but some of

them in the night covered the walls in every part of the city with pasquinades; while others in the day time collected in groups and openly expressed their loathing for the government.

Terror of Agathocles.

Seeing what was taking place, and beginning to fear the worst, Agathocles at one time meditated making his escape by secret flight; but as he had nothing ready for such a measure, thanks to his own imprudence, he had to give up that idea. At another time he set himself to drawing out lists of men likely to assist him in a bold *coup d'état*, by which he should put to death or arrest his enemies, and then possess himself of absolute power. While still meditating these plans he received information that Moeragenes, one of the body-guard, was betraying all the secrets of the palace to Tlepolemus, and was co-operating with him on account of his relationship with Adaeus, at that time the commander of Bubastus. Agathocles immediately ordered his secretary Nicostratus to arrest Moeragenes, and extract the truth from him by every possible kind of torture.

Arrest of Moeragenes.

Being promptly arrested by Nicostratus, and taken to a retired part of the palace, he was at first examined directly as to the facts alleged; but, refusing to confess anything, he was stripped. And now some of the torturers were preparing their instruments, and others with scourges in their hands were just taking off their outer garments, when just at that very moment a servant ran in, and, whispering something in the ear of Nicostratus, hurried out again. Nicostratus followed close behind him, without a word, frequently slapping his thigh with his hand.

28. The predicament of Moeragenes was now indescribably strange. There stood the executioners by his side on the point of raising their scourges, while others close to him were getting ready their instruments of torture: but when Nicostratus withdrew they all stood silently staring at each other's faces, expecting him every moment to return; but as time went on they one by one slipped away, until Moeragenes was left alone. Having made his way through the palace, after this unhoped-for escape, he rushed in his half-clothed state

Moeragenes rouses the soldiers.

into a tent of the Macedonian guards which was situated close to the palace. They chanced to be at breakfast, and therefore a good many were collected together; and to them he narrated the story of his wonderful escape. At first they would not believe it, but ultimately were convinced by his appearing without his clothes. Taking advantage of this extraordinary occurrence, Moeragenes besought the Macedonian guards with tears not only to help him to secure his own safety, but the king's also, and above all their own. "For certain destruction stared them in the face," he said, "unless they seized the moment when the hatred of the populace was at its height, and every one was ready to wreak vengeance on Agathocles. That moment was *now*, and all that was wanted was some one to begin."

29. The passions of the Macedonians were roused by these words, and they finally agreed to do as Moeragenes advised. They at once went round to the tents, first those of their own corps, and then those of the other soldiers; which were all close together, facing the same quarter of the city. The wish was one which had for a long time been formed in the minds of the soldiery, wanting nothing but some one to call it forth, and with courage to begin. No sooner, therefore, had a commencement been made than it blazed out like a fire: and before four hours had elapsed every class, whether military or civil, had agreed to make the attempt.

Agathocles despairs.

At this crisis, too, chance contributed a great deal to the final catastrophe. For a letter addressed by Tlepolemus to the army as well as some of his spies, had fallen into the hands of Agathocles. The letter announced that he would be at Alexandria shortly, and the spies informed Agathocles that he was already there. This news so distracted Agathocles that he gave up taking any measures at all or even thinking about the dangers which surrounded him, but departed at his usual hour to his wine, and kept up the carouse to the end in his usual licentious fashion. But his mother Oenanthe went in great distress to the temple of Demeter and Persephone, which was open on account of a certain annual sacrifice; and there first

Oenanthe in the temple of Demeter.

of all she besought the aid of those goddesses with bendings of the knee and strange incantations, and then sat down close to the altar and remained motionless. Most of the women present, delighted to witness her dejection and distress, kept silence: but the ladies of the family of Polycrates, and certain others of the nobility, being as yet unaware of what was going on around them, approached Oenanthe and tried to comfort her. But she cried out in a loud voice: "Do not come near me, you monsters! I know you well! Your hearts are always against us; and you pray the goddess for all imaginable evil upon us. Still I trust and believe that, God willing, you shall one day taste the flesh of your own children." With these words she ordered her female attendants to drive them away, and strike them with their staves if they refused to go. The ladies availed themselves of this excuse for quitting the temple in a body, raising their hands and praying that she might herself have experience of those very miseries with which she had threatened her neighbours.

30. The men having by this time decided upon a revolution, now that in every house the anger of the women was added to the general resentment, the popular hatred blazed out with redoubled violence. As soon as night fell the whole city was filled with tumult, torches, and hurrying feet. Some were assembling with shouts in the stadium; some were calling upon others to join them; some were running backwards and forwards seeking to conceal themselves in houses and places least likely to be suspected. And now the open spaces round the palace, the stadium, and the street were filled with a motley crowd, as well as the area in front of the Dionysian Theatre. Being informed of this, Agathocles roused himself from a drunken lethargy,—for he had just dismissed his drinking party,—and, accompanied by all his family, with the exception of Philo, went to the king. After a few words of lamentation over his misfortunes addressed to the child, he took him by the hand, and proceeded to the covered walk which runs between the Maeander garden and the Palaestra, and leads to the entrance of the theatre. Having securely fastened the two first doors through which he passed,

A mob assembles.

he entered the third with two or three bodyguards, his own family, and the king. The doors, however, which were secured by double bars, were only of lattice work and could therefore be seen through.

By this time the mob had collected from every part of the city in such numbers, that, not only was every foot of ground occupied, but the doorsteps and roofs also were crammed with human beings; and such a mingled storm of shouts and cries arose, as might be expected from a crowd in which women and children were mixed with men: for in Alexandria, as in Carthage, the children perform as conspicuous a part in such commotions as the men.

31. Day now began to break and the uproar was still a confused babel of voices; but one cry made itself heard conspicuously above the rest, it was a call for THE KING. The first thing actually done was by the Macedonian guard: they left their quarters and seized the vestibule which served as the audience hall of the palace; then, after a brief pause, having ascertained whereabouts in the palace the king was, they went round to the covered walk, burst open the first doors, and, when they came to the next, demanded with loud shouts that the young king should be surrendered to them. Agathocles, recognising his danger, begged his bodyguards to go in his name to the Macedonians, to inform them that "he resigned the guardianship of the king, and all offices, honours, or emoluments which he possessed, and only asked that his life should be granted him with a bare maintenance; that by sinking to his original situation in life he would be rendered incapable, even if he wished it, of being henceforth oppressive to any one." All the bodyguards refused except Aristomenes, who afterwards obtained the chief power in the state.

Cries for the king.

This man was an Acarnanian, and, though far advanced in life when he obtained supreme power, he is thought to have made a most excellent and blameless guardian of the king and kingdom. And as he was distinguished in that capacity, so had he been remarkable before for his adulation of Agathocles in the time of his prosperity. He was the first, when entertaining Agathocles at his

Aristomenes.

house, to distinguish him among his guests by the present of a gold diadem, an honour reserved by custom to the kings alone; he was the first too who ventured to wear his likeness on his ring; and when a daughter was born to him he named her Agathocleia.

But to return to my story. Aristomenes undertook the mission, received his message, and made his way through a certain wicket-gate to the Macedonians. He stated his business in few words: the first impulse of the Macedonians was to stab him to death on the spot; but some of them held up their hands to protect him, and successfully begged his life. He accordingly returned with orders to bring the king or to come no more himself. Having dismissed Aristomenes with these words, the Macedonians proceeded to burst open the second door also. When convinced by their proceedings, no less than by the answers they had returned, of the fierce purpose of the Macedonians, the first idea of Agathocles was to thrust his hand through the latticed door,—while Agathocleia did the same with her breasts which she said had suckled the king,—and by every kind of entreaty to beg that the Macedonians would grant him bare life.

The guards insist on the surrender of the king.

32. But finding that his long and piteous appeals produced no effect, at last he sent out the young king with the bodyguards. As soon as they had got the king, the Macedonians placed him on a horse and conducted him to the stadium. His appearance being greeted with loud shouts and clapping of hands, they stopped the horse, and dismounting the child, ushered him to the royal stall and seated him there. But the feelings of the crowd were divided: they were delighted that the young king had been brought, but they were dissatisfied that the guilty persons had not been arrested and met with the punishment they deserved. Accordingly, they continued with loud cries to demand that the authors of all the mischief should be brought out and made an example. The day was wearing away, and yet the crowd had found no one on whom to wreak their vengeance, when Sosibius, who, though a son of the elder Sosibius, was at that time a member of the

The king conducted to the stadium.

bodyguard, and as such had a special eye to the safety of the king and the State,—seeing that the furious desire of the multitude was implacable, and that the child was frightened at the unaccustomed faces that surrounded him and the uproar of the crowd, asked the king whether he would "surrender to the populace those who had injured him or his mother." The boy having nodded assent, Sosibius bade some of the bodyguard announce the king's decision, while he raised the young child from his seat and took him to his own house which was close by to receive proper attention and refreshment. When the message from the king was declared, the whole place broke out into a storm of cheering and clapping of hands. But meanwhile Agathocles and Agathocleia had separated and gone each to their own lodgings. Without loss of time soldiers, some voluntarily and others under pressure from the crowd, started in search of them.

33. The beginning of actual bloodshed, however, was this. One of the servants and flatterers of Agathocles, whose name was Philo, came out to the stadium still flustered with wine. Seeing the fury of the multitude, he said to some bystanders that they would have cause to repent it again, as they had only the other day, if Agathocles were to come there. Of those who heard him some began to abuse him, while others pushed him about; and on his attempting to defend himself, some tore his cloak off his back, while others thrust their spears into him and wounded him mortally. He was dragged into the middle of the crowd breathing his last gasp; and, having thus tasted blood, the multitude began to look impatiently for the coming of the other victims. They had not to wait long. First appeared Agathocles dragged along bound hand and foot. No sooner had he entered than some soldiers rushed at him and struck him dead. And in doing so they were his friends rather than enemies, for they saved him from the horrible death which he deserved. Nicon was brought next, and after him Agathocleia stripped naked, with her two sisters; and following them the whole family. Last of all some men came bringing Oenanthe, whom they had torn from the temple of Demeter and Persephone, riding stripped naked upon a horse.

Death of Agathocles, his sister, and Oenanthe.

They were all given up to the populace, who bit, and stabbed them, and knocked out their eyes, and, as soon as any one of them fell, tore him limb from limb, until they had utterly annihilated them all: for the savagery of the Egyptians when their passions are roused is indeed terrible. At the same time some young girls who had been brought up with Arsinoe, having learnt that Philammon, the chief agent in the murder of that Queen, had arrived three days before from Cyrene, rushed to his house; forced their way in; killed Philammon with stones and sticks; strangled his infant son; and, not content with this, dragged his wife naked into the street and put her to death.

Such was the end of Agathocles and Agathocleia and their kinsfolk.

34. I am quite aware of the miraculous occurrences and embellishments which the chroniclers of this event have added to their narrative with a view of producing a striking effect upon their hearers, making more of their comments on the story than of the story itself and the main incidents. Some ascribe it entirely to Fortune, and take the opportunity of expatiating on her fickleness and the difficulty of being on one's guard against her. Others dwell upon the unexpectedness of the event, and try to assign its causes and probabilities. It was not my purpose, however, to treat this episode in this way, because Agathocles was not a man of conspicuous courage or ability as a soldier; nor particularly successful or worth imitating as a statesman; nor, lastly, eminent for his acuteness as a courtier or cunning as an intriguer, by which latter accomplishments Sosibius and many others have managed to keep one king after another under their influence to the last day of their lives. The very opposite of all this may be said of this man. For though he obtained high promotion owing to Philopator's feebleness as a king; and though after his death he had the most favourable opportunity of consolidating his power, he yet soon fell into contempt, and lost his position and his life at once, thanks to his own want of courage and vigour. The contemptible character of Agathocles.

35. To such a story then no such dissertation is required, as was in place, for instance, in the case of the Sicilian monarchs,

Agathocles and Dionysius, and certain others who have administered governments with reputation. For the former of these, starting from a plebeian and humble position—having been, as Timaeus sneeringly remarks, a potter—came from the wheel, clay, and smoke, quite a young man to Syracuse. And, to begin with, both these men in their respective generations became tyrants of Syracuse, a city that had obtained at that time the greatest reputation and the greatest wealth of any in the world; and afterwards were regarded as suzerains of all Sicily, and lords of certain districts in Italy. While, for his part, Agathocles not only made an attempt upon Africa, but eventually died in possession of the greatness he had acquired. It is on this account that the story is told of Publius Scipio, the first conqueror of the Carthaginians, that being asked whom he considered to have been the most skilful administrators and most distinguished for boldness combined with prudence, he replied, "the Sicilians Agathocles and Dionysius." Now, in the case of such men as these, it is certainly right to try to arrest the attention of our readers, and, I suppose, to speak of Fortune and the mutability of human affairs, and in fact to point a moral: but in the case of such men as we have been speaking of, it is quite out of place to do so.

See 12, 15.

36. For these reasons I have rejected all idea of making too much of the story of Agathocles. But another and the strongest reason was that all such wonderful and striking catastrophes are only worth listening to once; not only are subsequent exhibitions of them unprofitable to ear and eye, but elaborate harping upon soon becomes simply troublesome. For those who are engaged on representing anything either to eye or ear can have only two objects to aim at,—pleasure and profit; and in history, more than in anything else, excessive prolixity on events of tragic interest fails of both these objects. For, in the first place, who would wish to emulate extraordinary catastrophes? And next, no one likes to be continually seeing and hearing things that are unnatural and beyond the ordinary conceptions of mankind. We are, indeed, eager to see and hear such things once and for the first time, because we want to know that a thing is possible which was supposed to be im-

possible: but when once convinced on that point no one is pleased at lingering on the Unnatural; but in fact would rather not come across it at all oftener than need be. In fact, the dwelling upon misfortunes which exceed the ordinary limits is more suitable to tragedy than to history. But perhaps we ought to make allowances for men who have studied neither nature nor universal history. They think, I presume, that the most important and astonishing events in all history are those which they happen to have come across themselves or to have heard from others, and they therefore give their attention exclusively to those. They accordingly do not perceive that they are making a mistake in expatiating on events which are neither novel,—for they have been narrated by others before,—nor capable of giving instruction or pleasure. So much on this point. . . .

ANTIOCHUS

37. King Antiochus, at the beginning of his reign, was thought to be a man of great enterprise and courage, and great vigour in the execution of his purposes; but as he grew older his character evidently deteriorated in itself, and disappointed the expectation of the world. . . .

Disappointments as to the character of Antiochus the Great.

BOOK XVI

PHILIP V. WAGES WAR WITH ATTALUS, KING OF PERGAMUM, AND THE RHODIANS. See *supra* 15, 20-24; Livy, 31, 17, *sqq.*

1. KING PHILIP having arrived at Pergamum, and believing that he had as good as made an end of Attalus, gave the rein to every kind of outrage; and by way of gratifying his almost insane fury he vented his wrath even more against the gods than against man. For his skirmishing attacks being easily repelled by the garrison of Pergamum, owing to the strength of the place, and being prevented by the precautions taken by Attalus from getting booty from the country, he directed his anger against the seats of the gods and the sacred enclosures; in which, as it appears to me, he did not wrong Attalus so much as himself. He threw down the temples and the altars, and even had their stones broken to pieces that none of the buildings he had destroyed might be rebuilt. After spoiling the Nicephorium, cutting down its grove, and demolishing its ring wall, and levelling with the ground many costly fanes, he first directed his attack upon Thyatira, and thence marched into the plain of Thebe, thinking that this district would supply him with the richest spoil. But finding himself again disappointed in this respect, on arriving at the "Holy Village" he sent a message to Zeuxis, demanding that he would furnish him with corn, and render the other services stipulated for in the treaty.[1] Zeuxis, however, though feigning to fulfil the obligations of the treaty, was not minded to give Philip real and substantial help. . . .

Philip's impious conduct in Asia, B.C. 201.

Zeuxis, Satrap of Antiochus, fails to help Philip substantially.

[1] That is the treaty between Philip and Antiochus.

GREAT SEA-FIGHT OFF CHIOS BETWEEN PHILIP AND THE ALLIED FLEETS OF ATTALUS AND RHODES, B.C. 201

2. As the siege was not going on favourably for him, and the enemy were blockading him with an increasing number of decked vessels, he felt uncertain and uneasy as to the result. But as the state of affairs left him no choice, he suddenly put to sea quite unexpectedly to the enemy; for Attalus expected that he would persist in pushing on the mines he had commenced. But Philip was especially keen to make his putting to sea a surprise, because he thought that he would thus be able to outstrip the enemy, and complete the rest of his passage along the coast to Samos in security. But he was much disappointed in his calculations; for Attalus and Theophiliscus (of Rhodes), directly they saw him putting to sea, lost no time in taking action. And although, from their previous conviction that Philip meant to stay where he was, they were not in a position to put to sea quite simultaneously, still by a vigorous use of their oars they managed to overtake him, and attacked,—Attalus the enemy's right wing, which was his leading squadron, and Theophiliscus his left. Thus intercepted and surrounded, Philip gave the signal to the ships of his right wing, ordering them to turn their prows towards the enemy and engage them boldly; while he himself retreated under cover of the smaller islands, which lay in the way, with some light galleys, and thence watched the result of the battle. The whole number of ships engaged were, on Philip's side, fifty-three decked, accompanied by some undecked vessels, and galleys and beaked ships to the number of one hundred and fifty; for he had not been able to fit out all his ships in Samos. On the side of the enemy there were sixty-five decked vessels, besides those which came from Byzantium, and along with them nine *triemioliae* (light-decked vessels), and three triremes.

Philip failing to take Chios sails off to Samos.

Attalus and Theophiliscus follow him.

3. The fight having been begun on the ship on which King Attalus was sailing, all the others near began charging each other without waiting for orders. Attalus ran into an eight-banked ship, and having struck it a well-directed blow below the water-line, after

Incidents in the battle.

a prolonged struggle between the combatants on the decks, at length succeeded in sinking it. Philip's ten-banked ship, which, moreover, was the admiral's, was captured by the enemy in an extraordinary manner. For one of the *triemioliae*, having run close under her, she struck against her violently amidships, just beneath the thole of the topmost bank of oars, and got fast jammed on to her, the steersman being unable to check the way of his ship. The result was that, by this craft hanging suspended to her, she became unmanageable and unable to turn one way or another. While in this plight, two quinqueremes charged her on both sides at once, and destroyed the vessel itself and the fighting men on her deck, among whom fell Democrates, Philip's admiral. At the same time Dionysodorus and Deinocrates, who were brothers and joint-admirals of the fleet of Attalus, charged, the one upon a seven-banked, the other upon an eight-banked ship of the enemy, and had a most extraordinary adventure in the battle. Deinocrates, in the first place, came into collision with an eight-banked ship, and had his ship struck above the water-line; for the enemy's ship had its prow built high; but he struck the enemy's ship below the water-line,[1] and at first could not get himself clear, though he tried again and again to back water; and, accordingly, when the Macedonian boarded him and fought with great gallantry, he was brought into the most imminent danger. Presently, upon Attalus coming to his aid, and by a vigorous charge separating the two ships, Deinocrates unexpectedly found himself free, and the enemy's boarders were all killed after a gallant resistance, while their own vessel being left without men was captured by Attalus. In the next place, Dionysodorus, making a furious charge, missed his blow; but running up alongside of the enemy lost all the oars on his right side, and had the timbers supporting his towers smashed to pieces, and was thereupon immediately surrounded by the enemy. In the midst of loud shouts and great confusion, all the rest of his marines perished along with the ship, but he himself with two others managed to

Loss of Philip's flagship and admiral.

Deinocrates.

Dionysodorus.

[1] The word *βίαχα* in the text is unknown, and certainly corrupt. The most obvious remedy is *ὑπόβρυχα* or *ὑποβρύχια*. But we cannot be sure.

escape by swimming to the *triemiolia* which was coming up to the rescue.

4. The fight between the rest of the fleet, however, was an undecided one; for the superiority in the numbers of Philip's galleys was compensated for by Attalus's superiority in the number of his decked ships. Thus on the right wing of Philip's fleet the state of things was that the ultimate result was doubtful, but that, of the two, Attalus had the better hope of victory. As for the Rhodians, they were, at first starting, as I have said, far behind the enemy, but being much their superiors in speed they managed to come up with the rear of the Macedonians. At first they charged the vessels on the stern as they were retiring, and broke off their oars; but upon Philip's ships swinging round and beginning to bring help to those in danger, while those of the Rhodians who had started later than the rest reached the squadron of Theophiliscus, both parties turned their ships in line prow to prow and charged gallantly, inciting each other to fresh exertions by the sound of trumpets and loud cheers. Had not the Macedonians placed their galleys between the opposing lines of decked ships, the battle would have been quickly decided; but, as it was, these proved a hindrance to the Rhodians in various ways. For as soon as the first charge had disturbed the original order of the ships, they became all mixed up with each other in complete confusion, which made it difficult to sail through the enemy's line or to avail themselves of the points in which they were superior, because the galleys kept running sometimes against the blades of their oars so as to hinder the rowing, and sometimes upon their prows, or again upon their sterns, thus hampering the service of steerers and rowers alike. In the direct charges, however, the Rhodians employed a particular manœuvre. By depressing their bows they received the blows of the enemy above the water-line, while by staving in the enemy's ships below the water-line they rendered the blows fatal. Still it was rarely that they succeeded in doing this, for, as a rule, they avoided collisions, because the Macedonians fought gallantly from their decks when they came to close quarters. Their most frequent manœuvre was to row through the Macedonian line, and disable the enemy's ships by

The skill of the Rhodian sailors.

breaking off their oars, and then, rowing round into position, again charge the enemy on the stern, or catch them broadside as they were in the act of turning; and thus they either stove them in or broke away some necessary part of their rigging. By this manner of fighting they destroyed a great number of the enemy's ships.

5. But the most brilliant and hazardous exploits were those of three quinqueremes: the flagship on which Theophiliscus sailed, then that commanded by Philostratus, and lastly the one steered by Autolycus, and on board of which was Nicostratus. This last charged an enemy's ship, and left its beak sticking in it. The ship thus struck sank with all hands; but Autolycus and his comrades, as the sea poured into his vessel through the prow, was surrounded by the enemy. For a time they defended themselves gallantly, but at last Autolycus himself was wounded, and fell overboard in his armour, while the rest of the marines were killed fighting bravely. While this was going on, Theophiliscus came to the rescue with three quinqueremes, and though he could not save the ship, because it was now full of water, he yet stove in three hostile vessels, and forced their marines overboard. Being quickly surrounded by a number of galleys and decked ships, he lost the greater number of his marines after a gallant struggle on their part; and after receiving three wounds himself, and performing prodigies of valour, just managed to get his own ship safely off with the assistance of Philostratus, who came to his aid and bravely took his share of the danger. Having thus rejoined his own squadron, he darted out once more and ran in upon the enemy, utterly prostrated in body by his wounds, but more dashing and vehement in spirit than before.

Further incidents in the fight on the left wing. The Rhodian admiral Theophiliscus mortally wounded.

So that there were really two sea-fights going on at a considerable distance from each other. For the right wing of Philip's fleet, continually making for land in accordance with his original plan, was not far from the Asiatic coast; while the left wing, having to veer round to support the ships on the rear, were engaged with the Rhodians at no great distance from Chios.

6. As the fleet of Attalus, however, was rapidly overpowering the right wing of Philip, and was now approaching the small islands, under cover of which Philip was moored watching the result of the battle, Attalus saw one of his quinqueremes staved in and in the act of being sunk by an enemy's ship. He therefore hurried to its assistance with two quadriremes. The enemy's ship turning to flight, and making for the shore, he pursued it somewhat too eagerly in his ardent desire to effect its capture. Thereupon Philip, observing that Attalus had become detached a considerable distance from his own fleet, took four quinqueremes and three *hemioliae*, as well as all the galleys within reach, and darting out got between Attalus and his ships, and forced him in the utmost terror to run his three ships ashore. After this mishap the king himself and his crew made their way to Erythrae, while Philip captured his vessels and the royal equipage on board them. For in this emergency Attalus had employed an artifice. He caused the most splendid articles of the royal equipage to be spread out on the deck of his ship; the consequence of which was that the first Macedonians who arrived on the galleys, seeing a quantity of flagons and purple robes and such like things, abandoned the pursuit, and turned their attention to plundering these. Thus it came about that Attalus got safe away to Erythrae; while Philip, though he had distinctly got the worst of it in the general engagement, was so elated at the unexpected reverse which had befallen Attalus, that he put to sea again and exerted himself strenuously in collecting his ships and restoring the spirits of his men by assuring them that they were the victors. For when they saw Philip put to sea towing off the royal ship, they very naturally thought that Attalus had perished. But Dionysodorus, conjecturing what had really happened to the king, set about collecting his own ships by raising a signal; and this being speedily done, he sailed away unmolested to their station in Asia. Meanwhile those Macedonians who were engaged with the Rhodians, having been for some time past in evil case, were gradually extricating themselves from the battle, one after the

Attalus intercepted by Philip, and forced to abandon his ship.

Victory of the Rhodians.

other retiring on the pretence of being anxious to support their comrades. So the Rhodians, taking in tow some of their vessels, and having destroyed others by charging them, sailed away to Chios.

B.C. 201. The losses in the battle.

7. In the battle with Attalus Philip had had destroyed a ten-banked, a nine-banked, a seven-banked, and a six-banked ship, ten other decked vessels, three *triemioliae*, twenty-five galleys and their crews. In the battle with the Rhodians ten decked vessels and about forty galleys. While two quadriremes and seven galleys with their crews were captured. In the fleet of Attalus one *triemiolia* and two quinqueremes were sunk, while two quadriremes besides that of the king were captured. Of the Rhodian fleet two quinqueremes and a trireme were destroyed, but no ship was taken. Of men the Rhodians lost sixty, Attalus seventy; while Philip lost three thousand Macedonians and six thousand rowers. And of the Macedonians and their allies two thousand were taken prisoners, and of their opponents six hundred.

Philip vainly pretends that he won the battle.

8. Such was the end of the battle of Chios; in which Philip claimed the victory on two pretexts. First, because he had driven Attalus ashore and had captured his ship; and secondly, because, as he had anchored at the promontory of Argennum, he had the credit of having taken up his anchorage where the wrecks were floating. He acted in accordance with this assertion next day by collecting the wrecks, and causing the corpses which could be recognised to be picked up for burial, all for the sake of strengthening this pretence. For that he did not himself believe that he had won was shortly afterwards proved by the Rhodians and Dionysodorus. For on that very next day, while he was actually engaged on these operations, after communication with each other they sailed out to attack him, but, on nobody putting out to meet them, they returned to Chios. Philip indeed had never before lost so many men either by land or sea at one time, and was extremely mortified at what had happened and had lost much of his spirit for the enterprise. To the outside world, however, he tried to conceal his real sentiments: though this was forbidden by facts.

Besides everything else, what happened after the battle impressed all who saw it too strongly. For the slaughter and destruction was so great that, on the day of battle itself the whole strait was filled with corpses, blood, arms, and wrecks; while on the subsequent days the strands might be seen piled up with all these together in wild confusion. Hence the extreme consternation of the king could not be confined to himself, but was shared by all his Macedonians.

Death of Theophiliscus.

9. Theophiliscus survived for one day; and then having written a despatch home with an account of the battle, and appointed Cleonaeus to succeed him in his command, died from his wounds. He had shown great valour in the engagement, and his far-sighted policy deserves to be remembered. If it had not been for his boldness in attacking Philip in time, all the allies would have let the opportunity pass, in terror at Philip's audacity. But by beginning the war as he did he forced his countrymen to seize the opportunity, and compelled Attalus not to lose time in mere preparatory measures for war, but to go to war energetically and grapple with the danger. The Rhodians, therefore, were quite right to pay him, even after his death, such honours as were incentives, not only to men living at the time, but to future generations also, to prompt service in their country's cause. . . .

THE INDECISIVE BATTLE OF CHIOS WAS FOLLOWED BY ANOTHER OFF LADE, IN WHICH PHILIP WAS PARTLY SUCCESSFUL[1]

10. After the battle of Lade, the Rhodians being out of his way, and Attalus not having yet appeared on the scene, it is clear that Philip might have accomplished his voyage to Alexandria. And here we have evidence stronger than any other of Philip's infatuation in acting as he did. What, then, prevented his design? Nothing in the world but what always occurs in the natural course of affairs. For at a distance many men at times desire the impossible from the extravagant prospects it holds out, their ambition over-mastering their reason;

[1] *Jam cum Rhodiis et Attalo navalibus certaminibus, neutro feliciter, vires expertus.* Livy, 31, 14.

but when they approach the moment of action they quite as irrationally abandon their purpose, because their calculations are obscured and confused by the embarrassments and difficulties which meet them. . . .

PHILIP'S OPERATIONS IN CARIA, B.C. 201

11. Having made some assaults which proved abortive owing to the strength of the place, Philip went away again, plundering the forts and villages in the country. Thence he marched to Prinassus and pitched his camp under its wall. Having promptly got ready his pent-houses and other siege artillery, he began to attempt the town by mines. This plan proving impracticable, owing to the rocky nature of the soil, he contrived the following stratagem. During the day he caused a noise to be made under ground, as though the mines were being worked at; while during the night he caused earth to be brought and piled up at the mouth of the mine, in order that the men in the city, by calculating the quantity of earth thrown up, might become alarmed. At first the Prinassians held out bravely: but when Philip sent them a message informing them that he had underpinned two plethra of their walls, and asking them whether they preferred to march out with their lives, or one and all to perish with their town when he set fire to the props, then at last, believing that what he said was true, they surrendered the city.

The stratagem by which Philip took Prinassus.

12. The town of Iassus is situated in Asia on the gulf between the temple of Poseidmen, the territory of Miletus, and the city of Myndus, called the gulf [of Iassus by some], but by most the gulf of Bargylia, from the names of the cities built upon its inner coast. The Iassians boast of being originally colonists from Argos, and more recently from Miletus, their ancestors having invited to their town the son of Neleus, the founder of Miletus, owing to their losses in the war with the Carians. The size of the town is ten stades. Among the people of Bargylia it is a common report widely believed that the statue of the Kindyan Artemis, though in the open air, is never touched by snow or

Legends of Iassus and Bargylia.

rain; and the same belief is held among the Iassians as to the Artemis Astias.[1] All these stories have been repeated by certain historians. But, for my part, I have in the whole course of my work set myself against such statements of our historiographers and have had no toleration for them. For it appears to me that such tales are only fit to amuse children, when they transgress not only the limits of probability but even those of possibility. For instance, to say that certain bodies when placed in full light cast no shadow argues a state of quite deplorable folly. But Theopompus has done this; for he says that those who enter the holy precinct of Zeus in Arcadia cast no shadow, which is on a par with the statements to which I have just referred. Now, in so far as such tales tend to preserve the reverence of the vulgar for religion, a certain allowance may be made for some historians when they record these miraculous legends. But they must not be allowed to go too far. Perhaps it is difficult to assign a limit in such a matter; still it is not impossible. Therefore, in my judgment, such displays of ignorance and delusion should be pardoned if they do not go very far, but anything like extravagance in them should be rejected. . . .

AFFAIRS IN GREECE

13. I have already described the deliberate policy of Nabis, tyrant of the Lacedaemonians; how he drove the citizens into exile, freed the slaves, and gave them the wives and daughters of their masters. The tyranny of Nabis. See 13, 6-8. How also, by opening his kingdom as a kind of inviolable sanctuary for all who fled from their own countries, he collected a number of bad characters in Sparta. I will now proceed to tell how in the same period, being in alliance with Aetolians, Eleans, and Messenians, and being bound by oaths and treaties to support one and all of those peoples in case of any one attacking them, he yet in utter contempt of these obligations determined to make a treacherous attack on Messene. . . . B.C. 202-201.

[1] An inscription found at Iassus [C.I.G. 2683] has confirmed this name which is found in one MS. instead of *Hestias*. Whether the meaning of the title is Artemis of the City, or some local designation, is uncertain.

DIGRESSION ON THE MERITS OF THE HISTORIANS ZENO AND ANTISTHENES OF RHODES

14. As some episodical historians have written on the period which embraces the affair at Messene and the sea-fights already described, it is my intention to discuss them briefly. I will not however speak of them all, but only those whom I suppose to be worthy of commemoration and full discussion.

The necessity of discussing the histories of Zeno and Antisthenes.

These are the Rhodian writers Zeno and Antisthenes, whom I judge to deserve this distinction, for more than one reason. They were contemporary with the events, and were engaged in practical politics; and, lastly, they composed their histories with no view to gain, but for the sake of fame, and as part of the business of politicians. Since then they write of the same events as myself, I cannot omit mentioning them; lest, from the reputation of their country, and the idea that naval affairs are peculiarly the province of Rhodians, some students may prefer their authority to mine where I differ from them.

Now both these writers, to begin with, describe the battle of

Their description of the battle of Lade. See ch. 10.

Lade as not less severe than that of Chios, but more fiercely and daringly contested, both in detail and as a whole, and finally assert that the victory was with the Rhodians. For my part I should be inclined to allow that historians must show some partiality to their own countries; not however that they should state what is exactly opposite to the facts regarding them. There are quite enough mistakes which writers make from ignorance, and which it is difficult for poor human nature to avoid: but if we deliberately write what is false for the sake of country, friends, or favour, how do we differ from those who do the same to get a living? For as the latter, by measuring everything by the standard of private gain, ruin the credit of their works, so your politicians often fall into the same discredit by yielding to the influence of hatred or affection. Therefore readers ought to be jealously watchful on this head; while writers ought to be on their guard for their own sakes.

15. The present matter is an example. When coming to de-

tails of the battle of Lade, these writers confess that in it "two quinqueremes of Rhodes were captured by the enemy; and that upon one ship raising its studding-sail to escape from the conflict, owing to its having being staved in and shipping sea, many of the vessels near it did the same and made for the open sea; and that at last the admiral, being left with only a few vessels, was forced to follow their example. That for the present they were forced by unfavourable winds to drop anchor on the territory of Myndus, but next day put to sea and crossed to Cos; while the enemy, having secured the quinqueremes, landed at Lade and took up their quarters in the Rhodian camp: that, moreover, the Milesians, deeply impressed by what had taken place, presented not only Philip, but Heracleides also, with a garland of victory on his entrance to their territory." And yet, though they give all these particulars, which all evidently indicate the losing side, they still declare the Rhodians to have been victorious both in particular combats and in the whole battle; and that too in spite of the fact that the original despatch from the admiral concerning the battle, sent to the Senate and Prytanies, still exists in their Prytaneium, which testifies to the truth, not of the statements of Antisthenes and Zeno, but of mine.

16. Next as to their account of the treacherous attempt upon Messene. Zeno says that "Nabis started from Sparta, crossed the Eurotas near the tributary called the Hoplites, and advanced along the narrow road past Poliasium until he arrived at Sallasia, thence past Pharae to Thalamae, and so to the river Pamisus." About which I do not know what to say. It is just as if one were to say that a man started from Corinth and marched through the Isthmus and arrived at the Scironean way, and then came straight to the Contoporian road, and journeyed past Mycenae to Argos. For such a statement would not be merely slightly wrong but wholly contradictory. For the Isthmus and the Scironian rocks are east of Corinth, while the Contoporian road and Mycenae are nearly due south-west; so that it is completely impossible to go by way of the former to the latter. The same may be said about Lacedaemon; for the Eurotas and Sallasia are to the north-east of Sparta, while Thalamae, Pharae, and the Pamisus are

Zeno's account of the attack of Nabis upon Messene. See ch. 13.

to the south-west. Therefore it is not possible to go to Sallasia, nor necessary to cross the Eurotas, if a man means to go to Messenia by way of Thalamae.

17. Besides these mistakes, he says that Nabis started on his return from Messenia by the gate on the road to Tegea. This is another absurdity; for Megalopolis is between Tegea and Messene, so that it is impossible that a gate at Messene should be called the "Gate to Tegea." The fact is that there is a gate there called the "Tegean Gate," by which Nabis commenced his return; and this led Zeno into the mistake of supposing that Tegea was near Messene, which is not the fact: for the Laconian territory, as well as that of Megalopolis, lies between that of Messene and Tegea. Lastly, he says that the Alpheus flows underground from its source for a considerable distance, and comes up near Lycoa, in Arcadia. The truth is that this river does go down underground not far from its source, and, after remaining hidden for about ten stades, comes up again, and then flows through the territory of Megalopolis, at first with a gentle stream, and then gaining volume, and watering that whole district in a splendid manner for two hundred stades, at length reaches Lycoa, swollen by the tributary stream of the Lusius, and become unfordable and deep. . . .

However, I think that the points I have mentioned, though all of them blunders, admit of some palliation and excuse; for the latter arose from mere ignorance, those connected with the sea-fight from patriotic affection. But is it not then a fault in Zeno, that he does not bestow as much pains on investigating the truth and thoroughly mastering his subject, as upon the ornaments of style; and shows on many occasions that he particularly plumes himself on this, as many other famous writers do? To my mind it is quite right to take great care and pay great attention to the presentation of one's facts in correct and adequate language, for this contributes in no small degree to the effectiveness of history; still I do not think that serious writers should regard it as their primary and most important object. Far from it. Quite other are the parts of his history on which a practical politician should rather pride himself.

18. The best illustration of what I mean will be the following. This same writer, in his account of the siege of Gaza and Antiochus's pitched battle with Scopas in Coele-Syria, at Mount Panium,[1] showed such extreme anxiety about ornaments of style, that he made it quite impossible even for professional rhetoricians or mob-orators to outstrip him in theatrical effect; while he showed such a contempt of facts, as once more amounted to unsurpassable carelessness and inaccuracy. For, intending to describe the first position in the field taken up by Scopas, he says that "the right extremity of his line, together with a few cavalry, rested on the slope of the mountain; while its left with all the cavalry belonging to this wing, was in the plains below. That Antiochus, just before the morning watch, despatched his elder son Antiochus with a division of his army to occupy the high ground which commanded the enemy; and that at daybreak he led the rest of his army across the river which flowed between the two camps, and drew them up on the plain: arranging his heavy-armed infantry in one line, facing the enemy's centre, and his cavalry, some on the right and the rest on the left wing of the phalanx, among which were the heavy-armed horsemen, under the sole command of the younger of the king's sons Antiochus. That in advance of this line he stationed the elephants at certain intervals, and the Tarentines[2] commanded by Antipater; while he filled up the spaces between the elephants with archers and slingers. And finally, that he took up his own station on the rear of the elephants with a squadron of household cavalry and body-guards." After this preliminary description he continues: "The younger Antiochus"—whom he had described as being on the level ground with the heavy-armed cavalry—"charged down from the high ground and put to flight and pursued the cavalry under Ptolemy, son of Aeropus, who was in command of the Aetolians in the plain on the left wing; but the two lines,

Zeno's account of the battle of Panium between Antiochus the Great and Scopas, B.C. 201.

[1] Called Panion or Paneion. See Josephus *B. Jud.* 3, 10, 7, Ιορδάνου πήγη τὸ Πάνειον. The town near it was called Paneas, and afterwards Paneas Caesarea, and later still Caesarea Philippi. Scopas, the Aetolian, was now serving Ptolemy Epiphanes; see 13, 2; 18, 53.

[2] See on 4, 77; 13, 1.

when they met, maintained a stubborn fight." But he fails to observe that, as the elephants, cavalry, and light-armed infantry were in front, the two lines could not possibly meet at all.

19. Next he says that "the phalanx, outmatched in agility and forced backwards by the Aetolians, retired step by step, while the elephants received the retreating line, and did great service in charging the enemy." But how the elephants got on the rear of the phalanx it is not easy to understand, or how, if they had got there, they could have done good service. For as soon as the two lines were once at close quarters, the animals would no longer have been able to distinguish friend from foe among those that came in their way. Again, he says that "the Aetolian cavalry were thrown into a panic during the engagement, because they were unaccustomed to the look of the elephants." But, by his own account, the cavalry which was originally stationed on the right wing remained unbroken; while the other division of the cavalry, that on the right wing, had all fled before the successful attack of Antiochus. What portion of the cavalry was it, then, that was on the centre of the phalanx, and was terrified by the elephants? And where was the king, or what part did he take in the battle, seeing that he had with him the very flower of the infantry and cavalry? For not a word has been told us about these. And where was the elder of the young Antiochi, who, with a division of the troops, occupied the high ground? For this prince is not represented even as returning to his quarters after the battle. And very naturally so. For Zeno started by assuming two sons of the king named Antiochus, whereas there was only one in the army on that occasion. How comes it, again, that according to him, Scopas returned first and also last from the field? For he says: "when he saw the younger Antiochus, after returning from the pursuit, on the rear of his phalanx, and accordingly gave up all hopes of victory, he retired." But afterwards he says that "he sustained the most imminent peril when his phalanx got surrounded by the elephants and cavalry, and was the last man to retire from the field."

20. These and similar blunders appear to me to reflect very great discredit upon writers. It is necessary, therefore,

to endeavour to make one's self master of all departments of history alike. That is the ideal; but if that is impossible, one ought at least to be excessively careful on the most essential and important points in it. I have been induced to say this because I have observed that in history, as in other arts and sciences, there is a tendency to neglect the true and essential, while the ostentatious and the showy secure praise and emulation as something great and admirable. The fact being that in history, as in other departments of literature, these latter qualities require less trouble and gain a cheaper reputation. As to his ignorance of the topography of Laconia, considering that his error was an important one, I did not hesitate to write to Zeno personally. For I thought it a point of honour not to look upon the mistakes of others as personal triumphs, as is the way with some writers; but to do the best I could to secure correctness, not only of my own historical writings, but of those of others also, for the benefit of the world at large. When Zeno received my letter and found that it was impossible to make the correction, because his history was already published, he was much vexed, but could do nothing. He, however, put the most friendly interpretation on my proceeding; and, in regard to this point, I would beg my own readers, whether of my own or future generations, if I am ever detected in making a deliberate misstatement, and disregarding truth in any part of my history, to criticise me unmercifully; but if I do so from lack of information, to make allowances: and I ask it for myself more than others, owing to the size of my history and the extent of ground covered by its transactions. . . .

Polybius wrote to Zeno on his geographical mistakes.

EGYPT

21. Tlepolemus,[1] the chief minister in the kingdom of Egypt, was a young man, but one who had spent all his life in the camp, and with reputation. By nature aspiring and ambitious, he had done much that was glorious in the service of his country, but much that was evil also. As a general in a campaign, and as an administrator of military expeditions, he was a man of

Character and extravagance of Tlepolemus.

[1] See 15, 25.

great ability, high natural courage, and extremely well fitted to deal personally with soldiers. But on the other hand, for the management of complicated affairs, he was deficient in diligence and sobriety, and had the least faculty in the world for the keeping of money or the economical administration of finance. And it was this that before long not only caused his own fall, but seriously damaged the kingdom as well. For though he had complete control of the exchequer, he spent the greater part of the day in playing ball and in matches in martial exercises with the young men; and directly he left these sports he collected drinking parties, and spent the greater part of his life in these amusements and with these associates. But that part of his day which he devoted to business, he employed in distributing, or, I might rather say, in throwing away the royal treasures among the envoys from Greece and the Dionysian actors, and, more than all, among the officers and soldiers of the palace guard. He was utterly incapable of saying no, and bestowed anything there was at hand on any one who said anything to please him. The evil which he himself thus began continually increased. For every one who had received a favour expressed his gratitude in extravagant language, both for the sake of what he had got and of what he hoped to get in the future. And thus being informed of the universal praise which was bestowed on him, of the toasts proposed in his honour at banquets, of complimentary inscriptions, and songs sung in his praise by the public singers all through the town, he became entirely befooled, and grew daily more and more puffed up with conceit, and more reckless in squandering favours upon foreigners and soldiers.

Tlepolemus suppresses a court intrigue against himself.

22. These proceedings were very offensive to the other members of the court; and, therefore, they watched everything he did with a jealous eye, and conceived a detestation for his insolence, which they began to compare unfavourably with the character of Sosibius. For the latter was considered to show more wisdom in his guardianship of the king than his age gave reason to expect; and, in his dealings with other persons, to maintain the dignity proper to his high trust, which was the

royal seal and person. Just at this time, Ptolemy, the son of Sosibius, returned from his mission to Philip. Before he left Alexandria on his voyage, he had been full of foolish pride, partly from his own natural disposition and partly from his father's success. But upon landing in Macedonia, and mixing with the young men at court, he conceived the notion that the virtue of the Macedonians consisted in the better fashion of their boots and clothes; he therefore came home got up in imitation of all these peculiarities, and fully persuaded that his foreign tour and association with Macedonians had made a man of him. He therefore immediately began showing jealousy of Tlepolemus, and inveighing against him; and as all the courtiers joined him, on the ground that Tlepolemus was treating the business and revenue of the state as though he were its heir and not its guardian, the quarrel quickly grew. Meanwhile Tlepolemus, being informed of certain unfriendly speeches, originating in the jealous observation and malignity of the courtiers, at first turned a deaf ear to them and affected to despise them; but when at length they ventured to hold a meeting and openly express their disapproval of him in his absence, on the ground of his maladministration of the government of the kingdom, he grew angry; and, summoning the council, came forward and said that "they brought their accusations against him secretly and in private, but he judged it right to accuse them in public and face to face." . . .

After making his public speech, Tlepolemus deprived Sosibius of the custody of the seal also, and having got that into his hands, thenceforth conducted the administration exactly as he chose. . . .

THE WAR IN COELE-SYRIA

22 (*a*). It seems to me to be at once just and proper to give the people of Gaza[1] the praise which they deserve. For though they do not differ as to bravery in war from the rest of the inhabitants of Coele-Syria, yet as parties to an international

B.C. 201. Valour of the people of Gaza.

[1] Ptolemy Philopator had made Gaza his chief depôt of war material; see 5, 68. Antiochus destroyed it in B.C. 198 for its loyalty to the King of Egypt.

agreement, and in their fidelity to their promises, they far surpass them, and show altogether a courage in such matters that is irresistible. In the first place, when all the other people were terrified at the invasion of the Persians,[1] in view of the greatness of their power, and one and all submitted themselves and their countries to the Medes, they alone faced the danger and stood a siege. Again, on the invasion of Alexander, when not only did the other cities surrender, but even Tyre was stormed and its inhabitants sold into slavery; and when it seemed all but hopeless for any to escape destruction, who resisted the fierce and violent attack of Alexander, they alone of all the Syrians withstood him, and tested their powers of defence to the uttermost. Following the same line of conduct on the present occasion, they omitted nothing within their power in their determination to keep faith with Ptolemy. Therefore, just as we distinguish by special mention in our history individuals of eminent virtue, so ought we, in regard to states as such, to mention with commendation those which act nobly in any point from traditional principles and deliberate policy. . . .

B.C. 332.

ITALY (LIVY, 30, 45)

23. Publius Scipio returned from Libya soon after the events I have narrated. The expectation of the people concerning him was proportionable to the magnitude of his achievements: and the splendour of his reception, and the signs of popular favour which greeted him were extraordinary. Nor was this otherwise than reasonable and proper. For after despairing of ever driving Hannibal from Italy, or of averting that danger from themselves and their kinsfolk, they now looked on themselves as not only securely removed from every fear and every menace of attack, but as having conquered their enemies. Their joy therefore knew no bounds; and when Scipio came into the city in triumph, and the actual sight of

Scipio's return to Rome and triumph, B.C. 201, cp. 15, 19.

[1] Syria was conquered by the Assyrian king Tiglath-Pilezer about B.C. 747, and was afterwards a part of the Babylonian and Persian empires. It does not seem certain to what invasion Polybius is here referring.

the prisoners who formed the procession brought still more clearly to their memories the dangers of the past, they became almost wild in the expression of their thanks to the gods, and their affection for the author of such a signal change. For among the prisoners who were led in the triumphal procession was Syphax, the king of the Masaesylii, who shortly afterwards died in prison. The triumph concluded, the citizens celebrated games and festivals for several days running with great splendour, Scipio, in his magnificent liberality, supplying the cost. . . .

WAR BETWEEN ROME AND PHILIP V.

24. At the beginning of the winter in which Publius Sulpicius was elected consul at Rome, king Philip, who was staying at Bargylia, was rendered exceedingly uneasy and filled with many conflicting anxieties for the future, when he observed that the Rhodians and Attalus, far from dismissing their navy, were actually manning additional ships and paying more earnest attention than ever to guarding the coasts. He had a double cause, indeed, for uneasiness: he was afraid of sailing from Bargylia, and foresaw that he would have to encounter danger at sea; and at the same time he was not satisfied with the state of things in Macedonia, and therefore was unwilling on any consideration to spend the winter in Asia, being afraid both of the Aetolians and the Romans; for he was fully aware of the embassies sent to Rome to denounce him [as soon as it was known] that the war in Libya was ended. These considerations caused him overwhelming perplexity; but he was compelled for the present to remain where he was, leading the life of a wolf, to use the common expression: for he robbed and stole from some, and used force to others, while he did violence to his nature by fawning on others, because his army was suffering from famine; and by these means managed sometimes to get meat to eat, sometimes figs, and sometimes nothing but a very short allowance of corn. Some of these provisions were supplied to him by

Winter of B.C. 201-200. Coss. P. Sulpicius, Galba, Maximus II., C. Aurelius. Cotta (for B.C. 200).

Philip's anxieties,

and the starving state of his army.

Zeuxis, and some by the people of Mylae, Alabanda, and Magnesia, whom he flattered whenever they gave him anything, and barked at and plotted against when they did not. Finally, he made a plot to seize Mylae by the agency of Philocles, but failed from the clumsiness with which the scheme was contrived. The territory of Alabanda he harried as though it were an enemy's, alleging that it was imperatively necessary to get food for his troops. . . .

When this Philip, father of Perseus, was thus overrunning Asia, being unable to get provisions for his army, he accepted a present of figs from the Magnesians, as they had no corn. For which reason, when he conquered Myus, he granted its territory to the Magnesians in return for their figs. . . .

25. The Athenian people sent envoys to king Attalus, both to thank him for the past, and to urge him to come to Athens to consult with them on the dangers that still threatened them.[1] The king was informed a few days afterwards that Roman ambassadors had arrived at the Peiraeus; and, believing that it was necessary to have an interview with them, he put to sea in haste. The Athenian people, being informed of his coming, passed very liberal votes as to the reception and general entertainment of the king. Arrived at the Peiraeus, Attalus spent the first day in transacting business with the Roman ambassadors, and was extremely delighted to find that they were fully mindful of their ancient alliance with him, and quite prepared for the war with Philip. Next morning, in company with the Romans and the Athenian magistrates, he began his progress to the city in great state. For he was met, not only by all the magistrates and the knights, but by all the citizens with their children and wives. And when the two processions met, the warmth of the welcome given by the populace to the Romans, and still more to Attalus, could not have been exceeded. At his entrance into the city by the gate Dipylum the priests and priestesses lined the street on both sides: all the temples were then thrown open; victims were placed ready at all the altars; and the king was requested to offer sacrifice. Finally they voted

The visit of Attalus to Athens, B.C. 200.

[1] That is from the wars undertaken by them against Philip. Livy, 31, 14, 24.

him such high honours as they had never without great hesitation voted to any of their former benefactors: for, in addition to other compliments, they named a tribe after Attalus, and classed him among their eponymous heroes.

26. They next summoned an ecclesia and invited the king to address them. But upon his excusing himself, on the plea that it would be ill-bred for him to appear before the people and recount his own good services in the presence of those on whom they had been bestowed, they gave up asking for his personal appearance; but begged him to give them a written statement as to what he thought was the best thing to do in view of the existing circumstances. On his consenting to do this, and writing the document, the magistrates produced the despatch to the ecclesia. The contents of this written communication were briefly these: he recalled the good services he had done the people in the past; enumerated the things he had accomplished in the existing war against Philip; and lastly exhorted them to activity in this war, and protested that, if they did not determine resolutely to adopt this policy of hostility to Philip in common with the Rhodians, Romans, and himself, and yet afterwards wished to share in the benefits which had been secured by others, they would miss securing the true interests of their country. As soon as this despatch had been read, the people, influenced both by its contents and by their warm feeling towards Attalus, were prepared to vote the war: and when the Rhodians also entered and argued at great length to the same effect, the Athenians at once decreed the war against Philip. They gave the Rhodians also a magnificent reception, honoured their state with a crown of valour, and voted all Rhodians equal rights of citizenship at Athens, on the ground of their having, besides other things, restored the Athenian ships which had been captured with the men on board them. After concluding this arrangement, the Rhodian ambassadors sailed to Ceos with their fleet to visit the islands. . . .

The Athenians vote for war against Philip.

27. While the Roman ambassadors were still at Athens, Nicanor, by the command of Philip, made a raid upon Attica, and came as far as the Aca-

The Romans warn Philip to

abstain from attacking Greece, and to do justice to Attalus, on pain of war.

demy. Thereupon the Romans sent a herald to him, and bade him announce to his master Philip that "The Romans admonished him to make no war upon any Greek State, and to submit to an arbitration before a fair tribunal as to the injuries he had inflicted upon Attalus: that, if he did this, he might have peace with Rome, but, if he refused to obey, the opposite would immediately follow." On the receipt of this message Nicanor retired. Then the Romans sailed along the coast of Epirus and delivered a similar announcement in regard to Philip in the town of Phoenice; also to Amynandrus in the district of Athamania; also to the Aetolians in Naupactus, and the Achaeans in Aegium. And having thus by the mouth of Nicanor given Philip this clear warning, the Roman envoys themselves sailed away to visit Antiochus and Ptolemy with a view to settle their controversies. . . .

28. It appears to me that to make a good beginning, and even to maintain enthusiasm long enough to secure a considerable measure of success, is an achievement of which many have been found capable; but to carry a purpose through to its end, and, even though fortune be adverse, to make up by cool reason for the deficiency of enthusiasm is within the power of few. From this point of view one cannot but disparage the inactivity of Attalus and the Rhodians, while regarding with admiration the royal and lofty spirit displayed by Philip, and his constancy to his purpose,—not meaning to speak in praise of his character as a whole, but simply commending the vigour with which he acted on this occasion. I make this distinction to prevent any one supposing that I contradict myself, because I recently praised Attalus and the Rhodians and found fault with Philip, whereas I am now doing the reverse. This is just such a case as I referred to at the beginning of my history, when I said that it was necessary sometimes to praise, and sometimes to blame the same persons, since it frequently happens that changes of circumstances for the worse and calamities alter men's original dispositions, and frequently also changes for the better; and sometimes too it is the case that from natural

The firmness and vigour of Philip in meeting the danger.

I, 14.

temperament men are at one time inclined to what is right, at another to the reverse. And it is a variation of this sort that I think occurred to Philip in this instance. For, irritated by his defeats, and influenced in a great degree by anger and passion, he addressed himself with a kind of insane or inspired eagerness to meet the dangers of the hour; and it was in this spirit that he rose to the attack upon the Rhodians and king Attalus, and gained the successes which followed. I was induced to make these remarks, because I observe that some men, like bad runners in the stadium, abandon their purposes when close to the goal; while it is at that particular point, more than at any other, that others secure the victory over their rivals. . . .

29. Philip was anxious to anticipate the Romans in seizing bases of operation and landing-places in this country (Asia). . . . B.C. 200.

In order that, if it should be his purpose again to cross to Asia, he might have a landing-place at Abydos. . . .

The position of Abydos and Sestos, and the advantages of the situation of those towns it would, I think, be waste of time for me to state in great detail, because the singularity of those sites has made them familiar to all persons of intelligence. Still I imagine that it will not be otherwise than useful to remind my readers briefly of the facts, by way of attracting their attention. A man would best realise the advantages of these cities, not by regarding their sites by themselves, but by comparing and contrasting them with those about to be mentioned. For just as it is impossible to sail from the Ocean,—or as some call it the Atlantic,—into our sea, except by passing between the Pillars of Heracles, so is it impossible to sail from our sea into the Propontis and the Pontus except through the channel separating Sestos and Abydos. But as though Fortune had designed these two straits to counterbalance each other, the passage between the Pillars of Heracles is many times as broad as that of the Hellespont,—the former being sixty, the latter two stades; the reason being, as far as one may conjecture, the great superiority in size of the external Ocean to our sea: while the channel at Abydos is more convenient than that at the Pillars of Heracles. For the former being lined on both sides

The Dardanelles compared with the Straits of Gibraltar.

by human habitations is of the nature of a gate admitting mutual intercourse, sometimes being bridged over by those who determine to cross on foot, and at all times admitting a passage by sea. But the channel at the Pillars of Heracles is seldom used, and by very few persons, owing to the lack of intercourse between the tribes inhabiting those remote parts of Libya and Europe, and owing to the scantiness of our knowledge of the external Ocean. The city of Abydos itself is enclosed on both sides by two European promontories, and possesses a harbour capable of sheltering ships anchoring in it from every wind; while there is no possibility of anchoring at any point near the city outside the harbour mouth, owing to the rapidity and violence of the current setting through the strait.

Siege of Abydos.

30. Having then invested Abydos partly by a palisade and partly by an earthwork, Philip began blockading it by land and sea together. This siege was not at all remarkable for the extent of the machinery employed, or the ingenuity displayed in those works on which besiegers and besieged are wont to exhaust all their invention and skill against each other; but still it deserves, if any ever did, to be remembered and recorded for the noble spirit and extraordinary gallantry exhibited by the besieged. At first, feeling full confidence in themselves, the inhabitants of Abydos maintained a courageous resistance to the attempts of Philip; struck and dislodged some of his engines, which he brought against their walls by sea, with stones from their catapults, and destroyed others by fire, and with such fierceness, that the enemy were barely able to drag their ships out of danger. Against the siege operations on land, too, up to a certain point they offered an undaunted resistance, not at all despairing of ultimately overpowering the enemy. But when their outer wall was undermined and fell, and when moreover the Macedonians by means of these same mines were approaching the inner wall, which had been erected by the besieged to cover the breach: then at length they send Iphiades and Pantacnotus as ambassadors, with an offer to Philip that he should take over the city, on condition of letting the soldiers from Rhodes and Attalus depart under a truce; and of permitting all free persons to depart as they could, and wherever each might choose, with

the clothes that each was wearing. But on Philip bidding them "surrender at discretion or fight like men," the ambassadors returned to the town.

31. On being informed of the message the people of Abydos met in public assembly, and with feelings of utter despair deliberated upon their position. They thereupon resolved, first to liberate the slaves, that they might secure their sincere interest and loyalty; next, to collect all the women into the temple of Artemis, and the children with their nurses into the gymnasium; and finally to bring together their silver and gold into the market-place, as well as collect their clothes which were of any value into the quadrireme of the Rhodians and the trireme of the Cyzicenes. Having formed these resolutions and acted on the decree with unanimity, they again assembled in public meeting, and elected fifty of the older and most trusted men, who at the same time were possessed of sufficient bodily vigour to enable them to carry out what had been determined upon; and these they bound on oath in the presence of the whole of the citizens, that "whenever they saw the inner wall being captured by the enemy, they would kill the children and women, and would burn the above-mentioned ships, and, in accordance with the curses that had been invoked, would throw the silver and gold into the sea." After this they brought the priests forward, and all the citizens swore that they would conquer the enemy or die fighting for their country. To crown all, they slew victims and compelled the priests and priestesses to dictate the words of this imprecation over the burnt offerings. Having bound themselves by this solemn agreement, they left off attempting to countermine the enemy, and resolved that, directly the interior wall fell, they would fight to the last in the breach with the enemy's storming party and there die.

Desperate resolution of the people of Abydos.

32. This would justify us in saying that the gallantry of the Abydenians outdid the proverbial Phocian recklessness and Acarnanian courage.[1] For the Phocians have the reputation of having adopted

Comparison of this resolution of the Abydenians

[1] For the Phocians see Pausan. 10, 1, 6. For the Acarnanians see *supra*, 9, 40.

with similar ones of the Phocians and Acarnanians.

a similar resolution as to their families, but not because they despaired of victory, for they were about to fight a pitched battle with the Thessalians in the open field. So too the Acarnanians, upon the mere prospect of an Aetolian invasion, adopted a like resolution; the details of which I have already narrated. But the Abydenians, at a time when they were closely invested and in all but complete despair of being saved, elected by a unanimous resolution to meet their fate along with their children and wives, rather than to live any longer with the knowledge that their children and wives would fall into the power of the enemy. Therefore one might justly complain of Fortune for having, in the former cases, given victory and safety to those who despaired of them, while she adopted the opposite decision in regard to the Abydenians. For the men were killed, and the city was taken, but the children with their mothers fell into the hands of the enemy.

33. As soon as the interior wall had fallen, the men, according to their oaths, sprang upon the ruins and fought the enemy with such desperate courage, that Philip, though he had kept sending the Macedonians to the front in relays till nightfall, at last abandoned the contest in despair of accomplishing the capture at all. For not only did the Abydenian forlorn hope take their stand upon the dead bodies of the fallen enemies, and maintain the battle with fury; nor was it only that they fought gallantly with mere swords and spears; but when any of these weapons had been rendered useless, or had been knocked out of their hands, they grappled with the Macedonians, and either hurled them to the ground arms and all, or broke their sarissae, and stabbing their faces and exposed parts of their bodies with the broken ends, threw them into a complete panic. But the fight being interrupted by nightfall, most of the citizens having now fallen in the breach, and the rest being utterly exhausted by fatigue and wounds, Glaucides and Theognetus collected a few of the older men together, and, instigated by hopes of personal safety, lowered the special eminence and unique glory which their fellow-citizens had acquired. For they resolved to save the

How the city was surrendered and the women and children saved after all.

children and women alive, and at daybreak to send the priests and priestesses with garlands to Philip, to entreat his mercy and surrender the city to him.

34. While this was going on, king Attalus, having heard that Abydos was being besieged, sailed through the Aegean to Tenedos; and similarly the youngest of the Roman ambassadors, Marcus Aemilius, arrived on board ship at Abydos itself. For the Roman ambassadors, having learnt at Rhodes the fact of the siege of Abydos, and wishing in accordance with their commission to deliver their message to Philip personally, put off their purpose of visiting the two kings, and despatched this man to him. Having found the king outside Abydos, he explained to him that "The Senate had resolved to order him not to wage war with any Greek state; nor to interfere in the dominions of Ptolemy; and to submit the injuries inflicted on Attalus and the Rhodians to arbitration; and that if he did so he might have peace, but if he refused to obey he would promptly have war with Rome." Upon Philip endeavouring to show that the Rhodians had been the first to lay hands on him, Marcus interrupted him by saying: "But what about the Athenians? And what about the Cianians? And what about the Abydenians at this moment? Did any one of them also lay hands on you first?" The king, at a loss for a reply, said: "I pardon the offensive haughtiness of your manners for three reasons: first, because you are a young man and inexperienced in affairs; secondly, because you are the handsomest man of your time" (this was true); "and thirdly, because you are a Roman. But for my part, my first demand to the Romans is that they should not break their treaties or go to war with me; but if they do, I shall defend myself as courageously as I can, appealing to the gods to defend my cause." With these words they separated. On becoming master of Abydos, Philip found all the property of the citizens collected by themselves ready to his hand. But when he saw the numbers and fury of those who were stabbing, burning, hanging, throwing into wells, or precipitating themselves from housetops, and their children and wives, he was overpowered with surprise; and

A Roman envoy arrives to warn Philip to desist.

The voluntary death of the Abydenians.

resenting these proceedings he published a proclamation, announcing, that "he gave three days' grace to those who wished to hang or stab themselves." The Abydenians, already bent on executing their original decree, and looking upon themselves as traitors to those who had fought and died for their country, could not endure remaining alive on any terms; and, accordingly, with the exception of those who had previously been put in chains or some similar restraint, they all without delay hastened to their death, each family by itself. . . .

The Rhodians resolve to side with Rome.

35. After the capture of Abydos, envoys came from the Achaean nation to Rhodes urging the Rhodians to make terms with Philip. But upon these being followed by the arrival of the ambassadors from Rome, who argued that they should make no terms with Philip without consulting the Romans, the Rhodian people voted to listen to the latter and to hold to their friendship with them. . . .

THE PELOPONNESE—WAR WITH NABIS

Philopoemen's device for collecting all the Achaean levies at Tegea simultaneously, B.C. 200.

36. Philopoemen calculated the distances of all the cities of the Achaean league, and from which of them men could arrive at Tegea along the same roads. He then wrote despatches to each of them, and sent them to the most distant cities, so dividing them that each city that was farthest on a particular road should get, not only the one addressed to itself, but those also of the other cities on the same road. The contents of these first despatches addressed to the chief magistrate were as follows: "As soon as ye receive this despatch, forthwith cause all the men of military age, with arms, and provisions, and money for five days, to assemble immediately in the market-place. And as soon as they are thus collected, march them out and lead them to the next city. As soon as ye have arrived there, deliver the despatch addressed to its chief magistrate and follow the instructions therein contained." Now, this second despatch contained exactly the same words as the former, except of course that the name of the next town was changed to which

they were to march. By this arrangement being repeated right along the road, in the first place no one knew for what purpose or undertaking the expedition was directed; and in the next place, every one was absolutely ignorant where he was going, beyond the name of the next town, but all marched forward in a state of complete mystification, taking on the successive contingents as they went. But as of course the most remote towns were not equally distant from Tegea, the letters were not delivered to them all at the same time, but to each in proportion to its distance. By which arrangement, without either the Tegeans or the new arrivals knowing what was going to happen, all the Achaeans marched into Tegea under arms by all the gates simultaneously.

A raid upon Laconia.

37. What suggested to Philopoemen this stratagem was the great number of the tyrant's eavesdroppers and spies. On the day then on which the main body of the Achaeans were to arrive at Tegea, he despatched a band of picked men, so timing their start, that they might pass the night near Sellasia and at daybreak begin a raid on Laconia. They had orders that, in case the mercenaries of Nabis left their quarters and attacked them, they were to retire on Scotita, and in other respects follow the directions of Didascalondas of Crete; for Philopoemen had given his confidence to this officer, and full directions as to the whole expedition. These men therefore set out in good spirits to the task assigned to them. Philopoemen himself having issued orders to the Achaeans to sup early, led out his army from Tegea, and after a rapid night's march halted it about the time of the morning watch in the neighbourhood of Scotita, which is between Tegea and Lacedaemon. When day broke the mercenaries in Pellene, being informed by their scouts of the raid which the enemy were making, started at once to the rescue, as was their custom, and bore down upon them; and when the Achaeans, in accordance with their instructions, retired, they followed, harassing them with bold and daring assaults. But as soon as they came to the place where Philopoemen lay in ambush, the Achaeans sprang up and cut some of them to pieces, and took others prisoners. . . .

38. Philip seeing that the Achaeans were disposed to hesi-

tate about undertaking the war with Rome, tried earnestly by every means to rouse their feeling of hostility. . . .

COELE-SYRIA

39. Ptolemy's general Scopas marched into the upper region during the winter and subdued the Jewish nation. . . .

The siege having been conducted in a desultory manner, Scopas fell into bad repute and was attacked with all the petulance of youth. . . .

Having conquered Scopas, Antiochus took Batanaea, Samaria, Abila, and Gadara; and after a while those of the Jews who inhabit the sacred town called Jerusalem submitted to him also. On the subject of this town I have a good deal more to say, and especially on account of the splendour of its temple, but I shall put it off to another opportunity.

B.C. 200. Antiochus conquers Coele-Syria and the Jews after beating Scopas at Panium. See *supra*, ch. 18.

BOOK XVIII[1]

THE WAR WITH PHILIP

1. WHEN the time appointed arrived, Philip put to sea from Demetrias and came into the Melian Gulf, with five galleys and one beaked war-ship (pristis), on the latter of which he himself was sailing. There met him the Macedonian secretaries Apollodorus and Demosthenes, Brachylles from Boeotia, and the Achaean Cycliadas, who had been driven from the Peloponnese for the reasons I have already described. With Flamininus came king Amynandras, and Dionysodorus, legate of king Attalus. The commissioners from cities and nations were Aristaenus and Xenophon from the Achaeans; Acesimbrotus the navarch from the Rhodians; Phaeneas their Strategus from the Aetolians, and several others of their statesmen with him. Approaching the sea near Nicaea, Flamininus and those with him took their stand upon the very edge of the beach, while Philip, bringing his ship close to shore, remained afloat. Upon Flamininus bidding him disembark, he stood up on board and refused to leave his ship. Flamininus again asked him what he feared, he said that he feared no one but the gods, but he distrusted most of those who were there, especially the Aetolians. Upon the Roman expressing his surprise, and remarking that the danger was the same to all and the risk common, Philip retorted that "He was mistaken in saying that:

Congress at Nicaea in Locris, winter of B.C. 198-197. Coss. Titus Quinctius Flamininus, Sext. Aelius Paetus Catus.

Cycliadas expelled for favouring Philip. See Livy, 32, 19.

[1] According to Hultsch no fragments or extracts of book 17 are preserved. In it would have been contained the campaign of B.C. 199, in the war between Rome and Philip, for which see Livy, 31, 34-43. And the operations of Flamininus in the season of B.C. 198, Livy, 32, 9-18. The first seventeen chapters of this book are generally classed in book 17.

for that, if anything happened to Phaeneas, there were many who would act as Strategi for the Aetolians; but if Philip were to perish at the present juncture, there was no one to be king of the Macedonians." Though all thought this an unconciliatory way of opening the discussion, Flamininus nevertheless bade him speak on the matters he had come to consider. Philip however said that "The word was not with himself but with Flamininus; and therefore begged that he would state clearly what he was to do in order to have peace." The Roman consul replied that "What he had to say was simple and obvious: it was to bid him evacuate Greece entirely; restore the prisoners and deserters in his hands to their several states; hand over to the Romans those parts of Illyricum of which he had become possessed since the peace of Epirus; and, similarly, to restore to Ptolemy all the cities which he had taken from him since the death of Ptolemy Philopator.

The Roman demand.

Peace of Epirus, B.C. 205.

See *supra* 11, 5-7.

2. Having said this Flamininus refrained from any further speech of his own; but turning to the others he bade them deliver what they had been severally charged to say by those who sent them. And first Dionysodorus, the envoy of Attalus, took up the discourse by declaring that "Philip ought to restore the king's ships which had been captured in the battle at Chios and their crews with them; and to restore also the temple of Aphrodite to its original state, as well as the Nicephorium, both of which he had destroyed." He was followed by the Rhodian navarch Acesimbrotus, who demanded "That Philip should evacuate Peraea, which he had taken from them; withdraw his garrisons from Iasus, Bargylia, and Euromus; restore the Perinthians to their political union with Byzantium; and evacuate Sestos, Abydos, and all commercial ports and harbours in Asia." Following the Rhodians the Achaeans demanded "The restoration of Corinth and Argos uninjuired." Then came the Aetolians, who first demanded, like the Romans, that "Philip should entirely evacuate Greece; and, secondly, that he should restore to them uninjured all cities formerly members of the Aetolian league."

Demands of Attalus,

of the Rhodians,

of the Achaeans.

and of the Aetolians.

3. When Phaeneas the Aetolian strategus had delivered this demand, a man called Alexander Isius, who had the reputation of being an able politician and good speaker, said that "Philip was neither sincere at the present moment in proposing terms, nor bold in his manner of making war, when he had to do that. In conferences and colloquies he was always setting ambushes and lying in wait, and using all the practices of war, but in actual war itself took up a position at once unjust and ignoble: for he avoided meeting his enemies face to face, and, as he fled before them, employed himself in burning and plundering the cities; and by this policy, though himself beaten, he spoilt the value of the victor's reward. Yet former kings of Macedonia had not adopted this plan, but one exactly the reverse: for they were continually fighting with each other in the open field, but rarely destroyed and ruined cities. This was shown clearly by Alexander's war in Asia against king Darius; and again in the contentions between his successors, when they combined to fight Antigonus for the possession of Asia. So too had the successors of these kings followed the same policy down to the time of Pyrrhus: they had been prompt to war against each other in the open field, and to do everything they could to conquer each other in arms, but had spared the cities, that they might rule them if they conquered, and be honoured by their subjects. But that a man should abandon war, and yet destroy that for which the war was undertaken, seemed an act of madness, and madness of a very violent sort. And this was just what Philip was doing at that moment; for he had destroyed more cities in Thessaly, on his rapid march from the pass of Epirus, though he was a friend and ally of that country, than any one who had ever been at war with the Thessalians."

Speech of Alexander Isius.

After a good deal more to the same effect he ended by asking Philip, "On what grounds he was holding the town of Lysimacheia with a garrison, having expelled the strategus sent by the Aetolian league, of which it was a member? Also on what grounds he had enslaved the Ciani who were also in alliance with the Aetolians? Lastly, on what plea he was in actual occupation of Echinus, Phthiotid Thebes, Pharsalus, and Larisa?"

4. When Alexander had concluded his speech, Philip came somewhat nearer to the shore than he was before, and, rising on board his ship, said that "Alexander had composed and delivered a speech in the true Aetolian and theatrical style. For every one knew quite well that nobody willingly destroys his own allies, but that, at times of special danger, military commanders are compelled to do many things contrary to their natural feelings." While the king was still speaking, Phaeneas, who was very short-sighted, interrupted him by saying, "You are trifling with us; you must either fight and conquer, or obey the commands of the stronger." Philip, in spite of the unfortunate position of his affairs, could not refrain from his habitual humour: turning towards Phaeneas he said, "Even a blind man could see that." Such a knack had he of cutting repartee. Then he turned to Alexander again and said, "You ask me, Alexander, why I took possession of Lysimacheia. I reply, in order that it might not by your neglect be devastated by Thracians, as it has now actually been; because I was compelled by this war to remove my soldiers, who indeed were no hostile garrison, as you say, but were there for its protection. As for the Ciani, I did not go to war with them, but only assisted Prusias to take them who was at war with them. And of this you yourselves were the cause. For though I sent envoy after envoy to you desiring that you would repeal the law which allows you the privilege of taking 'spoil from spoil,' you replied that rather than abolish this law you would remove Aetolia from Aetolia."

The rejoinder of Philip.

5. When Flamininus expressed some wonder at what he meant by this, the king tried to explain it to him by saying that "The Aetolian custom was this. They not only plundered those with whom they were at war, and harried their country; but, if certain other nations were at war with each other, even though both were friends and allies of the Aetolians, none the less the Aetolians might, without a formal decree of the people, take part with both combatants and plunder the territory of both. The result was that in the eyes of the Aetolians there were no defined limits of friendship or enmity, but they were ready to be the enemies and assailers of all who had a dispute on any-

Philip explains the peculiar law of the Aetolians.

thing. "How then," he added, "have they any right to blame me if, while on terms of friendship with the Aetolians, I did anything against the Ciani in support of my own allies? But the most outrageous part of their conduct is that they try to rival Rome, and bid me entirely evacuate Greece! The demand in itself is sufficiently haughty and dictatorial: still, in the mouths of Romans, it is tolerable, but in that of Aetolians quite intolerable. What is this Greece, pray, from which ye bid me depart? How do you define it? Why, most of the Aetolians themselves are not Greeks; for neither the Agrai, nor the Apodoti, nor the Amphilochi are counted as Greek. Do you then give up those tribes to me?"

6. Upon Flamininus laughing at these words, Philip proceeded: "Well, enough said to the Aetolians! But to the Rhodians and Attalus I have to say that, in the eyes of a fair judge, it would be held more just that they should restore to me the ships captured, than I to them. For I did not begin the attack upon Attalus and the Rhodians, but they upon me, as everybody acknowledges. However, at your instance, Titus, I restore Peraea to the Rhodians, and to Attalus his ships and as many of the men as are still alive. As for the destruction of the Nicephorium and the grove of Aphrodite, I am not able to do anything else towards their restoration, but I will send plants and gardeners to attend to the place and the growth of the trees that have been cut down." Flamininus once more laughing at the king's sarcastic tone, Philip turned to the Achaeans, and first went through the list of benefactions received by them from Antigonus and himself; then quoted the extraordinary honours Antigonus and he had received from them; and concluded by reading their decree for abandoning him and joining Rome. Taking this for his text, he expatiated at great length on the fickleness and ingratitude of the Achaeans. Still he said he would restore Argos to them, and as to Corinth would consult with Flamininus.

Philip's answer to the Rhodians and Attalus.

and the Achaeans.

7. Having thus concluded his conversation with the other envoys, he asked Flamininus, observing that the discussion was really confined to himself and the Romans, "Whether he considered that

A retort of Flamininus.

he was bound to evacuate only those places in Greece which he had himself acquired, or those also which he had inherited from his ancestors?" On Flamininus making no answer, Aristaenus for the Achaeans, and Phaeneas for the Aetolians, were on the point of replying. But as the day was closing in, time prevented them from doing so; and Philip demanded that they should all hand into him a written statement of the terms on which peace was to be granted: for being there alone he had no one with whom to consult; and therefore wished to turn their demands over in his own mind. Now Flamininus was much amused at Philip's sarcastic banter; but not wishing the others to think so, he retaliated on him by a sarcasm also, saying: "Of course you are alone, Philip: for you have killed all the friends likely to give you the best advice!" The king smiled sardonically, but said nothing. And for the present, all having handed in the written statements of their demands as aforesaid, the conference broke up, after appointing to meet again next day at Nicaea. But next morning, though Flamininus came to the appointed place and found the others there, Philip did not arrive.

Second day's conference, Philip comes late.

8. When the day, however, had nearly come to an end, and Titus and the others had almost given him up, Philip appeared accompanied as before, and excused himself by saying that he had spent the whole day in perplexity and doubt, caused by the severity of the demands made upon him. But every one else thought that he had acted thus from a wish to prevent, by the lateness of the hour, the delivery of invectives by the Achaeans and Aetolians: for he saw, as he was going away on the previous evening, that both were ready to attack him and state grievances. Therefore, as soon as he approached the meeting this time, he demanded that "The Roman Consul should discuss the matter with him in private; that they might not have a mere war of words on both sides, but that a definite settlement should be come to on the points in dispute." On his several times repeating this request and pressing it strongly, Flamininus asked those present what he ought to do. On their bidding him meet the king and hear what he had to say, he took with him Appius Claudius, at that time a military Tribune,

and telling the others to retire a short way from the sea and remain there, he himself bade Philip disembark. Accordingly the king, attended by Apollodorus and Demosthenes, left his ship, and, joining Flamininus, conversed with him for a considerable time. What was said by the one and the other on that occasion it is not easy to state. However, when Philip and he had parted, Flamininus, in explaining the king's views to the others, said that he consented to restore Pharsalus and Larisa to the Aetolians, but not Thebes: and that to the Rhodians he surrendered Peraea, but not Iasus and Bargylia: to the Achaeans he gave up Corinth and Argos: to the Romans he promised that he would surrender Illyricum and all prisoners: and to Attalus the ships, and as many of the men captured in the sea-fights as survived.

Philip's final offers.

9. All present expressed their dissatisfaction at these terms, and alleged that it was necessary before all that he should perform the general injunction, that, namely, of evacuating all Greece: otherwise these particular concessions were vain and useless. Observing that there was an animated discussion going on among them, and fearing at the same time that they would indulge in accusations against himself, Philip requested Flamininus to adjourn the conference till next day, as the evening was closing in; and promised that he would then either persuade them to accept his terms or submit to theirs. Flamininus consenting, they separated, after appointing to meet next day on the beach near Thronium.

Dissatisfaction of the Congress.

Next day all came to the appointed place in good time. Philip in a short speech called on all, and especially on Flamininus, "Not to break off the negotiation for peace now that by far the greater number were inclined to come to some arrangement; but, if possible, to come to an understanding by themselves on the points in dispute; or, if that could not be, to send envoys to the Senate, and either convince it as to this controversy, or submit to whatever it enjoined."

Third day's conference. A reference to the Senate agreed on.

On this proposition of the king, all the others declared that they preferred war to such a demand. But the Roman Consul

said that "He was quite aware that it was improbable that Philip would submit to any of their demands, yet, as it did not in the least stand in the way of such action as they chose to take to grant the favour demanded by the king, he would concede it. For not one of the proposals actually made at present could be confirmed without the authority of the Senate; and besides the season now coming on was a favourable one for ascertaining its opinion; for, even as things were, the armies could do nothing owing to the winter: it was therefore against no one's interests, but, on the contrary, very convenient for them all, to devote this time to a reference to the Senate on the present state of affairs."

The embassies to Rome.

10. Seeing that Flamininus was not averse to referring the matter to the Senate, all the others presently consented, and voted to allow Philip to send envoys to Rome, and that they too should severally send envoys of their own to plead their cause before the Senate, and state their grievances against Philip.

The business of the conference having thus been concluded in accordance with his views and the opinions he had originally expressed, Flamininus at once set about carefully securing his own position, and preventing Philip from taking any undue advantage. For though he granted him three months' suspension of hostilities, he stipulated that he should complete his embassy to Rome within that time, and insisted on his immediately removing his garrisons from Phocis and Locris. He was also very careful to insist on behalf of the Roman allies, that no act of hostility should be committed against them during this period by the Macedonians. Having made these terms in writing with Philip, he immediately took the necessary steps himself to carry out his own policy. First, he sent Amynandrus to Rome at once, knowing that he was a man of pliable character, and would be easily persuaded by his own friends in the city to take any course they might propose; and at the same time would carry with him a certain prestige, and rouse men's curiosity and interest by his title of royalty. Next to him he sent as personal envoys his wife's nephew Quintus Fabius, Quintus Fulvius, and Appius Claudius Nero. From the Aetolians went Alexander Isius, Damocritus

of Calydon, Dicaearchus of Trichonium, Polemarchus of Arsinoe, Lamius of Ambracia, Nicomachus of Acarnania,—one of those who had fled from Thurium and settled in Ambracia,—and Theodotus of Pherae, an exile from Thessaly who settled in Stratus: from the Achaeans Xenophon of Aegium: from King Attalus only Alexander: and from the Athenian people Cephisodorus and his colleagues.

11. Now these envoys arrived in Rome before the Senate had settled the provinces of the Consuls appointed for this year, and whether it would be necessary to send both to Gaul, or one of them against Philip. But the friends of Flamininus having assured themselves that both Consuls would remain in Italy owing to the threat of an attack from the Celts, all the ambassadors appeared and bluntly stated their grievances against Philip. The bulk of their accusations was to the same effect as what they had before stated to the king himself; but they also endeavoured carefully to instil this idea in the minds of the Senators, "That so long as Chalcis, Corinth, and Demetrias were subject to Macedonia, it was impossible for the Greeks to think of liberty; for Philip himself had spoken the exact truth when he called these places the 'fetters of Greece.' For neither could the Peloponnese breathe while a royal garrison was stationed in Cornith, nor the Locrians, Boeotians, and Phocians feel any confidence while Philip was in occupation of Chalcis and the rest of Euboea; nor indeed could the Thessalians or Magnesians raise a spark of liberty[1] while Philip and the Macedonians held Demetrias. That, therefore, Philip's offer to evacuate the other places was a mere pretence in order to escape the immediate danger; and that on the very first day he chose he would with ease reduce the Greeks again under his power, if he were in possession of these places." They accordingly urged the Senate "either to force Philip to evacuate the cities they had named, or to stand by the policy they had begun, and vigorously prosecute the war against him. For in truth the most difficult part of the war was already accomplished, the Macedonians having already been

The speeches of the Greek envoys in the Senate.

[1] The reading *ἐναύσασθαι*, which I attempt to represent, is doubtful. Schweig. suggests *ἐγγεύσασθαι* "to taste."

twice defeated, and most of their resources on land already expended."

They concluded by beseeching the Senate "not to beguile the Greeks of their hopes of liberty, nor deprive themselves of the most glorious renown." Such, or nearly so, were the arguments advanced by the Greek envoys. Philip's envoys were prepared to make a long speech in reply: but they were stopped at the threshold. For being asked whether they were prepared to evacuate Chalcis, Corinth, and Demetrias, they declared that they had not any instructions as to those towns. They were accordingly rebuked by the Senate and obliged to discontinue their speech.

12. The Senate then, as I have said before, assigned Gaul to both the consuls as their province, and ordered that the war against Philip should go on, assigning to Titus Flamininus the entire control of Greek affairs. These decrees having been quickly made known in Greece, Flamininus found everything settled to his mind, partly no doubt by the assistance of chance, but for the most part by his own foresight in the management of the whole business. For he was exceedingly acute, if ever Roman was. The skill and good sense with which he conducted public business and private negotiations could not be surpassed, and yet he was quite a young man, not yet more than thirty, and the first Roman who had crossed to Greece with an army. . . .

B.C. 197 Coss. G. Cornelius Cathagus, Q. Minucius Rufus.

13. It has often and in many cases occurred to me to wonder at the mistakes men make; but none seems to me so surprising as that of traitors. I wish, therefore, to say a word in season on the subject. I know very well that it is one which does not admit of easy treatment or definition. For it is not at all easy to say whom we ought to regard as a real traitor. Plainly all those, who at a time of tranquillity make compacts with kings or princes, cannot be reckoned such off hand; nor, again, those who in the midst of dangers transfer their country from existing friendships and alliances to others. Far from it. For such men have again and again been the authors of manifold advantages to their own countries. But not to go any

Was Aristaenus a traitor or a wise Opportunist?

further for example, my meaning can be made clear by the circumstances of the present case. For, if Aristaenus had not at this time opportunely caused the Achaeans to leave their alliance with Philip and join that of Rome, it is clear that the whole league would have been utterly ruined. But as it was, this man and this policy were confessedly the sources, not only of security to individual Achaeans at the time, but of the aggrandisement of the whole league. Therefore he was not looked upon as a traitor, but universally honoured as a benefactor and saviour of the country. The same principle will hold good in the case of all others who regulate their policy and measures by the necessities of the hour.

Comparison of the policy of the Achaeans and other Peloponnesians towards Philip V. with that recommended by Demosthenes towards Philip II.

14. From this point of view fault might be found with Demosthenes, admirable as he is in many respects, for having rashly and indiscriminately launched an exceedingly bitter charge at the most illustrious Greeks. For he asserted that in Arcadia, Cercidas, Hieronymus, and Eucampidas were traitors to Greece for making an alliance with Philip; in Messene the sons of Philiades, Neon and Thraylochus; in Argos, Mystis, Teledamus, one Mnaseas; in Thessaly, Daochus and Cineas; in Boeotia, Theogeiton and Timolas: and many more besides he has included in the same category, naming them city by city; and yet all these men have a weighty and obvious plea to urge in defence of their conduct, and above all those of Arcadia and Messene.[1] For it was by their bringing Philip into the Peloponnese, and humbling the Lacedaemonians, that these men in the first place enabled all its inhabitants to breathe again, and conceive the idea of liberty; and in the next place, by recovering the territory and cities which the Lacedaemonians in the hour of prosperity had taken from the Messenians, Megalopolitans, Tegeans, and Argives, notoriously raised the fortunes of their own countries.[2] In return for this they were bound not to make war

[1] Demosthenes, *de Corona*, §§ 43, 48, 295.

[2] B.C. 338 after the battle of Chaeronea. See Thirlwall, 6, 77; Grote, 11, 315 (ch. 90); Kennedy's translation of the *de Corona*, Appendix vi. The argument of Polybius is of course an *ex post facto* one. It is open still to

on Philip and the Macedonians, but to do all they could to promote his reputation and honour. Now, if they had been doing all this, or if they had admitted a garrison from Philip into their native cities, or had abolished their constitutions and deprived their fellow-citizens of liberty and freedom of speech, for the sake of their own private advantage or power, they would have deserved this name of traitor. But if, while carefully maintaining their duty to their countries, they yet differed in their judgment of politics, and did not consider that their interests were the same as those of the Athenians, it is not, I think, fair that they should have been called traitors on that account by Demosthenes. The man who measures everything by the interests of his own particular state, and imagines that all the Greeks ought to have their eyes fixed upon Athens, on the pain of being styled traitors, seems to me to be ill-informed and to be labouring under a strange delusion, especially as the course which events in Greece took at that time has borne witness to the wisdom, not of Demosthenes, but of Eucampidas, Hieronymus, Cercidas, and the sons of Philiades. For what did the Athenians eventually get by their opposition to Philip? Why, the crowning disaster of the defeat at Chaeronea. And had it not been for the king's magnanimity and regard for his own reputation, their misfortunes would have gone even further, thanks to the policy of Demosthenes. Whereas, owing to the men I have mentioned, security and relief from attacks of the Lacedaemonians were obtained for Arcadia and Messenia generally, and many advantages accrued to their states separately.

B.C. 338.

15. It is not easy then to define to whom one may properly apply this name. The nearest approach to truth would be to assign it to those who in times of public danger, either for the sake of personal security or advantage, or to retaliate upon political opponents, put their cities into the hands of the enemy: or indeed to those who, by admitting a foreign garrison, and employing external assistance to carry out private

The true traitor is the man who acts with personal objects or from party spirit.

maintain that, had the advice of Demosthenes been followed, these states might have been freed from the tyranny of Sparta without becoming subject to another master in the king of Macedonia.

aims and views, bring their country under the direction of a superior power. All such men as these one might include in the category of traitors with perfect reasonableness. Such men, indeed, gain neither profit nor honour, but the reverse, as every one acknowledges. And this brings me back to my original observation, that it is difficult to understand with what object, and supported by what reasoning, men rush upon such a disastrous position. For no one ever yet betrayed his city or camp or fort without being detected; but even if a man here and there managed to conceal it at the moment of his crime, yet all have been detected in the course of time. Nor when known has any such ever had a happy life; but, as a rule, they meet with the punishment they deserve from the very persons in whose favour they act. For, indeed, though generals and princes constantly employ traitors for their own purposes; yet when they have got all they can out of them, they treat them thenceforth as traitors, as Demosthenes says; very naturally considering that those, who have put their country and original friends into the hands of their enemies, are never likely to be really loyal or to keep faith with themselves. Nay, even though they escape violence at the hands of these, yet they do not easily avoid the vengeance of those whom they betrayed. Or if, finally, they manage to evade the designs of both the one and the other, yet all over the world fame dogs their footsteps with vengeance to their lives' end, suggesting to their imaginations night and day numberless terrors, false and true; helping and hounding on all who design any evil against them; and, finally, refusing to allow them even in sleep to forget their crimes, but forcing them to dream of every kind of plot and disaster, because they are aware of the universal loathing and hatred which attend them. Yet, though all this is true, nobody who wanted one was ever at a loss for a traitor, except in the rarest cases. From which one might say with some plausibility that man, reputed the most cunning of animals, gives considerable grounds for being regarded as the stupidest. For the other animals, which obey their bodily appetites alone, can be deceived by these alone; while man, though he has reason

The reward of treason.

Demosth. *de Corona*, § 47.

to guide him, is led into error by the failure of that reason no less than by his physical appetites. . . .

Attalus in Sicyon, B.C. 198.

16. King Attalus had for some time past been held in extraordinary honour by the Sicyonians, ever since the time that he ransomed the sacred land of Apollo for them at the cost of a large sum of money; in return for which they set up the colossal statue of him, ten cubits high, near the temple of Apollo in the market-place. But on this occasion, on his presenting them with ten talents and ten thousand medimni of wheat, their devotion to him was immensely increased; and they accordingly voted him a statue of gold, and passed a law to offer sacrifice in his honour every year. With these honours, then, Attalus departed to Cenchreae.[1] . . .

The cruelty of Apega, wife of Nabis.

17. The tyrant Nabis, leaving Timocrates of Pellene at Argos,—because he trusted him more than any one else and employed him in his most important undertakings,—returned to Sparta: and thence, after some few days, despatched his wife with instructions to go to Argos and raise money. On her arrival she far surpassed Nabis himself in cruelty. For she summoned women to her presence either privately or in families, and inflicted every kind of torture and violence upon them, until she had extorted from almost all of them, not only their gold ornaments, but also the most valuable parts of their clothing. . . .

B.C. 197. King Attalus before the assembled Boeotians. See Livy, 33, 2.

In a speech of considerable length Attalus reminded them of the ancient valour of their ancestors. . . .

THE END OF THE FIRST MACEDONIAN WAR

B.C. 197, at the beginning of spring. Livy, 33, 1.

18. Flamininus being unable to ascertain where the enemy were encamped, but yet being clearly informed that they had entered Thessaly, gave orders to all his men to cut stakes to carry with them, ready for use at any moment. This seems im-

[1] Attalus spent the winter of B.C. 198-197 at Aegina, in the course of which he seems to have visited Sicyon.

possible to Greek habits, but to those of Rome it is easy. For the Greeks find it difficult to hold even their sarissae on the march, and can scarcely bear the fatigue of them; but the Romans strap their shields to their shoulders with leathern thongs, and, having nothing but their javelins in their hands, can stand the additional burden of a stake. There is also a great difference between the stakes employed by the two peoples. The Greeks hold that the best stake is that which has the largest and most numerous shoots growing round the stem; but the Roman stakes have only two or three side shoots, or at most four; and those are selected which have these shoots on one side only. The result is that their porterage is very easy (for each man carries three or four packed together), and they make an exceedingly secure palisade when put into use. For the Greek palisading, when set in the front of the camp, in the first place can easily be pulled down; for since the part that is firm and tightly fixed in the ground is single, while the projecting arms of it are many and large, two or three men can get hold of the same stake by its projecting arms, and easily pull it up; and directly that is done, its breadth is so great that a regular gateway is made: and because in such a palisade the stakes are not closely interlaced or interwoven with each other, when one is pulled up the part next to it is made insecure. With the Romans it is quite different. For as soon as they fix their stakes, they interlace them in such a manner that it is not easy to know to which of the stems fixed in the ground the branches belong, nor on which of these branches the smaller shoots are growing. Moreover, it is impossible to insert the hand and grasp them, owing to the closeness of the interlacing of the branches and the way they lie one upon another, and because the main branches are also carefully cut so as to have sharp ends. Nor, if one is got hold of, is it easy to pull up: because, in the first place, all the stakes are sufficiently tightly secured in the ground to be self-supporting; and, in the second place, because the man who pulls away one branch must, owing to the close interlacing, be able to move several others in its train; and it is quite unlikely that two or three men should happen to get hold

The methods of forming palisades among the Greeks and Romans.

of the same stake. But even if, by the exertion of enormous force, a man has succeeded in pulling one or another up, the gap is scarcely perceptible. Considering, therefore, the vast superiority of this method, both in the readiness with which such stakes are found, the ease with which they are carried, and the security and durability of the palisade made with them, it is plain, in my opinion, that if any military operation of the Romans deserves to be admired and imitated, it is this.

19. After providing for contingencies by these preparations, Flamininus advanced with his whole force at a moderate pace, and, having arrived at about fifty stades from Pherae, pitched a camp there; and next morning, just before the morning watch, sent out some reconnoitring parties to see whether they could get any opportunity of discovering the position and movements of the enemy. Philip, at the same time, being informed that the Romans were encamped near Thebes, started with his whole force from Larisa in the direction of Pherae. When about thirty stades from that town, he pitched his camp there, and gave orders for all his men to make their preparations early next morning, and about the morning watch got his troops on the march. The division whose usual duty it was to form the advance guard he sent forward first, with instructions to cross the heights above Pherae, while he personally superintended the main army's advance from the camp as the day was breaking. The advanced guards of the two armies were within a very little of coming into collision in the pass; for the darkness prevented their seeing each other until they were quite a short distance apart. Both sides halted, and sent speedy intelligence to their respective leaders of what had happened, and asking for instructions. . . .

Flamininus marches to Pherae in Thessaly.

Thebae Phthiotides.

The advanced guards of the two armies meet.

[The generals decided] to remain in their intrenchments, and recall these advanced guards. Next morning both sent out about three hundred cavalry and light infantry to reconnoitre, among which Flamininus also sent two squadrons of Aetolians, because they were acquainted with the country. These opposing reconnoitring parties fell in with each other on the road between Pherae and Larisa, and joined battle

with great fury. The men under Eupolemus the Aetolian fighting gallantly, and urging the Italian troops to do the same, the Macedonians were repulsed; and, after skirmishing for a long while, both parties retired to their respective camps.

20. Dissatisfied with the country near Pherae, as being thickly wooded and full of walls and gardens, both parties broke up their camps next day. Philip directed his march towards Scotusa, because he desired to supply himself with provisions from that town, and thus, with all his preparations complete, to find a district more suitable to his army: while Flamininus, divining his intention, got his army on the march at the same time as Philip, in great haste to anticipate him in securing the corn in the territory of Scotusa. A range of hills intervening between their two lines of march, the Romans could not see in what direction the Macedonians were marching, nor the Macedonians the Romans. Both armies, however, continued their march during this day, Flamininus to Eretria in Phthiotis, and Philip to the river Onchestus; and there they respectively pitched their camps. Next day they advanced again, and again encamped: Philip at Melambium in the territory of Scotusa, and Flamininus at the temple of Thetis in that of Pharsalus, being still ignorant of each other's whereabouts. A violent storm of rain and thunder coming on next day, the whole atmosphere descended from the clouds to the earth about the time of the morning watch, so that the darkness was too dense to see even those who were quite close. In spite of this, Philip was so eager to accomplish his object, that he started with his whole army; but finding himself much embarrassed on the march by the mist, after accomplishing a very small distance he again encamped; but he sent his reserve back, with instructions to halt upon the summit of the intervening hills.[1]

Autumn of B.C. 197. Both Philip and Flamininus advance towards Scotusa, on opposite sides of a range of hills.

21. Flamininus, in his camp near the temple of Thetis,

[1] That is of Cynoscephalae. *Supergressi tumulos qui Cynoscephalae vocantur, relicta ibi statione firma peditum equitumque, posuerunt castra.* Livy, 33, 7.

Another skirmish between detached parties.

being uncertain as to the position of the enemy, sent out ten troops of cavalry and a thousand light infantry in advance, with instructions to keep a careful look-out as they traversed the country. As these men were approaching the ridge of the hills they came upon the Macedonian reserve without expecting it, owing to the dimness of the light. After a short interval of mutual alarm, both sides began irregular attacks on each other, and both despatched messengers to their respective chiefs to give information of what had occurred; and when the Romans began to get the worst of it in the encounter, and to suffer heavily at the hands of the Macedonian reserve, they sent to their camp begging for supports. Flamininus accordingly despatched the Aetolians under Archedamus and Eupolemus, as well as two of his own tribunes, with a force altogether of five hundred cavalry and two thousand infantry, after properly exhorting them to do their duty. On their arrival to the support of the skirmishing party already engaged, the aspect of affairs was promptly changed. For the Romans, inspired by the hope which this reinforcement gave, renewed the contest with redoubled spirit; while the Macedonians, though offering a gallant defence, were now in their turn hard pressed, and being forced to make a general retreat, retired to the highest points in the hills, and despatched messengers to the king for help.

Philip sends supports.

22. But Philip, who had not expected, for reasons indicated above, that a general engagement would take place on that day, happened to have sent a considerable part of his troops out of camp foraging. But when informed of what was taking place by these messengers, the mist at the same time beginning to lift, he despatched, with due exhortation, Heracleides of Gyrton, the commander of his Thessalian cavalry; Leon, the general of his Macedonian horse; and Athenagoras, with all the mercenaries except those from Thrace. The reserve being joined by these troops, and the Macedonian force having thus become a formidable one, they advanced against the enemy, and in their turn drove the Romans back from the heights. But what prevented them, more than anything else, from entirely routing

the enemy was the gallantry of the Aetolian cavalry, which fought with desperate fury and reckless valour. For the Aetolians are as superior to the rest of the Greeks in cavalry for fighting in skirmishing order, troop to troop, or man to man, as they are inferior to them both in the arms and tactics of their infantry for the purpose of a general engagement. The enemy being held in check therefore by these troops, the Romans were not forced back again quite on to the level ground, but, after retiring to a short distance, faced round and halted. But when Flamininus saw that not only had the cavalry and light infantry retired, but that, owing to them, his whole force was rendered uneasy, he drew out his entire army and got them into order of battle close to the hills. Meanwhile one man after another of the Macedonian reserve ran towards Philip shouting out, "King, the enemy are flying: do not let slip the opportunity. The barbarians cannot stand before us: now is the day for you to strike: now is your opportunity!" The result was that he was induced to fight in spite of his dissatisfaction with the ground. For these hills, which are called Cynoscephalae, are rough, precipitous, and of considerable height; and it was because he foresaw the disadvantages of such a ground, that he was originally disinclined to accept battle there; but, being excited now by the extravagantly sanguine reports of these messengers, he gave the order for his army to be drawn out of camp.

Valour of the Aetolian cavalry.

Cynoscephalae.

Flamininus offers battle, which Philip, against his better judgment, accepts.

23. Having got his main body into order, Flamininus gave his attention at the same time to relieving his advanced guard, and to going along the ranks to encourage his men. His exhortation was short, but clear and intelligible to the hearers: for, pointing to the enemy with his hand, he said to his soldiers: "Are not these the Macedonians, my men, whom, when occupying in their own country the pass to Eordaea, you routed in open battle, under the command of Sulpicius, and drove to take refuge on the hills with the loss of many of their comrades? Are not these the Macedonians whom, when defended by what seemed an impassable country in Epirus, you dis-

Flamininus addresses his men, and advances to the attack.

lodged by sheer valour, and forced to throw away their shields and fly right into Macedonia? Why then should you feel any hesitation when you are to fight the same men on equal ground? Why look anxiously to the past, rather than let that past minister courage to you for the present? Therefore, my men, rouse each other by mutual exhortations, and hasten in your might to the struggle! For, with God's will, I am persuaded that this battle will quickly have the same issue as the contests in the past." With these words he ordered his right wing to remain where they were, and the elephants in front of them; while with his left, supported by the light infantry, he advanced in gallant style to attack the enemy. And the Roman troops already on the field, finding themselves thus reinforced by the legions on their rear, once more faced round and charged their opponents.

The advanced guard are encouraged.

24. Meanwhile, when he had seen the main part of his army in position outside the camp, Philip himself advanced with his peltasts and the right wing of his phalanx, commencing the ascent of the hills with great rapidity, and having left instructions with Nicanor, surnamed the Elephant, to see that the rest of the army followed at once. As soon as his first files reached the summit, he deployed his men into line by the left, and occupied the range of high ground: for the Macedonians who had been sent in advance had forced the Romans a considerable distance down the other side of the hills, and therefore he found the ridges unoccupied by the enemy. But while he was still engaged in getting the right wing of his army into line, his mercenaries came on the ground, having been decisively repulsed by the enemy. For when the Roman light infantry found themselves supported by the heavy, as I said just now, with their assistance, which they regarded as turning the scale in their favour, they made a furious charge on the enemy, and killed a large number of them. When the king first came on the ground, and saw that the fighting between the light armed was going on near the enemy's camp, he was delighted: but when, on the other hand, he saw his own men giving ground and requiring

Philip also advances and occupies the hills.

Philip's advanced guard defeated.

support, he was compelled to give it, and allow the necessities of the moment to decide the fortunes of the whole day, in spite of the fact that the greater part of his phalanx was still on the march and engaged in mounting the hills. Receiving therefore the men who had been already engaged, he massed them all upon his right wing, both infantry and cavalry; while he ordered the peltasts and heavy armed to double their depth and close up to the right. By the time this was effected the enemy were close at hand; and, accordingly, the word was given to the phalanx to lower spears and charge; to the light infantry to cover their flank. At the same time Flamininus also, having received his advanced party into the intervals between his maniples, charged the enemy.

25. The charge was made with great violence and loud shouting on both sides: for both advancing parties raised their war cry, while those who were not actually engaged shouted encouragement to those that were; and the result was a scene of the wildest excitement, terrible in the last degree. Philip's right wing came off brilliantly in the encounter, for they were charging down hill and were superior in weight, and their arms were far more suited for the actual conditions of the struggle: but as for the rest of the army, that part of it which was in the rear of the actual fighters did not get into contact with the enemy; while the left wing, which had but just made the ascent, was only beginning to show on the ridge. Seeing that his men were unable to stand the charge of the phalanx, and that his left wing was losing ground, some having already fallen and the rest slowly retiring, but that hopes of saving himself still remained on the right, Flamininus hastily transferred himself to the latter wing; and when he perceived that the enemy's force was not well together—part being in contact with the actual fighters, part just in the act of mounting the ridge, and part halting on it and not yet beginning to descend,[1]—

The battle.

Philip's right wing repulse the Roman left.

Successful advance of the Roman right.

[1] I have given the meaning which I conceive this sentence to have; but the editors generally suspect the loss of a word like ἄπρακτα or ἀπραγοῦντα after τὰ μὲν συνεχῆ τοῖς διαγωνιζομένοις. This is unnecessary if we regard συνεχῆ as predicative, and I think this way of taking it gives sufficient sense. Polybius is thinking of the Macedonian army as being so dislocated by the

keeping the elephants in front he led the maniples of his right against the enemy. The Macedonians having no one to give them orders, and unable to form a proper phalanx, owing to the inequalities of the ground and to the fact that, being engaged in trying to come up with the actual combatants, they were still in column of march, did not even wait for the Romans to come to close quarters: but, thrown into confusion by the mere charge of the elephants, their ranks were disordered and they broke into flight.

26. The main body of the Roman right followed and slaughtered the flying Macedonians. But one of the tribunes, with about twenty maniples, having made up his mind on his own account what ought to be done next, contributed by his action very greatly to the general victory. He saw that the division which was personally commanded by Philip was much farther forward than the rest of the enemy, and was pressing hard upon the Roman left by its superior weight; he therefore left the right, which was by this time clearly victorious, and directing his march towards the part of the field where a struggle was still going on, he managed to get behind the Macedonians and charge them on the rear. The nature of the phalanx is such that the men cannot face round singly and defend themselves: this tribune, therefore, charged them and killed all he could get at; until, being unable to defend themselves, they were forced to throw down their shields and fly; whereupon the Romans in their front, who had begun to yield, faced round again and charged them too. At first, as I have said, Philip, judging from the success of his own division, felt certain of a complete victory; but when he saw his Macedonians all on a sudden throwing away their shields, and the enemy close upon their rear, he withdrew with a small body of foot and horse a short distance from the field and took a general survey of the whole battle: and when he observed that the Romans in their pursuit of his left wing were already approaching the tops of the hills, he rallied as many Thracians and Macedonians as he could at the moment,

The Macedonian phalanx outflanked.

The king quits the field and flies.

nature of the ground, that, while some parts were in contact with the enemy, the rest had not arrived on the scene of the fighting.

and fled. As Flamininus was pursuing the fugitives he came upon the lines of the Macedonian left, just as they were scaling the ridge in their attempt to cross the hills, and at first halted in some surprise because the enemy held their spears straight up, as is the custom of the Macedonians when surrendering themselves or intending to pass over to the enemy. Presently, having had the reason of this movement explained to him, he held his men back, thinking it best to spare the lives of those whom fear had induced to surrender. But whilst he was still reflecting on this matter, some of the advanced guard rushed upon these men from some higher ground and put most of them to the sword, while the few survivors threw away their shields and escaped by flight.

27. The battle was now at an end in every part of the field; the Romans everywhere victorious; and Philip in full retreat towards Tempe. The first night he passed at what is called Alexander's tower; the next day he got as far as Gonni, on the pass into Tempe, and there remained, with a view of collecting the survivors of the battle.

Philip retreats to Tempe.

But the Romans, after following the fugitives for a certain distance, returned; and some employed themselves in stripping the dead; others in collecting the captives; while the majority hurried to the plunder of the enemy's camp. But there they found that the Aetolians had been beforehand with them; and thinking, therefore, that they were deprived of their fair share of the booty, they began grumbling at the Aetolians and protesting to their general that "he imposed the dangers upon them, but yielded the spoil to others." For the present, however, they returned to their own camp, and passed the night in their old quarters: but next morning they employed themselves in collecting the prisoners and the remainder of the spoils, and then started on the march towards Larisa. In the battle the Romans lost seven hundred men; the Macedonians eight thousand killed, and not less than five thousand taken prisoners.

The Romans soon abandon pursuit and devote themselves to the plunder.

The losses on both sides.

Such was the result of the battle at Cynoscephalae in Thessaly between the Romans and Philip.

28. In my sixth book I made a promise, still unfulfilled, of taking a fitting opportunity of drawing a comparison between the arms of the Romans and Macedonians, and their respective system of tactics, and pointing out how they differ for better or worse from each other. I will now endeavour by a reference to actual facts to fulfil that promise. For since in former times the Macedonian tactics proved themselves by experience capable of conquering those of Asia and Greece; while the Roman tactics sufficed to conquer the nations of Africa and all those of Western Europe; and since in our own day there have been numerous opportunities of comparing the men as well as their tactics,—it will be, I think, a useful and worthy task to investigate their differences, and discover why it is that the Romans conquer and carry off the palm from their enemies in the operations of war: that we may not put it all down to Fortune, and congratulate them on their good luck, as the thoughtless of mankind do; but, from a knowledge of the true causes, may give their leaders the tribute of praise and admiration which they deserve.

Now as to the battles which the Romans fought with Hannibal, and the defeats which they sustained in them, I need say no more. It was not owing to their arms or their tactics, but to the skill and genius of Hannibal that they met with those defeats: and that I made quite clear in my account of the battles themselves. And my contention is supported by two facts. First, by the conclusion of the war: for as soon as the Romans got a general of ability comparable with that of Hannibal, victory was not long in following their banners. Secondly, Hannibal himself, being dissatisfied with the original arms of his men, and having immediately after his first victory furnished his troops with the arms of the Romans, continued to employ them thenceforth to the end.[1] Pyrrhus, again, availed himself not only of the arms, but also of the troops of Italy, placing a maniple of Italians and a company of his own phalanx alternately, in his battles against the Romans. Yet even this did not enable him to win; the battles were somehow or another always indecisive.

The Roman defeats in the Punic wars were not from inferior tactics, but owing to the genius of Hannibal.

[1] See 3, 87.

It was necessary to speak first on these points, to anticipate any instances which might seem to make against my theory. I will now return to my comparison.

29. Many considerations may easily convince us that, if only the phalanx has its proper formation and strength, nothing can resist it face to face or withstand its charge. For as a man in close order of battle occupies a space of three feet; and as the length of the sarissae is sixteen cubits according to the original design, which has been reduced in practice to fourteen; and as of these fourteen four must be deducted, to allow for the distance between the two hands holding it, and to balance the weight in front; it follows clearly that each hoplite will have ten cubits of his sarissa projecting beyond his body, when he lowers it with both hands, as he advances against the enemy: hence, too, though the men of the second, third, and fourth rank will have their sarissae projecting farther beyond the front rank than the men of the fifth, yet even these last will have two cubits of their sarissae beyond the front rank; if only the phalanx is properly formed and the men close up properly both flank and rear, like the description in Homer[1]—

> "So buckler pressed on buckler; helm on helm;
> And man on man: and waving horse-hair plumes
> In polished head-piece mingled, as they swayed
> In order: in such serried rank they stood."

And if my description is true and exact, it is clear that in front of each man of the front rank there will be five sarissae projecting to distances varying by a descending scale of two cubits.

30. With this point in our minds, it will not be difficult to imagine what the appearance and strength of the whole phalanx is likely to be, when, with lowered sarissae, it advances to the charge sixteen deep. Of these sixteen ranks, all above the fifth are unable to reach with their sarissae far enough to take actual part in the fighting. They, therefore, do not lower them, but hold them with the points inclined upwards over the shoulders of the ranks in front of them, to shield the heads of the whole phalanx; for the sarissae are so closely serried, that they repel missiles which have carried over the front ranks and might fall upon the heads of those in the rear. These rear ranks, how-

[1] *Iliad*, 13, 131.

ever, during an advance, press forward those in front by the weight of their bodies; and thus make the charge very forcible, and at the same time render it impossible for the front ranks to face about.

Such is the arrangement, general and detailed, of the phalanx. It remains now to compare with it the peculiarities and distinctive features of the Roman arms and tactics. Now, a Roman soldier in full armour also requires a space of three square feet. But as their method of fighting admits of individual motion for each man—because he defends his body with a shield, which he moves about to any point from which a blow is coming, and because he uses his sword both for cutting and stabbing,—it is evident that each man must have a clear space, and an interval of at least three feet both on flank and rear, if he is to do his duty with any effect. The result of this will be that each Roman soldier will face two of the front rank of a phalanx, so that he has to encounter and fight against ten spears, which one man cannot find time even to cut away, when once the two lines are engaged, nor force his way through easily—seeing that the Roman front ranks are not supported by the rear ranks, either by way of adding weight to their charge, or vigour to the use of their swords. Therefore it may readily be understood that, as I said before, it is impossible to confront a charge of the phalanx, so long as it retains its proper formation and strength.

The Roman more open order compared with the phalanx.

31. Why is it then that the Romans conquer? And what is it that brings disaster on those who employ the phalanx? Why, just because war is full of uncertainties both as to time and place; whereas there is but one time and one kind of ground in which a phalanx can fully work. If, then, there were anything to compel the enemy to accommodate himself to the time and place of the phalanx, when about to fight a general engagement, it would be but natural to expect that those who employed the phalanx would always carry off the victory. But if the enemy finds it possible, and even easy, to avoid its attack, what becomes of its formidable character? Again, no one denies that for its employment it is indispensable to have a country

Why the phalanx fails.

flat, bare, and without such impediments as ditches, cavities, depressions, steep banks, or beds of rivers: for all such obstacles are sufficient to hinder and dislocate this particular formation. And that it is, I may say, impossible, or at any rate exceedingly rare to find a piece of country of twenty stades, or sometimes of even greater extent, without any such obstacles, every one will also admit. However, let us suppose that such a district has been found. If the enemy decline to come down into it, but traverse the country sacking the towns and territories of the allies, what use will the phalanx be? For if it remains on the ground suited to itself, it will not only fail to benefit its friends, but will be incapable even of preserving itself; for the carriage of provisions will be easily stopped by the enemy, seeing that they are in undisputed possession of the country: while if it quits its proper ground, from the wish to strike a blow, it will be an easy prey to the enemy. Nay, if a general does descend into the plain, and yet does not risk his whole army upon one charge of the phalanx or upon one chance, but manœuvres for a time to avoid coming to close quarters in the engagement, it is easy to learn what will be the result from what the Romans are now actually doing.

32. For no speculation is any longer required to test the accuracy of what I am now saying: that can be done by referring to accomplished facts.

The Romans do not, then, attempt to extend their front to equal that of a phalanx, and then charge directly upon it with their whole force: but some of their divisions are kept in reserve, while others join battle with the enemy at close quarters. Now, whether the phalanx in its charge drives its opponents from their ground, or is itself driven back, in either case its peculiar order is dislocated; for whether in following the retiring, or flying from the advancing enemy, they quit the rest of their forces: and when this takes place, the enemy's reserves can occupy the space thus left, and the ground which the phalanx had just before been holding, and so no longer charge them face to face, but fall upon them on their flank and rear. If, then, it is easy to take precautions against the opportunities and peculiar advantages of the phalanx, but impossible to do so in the case of its disadvantages, must it not

follow that in practice the difference between these two systems is enormous? Of course those generals who employ the phalanx must march over ground of every description, must pitch camps, occupy points of advantage, besiege, and be besieged, and meet with unexpected appearances of the enemy: for all these are part and parcel of war, and have an important and sometimes decisive influence on the ultimate victory. And in all these cases the Macedonian phalanx is difficult, and sometimes impossible to handle, because the men cannot act either in squads or separately. The Roman order on the other hand is flexible: for every Roman, once armed and on the field, is equally well equipped for every place, time, or appearance of the enemy. He is, moreover, quite ready and needs to make no change, whether he is required to fight in the main body, or in a detachment, or in a single maniple, or even by himself. Therefore, as the individual members of the Roman force are so much more serviceable, their plans are also much more often attended by success than those of others.

Flexibility of the Roman order.

I thought it necessary to discuss this subject at some length, because at the actual time of the occurrence many Greeks supposed when the Macedonians were beaten that it was incredible; and many will afterwards be at a loss to account for the inferiority of the phalanx to the Roman system of arming.

33. Philip having thus done all he could in the battle, but having been decisively beaten, after taking up as many of the survivors as he could, proceeded through Tempe into Macedonia. On the night previous to his start he sent one of his guard to Larisa, with orders to destroy and burn the king's correspondence. And it was an act worthy of a king to retain, even in the midst of disaster, a recollection of a necessary duty. For he knew well enough that, if these papers came into the possession of the Romans, they would give many handles to the enemy both against himself and his friends. It has, perhaps, been the case with others that in prosperity they could not use power with the moderation which becomes mortal men, while in disaster they displayed caution and good sense; but certainly

Prudent conduct of Philip.

this was the case with Philip. And this will be made manifest by what I shall subsequently relate. For as I showed without reserve the justice of his measures at the beginning of his reign, and the change for the worse which they subsequently underwent; and showed when and why and how this took place, with a detailed description of the actions in this part of his career;[1] in the same way am I bound to set forth his repentance, and the dexterity with which he changed with his change of fortune, and may be said to have shown the highest prudence in meeting this crisis in his affairs.

As for Flamininus, having after the battle taken the necessary measures as to the captives and the rest of the spoils, he proceeded to Larisa. . . .

34. Flamininus was much annoyed at the selfishness displayed by the Aetolians in regard to the spoils; and had no idea of leaving them to be masters of Greece after he had deprived Philip of his supremacy there. He was irritated also by their braggadocio, when he saw that they claimed all the credit of the victory, and were filling Greece with the report of their valour. Wherefore, wherever he met them he behaved with hauteur, and never said a word on public business, but carried out all his measures independently or by the agency of his own friends. While the relations between these two were in this strained state, some few days after the battle Demosthenes, Cycliadas, and Limnaeus came on a mission from Philip; and, after considerable discussion with them, Flamininus granted an immediate armistice of fifteen days, and agreed to have a personal interview also with Philip in the course of them to discuss the state of affairs. And this interview being conducted in a courteous and friendly manner, the suspicions entertained of Flamininus by the Aetolians blazed forth with double fury. For as corruption, and the habit of never doing anything without a bribe, had long been a common feature in Greek politics, and as this was the acknowledged characteristic of the Aetolians, they could not believe that Flamininus could so change in his relations with Philip without a bribe. They did not know the habits and principles

Estrangement of Aetolians.

Flamininus grants fifteen days' truce to Philip.

[1] See 4, 77; 7, 12; 10, 26.

of the Romans on this subject; but judging from themselves they concluded that there was every probability of Philip in his present position offering a large sum of money, and of Flamininus being unable to resist the temptation.

The disinterestedness of the Romans generally as to money.

35. If I had been speaking of an earlier period, and expressing what was generally true, I should have had no hesitation in asserting of the Romans as a nation that they would not be likely to do such a thing,—I mean in the period before they engaged in wars beyond the sea, and while they retained their own habits and principles uncontaminated.[1] But in the present times I should not venture to say this of them all; still, as individuals, I should be bold to say of the majority of the men of Rome that they are capable of preserving their honesty in this particular: and as evidence that I am making no impossible assertion, I would quote two names which will command general assent,—I mean first, Lucius Aemilius who conquered Perseus, and won the kingdom of Macedonia. In that kingdom, besides all the other splendour and wealth, there was found in the treasury more than six thousand talents of gold and silver: yet he was so far from coveting any of this, that he even refused to see it, and administered it by the hands of others; though he was far from being superfluously wealthy himself, but, on the contrary, was very badly off. At least, I know that on his death, which occurred shortly after the war, when his own sons Publius Scipio and Quintus Maximus wished to pay his wife her dowry, amounting to twenty-five talents, they were reduced to such straits that they would have been quite unable to do so if they had not sold the household furniture and slaves, and some of the landed property besides. And if what I say shall appear incredible to any one, he may easily convince himself on the subject: for though there are many controversies at Rome, and especially on this particular point, arising from the antagonistic parties among them, yet he will find that what I have just said about Aemilius is acknowledged by every one. Again, Publius Scipio, son by blood of this Aemilius, and son by adoption

Lucius Aemilius Paulus.

Publius Cornelius, Scipio Africanus Minor.

[1] See 6, 56; 32, 11.

of Publius called the Great, when he got possession of Carthage, reckoned the wealthiest city in the world, took absolutely nothing from it for his own private use, either by purchase or by any other manner of acquisition whatever, although he was by no means a very rich man, but very moderately so for a Roman. But he not only abstained from the wealth of Carthage itself, but refused to allow anything from Africa at all to be mixed up with his private property. Therefore, in regard to this man once more, any one who chooses to inquire will find that his reputation in this particular is absolutely undisputed at Rome. I shall, however, take a more suitable opportunity of treating this subject at greater length.

36. Titus then having appointed Philip a day for the congress, immediately wrote to the allies announcing when they were to appear; and a few days afterwards came himself to the pass of Tempe at the appointed time. When the allies had assembled, and the congress met, the Roman imperator rose and bade each say on what terms they ought to make peace with Philip. King Amynandros then delivered a short and moderate speech, merely asking that "they would all have some consideration for him, to prevent Philip, as soon as the Romans left Greece, from turning the whole weight of his anger upon him; for the Athamanes were always an easy prey to the Macedonians, because of their weakness and the close contiguity of their territory." When he had finished, Alexander the Aetolian rose and complimented Flamininus for "having assembled the allies in that congress to discuss the terms of peace; and, above all, for having on the present occasion called on each to express his opinion. But he was deluded and mistaken," he added, "if he believed that by making terms with Philip he would secure the Romans peace or the Greeks freedom. For neither of these was possible. But if he desired to accomplish both the design of his own government and his own promises, which he had given to all the Greeks, there was one way, and one only, of making terms with Macedonia, and that was to eject Philip from his throne; and this could easily be done if he did not let slip the present opportunity."

The congress of Tempe, B.C. 197.

Speech of King Amynandros.

Alexander the Aetolian.

After some further arguments in support of this view he sat down.

Reply of Flamininus.

37. Flamininus here took up the argument, and said that "Alexander was mistaken not only as to the policy of Rome, but also as to the object which he proposed to himself, and above all as to the true interests of Greece. For it was not the Roman way to utterly destroy those with whom they had been at open war. A proof of his assertion might be found in the war with Hannibal and the Carthaginians; for though the Romans had received the severest provocation at their hands, and afterwards had it in their power to do absolutely what they pleased to them, yet they had adopted no extreme measures against the Carthaginians. For his part, moreover, he had never entertained the idea that it was necessary to wage an inexpiable war with Philip; but on the contrary had been prepared before the battle to come to terms with him, if he would have submitted to the Roman demands. He was surprised, therefore, that those who had taken part in the former peace conference should now adopt a tone of such irreconcilable hostility. Have we not conquered? (say they). Yes, but this is the most senseless of arguments. For brave men, when actually at war, should be terrible and full of fire; when beaten, undaunted and courageous; when victorious, on the other hand, moderate, placable, and humane. But your present advice is the reverse of all this. Yet, in truth, to the Greeks themselves it is greatly to their interest that Macedonia should be humbled, but not at all so that she should be destroyed. For it might chance thereby that they would experience the barbarity of Thracians and Gauls, as has been the case more than once already." He then added that "the final decision of himself and Roman colleagues was, that, if Philip would consent to fulfil all the conditions formerly enjoined by the allies, they would grant him peace, subject, of course, to the approval of the Senate: and that the Aetolians were free to take what measures they chose for themselves." Upon Phaeneas attempting to reply that "Everything done hitherto went for nothing; for if Philip managed to extricate himself from his present difficulties, he would at once find some other occasion for hostilities,"—Flamininus sprang

at once from his seat, and said, with some heat, "Cease this trifling, Phaeneas! For I will so settle the terms of the peace that Philip will be unable, even if he wished it, to molest the Greeks."

38. After this they separated for that day. On the next the king arrived: and on the third, when all the delegates were met for discussion, Philip entered, and with great skill and tact diverted the anger which they all entertained against him. For he said that "He conceded the demands made on the former occasion by the Romans and the allies, and remitted the decision on the remaining points to the Senate." But Phaeneas, one of the Aetolians present, said: "Why then, Philip, do not you restore to us Larisa Cremaste, Pharsalus, Phthiotid Thebes, and Echinus?" Whereupon Philip bade them take them over. But Flamininus here interposed, and forbade the Aetolians to take over any of the towns except Phthiotid Thebes; "for upon his approaching this town with his army, and summoning it to submit to the Roman protection, the Thebans had refused; and, as it had now come into his hands in the course of war, he had the right of taking any measures he chose regarding it." Phaeneas and his colleagues indignantly protested at this, and asserted that it was their clear right to recover the towns previously members of their league, "first on the ground that they had taken part in the recent war; and secondly in virtue of their original treaty of alliance, according to which the movable property of the conquered belonged to the Romans, the towns to the Aetolians." To which Flamininus answered that "they were mistaken in both points; for their treaty with Rome had been annulled when they abandoned the Romans, and made terms with Philip: and, even supposing that treaty to be still in force, they had no right to recover or take over such cities as had voluntarily put themselves under the protection of Rome, as the whole of the cities in Thessaly had done, but only such as were taken by force.[1]

On the third day of the conference Philip appears.

The Aetolians checkmated by Flamininus.

[1] Livy (33, 13) has mistaken the meaning of Polybius in this passage, representing the quarrel of the Aetolians and Flamininus as being for the possession of Thebes,—the only town, in fact, on which there was no dispute.

39. The other members of the congress were delighted at this speech of Flamininus. But the Aetolians listened with indignation; and what proved to be the beginning of serious evils was engendered. For this quarrel was the spark from which, not long afterwards, both the war with the Aetolians and that with Antiochus flamed out. The principal motive of Flamininus in being thus forward in coming to terms was the information he had received that Antiochus had started from Syria with an army, with the intention of crossing over into Europe. Therefore he was anxious lest Philip, catching at this chance, should determine to defend the towns and protract the war; and lest meanwhile he should himself be superseded by another commander from home, on whom the honour of all that he had achieved would be diverted. Therefore the terms which the king asked were granted: namely, that he should have four months' suspension of hostilities, paying Flamininus at once the two hundred talents; delivering his son Demetrius and some others of his friends as hostages; and sending to Rome to submit the decision on the whole pacification to the Senate. Flamininus and Philip then separated, after interchanging mutual pledges of fidelity, on the understanding that, if the treaty were not confirmed, Flamininus was to restore to Philip the two hundred talents and the hostages. All the parties then sent ambassadors to Rome, some to support and others to oppose the settlement. . . .

The terms of the peace settled. Winter of B.C. 197.

40. Why is it that, though deceived again and again by the same things and persons, we are unable to abandon our blind folly? For this particular kind of fraud has often been committed before now, and by many. That other men should allow themselves to be taken in is perhaps not astonishing; but it is wonderful that those should do so who are the authors and origin of the same kind of malpractice. But I suppose the cause is the absence of that rule so happily expressed by Epicharmus:

Foolish credulity, see ch. 13; and 31, 21.

"Cool head and wise mistrust are wisdom's sinews." . . .

ASIA

41. [They endeavoured] to prevent Antiochus from sailing along their coast, not from enmity to him, but from a suspicion that by giving support to Philip he would become an obstacle in the way of Greek liberty. . . .

King Antiochus was very desirous of possessing Ephesus, owing to its extremely convenient position; for it appeared to occupy the position of an Acropolis for expeditions by land and sea against Ionia and the cities of the Hellespont, and to be always a most convenient base of operations for the kings of Asia against Europe. . . .

Of King Attalus, who now died, I think I ought to speak a suitable word, as I have done in the case of others. Originally he had no other external qualification for royalty except money alone, which, indeed, if handled with good sense and boldness, is of very great assistance in every undertaking, but without these qualities is in its nature the origin of evil, and, in fact, of utter ruin to very many. For in the first place it engenders envy and malicious plots, and contributes largely to the destruction of body and soul. For few indeed are the souls that are able by the aid of wealth to repel dangers of this description. This king's greatness of mind therefore deserves our admiration, because he never attempted to use his wealth for anything else but the acquisition of royal power,—an object than which none greater can be mentioned. Moreover he made the first step in this design, not only by doing services to his friends and gaining their affection, but also by achievements in war. For it was after conquering the Gauls, the most formidable and warlike nation at that time in Asia, that he assumed this rank and first puts himself forward as king. And though he obtained this honour, and lived seventy-two years, of which he reigned forty-four, he passed a life of the utmost virtue and goodness towards his wife and children; kept faith with all allies and friends; and died in the midst of a most glorious campaign, fighting for the liberty of the Greeks; and what is more

Death of King Attalus, who had fallen ill at Thebes, before the battle of Cynoscephalae, and had been brought home to die at Pergamum, autumn, B.C. 197. Livy, 33, 21.

remarkable than all, though he left four grown-up sons, he so well settled the question of succession, that the crown was handed down to his children's children without a single dispute. . . .

ITALY

42. After Marcus Marcellus had entered upon the consulship the ambassadors from Philip, and from Flamininus and the allies, arrived at Rome to discuss the treaty with Philip; and after a lengthened hearing the confirmation of the terms was decreed in the Senate. But on the matter being brought before the people, Marcus Claudius, who was ambitious of being himself sent to Greece, spoke against the treaty, and did his best to get it rejected. The people however ratified the terms, in accordance with the wish of Flamininus; and, upon this being settled, the Senate immediately despatched a commission of ten men of high rank to arrange the settlement of Greece in conjunction with Flamininus, and to confirm the freedom of the Greeks. Among others Damoxenus of Aegium and his colleagues, envoys from the Achaean league, made a proposal in the Senate for an alliance with Rome; but as some opposition was raised to this at the time, on account of a counter-claim of the Eleians upon Triphylia, and of the Messenians, who were at the time actually in alliance with Rome, upon Asine and Pylus, and of the Aetolians upon Heraea,—the decision was referred to the commission of ten. Such were the proceedings in the Senate. . . .

B.C. 196. Coss. L. Funius Purpureo, M. Claudius Marcellus. The treaty with Philip is confirmed.

GREECE

43. After the battle of Cynoscephalae, as Flamininus was wintering at Elateia, the Boeotians, being anxious to recover their citizens who had served in Philip's army, sent an embassy to Flamininus to try and secure their safety. Wishing to encourage the loyalty of the Boeotians to himself, because he was already anxious as to the action of Antiochus, he readily assented to their petition. These men were promptly restored from Macedonia, and one of them named Brachylles the Boeotians at once elected Boeotarch; and in a similar spirit honoured and pro-

Philip allows his Boeotian followers to return home.

moted, as much as before, such of the others as were thought to be well disposed to the royal house of Macedonia. They also sent an embassy to Philip to thank him for the return of the young men, thus derogating from the favour done them by Flamininus,—a measure highly disquieting to Zeuxippus and Peisistratus, and all who were regarded as partisans of Rome; because they foresaw what would happen to themselves and their families, knowing quite well that if the Romans quitted Greece, and Philip remained closely supporting the political party opposed to themselves, it would be unsafe for them to remain citizens of Boeotia. They therefore agreed among themselves to send an embassy to Flamininus in Elateia: and having obtained an interview with him, they made a lengthy and elaborate statement on this subject, describing the state of popular feeling which was now adverse to themselves, and discanting on the untrustworthiness of democratic assemblies. And finally, they ventured to say that "Unless they could overawe the common people by getting rid of Brachylles, there could be no security for the party in favour of Rome as soon as the legions departed." After listening to these arguments Flamininus replied that "He would not personally take any part in such a measure, but he would not hinder those who wished to do so." Finally, he bade them speak to Alexamenus the Strategus of the Aetolians. Zeuxippus and his colleagues accepted the suggestion, and communicated with Alexamenus, who at once consented; and agreeing to carry out their proposal sent three Aetolians and three Italians, all young men, to assassinate Brachylles. . . .

Zeuxippus and Peisistratus, heads of the Romanising party, determine to get rid of Brachylles, B.C. 196.

There is no more terrible witness, or more formidable accuser, than the conscience which resides in each man's breast. . . .

Zeuxippus condemned by his own conscience. See Livy, 33, 28.

44. About this same time the ten commissioners arrived from Rome who were to effect the settlement of Greece, bringing with them the decree of the Senate on the peace with Philip. The main points of the decree were these: "All other Greeks, whether in Asia or Europe, to be free and enjoy their own

The Senatus Consultum.

laws; but that Philip should hand over to the Romans those at present under his authority, and all towns in which he had a garrison, before the Isthmian games; and restore Eurōmus, Pedasa, Bargylia, Iasus, Abydos, Thasus, Marinus, and Perinthus to freedom, and remove his garrisons from them. That Flamininus should write to Prusias commanding him to liberate Cius, in accordance with the decree of the Senate. That Philip should restore to the Romans within the same period all captives and deserters; and likewise all decked ships, except three and his one sixteen-banked vessel; and should pay a thousand talents, half at once, and half by instalments spread over ten years."

Objections of the Aetolians.

45. Upon this decree being published in Greece, it created a feeling of confidence and gratification in all the communities except the Aetolians. These last were annoyed at not getting all they expected, and attempted to run down the decree by saying that it was mere words, without anything practical in it; and they based upon the clauses of the decree itself some such arguments as follow, by way of disquieting those who would listen to them. They said "That there were two distinct clauses in the decree relating to the cities garrisoned by Philip: one ordering him to remove those garrisons and to hand over the cities to the Romans; the other bidding him withdraw his garrisons and set the cities free. Those that were to be set free were definitely named, and they were towns in Asia; and it was plain, therefore, that those which were to be handed over to the Romans were those in Europe, namely, Oreus, Eretria, Chalcis, Demetrias, and Corinth. Hence it was plain that the Romans were receiving the 'fetters of Greece' from the hands of Philip, and that the Greeks were getting, not freedom, but a change of masters."

These arguments of the Aetolians were repeated *ad nauseam*. But, meanwhile, Flamininus left Elateia with the ten commissioners, and having crossed to Anticyra, sailed straight to Corinth, and there sat in council with the commissioners, and considered the whole settlement to be made.

The commissioners sit at

But as the adverse comments of the Aetolians obtained wide currency, and were accepted by

some, Flamininus was forced to enter upon many elaborate arguments in the meetings of the commission, trying to convince the commissioners that if they wished to acquire unalloyed praise from the Greeks, and to establish firmly in the minds of all that they had originally come into the country not to gain any advantage for Rome, but simply to secure the freedom of Greece, they must abandon every district and free all the cities now garrisoned by Philip. But this was just the point in dispute among the commissioners; for, as to all other cities, a decision had been definitely arrived at in Rome, and the ten commissioners had express instructions; but about Chalcis, Corinth, and Demetrias they had been allowed a discretion on account of Antiochus, in order that they might take such measures as they thought best from a view of actual events. For it was notorious that this king had for some time past been meditating an interference in Europe. However, as far as Corinth was concerned, Flamininus prevailed on the commissioners to free it at once and restore it to the Achaean league, from respect to the terms of the original agreement; but he retained the Acrocorinthus, Demetrias, and Chalcis.

Corinth, and declare all Greek cities free, except the Acrocorinthus, Demetrias, and Chalcis.

46. When these decisions had been come to, the time for the celebration of the Isthmian games arrived. The expectation of what would happen there drew the men of highest rank from nearly every quarter of the world; and there was a great deal of talk on the subject from one end of the assembled multitude to the other, and expressed in varied language. Some said that from certain of the places and towns it was impossible that the Romans could withdraw; while others asserted that they would withdraw from those considered most important, but would retain others that were less prominent, though capable of being quite as serviceable. And such persons even took upon themselves in their ingenuity to designate the precise places which would be thus treated. While people were still in this state of uncertainty, all the world being assembled on the stadium to watch the games, the herald came forward, and having proclaimed silence by the sound of a trumpet,

The Isthmian games, July B.C. 196.

delivered the following proclamation: "The senate of Rome and Titus Quintus, proconsul and imperator, having conquered King Philip and the Macedonians in war, declare the following peoples free, without garrison, or tribute, in full enjoyment of the laws of their respective countries: namely, Corinthians, Phocians, Locrians, Euboeans, Achaeans of Phiotis, Magnesians, Thessalians, Perrhaebians."

Proclamation of the freedom of the Greek cities.

Now as the first words of the proclamation were the signal for a tremendous outburst of clapping, some of the people could not hear it at all, and some wanted to hear it again; but the majority feeling incredulous, and thinking that they heard the words in a kind of dream, so utterly unexpected was it, another impulse induced every one to shout to the herald and trumpeter to come into the middle of the stadium and repeat the words: I suppose because the people wished not only to hear but to see the speaker, in their inability to credit the announcement. But when the herald, having advanced into the middle of the crowd, once more, by his trumpeter, hushed the clamour, and repeated exactly the same proclamation as before, there was such an outbreak of clapping as is difficult to convey to the imagination of my readers at this time. When at length the clapping ceased, no one paid any attention whatever to the athletes, but all were talking to themselves or each other, and seemed like people bereft of their senses. Nay, after the games were over, in the extravagance of their joy, they nearly killed Flamininus by the exhibition of their gratitude. Some wanted to look him in the face and call him their preserver; others were eager to touch his hand; most threw garlands and fillets upon him; until between them they nearly crushed him to death. But though this expression of popular gratitude was thought to have been extravagant, one might say with confidence that it fell short of the importance of the actual event. For that the Romans and their leader Flamininus should have deliberately incurred unlimited expense and danger, for the sole purpose of freeing Greece, deserved their admiration; and it was also a great thing that their power was equal to their intention. But the greatest thing of all is that Fortune foiled their attempt by none of her

An exciting scene.

usual caprices, but that every single thing came to a successful issue at the same time: so that all Greeks, Asiatic and European alike, were by a single proclamation become "free, without garrison or tribute, and enjoying their own laws."

47. The Isthmian festival having come to an end, the first persons with whom the commissioners dealt were the ambassadors from Antiochus. They instructed them that "Their master must abstain from attacking those cities in Asia which were autonomous, and go to war with none of them; and must evacuate those that had been subject to Ptolemy or Philip. In addition to this they forbade him to cross over into Europe with an army; for no Greek henceforth was to be attacked in war or to be enslaved to any one. Finally, they said that some of their own number would go to visit Antiochus." With this answer Hegesianax and Lysias returned to Antiochus. They next summoned the representatives of all the nations and cities, and declared to them the decisions of the commissioners. The Macedonian tribe of the Orestae, on the ground of their having joined Rome during the war, they declared autonomous; the Perrhaebians, Dolopes, and Magnesians they declared to be free. To the Thessalians, in addition to their freedom, they assigned the Phiotid Achaeans, with the exception, however, of Phthiotid Thebes and Pharsalus: for the Aetolians made such a point of their claim to Pharsalus, as also to Leucas, on the ground of the rights secured them by the original treaty, that the commissioners referred the consideration of their demand in regard to these places back again to the Senate, but allowed them to retain Phocis and Locris as members of their league, as they had been before. Corinth, Triphylia, and Heraea they handed over to the Achaeans. Oreus and Eretria the majority wished to give to King Eumenes, but on the instance of Flamininus this design was not confirmed; and, accordingly, a short time afterwards these towns, with Carystus, were declared free by the Senate. To Pleuratus they assigned Lychnis and Parthus in Illyria, towns which had been subject to Philip; and Amynandros they allowed to retain all such strongholds as he had taken from Philip during the war.

Answer of commissioners to King Antiochus.

Final arrangements.

48. This business completed, the commissioners separated in various directions: Publius Lentulus sailed to Bargylia and announced its freedom; Leucius Stertinius did the same to Hephaestia, Thasus, and the cities in Thrace; while Publius Ventilius and Lucius Terentius started to visit Antiochus; and Gnaeus Cornelius with his colleagues went to king Philip. They met him near Tempe, and after speaking with him on the other matters about which they had instructions, they advised him to send an embassy to Rome, to ask for an alliance, in order to obviate all suspicion of being on the watch for an opportunity in expectation of the arrival of Antiochus. The king agreeing to follow this advice, Cornelius left him and went to the league congress at Thermus; and coming into the public assembly urged the Aetolians in a lengthy speech to abide by the policy they had adopted, from the first, and maintain their good disposition towards the Romans. Many rose to answer: of whom some expressed dissatisfaction with the Romans in moderate and decorous language, for not having used their good fortune with sufficient regard to their joint interests, and for not observing the original compact; while others delivered violent invectives, asserting that the Romans would never have set foot on Greece or conquered Philip if it had not been for them. Cornelius disdained to answer these speeches in detail, but he advised them to send ambassadors to Rome, for they would get full justice in the Senate: which they accordingly did. Such was the conclusion of the war with Philip. . . .

The commissioners separate and go to various parts of Greece.

Two go to Antiochus and others to Philip.

Gnaeus Cornelius at the congress of the Aetolian league.

ASIA

49. Whenever they are reduced to the last extremity, as the phrase goes, they will fly to the Romans for protection and commit themselves and their city to them.[1] . . .

[1] Referring apparently to the conduct of the Hellenic cities in Asia in presence of Antiochus, who, having wintered in Ephesus (B.C. 197-196), was endeavouring in 196 by force or stratagem to consolidate his power in Asia Minor. Livy, 33, 38.

50. Just when the designs of Antiochus in Thrace were succeeding to his heart's desire, Lucius Cornelius and his party sailed into Selybria. These were the envoys sent by the Senate to conclude a peace between Antiochus and Ptolemy. And at the same time there arrived Publius Lentulus from Bargylia, Lucius Terentius and Publius Villius from Thasus, three of the ten commissioners for Greece. Their arrival having been promptly announced to Antiochus, they all assembled within the next few days at Lysimacheia; and it so happened that Hegesianax and Lysias, who had been on the mission to Flamininus, arrived about the same time. The private intercourse between the king and the Romans was informal and friendly; but when presently they met in conference to discuss public affairs, things took quite another aspect. Lucius Cornelius demanded that Antiochus should evacuate all the cities subject to Ptolemy which he had taken in Asia; while he warned him in solemn and emphatic language that he must do so also to the cities subject to Philip, "for it was ridiculous that Antiochus should come in and take the prizes of the war which Rome had waged with Philip." He also admonished him to abstain from attacking autonomous cities, and added that "He was at a loss to conjecture with what view Antiochus had crossed over to Europe with such a powerful army and fleet; for if it were not with the intention of attacking the Romans, there was no explanation left that any reasonable person could accept." With these words the Romans ceased speaking.

Antiochus in the Chersonesus and Thrace, B.C. 196.

Speech of Lucius Cornelius.

51. The king began his reply by saying that "He did not understand by what right the Romans raised a controversy with him in regard to the cities in Asia. They were the last people in the world who had any claim to do so." Next he claimed that "They should refrain entirely from interfering in the affairs of Asia, seeing that he never in the least degree interposed in those of Italy. He had crossed into Europe with his army to recover his possessions in the Chersonese and the cities in Thrace; his right to the government of these places being superior to that of any one in the world. For this was originally the

The reply of Antiochus.

principality of Lysimachus; and as Seleucus waged war with and conquered that prince, the whole domain of Lysimachus passed to Seleucus:[1] then owing to the multifarious interests which distracted the attention of his predecessors, first Ptolemy and then Philip had managed to wrest this country from them and secure it for themselves. He had not then availed himself of Philip's difficulties to take it, but had *recovered* possession of it in the exercise of his undoubted rights. It was no injury to the Romans that he should now be restoring to their homes, and settling again in their city, the people of Lysimacheia who had been expelled by an unexpected raid of the Thracians. He was doing this, not from any intention of attacking the Romans, but to prepare a place of residence for his son Seleucus. As for the autonomous cities of Asia, they must acquire their freedom by his free grace, not by an injunction from Rome.. As for Ptolemy, he was about to settle matters amicably with him: for it was his intention to confirm their friendship by a matrimonial alliance."

Lysimachus conquered by Seleucus Nicanor, B.C. 281.

52. But upon Lucius expressing an opinion that they ought to call in the representatives of Lampsacus and Smyrna and give them a hearing, this was done. The envoys from Lampsacus were Parmenio and Pythodorus, and from Smyrna Coeranus. These men expressing themselves with much openness, Philip was irritated at the idea of defending himself against accusers before a tribunal of Romans, and interrupting Parmenio, said: "A truce to your long speeches: I do not choose to have my controversies with you decided before a Roman but before a Rhodian court." Thereupon they broke up the conference very far from pleased with each other. . . .

Antiochus refuses to acknowledge the Romans as arbitrators.

EGYPT

53. Many people have a yearning for bold and glorious undertakings, but few dare actually attempt them. Yet Scopas had much fairer opportunities for a

Death of Scopas. See *supra*,

[1] Justin. 17, 1-2; Appian *Syr.* 62. The battle was in the plain of Corus in Phrygia.

hazardous and bold career than Cleomenes. For the latter, though circumvented by his enemies, and reduced to depend upon such forces as his servants and friends could supply, yet left no chance untried, and tested every one to the best of his ability, valuing an honourable death more highly than a life of disgrace. But Scopas, with all the advantages of a formidable body of soldiers and of the excellent opportunity afforded by the youth of the king, by his own delays and halting counsels allowed himself to be circumvented. For having ascertained that he was holding a meeting of his partisans at his own house, and was consulting with them, Aristomenes sent some of the royal bodyguards and summoned him to the king's council. Whereupon Scopas was so infatuated that he was neither bold enough to carry out his designs, nor able to make up his mind to obey the king's summons,—which is in itself the most extreme step,—until Aristomenes, understanding the blunder he had made, caused soldiers and elephants to surround his house, and sent Ptolemy son of Eumenes in with some young men, with orders to bring him quietly if he would come, but, if not, by force. When Ptolemy entered the house and informed Scopas that the king summoned him, he refused at first to obey, but remained looking fixedly at Ptolemy, and for a long while preserved a threatening attitude as though he wondered at his audacity; and when Ptolemy came boldly up to him and took hold of his chlamys, he called on the bystanders to help him. But seeing that the number of young men who had accompanied Ptolemy into the house was large, and being informed by some one of the military array surrounding it outside, he yielded to circumstances, and went, accompanied by his friends, in obedience to the summons. 13, 2; 16, 18, B.C. 196.

54. On his entering the council chamber the king was the first to state the accusation against him, which he did briefly. He was followed by Polycrates lately arrived from Cyprus; and he again by Aristomenes. The charges made by them all were much to the same effect as what I have just stated; but there was now added to them the seditious meeting with his friends, and his refusal to obey the summons of the king. On these charges Scopas before the council.

he was unanimously condemned, not only by the members of the council, but also by the envoys of foreign nations who were present. And when Aristomenes was about to commence his accusation he brought in a large number of other Greeks of rank also to support him, as well as the Aetolian ambassadors who had come to negotiate a peace, among whom was Dorimachus son of Nicostratus. When these speeches had been delivered, Scopas endeavoured to put forward certain pleas in his defence: but gaining no attention from any one, owing to the senseless nature of his proceedings, he was taken along with his friends to prison. There after nightfall Aristomenes caused Scopas and his family to be put to death by poison; but did not allow Dicaearchus to die until he had had him racked and scourged, thus inflicting on him a punishment which he thoroughly deserved in the name of all Greece. For this was the Dicaearchus whom Philip, when he resolved upon his treacherous attack on the Cyclades and the cities of the Hellespont, appointed leader of the whole fleet and the entire enterprise: who being thus sent out to perform an act of flagrant wickedness, not only thought that he was doing nothing wrong, but in the extravagance of his infatuation imagined that he would strike terror into the gods as well as man. For wherever he anchored he used to build two altars, to Impiety and Lawlessness, and, offering sacrifice upon these altars, worshipped them as his gods. Therefore in my opinion he met with a just retribution both from gods and men: for as his life had been spent in defiance to the laws of nature, his end was properly also one of unnatural horror. All the other Aetolians who wished to depart were allowed by the king to go in possession of their property.

Death of Dicaearchus.

55. As in the lifetime of Scopas his love of money had been notorious, for his avarice did in fact surpass that of any man in the world, so after his death was it made still more conspicuous by the enormous amount of gold and other property found in his house; for by the assistance of the coarse manners and drunken habits of Charimortus he had absolutely pillaged the kingdom.

Enormous wealth collected by Scopas.

Having thus settled the Aetolian business to their liking, the courtiers turned their attention to the ceremony of instituting the king into the management of his office, called the *Anacleteria*. His age was not indeed yet so far advanced as to make this necessary; but they thought that the kingdom would gain a certain degree of firmness and a fresh impulse towards prosperity, if it were known that the king had assumed the independent direction of the government. They then made the preparations for the ceremony with great splendour, and carried it out in a manner worthy of the greatness of the kingdom, Polycrates being considered to have contributed very largely to the accomplishment of their efforts. For this man had enjoyed even during his youth, in the reign of the late king, a reputation second to no one in the court for fidelity and practical ability; and this reputation he had maintained during the present reign also. For having been entrusted with the management of Cyprus and its revenues, when its affairs were in a critical and complicate state, he not only preserved the island for the young king, but collected a very considerable sum of money, with which he had just arrived and had paid to the king, after handing over the government of Cyprus to Ptolemy of Megalopolis. But though he obtained great applause by this, and a large fortune immediately afterwards, yet, as he grew older, he drifted into extravagant debauchery and scandalous indulgence. Nor was the reputation of Ptolemy, son of Agesarchus very different in the later part of his life. But in regard to these men, when we come to the proper time, I shall not shrink from stating the circumstances which disgraced their official life. . . .

The anacleteria of Ptolemy Epiphanes, B.C. 176. Aet. 14.

BOOK XIX

THE only fragment we possess of the nineteenth book of Polybius is a statement quoted by Plutarch as to M. Porcius Cato, to the effect that by his orders the walls of all the numerous Spanish cities north of the Baetis were dismantled on the same day. Cato was in Spain B.C. 195. The means taken by him to secure this simultaneous destruction of fortifications are told by Frontinus, *Strateg*, I, I, I.

We thus lose the history of the years B.C. 195, 194, 193; as well as the greater part of that of B.C. 192, 191, contained in the early part of book 20, of which only a few fragments remain. Livy, however, has evidently translated from Polybius in his history of these years, and a brief abstract of events in Greece may help the reader in following the fragmentary book which follows with more interest.

B.C. 195.

Lucius Valerius Flaccus,
M. Porcius Cato, } Coss.

Flamininus's imperium is extended for this year, because of the danger from Antiochus and Nabis. The Aetolians, still discontented, push their demand for Pharsalus and Leucas, and are referred by the Senate back to Flamininus. The latter summons a conference of Greek states at Corinth, and a war is decreed against Nabis, the Aetolians still expressing their dislike of Roman interference. The levies are collected; Argos is freed from Nabis; Sparta all but taken; and Nabis forced to submit to most humiliating terms: the Aetolians again objecting to his being allowed to remain at Sparta on any terms at all. In this year also legates from Antiochus visit Flamininus, but are referred to the Senate.

B.C. 194.

Publius Cornelius Scipio II.,
Tiberius Sempronius Longus, } Coss.

Flamininus leaves Greece after a speech at Corinth to the assembled league advising internal peace and loyalty to Rome, and enters Rome in triumph. There is a time of comparative tranquillity in Greece.

B.C. 193.

L. Cornelius Merula,
Q. Minucius Thermus, } Coss.

The legates from Antiochus are sent back with the final answer that, unless the king abstains from entering Europe in arms, the Romans will

free the Asiatic Greek cities from him. Roman legates, P. Sulpicius, P. Villius, P. Aelius, are sent to him. Hannibal arrives at the court of Antiochus, and urges him to resist; and the Aetolians urge the same course, trying also to stir up Nabis and Philip of Macedon. Antiochus accordingly will give the Roman envoys no satisfactory answer.

B.C. 192.

L. Quintius Flamininus,
Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, } Coss.

The Romans therefore prepare for war. A fleet under the praetor Atilius is sent against Nabis: commissioners are sent into Greece—T. Quintius Flamininius, C. Octavius, Cn. Servilius, P. Villius—early in the year: M. Baebius is ordered to hold his army in readiness at Brundisium. Then news is brought to Rome by Attalus of Pergamum (brother of king Eumenes) that Antiochus has crossed the Hellespont, and the Aetolians on the point of joining him. Therefore Baebius is ordered to transport his army to Apollonia.

Meanwhile Nabis takes advantage of the alarm caused by Antiochus to move. He besieges Gythium, and ravages the Achaean territory. The league, under Philopoemen, proclaim war against him, and, after losing an unimportant naval battle, decisively defeat him on land and shut him up in Sparta.

The Aetolians now formally vote to call in Antiochus, "to liberate Greece and arbitrate between them and Rome." They occupy Demetrias; and kill Nabis by a stratagem. Whereupon Philopoemen annexes Sparta to the Achaean league. Later in the year Antiochus meets the assembly of the Aetolians at Lamia in Thessaly, is proclaimed "Strategus"; and after a vain attempt to conciliate the Achaeans seizes Chalcis, where he winters, and marries a young wife.

B.C. 191.

P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica,
M. Acilius Glabrio, } Coss.

The Romans declare war with Antiochus. Manius Acilius is selected to go to Greece, where he takes over the army of Baebius, and after taking many towns in Thessaly meets and defeats Antiochus at Thermopylae; where the Aetolian league did after all little service to the king, who retires to Ephesus.

See Livy, 34, 43 —— 36, 21. See also Plutarch, *Philopoemen*, and *Flamininus*; Appian, *Syriacae*, 6—21.

BOOK XX

GREECE

1. THE Aetolians chose thirty of the Apocleti[1] to confer with King Antiochus. . . .

Antiochus the Great at a meeting of Aetolians at Lamia, autumn of B.C. 192. Livy, 35, 43-46.

He accordingly summoned a meeting of the Apocleti and consulted them on the state of affairs. . . .

2. When Antiochus sent an embassy to the Boeotians, they answered that they would not consider his proposals until the king came in person. . . .

3. As Antiochus was staying at Chalcis, just as the winter was beginning, two ambassadors came to visit him, Charops from Epirus, and Callistratus from Elis. The prayer of the Epirotes was that "The king would not involve them in the war with Rome, for they dwelt on the side of Greece immediately opposite Italy; but that, if he could, he would secure their safety by defending the frontier of Epirus: in that case he should be admitted into all their towns and harbours: but if he decided not to do so at present, they asked his indulgence if they shrank from a war with Rome." The Eleans, in their turn, begged him "To send a reinforcement to their town; for as the Achaeans had voted war against them, they were in terror of an attack from the troops of the league." The king answered the Epirotes by saying that he would send envoys to confer with them on their mutual

Antiochus passes the winter of B.C. 192-191 at Chalcis. Visit of envoys from Epirus and Elis.

[1] The Apocleti, of the numbers of whom we have no information, acted as a consultative senate to prepare measures for the Aetolian Assembly. See Freeman, *History of Federal Government*, p. 335. Livy, 35, 34.

interests; but to Elis he despatched a thousand foot soldiers under the command of Euphanes of Crete. . . .

4. The Boeotians had long been in a very depressed state, which offered a strong contrast to the former prosperity and reputation of their country. They had acquired great glory as well as great material prosperity at the time of the battle of Leuctra; but by some means or another from that time forward they steadily diminished both the one and the other under the leadership of Amaeocritus; and subsequently not only diminished them, but underwent a complete change of character, and did all that was possible to wipe out their previous reputation. For having been incited by the Achaeans to go to war with the Aetolians, they adopted the policy of the former and made an alliance with them, and thenceforth maintained a steady war with the Aetolians. But on the Aetolians invading Boeotia, they marched out with their full available force, and without waiting for the arrival of the Achaeans, who had mustered their men and were on the point of marching to their assistance, they attacked the Aetolians; and being worsted in the battle were so completely demoralised, that, from the time of that campaign, they never plucked up spirit to claim any position of honour whatever, and never shared in any enterprise or contest undertaken by the common consent of the Greeks. They devoted themselves entirely to eating and drinking, and thus became effeminate in their souls as well as in their bodies.

The decline of Boeotia, from B.C. 371-361.

B.C. 245. See Plutarch, *Arat.* 16.

5. Such were, briefly, the steps in the degeneracy of Boeotia. Immediately after the battle just mentioned they abandoned the Achaeans and joined the Aetolians.[1] But on the latter presently going to war with Philip's father Demetrius, they once more abandoned the Aetolians; and upon Demetrius entering Boeotia with an army, without attempting resistance they submitted completely to the Macedonians. But as a spark of

Demetrius II. B.C. 239-229.

[1] *προσένειμαν Αἰτώλοις τὸ ἔθνος*, cp. 2, 43. Some have thought that a regular political union with the Aetolian League is meant. But the spirit of the narrative seems to point rather to an alliance.

their ancestral glory still survived, there were found some who disliked the existing settlement and the complete subservience to Macedonia: and they accordingly maintained a violent opposition to the policy of Ascondas and Neon, the ancestors of Brachylles, who were the most prominent in the party which favoured Macedonia. However, the party of Ascondas eventually prevailed, owing to the following circumstance. Antigonus (Doson), who, after the death of Demetrius, was Philip's guardian, happened to be sailing on some business along the coast of Boeotia; when off Larymna he was surprised by a sudden ebb of the tide, and his ships were left high and dry. Now just at that time a rumour had been spread that Antigonus meant to make a raid upon the country; and therefore Neon, who was Hipparch at the time, was patrolling the country at the head of all the Boeotian cavalry to protect it, and came upon Antigonus in this helpless and embarrassed position: and having it thus in his power to inflict a serious blow upon the Macedonians, much to their surprise he resolved to spare them. His conduct in so doing was approved by the other Boeotians, but was not at all pleasing to the Thebans. Antigonus, however, when the tide flowed again and his ships floated, proceeded to complete the voyage to Asia on which he was bound, with deep gratitude to Neon for having abstained from attacking him in his awkward position.

The rise of the house of Neon.

B.C. 222. Accordingly, when at a subsequent period he conquered the Spartan Cleomenes and became master of Lacedaemon, he left Brachylles in charge of the town, by way of paying him for the kindness done him by his father Neon. This proved to be the beginning of a great rise in importance of the family of Brachylles. But this was not all that Antigonus did for him: from that time forward either he personally, or king Philip, continually supported him with money and influence; so that before long this family entirely overpowered the political party opposed to them in Thebes, and forced all the citizens, with very few exceptions, to join the party of Macedonia. Such was the origin of the political adherence to Macedonia of the family of Neon, and of its rise to prosperity.

6. But Boeotia as a nation had come to such a low pitch, that for nearly twenty-five years the administration of justice had been suspended in private and public suits alike. Their magistrates were engaged in despatching bodies of men to guard the country or in proclaiming national expeditions, and thus continually postponed their attendance at courts of law. Some of the Strategi also dispensed allowances to the needy from the public treasury; whereby the common people learnt to support and invest with office those who would help them to escape the penalties of their crimes and undischarged liabilities, and to be enriched from time to time with some portion of the public property obtained by official favour. No one contributed to this lamentable state of things more than Opheltas, who was always inventing some plan calculated to benefit the masses for the moment, while perfectly certain to ruin them in the future. To these evils was added another unfortunate fashion. It became the practice for those who died childless not to leave their property to the members of their family, as had been the custom of the country formerly, but to assign it for the maintenance of feasts and convivial entertainments to be shared in by the testator's friends in common; and even many who did possess children left the larger part of their property to the members of their own club. The result was that there were many Boeotians who had more feasts to attend in the month than there were days in it. The people of Megara therefore, disliking this habit, and remembering their old connexion with the Achaean league, were inclined once more to renew their political alliance with it. For the Megarians had been members of the Achaean league since the time of Antigonus Gonatas; but upon Cleomenes blockading the Isthmus, finding themselves cut off from the Achaeans they joined the Boeotians, with the consent of the former. But a little before the time of which we are now speaking, becoming dissatisfied with the Boeotian constitution, they again joined the Achaeans. The Boeotians, incensed at what they considered acts of contempt, sallied out in full force to attack Megara; and on the Megarians declining to listen to

Disorganised state of Boeotia.

Antigonus Gonatas, *ob.* B.C. 239.

Cleomenic war B.C. 227-221.

them, they determined in their anger to besiege and assault their city. But being attacked by a panic, on a report spreading that Philopoemen was at hand at the head of a force of Achaeans, they left their scaling ladders against the walls and fled back precipitately to their own country.

7. Such being the state of Boeotian politics, it was only by extraordinary good fortune that they evaded destruction in the dangerous periods of the wars of Philip and Antiochus. But in the succeeding period they did not escape in the same way. Fortune, on the contrary, seemed determined to make them pay for their former good luck by a specially severe retribution, as I shall relate hereafter. . . .

Antiochus received in Thebes, B.C. 192.

Many of the Boeotians defended their alienation from the Romans by alleging the assassination of Brachylles,[1] and the expedition made by Flamininus upon Coronea owing to the murders of Romans on the roads.[2] But the real reason was their moral degeneracy, brought about by the causes I have mentioned. For as soon as the king approached, the Boeotian magistrates went out to meet him, and after holding a friendly conversation with him conducted him into Thebes. . . .

Antiochus wintering in Chalcis, B.C. 192-191.

8. Antiochus the Great came to Chalcis in Euboea, and there completed his marriage, when he was fifty years old, and had already undertaken his two most important labours, the liberation of Greece—as he called it—and the war with Rome. However, having fallen in love with a young lady of Chalcis, he was bent on marrying her, though the war was still going on; for he was much addicted to wine and delighted in excesses. The lady was a daughter of Cleoptolemus, a man of rank, and was possessed of extraordinary beauty. He remained in Chalcis all the winter occupied in marriage festivities, utterly regardless of the pressing business of the time. He gave the girl the name of Euboea, and after his defeat[3] fled with his bride to Ephesus. . . .

[1] Brachylles, when a Boeotarch in B.C. 196, was assassinated by a band of six men, of whom three were Italians and three Aetolians, on his way home from a banquet. Livy, 33, 28.

[2] Livy, 33, 29.

[3] At Thermopylae, in which battle Livy (36, 19) states on the authority of Polybius that only 500 men out of 10,000 brought by Antiochus into Greece escaped, B.C. 191.

9. When the Romans took Heracleia, Phaeneas the Aetolian Strategus, in view of the danger threatening Aetolia, and seeing what would happen to the other towns, determined to send an embassy to Manius Acilius to demand a truce and treaty of peace. With this purpose he despatched Archidamus, Pantaleon and Chalesus, who on meeting the Roman consul were intending to enter upon a long argument, but were interrupted in the middle of their speech and prevented from finishing it. For Acilius remarked that "For the present he had no leisure to attend to them, being much engaged with the distribution of the spoils of Heracleia: he would, however, grant a ten days' truce and send Lucius Valerius Flaccus with them, with instructions as to what he was to say." The truce being thus made, and Valerius having come to Hypata, a lengthened discussion took place on the state of affairs. The Aetolians sought to establish their case by referring to their previous services to Rome. But Valerius cut this line of argument short by saying that "Such justification did not apply to the present circumstances; for as these old friendly relations had been broken off by them, and the existing hostility was owing entirely to the Aetolians themselves, the services of the past could be of no assistance to them in the present. They must therefore abandon all idea of justification, and adopt a tone of supplication, and beseech the consul's pardon for their transgressions." After a long discussion on various details, the Aetolians eventually decided to leave the whole matter to Acilius, and commit themselves without reserve to the good faith of the Romans. They had no comprehension of what this really involved; but they were misled by the word "faith" into supposing that the Romans would thereby be more inclined to grant them terms. But with the Romans for a man "to commit himself to their good faith" is held to be equivalent to "surrendering unconditionally."

Heracleia Trachinia taken by Acilius after the battle of Thermopylae, B.C. 191.

Embassy of the Aetolians.

10. Having come to this resolution, Phaeneas despatched legates with Valerius to announce the decision of the Aetolians to Acilius. On being admitted to the presence of the Consul, these legates, after

Aetolian embassy to Acilius.

once more entering upon a plea of self-justification, ended by announcing that the Aetolians had decided to commit themselves to the good faith of the Romans. Hereupon Acilius interrupted them by saying, "Is this really the case, men of Aetolia?" And upon their answering in the affirmative, he said: "Well then, the first condition is that none of you, individually or collectively, must cross to Asia; the second is that you must surrender Menestratus the Epirote" (who happened at that time to be at Naupactus, where he had come to the assistance of the Aetolians), "and also King Amynander, with such of the Athamanians as accompanied him in his desertion to your side." Here Phaeneas interrupted him by saying: "But it is neither just nor consonant with Greek customs, O Consul, to do what you order." To which Acilius replied,—not so much because he was angry, as because he wished to show him the dangerous position in which he stood, and to thoroughly frighten him,—"Do you still presume to talk to me about Greek customs, and about honour and duty, after having committed yourselves to my good faith? Why, I might if I chose put you all in chains and commit you to prison!" With these words he ordered his men to bring a chain and an iron collar and put it on the neck of each of them. Thereupon Phaeneas and his companions stood in speechless amazement, as though bereft of all power of thought or motion, at this unexpected turn of affairs. But Valerius and some others who were present besought Acilius not to inflict any severity upon the Aetolians then before him, as they were in the position of ambassadors. And on his yielding to these representations, Phaeneas broke silence by saying that "He and the Apocleti were ready to obey the injunctions, but they must consult the general assembly if they were to be confirmed." Upon Acilius agreeing to this, he demanded a truce of ten days to be granted. This also having been conceded, they departed with these terms, and on arrival at Hypata told the Apocleti what had been done and the speeches that had been made. This report was the first thing which made their error, and the compulsion under which they were placed, clear to the Aetolians. It was therefore decided to write round to the various cities

Roman terms.

and call the Aetolians together, to consult on the injunctions imposed upon them. When the news of the reception Phaeneas had met with was noised abroad, the Aetolian people were so infuriated that no one would even attend the meeting to discuss the matter at all. It was thus impossible to hold the discussion. They were further encouraged by the arrival of Nicander, who just at that time sailed into Phalara, on the Malian gulf, from Asia, bringing news of the warm reception given him by Antiochus, and the promises for the future which the king had made; they therefore became quite indifferent as to the non-completion of the peace. Thus when the days of the truce had elapsed the Aetolians found themselves still at war with Rome.

The Aetolians fail to ratify the peace.

11. But I ought not to omit to describe the subsequent career and fate of Nicander. He arrived back at Phalara on the twelfth day after leaving Ephesus, and found the Romans still engaged in Heracleia, and the Macedonians having already evacuated Lamia, but encamped at no great distance from the town: he thereupon conveyed his money unexpectedly into Lamia, and attempted himself to make his way between the two camps into Hypata. But, falling into the hands of the Macedonian pickets, he was taken to Philip, while his evening party was still at the midst of their entertainment, greatly alarmed lest he should meet with rough treatment from having incurred Philip's resentment, or should be handed over to the Romans. But when the matter was reported to the king, he at once gave orders that the proper officers should offer Nicander refreshments, and show him every politeness and attention. After a time he got up from table and went personally to visit him; and after enlarging at great length on "the folly of the Aetolians, for having first brought the Romans into Greece, and afterwards Antiochus," he still, even at this hour, urged that "they should forget their past, adhere to their loyalty to himself, and not show a disposition to take advantage of each other's difficulties." He bade Nicander convey this message to the leaders of the Aetolians, and exhorting him personally to remember the favours which he had received at his hands, he despatched him with a sufficient escort, which he ordered to see him safe into Hypata.

The fate of Nicander.

This result was far beyond Nicander's hopes or expectations. He was restored in due course to his friends, and from the moment of this adventure remained devoted to the royal family of Macedonia. Thus, in the subsequent period of the war with Perseus, the obligations which this favour had imposed upon him caused him to offer such an unwilling and lukewarm opposition to the designs of Perseus, that he exposed himself to suspicion and denunciation, and at last was summoned to Rome and died there. . . .

12. The Spartans could not find one of their own citizens willing to address Philopoemen on this subject. To men who for the most part undertake work for what they can get by it there are plenty of people to offer such rewards, and to regard them as the means of founding and consolidating friendship: but in the case of Philipoemen no one could be found willing to convey this offer to him at all. Finally, being completely at a loss, they elected Timolaus to do it, as being his ancestral guest-friend and very intimate with him. Timolaus twice journeyed to Megalopolis for this express purpose, without daring to say a word to Philopoemen about it. But having goaded himself to making a third attempt, he at length plucked up courage to mention the proposed gifts. Much to his surprise Philopoemen received the suggestion with courtesy; and Timolaus was overjoyed by the belief that he had attained his object. Philopoemen, however, remarked that he would come to Sparta himself in the course of the next few days; for he wished to offer all the magistrates his thanks for this favour. He accordingly came, and, being invited to attend the Senate, he said: "He had long been aware of the kindness with which the Lacedaemonians regarded him; but was more convinced than ever by the compliments and extraordinary mark of honour they now offered him. But while gratefully accepting their intention, he disliked the particular manner of its exhibition. They should not bestow such honour and rewards on their friends, the poison of which would indelibly infect the receiver, but rather upon their enemies; that the former might retain their freedom of speech and the confidence of the Achaeans

The Spartans wish to offer Philopoemen the palace of Nabis, as a reward, and as an inducement to defend their liberty. Plutarch, *Philop.* 15.

when proposing to offer assistance to Sparta; while the latter, by swallowing the bait, might be compelled either to support their cause, or at any rate to keep silence and do them no harm. . . ."

The remaining events of the war against Antiochus in this year are related by Livy, 36, 41-45. Acilius was engaged for two months in the siege of Naupactus: while the Roman fleet under Gaius Livius defeated that of Antiochus, under his admiral Polyxenidas, off Phocaea.

To see an operation with one's own eyes is not like merely hearing a description of it. It is, indeed, quite another thing; and the confidence which such vivid experience gives is always greatly advantageous. . . .

BOOK XXI

1. At this time also it happened that the embassy, which the Lacedaemonians had sent to Rome, returned disappointed. The subject of their mission was the hostages and the villages. As to the villages the Senate answered that they would give instructions to envoys sent by themselves; and as to the hostages they desired to consider further. But as to the exiles of past times, they said that they wondered why they were not recalled, now that Sparta had been freed from her tyrants. . . .

B.C. 190. Embassy from Sparta, and the answer of the Roman Senate.

2. At the same period the Senate dealt with the ambassadors from Philip. They had come to set forth the loyalty and zeal of the king, which he had shown to the Romans in the war against Antiochus. On hearing what the envoys had to say, the Senate released the king's son Demetrius from his position as hostage at once, and promised that they would also remit part of the yearly indemnity, if he kept faith with Rome in future. The Senate likewise released the Lacedaemonian hostages, except Armenas, son of Nabis; who subsequently fell ill and died. . . .

3. Directly the news of the victory at sea reached Rome, the Senate first decreed a public *supplicatio* for nine days,—which means a public and universal holiday, accompanied by the sacrifice of thank-offerings to the gods for the happy success,—and next gave audience to the envoys from Aetolia and Manius Acilius. When both parties had pleaded their cause at some length, the Senate decreed to offer the Aetolians the alternative of committing their cause unconditionally to the arbitration of the

Supplicatio for the victory off Phocaea.

Answer to the Aetolian Envoys sent, on the intercession of Flamininus, when

Senate, or of paying a thousand talents down and making an offensive and defensive alliance with Rome. But on the Aetolians desiring the Senate to state definitely on what points they were to submit to such arbitration, the Senate refused to define them. Accordingly the war with the Aetolians went on. . . .

Acilius was about to take Naupactus. Livy, 36, 34-35: 37, 1.

4. While Amphissa was still being besieged by Manius Acilius, the Athenians, hearing at that time both of the distress of the Amphissians and of the arrival of Publius Scipio, despatched Echedemus and others on an embassy to him, with instructions to pay their respects to both Lucius and Publius Scipio, and at the same time to try what could be done to get peace for the Aetolians. On their arrival, Publius welcomed them gladly and treated them with great courtesy; because he saw that they would be of assistance to him in carrying out his plans. For he was very desirous of effecting a settlement in Aetolia on good terms; but had resolved that, if the Aetolians refused to comply, he would at all hazards relinquish that business for the present, and cross to Asia: for he was well aware that the ultimate object of the war and of the entire expedition was not to reduce the Aetolian nation to obedience, but to conquer Antiochus and take possession of Asia. Therefore, directly the Athenians mentioned the pacification, he accepted their suggestion with eagerness, and bade them sound the Aetolians also. Accordingly, Echedemus and his colleagues, having sent a preliminary deputation to Hypata, presently followed in person, and entered into a discussion with the Aetolian magistrates on the subject of a pacification. They, too, readily acquiesced in the suggestion, and certain envoys were appointed to meet the Romans. They found Publius and the army encamped sixty stades from Amphissa, and there discoursed at great length on their previous services to Rome. Publius Scipio adopted in reply a still milder and more conciliatory style, quoting his own conduct in Iberia and Libya, and explaining how he had treated all who in those countries had

Spring of B.C. 190. Coss. L. Cornelius Scipio, C. Laelius.

P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus in Greece as legatus to his brother Lucius. (March.)

Aetolian envoys visit the consuls.

confided to his honour: and finally expressing an opinion that they had better put themselves in his hands. At first, all who were present felt very sanguine that the pacification was about to be accomplished. But when, in answer to the Aetolian demand to know on what terms they were to make the peace, Lucius Scipio explained that they had two alternatives—to submit their entire case unconditionally to the arbitrament of Rome, or to pay a thousand talents down and to make an offensive and defensive alliance with her — the Aetolians present were thrown into the state of the most painful perplexity at the inconsistency of this announcement with the previous talk: but finally they said that they would consult the Aetolians on the terms imposed.

5. On the return of the Aetolian envoys for the purpose of consulting their countrymen, Echedemus and his colleagues joined the council of the *apocleti* in their deliberations on this subject. One of the alternatives was impossible owing to the amount of money demanded, and the other was rendered alarming in their eyes by the deception they had experienced before, when, after submitting to the surrender, they had narrowly escaped being thrown into chains. Being then much perplexed and quite unable to decide, they sent the same envoys back to beg the Scipios that they would either abate part of the money, so as to be within their power to pay, or except from the surrender the persons of citizens, men and women. But upon their arrival in the Roman camp and delivering their message, Lucius Scipio merely replied that "The only terms on which he was commissioned by the Senate to treat were those which he had recently stated." They therefore returned once more, and were followed by Echedemus and his colleagues to Hypata, who advised the Aetolians that "Since there was at present a hitch in the negotiations for peace, they should ask for a truce; and, having thus at least delayed the evils threatening them, should send an embassy to the Senate. If they obtained their request, all would be well; but, if they did not, they must trust to the chapter of accidents: for their position could not be worse than it was now, but for many reasons might not impossibly be better." The advice of Echedemus was thought

See bk. 20, ch. 10.

sound, and the Aetolians accordingly voted to send envoys to obtain a truce; who, upon reaching Lucius Scipio, begged that for the present a truce of six months might be granted them, that they might send an embassy to the Senate. Publius Scipio, who had for some time past been anxious to begin the campaign in Asia, quickly persuaded his brother to grant their request. The agreement therefore was reduced to writing, and thereupon Manius Acilius handed over his army to Lucius Scipio, and returned with his military tribunes to Rome. . . .

A six months' truce with the Aetolians.

ASIA

6. Factions became rife at Phocaea,[1] partly because they suffered from the Romans left with the ships being quartered on them, and partly because they were annoyed at the tribute imposed on them. . . .

A party at Phocaea wish to join Antiochus, B.C. 190.

Then the Phocaean magistrates, alarmed at the state of popular excitement caused by the dearth of corn, and the agitation kept up by the partisans of Antiochus, sent envoys to Seleucus,[2] who was on their frontiers, ordering him not to approach the town, as they were resolved to remain neutral and await the final decision of the quarrel, and then obey orders. Of these ambassadors the partisans of Seleucus and his faction were Aristarchus, Cassander, and Rhodon; those, on the contrary, who inclined to Rome were Hegias and Gelias. On their arrival Seleucus at once showed every attention to Aristarchus and his partisans, but treated Hegias and Gelias with complete neglect. But when he was informed of the state of popular feeling, and the shortness of provisions in Phocaea, he threw aside all negotiation or discussion with the envoys, and marched towards the town. . . .

Two Galli, with sacred images and figures on their breasts, advanced from the town, and besought them not to adopt any extreme measures against the city.[3] . . .

The Roman fleet at Sestos. Intercession of the Galli or priests of Cybele. Livy, 37, 9.

[1] Livy, 37, 9. [2] Son of Antiochus the Great, afterwards King Seleucus IV.
[3] This extract, preserved in Suidas, s. v. *προστηθιδίων*, has been restored by

7. The fire-carrier used by Pausistratus, the navarch of the Rhodians, was a scoop or basket. On either side of the prow two staples were fixed into the inner part of the two sides of the ship, into which poles were fitted with their extremities extending out to sea. To the end of these the scoop filled with fire was attached by an iron chain, in such a way that in charging the enemy's ship, whether on the prow or the broadside, fire was thrown upon it, while it was kept a long way off from his own ship by the slope of the poles. . . .

The Rhodian firing apparatus.

The Rhodian admiral Pamphilidas was thought to be better capable than Pausistratus of adapting himself to all possible contingencies, because his character was more remarkable for its depth and solidity than for its boldness. For most men judge not from any fixed principle but by results. Thus, though they had recently elected Pausistratus to the command, on the ground of his possessing these very qualities of energy and boldness, their opinions at once underwent a complete revolution when he met with his disaster. . . .

Pausistratus beaten by Polyxenidas, the admiral of the king. Livy, 37, 10, 11.

8. At this time a letter arrived at Samos for Lucius Aemilius and Eumenes from the consul Lucius Scipio, announcing the agreement made with the Aetolians for the truce, and the approaching advance of the land forces to the Hellespont. Another to the same effect was sent to Antiochus and Seleucus from the Aetolians. . . .

The Aetolian truce announced to Eumenes and Antiochus.

9. An embassy from King Eumenes having arrived in Achaia proposing an alliance, the Achaeans met in public assembly and ratified it, and sent out some soldiers, a thousand foot and a hundred horse, under the command of Diophanes of Megalopolis. . . .

Achaean contingent sent to the war. Livy, 37, 20.

Diophanes was a man of great experience in war; for during the protracted hostilities with Nabis in the neighbourhood of Megalopolis, he had served throughout under

a brilliant emendation of Toupe, who reads *ἐξελθόντες μὲν Γάλλοι* for the meaningless *ἐξελθόντες μεγάλοι*. Livy calls them *fanatici Galli*.

Philopoemen, and accordingly had gained a real familiarity with the operations of actual warfare. And besides this advantage, his appearance and physical prowess were impressive; and, most important of all, he was a man of personal courage and exceedingly expert in the use of arms. . . .

10. King Antiochus had already penetrated into the territory of Pergamum; but when he heard that king Eumenes was close at hand, and saw that the land forces as well as the fleet were ready to attack him, he began to consider the propriety of proposing a pacification with the Romans, Eumenes, and the Rhodians at once. He therefore removed with his whole army to Elaea, and having seized a hill facing that town, he encamped his infantry upon it, while he entrenched his cavalry, amounting to over six thousand, close under the walls of the town. He took up his own position between these two, and proceeded to send messengers to Lucius Aemilius in the town, proposing a peace. The Roman imperator thereupon called Eumenes and the Rhodians to a meeting, and desired them to give their opinions on the proposal. Eudemus and Pamphilidas were not averse to making terms; but the king said that "To make peace at the present moment was neither honourable nor possible. How could it be an honourable conclusion of the war that they should make terms while confined within the walls of a town? And how was it possible to give validity to those terms without waiting for the Consul and obtaining his consent? Besides, even if they did give any indication of coming to an agreement with Antiochus, neither the naval nor military forces could of course return home until the Senate and people had ratified the terms of it. All that would be left for them to do would be to spend the winter where they were, waiting idly for the decision from home, doing nothing, and exhausting the wealth and resources of their allies. And then, if the Senate withheld its approval of the terms, they would have to begin the war all over again, having let the opportunity pass, which, with God's help, would have enabled them to put a period to the whole war." Such was the speech

Antiochus proposes peace with Rome, Eumenes, and Rhodes.

Eumenes opposes the peace, on the grounds of honour and prudence.

of king Eumenes. Lucius Aemilius accepted the advice, and answered the envoys of Antiochus that the peace could not possibly be made until the Proconsul arrived. On hearing this Antiochus immediately began devastating the territory of Elaea; and subsequently, while Seleucus remained in occupation of that district, Antiochus continued his march through the country as far as the plain of Thebe, and having there entered upon an exceedingly fertile and wealthy district, he gorged his army with spoil of every description. . . .

Prusias, king of Bithynia.

11. On his arrival at Sardis after this expedition, Antiochus at once sent to Prusias to urge him to an alliance. Now in former times Prusias had by no means been disinclined to join Antiochus, because he was much alarmed lest the Romans should cross over to Asia for the purpose of putting down all crowned heads. But the perusal of a letter received from Lucius and Publius Scipio had served to a great extent to relieve his anxiety, and give him a tolerably correct forecast of the result of the war. For

Letter of the Scipios to Prusias.

the Scipios had put the case with great clearness in their letter, and had supported their assertions by numerous proofs. They entered not only upon a defence of the policy adopted by themselves, but of that also of the Roman people generally; by which they showed that, so far from depriving any of the existing kings of their sovereignties, they had themselves been the authors in some cases of their establishment, in others of the extension of their powers and the large increase of their dominions. To prove this they quoted the instances of Andobales and Colichas in Iberia, of Massanissa in Libya, and of Pleuratus in Illyria, all of whom they said they had raised from petty and insignificant princes to the position of undisputed royalty. They further mentioned the cases of Philip and Nabis in Greece. As to Philip, they had conquered him in war and reduced him to the necessity of giving hostages and paying tribute: yet, after receiving a slight proof of his good disposition, they had restored his son and the young men who were hostages with him, had remitted the tribute, and given him back several of the towns that had been taken in the course of war. While as for Nabis, though they might have utterly destroyed him, they had not done so, but

had spared him, tyrant as he was, on receiving the usual security for his good faith. With these facts before his eyes they urged Prusias in their letter not to be in any fear for his kingdom, but to adopt the Roman alliance without misgiving, for he would never have reason to regret his choice. This letter worked an entire change in the feelings of Prusias; and when, besides, Caius Livius and the other legates arrived at his court, after conversation with them, he entirely relinquished all ideas of looking for support from Antiochus. Foiled, therefore, of hope in this quarter, Antiochus retired to Ephesus: and being convinced on reflection that the only way of preventing the transport of the enemy's army, and in fact of repelling an invasion of Asia at all, was to keep a firm mastery of the sea, he determined to fight a naval battle and leave the issue of the struggle to be decided by his success in that. . . .

On its voyage from Samos to Teos the Roman fleet sight some pirate vessels. Livy, 37, 27.

12. When the pirates saw that the Roman fleet was coming they turned and fled. . . .

The battle between the fleets of Rome and Antiochus took place between the promontories Myonnesus and Corycum, which form the bay of Teos, Antiochus was beaten with a loss of forty-two ships early in B.C. 190. *Livy*, 37, 30.

13. After sustaining this defeat at sea, Antiochus remained in Sardis, neglecting to avail himself of such opportunities as he had left, and taking no steps whatever to prosecute the war; and when he learnt that the enemy had crossed into Asia he lost all heart, and determined in despair to send an envoy to Lucius and Publius Scipio to treat of peace. He selected Heracleides of Byzantium for this purpose, and despatched him with instructions to offer to surrender the territories of Lampsacus and Smyrna as well as Alexandria (Troas), which were the original cause of the war, and any other cities in Aeolis and Ionia of which they might wish to deprive him, as having embraced their side in the war; and in addition to this to promise an indemnity of half the expenses they had incurred in their quarrel with him. Such were the offers which the envoy was instructed to make in his

Antiochus despairs of resistance, and sends an envoy to the Scipios to treat of peace.

public audience; but, besides these, there were others to be committed to Publius Scipio's private ear, of which I will speak in detail later on. On his arrival at the Hellespont the envoy found the Romans still occupying the camp which they had constructed immediately after crossing. At first he was much cheered by this fact, for he thought it would materially aid his negotiation that the enemy were exactly where they were at first, and had not as yet taken any further action. But when he learnt that Publius Scipio was still on the other side of the water he was much disturbed, because the turn which his negotiations were to take depended principally on Scipio's view of the matter. The reason of the army being still in their first camp, and of Publius Scipio's absence from the army, was that he was one of the Salii. These are, as I have before stated, one of the three colleges of priests by whom the most important sacrifices to the gods are offered at Rome. And it is the law that, at the time of these sacrifices, they must not quit the spot for thirty days in which it happens to find them.[1] This was the case at the present time with Publius Scipio; for just as the army was on the point of crossing this season arrived, and prevented him from changing his place of abode. Thus it came about that he was separated from the legions and remained in Europe, while, though the army crossed, it remained encamped, and could take no further step, because they were waiting for him.

The laws relating to the Salii or priests of Mars.

14. However, Publius arrived a few days afterwards, and Heracleides being summoned to attend the Council, delivered the message with which he was charged, announcing that Antiochus abandoned Lampsacus, Smyrna, and Alexandria; and also all such towns in Aeolis and Ionia as had sided with Rome; and that he offered, further, an indemnity of half their expenses in the present war. He added many arguments besides, urging the Romans "Not to tempt fortune too far, as they were but

Speech of Heracleides.

[1] *Dies forte, quibus Ancilia moventur, religiosi ad iter inciderant.* Livy, 37, 33. The festival of Mars, during which the *ancilia* were carried about, was on the 1st of March and following days. If this incident, therefore, took place in the late spring or summer of B.C. 190, the Roman Calendar must have been very far out.

men; nor to extend their empire indefinitely, but rather to keep it within limits, if possible those of Europe,—for even then they would have an enormous and unprecedented dominion, such as no nation before them had attained;—but if they were determined at all hazards to grasp parts of Asia also, let them say definitely what parts those were, for the king would go to the utmost stretch of his power to meet their wishes." After the delivery of this speech the council decided that the Consul should answer that "It was only fair that Antiochus should pay, not the half, but the whole expense of the war, seeing that he, and not they, had originally begun it; and as to the cities, he must not only liberate those in Aeolis and Ionia, but must surrender his whole dominion on this side of Mount Taurus." On receiving this answer from the council, conveying demands which went far beyond his instructions, the envoy, without answering a word, abstained from a public audience thenceforth, but exerted himself to conciliate Publius Scipio.

The Consul's answer.

15. Having at length got a suitable opportunity, he disclosed to him the offers with which he was charged. These were that the king would first restore his son without ransom, who had been taken prisoner in the early part of the war; and was prepared, secondly, to pay him any sum of money he might name, and thenceforth share with him the wealth of his kingdom, if he would only support the acceptance of the terms offered by the king. Publius replied that the promise as to his son he accepted, and would feel under an obligation to the king if he fulfilled it; but as to the rest he assured him that the king, among his other delusions, was under a complete mistake as to the course demanded by his own interests. "For if he had made these offers while still master of Lysimacheia and the entrance into the Chersonese, he would at once have got what he asked: and so too, even after evacuating these places, if he had appeared with his army at the Hellespont and shown that he meant to prevent our crossing, and then had sent his envoys, he might even thus have obtained his demands. But when he comes with his proposals of equitable terms, after allowing our troops to set foot in Asia,

The secret offers of Antiochus to Publius Scipio.

Scipio's reply.

and having so not only submitted to the bridle, but allowed the rider to mount, he must expect to fail and be disappointed of his hopes. Therefore, I advise him to adopt wiser measures, and look at the facts in their true light. In return for his promise in regard to my son, I will give him a hint which is well worth the favour he offers me: make any concession, do anything, rather than fight with the Romans." With this answer Heracleides returned and told the king everything. And Antiochus, considering that no severer terms could be imposed on him if he were beaten in the field, abandoned all idea of negotiation, and began making preparations of all sorts and in every direction for the battle. . . .

Antiochus sent Scipio's son back. The decisive battle took place in the neighbourhood of Thyatira, and proved a decisive victory for the Romans. This was in the late autumn of B.C. 190. *See Livy*, 37, 38-44.

16. After the victory the Romans took Sardis and its Acropolis, and there they were visited by Musaeus bringing a message from Antiochus. Being politely received by the Scipios, he announced that Antiochus wished to send envoys to treat on the terms of peace, and therefore desired that a safe conduct should be given them. This was granted and the herald returned; and some days after, Zeuxis, formerly Satrap of Lydia, and Antipater, his nephew, came as ambassadors from king Antiochus. Their first anxiety was to meet king Eumenes, because they feared that his old quarrel would cause him to be only too ready to do them a bad turn. But when they found him, contrary to their expectation, disposed to moderate and gentle methods, they at once addressed themselves to meeting the council. Being summoned to attend it they made a lengthy speech, among other things exhorting the Romans to use their victory with mildness and generosity; and alleging that such a course was still more to the interest of the Romans than of Antiochus, since Fortune had committed to them the empire and lordship of the world. Finally, they asked "What they were to do to obtain peace and the friendship of Rome?" The members of the council had already in a previous sitting discussed and agreed upon this

point, and now bade Publius Scipio deliver their decision.

17. Scipio began by saying that victory never made the Romans more severe than before, and accordingly the envoys would receive the same answer as they had previously received when they came to the Hellespont before the battle. "They must evacuate Europe and all Asia this side Taurus: must pay the Romans fifteen thousand Euboic talents as an indemnity for the expenses of the war, five hundred at once, two thousand five hundred on the ratification of the treaty by the people, and the rest in twelve yearly instalments of a thousand talents. Further, Antiochus must pay Eumenes the four hundred talents owing to him, and the balance of the corn due in accordance with the treaty made with his father Attalus. He must at the same time deliver Hannibal the Carthaginian, Thoas the Aetolian, Mnasilochus the Acarnanian, and Philo and Eubulides the Chalcidians. As security for the fulfilment of these terms, Antiochus must at once give twenty hostages named in the treaty." Such was the decision announced by Publius Scipio in the name of the whole Council. Antipater and Zeuxis having expressed their consent to them, it was agreed by all to send envoys to Rome to appeal to the Senate and people to confirm the treaty. The ambassadors of Antiochus departed with this understanding: and during the following days the Roman commanders divided their forces into their winter quarters; and when some few days later the hostages arrived, both Eumenes and the envoys of Antiochus started on their voyage to Rome. Nor were they alone in their mission; for Rhodes also, and Smyrna, and nearly all the nations and states on this side Taurus sent ambassadors to Rome. . . .

The Roman terms imposed on Antiochus.

The terms are accepted, and missions sent to Rome.

18.[1] At the beginning of the summer following the victory of the Romans over Antiochus, the ambassadors of that king, and those from Rhodes, as well as from the other states arrived in Rome. For, as I

B.C. 189. Coss. Cn. Manlius Vulso, M. Fulvius

[1] The remaining chapters of this book are placed by Schweighaeuser and others in book 22, 1-27.

Nobilior. Reception of king Eumenes and the ambassadors at Rome.

said, nearly all the states in Asia began sending envoys to Rome immediately after the battle, because the hopes of all as to their future position rested at that time on the Senate. All who arrived were graciously received by the Senate; but the most imposing reception was that accorded to king Eumenes, both in the complimentary processions sent out to meet him and the arrangements made for his entertainment; and next in cordiality to his reception was that given to the Rhodians.

The audiences in the Senate.

When the time for the audiences came, they first called in the king and bade him say freely what he wished to obtain at the hands of the Senate.

Eumenes.

But Eumenes at first evaded the task by saying: "If I had been desirous of obtaining any favour from others, I should have looked to the Romans for advice, that I might neither desire anything that was wrong nor ask anything unfair; but seeing that I am here to prefer my request to the Romans themselves, I think it better to leave the interests of myself and my brothers unreservedly in their hands." And though one of the Senators rose and begged him to have no apprehension, but to speak his mind, he still adhered to this view. And so after a certain time had elapsed the king withdrew; and the Senate, remaining in the curia, debated what was to be done. Eventually it was decreed to call upon Eumenes to declare with his own mouth the objects of his visit without reserve, on the ground that he knew best what his own kingdom required, and what was the state of things in Asia. He was then called in; and, one of the Senators having informed him of the vote, he was compelled to speak on the business.

19. He said therefore that "He would not say another word on his own concerns, but would adhere strictly to his resolution of leaving the decision as to them entirely in the hands of the Romans.

Speech of Eumenes.

But there was one subject on which he felt anxiety, namely, the policy of Rhodes; and it was this that induced him to address the Senate on the present occasion. These Rhodians had come to Rome to further the interests of their own country, and their own prosperity, quite as much as he had come to promote those of his own kingdom at that moment;

but their professions were entirely at variance with their real purpose. And it was easy to satisfy one's self of this: for, when they enter the Senate house, they will say that they come neither to ask anything for themselves nor to thwart Eumenes in any way whatever; but are ambassadors for the liberty of the Greek inhabitants of Asia. 'To secure this,' they will say, 'is not so much a favour to themselves as an act incumbent on the Romans, and in consonance with their former achievements.' Such will be their specious professions; but the real truth of the case will be wholly different. For if these cities are once set free, the result will be that their dominion will be many times increased, while his own would be in a manner entirely broken up. For the attractive name of liberty and autonomy would draw from his rule not only the cities to be freed at present, but those also which had been under his rule from of old, directly it is made apparent that the Senate has adopted that policy, and would add them to the dominion of Rhodes. That was the natural course for things to take. Imagining that they owed their freedom to Rhodes, those cities would become in name its allies, but in reality entirely subservient, owing to the heavy obligation under which they will find themselves. He begged the Senators, therefore, to be on their guard on that point: lest they should find that they had unwittingly aggrandised one friendly nation too much, and disproportionately weakened another; or even that they were benefiting men who had once been their foes, to the neglect and contempt of their genuine friends."

20. "For myself," he continued, "though in every other point I would yield, if it were necessary, to my neighbours, yet in the matter of your friendship and of my goodwill towards you I will never, if I can help it, yield to any one alive. And I think that my father, if he had been living, would have said the same: for as he was the first to become your friend and ally, so of all the inhabitants of Asia and Greece he was the most nobly loyal to you to the last day of his life, not only in heart but in deed. For he took his part in all your wars in Greece, and furnished the largest contingents of men and ships of all your allies; contributed the largest share of supplies; and faced the most serious dangers: and to sum up all,

ended his life actually engaged in the war with Philip, while employed in urging the Boeotians to join your alliance. I, too, when I succeeded to his kingdom, while fully maintaining my father's views, for it was impossible to do more, have yet gone even beyond him in actual achievements: for the state of the times brought me to a more fiery test than they did him. Antiochus offered me his daughter and a share in his whole kingdom: offered me immediate restoration of all the cities that had been before wrested from me: and finally promised me any price I chose if I would join him in his war with you. But so far from accepting any one of these offers, I joined you in your struggle against Antiochus with the largest military and naval contingents of any of your allies; contributed the largest share of supplies at the time of your utmost need; and exposed myself unreservedly to every danger along with your generals. Finally, I submitted to being invested in Pergamos itself, and risked my life as well as my crown in my loyalty to your people.

21. "Therefore, men of Rome, as many of you have been eye-witnesses of the truth of my words, and all of you know it, it is but just that you should have a corresponding regard for my interests. You have made Massanissa king of the greater part of Libya, though he had once been your enemy and at last deserted to your side accompanied only by a few horsemen, only because he kept faith with you in one war: you have raised Pleuratus to the first position among the princes of Illyria, though he had done absolutely nothing for you beyond keeping loyal; it would be the height of inconsistency if you should neglect me and my family, who from generation to generation have co-operated in your most important and glorious undertakings. What is it, then, that I am asking you to do, and what do I claim at your hands? I will tell you openly, since you have called upon me to speak my mind to you. If you decide, then, to continue holding certain parts of Asia which are on this side Taurus, and were formerly subject to Antiochus, that is what I should wish to see best of all: for I consider that the security of my realm would best be secured by having you for neighbours, and especially by my sharing in your prestige. But if you decide not to do this, but to evacuate

Asia entirely, there is no one to whom you may with greater justice surrender the prizes you have won in the field than to me. But it may be said, it is a more honourable thing still to set the enslaved free. Yes! if they had not ventured to join Antiochus in the war against you. But since they had the hardihood to do so, it is a much more honourable course to make a proper return to your sincere friends, than to benefit those who have shown themselves your enemies."

22. After the delivery of this effective speech Eumenes retired. The Senate received both the king himself and the speech with every mark of favour, and were enthusiastic for doing everything in their power to gratify him. They wished to call in the Rhodians next after him; but one of the Rhodian ambassadors not being there in time, they called in those from Smyrna, who delivered a long disquisition on the goodwill and zeal which they had displayed towards Rome during the late war. But as there are no two opinions about the fact of their having been, of all the autonomous states in Asia, the most strenuous in the cause, I do not think it necessary to set forth their speech in detail.

The legates from Smyrna.

But next to them came in the Rhodians: who, after a short preamble as to their services to the Romans, quickly came to the discussion of the position of their own country. They said that "It was a very great embarrassment to them, in the discharge of their ambassadorial duties, to find themselves placed by the necessities of the case in opposition to a sovereign with whom their public and private relations were of the most friendly description. It was the opinion of their countrymen that the most honourable course, and the one which above all others would redound to the credit of Rome, was, that the Greeks in Asia should be set free, and should recover that possession dearest to all mankind—autonomy: but this was the last thing to suit Eumenes and his brothers. It was the nature of monarchy to hate equality, and to endeavour to have everybody, or at least as many as possible, subject and obedient. But though that was the case now, still they felt convinced that they should gain their object, not because they had greater influence with

Speech of the Rhodians.

the Romans than Eumenes, but because they would be shown to be suggesting a course more just in itself and more indisputably advantageous to all concerned. If, indeed, the only way the Romans could requite Eumenes was by handing over to him the autonomous towns, they might reasonably be at a loss to determine what to do; for they would have had to decide between neglecting a sincere friend and disregarding their own honour and duty, and thus entirely obscuring and degrading the glory of their great achievements. But if, on the other hand, it were possible adequately to consult for both these objects at the same time, who could doubt about the matter any longer? Yet the fact was that, as in a costly banquet, there was enough and to spare for all. Lycaonia, Phrygia on the Hellespont, and Pisidia, the Chersonese also and the districts bordering on it, were at the disposal of the Romans to give to whom they chose; only a few of which added to the kingdom of Eumenes would double its present extent, while if all, or even the great part were assigned to him, it would become second to that of no other prince in Asia.

23. "It was therefore in the power of the Romans to strengthen their friends very materially without destroying the glory of their own policy. For the end which they proposed to themselves in their war was not the same as that of other nations, but widely different. The rest of the world all entered upon war with the view of conquering and seizing cities, wealth, or ships: but heaven had ordained that they should want none of these things, by having put everything in the whole world under their rule. What was it, then, that they had still occasion to wish for, and to take the securest means to obtain? Plainly praise and glory among mankind; which it was difficult indeed to gain, but most difficult of all to preserve when gained. Their war with Philip might show them their meaning. That war they had, as they professed, undertaken with the sole object of liberating Greece; and that was in fact the only prize they gained in it, and no other whatever: yet the glory they got by it was greater than that which the tribute of the Carthaginians had brought them. And justly so: for money is a possession common to all mankind, but honour and praise and glory are

attributes of the gods and of those men who approach nearest to them. Therefore, the most glorious of all their achievements was the liberation of Greece; and if they now completed that work their fame would receive its consummation: but if they neglected to do so, even what they had already accomplished would lose its lustre." They finally wound up by saying, "As for us, gentlemen, having once deliberately adopted this policy and joined with you in the severest battles and in genuine dangers, we do not now propose to abandon the part of friends; but have not hesitated to say openly what we believe to be for your honour and your interests alike, with no ulterior design whatever, and with a single eye to our duty as the highest earthly object."

24. This speech of the Rhodians was universally regarded as temperate and fair. The Senate next caused Antipater and Zeuxis, the ambassadors of Antiochus, to be introduced: and on their speaking in a tone of entreaty and supplication, an approval of the agreement made by him with Scipio in Asia was voted. A few days later the people also ratified it, and oaths were accordingly interchanged with Antipater and his colleague. This done, the other ambassadors from Asia were introduced into the Senate: but a very brief hearing was given to each, and the same answer was returned to all; namely, that ten commissioners would be sent to decide on all points of dispute between the cities. The Senate then appointed ten commissioners, to whom they gave the entire settlement of particulars; while as a general principle they decided that of Asia this side Taurus such inhabitants as had been subject to Antiochus were to be assigned to Eumenes, except Lycia and Caria up to the Maeander, which were to belong to the Rhodians; while of the Greek cities, such of them as had been accustomed to pay tribute to Attalus were to pay the same to Eumenes; and only those who had done so to Antiochus were to be relieved of tribute altogether. Having given the ten commissioners these outlines of the general settlement, they sent them out to join the consul, Cnaeus Manlius Vulso, in Asia.

Treaty with Antiochus confirmed.

Settlement of Asia, B.C. 189.

After these arrangements had been completed, the Rhodian envoys came to the Senate again with a request in regard to Soli in Cilicia, alleging that they were called upon by ties of kindred to think of the interests of that city; for the people of Soli were, like the Rhodians, colonists from Argos. Having listened to what they had to say, the Senate invited the attendance of the ambassadors from Antiochus, and at first were inclined to order Antiochus to evacuate the whole of Cilicia; but upon these ambassadors resisting this order, on the ground of its being contrary to the treaty, they once more discussed the case of Soli by itself. The king's ambassadors still vehemently maintaining their rights, the Senate dismissed them and called in the Rhodians. Having informed them of the opposition raised by Antipater, they added that they were ready to go any length in the matter, if the Rhodians, on a review of the whole case, determined to push their claim. The Rhodian envoys, however, were much gratified by the spirit shown by the Senate, and said that they would ask nothing more. This question, therefore, was left as it was; and just as the ten commissioners and the other ambassadors were on the point of starting, the two Scipios, and Lucius Aemilius, the victor in the sea fight with Antiochus, arrived at Brundisium; and after certain days all three entered Rome in triumph. . . .

Soli in Cilicia.

Summer B.C. 189.

Amynandrus was restored to the kingdom of Athamania, which was occupied by a garrison of Philip's, by the aid of the Aetolians, who then proceeded to invade Amphilochia and the Dolopes. Hence the Aetolian war, beginning with the siege of Ambracia by M. Fulvius Nobilior. *Livy*, 38, 1-11.

25. Amynandrus, king of the Athamanes, thinking that he had now permanently recovered his kingdom, sent envoys to Rome and to the Scipios in Asia, for they were still in the neighbourhood of Ephesus, partly to excuse himself for having, as it appeared, secured his recall by the help of the Aetolians, but chiefly to entreat that he might be received again into the Roman alliance. But the Aetolians, imagining that they had now a

Summer of B.C. 190.

good opportunity of once more annexing Amphilochia and Aperantia, determined on an expedition against those countries; and when Nicander their Strategus had mustered the league army, they invaded Amphilochia. Finding most of the people willing to join them, they advanced into Aperantia; and the Aperantians also willingly yielding to them, they continued their expedition into Dolopia. The Dolopians for a time made a show of resistance, and of keeping loyal to Philip; but on considering what had happened to the Athamanes, and the check which Philip had received there, they quickly changed their minds and gave in their adhesion to the Aetolians. After this successful issue of his expedition Nicander led his army home, believing that Aetolia was secured by the subjection of these tribes and places, against the possibility of any one injuring its territory. But immediately after these events, and when the Aetolians were still in the full elation of their successes, a report reached them of the battle in Asia, in which they learnt that Antiochus had been utterly defeated. This caused a great revulsion of feeling; and when presently Damoteles came from Rome and announced that a continuation of the war was decreed against them, and that Marcus Fulvius and an army had crossed to attack them, they were reduced to a state of complete despair; and not knowing how to meet the danger which was impending over them, they resolved to send to Rhodes and Athens, begging them to despatch envoys to Rome to intercede in their behalf, and, by softening the anger of the Romans, to find some means of averting the evils that threatened Aetolia. They also sent ambassadors of their own to Rome once more, Alexander, Isius, and Phaeneas, accompanied by Callippus of Ambracia and Lycopus. . . .

Late autumn of B.C. 190.

Spring of B.C. 189.

26. Some envoys from Epirus having visited the Roman Consul, he consulted with them as to the best way of attacking the Aetolians. They advised that he should begin by attacking Ambracia, which was at that time a member of the Aetolian league. They gave as their reasons that, if the Aetolians ventured to give

M. Fulvius Nobilior at Apollonia.

battle, the neighbourhood of Ambracia was very favourable for the legions to fight in; and that if, on the other hand, the Aetolians avoided an engagement, the town was an excellent one to besiege: for the district round it would supply abundant timber for the construction of siege artillery; and the river Arachthus, which flowed right under the walls, would be of great use in conveying supplies to the army in the summer season, and serve as a protection to their works. Fulvius thought the advice good, and accordingly marched through Epirus to attack Ambracia. On his arrival there, as the Aetolians did not venture to meet him, he reconnoitred the city, and set vigorously to work on the siege. Meanwhile the Aetolian envoys that had been sent to Rome were caught off Cephallenia by Sibyrtus, son of Petraeus, and brought into Charadrus. The Epirotes first resolved to place these men at Buchetus and keep them under strict guard. But a few days afterwards they demanded a ransom of them on the ground that they were at war with the Aetolians. It happened that one of them, Alexander, was the richest man in Greece, while the others were badly off, and far inferior to Alexander in the amount of their property. At first the Epirotes demanded five talents from each. The others did not absolutely refuse this, but were willing to pay if they could, because they cared above everything to secure their own safety. But Alexander refused to consent, for it seemed a large sum of money, and he lay awake at night bewailing himself at the idea of being obliged to pay five talents. The Epirotes, however, foresaw what would happen, and were extremely alarmed lest the Romans should hear that they had detained men who were on a mission to themselves, and should send a despatch ordering their release; they, therefore, lowered their demand to three talents a-piece. The others gladly accepted the offer, gave security, and departed: but Alexander said that he would not pay more than a talent, and that was too much; and at last, giving up all thought of saving himself, remained in custody, though he was an old man, and possessed property worth more than two hundred talents; and I think he would have died rather than pay the three

Fulvius advances upon Ambracia.

The Aetolian envoys intercepted.

talents. So extraordinarily strong in some men is the passion for accumulating money. But on this occasion Fortune so favoured his greed, that the result secured all men's praise and approval for his infatuation. For, a few days afterwards, a despatch arrived from Rome ordering the release of the ambassadors; and, accordingly, he was the only one of them that was set free without ransom. When the Aetolians learnt what had happened to him, they elected Damoteles as their ambassador to Rome; who, however, when as far as Leucas on his voyage, was informed that Marcus Fulvius was marching through Epirus upon Ambracia, and, therefore, gave up the mission as useless, and returned back to Aetolia. . . .

Siege of Ambracia, and the gallant resistance of the Aetolians.

27. The Aetolians being besieged by the consul Marcus Fulvius, offered a gallant resistance to the assault of the siege artillery and battering rams. Marcus having first strongly secured his camp began the siege on an extensive scale; he opened three separate parallel works across the plain against the Pyrrheium, and a fourth opposite the temple of Asclepius, and a fifth directed against the Acropolis. And the attack being pushed on energetically at all these points at once, the besieged became terribly alarmed at the prospect before them. Still, as the rams vigorously battered the walls, and the long poles with their iron sickles tore off the battlements, they tried to invent machines to baffle them, letting down huge masses of lead and stones and oak logs by means of levers upon the battering rams; and putting iron hooks upon the sickles and hauling them inside the walls, so that the poles to which they were fastened broke against the battlements, and the sickles fell into their hands. Moreover they made frequent sallies, in which they fought with great courage: sometimes making a descent by night upon the pickets quartered at the works, and at others attacking in broad daylight the day-parties of the besiegers: and by these means they managed to protract the siege. . . .

Nicander was outside the city, and sent five hundred horse into it. They carried the intervening entrenchment of the enemy and forced their way into the town. With these he had fixed on a day on which they were to sally out, and he was to be ready to support them. They accordingly made the sally

with great courage and fought gallantly; but either from fear of the danger, or because he conceived that what he was engaged upon at the time could not be neglected, Nicander failed to come up to time, and accordingly the attempt failed. . . .[1]

28. By assiduously working the battering rams the Romans were always breaking down this or that part of the wall. But yet they could not succeed in storming any of these breaches, because the besieged were energetic in raising counter walls, and the Aetolians fought with determined gallantry on the débris. They, therefore, in despair had recourse to mines and underground tunnels. Having safely secured the central one of their three works, and carefully concealed the shaft with wattle screens, they erected in front of it a covered walk or stoa about two hundred feet long, parallel with the wall; and beginning their digging from that, they carried it on unceasingly day and night, working in relays. For a considerable number of days the besieged did not discover them carrying the earth away through the shaft; but when the heap of earth thus brought out became too high to be concealed from those inside the city, the commanders of the besieged garrison set to work vigorously digging a trench inside, parallel to the wall and to the stoa which faced the towers. When the trench was made to the required depth, they next placed in a row along the side of the trench nearest the wall a number of brazen vessels made very thin; and, as they walked along the bottom of the trench past these, they listened for the noise of the digging outside. Having marked the spot indicated by any of these brazen vessels, which were extraordinarily sensitive and vibrated to the sound outside, they began digging from within, at right angles to the trench, another underground tunnel leading under the wall, so calculated as to exactly hit the enemy's tunnel. This was soon accomplished, for the Romans had not only brought their mine up to the wall, but had under-pinned a considerable length of it on either side of their mine; and thus the two parties found themselves face to face. At first they conducted this underground fighting with their spears: but as neither side could do much good, because

The Romans begin mining operations.

Counter-mines by the besieged.

[1] The text of this fragment is much dislocated.

both parties protected themselves with shields and wattles, some one suggested another plan to the defenders. Putting in front of them an earthenware jar, made to the width of the mine, they bored a hole in its bottom, and, inserting an iron funnel of the same length as the depth of the vessel, they filled the jar itself with fine feathers, and putting a little fire in it close to the mouth of the jar, they clapped on an iron lid pierced full of holes. They carried this without accident through the mine with its mouth towards the enemy. When they got near the besiegers they stopped up the space all round the rim of the jar, leaving only two holes on each side through which they thrust spears to prevent the enemy coming near the jar. They then took a pair of bellows such as blacksmiths use, and, having attached them to the orifice of the funnel, they vigorously blew up the fire placed on the feathers near the mouth of the jar, continually withdrawing the funnel in proportion as the feathers became ignited lower down. The plan was successfully executed; the volume of smoke created was very great, and, from the peculiar nature of feathers, exceedingly pungent, and was all carried into the faces of the enemy. The Romans, therefore, found themselves in a very distressing and embarrassing position, as they could neither stop nor endure the smoke in the mines.[1] The siege being thus still further protracted the Aetolian commander determined to send an envoy to the Consul. . . .

The Romans smoked out.

29. About this time the ambassadors from Athens and Rhodes came to the Roman camp for the purpose of furthering, if they could, the conclusion of a peace. The Athamanian king, Amynandrus, also arrived, very eager to relieve the Ambraciots from their miserable position, and having received a safe conduct from Marcus Fulvius in consideration of the urgent nature of the business: For he had a very friendly feeling towards the Ambraciots, from having passed most of the

Intercession of Athens, Rhodes, and king Amynandrus.

[1] Smoking out an enemy in a mine was one of the regular manœuvres. See Aen. Tact. 37. It was perhaps suggested by the illegal means taken by workmen in the silver mines to annoy a rival; for we find an Athenian law directed against it. See Demosth. *in Pantaen.* § 36.

time of his exile in that town.[1] A few days afterwards also some Acarnanians arrived, bringing Damoteles and his fellow envoys. For Marcus Fulvius, having been informed of their misfortunes, had written to the people of Thyreum to bring the men to him. All these various persons, therefore, having assembled, the negotiations for peace were pushed on energetically. For his part, Amynandrus was urgent in his advice to the Ambraciots to save themselves from the destruction which would not be long in coming to them unless they adopted wiser counsels. On his coming again and again up to the wall and conversing with them on this subject, the Ambraciots decided to invite him inside the town. The consul having given the king leave to enter the walls, he went in and discussed the situation with the inhabitants. Meanwhile the Athenian and Rhodian envoys got hold of the consul and tried by ingenious arguments to mollify his anger. Some one also suggested to Damoteles and Phaeneas to apply to Caius Valerius and endeavour to win him over. He was the son of that Marcus Valerius Laevinus who made the first alliance with the Aetolians; and half brother, by the mother's side, of the consul Marcus Fulvius, and being a young man of vigorous character enjoyed the greatest confidence of the consul. Being appealed to by Damoteles, and thinking that in a way he had a family interest in the matter, and was bound to undertake the patronage of the Aetolians, he exerted himself with the greatest zeal and enthusiasm to rescue that people from their perilous position. The matter then being vigorously pushed forward on all sides at once was at length accomplished. For the Ambraciots, by the persuasion of the king, surrendered to the consul unreservedly as far as they themselves were concerned, and gave up the town, on the one condition that the Aetolian garrison should march out under truce. This primary exception they made that they might keep faith with their allies.

30. So the consul agreed to grant the Aetolians peace on condition of receiving two hundred Euboic talents down, and

[1] Nothing seems to be known of this exile of Fulvius, who had been granted an ovation in B.C. 191 for his victories in Spain. He was, however, in opposition to Cato, one of whose numerous prosecutions may have been against him.

three hundred in six yearly instalments of fifty: of the restoration to the Romans of all prisoners and deserters within six months without ransom: of their retaining no city in their league, nor thenceforth admitting any fresh one, of such as had been captured by the Romans, or had voluntarily embraced their friendship since Titus Quinctius crossed into Greece: the Cephallenians not to be included in these terms.

Terms granted to the Aetolians.

Such was the sketch in outline of the main points of the treaty. But it required first the consent of the Aetolians, and then to be referred to Rome: and meanwhile the Athenian and Rhodian envoys remained where they were, waiting for the decision of the Aetolians. On being informed by Damoteles and his colleagues on their return of the nature of the terms that had been granted them, the Aetolians consented to the general principle—for they were in fact much better than they had expected,—but in regard to the towns formerly included in their league they hesitated for some time; finally, however, they acquiesced. Marcus Fulvius accordingly took over Ambracia, and allowed the Aetolian garrison to depart under terms; but removed from the town the statues and pictures, of which there was a great number, owing to the fact of Ambracia having been a royal residence of Pyrrhus. He was also presented with a crown[1] weighing one hundred and fifty talents. After this settlement of affairs he directed his march into the interior of Aetolia, feeling surprised at meeting with no communication from the Aetolians. But on arriving at Amphilochian Argos, a hundred and eighty stades from Ambracia, he pitched his camp; and being there met by Damoteles and his colleagues with the information that the Aetolians had resolved to ratify the treaty which they had concluded, they went their several ways, the Aetolians back to their own country, and Marcus to Ambracia, where he busied himself about getting his army across to Cephallenia; while the Aetolians appointed Phaeneas and Nicander ambassadors to go to Rome about the peace: for not a single line of the above treaty held good until ratified by the Roman people.

The Aetolian people confirm the treaty.

[1] Or "a compliment." The Greek word *στέφανος* seems to be used for any present made to a victor. So also in ch. 34, and elsewhere.

31. While these envoys, accompanied by those from Rhodes and Athens, were on their voyage with this object, Marcus Fulvius sent Caius Valerius also, and some others of his friends to Rome to secure the ratification of the treaty. But when they arrived at Rome they found that a fresh cause of anger with the Aetolians had arisen by the instrumentality of king Philip; who, looking upon himself as wronged by the Aetolians having taken Athamania and Dolopia from him, had sent to some of his friends at Rome, urging them to share his displeasure and secure the rejection of the pacification. Accordingly, on the first arrival of the Aetolians, the Senate would not listen to them; but afterwards, at the intercession of the Rhodians and Athenians, changed its mind and consented to their request: for Damis,[1] besides other excellences displayed in his speech, was thought to have introduced a very apt simile, extremely applicable to the case in hand. He said

Speech of Damis.

"The Romans had good cause for anger with the Aetolians; for, instead of being grateful for the many kindnesses received at their hands, they had brought the Roman Empire into great danger by causing the war with Antiochus to break out. But the Senate were wrong in one point, namely in directing their anger against the masses. For in states the common people were like the sea, which left to its own nature was ever calm and unmoved, and not in the least likely ever to trouble any of those who approached or used it; but directly violent winds blew upon and disturbed it, and forced it against its nature to become agitated, then indeed nothing could be more dreadful or formidable than the sea. This was just the case with the Aetolians. As long as they were left to themselves, no people in Greece were more loyal to you or more staunch in supporting your active measures. But when Thoas and Dicaearchus brought a storm from Asia, and Mnestas and Damocritus from Europe, and, disturbing the calm of the Aetolian masses, compelled

[1] Hultsch's text, supported by the MSS., has Δάμις ὁ κιχησίων, from which no sense seems obtainable. According to Suidas, Damis was a philosopher from Nineveh who had settled in Athens. Livy (38, 10), has *Leon Hicesiae filius*. He must therefore have found the name Leon in his copy, which could hardly have been substituted for Δᾶμις by mistake, though ΊΚΕΣίου may have become κιχησίων.

them to become reckless of what they said or did,—then indeed their good disposition gave way to bad, and while intending to do mischief to you they really inflicted damage upon themselves. It is against these mischief-makers therefore that you should be implacable; while you should take pity on the masses and make peace with them: with the assurance that, if once more left to themselves, with the additional feeling of having owed their safety on the present occasion to you, their attachment to you will be the warmest in Greece."

32. By these arguments the Athenian envoy persuaded the Senate to make peace with the Aetolians. The decree therefore having been passed and confirmed by a vote of the people, the treaty was formally ratified, of which the text was as follows: "The people of the Aetolians shall in good faith maintain the empire and majesty of the people of Rome.

Treaty with Aetolia, B.C. 189.

"They shall not allow hostile forces to pass through their territory or cities against the Romans, their allies or friends; nor grant them any supplies from the public fund.

"They shall have the same enemies as the people of Rome; and if the Roman people go to war with any, the Aetolian people shall do so also.

"The Aetolians shall surrender to the praefectus in Corcyra, within a hundred days from the completion of the treaty, runaway slaves, and prisoners of the Romans and their allies, except such as having been taken during the war have returned to their own land and been subsequently captured; and except such as were in arms against Rome during the time that the Aetolians were fighting on the side of the Romans.

"If there should be any not found within that time, they shall hand them over as soon as they are forthcoming, without deceit or fraud. And such persons, after the completion of the treaty, shall not be allowed to return to Aetolia.

"The Aetolians shall pay the consul in Greece at once two hundred Euboic talents of silver, of a standard not inferior to the Attic. In place of one third of this silver, they may, if they so choose, pay gold, at the rate of a mina of gold to ten minae of silver. They shall pay the money in the six years

next following the completion of the treaty in yearly instalments of fifty talents; and shall deliver the money in Rome.

"The Aetolians shall give the Consul forty hostages, not less than ten or more than forty years old, to remain for the six years; they shall be selected by the Romans freely, excepting only the Strategus, Hipparch, public secretary, and such as have already been hostages at Rome.

"The Aetolians shall deliver such hostages in Rome; and if any one of them die, they shall give another in his place.

"Cephallenia shall not be included in this treaty.

"Of such territories, cities, and men as once belonged to the Aetolians, and, in the consulship of Titus Quinctius and Cnaeus Domitius, or subsequently, were either captured by the Roman or voluntarily embraced their friendship, the Aetolians shall not annex any, whether city or men therein.

B.C. 192.

"The city and territory of Oeniadae shall belong to the Acarnanians."

The treaty having been solemnly sworn, peace was concluded, and the war in Aetolia, as is in the rest of Greece, thus came to an end. . . .

THE WAR WITH THE GAULS OF ASIA

33. While the negotiations for peace with Antiochus, and for the settlement of Asia generally were going on at Rome, and the Aetolian war was being fought in Greece, it happened that another war in Asia, that, namely, against the Gauls, was brought to a conclusion, the account of which I am now about to give. . . .

34. Moagĕtes was Tyrant of Cibyra, a cruel and crafty man, whose career deserves somewhat more than a passing reference. . . .

When Cnaeus Manlius was approaching Cibyra and had sent Helvius to find out the intentions of Moagĕtes, the latter begged him by ambassadors not to damage the country, because he was a friend of Rome, and ready to do anything that was required of him; and, at the same time, he offered Helvius a compliment of fifteen

Coss. Cn. Manlius Vulso, M. Fulvius Nobilior, B.C. 189; Moagĕtes reduced to submission.

talents. In answer to this, Helvius said that he would refrain from damaging the territory; but that as to the general question Moagĕtes must communicate with the Consul, for he was close behind with his army. Moagĕtes accordingly sent ambassadors to Cnaeus, his own brother being one of them. When the Consul met them in the road, he addressed them in threatening and reproachful terms, asserting that "Not only had Moagĕtes shown himself the most determined enemy of Rome, of all the princes in Asia, but had done his very best to overthrow their empire, and deserved punishment rather than friendship."[1] Terrified by this display of anger, the ambassadors abstained from delivering the rest of the message with which they were charged, and merely begged him to have an interview with Moagĕtes: and when Cnaeus consented they returned to Cibyra. Next morning the Tyrant came out of the town accompanied by his friends, displaying his humility by a mean dress and absence of all pomp; and, in conducting his defence, descanted in melancholy terms on his own helplessness and the poverty of the towns under his rule (which consisted of Cibyra, Syleium, and the town in the Marsh), and entreated Cnaeus to accept the fifteen talents. Astonished at his assurance, Cnaeus made no answer, except that, "If he did not pay five hundred talents, and be thankful that he was allowed to do so, he would not loot the country, but he would storm and sack the city." In abject terror Moagĕtes begged him not to do anything of the sort; and kept adding to his offer little by little, until at last he persuaded Cnaeus to take one hundred talents, and one thousand medimni of corn, and admit him to friendship.[2] . . .

35. When Cnaeus Manlius was crossing the River Colobatus, ambassadors came to him from the town of Sinda (in Pisidia) begging for help, because the people of Termessus had called in the aid of the people of Philomelus, and had depopulated their territory and sacked their town; and were at that very moment besieg- Pacification of Pamphylia.

[1] The Greek text is corrupt. The sense is given from Livy, 38, 14.

[2] The dynasty lasted until the time of the Mithridatic wars. The last Moagĕtes being deposed by Muraena, when Cibyra was joined to Lycia. Strabo, 13, 4, 71.

ing its citadel, into which all the citizens, with wives and children, had retreated. On hearing this, Cnaeus immediately promised them aid with the greatest readiness; and thinking the affair was a stroke of luck for himself, directed his march towards Pamphylia. On his arrival in the neighbourhood of Termessus, he admitted the Termessians to friendship on the payment of fifty talents. He did the same with the Aspendians: and having received the ambassadors of the other towns in Pamphylia, he impressed on them in these interviews the conviction mentioned above,[1] and having relieved the Sindians from their siege, he once more directed his march against the Gauls. . . .

Conquest of Pisidia.

36. After taking the town of Cyrmasa (in Pisidia), and a very large booty, Cnaeus Manlius continued his advance. And as he was marching along the marsh, envoys came from Lysinoe, offering an unconditional surrender. After accepting this, Cnaeus entered the territory of Sagalassus, and having driven off a vast quantity of spoil waited to see what the Sagalassians were prepared to do. When their ambassadors arrived he received them; and accepting a compliment of fifty talents, twenty thousand medimni of barley, and twenty thousand of wheat, admitted them to friendship with Rome. . . .

Cnaeus Manlius in Galatia.

37. Cnaeus sent envoys to Eposognatus the Gaul, desiring him to send embassies to the kings of the Gauls. Eposognatus in his turn sent envoys to Cnaeus begging him not to move his quarters or attack the Tolistobogian Gauls; and assuring him that he would send embassies to the kings, and propose peace to them, and felt quite certain that he would be able to bring them to a proper view of affairs in all respects. . . .

In the course of his march through the country Cnaeus made a bridge over the River Sangorius, which was extremely deep and difficult to cross. And having encamped on the bank of the river, he was visited by some Galli[2] sent by Attis and Battacus, the priests of the mother of the gods at Pesinus, wearing figures and images on their breasts, and announcing

[1] That is probably "of the necessity of submitting to Rome;" but the passage referred to is lost.

[2] See ch. 6.

that the goddess promised him victory and power; to whom Cnaeus gave a courteous reception. . . .

When Cnaeus was at the small town of Gordieium, ambassadors came from Eposognatus, announcing that he had been round and talked with the kings of the Gauls, but that they would not consent to make any overtures of friendship whatever; on the contrary, they had collected their children and women on Mount Olympus, and were prepared to give battle. . . .

The victory of the Romans over the Tolistoboii at Mount Olympus is described by Livy, 38, 19-23; *that over the Tectosages, a few miles from Ancyra, in* 38, 24-27. *The second battle took place in mid-autumn*, B.C. 189; *and the result was that the Gauls gave in their submission at Ephesus, and were forced to engage to leave off predatory excursions, and to confine themselves to their own frontiers. Livy*, 38, 27 *and* 40.

38. It chanced that among the prisoners made when the Romans won the victory at Olympus over the Gauls of Asia, was Chiomara, wife of Ortiago. The centurion who had charge of her availed himself of his chance in soldierly fashion, and violated her.

The vengeance of Chiomara, wife of the Gallic chief Ortiago. See Livy, 38, 24.

He was a slave indeed both to lust and money: but eventually his love of money got the upper hand; and, on a large sum of gold being agreed to be paid for the woman, he led her off to put her to ransom. There being a river between the two camps, when the Gauls had crossed it, paid the man the money, and received the woman, she ordered one of them by a nod to strike the Roman as he was in the act of taking a polite and affectionate farewell of her. The man obeyed, and cut off the centurion's head, which she picked up and drove off with, wrapped in the folds of her dress. On reaching her husband she threw the head at his feet; and when he expressed astonishment and said: "Wife to keep faith is a good thing," she replied: "Yes; but it is a better thing that there should be only one man alive who has lain with me!" [Polybius says that he conversed with the

woman at Sardis, and was struck with her dignified demeanour and intelligence.][1] . . .

89. After the victory over the Gauls at Olympus, when the Romans were encamped at Ancyra, and Cnaeus was on the point of continuing his advance, ambassadors came from the Tectosages asking that Cnaeus would leave his troops in their quarters, and advance himself in the course of the next day into the space between the two camps; and promising that their kings would come to meet him, and discuss the terms of a peace. But when Cnaeus consented, and duly arrived at the appointed place with five hundred horse, the kings did not appear. After his return to the camp, however, the ambassadors came again, and, offering some excuses for the kings, begged him to come once more, as they would send some of their chief men to discuss the whole question. Cnaeus consented; but, without leaving the camp himself, sent Attalus and some tribunes with three hundred horse. The envoys of the Gauls duly appeared and discussed the business: but finally said that it was impossible for them to conclude the matter or ratify anything they agreed upon; but they engaged that the kings would come next day to agree on the terms, and finally settle the treaty, if the Consul would also come to them. Attalus promised that Cnaeus would come, and they separated for that day. But the Gauls were deliberately contriving these postponements, and amusing the Romans, because they wanted to get some part of their families and property beyond the river Halys; and, first of all, to get the Roman Consul into their hands if they could, but if not, at any rate to kill him. With this purpose they watched next day for the coming of the Romans, with a thousand horse ready to fall upon him. When Cnaeus heard the result of Attalus's interview, believing that the kings would come, he left the camp, attended as usual by five hundred horse. Now it happened that, on the days of the previous interviews, the foraging parties which went out

The Gauls try to take Cnaeus Manlius by a stratagem, but are foiled. See Livy, 38, 25.

[1] This is really Plutarch's version of a story he found in Polybius, and, to judge from Livy, 38, 24, not a very complete one. It took place near Ancyra. Plutarch *de mulierum virtutibus.*

from the Roman camp to fetch wood and hay had gone in the same direction, in order to have the protection of the squadron which went to the parley. A numerous foraging party acted in the same way on this third occasion, and the tribunes ordered them to proceed in the same direction, with the usual number of horsemen to protect them as they advanced. And their being out on this duty proved accidentally to be the salvation of their comrades in the danger which threatened them. . . .

CEPHALLENIA

The citadel of Same in Cephallenia taken by a night surprise.

40. M. Fulvius took the quarter of the town in which was the citadel by a night surprise, and introduced the Romans into the town.[1]

Philopoemen's policy towards Sparta. See above, bk. 19.

41. The good and the expedient are seldom compatible, and rare indeed are those who can combine and reconcile them. For as a general rule we all know that the good shuns the principles of immediate profit, and profit those of the good. However, Philopoemen attempted this task, and succeeded in his aim. For it was a good thing to restore the captive exiles to Sparta; and it was an expedient thing to humble the Lacedaemonian state, and to punish those who had served as bodyguards to a tyrant. But seeing clearly that money is ever the support on which every dynasty rests, and having a clear head and the instincts of a ruler, he took measures to prevent the introduction into the town of money from outside. . . .

Cnaeus Manlius spends the winter of 189-188 B C.

43.[2] Meanwhile in Asia the Roman consul Cnaeus Manlius wintered at Ephesus, in the last year of this Olympiad, and was there visited by embassies from the Greek cities in Asia and many others,

[1] See Livy, 38, 28, 29. The fragment here seems to be that translated by Livy in ch. 29, *Romani nocte per arcem, quam Cyatidem vocant (nam urbs in mare devexa in Occidentem vergit) muro superato in forum pervenerunt.* The people of Same suddenly threw off the terms under which the rest of Cephallania had submitted and stood a four months' siege.

[2] A fragment, arranged in Hultsch's text as ch. 42, is too much mutilated to be translated with any approach to correctness.

at Ephesus, the last year of the 147th Olympiad, and arranges the settlement of Asia.

bringing complimentary crowns to him for his victories over the Gauls. For the entire inhabitants of Asia this side Taurus were not so much rejoiced at the prospect given them by Antiochus's defeat of being relieved from tribute, garrisons, or other royal exactions, as at the removal of all fear of the barbarians, and at their escape from their insolence and lawlessness. Among the rest Musaeus came from Antiochus, and some envoys from the Gauls, desiring to ascertain the terms upon which friendship would be granted them; and also from Ariarathes, the king of Cappadocia. For this latter prince, having attached himself to the fortunes of Antiochus, and having taken part in his battle with the Romans, had become alarmed and dismayed for his own fate, and therefore was endeavouring by frequent embassies to ascertain what he would have to pay or do to get pardon for his error. The Consul complimented the ambassadors from the cities, and dismissed them after a very favourable reception; but he replied to the Gauls that he would not make a treaty with them until king Eumenes, whom he expected, had arrived. To the envoys from Ariarathes he said that they might have peace on the payment of six hundred talents. With the ambassador of Antiochus he arranged that he would come with his army to the frontier of Pamphylia, to receive the two thousand five hundred talents, and the corn with which the king had undertaken to furnish the Roman soldiers before his treaty with Lucius Scipio. This business being thus settled, he solemnly purified his army; and, as the season for military operations was now beginning, he broke up his quarters, and, taking Attalus with him, arrived at Apameia in eight days' march, and remained there three days. On the fourth he continued his advance; and, pushing on at great speed, arrived on the third day at the rendezvous with Antiochus, and there pitched his camp. Here he was visited by Musaeus, who begged him to wait, as the carts and cattle that were bringing the corn and money were late. He consented to wait: and, when the supply arrived, he distributed the corn among the soldiers, and handed over the money to one of his tribunes, with orders to convey it to Apameia.

Spring of B.C. 188.

44. He himself started in full force for Perga, where he heard that a commander of a garrison placed in that town by Antiochus had neither left it himself nor withdrawn his garrison. When he came within a short distance of the place he was met by the captain of the garrison, who begged Cnaeus not to condemn him unheard. "He had received the city from Antiochus in trust, and was holding it until he should be instructed what to do by the sovereign who had entrusted it to him." And he therefore begged for thirty days' respite, to enable him to send and ask the king for instructions. Observing that Antiochus was behaving straightforwardly in other particulars, Cnaeus consented to allow him to send and ask the king the question. After some days the officer accordingly received an answer, and surrendered the city.

A faithful officer at Perga.

About this time, just at the beginning of summer, the ten commissioners and king Eumenes arrived by sea at Ephesus; and, after giving themselves two days to recover from the voyage, proceeded up the country to Apameia. When their arrival was known to Cnaeus Manlius, he sent his brother Lucius with four thousand men to Oroanda (in Pisidia), as a forcible hint that they must pay the money owing, in accordance with the terms agreed on; while he himself marched his army at full speed to meet Eumenes and the commissioners. On his arrival he found the king and the ten commissioners, and immediately held a consultation with them on the measures to be taken. The first resolution come to was to confirm the sworn agreement and treaty with Antiochus, about which I need say no more, beyond giving the actual text of the treaty, which was as follows:—

Summer, B.C. 188. The ten Roman commissioners arrive in Asia. See ch. 24.

45. "There shall be perpetual peace between Antiochus and the Romans if he fulfils the provisions of the treaty.

Text of the treaty between Antiochus and Rome.

"Neither Antiochus nor any subject to him shall allow any to pass through their territories to attack the Romans or their allies, nor supply them with aught. Neither shall the Romans or their allies do the like for those attacking Antiochus or those subject to him.

"Antiochus shall not wage war upon the Islanders or the dwellers in Europe.

"He shall evacuate all cities and territory (this side Taurus[1]). His soldiers shall take nothing out with them except the arms they are carrying. If they chance to have taken anything away they shall restore it to the same cities.

"He shall receive neither soldiers nor other men from the territory of king Eumenes.

"If there be any men in the army of Antiochus coming from any of the cities taken over by the Romans, he shall deliver them up at Apameia.

"If there be any from the kingdom of Antiochus with the Romans or their allies, they may remain or depart as they choose.

"Antiochus and those subject to him shall give back the slaves, captives, and deserters of the Romans or their allies and any captive received from any quarter. Antiochus shall give up, if it be within his power so to do, Hannibal, son of Hamilcar, the Carthaginian, Mnesilochus the Acarnanian, Thoas the Aetolian, Euboulidas and Philo the Chalcidians, and such of the Aetolians as have held national offices.

"Antiochus shall give up all his elephants, and shall have none henceforth.

"Antiochus shall surrender his ships of war, their tackle, and fittings, and henceforth have only ten decked ships. He shall not have a vessel rowed by thirty oars, [or by less][2] for purposes of war begun by himself.

"He shall not sail west of the river Calycadnus and the promontory of Sarpedon, except to convey tribute or ambassadors or hostages.

"It shall not be lawful for Antiochus to enlist soldiers or receive exiles from the territory subject to Rome.

"Such houses as belonged to the Rhodians or their allies, in the territory subject to Antiochus, shall continue to belong to the Rhodians as before the war: any money owed to them

[1] These words are wanting in the text. From Livy (38, 38) it appears that the territory was defined as between the Taurus and the R. Halys as far as the borders of Lycaonia.

[2] Livy (*l.c.*) has *neve monerem ex belli causa quod ipse illaturus erit.*

shall still be recoverable: and any property left behind by them, if sought for, shall be restored.

"The Rhodians shall, as before the war, be free from tribute.

"If Antiochus has given any of the towns to others which he is bound to restore, he shall remove from them also his garrisons and men. And if any shall wish hereafter to desert to him, he shall not receive them.

"Antiochus shall pay to the Romans ten thousand talents, in ten yearly instalments, of the best Attic silver, each talent to weigh not less than eighty Roman pounds, and ninety thousand medemni of corn.

"Antiochus shall pay to king Eumenes three hundred and fifty talents in the five years next following, in yearly instalments of seventy talents; and in lieu of the corn, according to the valuation of Antiochus himself, one hundred and twenty-seven talents, two hundred and eight drachmae, which sum Eumenes has consented to accept 'as satisfying his claims.'

"Antiochus shall give twenty hostages, not less than eighteen nor more than forty-five years old, and change them every three years.

"If there be in any year a deficit in the instalment paid, Antiochus shall make it good in the next year.

"If any of the cities or nations, against whom it has been hereby provided that Antiochus should not make war, should commence war against him, it shall be lawful for Antiochus to war with them; but of such nations and cities he shall not have sovereignty nor attach them as friends to himself.

"Such complaints as arise between the parties to this treaty shall be referred to arbitration.

"If both parties agree in wishing anything to be added to or taken from this treaty, it shall be lawful so to do."

46. Immediately after this treaty had been solemnly sworn to, the proconsul Cnaeus sent Quintus Minucius Thermus and his brother Lucius, who had just brought the money from Oroanda to Syria, with orders to receive the oath from the king, and confirm the several clauses of the treaty. And to Quintus Fabius Labeo, who was in command of the fleet, he sent a despatch ordering

Burning of Antiochus's ships at Patara in Lycia.

him to sail back to Patara, and take over and burn the ships there. . . .

Ariarathes V. King of Cappadocia.

47. The proconsul Cnaeus Manlius made Ariarathes a friend of Rome on receipt of three hundred talents. . . .

Final settlement of the affairs of Asia Minor by the commissioners. Autumn B.C. 188.

48. At Apameia the Proconsul and the ten commissioners, after listening to all who appealed to them, assigned in the case of disputed claims to territory, money, or anything else, certain cities in which the parties might have their claims settled by arbitration. The general scheme which they drew out was as follows: Those of the autonomous cities which, having formerly paid tribute to Antiochus, had remained faithful to Rome, they relieved from tribute altogether. Those that had been tributary to Attalus they ordered to pay the same tribute to his successor Eumenes. Such as had abandoned the Roman friendship and joined Antiochus in the war, they ordered to pay Eumenes the amount of tribute imposed on them by Antiochus. The people of Colophon, Notium, Cymae, and Mylae, they freed from tribute. To the Clazomenians, besides this relief, they gave the Island Drymussa. To the Ephesians they restored the sacred district which they had been obliged by the enemy to evacuate. . . .[1] To the people of Chios, Smyrna, and Erythrae, besides other marks of honour, they assigned the territory which they severally expressed a wish to have at the time, and alleged was their right, from regard for their loyalty and zeal which they had shown to Rome during the war. To the Phocaeans they restored their ancestral city and the territory which they possessed of old. They next transacted business with the Rhodians, giving them Lycia and Caria up to the river Maeander, except Telmissus. As to king Eumenes and his brothers, not content with the liberal provision made for them in their treaty with Antiochus, they now assigned him in addition the Chersonese, Lysimacheia, and the castles on the borders of these districts, and such country as had been subject to Antiochus in Europe; and in Asia, Phrygia on the

[1] See Livy, 38, 39. Some words are lost referring to grants to the people of Ilium.

Hellespont, Great Phrygia, so much of Mysia as he had before subjugated, Lycaonia, Milyas, Lydia, Tralles, Ephesus, and Telmissus: all these they gave to Eumenes. As to Pamphylia, Eumenes alleged that it was on this side Taurus, the ambassadors of Antiochus on the other; and the commissioners feeling unable to decide, referred the question to the Senate. Having thus decided the largest number and most important of the matters brought before them, they started on the road towards the Hellespont, intending on their journey to still further secure the settlement arrived at with the Gauls. . . .

BOOK XXII

CONTENTS

In the 148th Olympiad (B.C. 188-184) *embassies came from Philip and the tribes bordering on Macedonia to Rome. The decrees of the Senate concerning them. In Greece the quarrel of Philip with the Thessalians and Perrhaebians about the cities held by Philip in their countries from the time of the war with Antiochus. The decision concerning them before Q. Caecilius at Tempe. Decisions of Caecilius. A difference of Philip with the ambassadors of Eumenes and the exiles from Maroneia; the pleadings on these points at Thessalonica and the decision of Caecilius. The massacre at Maroneia instigated by king Philip. The arrival of the Roman legates, and their decisions. The causes of the war between the Romans and Perseus. Arrival of ambassadors from kings Ptolemy and Eumenes and Seleucus in the Peloponnese. The decision of the Achaeans on the alliance with Ptolemy, and on the gifts offered them by these kings. Arrival of Q. Caecilius and his disapprobation of the measures taken in regard to Sparta. Embassy of Areus and Alcibiades, two of the earlier exiles from Sparta, to Rome, and their accusations against Philopoemen and the Achaeans. The Roman envoys come to Cleitor, where there is an Achaean assembly. The speeches delivered for both parties, and the Achaean decrees in the affair of Sparta.*[1]

3. AFTER the execution of the men at Compasium,[2] some of the Lacedaemonians, incensed at what had been done, and

[1] This summary is arranged by Hultsch as chs. 1 and 2 of book 22. It appears as book 23, chs. 4, 5 in Schweighaeuser's text.

[2] In B.C. 191 Philopoemen secured the adhesion of Sparta to the Achaean league: but the Spartans were never united in their loyalty to it, and during his year as Strategus (B.C. 189) he punished a massacre of some Achaean

believing that the power and authority of the Romans had been set at naught by Philopoemen, went to Rome and accused Philopoemen and his proceedings; and finally obtained a letter addressed to the Achaeans from Marcus Lepidus, the consul of the year, and afterwards Pontifex Maximus, in which he told the Achaeans that they had not acted equitably in the matters of the Lacedaemonians. At the same time as this mission from Sparta, Philopoemen also appointed Nicodemus of Elis and others to go on an embassy to Rome.

An appeal to Rome against Philopoemen. B.C. 187. Coss. M. Aemilius Lepidus, C. Flamininus.

Just at that time Demetrius of Athens came on a mission from Ptolemy, to renew the existing alliance between the king and the Achaean league. This was eagerly accepted, and my father, Lycortas, and Theodoridas, and Rositeles of Sicyon were appointed ambassadors to take the oaths on behalf of the Achaeans, and receive those of the king. And on that occasion a circumstance occurred, which, though not important perhaps, is still worth recording. After the completion of this renewal of alliance on behalf of the Achaeans, Philopoemen entertained the ambassador; and in the course of the banquet the ambassador introduced the king's name, and said a great deal in his praise, quoting anecdotes of his skill and boldness in hunting, as well as his excellence in riding and the use of arms; and ended by quoting, as a proof of what he said, that the king on horseback once transfixed a bull with a javelin. . . .

Renewal of the treaty between the Achaean league and Ptolemy.

The accomplishments of Ptolemy Epiphanes.

4. In Boeotia, after the formation of the treaty between Rome and Antiochus, the hopes of the whole revolutionary party were destroyed. Politics therefore began to assume a new aspect; and whereas the administration of justice among them had been postponed for nearly the last twenty years, voices began to make themselves heard in the cities to the

The effect of the collapse of Antiochus upon Boeotia.

sympathisers in Sparta by an execution of eighty Spartans at Compasium on the frontier of Laconia. This number Plutarch gives on the authority of Polybius, but another account stated it at three hundred and fifty. Plut. *Phil.* 16.

effect that "there ought to be an end and settlement of their mutual disputes." But after considerable controversy on this point, because the discontented were more numerous than the wealthy, the following circumstance occurred which helped accidently to support the party of order. Titus Flamininus had for some time past been zealously working in Rome to secure the restoration of Zeuxippus to Boeotia, because he had found him serviceable on many occasions during the wars with Antiochus and Philip. And just at this time he had induced the Senate to send a despatch to the Boeotians ordering them to recall Zeuxippus and his fellow exiles. When this despatch arrived, the Boeotians, fearing that, if these men were restored, they would become detached from their good understanding with Macedonia, determined that the legal sentence upon Zeuxippus and the rest should be publicly proclaimed,[1] which they had formerly drawn up against them. Thus they condemned them on two charges, first, of sacrilege for having stripped off the silver from the plated table of Zeus, and, secondly, of murder for having killed Brachylles. Having made this arrangement, they assumed that they need pay no further attention to the despatch of the Senate, but contented themselves with sending Callicritus and others to Rome with the message that they were unable to rescind what had been settled by their laws. Zeuxippus having sent an embassy to the Senate at the same time, the Romans wrote to the Aetolians and Achaeans an account of the attitude assumed by the Boeotians, and ordered them to restore Zeuxippus to his country. The Achaeans refrained from invading the country with an army, but selected some ambassadors to go and persuade the Boeotians to obey the orders from Rome; and also to settle the legal disputes existing between them and the Achaeans, on the same principles as they conducted the administration of justice at home: for it happened that there were some controversies between the two nations that had been dragging on for a long time. On receiving this message the Boeotians, whose Strategus was then Hippias, promised at the moment that they would do

Resistance to the recall of Zeuxippus.

See 18, 43. Livy, 33, 28.

[1] Some words are lost from the text describing their method of procedure.

what was demanded of them, but shortly afterwards neglected it at every point. Therefore, when Hippias had laid down his office and Alcetas had succeeded him, Philopoemen gave all who chose license to make reprisals on the territories of the Boeotians; which proved the beginning of a serious quarrel between the two nations. For on the cattle of Myrrichus and Simon being driven off,[1] and a struggle arising over this transaction, the contest soon ceased to be political, and became the beginning and prelude of open war. If indeed the Senate had persisted in carrying out the restoration of Zeuxippus, war would quickly have been kindled; but as it maintained silence on the subject, the Megareans were induced by an embassy proposing terms to stop the reprisals. . . .[1]

Rhodes and the Lycians.

5. A quarrel arose between the Lycians and Rhodians from the following causes. When the ten commissioners were employed in the settlement of Asia, they were visited by Theaetetus and Philophron on a mission from Rhodes, demanding that Lycia and Caria should be given to them in return for the goodwill and zeal displayed by them in the war with Antiochus. At the same time Hipparchus and Satyrus came from Ilium begging, on the ground of their kindred with the Lycians, that the latter should receive pardon for their transgressions. The commissioners listened to these pleadings, and tried to do what they could to satisfy both. For the sake of the people of Ilium, they inflicted no severity on the Lycians, but gratified the Rhodians by presenting them with the sovereignty over that people. This decision was the origin of a serious division and controversy between the Lycians and Rhodians. For the envoys of Ilium visited the Lycian cities, giving out that they had succeeded in pacifying the Roman anger, and that they owed their liberty to them; while Theaetetus and his colleague took back word to their countrymen that Lycia and all Caria south of the Maeander had been given as a free gift by the Romans to Rhodes. Presently an embassy came from Lycia to Rhodes desiring an alliance; while the Rhodians on their part had elected certain of their citizens to go to Lycia and give

[1] Some words are lost in the text which would more fully explain the transaction.

orders to the several cities as to what they were to do. They were thus entirely at cross purposes, and for some time the cause of the misunderstanding was not generally intelligible. But when the Lycian ambassadors appeared in the assembly and began talking about an alliance, and Pothion the Prytanis rose after them and explained the different ideas which the two people entertained on the subject, and moreover, sternly rebuked the Lycian envoys,[1] the latter declared that they would endure anything rather than be subject to the Rhodians. . . .

EGYPT UNDER PTOLEMY EPIPHANES AFTER THE DEATH OF ARISTOMENES (18, 53, 54)

6. All men admire the magnanimity of Philip towards Athens; for though he had been injured as well as abused by them, yet when he conquered them at Chaeroneia, so far from using this opportunity for injuring his opponents, he caused the corpses of the Athenians to be buried with the proper ceremonies; while those of them who had been taken prisoners he actually presented with clothes, and restored to their friends without ransom. But though men praise they do not imitate such conduct. They rather try to outdo those with whom they are at war, in bitterness of passion and severity of vengeance. Ptolemy, for instance, had men tied naked to carts and dragged at their tail, and then put to death with torture. . . .

Contrast of the conduct of Philip II. of Macedon to Athens in B.C. 338 with that of Ptolemy.

7. When this same Ptolemy was besieging Lycopolis, the Egyptian nobles surrendered to the king at discretion; and his cruel treatment of them involved him in manifold dangers. The same was the result at the time Polycrates suppressed the revolt. For Athinis, Pausiras, Chesuphus, and Irobastus, who still survived of the rebellious nobles, yielding to necessity, appeared at the city of Sais and surrendered at discretion to the king. But Ptolemy, regardless of all pledges, had them tied naked to the carts and dragged off, and then put to death with torture. He then went to

Suppression of the revolt in lower Egypt, B.C. 186-185.

Lycopolis in the Thebaid.

[1] Something is lost in the text.

Naucratis with his army, where he received the mercenaries enlisted for him by Aristonicus from Greece, and thence sailed to Alexandria, without having taken any part whatever in the actual operations of the war, thanks to the dishonest advice of Polycrates, though he was now twenty-five years old. . . .

8. At this time were sowed the seeds of fatal evils to the royal house of Macedonia. I am aware that some historians of the war between Rome and Perseus, when they wish to set forth the causes of the quarrel for our information, assign as the primary one the expulsion of Abrupolis from his principality, on the ground of having made a raid upon the mines at Pangaeum after the death of Philip, which Perseus repulsed, finally expelling him entirely out of his own dominions. Next they mention the invasion of Dolopia, and the visit of Perseus to Delphi, the plot against Eumenes at Delphi, and the murder of the ambassadors in Boeotia; and from these they say sprang the war between Perseus and the Romans. But my contention is that it is of most decisive advantage, both to historians and their readers, to know the causes from which the several events are born and spring. Most historians confound these, because they do not keep a firm hold upon the distinction between a pretext and a cause, or again between a pretext and a beginning of a war. And since events at the present time recall this distinction I feel compelled to renew my discussion of this subject. For instance, of the events just referred to, the first three are pretexts; the last two—the plot against Eumenes, the murder of the ambassadors, and other similar things that happened during the same period—are clear *beginnings* of the war between Rome and Perseus, and of the final overthrow of the Macedonian kingdom; but not one of them is a *cause* of these things. I will illustrate by examples. Just as we say that Philip son of Amyntas contemplated and determined upon accomplishing the war with Persia, while Alexander put into execution what he had projected, so in the present instance we say that Philip son of Demetrius first pro-

B.C. 186. The origin of the last Macedonian war.

Abrupolis, a Thracian prince and friend of the Romans. See Livy, 42, 13, 40. Death of Philip V. B.C. 179.

B.C. 176-172.

See bk. 3, ch. 6.

jected the last war against Rome, and had all his preparations ready for the execution of his design, but that after his death Perseus became the agent in carrying out the undertaking itself. If this be true, the following also is clear: it is impossible that the causes of the war should have been subsequent to the death of him who resolved upon and projected it; which would be the case if we accepted the account of these historians; for the events alleged by them as its causes were subsequent to the death of Philip. . . .

Complaints lodged against Philip at Rome, B.C. 185.

9. About the same time ambassadors came to Rome from king Eumenes, informing the Senate of the encroachment of Philip upon the cities in Thrace. There came also the exiles of the Maronitae denouncing Philip, and charging him with being the cause of their expulsion. These were followed by Athamanians, Perrhaebians, and Thessalians, demanding the restoration of their cities which Philip had taken from them during the war with Antiochus. Ambassadors also came from Philip to make answer to all accusers. After repeated debates between all these envoys and the ambassadors of Philip, the Senate decided to appoint a commission at once, to investigate the actions of Philip, and to protect all who chose to state their views and their complaints of the king to his face. The legates thus appointed were Quintus Caecilius, Marcus Baebius, and Tiberius Claudius.[1] . . .

A commission of investigation appointed.

Aenus in Thrace.

There was again a war of parties among the Aenii, one side inclining to Eumenes, the other to Macedonia. . . .

The result of these embassies was the Congress of Tempe, at which no definite settlement was made. Livy, 39, 25-28.

A MEETING OF THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE PARLIAMENT

Philopoemen Achaean Strategus for two years running, from

10. I have already stated that in the Peloponnese, while Philopoemen was still Strategus, the Achaean league sent an embassy to Rome

[1] Livy (39, 24) gives the names as Q. Caecilius Metellus, M. Baebius Tamphilus, Ti. Sempronius.

on the subject of Sparta, and another to king Ptolemy to renew their ancient alliance. May B.C. 189 to May B.C. 187.

Immediately after Philopoemen had been succeeded by Aristaenus as Strategus, the ambassadors of king Ptolemy arrived, while the league meeting was assembled at Megalopolis. King Eumenes also had despatched an embassy offering to give the Achaeans one hundred and twenty talents, on condition that it was invested and the interest used to pay the council of the league at the time of the federal assemblies. Ambassadors came also from king Seleucus, to renew his friendship with them, and offering a present of a fleet of ten ships of war. But when the assembly got to business, the first to come forward to speak was Nicodemus of Elis, who recounted to the Achaeans what he and his colleagues had said in the Roman Senate about Sparta, and read the answer of the Senate; which was to the effect that the Senate disapproved of the destruction of the walls, and of the execution of the men put to death at Compasium, but that it did not rescind any arrangement made. No one saying a word for or against this, the subject was allowed to pass.

Aristaenus. May, B.C. 187 to May, B.C. 186.

Seleucus Philopator succeeded his father Antiochus the Great, B.C. 187.

Business of the Achaean assembly.

Letter from the Senate on the subject of Philopoemen's actions at Sparta.

Next came the ambassadors from Eumenes, who renewed the ancestral friendship of the king with the Achaeans, and stated to the assembly the offer made by him. They spoke at great length on these subjects, and retired after setting forth the greatness of the king's kindness and affection to the nation.

The offer of Eumenes.

11. After they had finished their speech, Apollonidas of Sicyon rose and said that: "As far as the amount of the money was concerned, it was a present worthy of the Achaeans. But if they looked to the intention of the donor, or the purpose to which the gift was to be applied, none could well be more insulting and more unconstitutional. The laws prohibited any one, whether a private individual or magistrate, from accepting presents from a king on any pretence whatever; but if they took this money they

Answer of Apollonidas.

would every one of them be plainly accepting a present, which was at once the gravest possible breach of the law, and confessedly the deepest possible personal disgrace. For that the council should take a great wage from Eumenes, and meet to deliberate on the interests of the league after swallowing such a bait, was manifestly disgraceful and injurious. It was Eumenes that offered money now; presently it would be Prusias; and then Seleucus. But as the interests of democracies and of kings are quite opposite to each other, and as our most frequent and most important deliberations concern the points of controversy arising between us and the kings, one of two things must necessarily happen; either the interests of the king will have precedence over our own, or we must incur the reproach of ingratitude for opposing our paymasters." He therefore urged the Achaeans not only to decline the offer, but to hold Eumenes in detestation for thinking of making it.

Speech of Cassander of Aegina.

Next rose Cassander of Aegina and reminded the Achaeans of "The misfortunes which the Aeginetans had met with through being members of the Achaean league; when Publius Sulpicius sailed against them with the Roman fleet, and sold all the unhappy Aeginetans into slavery." In regard to this subject I have already related how the Aetolians, having got possession of Aegina in virtue of their treaty with Rome, sold it to Attalus for thirty talents. Cassander therefore drew the attention of the Achaeans to these facts; and demanded that Eumenes should not seek to gain the affection of the Achaeans by offering them money, but that he should establish an incontestable claim to every sign of devotion by giving back Aegina. He urged the Achaeans not to accept presents which would place them in the position of being the destroyers of the hopes of Aeginetan restoration for all time.

The present of Eumenes is refused.

After these speeches had been delivered, the people showed such signs of enthusiastic approval that no one ventured to speak on the side of the king; but the whole assembly rejected the offer by acclamation, though its amount certainly made it exceedingly tempting.

12. The next subject introduced for debate was that of king Ptolemy. The ambassadors who had been on the mission

to Ptolemy were called forward, and Lycortas, acting as spokesman, began by stating how they had interchanged oaths of alliance with the king; and next announced that they brought a present from the king to the Achaean league of six thousand stands of arms for peltasts, and two thousand talents in bronze coinage. He added a panegyric on the king, and finished his speech by a brief reference to the goodwill and active benevolence of the king towards the Achaeans. Upon this the Strategus of the Achaeans, Aristaenus, stood up and asked Lycortas and his colleagues in the embassy to Ptolemy "which alliance it was that he had thus renewed?"

Ptolemy. The speech of Lycortas.

A mistake discovered.

No one answering the question, but all the assembly beginning to converse with each other, the Council chamber was filled with confusion. The cause of this absurd state of things was this. There had been several treaties of alliance formed between the Achaeans and Ptolemy's kingdom, as widely different in their provision as in the circumstances which gave rise to them: but neither had Ptolemy's envoy made any distinction when arranging for the renewal, merely speaking in general terms on the matter, nor had the ambassadors sent from Achaia; but they had interchanged the oaths on the assumption of there being but one treaty. The result was, that, on the Strategus quoting all the treaties, and pointing out in detail the differences between them, which turned out to be important, the assembly demanded to know which it was that it was renewing. And when no one was able to explain, not even Philopoemen himself, who had been in office when the renewal was made, nor Lycortas and his colleagues who had been on the mission to Alexandria, these men all began to be regarded as careless in conducting the business of the league; while Aristaenus acquired great reputation as being the only man who knew what he was talking about; and finally, the assembly refused to allow the ratification, voting on account of this blunder that the business should be postponed.

Then the ambassadors from Seleucus entered with their proposal. The Achaeans, however, voted to renew the friendship with Seleucus, but to decline for the present the gift of the ships.

Offer of Seleucus.

18. Having thus finished their deliberations, the assembly broke up and the people separated to their several cities. But subsequently, while the (Nemean) games were in course of celebration, Quintus Caecilius arrived from Macedonia, on his way back from the embassy which he had been conducting to Philip. Aristaenus having called a meeting of the league magistrates in Argos, Quintus attended and upbraided them for having exceeded justice in the harshness and severity with which they had treated the Lacedaemonians, and urged them strongly to repair the error. Aristaenus said not a word, showing clearly by his silence that he disapproved of what had been done and agreed with the words of Caecilius. But Diophanes of Megalopolis, who was more of a soldier than a statesman, stood up to speak, and so far from offering any defence of the Achaeans, suggested to Caecilius, from hostility to Philopoemen, another charge that might be brought against them. For he said that "the Lacedaemonians were not the only people who had been badly treated; the Messenians had been so also." There were as a fact some controversies going on among the Messenians, in regard to the decree of Flamininus concerning the exiles, and the execution of it by Philopoemen: and Caecilius, thinking that he now had a party among the Achaeans themselves of the same opinion as himself, expressed still greater anger at the hesitation on the part of the assembled magistrates in obeying his orders. However, when Philopoemen, Lycortas, and Archon argued long and elaborately to prove that what had been done at Sparta was right, and advantageous to the Lacedaemonians themselves more than to any one else, and that it was impossible to disturb any existing arrangements without violating justice to man and piety to the gods, they came to the decision that they would maintain them, and give an answer to that effect to the Roman legate. Seeing what the disposition of the magistrates was, Caecilius demanded that the public assembly should be summoned, to which the Achaean magistrates demanded to see the instructions which he had from the Senate on these points: and when he gave no answer to this demand, they said that they would not summon the assembly for him, as their laws forbade them to do so unless a man

Winter of B.C. 185.

brought written instructions from the Senate, stating the subject on which they were to summon it. Caecilius was so angry at this uncompromising opposition to his orders, that he refused to receive his answer from the magistrates, and so departed without any answer at all. The Achaeans laid the blame both of the former visit of Marcus Fulvius and the present one of Caecilius on Aristaenus and Diophanes, on the ground that they had invited them on account of their political opposition to Philopoemen; and accordingly the general public felt a certain suspicion of these two men. Such was the state of the Peloponnese. . . .

Philopoemen on Archon.

14. Philopoemen had a sharp difference in debate with Archon the Strategus. In course of time, however, Philopoemen was convinced by Archon's arguments, and, changing his mind, spoke in warm commendation of Archon as having managed his business with skill and address. But when I heard the speech at the time it did not seem to me right to praise a man and yet do him an injury, nor do I think so now in my maturer years. For I think that there is as wide a distinction in point of morality between practical ability and success secured by absence of scruples, as there is between skill and mere cunning. The former are in a manner the highest attainments possible, the latter the reverse. But owing to the lack of discernment so general in our day, these qualities, which have little in common, excite the same amount of commendation and emulation in the world. . . .

Ambassadors from Philip and the Achaeans heard on the report of Caecilius, B.C. 185-184.

15. When Caecilius returned from Greece and made his report to the Senate concerning Macedonia and the Peloponnese, the ambassadors who had come to Rome on these matters were introduced into the Senate. First came those from Philip and Eumenes, as well as the exiles from Aenus and Maroneia; and on their saying much the same as they had said before Caecilius and his colleagues at Thessalonica, the Senate voted to send another deputation to Philip, to see first of all whether he had evacuated the cities in Perrhaebia in conformity with the answer he gave to Caecilius: and secondly, to order him to

remove his garrison from Aenus and Maroneia; and in a word, to abandon all fortresses, positions, and towns on the sea-board of Thrace.

The Achaean ambassadors make their defence.

After these the ambassadors from the Peloponnese were introduced. For the Achaeans on their part had sent Apollonidas of Sicyon, and others, to justify themselves to Caecilius for his having received no answer, and generally to inform the Senate on the question of Sparta; and at the same time Areus and Alcibiades had come from Sparta as ambassadors,—two of the old exiles recently restored by Philopoemen and the Achaeans. And this was a circumstance that particularly roused the anger of the Achaeans; because they thought it the height of ingratitude on the part of the exiles, after receiving so important and recent a service at their hands, to be now sending a hostile embassy, and accusing to the sovereign people those who had been the authors of their unlooked-for preservation and restoration to their country.

16. Both parties were heard in their defence in each other's presence. Apollonidas of Sicyon and his colleagues tried to convince the Senate that the affairs of Sparta could not have been better managed than they were managed by Philopoemen. Areus and his colleagues attempted to establish the reverse: alleging, first of all, that the power of the city was entirely destroyed by the violent withdrawal of so large a number; and, in the second place, that even those that were left were so few that their position was insecure, now that the walls were pulled down; and that their freedom of speech was entirely destroyed by the fact that they were not only amenable to the general decrees of the Achaean league, but were also made specially subject to the magistrates set over them from time to time. After hearing these envoys also, the Senate decided to give the same legates instructions regarding them as well as the others, and appointed Appius Claudius and his colleagues commissioners for Greece.

The Spartan envoys.

The decision.

But the ambassadors from the Achaeans offered an explanation also to Caecilius in the Senate, on behalf of the

magistrates, asserting that "They did not act wrongly or deserve blame for refusing to summon the assembly, unless it were requisite to decide on an alliance or a war, or unless some one brought a letter from the Senate. The magistrates had therefore impartially considered the subject of summoning the assembly, but were prevented from doing so by the laws, because he neither brought a despatch from the Senate nor would show them any written instructions." At the conclusion of this speech Caecilius rose and made an attack on Philopoemen and Lycortas, and the Achaeans generally, and on the policy they had pursued towards the city of Sparta. After listening to the arguments, the Senate answered the Achaeans by saying that they would send commissioners to investigate the matter of Sparta; and they accompanied this answer by an admonition to them to pay attention to the ambassadors sent by them from time to time, and show them proper respect, as the Romans did to ambassadors who came to them. . . .

Defence of the refusal to call the Achaean assembly.

17. When Philip learnt, by a message from his own ambassadors at Rome, that he would be obliged to evacuate the cities in Thrace, he was extremely annoyed, because he regarded his kingdom as being now curtailed on every side; and he vented his wrath upon the unhappy people of Maroneia. He sent for Onomastus, his governor in Thrace, and communicated with him on the subject. And Onomastus on his return sent Cassander to Maroneia, who, from long residence there, was familiar with the inhabitants,—for Philip's practice had long been to place members of his court in these cities, and accustom the people to their residence among them. Some few days after his arrival, the Thracians having been prepared for what they had to do, and having obtained entrance to the city by night through the instrumentality of Cassander, a great massacre took place, and many of the Maronites were killed. Having wreaked this vengeance on those who opposed him, and satisfied his own anger, Philip waited for the arrival of the Roman legates, persuaded that no one would venture for fear of him to denounce his crime. But when Appius and his colleagues presently arrived, they

Philip's vengeance on the people of Maroneia, early in B.C. 184. Livy, 39, 33.

were promptly informed of what had happened at Maroneia, and expostulated in severe terms with Philip for it. The king attempted to defend himself by asserting that he had nothing to do with this act of violence; but that the Maronites, being divided into two hostile parties, one inclined to Eumenes and the other to himself, inflicted this misfortune upon themselves. He moreover bade them confront him with any one who wished to accuse him. He said this from a conviction that no one would venture to do so; because they would consider that Philip's vengeance upon those who opposed him would be near at hand, while assistance from Rome would have a long way to come. But when Appius and his colleagues said that "they required to hear no defence, for they were well aware of what had happened, and who was the cause of it," Philip became much confused.

He attempts to evade responsibility for it.

18. They went no further than this in the first interview: but during the next day Appius ordered Philip to send Onomastus and Cassander at once to Rome, that the Senate might inform itself on what had happened. The king was disturbed at this to the greatest possible degree, and for some time did not know what to say; but at last he said that he would send Cassander, who was the actual author of the business, that the Senate might learn the truth from him; but he tried to get Onomastus excused, both in this and subsequent interviews with the legates, alleging as a reason that not only had Onomastus not been in Maroneia at the time of the massacre, but not even in any part of the country in its neighbourhood. His real motive, however, was fear lest, if he got to Rome, having been engaged with him in many similar transactions, he would not only tell the Romans the story of Maroneia, but all the others also. Eventually he did get Onomastus excused; and having, after the departure of the legates, sent off Cassander, he sent some agents with him as far as Epirus, and there had him poisoned.[1] But Appius and his colleagues

The guilty agents are to be sent to Rome.

Another crime.

Philip's hostility to Rome.

[1] Livy (39, 34) more cautiously says: veneno *creditur* sublatus. Such accusations were easily made, and not easily proved or confuted.

left Philip with their minds fully made up both as to his guilt in the matter of Maroneia and his alienation from Rome.

The king, thus relieved of the presence of the legates, after consulting with his friends Apelles and Philocles became clearly conscious that his quarrel with Rome had now become serious, and that it could no longer be concealed, but was become notorious to most people in the world. He was therefore now wholly bent on measures of self-defence and retaliation. But as he was as yet unprepared for some of the plans which he had in his mind, he cast about to find some means of putting matters off, and gaining time for making his preparations for war. He accordingly resolved to send his youngest son Demetrius to Rome: partly to make his defence on the charges brought against him, and partly also to beg pardon for any error which he might have committed. He felt certain that everything he wished would be obtained from the Senate by means of this young prince, because of the extraordinary attentions which had been shown him when he was acting as a hostage. He no sooner conceived this idea than he set about making preparations for sending the prince and those of his own friends destined to accompany him on his mission. At the same time he promised the Byzantines to give them help: not so much because he cared for them, as from a wish under cover of their name to strike terror into the princes of the Thracians living beyond the Propontis, as a step towards the fulfilment of his main purpose. . . .

King Philip meditates a breach with Rome.

Sends his son Demetrius there, in hopes of putting off the war for a time.

19. In Crete, while Cydas son of Antalces was *Cosmus*,[1] the Gortynians, who sought in every way to depress the Gnossians, deprived them of a portion of their territory called Lycastium, and assigned it to the Rhaucii, and another portion called Diatonium to the Lyctii. But when about this time Appius and his colleagues arrived in the island from Rome, with the

Disputes in Crete.

[1] For the ten Cosmi of Crete, see Aristot. *Pol.* 2, 10; and Müller's *Dorians*, vol. ii. p. 133 *sq.* Cydas gives his name to the year as πρωτόκοσμος, see C. I. G. 2583. The same inscription contains the title κοσμόπολις, apparently like πολιοῦχος, as a name for a guardian hero of the city. We have already had this latter title as that of a chief magistrate at Locri. See bk. 12, ch. 16.

view of settling the controversies which existed among them, and addressed remonstrances to the cities of Gnossus and Gortyn on these points, the Cretans gave in, and submitted the settlement of their disputes to Appius. He accordingly ordered the restoration of their territory to the Gnossians; and that the Cydoniates should receive back the hostages which they had formerly left in the hands of Charmion, and should surrender Phalasarna, without taking anything out of it. As to sharing in the legal jurisdiction of the whole island, he left it free to the several cities to do so or not as they pleased, on condition that in the latter case they abstained from entering the rest of Crete, they and the exiles from Phalasarna who murdered Menochius and his friends, their most illustrious citizens. . . .

The Queen-Dowager, widow of Attalus, and her sons.

20. Apollonias, the wife of Attalus, father of king Eumenes, was a native of Cyzicus, and a woman who for many reasons deserves to be remembered, and with honour. Her claims upon a favourable recollection are that, though born of a private family, she became a queen, and retained that exalted rank to the end of her life, not by the use of meretricious fascinations, but by the virtue and integrity of her conduct in private and public life alike. Above all, she was the mother of four sons with whom she kept on terms of the most perfect affection and motherly love to the last day of her life. And so Attalus and his brother gained a high character, while staying at Cyzicus, by showing their mother proper respect and honour. For they took each of them one of her hands and led her between them on a visit to the temples and on a tour of the town, accompanied by their suite. At this sight all who saw it received the young princes with very warm marks of approval, and, recalling the story of Cleobis and Biton, compared their conduct with theirs; and remarked that the affectionate zeal shown by the young princes, though perhaps not going so far as theirs, was rendered quite as illustrious by the fact of their more exalted position. This took place in Cyzicus, after the peace made with king Prusias. . . .

Herodotus, 1, 31.

21. Ostiagon the Gaul, king of the Gauls of Asia, en-

deavoured to transfer to himself the sovereignty of all the Gauls; and he had many qualifications for such a post, both natural and acquired. For he was open-handed and generous, a man of popular manners and ready tact; and, what was most important in the eyes of the Gauls, he was a man of courage and skill in war. . . .

The policy of Ostiagon in Galatia.

22. Aristonicus was one of the eunuchs of Ptolemy, king of Egypt, and had been brought up from childhood with the king. As he grew up he displayed more manly courage and tastes than are generally found in an eunuch. For he had a natural predilection for a military life, and devoted himself almost exclusively to that and all that it involved. He was also skilful in dealing with men, and, what is very rare, took large and liberal views, and was naturally inclined to bestow favours and kindnesses. . . .

Character of Aristonicus. See above, ch. 7.

BOOK XXIII

1. In the 149th Olympiad a greater number of embassies came to Rome from Greece than were almost ever seen before. For as Philip was compelled by treaty to submit disputes with his neighbours to arbitration, and as it was known that the Romans were willing to receive accusations against Philip, and would secure the safety of those who had controversies with him, all who lived near the frontier of Macedonia came to Rome, some in their private capacity, some from cities, others from whole tribes, with complaints against Philip. At the same time also came ambassadors from Eumenes, accompanied by his brother Athenaeus, to accuse Philip in regard to the Thracian cities and the aid sent to Prusias. Philip's son, Demetrius, also came to make answer to all these various envoys, accompanied by Apelles and Philocles, who were at that time considered the king's first friends. Ambassadors also came from Sparta, representatives of each faction of the citizens.

149th Olympiad, B.C. 184-180.

Coss. P. Claudius Pulcher, L. Porcius Licinus, B.C. 184.

The first summoned to the Senate was Athenaeus, from whom the Senate accepted the compliments of fifteen thousand gold pieces, and passed a decree highly extolling Eumenes and his brothers for their answer, and exhorting them to continue in the same mind. Next the praetors called upon all the accusers of Philip, and brought them forward by one embassy at a time. But as they were numerous, and their entry occupied three days, the Senate became embarrassed as to the settlement to be made in each case. For from Thessaly there were ambassadors from the whole nation, and also from each

B.C. 183, Coss. M. Claudius Marcellus Q. Fabius Labeo.

city separately; so also from the Perrhaebians, Athamanians, Epirotes, and Illyrians. And of these some brought cases of dispute as to territory, slaves, or cattle; and some about contracts or injuries sustained by themselves. Some alleged that they could not get their rights in accordance with the treaty, because Philip prevented the administration of justice; while others impeached the justice of the decisions given, on the ground that Philip had corrupted the arbitrators. And, in fact, there was an inextricable confusion and multiplicity of charges.

2. In such a state of things the Senate felt unable to come to a clear decision itself, and did not think it fair that Demetrius should have to answer each of the several indictments; for it regarded him with great favour, and saw at the same time that his extreme youth unfitted him to cope with business of such intricacy and complexity. Besides, what it desired most was not to hear speeches of Demetrius, but to ascertain with certainty the disposition of Philip. Excusing him therefore from pleading his cause, the Senate asked the young man and his friends whether they were the bearers of any written memoir from the king; and upon Demetrius answering that he was, and holding out a paper of no great size, the Senate bade him give a summary of what the paper contained in answer to the accusations alleged. It amounted to this, that on each point Philip asserted that he had carried out the injunctions of the Senate, or, if he had not done so, laid the blame upon his accusers; while to the greater number of his declarations he had added the words, "though the commissioners with Caecilius were unfair to me in this point," or again, "though I am unjustly treated in this respect." Such being Philip's mind, as expressed in the several clauses of the paper, the Senate, after hearing the ambassadors who were come to Rome, comprehended them all under one measure. By the mouth of the praetor it offered an honourable and cordial reception to Demetrius, expressed in ample and emphatic language, and answered his speech by saying that "The Senate fully believe that on all the points mentioned by Demetrius, or read by him from his paper of instructions, full justice was

Demetrius in the Senate. Livy, 39. 47.

already done or would be done. But, in order that Philip might be made aware that the Senate paid this honour to Demetrius, ambassadors would be sent to see that everything was being done in accordance with the will of the Senate, and at the same time to inform the king that he owed this grace to his son Demetrius." Such was the arrangement come to on this part of the business.

The ambassadors of Eumenes complain that Philip has not evacuated Thrace.

3. The next to enter the Senate were the ambassadors of king Eumenes, who denounced Philip on account of the assistance sent to Prusias, and concerning his actions in Thrace, alleging that even at that moment he had not withdrawn his garrisons from the cities. But upon Philocles showing his wish to offer a defence on these points, as having been formerly charged with a mission to Prusias, and being now sent to the Senate to represent Philip on this business, the Senate, without listening very long to his speech, answered that "With regard to Thrace, unless the legates found everything there settled in accordance with its will, and all the cities restored to the entire control of Eumenes, the Senate would be unable any longer to allow it to pass, or to submit to being continually disobeyed."

The high honour paid to Demetrius at Rome, and its fatal result.

Though the ill-feeling between the Romans and Philip was becoming serious, a check was put to it for the time by the presence of Demetrius. And yet this young prince's mission to Rome proved eventually no slight link in the chain of events which led to the final ruin of his house. For the Senate, by thus making much of Demetrius, somewhat turned the young man's head, and at the same time gravely annoyed Perseus and the king, by making them feel that the kindness they received from the Romans was not for their own sakes, but for that of Demetrius. And T. Quintius Flamininus contributed not a little to the same result by taking the young prince aside and communicating with him in confidence. For he flattered him by suggesting that the Romans meant before long to invest him with the kingdom; while he irritated Philip and Perseus by sending a letter ordering the king to send Demetrius to Rome again, with as many friends of the

highest character as possible. It was, in fact, by taking advantage of these circumstances that Perseus shortly afterwards induced his father to consent to the death of Demetrius. But I shall relate that event in detail later on.

4. The next ambassadors called in were the Lacedaemonians. Of these there were four distinct factions. Lysis and his colleagues represented the old exiles, and their contention was that they ought to have back the possessions from which they had originally been driven. Areus and Alcibiades, on the contrary, contended that they should receive the value of a talent from their original property, and divide the rest among deserving citizens. Serippus pleaded that things should be left in exactly the state in which they were when they formerly belonged to the Achaean league. Lastly, Chaeron and his colleagues represented those who had been condemned to death or exile by the votes of the Achaean league, and demanded their own recall and the restoration of the constitution. These all delivered speeches against the Achaeans in conformity with their several objects. The Senate, finding itself unable to come to a clear decision on these particular controversies, appointed a committee of investigation, consisting of the three who had already been on a mission to the Peloponnese on these matters, namely Titus Flamininus, Q. Caecilius, and Appius Claudius Pulcher.[1] After long discussions before this committee it was unanimously decided that the exiles and the condemned were to be recalled, and that the city should remain a member of the Achaean league. But as to the property, whether the exiles were each to select a talent's worth from what had been theirs [or to receive it all back], on this point they continued to dispute. That they might not, however, have to begin the whole controversy afresh [the committee] caused the points agreed upon to be reduced to writing, to

The four Spartan embassies.
1. Lysis, for the men banished by Nabis.
2. Areus and Alcibiades.
3. Serippus.
4. Chaeron, for the recent exiles.
Decision of the IIIviri.

[1] There is some loss in the text as to these names. The last is mentioned on a Geeek embassy in 22, 16. See also the index. Livy, 39, 41, says nothing of this committee of three.

which all affixed their seals. But the committee, also wishing to include the Achaeans in the agreement, called in Xenarchus and his colleagues, who were at that time on a mission from the Achaeans, to renew their alliance with Rome, and at the same time to give an eye to their controversy with the Lacedaemonians. These men, being unexpectedly asked whether they consented to the terms contained in the written document, were somewhat at a loss what to answer. For they did not approve of the restoration of the exiles and the condemned persons, as being contrary to the decree of the league, and the contents of the tablet on which that decree was engraved; and yet they approved of the document as a whole, because it contained the clause providing that Sparta should remain a member of the league. Finally, however, partly from this difficulty, and partly from awe of the Roman commissioners, they affixed their seal. The Senate, therefore, selected Quintus Marcius to go as legate to settle the affairs of Macedonia and the Peloponnese. . . .

Deinocrates of Messene.

5. When Deinocrates of Messene arrived on a mission at Rome, he was delighted to find that Titus Flamininus had been appointed by the Senate to go as ambassador to Prusias and Seleucus. For having been very intimate with Titus during the Lacedaemonian war, he thought that this friendship, combined with his disagreements with Philopoemen, would induce him on his arrival in Greece to settle the affairs of Messene in accordance with his own views. He therefore gave up everything else to attach himself exclusively to Titus, on whom he rested all his hopes. . . .

This same Deinocrates was a courtier and a soldier by nature as well as habit, but he assumed the air of consummate statesmanship. His parts, however, were showy rather than solid. In war his fertility of resource and boldness were beyond the common run; and he shone in feats of personal bravery. Nor were these his only accomplishments: he was attractive and ready in conversation, versatile and courteous in society. But at the same time he was devoted to licentious intrigue, and in public affairs and questions of policy was quite incapable of sustained attention or far-sighted views, of forti-

fying himself with well-considered arguments, or putting them before the public. On this occasion, for instance, though he had really given the initiative to grave misfortunes, he did not think that he was doing anything of importance; but followed his usual manner of life, quite regardless of the future, indulging day after day in amours, wine, and song. Flamininus, however, did once force him to catch a glimpse of the seriousness of his position. For seeing him on a certain occasion in a party of revellers dancing in long robes, he said nothing at the time; but next morning, being visited by him with some request in behalf of his country, he said: "I will do my best, Deinocrates; but it does astonish me that you can drink and dance after having given the start to such serious troubles for Greece." He appears, indeed, at that to have a little recovered his soberer senses, and to have understood what an improper display he had been making of his tastes and habits. However, he arrived at this period in Greece in company with Flamininus, fully persuaded that the affairs of Messene would be settled at a blow in accordance with his views. But Philopoemen and his party were fully aware that Flamininus had no commission from the Senate in regard to affairs in Greece; they therefore awaited his arrival without taking any step of any sort. Having landed at Naupactus, Flamininus addressed a despatch to the Strategus and Demiurgi[1] bidding them summon the Achaeans to an assembly; to which they wrote back that "they would do so, if he would write them word what the subjects were on which he wished to confer with the Achaeans; for the laws enjoined that limitation on the magistrates." As Flamininus did not venture to write this, the hopes of Deinocrates and the so-called "old exiles," but who had at that time been recently banished from Sparta, came to nothing, as in fact did the visit of Flamininus and the plans which he had formed....

[1] The ten federal magistrates of the league, who formed a council to act with the general. Their number probably arose from the number of the Achaean cantons or towns, after two of the twelve—Helice and Olenus—were destroyed. Polybius nowhere else gives them this title in any part of the history we possess, but its use by Livy, 32, 22, seems to point to his having used it in other places. It also occurs in a letter of Philip II. (perhaps genuine) quoted in Demosth. *de Cor.* 157. Polybius calls them also οἱ ἄρχοντες, ἀρχαί, προεστῶτες συνάρχοντες, συναρχίαι. See Freeman's *Federal Gov.* p. 282.

6. About the same period some ambassadors were sent by the exiled citizens of Sparta to Rome, among whom was Arcesilaus and Agesipolis who, when quite a boy, had been made king in Sparta. These two men were fallen upon and killed by pirates on the high seas; but their colleagues arrived safely at Rome. . . .

See 4. 35.

7. On the return of Demetrius from Rome, bringing with him the formal reply, in which the Romans referred all the favour and confidence which they avowed to their regard for Demetrius, saying that all they had done or would do was for his sake,— the Macedonians gave Demetrius a cordial reception, believing that they were relieved from all fear and danger: for they had looked upon war with Rome as all but at their doors, owing to the provocations given by Philip. But Philip and Perseus were far from pleased, and were much offended at the idea of the Romans taking no account of them, and referring all their favour to Demetrius. Philip however concealed his displeasure; but Perseus, who was not only behind his brother in good feelings to Rome, but much his inferior in other respects, both in natural ability and acquired accomplishments, made no secret of his anger: and was beginning to be thoroughly alarmed as to his succession to the crown, and lest, in spite of being the elder, he should be excluded. Therefore he commenced by bribing the friends of Demetrius. . . .

The popularity of Demetrius in Macedonia. His father's anger and his brother's jealousy.

The end of this fraternal jealousy is described in Livy, 40, 5-24. *By a forged letter purporting to come from Flamininus, Philip is persuaded that his son played the traitor at Rome and gives an order or a permission for his being put to death; which is accordingly done, partly by poison and partly by violence, at Heracleia*, B.C. 181.

8. Upon Quintus Marcius arriving on his mission in Macedonia, Philip evacuated the Greek cities in Thrace entirely and withdrew his garrisons, though in deep anger and heaviness of spirit; and he put on a right footing everything else to which the Roman injunctions referred, wishing to give them no indica-

Philip feigns submission to Rome, B.C. 183.

tion of his estrangement, but to secure time for making his preparations for war. In pursuance of this design he led out an army against the barbarians, and marching through the centre of Thrace he invaded the Odrysae, Bessi, and Dentheleti. Coming to Philippopolis, the inhabitants flying for safety to the heights, he took it without a blow. And thence, after traversing the plain, and sacking some of the villages, and exacting a pledge of submission from others, he returned home, leaving a garrison in Philippopolis, which was after a time expelled by the Odrysae in defiance of their pledge of fidelity to Philip. . . .

The plain of the Hebrus.

9. In the second year of this Olympiad, on the arrival of ambassadors from Eumenes, Pharnaces, and the Achaean league, and also from the Lacedaemonians who had been banished from Sparta,[1] and from those who were in actual possession of it, the Senate despatched their business. But there came after them a mission from Rhodes in regard to the disaster at Sinope; to whom the Senate replied that it would send legates to investigate the case of the Sinopeans and their grievances against those kings. And Quintus Marcius having recently arrived from Greece and made his report on the state of affairs in Macedonia and the Peloponnese, the Senate did not require to hear much more; but having called in the envoys from the Peloponnese and Macedonia they listened indeed to what they had to say, but founded its reply, without any reference to their speeches, wholly on the report of Marcius, in which he had stated, in reference to king Philip, that he had indeed done all that was enjoined on him, but with great reluctance; and that, if he got an opportunity, he would go all lengths against the Romans. The Senate accordingly composed a reply to the king's envoys in which, while praising Philip for what he had done, they warned him for the future to be careful not to be found acting in opposition to the Romans. As to the Peloponnese, Marcius had reported that, as the Achaeans were unwilling to refer any matter whatever to the Senate, but were haughtily inclined

After midsummer of B.C. 183.

February, B.C. 182.

[1] That is, apparently, by some fresh disturbance towards the end of B.C. 183. See Strachan-Davidson, p. 495.

and desirous of managing all their affairs themselves, if the Senate would only reject their present application and give ever so slight an indication of displeasure, Sparta would promptly come to an understanding with Messene; and then the Achaeans would be glad enough to appeal to the protection of Rome. In consequence of this report they answered the Lacedaemonian Serippus and his colleagues, wishing to leave this city in a state of suspense, that they had done their best for them, but that for the present they did not think this matter concerned them. But when the Achaeans besought for help against the Messenians[1] in virtue of their alliance with Rome, or at least that they would take precautions to prevent any arms or corn from being brought from Italy into Messene, the Senate refused compliance with either request and answered that the Achaeans ought not to be surprised if Sparta or Corinth or Argos renounced their league, if they would not conduct their hegemony in accordance with the Senate's views. This answer the Senate made public, as a kind of proclamation that any people who chose might break off from the Achaeans for all the Romans cared; and they further retained the ambassadors in Rome, waiting to see the issue of the quarrel between the Achaeans and Messenians. . . .

The conflict of feelings in Philip's mind.

10. In this period a certain dreadful foreshadowing of misfortune fell upon king Philip and the whole of Macedonia, of a kind well worthy of close attention and record. As though Fortune had resolved to exact from him at once the penalties for all the impieties and crimes which he had committed in the whole course of his life, she now visited him with furies, those deities of retribution, those powers that had listened to the prayers of the victims of his cruelties, who, haunting him day and night, so plagued him to the last day of his life, that all the world was forced to acknowledge the truth of the proverb, that "Justice has an eye" which mere men should never despise. The first idea suggested to him by this evil power was that, as he

[1] The Messenians revolted from the league B.C. 183, and in the course of the fighting which ensued Philopoemen fell into an ambush, was taken prisoner, and put to death by them. See ch. 12.

was about to go to war with Rome, he had better remove from the most important cities, and those along the sea-coast, the leading citizens, with their wives and children, and place them in Emathia, formerly called Paeonia, and fill up the cities with Thracians and other barbarians, as likely to be more securely loyal to him in the coming hour of danger. The actual carrying out of this measure, and the uprooting of these men and their families, caused such an outburst of grief, and so violent an outcry, that one might have supposed the whole district to have been taken by the sword. Curses and appeals to heaven were rained upon the head of the king without any further attempt at concealment. His next step, prompted by the wish to leave no element of hostility or disaffection in the kingdom, was to write to the governors of the several cities ordering them to search out the sons and daughters of such Macedonians as had been put to death by him, and place them in ward; in which he referred especially to Admetus, Pyrrhicus, and Samus, and those who had perished with them: but he also included all others whosoever that had been put to death by order of the king, quoting this verse, we are told:— [1]

See 5, 9.

"Oh fool! to slay the sire and leave the sons."

Most of these men being persons of distinguished families, their fate made a great noise and excited universal pity. But Fortune had a third act in this bloody drama in reserve for Philip, in which the young princes plotted against each other; and their quarrels being referred to him, he was forced to choose between becoming the murderer of his sons and living the rest of his life in dread of being murdered by them in his old age; and to decide which of the two he had the greater reason to fear. Tortured day and night by these anxieties, the miseries and perturbations of his spirit lead to the inevitable reflection that the wrath of heaven fell upon his old age for the sins of his previous life: which will be rendered still more evident by what remains to be told. . . . Just when his soul was stung to madness by these circumstances, the quarrel between his sons blazed out: Fortune, as it were of set purpose, bringing their misfortunes upon the scene all at one time. . . .

[1] Stasinus *fr.*

Fragment referring to the military sham fight in which Perseus and Demetrius quarrelled, B.C. 182. See Livy, 40, 6.

The Macedonians make offerings to Xanthus as a hero, and perform a purification of the army with horses fully equipped. . . .

Part of a speech of Philip to his two sons after the quarrel at the manœuvres. See Livy, 40, 8.

11. "One should not merely read tragedies, tales, and histories, but should understand and ponder over them. In all of them one may learn that whenever brothers fall out and allow their quarrel to go any great length, they invariably end not only by destroying themselves but in the utter ruin of their property, children, and cities; while those who keep their self-love within reasonable bounds, and put up with each other's weaknesses, are the preservers of these, and live in the fairest reputation and fame. I have often directed your attention to the kings in Sparta, telling you that they preserved the hegemony in Greece for their country just so long as they obeyed the ephors, as though they were their parents, and were content to reign jointly. But directly they in their folly tried to change the government to a monarchy, they caused Sparta to experience every misery possible. Finally, I have pointed out to you as an example the case of Eumenes and Attalus; showing you that, though they succeeded to but a small and insignificant realm, they have raised it to a level with the best, simply by the harmony and unity of sentiment, and mutual respect which they maintained towards each other. But so far from taking my words to heart, you are, as it seems to me, whetting your angry passions against each other. . . ."

THE FALL OF PHILOPOEMEN

The death of Philopoemen, B.C. 183, or perhaps early in B.C. 182.

12. Philopoemen rose[1] and proceeded on his way, though he was oppressed at once by illness and the weight of years, being now in the seventieth year of his age. Conquering his weakness, however, by the force of his previous habits he reached Megalopolis, from Argos, in one day's journey. . . .

[1] He was ill with fever. Plutarch, *Phil.* 18.

He was captured, when Achaean Strategus, by the Messenians and poisoned. Thus, though second to none that ever lived before him in excellence, his fortune was less happy; yet in his previous life he seemed ever to have enjoyed her favour and assistance. But it was, I suppose, a case of the common proverb, "a man may have a stroke of luck, but no man can be lucky always." We must, therefore, call our predecessors fortunate, without pretending that they were so invariably—for what need is there to flatter Fortune by a meaningless and false compliment? It is those who have enjoyed Fortune's smiles in their life for the longest time, and who, when she changes her mind, meet with only moderate mishaps, that we must speak of as fortunate. . . .

Philopoemen was murdered by the Messenians, who had abandoned the league and were at war with it. See Livy, 39, 49-50.

Philopoemen was succeeded by Lycortas,[1] . . . and though he had spent forty years of an active career in a state at once democratic and composed of many various elements, he had entirely avoided giving rise to the jealousy of the citizens in any direction: and yet he had not flattered their inclinations, but for the most part had used great freedom of speech, which is a case of very rare occurrence. . . .

Character of Philopoemen. He is succeeded by Lycortas as Strategus.

13. An admirable feature in Hannibal's character, and the strongest proof of his having been a born ruler of men, and having possessed statesmanlike qualities of an unusual kind, is that, though he was for seventeen years engaged in actual warfare, and though he had to make his way through numerous barbaric tribes, and to employ innumerable men of different nationalities in what appeared desperate and hazardous enterprises, he was never made the object of a conspiracy by any of them, nor deserted by any of those who had joined him and put themselves under his command. . . .

Character of Hannibal, who poisoned himself at the court of Prusias, B.C. 183. See Livy, 39, 1.

14. Publius Scipio, in the course of an active career in

[1] Livy (39, 50) speaks of Lycortas at the time of Philopoemen's death as *alter imperator Achaeorum*. If he had been the ὑποστρατηγός we know that he would not by law have succeeded on the death of the Strategus. Plutarch, *Phil.* 21, seems to assert that an election was held at once, but not the ordinary popular election.

an aristocratic state, secured such popularity with the multitude and such credit with the Senate, that when some one took upon himself to bring him to trial before the people in the manner usual at Rome, and produced many bitter accusations against him, he came forward and said nothing but that "It ill-became the Roman people to listen to accusations against P. Cornelius Scipio, to whom his accusers owed it that they had the power of speech at all." At this the populace dispersed, and quitting the assembly, left the accuser alone. . . . Once when there was a sum of money required in the Senate for some pressing business, and the quaestor, on the ground of a legal difficulty, refused to open the treasury on that particular day, Scipio said that "he would take the keys himself and open it; for he was the cause of the treasury being locked at all." And again, when some one in the Senate demanded an account of the money which he had received from Antiochus before the treaty for the pay of his army, he said that he had the ledger, but that he ought not to be called to account by any one. But on his questioner persisting, and urging him to produce it, he bade his brother bring it. When the schedule was brought, he held it out in front of him, and tearing it to pieces in the sight of everybody bade the man who asked for it seek it out of these fragments, and he demanded of the rest "How they could ask for the items of the expenditure of these three thousand talents, and yet no longer ask for an account of how and by whose agency the fifteen thousand talents which they received from Antiochus came into the treasury, nor how it is that they have become masters of Asia, Libya, and Iberia?" This speech not only made a strong impression on the rest, but also reduced the man who demanded the account to silence.

Character of P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus, whose death Polybius places in this year, but according to Livy wrongly, who assigns it to the previous year (39. 52.)

These anecdotes have been related by me for the double purpose of enhancing the fame of the departed, and of encouraging future generations in the paths of honour. . . .

15. For my part, I never concur with those who indulge their anger against men of their own blood to the length of not only depriving them of the year's harvest when at war with them, but even of cutting down their trees and destroying

their buildings, and of leaving them no opportunity for repentance. Such proceedings seem to me to be rank folly. For, while they imagine that they are dismaying the enemy by the devastation of their territory, and the deprivation of their future as well as their present means of getting the necessaries of life, they are all the while exasperating the men, and converting an isolated ebullition of anger into a lasting hatred. . . .

Lycortas, the successor of Philopoemen, compels the Messenians to sue for peace, B.C. 183-182.

16. Lycortas the Achaean Strategus crushed the spirits of the Messenians in the war. Up to this time the populace at Messene had been afraid of their magistrates; but now at length, relying on the protection of the enemy, some of them plucked up courage to break silence and to say that the time was come to send an embassy to negotiate a peace. Deinocrates and his colleagues, being no longer able to face the people under this storm of popular odium, yielded to circumstances and retired to their own houses. Thereupon the people, acting under the advice of the older men, and especially under that of Epaenetus and Apollodorus, the ambassadors from Boeotia,—who, having arrived some time before to negotiate a peace, happened fortunately to be at that time at Messene,—appointed and despatched envoys, begging forgiveness for their transgressions. The Achaean Strategus, having summoned his colleagues[1] to council, and given the envoys a hearing, answered that "There was but one way in which the Messenians could reconcile themselves to the league, and that was by at once surrendering to him the authors of the revolt and of the murder of Philopoemen, leave the rest to the authority of the league assembly, and at once receive a garrison into their citadel." When this message was announced to the Messenian populace, those who had long been bitterly opposed to the authors of the war were ready enough to surrender them and to arrest them; while the rest, being persuaded that they would not be severely dealt with by the Achaeans, readily consented to submit the general question to the decision of the assembly. But what chiefly induced them to unanimously accept the proposal was, that they in fact had no choice in the matter. The Strategus accordingly

[1] That is the ten Demiurgi.

at once took over the citadel and marched his peltasts into it; and then, taking some picked troops with him, entered the city; and having summoned a meeting of the people, addressed them in terms befitting the occasion, promising that "they would never have reason to repent having committed themselves to the honour of the Achaeans." The general question of what was to be done he thus referred to the league,—for it happened conveniently that the Achaeans were just then re-assembling at Megalopolis for the second Congress,[1]—but of those who were guilty of the disturbances, he ordered all such as were actually implicated in the summary execution of Philopoemen to put an end to their own lives. . . .

Summer B.C. 182.

17. The Messenians were reduced by their own folly to the brink of ruin, but were restored to their former position in the league by the magnanimity of Lycortas and the Achaeans. But the towns of Abia, Thuria, and Pharae during these transactions abandoned their connection with Messene, and, setting up a pillar engraved with a treaty of alliance between themselves, formed a separate league. When the Romans were informed that the Messenian war had turned out successfully for the Achaeans, without taking any account of their previous declaration they gave a different answer to the same ambassadors, asserting that they had taken measures to prevent any one from conveying arms or corn from Italy into Messene. By this they showed clearly that, so far from avoiding or disregarding the affairs of foreign nations not directly concerning themselves, they were, on the contrary, annoyed at everything not being referred to them and carried out in accordance with their opinion.

Abia, Thuria, and Pharae make a separate league.

When the ambassadors arrived in Sparta with their answer, the Achaean Strategus as soon as he had settled the Messenian business, summoned a congress at Sicyon, and on its assembling, proposed a resolution for the reception of Sparta into the league, alleging

Achaean meeting at Sicyon.

[1] The second congress of the year seems to mean not that held for election of the Strategus for the next year, which met about 12th May, but the second regular meeting in August.

that "The Romans had declined the arbitration which had previously been offered to them in regard to this city,—for they had answered that they had now no concern with any of the affairs of Sparta. Those, however, at present in power at Sparta were desirous of being admitted to the privileges of the league. Therefore he advised that they should admit the town; for this would be advantageous in two ways: first, because they would be thus admitting men who had remained unshaken in their loyalty to the league; and secondly, because they would not be admitting those of the old exiles, who had behaved with ingratitude and impiety towards them, to any share of their privileges; but by confirming the measures of those who had excluded them, would at the same time be showing, with God's help, due gratitude to the latter." With these words Lycortas exhorted the Achaeans to receive the city of Sparta into the league. But Diophanes and some others attempted to put in a word for the exiles, and urged the Achaeans "Not to join in pressing heavily upon these banished men; and not to be influenced by a mere handful of men to strengthen the hands of those who had impiously and lawlessly expelled them from their country."

18. Such were the arguments employed on either side. The Achaeans, after listening to both, decided to admit the city, and accordingly the agreement was engraved on a tablet, and Sparta became a member of the Achaean league: the existing citizens having agreed to admit such of the old exiles as were not considered to have acted in a hostile spirit against the Achaeans. After confirming this arrangement the Achaeans sent Bippus of Argos and others as ambassadors to Rome, to explain to the Senate what had been done in the matter. The Lacedaemonians also sent Chaeron and others; while the exiles too sent a mission led by Cletis Diactorius[1] to oppose the Achaean ambassadors in the Senate.

Sparta admitted to the league.

[1] This looks like a local name, but no place is known corresponding to it. A Diactorides of Sparta is mentioned in Herodotus, 6, 127; and perhaps, as Hultsch suggests, we ought to read "Cletis and Diactorius."

BOOK XXIV

1. THE ambassadors from the Spartan exiles and from the Achaeans arrived in Rome simultaneously with those of Eumenes, king Ariarathes, and Pharnaces; and the Senate attended to these latter first. A short time previously a report had been made to the Senate by Marcus,[1] who had been despatched on a mission respecting the war that had broken out between Eumenes and Pharnaces, speaking highly of the moderation of Eumenes in every particular, and the grasping temper and insolence of Pharnaces. The Senate accordingly did not require any lengthened arguments; but, after listening to the ambassadors, answered that they would once more send legates to examine more minutely into the points in dispute between the kings. Then came in the ambassadors from the Lacedaemonian exiles, and with them the ambassadors from the citizens actually in the city; and after giving them a long hearing, the Senate expressed no disapproval of what had been done, but promised the exiles to write to the Achaeans on the subject of their restoration to their country. Some days afterwards, Bippus of Argos and his colleagues, sent by the Achaeans, entered the Senate with a statement as to the restoration of order in Messene; and the Senate, without showing displeasure at any part of the arrangement, gave the ambassadors a cordial reception. . . .

Embassies at Rome from the Achaeans, the Spartan exiles, Eumenes of Pergamus, Ariarathes, king of Cappadocia, and Pharnaces, king of Pontus, B.C. 182.

[1] The mission to Eumenes and Pharnaces has been already mentioned in bk. 23, ch. 9, but the name of the ambassador was not given; nor is it mentioned by Livy (40, 20), who records the mission. It is uncertain who is meant by Marcus, some editors have altered it to Marcius, *i.e.* Q. Marcius Philippus, who had been sent to Macedonia, imagining him to have fulfilled both missions.

2. When the ambassadors of the Spartan exiles arrived in the Peloponnese from Rome with a letter from the Senate to the Achaeans, desiring that measures should be taken for their recall and restoration to their country, the Achaeans resolved to postpone the consideration of the question until their own ambassadors should return. After making this answer, they caused the agreement between themselves and the Messenians to be engraved on a tablet: granting them, among other favours, a three years' remission of taxes, in order that the damage done to their territory should fall upon the Achaeans equally with the Messenians. But when Bippus and his colleagues arrived from Rome, and reported that the letter in regard to the exiles was not due to any strong feeling on the part of the Senate, but to the importunity of the exiles themselves, the Achaeans voted to make no change. . . .

Terms granted to the Messenians

The request of the Spartan exiles refused.

3. Mount Haemus is close to the Pontus, the most extensive and loftiest of the ranges in Thrace, which it divides into two nearly equal parts, from which a view of both seas may be obtained. . . .[1]

M. Haemus. Livy, 46, 21.

4. In Crete there was the beginning of great troubles set in motion, if one should speak of "a beginning of troubles" in Crete: for owing to the persistency of civil wars and the acts of savagery practised against each other, beginning and end are much the same in Crete; and what appears to some people to be an incredible story is a spectacle of everyday occurrence there. . . .

Crete in B.C. 182. See bk. 22, ch. 19.

5. Having come to terms with each other, Pharnaces, Attalus, and the rest returned home. While this was going on, Eumenes had recovered from his illness, and was staying at Pergamus; and when his brother arrived to announce the arrangements that had been made, he approved of what had been done, and resolved to send

End of the war between Eumenes and Pharnaces, which the former had undertaken to support his father-in-law Ariarathes. See

[1] From Strabo (vii. 5, 13), who adds: "But this is not true, for the distance from the Adriatic is immense, and there are many obstacles in the way to obscure the view."

Livy, 38, 39. B.C. 182-181.

his brothers to Rome: partly because he hoped to put an end to the war with Pharnaces by means of their mission, and partly because he wished to introduce his brothers to his own private friends at Rome, and officially to the Senate. Attalus and his brother were eager for this tour; and when they arrived in Rome the young men met with a cordial reception from everybody in private society, owing to the intimacies which they had formed during the Roman wars in Asia, and a still more honourable welcome from the Senate, which made liberal provision for their entertainment and maintenance, and treated them with marked respect in such conferences as it had with them. Thus, when the young men came formally before the Senate, and, after speaking at considerable length of the renewal of their ancient ties of friendship with Rome and inveighing against Pharnaces, begged the Senate to adopt some active measures to inflict on him the punishment he deserved, the Senate gave them a favourable hearing, and promised in reply to send legates to use every possible means of putting an end to the war. . . .

Ptolemy Epiphanes sends a present to the Achaeans. Lycortas, Polybius, and Aratus sent to return thanks, B.C. 181.

6. About the same time king Ptolemy, wishing to make friends with the Achaean league, sent an ambassador to them with an offer of a fleet of ten penteconters fully equipped; and the Achaeans, thinking the present worthy of their thanks, for the cost could not be much less than ten talents, gladly accepted the offer. Having come to this resolution, they selected Lycortas, Polybius, and Aratus, son of Aratus of Sicyon, to go on a mission to the king, partly to thank him for the arms which he had sent on a former occasion, and partly to receive the ships and make arrangements for bringing them across. They appointed Lycortas, because, as Strategus at the time that Ptolemy renewed the alliance, he had worked energetically on the king's side; and Polybius, though below the legal age for acting as ambassador,[1] because his father has been ambassador at the renewal of the alliance

Bk. 22, ch. 12.

[1] Perhaps thirty, which seems to have been the legal age for admission to political functions. See 29, 24.

with Ptolemy, and had brought the present of arms and of money to the Achaeans; and Aratus, similarly, on account of his former intercourse with the king. However, this mission never went after all, as Ptolemy died just at this time. . . .

Ptolemy Epiphanes poisoned in B.C. 181.

7. There was at this time in Sparta a man named Chaeron, who in the previous year had been on an embassy to Rome, a man of ready wit and great ability in affairs, but still young, in a humble position of life, and without the advantages of a liberal education. By flattering the mob, and starting questions which no one else had the assurance to move, he soon acquired a certain notoriety with the people. The first use he made of his power was to confiscate the land granted by the tyrants to the sisters, wives, mothers, and children of the exiles, and to distribute it on his own authority among the poor without any fixed rule or regard to equality. He next squandered the revenue, using the public money as though it were his own, without the authority of law, public decree, or magistrate. Annoyed at these proceedings, certain men managed to get themselves appointed auditors of the treasury in accordance with the laws. Seeing this, and conscious of his mal-administration of the government, Chaeron sent some men to attack Apollonides, the most illustrious of the auditors, and the most able to expose his embezzlements, who stabbed him to death in broad daylight as he was coming from the bath. Upon this being reported to the Achaeans, and the people expressing great indignation at what had been done, the Strategus at once started for Sparta; and when he arrived there he brought Chaeron to trial for the murder of Apollonides, and having condemned him, threw him into prison. He then incited the remaining auditors to make a real investigation into the public funds, and to see that the relations of the exiles got back the property of which Chaeron had shortly before deprived them. . . .

Chaeron's malversations at Sparta.

Assassination of Apollonides.

8. In Asia king Pharnaces, once more treating the reference to Rome with contempt, sent Leocritus in the course of the winter with ten thousand men to ravage Galatia, while he himself at the begin-

Winter of B.C. 181-180.

ning of spring collected his forces and invaded Cappadocia. When Eumenes heard of it, he was much enraged at Pharnaces thus breaking through the terms of the agreement to which he was pledged, but was compelled to retaliate by acting in the same way. When he had already collected his forces, Attalus and his brother landed from their voyage from Rome, and the three brothers, after meeting and interchanging views, marched out at once with the army. But on reaching Galatia they found Leocritus no longer there; and when Carsignatus and Gaesotorius, who had before embraced the cause of Pharnaces, sent them a message desiring that their lives might be spared, and promising that they would do anything that might be required of them, they refused the request on the ground of the treachery of which they had been guilty, and advanced with their full force against Pharnaces; and having performed the distance from Calpitus to the river Halys in five days, they reached Parnassus in six more, and being there joined by Ariarathes, the king of the Cappadocians, with his own army, they entered the territory of the Mocissians. Just as they had pitched their camp, news came that the ambassadors from Rome had arrived to effect a pacification. When he heard this, Eumenes sent his brother Attalus to receive them; while he devoted himself to doubling the number of his troops, and improving them to the utmost: partly with a view to prepare them for actual service, and partly to impress the Romans with the belief that he was able to defend himself against Pharnaces, and beat him in war.

Spring of B.C. 180.

Eumenes enters Cappadocia.

Two Galatian chiefs.

Calpitus in Galatia (?).

Parnassus, a town on the Halys.

Mocissus, N. of the Halys.

9. When the Roman legates arrived and urged the putting an end to the war, Eumenes and Ariarathes professed to be ready to obey; but begged the Romans to bring them, if possible, to an interview with Pharnaces, that they might see fully from what was said in their own presence how faithless and cruel a man Pharnaces was; and, if this proved to be impossible, to take a fair and impartial view of the controversy and

The Roman legates arrive and undertake to negotiate.

decide it themselves. The legates replied that they would do everything that was in their power and was consistent with honour; but they required the kings to remove their army from the country: for it was inconsistent that, when they were there with proposals for a peace, operations of war should be going on and mutual acts of hostility be committed. Eumenes and his ally yielded to this representation, and immediately marched off in the direction of Galatia. The Roman legates then visited Pharnaces, and first demanded that he should meet Eumenes and Ariarathes in a conference, as that would be the surest way of settling the affair; but when he expressed repugnance to that measure, and absolutely refused to do so, the Romans at once perceived that he plainly thought himself in the wrong, and distrusted his own cause; but, being anxious in any and every way to put an end to the war, they continued to press him until he consented to send plenipotentiaries to the coast, to conclude a peace on such terms as the legates might command. When these plenipotentiaries, the Roman legates, and Eumenes and Ariarathes met, the latter showed themselves ready to consent to any proposal for the sake of concluding a peace. But the envoys of Pharnaces disputed every point, and did not hold even to what they had once accepted, but continually brought forward some fresh demand, and altered their mind again and again. The Roman legates, therefore, quickly came to the conclusion that they were wasting their labour, as Pharnaces could not be induced to consent to the pacification. The conference accordingly having come to nothing, and the Roman legates having left Pergamum, and the envoys of Pharnaces having gone home, the war went on, Eumenes and his allies proceeding in their preparations for it. Meanwhile, however, the Rhodians earnestly requested Eumenes to help them; and he accordingly set out in great haste to carry on a war against the Lycians. . . .

The negotiation fails.

The Rhodians engaged in putting down a rising of the Lycians. See Bk. 22, ch. 5.

10. This year the Achaean Strategus Hyperbatus brought before the assembly the question of the letter from Rome as to the recall of the Lacedaemonian exiles. Lycortas and his party recom-

B.C. 180. Debate in the Achaean assembly

on the Roman despatch.

mended that no change should be made, on the ground that "The Romans had only acted as they were bound to do in listening to the petition of men who, on the face of it, were deprived of their rights, so far as that petition seemed reasonable; but when they were convinced that of a petition some points were impossible, and others such as to inflict great disgrace and damage upon their friends, it had never been their custom to insist upon them peremptorily, or force their adoption. So in this case also, if it were shown to them that the Achaeans by obeying their letter would be breaking their oaths, their laws, and the provisions engraved on the tablets, the very bonds of our league, they will retract their orders, and will admit that we are right to hesitate and to ask to be excused from carrying out its injunctions." Such was the speech of Lycortas. But Hyperbatus and Callicrates advised submission to the letter, and that they should hold its authority superior to law or tablet or anything else. Such being the division of opinion, the Achaeans voted to send ambassadors to the Senate, to put before it the points contained in the speech of Lycortas. Callicrates of Leontium, Lydiades of Megalopolis, and Aratus of Sicyon were forthwith nominated for this mission, and were despatched with instructions to this effect. But on their arrival at Rome Callicrates went before the Senate, and, so far from addressing it in accordance with his instructions, he on the contrary entered upon an elaborate denunciation of his political opponents; and, not contented with that, he undertook to rebuke the Senate itself.

11. For he said that "The Romans were themselves responsible for the Greeks neglecting their letters and orders instead of obeying them. For in all the democratic states of the day there were two parties,—one recommending obedience to the Roman rescripts, and holding neither law nor tablet nor anything else to be superior to the will of Rome; the other always quoting oaths and tablets, and exhorting the people to be careful about breaking them. Now the latter policy was by far the most popular in Achaia, and the most influential with the

Callicrates, instead of obeying his instructions, denounces his opponents, and persuades the Senate that their interference is necessary.

multitude; consequently the Romanisers were discredited and denounced among the populace—their opponents glorified. If then the Senate would give some sign of their interest in the matter, the leaders, in the first place, would quickly change to the Romanising party, and, in the next place, would be followed by the populace from fear. But if this were neglected by the Senate, the tendency towards the latter of the two parties would be universal, as the more creditable and honourable in the eyes of the populace. Thus it came about that at that very time certain statesmen, without any other claims whatever, had obtained the highest offices in their own cities, merely from coming forward to speak against the rescripts of the Senate, with the view of maintaining the validity of the laws and decrees made in the country. If then the Senate was indifferent about having their rescripts obeyed by the Greeks, by all means let it go on as it is now doing. But if the Senate wished that its orders should be carried out, and its rescripts be despised by no one, it must give serious attention to that subject. If it did not do so, he knew only too well that the exact opposite of the Senate's wishes would come about, as in fact had already been the case. For but lately, in the Messenian disturbance, though Quintus Marcius had taken many precautions to prevent the Achaeans adopting any measures with regard to the Messenians without the consent of the Romans, they had disobeyed that order; had voted the war on their own authority; had not only wasted the whole country in defiance of justice, but had in some cases driven its noblest citizens into exile, and in others put them to death with every extremity of torture, though they had surrendered, and were guilty of no crime but that of appealing to Rome on the points in dispute. Again, too, though the Senate had repeatedly written to order the restoration of the Lacedaemonian exiles, the Achaeans were so far from obeying, that they had actually set up an engraved tablet, and made a sworn agreement with the men actually in possession of the city that these exiles should never return. With these instances before their eyes, the Romans should take measures of precaution for the future."

12. After delivering a speech in these words, or to this effect, Callicrates left the Senate-house. He was followed by

the envoys of the exiles, who retired after delivering a short address, stating their case, and containing some of the ordinary appeals to pity. The Senate was persuaded that much of what Callicrates had said touched the interests of Rome, and that it was incumbent upon it to exalt those who supported its own decrees, and to humble those who resisted them. It was with this conviction, therefore, and at this time that it first adopted the policy of depressing those who in their several states took the patriotic and honourable side, and promoting those who were for appealing to its authority on every occasion, right or wrong. The result of which was that gradually, as time went on, the Senate had abundance of flatterers, but a great scarcity of genuine friends. However, on this occasion the Senate did not write about the restoration of the exiles to the Achaeans only, but also to the Aetolians, Epirotes, Athenians, Boeotians, and Acarnanians, calling them all as it were to witness, in order to break down the power of the Achaeans. Moreover, they added to their answer, without saying a word to his colleagues, a remark confined entirely to Callicrates himself, that "everybody in the various states should be as Callicrates." This man accordingly arrived in Greece with his answer, in a great state of exultation, little thinking that he had become the initiator of great miseries to all the Greeks, but especially to the Achaeans. This nation had still at that time the privilege of dealing on something like equal terms with Rome, because it had kept faith with her from the time that it had elected to maintain the Roman cause, in the hour of her greatest danger—I mean during the wars with Philip and Antiochus. . . . The league, too, had made progress in material strength and in every direction from the period from which my history commences; but the audacious proceeding of Callicrates proved the beginning of a change for the worse. . . .

The Romans adopt the policy of raising a party in Greece against the Achaean league.

The Romans having the feelings of men, with a noble spirit and generous principles, commiserate all who have met with misfortunes, and show favour to all who fly to them for protection; but directly any one claims anything as of right, on the ground of having been faithful to their alliance, they at once draw in and correct their error to the best of their

ability. Thus then Callicrates, who had been sent to Rome to plead for the rights of the Achaeans, acted in exactly the opposite spirit; and dragging in the subject of the Messenian war, on which the Romans themselves had made no complaint, returned to Achaia to overawe the people with the threat of the hostility of Rome. Having therefore by his official report frightened and dismayed the spirits of the populace, who were of course ignorant of what he had really said in the Senate, he was first of all elected Strategus, and, to make matters worse, proved to be open to bribery; and then, having got the office, carried out the restoration of the Lacedaemonian and Messenian exiles.[1] . . . B.C. 180-179.

13. Philopoemen and Aristaenus, the Achaeans, were unlike both in character and policy. Philopoemen was formed by nature in body and mind for the life of a soldier, Aristaenus for a statesman and debater. In politics they differed in this, that whereas during the periods of the wars with Philip and Antiochus, Roman influence had become supreme in Greece, Aristaenus directed his policy with the idea of carrying out with alacrity every order from Rome, and sometimes even of anticipating it. Still he endeavoured to keep up the appearance of abiding by the laws, and did, in fact, maintain the reputation of doing so, only giving way when any one of them proved to plainly militate against the rescripts from Rome. But Philopoemen accepted, and loyally performed, all Roman orders which were in harmony with the laws and the terms of their alliance; but when such orders exceeded these limits, he could not make up his mind to yield a willing obedience, but was wont first to demand an arbitration, and to repeat the demand a second time; and if this proved unavailing, to give in at length under protest, and so finally carry out the order. . . . Comparison between the characters of Philopoemen and Aristaenus.

14. Aristaenus used to defend his policy before the Achaeans by some such arguments as these: "It was impossible to maintain the Roman friendship by holding out the spear and the herald's staff together. If we have the resolution to withstand them face The view of Aristaenus on the right attitude towards Rome.

[1] See Hicks's *Greek Inscriptions*, p. 330.

to face, and can do so, well and good. But if Philopoemen himself does not venture to assert this,[1] . . . why should we lose what is possible in striving for the impossible? There are but two marks that every policy must aim at—honour and expediency. Those to whom honour is a possible attainment should stick to that, if they have political wisdom; those to whom it is not must take refuge in expediency. To miss both is the surest proof of unwisdom: and the men to do that are clearly those who, while ostensibly consenting to obey orders, carry them out with reluctance and hesitation. Therefore we must either show that we are strong enough to refuse obedience, or, if we dare not venture even to suggest that, we must give a ready submission to orders."

Philopoemen's answer in defence of his policy.

15. Philopoemen, however, said that "People should not suppose him so stupid as not to be able to estimate the difference between the Achaean and Roman states, or the superiority of the power of the latter. But as it is the inevitable tendency of the stronger to oppress the weaker, can it be expedient to assist the designs of the superior power, and to put no obstacle in their way, so as to experience as soon as possible the utmost of their tyranny? Is it not, on the contrary, better to resist and struggle to the utmost of our power? . . . And if they persist in forcing their injunctions upon us,[1] . . . and if, by reminding them of the facts we do something to soften their resolution, we shall at any rate mitigate the harshness of their rule to a certain extent; especially as up to this time the Romans, as you yourself say, Aristaenus, have always made a great point of fidelity to oaths, treaties, and promises to allies. But if we at once condemn the justice of our own cause, and, like captives of the spear, offer an unquestioning submission to every order, what will be the difference between the Achaeans and the Sicilians or Capuans, who have been notoriously slaves this long time past? Therefore it must either be admitted that the justice of a cause has no weight with the Romans, or, if we do not venture to say that, we must stand by our rights, and not abandon our own cause, especially as our position in regard to Rome is exceedingly strong and

[1] Something is lost from the text.

honourable. That the time will come when the Greeks will be forced to give unlimited obedience, I know full well. But would one wish to see this time as soon or as late as possible? Surely as late as possible! In this, then, my policy differs from that of Aristaenus. He wishes to see the inevitable arrive as quickly as possible, and even to help it to come: I wish to the best of my power to resist and ward it off."

From these speeches it was made clear that while the policy of the one was honourable, of the other undignified, both were founded on considerations of safety. Wherefore while both Romans and Greeks were at that time threatened with serious dangers from Philip and Antiochus, yet both these statesmen maintained the rights of the Achaeans in regard to the Romans undiminished; though a report found its way about that Aristaenus was better affected to the Romans than Philopoemen. . . .

BOOK XXV

1. TIBERIUS GRACCHUS destroyed three hundred cities of the Celtiberes.[1] . . .

B.C. 179. Coss. Q. Fulvius, L. Manlius.

2. The attack upon him being sudden and formidable, Pharnaces was reduced to submit to almost any terms; and on his sending an embassy, Eumenes and Ariarathes immediately accepted his proposals, and sent ambassadors to Pharnaces in return. When this had been repeated several times, the pacification was concluded on the following terms: "Eumenes, Prusias, and Ariarathes, shall maintain perpetual peace with Pharnaces and Mithridates.

The ex-praetors Ti. Sempronius Gracchus and L. Postumius were still in Spain, where they had been since B.C. 182. Livy, 40, 1, 44.

"Pharnaces shall not enter Galatia on any pretence.

Renewed war of Eumenes and Ariarathes upon Pharnaces. See bk. 24, chs. 8, 9.

"Such treaties as exist between Pharnaces and Gauls are hereby rescinded.

"Pharnaces shall likewise evacuate Paphlagonia, after restoring the inhabitants whom he had previously expelled, with their shields, javelins, and other equipment.

"Pharnaces shall restore to Ariarathes all territory of which he has deprived him, with the property thereon and the hostages.

"He shall restore Tium by the Pontus, which some time before was given freely and liberally by Eumenes to Prusias.

See bk. 5, ch. 77.

"Pharnaces shall restore, without ransom, all prisoners of war and all deserters.

[1] From Strabo 3, ch. 4, who quotes Poseidonius as criticising this statement by remarking that Polybius must count every tower as a city.

"He shall repay to Morzius and Ariarathes, in lieu of all money and treasure taken from them, the sum of nine hundred talents, and shall add thereto three hundred talents for Eumenes towards the expenses of the war.

"Mithridates, the Satrap of Armenia, shall also pay three hundred talents, because he attacked Ariarathes in defiance of the treaty with Eumenes.

"The persons included under this treaty are, of the princes in Asia, Artaxias, lord of the greater part of Armenia, and Acusilochus: of those in Europe, Gatalus the Sarmatian: of the autonomous peoples, the Heracleotes, the Mesembrians in the Chersonese, and the Cyzicenes."

The number and quality of hostages to be given by Pharnaces was also specified. The armies of the several parties then marched away, and thus was concluded the war of Eumenes and Ariarathes against Pharnaces.

Philip V. died at Amphipolis towards the end of B.C. 179. *His last days were embittered by remorse for the death of his son Demetrius, whose innocence had been demonstrated to him. He wished to leave his crown to Antigonus, the son of Echecrates and nephew of Antigonus Doson, in order to punish his elder son Perseus for his treachery in securing his brother's death. But Philip died suddenly before this could be secured, and Perseus succeeded him without opposition. See Livy*, 40, 55-57.

3. Having renewed the alliance with Rome, Perseus immediately began intriguing in Greece. He invited back into Macedonia absconding debtors, condemned exiles, and those who had been compelled to leave their country on charges of treason. He caused notices to be put up to that effect at Delos, Delphi, and the temple of Athena at Iton,[1] offering not only indemnity

The opening of the reign of Perseus.

[1] The notices are put up at the three places visited yearly by great numbers, and by many separate pilgrims. It is interesting to notice the persistence in a custom common from the earliest times, at any rate as far as Delos and Delphi are concerned. Iton was in Thessaly, and the temple and oracle of Athena there was celebrated throughout Greece, and was the central place of worship for the Thessalians. The town stood in a rich plain on the river Cuarius, and hence its name—sometimes written Siton—was connected by some with *σιτόφορος*, "corn-bearing" (Steph. *Byz.*) Homer calls it *μητέρα μήλων*, "mother of sheep." Pyrrhus hung up in this temple the spoils of

to all who returned, but also the restoration of the property lost by their exile. Such also as still remained in Macedonia he released from their debts to the Royal exchequer, and set free those who had been confined in fortresses upon charges of treason. By these measures he raised expectations in the minds of many, and was considered to be holding out great hopes to all the Greeks. Nor were other parts of his life and habits wanting in a certain royal magnificence. His outward appearance was striking, and he was well endowed with all the physical advantages requisite for a statesman. His look and mien were alike dignified and such as became his age. He had moreover avoided his father's weakness for wine and women, and not only drank moderately at dinner himself, but was imitated in this respect by his intimates and friends. Such was the commencement of the reign of Perseus. . . .

Philip V. in misfortune.

When king Philip had become powerful and had obtained supremacy over the Greeks, he showed the most utter disregard of faith and principle; but when the breeze of fortune again set against him, his moderation was as conspicuous in its turn. But after his final and complete defeat, he tried by every possible expedient to consolidate the strength of his kingdom.

4. After despatching the consuls Tiberius and Claudius against the Istri and Agrii,[1] the Senate towards the end of summer transacted business with the ambassadors that had come from the Lycians. They had not arrived at Rome until the Lycians had been completely conquered, but they had been despatched a considerable time before. For the people of Xanthus in Lycia, when about to embark upon the war, had sent Nicostratus and others to Achaia and Rome as ambassadors: who coming to Rome at that time moved many of the Senators to pity them, by laying before them the oppressiveness of the Rhodians and their own danger; and at length induced the

B.C. 177. Coss. C. Claudius Pulcher, Ti. Sempronius Gracchus.

Embassy from Lycia against Rhodes. See bk. 24, ch. 9.

Antigonus and his Gallic soldiers about B.C. 273. [Pausan. 1, 13, 2]. "Itonian Athena" had temples in other parts of Greece also, *e.g.* in Boeotia [Paus. 91, 34, 1].

[1] The war in Istria, and the mutiny of the troops against the consul Manlius, are described in Livy, 41, 8-11.

Senate to send envoys to Rhodes to declare that "On inspecting the record of the arrangements made by the ten commissioners in Asia, when settling the dominions of Antiochus, it appeared that the Lycians had been given to the Rhodians, not as a gift, but rather as friends and allies." But many were still dissatisfied with this solution of the matter. For the Romans seemed to wish, by thus pitting Rhodes against Lycia, to exhaust the accumulations and treasures of the Rhodians, because they had heard of the recent conveyance of the bride of Perseus by the Rhodians, and of their grand naval review. For shortly before this the Rhodians had been holding, with great splendour and elaboration of equipment, a review of all vessels belonging to them; the fact being that a vast quantity of timber for ship-building had been presented to them by Perseus. Moreover he had presented a gold tiara to each of the rowers on the upper bench in the ship that had brought him his bride Laodice.[1] . . .

Laodice, daughter of Seleucus IV. Livy, 42, 12.

5. When the envoys from Rome reached Rhodes and announced the decrees of the Senate, there was a great excitement in the island, and much confused discussion among the leading politicians. They were much annoyed at the allegation that the Lycians had not been given them as a gift but as allies; for having just satisfied themselves that the Lycian war was successfully concluded, they saw the commencement of fresh trouble for themselves growing up. For no sooner had the Romans arrived and made this announcement to the Rhodians, than the Lycians began a fresh revolt, and showed a determination of fighting to the last extremity for autonomy and freedom. However, after hearing the Roman envoys, the Rhodians made up their minds that the Romans had been deceived by the Lycians, and forthwith appointed Lycophron to lead an embassy to offer an explanation to the Senate. And the state of affairs was such that there was momentary expectation of a fresh rising of the Lycians. . . .

Excitement at Rhodes; and a fresh determination of the Lycians to assert independence.

[1] Besides this connexion with Seleucus of Syria, sure to be offensive to Rome, Perseus gave a sister to Prusias, another enemy of Rome and Eumenes. Livy, 42, 12.

6. When the Rhodian envoys arrived in Rome the Senate, after listening to their address, deferred its answer. Meanwhile the Dardanian envoys came with reports as to the number of the Bastarnae, the size of their men, and their courage in the field. They gave information also of the treacherous practices of Perseus and the Gauls, and said that they were more afraid of him than of the Bastarnae, and therefore begged the help of the Romans. The report of the Dardani being supported by that of the Thessalian envoys who arrived at that time, and who also begged for help, the Senators determined to send some commissioners to see with their own eyes the truth of these reports; and they accordingly at once appointed and despatched Aulus Postumius, accompanied by some young men. . .

Rhodian question deferred.

Reports of the intrigues of Perseus. See Livy, 41, 19, B.C. 176-175.

BOOK XXVI

SELEUCUS PHILOPATOR, whom we last heard of as king of Syria, was assassinated by one of his nobles—Heliodorus—in the twelfth year of his reign. Antiochus his younger brother had been a hostage at Rome, and being, according to agreement, exchanged in B.C. 175 for Philopator's son Demetrius, he was returning to Syria. At Athens, on his journey home, he heard of the death of Seleucus, and the attempt of Heliodorus to usurp the kingdom. By the help of Eumenes Heliodorus was expelled and Antiochus installed, to the satisfaction of the people, who gave him at first the surname of Epiphanes. He is the Antiochus Epiphanes whose cruelties are recorded in the books of the Maccabees. He died mad at Tabae in Persia, B.C. 164. See 31, 11. For the following extract preserved by Athenaeus, see the translation of Livy, 41, 19.

1. ANTIOCHUS EPIPHANES, nicknamed from his actions Epimanes (the Madman), would sometimes steal from the court, avoiding his attendants, and appear roaming wildly about in any chance part of the city with one or two companions. His favourite place to be found was the shops of the silversmiths or goldsmiths, chatting and discussing questions of art with the workers in relief and other artists; at another time he would join groups of the people of the town and converse with any one he came across, and would drink with foreign visitors of the humblest description. Whenever he found any young men carousing together he would come to the place without giving notice, with fife and band, like a rout of revellers, and often by his unexpected appearance cause the guests to rise and run away. He would often also lay aside his royal robes, and, putting on a tebenna,[1] go round the market-place as though a candidate for office, shaking hands and embracing various

Antiochus Epiphanes, B.C. 175-164.

[1] This word, of unknown origin, seems to be used here for the toga, or some dress equivalent to it. See 10, 4.

people whom he intreated to vote for him, sometime as aedile, and sometimes as tribune. And when he got the office and took his seat on an ivory curule chair, after the fashion of the Romans, he heard law cases which came on in the agora, and decided them with the utmost seriousness and attention. This conduct was very embarrassing to respectable people, some of whom regarded him as a good natured easy-going man, and others as a madman. In regard to making presents, too, his behaviour was on a par with this. Some he presented with dice made of gazelle horn, some with dates, others with gold. There were even instances of his making unexpected presents to men whom he met casually, and whom he had never seen before. In regard to public sacrifices and the honours paid to the gods, he surpassed all his predecessors on the throne; as witness the Olympieium at Athens and the statues placed round the altar at Delos. He used also to bathe in the public baths, when they were full of the townspeople, pots of the most expensive unguents being brought in for him; and on one occasion on some one saying, "Lucky fellows you kings, to use such things and smell so sweet!" without saying a word to the man, he waited till he was bathing the next day, and then coming into the bath caused a pot of the largest size and of the most costly kind of unguent called *stactè* to be poured over his head, so that there was a general rush of the bathers to roll themselves in it; and when they all tumbled down, the king himself among them, from its stickiness, there was loud laughter. . . .

BOOK XXVII

The events of the years B.C. 174, 173, 172, *which gradually led up to the war with Perseus, to be described in the twenty-seventh book, were briefly these :—*

In B.C. 174 Perseus forced the Dolopes, who had appealed against him to Rome, to submit to his authority. After this successful expedition he marched through Central and Northern Greece, visiting Delphi, where he stayed three days, Phthiotid Achaia, and Thessaly. He carefully abstained from inflicting any damage in the districts through which he passed, and tried to gain the confidence of the various states. In the same year he made friendly advances to the Achaeans, who had forbidden any Lacedaemonian to enter their territory, by offering to restore their fugitive slaves. But in spite of the exertions of Xenarchus the Strategus, the Achaeans refuse to make any change (Livy, 41, 22-24).

The same year saw also commotions in Aetolia, which were settled by five Roman commissioners : and in Crete, on the old score of the status of the Lycians. Q. Minucius was sent to settle this also (Livy, 41, 25).

In B.C. 173 Perseus entered on still more active intrigues in Greece, and in spite of the wildest scandals that were afloat as to his tyranny, he gained a powerful hold in Aetolia, Thessaly, and Perrhaebia. The Senate accordingly sent Marcellus to Aetolia and Achaia, and App. Claudius to Thessaly, to inquire into the facts ; and a commission of five into Macedonia, with directions to proceed afterwards to Alexandria (Livy, 42, 5, 6).

In B.C. 172 king Eumenes visited Rome and urged the Senate to take measures in time to counteract the attempts of Perseus ; warning them that he had already obtained strong hold upon the Boeotians and Aetolians, and had an inexhaustible recruiting ground in Thrace. That everywhere he had secured the death or exile of the partisans of Rome, and was overrunning in arms Thessaly and Perrhaebia (Livy, 42, 11-13).

The Senate, already inclined to listen to these representations, was still more inclined to do so by the defiant tone of Harpalus, the representative of king Perseus ; by the attempted assassination of Eumenes by emissaries of Perseus at Delphi on his home journey ; by receiving a report from Greece from C. Valerius confirming the speech of Eumenes ; and lastly by the confession of one L. Rammius of Brundisium, that he had been requested to poison certain Roman envoys who were accustomed to stay at his house on their journeys to and from Macedonia and Greece (Livy, 42, 15-17).

War was now determined on for the next year, and the praetor ordered to enroll troops. And Eumenes also, now recovered from the wounds of the assassins, made preparations to join in the struggle (Livy, 42, 18-27).

In B.C. 171, fresh legions having been enrolled, and an army of sixteen thousand infantry and eight hundred cavalry ordered to Macedonia, envoys appeared from Perseus demanding the reason. The Senate would not allow them to enter the Pomoerium, but received them in the temple of Bellona: and after listening to a report from Sp. Cavilius that Perseus had, among other acts of hostility, taken cities in Thessaly and entered Perrhaebia in arms, the Senate answered the Macedonian envoys that any complaint they had to make must be made to the consul, P. Licinius, who would presently be in Macedonia, but that they must not come into Italy again (Livy, 42, 36).

A few days afterwards five commissioners were sent into Greece, who distributed the districts to be visited among themselves: Servius and Publius Lentulus and Lucius Decimius were to go to Cephallenia, the Peloponnese, and the west coast generally; Q. Marcius and Aulus Atilius to Epirus, Aetolia, Thessaly, and thence to Boeotia and Euboea, where they were to meet the Lentuli. Meanwhile a letter from Perseus, demanding the cause of their coming and of the presence of troops in Macedonia, was received and left unanswered. After visiting the districts assigned to them, in the course of doing which Marcius and Atilius had met Perseus on the river Peneus, and granted him a truce to enable him to send envoys to Rome (Marcius knowing well that the Romans were not yet fully prepared for war[1]), the commissioners reached their destination at Chalcis, where the earlier events narrated in the following extracts occurred (Livy, 42, 36-43).

THE WAR WITH PERSEUS

1. AT this time Lases and Callias arrived at the head of an embassy from the Thespians, and Ismenias[2] from Neon. Lases and his colleagues offered to put their city wholly into the hands of the Romans; Ismenias proposed to submit all the

B.C. 171. Coss. P. Licinius Crassus C. Cassius Longinus.

[1] Marcius on his return to Rome gloried in having thus deceived the king and gained time for preparations at Rome, but his action was repudiated by the Senate. Livy, 42, 47.

[2] Ismenias had just been elected Strategus of Boeotia; but the party who had supported a rival candidate had in revenge obtained a decree of the league banishing the Boeotarchs from all the Boeotian cities. They had, however been received at Thespiae, whence they were recalled to Thebes and reinstated by a reaction in popular feeling. Then they obtained another decree banishing the twelve men who, though not in office, had convened the league assembly; and Ismenias as Strategus sentenced them to the loss of all rights in their absence. These are the "exiles" here meant (Livy, 42, 43). Who Neon was is not certain; but we find in the next chapter that he had been a leader in the Macedonising party at Thebes, perhaps a son of Brachylles, whose father's name was Neon (see 20, 5). He was captured in B.C. 167 and put to death by the Romans (Livy, 45, 31).

cities of Boeotia as one nation to the discretion of the commissioners. But this latter proposal was diametrically opposed to the policy of Marcius and his colleagues. What suited that policy best was to split up Boeotia into separate cities: and they therefore received Lases and his party, as well as the envoys from Chaeronea and Lebadea, and all who came from single cities, with great favour and lavish courtesy; but treated Ismenias with ostentatious neglect and coldness. Some of the exiles[1] also attacked Ismenias and were very near stoning him to death, and would have done so if he had not saved himself by taking refuge through the door[2] of the chamber where the commissioners were sitting. At the same period there were disturbances and party contests at Thebes. One party were for committing the town unconditionally to Rome; but the Coroneans and Haliartians flocked to Thebes and vehemently maintained that they ought to maintain the alliance with Perseus. For a time neither of the two parties showed any disposition to give in to each other; but when Olympichus of Coronea set the example of changing sides and asserting that they ought to cleave to the Romans, a great change and revolution came over the feelings of the populace. First, they compelled Dicetas to go on an embassy to Marcius and the other commissioners to excuse them for their alliance with Perseus. Next, they expelled Neon and Hippias, crowding to their houses, and bidding them go and make their own defence for the terms that they had made; for they were the men who had negotiated the alliance. When these men had left the town, the people immediately collected into the assembly and first voted honours and gifts to the Romans, and then ordered the magistrates to push on the alliance. Last of all they appointed ambassadors to hand over the city to the Romans and to restore their exiles.

The Roman commissioners at Chalcis: ambassadors from Thespiae and Neon of Boeotia.

Thebes.

[1] See note 2, page 356.

[2] *τὰ δίθυρα*, Livy (42, 44) says in *tribunal legatorum*, and Casaubon contents himself with the same word. Schweighaeuser translates it *podium*, as if a "raised platform" on which the commissioners sat was meant. I think it is used in the natural sense of a "door" leading into the hall in which they were sitting, and into which Ismenias fled for refuge. Livy used *tribunal* from the ideas of his age as to the construction of such a building.

2. Whilst these things were being accomplished at Thebes, the exiles in Chalcis appointed Pompides to state their grievances against Ismenias, Neon, and Dicetas. The bad policy of these men being manifest, and the Romans lending their support to the exiles, Hippias and his party were rendered so odious that they were in danger of falling victims to the fury of the populace, until the Romans, by checking the assaults of the mob, secured them a certain degree of safety.

The cause of the exiles' triumph at Chalcis.

When the Theban envoys arrived, bringing with them to the commissioners the decrees and honours I have mentioned, a rapid change passed over the face of things in each of the towns, for they were separated by a very narrow interval from each other. The commissioners with Marcius received the Theban envoys, complimented their town and counselled them to restore the exiles, and bade the several towns send embassies to Rome submitting themselves individually and unreservedly to the protection of the Romans. Their policy, therefore, of splitting up the league of the Boeotian towns, and of destroying the popularity of the Macedonian royal house with the Boeotian populace having thus completely succeeded, the commissioners sent for Servius Lentulus from Argos, and leaving him in charge at Chalcis went themselves to the Peloponnese; while Neon a few days afterwards retired to Macedonia; and Ismenias and Dicetas, being thrown at once into prison, shortly afterwards put an end to their lives. Thus it came about that the Boeotians, who had for a long period of years, and through many strange vicissitudes, maintained a national league, by now rashly and inconsiderately adopting the cause of Perseus, and giving way to an outburst of unreasoning excitement, were entirely disintegrated and split up into separate cities.

Dissolution of the Boeotian league, B.C. 171.

When Aulus and Marcius arrived at Argos, after communication with the council of the Achaean league, they called upon Archon the Strategus to despatch a thousand men to Chalcis, to garrison the town until the arrival of the Romans; an order which Archon readily obeyed. Having thus settled affairs in Greece

The Commissioners in the Peloponnese.

during the winter, and met Publius Lentulus and his two colleagues, the commissioners sailed back to Rome. . . .

The Rhodians prepare to co-operate with Rome.

3. Meanwhile Tiberius Claudius and Aulus Postumius had been engaged on a visitation of the islands and Greek cities in Asia, and had spent the longest time in Rhodes; though the Rhodians at that time did not require any supervision, for the prytanis that year was Agesilochus, a man of high rank, who had once been on an embassy to Rome. Even before the legates came, as soon as it became clear that the Romans intended to go to war with Perseus he had urged his people to throw in their fortunes with those of Rome; and, among other things, had counselled them to repair forty ships, in order that, if any occasion for using them should arise, it should not find them still in the midst of preparations, but ready to answer to the call and to carry out their resolve at once. By stating these facts to the Roman envoys, and showing them the preparations visibly progressing, he let them return to Rome in a high state of satisfaction with Rhodes. . . .

Perseus sends a circular despatch to the Greek States.

4. After the conferences had been held between the Roman envoys and the Greeks, Perseus drew up a despatch containing a statement of his case, and the arguments employed on either side; partly from an idea that he would thus be shown to have the superiority of right on his side, and partly because he wished to test the feelings of the several states. Copies of this despatch he sent to the other states by his ordinary letter-carriers; but to Rhodes he sent also Antenor and Philip as ambassadors, who, on their arrival in the island, handed over the document to the magistrates, and a few days afterwards entered the Council chamber and urged the Rhodians "To remain neutral for the present and watch what happened; and, if the Romans attacked Perseus in violation of the treaty, to endeavour to mediate. For this was the interest of all, and pre-eminently of the Rhodians, who more than most peoples desired equality and freedom of speech, and were ever the protectors, not only of their own liberty, but of that of the rest of Greece also; and therefore ought to be proportionally careful to provide and

The reply of the Rhodians.

guard against a policy of an opposite tendency." These and similar arguments of the envoys found favour with the Rhodian people. But, as they were already pledged to an attitude of friendship to Rome, the influence of the upper classes so far prevailed that, though a friendly reception was given to the Macedonian envoys, they demanded in their formal answer that Perseus should not ask them to take any measure which would involve the appearance of hostility to Rome. Antenor and his colleagues would not accept this reply, but with thanks for the kindness of their general reception, sailed back to Macedonia. . . .

Mission of Perseus to Boeotia.

5. Being informed that some of the cities of Boeotia remained faithful to him, Perseus sent Alexander on a mission to them. On his arrival in Boeotia, Alexander was obliged to abstain from visiting any of the cities except Coronea, Thisbae,[1] and Haliartus, finding that they offered him no facilities for securing close relations. But he entered those three towns and exhorted their inhabitants to cling to their loyalty to the Macedonians. They received his words with enthusiasm, and voted to send ambassadors to Macedonia. Alexander accordingly returned to the king and reported the state of things in Boeotia. A short time afterwards the ambassadors arrived, desiring the king to send aid to the cities which favoured the Macedonian cause; for the Thebans were oppressing them severely, because they would not agree with them and side with Rome. But Perseus replied that he was precluded by the truce from sending any aid to any one; but he begged them to resist the Thebans to the best of their power, and yet not to go to war with the Romans, but to remain neutral. . . .

Truce made with Q. Marcius. See Livy, 42, 43. B.C. 171.

War is decided upon at the expiration of the truce.

6. When the report of the commissioners from Asia concerning Rhodes and the other states had been made at Rome, the Senate called in the ambassadors of Perseus, Solon and Hippias: who endeavoured to argue the whole case and to deprecate the anger

[1] The text has Θήβας, which is inconsistent with what follows as to the Thebans. An inscription found on the site of Thisbae supplies the correction of an error as old as Livy (42, 46, 47). See Hicks's, *G. I.* p. 330.

of the Senate; and particularly to defend their master on the subject of the attempt upon the life of Eumenes. When they had finished all they had to urge, the Senate, which had all the while been resolved on war, bade them depart forthwith from Rome; and ordered all other Macedonians also that happened to be staying in the country to quit Italy within thirty days. The Senate then called upon the Consuls to act at once and see that they moved in good time. . . .

Attempted assassination of Eumenes at Delphi. Livy, 42, 16, B.C. 172.

7. Caius Lucretius[1] being at anchor off Cephallenia, wrote a letter to the Rhodians, requesting them to despatch some ships, and entrusted the letter to a certain trainer named Socrates. This letter arrived at Rhodes in the second six months of the Prytany of Stratocles. When the question came on for discussion, Agathagetus, Rhodophon, Astymedes, and many others were for sending the ships and taking part in the war from the first, without any further pretence; but Deinon and Polyaratus, though really displeased at the favour already shown to Rome, now for the present used the case of Eumenes as their pretext, and began by that means to alienate the feelings of the populace. There had in fact been a long standing feeling of suspicion and dislike in the minds of the Rhodians against Eumenes, dating from the time of his war with Pharnaces; when, upon king Eumenes blockading the entrance of the Hellespont to prevent ships sailing into the Pontus, the Rhodians had interfered with his design and thwarted him. This ill-feeling had again been recently exasperated during the Lycian war on the question of certain forts, and a strip of territory on the frontier of the Rhodian Peraea, which was being damaged by some of Eumenes's subjects. These incidents taken together made the Rhodians ready to listen to anything against the king. Seizing on this pretext, the party of Deinon tried to discredit the despatch, asserting that it did not come from the

Politics at Rhodes.

The Romanising party.

The Macedonian party.

Jealousy of Eumenes.

[1] Gaius Lucretius had seen naval service as *duumvir navalis* on the coast of Liguria in B.C. 181. Livy, 40, 26. He was now (B.C. 171) Praetor, his *provincia* being the fleet, and commanded 40 quinqueremes. *Id.* 42, 48.

Romans but from Eumenes, who wished to involve them on any possible pretext in a war, and bring expense and perfectly unnecessary suffering upon the people. In support of their contention they put forward the fact that the man who brought the letter was some obscure trainer or another; and asserted that the Romans were not accustomed to employ such messengers, but were rather inclined to act with unnecessary care and dignity in the despatch of such missives. When they said this they were perfectly aware that the letter had really been written by Lucretius: their object was to persuade the Rhodian people to do nothing for the Romans readily, but rather to perpetually make difficulties, and thus give occasions for offence and displeasure to crop up between the two nations. For their deliberate purpose was to alienate Rhodes from the Roman friendship, and to join it to that of Perseus, by every means in their power. Their motives for thus clinging to Perseus were that Polyaratus, who was ostentatious and vain, had become heavily in debt; and that Deinon, who was avaricious and unscrupulous, had from the first relied on increasing his wealth by getting presents from princes and kings. These speeches having been delivered, the Prytanis Stratocles rose, and, after inveighing at some length against Perseus, and speaking with equal warmth in praise of the Romans, induced the people to confirm the decree for the despatch of the ships. Forthwith six quadriremes were prepared, five of which were sent to Chalcis under the command of Timagoras, and the other under the command of another Timagoras to Tenedos. This latter commander fell in at Tenedos with Diophanes, who had been despatched by Perseus to Antiochus, and captured both him and his crew. All such allies as arrived with offers of help by sea Lucretius thanked warmly, but excused from taking part in this service, observing that the Romans had no need of naval support. . . .

Perseus now collected a large army at Citium, thirty-nine thousand foot and four thousand horse, and advanced through the north of Thessaly taking many towns, and finally taking up his quarters at Sicyrium, at the foot of Mount Ossa. The Roman consul, P. Licinius, marched from the south-west through Gomphi,

and thence to Larisa, where he crossed the river Peneus. After some cavalry skirmishes, which were generally favourable to the king, Perseus advanced nearer to the Roman camp, and a more important battle was fought, in which the king again scored a considerable success with his cavalry and light-armed troops. The Romans lost two hundred cavalry killed and as many prisoners and two thousand infantry, while Perseus only had twenty cavalry and forty infantry killed. He did not, however, follow up the victory sufficiently to inflict a crushing blow upon the Roman army; and though the Consul withdrew to the south of the Peneus, after some days' reflection the king made proposals of peace. See Livy, 42, 51-62. B.C. 171 (*summer*).

8. After the Macedonian victory Perseus summoned his Council, when some of his friends expressed an opinion that he ought to send an embassy to the Roman general, to signify his readiness even now to pay the Romans the same amount of tribute as his father had formerly undertaken to pay when beaten in war, and to evacuate the same places. "For if," they argued, "the Romans accept the terms the war will be ended in a manner honourable to the king after his victory in the field; and the Romans, after this taste of Macedonian valour, will be much more careful in the future not to impose an unjust or harsh burden upon the Macedonians. And if, on the other hand, in spite of the past, they prove obstinate and refuse to accept them, the anger of heaven will with justice fall on them; while the king by his moderation will gain the support of Gods and men alike." The majority of his friends held this view, and Perseus expressing his assent to it, Pantauchus, son of Balacrus, and Midon of Beroea, were forthwith sent as ambassadors to Licinius. On their arrival, Licinius summoned his Council, and the ambassadors having stated their proposals in accordance with their instructions, Pantauchus and his colleague were requested to withdraw, and they deliberated on the proposition thus made to them. They decided unanimously to return as stern an answer as possible. For this is a peculiarity

After beating the Roman cavalry on the Peneus, and obliging Licinius to retire south of the river, Perseus endeavours to make terms.

The Romans are inexorable.

of the Romans, which they have inherited from their ancestors, and are continually displaying,—to show themselves most peremptory and imperious in the presence of defeat, and most moderate when successful: a very noble peculiarity, as every one will acknowledge; but whether it be feasible under certain circumstances may be doubted. However that may be, on the present occasion they made answer that Perseus must submit without reserve himself, and give the Senate full power to take whatever measures it might think good concerning Macedonia and all in it. On this being communicated to Pantauchus and Midon, they returned and informed Perseus and his friends; some of whom were roused to anger at this astonishing display of haughtiness, and advised Perseus to send no more embassies or messages about anything whatever. Perseus, however, was not the man to take such a line. He sent again and again to Licinius, with continually enhanced offers, and promising a larger and larger sum of money. But as nothing that he could do had any effect, and as his friends found fault with him, and told him that, though he had won a victory, he was acting like one who had been defeated and lost all, he was at length compelled to renounce the sending of embassies, and remove his camp back to Sicyrium. Such was the position of the campaign. . . .

Perseus returns to Sicyrium.

9. When the report of the favourable result for Perseus of the cavalry engagement, and of the victory of the Macedonians, spread through Greece, the inclination of the populace to the cause of Perseus blazed out like a fire, most of them having up to that time concealed their real feelings. Their conduct, to my mind, was like what one sees at gymnastic contests. When some obscure and far inferior combatant descends into the arena with a famous champion reputed to be invincible, the spectators immediately bestow their favour upon the weaker of the two, and try to keep up his spirits by applause, and eagerly second his efforts by their enthusiasm. And if he succeeds so far as even to touch the face of his opponent, and make a mark to prove the blow, the whole of the spectators again show themselves on his side. Sometimes they even jeer at his antagonist: not because they dislike or

The effect of the success of Perseus upon the Greeks.

undervalue him, but because their sympathies are roused by the unexpected, and they are naturally inclined to take the weaker side. But if any one checks them at the right moment, they are quick to change and see their mistake. And this is what Cleitomachus is said to have done. He had the character of being an invincible athlete, and, as his reputation was spread all over the world, King Ptolemy is said to have been inspired with the ambition of putting an end to it. He therefore had Aristonicus the boxer, who was thought to have unusual physical capabilities for that kind of thing trained with extraordinary care, and sent to Greece. When he appeared on the arena at Olympia a great number of the spectators, it seems, immediately showed their favour for him, and cheered him on, being rejoiced that some one should have had the courage to make some sort of stand against Cleitomachus. But when, as the fight went on, he showed that he was a match for his antagonist, and even gave him a well-placed wound, there was a general clapping of hands, and the popular enthusiasm showed itself loudly on his side, the spectators calling out to Aristonicus to keep up his spirits. Thereupon they say that Cleitomachus stepped aside, and after waiting a short time to recover his breath, turned to the crowd and asked them "Why, they cheered Aristonicus, and supported him all they could? Had they detected him in playing foul in the combat? Or were they not aware that Cleitomachus was at that moment fighting for the honour of Greece, Aristonicus for that of king Ptolemy? Would they prefer an Egyptian to carry off the crown by beating Greeks, or that a Theban and Boeotian should be proclaimed victor in boxing over all comers?" Upon this speech of Cleitomachus, they say that such a revulsion of feeling came over the spectators, that Aristonicus in his turn was conquered more by the display of popular feeling than by Cleitomachus.

A scene at Olympia.

10. What happened in the case of Perseus in regard to the feeling of the multitude was very similar to this. For if any one had pulled them up and asked them plainly, in so many words, whether they wished such great power to fall to one man, and were desirous of trying the effect of an utterly irresponsible des-

potism, I presume that they would have promptly bethought themselves, recanted all they had said, and gone to the other extreme of feeling. Or if some one had briefly recalled to their recollection all the tyrannical acts of the royal house of Macedonia from which the Greeks had suffered, and all the benefits they had received from the Romans, I imagine they would have at once and decisively changed their minds. However, for the present, at the first burst of thoughtless enthusiasm, the people showed unmistakable signs of joy at the news, being delighted at the unlooked-for appearance of a champion able to cope with Rome. I say this much to prevent any one, in ignorance of human nature, from bringing a rash charge of ingratitude against the Greeks for the feelings which they displayed at that time. . . .

A new kind of missile used in the army of Perseus.

11. The *cestros* was a novel invention, made during the war with Perseus. This weapon consisted of an iron bolt two palms long, half of which was spike, and half a tube for the reception of the wooden shaft which was fixed into the tube, and measured a span in length and a finger-breadth in diameter. At the middle point of the shaft three wooden "plumes" were morticed in. The sling had thongs of unequal length, and on the leather between them the missile was loosely set. When the sling was being swung round, with the two thongs taut, the missile kept its place; but when the slinger let go one of the thongs, it flew from the leather like a leaden bullet, and was projected from the sling with such force as to inflict a very grievous wound upon any one whom it hit.[1]

Character of Cotys, king of the Odrysae, an ally of Perseus.

12. Cotys was a man of distinguished appearance and of great ability in military affairs, and besides, quite unlike a Thracian in character. For he was of sober habits, and gave evidence of a gentleness of temper and a steadiness of disposition worthy of a man of gentle birth. . . .

A prudent governor of Cyprus. See above, bk. 18, ch. 55.

13. Ptolemy, the general serving in Cyprus, was by no means like an Egyptian, but was a man of sense and administrative ability. He received the governorship of the island when the king of Egypt was quite a child, and devoted himself

[1] Livy, who translates this passage, calls the missile a *cestrosphendona* (42, 65).

with great zeal to the collection of money, refusing payments of any kind to any one, though he was often asked for them by the king's agents, and subjected to bitter abuse for refusing to part with any. But when the king came of age he made up a large sum and sent it to Alexandria, so that both king Ptolemy himself and his courtiers expressed their approval of his previous parsimony and determination not to part with any money. . . .

The battle on the Peneus was followed by other engagements of no great importance; and finally Perseus returned to Macedonia, and the Romans went into winter quarters in various towns in Thessaly, without a decisive blow having been struck on either side. Winter of B.C. 171-170. *Livy*, 42, 64-67.

14. Just about the time when Perseus retired for the winter from the Roman war, Antenor arrived at Rhodes from him, to negotiate for the ransom of Diophanes and those who were on board with him. Thereupon there arose a great dispute among the statesmen as to what course they ought to take. Philophron, Theaetetus, and their party were against entering into such an arrangement on any terms; Deinon and Polyaratus and their party were for doing so. Finally they did enter upon an arrangement with Perseus for their redemption. . . .

Winter of B.C. 171-170. Dispute at Rhodes as to the release of Diophanes, the envoy of Perseus, captured at Tenedos. See ch. 7.

15. Cephalus came [to Pella] from Epirus. He had long been connected by friendship with the royal house of Macedonia, but was now compelled by the force of circumstances to embrace the side of Perseus, the cause of which was as follows: There was a certain Epirote named Charops, a man of high character, and well disposed to Rome, who, when Philip was holding the passes into Epirus, was the cause of his being driven from the country, and of Titus Flamininus conquering Epirus and Macedonia. Charops had a son named Machatus, who had a son also named Charops. Machatus having died when this son was quite a youth, the elder Charops sent his grandson with a suitable retinue to Rome to learn to speak and read Latin. In the course of

What induced the leading men in Epirus to join Perseus.

time the young man returned home, having made many intimate friendships at Rome. The elder Charops then died, and the young man, being of a restless and designing character, began giving himself airs and attacking the distinguished men in the country. At first he was not much noticed, Antinous and Cephalus, his superiors in age and reputation, managing public affairs as they thought right. But when the war with Perseus broke out, the young man at once began laying information against these statesmen at Rome, grounding his accusations on their former intimacy with the Macedonian royal family; and by watching everything they said or did, and putting the worst construction on it, suppressing some facts and adding others, he succeeded in getting his accusations against them believed. Now Cephalus had always shown good sense and consistency, and at the present crisis had adhered to a course of the highest wisdom. He had begun by praying heaven that the war might not take place, or the question come to the arbitrament of arms; but when the war was actually begun, he was for performing all treaty obligations towards Rome, but for not going a step beyond this, or showing any unbecoming subservience or officiousness. When Charops then vehemently accused Cephalus at Rome, and represented everything that happened contrary to the wishes of the Romans as malice prepense on his part, at first he and others like him thought little of the matter, being not conscious of entertaining any designs hostile to Rome. But when they saw Hippolochus, Nicander, and Lochagus arrested without cause, and conveyed to Rome after the cavalry battle, and that the accusations made against them by Lyciscus were believed,—Lyciscus being a leader of the same party in Aetolia as Charops was in Epirus,—they at length began to be anxious about what would happen, and to consider their position. They resolved therefore to try every possible means to prevent themselves from being similarly arrested without trial and carried to Rome, owing to the slanders of Charops. It was thus that Cephalus and his friends were compelled, contrary to their original policy, to embrace the cause of Perseus. . . .

Charops.

Aetolian leaders arrested.

16. Theodotus and Philostratus committed an act of

flagrant impiety and treachery. They learnt that the Roman consul Aulus Hostilius was on his way to Thessaly to join the army; and thinking that, if they could deliver Aulus to Perseus, they would have given the latter the strongest possible proof of their devotion, and have done the greatest possible damage to the Romans at this crisis, they wrote urgently to Perseus to make haste. The king was desirous of advancing at once and joining them; but he was hindered by the fact that the Molossians had seized the bridge over the Aous, and was obliged to give them battle first. Now it chanced that Aulus had arrived at Phanota,[1] and put up at the house of Nestor the Cropian,[2] and thus gave his enemies an excellent opportunity; and had not fortune interfered on his behalf, I do not think that he would have escaped. But, in fact, Nestor providentially suspected what was brewing, and compelled him to change his quarters for the night to the house of a neighbour. Accordingly he gave up the idea of going by land through Epirus, and, having sailed to Anticyra,[3] thence made his way into Thessaly. . . .

Coss. A. Hostilius, Mancinus, A. Atilius Serranus, B.C. 170.

Attempt of two Molossian leaders to seize the consul.

17. Pharnaces was the worst of all his predecessors on the throne. . . .

Pharnaces, king of Pontus.

18. While Attalus was spending the winter in Elateia (in Phocis), knowing that his brother Eumenes was annoyed in the highest possible degree at the splendid honours which had been awarded to him having been annulled by a public decree of the Peloponnesians, though he concealed his annoyance from every one,—he took upon himself to send messages to certain of the Achaeans, urging that not only the statues of honour, but the complimentary inscriptions

Attalus desires that his brother Eumenes should be restored to honour in the Peloponnese.

[1] In Phocis. The name was variously given as Phanoteis, Phanote, Phanota (Steph. *Byz.*)

[2] Schweighaeuser seems to regard this as a second name. But the Greeks seldom had such, and it is more likely the designation of some unknown locality. There was an Attic deme named Cropia, and therefore the name is a recognised one (Steph. *Byz.*) Gronovius conjectured Ὠρωπίῳ "of Oropus."

[3] Apparently the Anticyra on the Sperchius, on the borders of Achaia Phthiotis.

also, which had been placed in his brother's honour, should be restored. His motive in acting thus was the belief that he could give his brother no greater gratification, and at the same time would display to the Greeks by this act his own brotherly affection and generosity.[1] . . .

Preparations for the attack upon Coele-Syria by the ministers of Ptolemy Philometor.

19. When Antiochus saw that the government of Alexandria was openly making preparations for a war of annexation in Coele-Syria, he sent Meleager at the head of an embassy to Rome, with instructions to inform the Senate of the fact, and to protest that Ptolemy was attacking him without the least justification. . . .

The need of promptness,

20. In all human affairs perhaps one ought to regulate every undertaking by considerations of time; but this is especially true in war, in which a moment makes all the difference between success and failure, and to miss this is the most fatal of errors. . . .

and of persistency.

Many men desire honour, but it is only the few who venture to attempt it; and of those who do so, it is rare to find any that have the resolution to persevere to the end. . . .

[1] Hence Attalus obtained the name of Philadelphus. The origin of Eumenes's loss of popularity in the Peloponnese is referred to in 28, 7, but no adequate cause is alleged. A reference to Achaia in his speech at Rome was not perhaps altogether friendly (Livy, 42, 12), and we shall see that he was afterwards suspected of intriguing with Perseus; but if this extract is rightly placed, it can hardly be on this latter ground that the Achaeans had renounced him.

BOOK XXVIII

1. WHEN the war between the kings Antiochus and Ptolemy[1] for the possession of Coele-Syria had just begun, Meleager, Sosiphanes, and Heracleides came as ambassadors from Antiochus, and Timotheos and Damon from Ptolemy. The one actually in possession of Coele-Syria and Phoenicia was Antiochus; for ever since his father's victory over the generals of Ptolemy at Panium[2] all those districts had been subject to the Syrian kings. Antiochus, accordingly, regarding the right of conquest as the strongest and most honourable of all claims, was now eager to defend these places as unquestionably belonging to himself: while Ptolemy, conceiving that the late king Antiochus had unjustly taken advantage of his father's orphan condition to wrest the cities in Coele-Syria from him, was resolved not to acquiesce in his possession of them. Therefore Meleager and his colleagues came to Rome with instructions to protest before the Senate that Ptolemy had, in breach of all equity, attacked him first; while Timotheos and Damon came to renew their master's friendship with the Romans, and to offer their mediation for putting an end to the war with Perseus; but, above all, to watch the communications made by Meleager's embassy. As to putting an end to the war, by the advice of Marcus Aemilius they did not venture to speak of it; but after formally renewing the friendly relations between Ptolemy and Rome, and receiving a favourable answer, they returned to Alexandria. To Meleager and his colleagues the Senate answered that Quintus Marcius should be commissioned to write to

B.C. 169, Antiochus and Ptolemy both appeal to Rome on the subject of Coele-Syria.

[1] Antiochus IV. Epiphanes, B.C. 175-164; Ptolemy VI. Philometor, B.C. 181-146.

[2] See 16, 18.

Ptolemy on the subject, as he should think it most to the interest of Rome and his own honour. Thus was the business settled for the time. . . .

The Rhodians ask for license to import corn.

2. About this time there came also ambassadors from the Rhodians towards the end of summer, Agesilochus, Nicagoras, and Nicander. The objects of their mission were to renew the friendship of Rhodes and Rome; to obtain a license for importing corn from the Roman dominions; and to defend their state from certain charges that had been brought against it. For there were most violent party contests going on in Rhodes: Agathagetus, Philophron, Rhodophon, and Theaetetus resting all their hopes on the Romans, and Deinon and Polyaratus on Perseus and the Macedonians; and as these divisions gave rise to frequent debates in the course of their public business, and many contradictory expressions were used in their deliberations, plenty of opportunities were afforded to those who wished to make up stories against the state. On this occasion, however, the Senate affected to be ignorant of all this, though perfectly acquainted with what went on in the island, and granted them a license to import one hundred thousand medimini of corn from Sicily. This answer was given by the Senate to the Rhodians separately. Audience was then given collectively to all the envoys from the rest of Greece that were united in the same policy. . . .

B.C. 169. Aulus Hostilius, in Greece with preconsular authority, sends Popilius and Octavius to visit the Greek towns and read the decree of the Senate.

3. Aulus being thus Proconsul, and wintering in Thessaly with the army, sent Gaius Popilius and Gnaeus Octavius to visit certain places in Greece. They first came to Thebes, where, after speaking in complimentary terms of the Thebans, they exhorted them to maintain their good disposition towards Rome. They then went a round of the cities in the Peloponnese, and endeavoured to convince the people of the clemency and humanity of the Senate by producing the[1] de-

[1] The decree referred to is given in Livy, 43, 17. "No one shall supply any war material to the Roman magistrates other than that which the Senate has decreed." This had been extracted from the Senate by vehement complaints reaching Rome of the cruel extortions of the Roman officers in the previous two years.

cree which I recently mentioned. At the same time they made it clearly understood that the Senate was aware who in the several states were hanging back and trying to evade their obligations, and who were forward and zealous; and they let it be seen that they were as much displeased with those who thus hung back as with those who openly took the opposite side. This brought hesitation and doubt to the minds of the people at large, as to how to frame their words and actions so as to exactly suit the necessities of the times. Gaius and Gnaeus were reported to have resolved, as soon as the Achaean congress was assembled, to accuse Lycortas, Archon, and Polybius, and to point out that they were opposed to the policy of Rome; and were at the present moment refraining from active measures, not because that was their genuine inclination, but because they were watching the turn of events, and waiting their opportunity. They did not, however, venture to do this, because they had no well-founded pretext for attacking these men. Accordingly, when the council[1] met at Aegium, after delivering a speech of mingled compliments and exhortation, they took ship for Aetolia.

They visit the Peloponnese, and express some dissatisfaction at the backward policy of certain Achaeans.

Lycortas, Archon, and Polybius are supposed to be particularly aimed at.

4. The Aetolian congress being summoned to meet them at Thermum, they came before the assembled people, and again delivered a speech in which expressions of benevolence were mixed with exhortations. But the real cause of summoning the congress was to announce that the Aetolians must give hostages. On their leaving the speakers' platform, Proandrus stood forward and desired leave to mention certain services performed by himself to the Romans, and to denounce those who accused him. Gaius thereupon rose; and, though he well knew that Proandrus was opposed to Rome, he paid him some compliments, and acknowledged the truth of everything he had said. After this, Lyciscus stood forward, and, without accusing any one person by name,

The legates in Aetolia.

Various Aetolians accuse each other.

Proandrus.

Lyciscus.

[1] Polybius seems to mean the smaller council, not the public assembly, though Livy evidently understood the latter (43, 47).

yet cast suspicion on a great many. For he said that "The Romans had been quite right to arrest the ringleaders and take them to Rome" (whereby he meant Eupolemus, Nicander, and the rest): "but members of their party still remained in Aetolia, all of whom ought to meet with the same correction, unless they gave up their children as hostages to the Romans." In these words he meant to point especially to Archedamus and Pantaleon; and, accordingly, when he retired, Pantaleon stood up, and, after a brief denunciation of Lyciscus for his shameless and despicable flattery of the stronger side, turned to Thoas, conceiving him to be the man whose accusations of himself obtained the greater credit from the fact that he had never been supposed to be at enmity with him. He reminded Thoas first of the events in the time of Antiochus; and then reproached him for ingratitude to himself, because, when he had been surrendered to Rome, he obtained an unexpected release at the intercession of Nicander and himself. He ended by calling upon the Aetolians, not only to hoot Thoas down if he tried to speak, but to join with one accord in stoning him. This was done; and Gaius, after administering a brief reproof to the Aetolians for stoning Thoas, departed with his colleague to Acarnania, without any more being said about hostages. Aetolia, however, was filled with mutual suspicions and violent factions.

Pantaleon.

Thoas stoned.

5. In Acarnania the assembly was held at Thurium, at which Aeschrion, Glaucus, and Chremes, who were all partisans of Rome, begged Gaius and Gnaeus to place a garrison in Acarnania; for they had among them certain persons who were for putting the country in the hands of Perseus and the Macedonians. The advice of Diogenes was the opposite. "A garrison," he said, "ought not to be put into any of their cities, for that was what was done to those who had been at war with Rome and had been beaten; whereas the Acarnanians had done no wrong, and did not deserve in any respect to have a garrison thrust upon them. Chremes and Glaucus and their partisans were slandering their political opponents, and desired to bring in a garrison which would support their self-

Acarnania.

seeking policy, in order to establish their own tyrannical power." After these speeches, Gaius and his colleague, seeing that the populace disliked the idea of having garrisons, and wishing to follow the line of policy marked out by the Senate, expressed their adherence to the view of Diogenes; and departed to join the Proconsul at Larisa, after paying some compliments to the Acarnanians. . . .

6. The Greeks made up their minds that this embassy required much consideration on their part. They therefore called to council such men as were of one mind in other political questions,— Arcesilaus and Ariston of Megalopolis, Stratius of Tritaea, Xenon of Patrae and Apollonides of Sicyon. But Lycortas stood firm to his original view: which was that they should send no help to either Perseus or Rome in any way, nor, on the other hand, take part against either. For he held that co-operation with either would be disadvantageous to the Greeks at large, because he foresaw the overwhelming power which the successful nation would possess; while active hostility, he thought, would be dangerous, because they had already in former times been in opposition to many of the most illustrious Romans in their state policy. Apollonides and Stratius did not recommend open and avowed hostility to Rome, but thought that "Those who were for plunging headlong into the contest, and wished to use the action of the nation to secure their own personal favour at Rome, ought to be put down and boldly resisted." Archon said that "They must yield to circumstances, and not give their personal enemies a handle for accusations; nor allow themselves to fall into the same misfortune as Nicander, who, before he had learnt what the power of Rome really was, had met with the gravest calamities." With this last view, Polyaenus, Arcesilaus, Ariston, and Xenon agreed. It was thereupon decided that Archon should go without delay to his duties as Strategus, and Polybius to those of Hipparch.

Meeting of Achaean statesmen to consider their policy, B.C. 169.

Lycortas is for complete neutrality.

Apollonides and Stratius for suppressing rash declarations for Rome, and yet not openly opposing her.

The Strategus Archon is for bending to the storm, and acting frankly for Rome.

Polybius Hipparch.

7. Very soon after these events, and when Archon had made up his mind that the Achaeans must take active part with Rome and her allies, it happened most conveniently that Attalus made his proposal to him and found him ready to accept it. Archon at once eagerly promised his support to Attalus's request: and when thereupon that prince's envoys appeared at the next congress, and addressed the Achaeans about the restoration of king Eumenes's honours, begging them to do this for the sake of Attalus, the people did not show clearly what their feeling was, but a good many rose to speak against the proposal from many various motives. Those who were originally the advisers of the honours being paid to the king were now desirous to confirm the wisdom of their own policy; while those who had private reasons for animosity against the king thought this a good opportunity for revenging themselves upon him; while others again, from spite against those who supported him, were determined that Attalus should not obtain his request. Archon, however, the Strategus, rose to support the envoys,—for it was a matter that called for an expression of opinion from the Strategus,—but after a few words he stood down, afraid of being thought to be giving his advice from interested motives and the hope of making money, because he had spent a large sum on his office. Amidst a general feeling of doubt and hesitation, Polybius rose and delivered a long speech. But that part of it which best fell in with the feelings of the populace was that in which he showed that "The original decree of the Achaeans in regard to these honours enacted that such honours as were *improper and contrary to law* were to be abolished, but not *all* honours by any means. That Sosigenes and Diopeithes and their colleagues, however, who were at the time judges, and for private reasons personally hostile to Eumenes, seized the opportunity of overturning all the erections put up in honour of the king; and in doing so had gone beyond the meaning of the decree of the Achaeans, and beyond the powers entrusted to them, and, what was worst of all, beyond the demands of justice and right. For the Achaeans had not resolved upon doing away with the honours of

Embassy from Attalus to the Achaeans desiring the restoration of the honours formally decreed to his brother Eumenes, See 27, 18.

Speech of Polybius.

Eumenes on the ground of having received any injury at his hands; but had taken offence at his making demands beyond what his services warranted, and had accordingly voted to remove everything that seemed excessive. As then these judges had overthrown these honours, because they had a greater regard for the gratification of their private enmity than for the honour of the Achaeans, so the Achaeans, from the conviction that duty and honour must be their highest consideration, were bound to correct the error of the judges, and the unjustifiable insult inflicted upon Eumenes: especially as, in doing so, they would not be bestowing this favour on Eumenes only, but on his brother Attalus also." The assembly having expressed their agreement with this speech, a decree was written out ordering the magistrates to restore all the honours of king Eumenes, except such as were dishonourable to the Achaean league or contrary to their law. It was thus, and at this time, that Attalus secured the reversal of the insult to his brother Eumenes in regard to the honours once given him in the Peloponnese. . . .

8. Perseus sent Pleuratus the Illyrian, an exile living at his court, and Adaeus of Beroea on a mission to king Genthius, with instructions to inform him of what he had achieved in his war with the Romans, Dardani, Epirotes, and Illyrians up to the present time; and to urge him to make a friendship and alliance with him in Macedonia. These envoys journeyed beyond Mount Scardus, through Illyria Deserta, as it is called,—a region a short time back depopulated by the Macedonians, in order to make an invasion of Illyria and Macedonia difficult for the Dardani. Their journey through this region was accompanied by much suffering; but they reached Scodra, and being there informed that Genthius was at Lissus, they sent a message to him. He promptly responded: and having been admitted to an interview with him, they discussed the business to which their instructions referred. Genthius had no wish to forfeit the friendship of Perseus;

Early in B.C. 169,[1] after taking Hyscana in Illyria, Perseus advances to Stubera, and thence sends envoys to king Genthius at Lissus. Livy, 43, 19.

Genthius temporises.

[1] The expedition of Perseus into Illyricum apparently took place late in the year B.C. 170 and in the first month of B.C. 169. Livy, 43, 18-20.

but he alleged want of means as an excuse for not complying with the request at once, and his inability to undertake a war with Rome without money. With this answer, Adaeus and his colleagues returned home. Meanwhile Perseus arrived at Stubera, and sold the booty and gave his army a rest while waiting for the return of Pleuratus and Adaeus. On their arrival with the answer from Genthius, he immediately sent another mission, consisting again of Adaeus, Glaucias, one of his body-guards, and the Illyrian (Pleuratus) also, because he knew the Illyrian language, with the same instructions as before: on the ground that Genthius had not stated distinctly what he wanted, and what would enable him to consent to the proposals. When these envoys had started the king himself removed with his army to Hyscana,[1] . . .

A second mission to Genthius.

Perseus goes back to Hyscana in Illyria.

9. The ambassador sent to Genthius returned without having accomplished anything more than the previous envoys, and without any fresh answer; for Genthius remained of the same mind,—willing to join with Perseus in his war, but professing to be in want of money. Perseus disregarded the hint, and sent another mission under Hippias to conclude the treaty, without taking any notice of the main point, while professing a wish to do whatever Genthius wished. It is not easy to decide whether to ascribe such conduct to mere folly, or to a spiritual delusion. For my part, I am inclined to regard it as a sheer spiritual delusion when men aim at bold enterprises, and risk their life, and yet neglect the most important point in their plans, though they see it all the time and have the power to execute it. For I do not think it will be denied by any man of reflection that, had Perseus at that time been willing to make grants of money either to states as such, or individually to kings and statesmen, I do not say on a great scale, but even to a moderate extent, they would all—Greeks and kings alike—have yielded to the temptation. As it was, he happily did not take that course, which would have given him, if successful, an

Genthius being unpersuaded by the second mission, Perseus sends a third, but still without offering money.

The dislike of Perseus to give money turned out happily for Greece.

[1] Hyscana, or Uscana, a town of the Illyrian tribe Penestae.

overweening supremacy; or, if unsuccessful, would have involved many others in his disaster. But he took the opposite course: which resulted in confining the numbers of the Greeks who adopted the unwise policy at this crisis to very narrow limits. . . .

[Perseus now returned from Stubera to Hyscana, and after a vain attempt upon Stratus in Aetolia, retired into Macedonia for the rest of the winter. In the early spring of B.C. 169 Q. Marcius Philippus began his advance upon Macedonia from his permanent camp in Perrhaebia. Perseus stationed Asclepiodotus and Hippias to defend two passes of the Cambunian mountains, while he himself held Dium, which commanded the coast road from Thessaly into Macedonia. Marcius however, after only a rather severe skirmish with the light-armed troops of Hippias, effected the passage of the mountains and descended upon Dium. The king was taken by surprise: he had not secured the pass of Tempe, which would have cut off the Romans from retreat; and he now hastily retired to Pydna. Q. Marcius occupied Dium, but after a short stay there retired upon Phila, to get provisions and secure the coast road. Whereupon Perseus reoccupied Dium, and contemplated staying there to the end of the summer. Q. Marcius took Heracleum, which was between Phila and Dium, and made preparations for a second advance on Dium. But the winter (B.C. 169-168) was now approaching, and he contented himself with seeing that the roads through Thessaly were put in a proper state for the conveyance of provisions. Livy, 43, 19-23; 44, 1-9.]

10. Having been completely worsted on the entrance of the Romans into Macedonia, Perseus found fault with Hippias. But in my opinion it is easy to find fault with others and to see their mistakes, but it is the hardest thing in the world to do everything that can be done one's self, and to be thoroughly acquainted with one's own affairs. And Perseus was now an instance in point. . . .

Perseus lays the blame of his failure on his generals. Livy, 44, 8.

11. The capture of Heracleum was effected in a very peculiar manner. The city wall at one part and for a short distance was low. The Romans attacked with three picked maniples: and the first made a protection for their heads by locking their shields together over them so closely, that they presented the appearance of a sloping tiled roof. . . .

The testudo. Livy, 44, 9.

This manœuvre the Romans used also in mock fights. . . .

While C. Marcius Figulus, the praetor, was engaged in

Chalcidice, Q. Marcius sent M. Popilius to besiege Meliboea in Magnesia. Perseus sent Euphranor to relieve it, and, if he succeeded, to enter Demetrias. This he did, and was not attacked at the latter place by Popilius or Eumenes—scandal saying that the latter was in secret communication with Perseus. Livy, 44, 10-13, B.C. 169.

12. Upon Perseus designing to come into Thessaly and there decide the war by a general engagement, as he probably would have done, Archon and his colleagues resolved to defend themselves against the suspicions and slanders that had been thrown upon them, by taking some practical steps. They therefore brought a decree before the Achaean congress, ordering an advance into Thessaly, with the full force of the league, to co-operate energetically with the Romans. The decree being confirmed, the Achaeans also voted that Archon should superintend the collection of the army and the necessary preparations for the expedition, and should also send envoys to the Consul in Thessaly, to communicate to him the decree of the Achaeans, and to ask when and where their army was to join him. Polybius and others were forthwith appointed, and strictly instructed that, if the Consul approved of the army joining him, they should at once send some messengers to communicate the fact, that they might not be too late on the field; and meanwhile, that Polybius himself should see that the whole army found provisions in the various cities through which it was to pass, and that the soldiers should have no lack of any necessaries. With these instructions the envoys started. The Achaeans also appointed Telocritus to conduct an embassy to Attalus, bearing the decree concerning the restoration of the honours of Eumenes. And as news arrived about the same time that king Ptolemy had just celebrated his *anacleteria*, the usual ceremony when the kings come of age, they voted to send some ambassadors to confirm the friendly relations existing between the league and the kingdom of Egypt, and thereupon appointed Alcithus and Pasiadas for this duty.

The Achaeans decide to co-operate actively with the Romans in Thessaly.

Polybius sent to the Consul.

Ptolemy Physcon celebrates his anacleteria.

13. Polybius and his colleagues found the Romans moved from Thessaly, and encamped in Perrhaebia, between Azorium and Doliche. They therefore postponed communication with the Consul, owing to the critical nature of the occasion, but shared in the dangers of the invasion of Macedonia. When the Roman army at length reached the district of Heracleum, it seemed the right moment for their interview with Q. Marcius, because he considered that the most serious part of his undertaking was accomplished. The Achaean envoys therefore took the opportunity of presenting the decree to Marcius, and declaring the intention of the Achaeans, to the effect that they wished with their full force to take part in his contests and dangers. In addition to this they demonstrated to him that every command of the Romans, whether sent by letter or messenger, had been during the present war accepted by the Achaeans without dispute. Marcius acknowledged with great warmth the good feeling of the Achaeans, but excused them from taking part in his labours and expenses, as there was no longer any need for the assistance of allies. The other ambassadors accordingly returned home; but Polybius stayed there and took part in the campaign, until Marcius, hearing that Appius Cento asked for five thousand Achaean soldiers to be sent to Epirus, despatched Polybius with orders to prevent the soldiers being granted, or such a heavy expense being causelessly imposed on the Achaeans; for Appius had no reason whatever for asking for these soldiers. Whether he did this from consideration for the Achaeans, or from a desire to prevent Appius from obtaining any success, it is difficult to say. Polybius, however, returned to the Peloponnese and found that the letter from Epirus had arrived, and that the Achaean congress had been soon afterwards assembled at Sicyon. He was therefore in a situation of great embarrassment. When Cento's demand of soldiers was brought before the Congress he did not think it by any means proper to reveal the charge which Q. Marcius had given him privately: and on the other hand to oppose the demand, without some clear pretext, was exceedingly

Summer of B.C. 169.

Autumn of B.C. 169.

Q. Marcius declines the offered army of Achaeans.

Appius Claudius Cento defeated at Hyscana in B.C. 170. Livy, 43, 10.

dangerous. In this difficult and delicate position he called to his aid the decree of the Roman Senate, forbidding compliance with the written demands of commanders unless made in accordance with its own decree. Now, no mention of such a decree occurred in the despatch from Appius. By this argument he prevailed with the people to refer the matter to the Consul, and by his means to get the nation relieved of an expense which would amount to over a hundred and twenty talents. Still he gave a great handle to those who wished to denounce him to Appius, as having thwarted his design of obtaining a reinforcement. . . .

See above, p. 372.

14. The people of Cydon at this time committed a shocking act of indisputable treachery. Though many such have occurred in Crete, yet this appeared to go beyond them all. For though they were bound to Apollonia, not only by the ties of friendship, but by those of common institutions also, and in fact by everything which mankind regard as sacred, and though these obligations were confirmed by a sworn treaty engraved and preserved in the temple of Idaean Zeus, yet they treacherously seized Apollonia, put the men to the sword, plundered the property, and divided among themselves the women, children, city, and territory. . . .

Crete. The Cydonians attack and take Apollonia near Cnossus.

15. Afraid of the Gortynians, because they had narrowly escaped losing their city in the previous year by an attack led by Nothocrates, the Cydonians sent envoys to Eumenes demanding his assistance in virtue of their alliance with him. The king selected Leon and some soldiers, and sent them in haste to Crete; and on their arrival the Cydonians delivered the keys of their city to Leon, and put the town entirely in his hands. . . .

The Cydonians ask help from Eumenes.

16. The factions in Rhodes kept continually becoming more and more violent. For when the decree of the Senate, directing that they should no longer conform to the demands of the military magistrates but only to those contained in the Senate's decrees, was communicated to them, and the people at large expressed satisfaction at the care of the Senate for their interests; Philophron and Theaetetus seized the occasion to carry

The Rhodians determine to send a mission to Rome, B.C. 170.

out their policy further, declaring that they ought to send envoys to the Senate, and to Q. Marcius Philippus the Consul, and Gaius Marcius Figulus, the commander of the fleet. For it was by that time known to everybody which of the magistrates designate in Rome were to come to Greece. The proposal was loudly applauded, though some dissent was expressed: and at the beginning of the summer B.C. 169. Agesilochus, son of Hegesias, and Nicagoras, son of Nicander, were sent to Rome; Agepolis, Ariston, and Pancrates to the Consul and commander of the fleet, with instructions to renew the friendship of the Cretans with Rome, and to make their defence against the accusations that were being uttered against their state; while Agesilochus and his colleagues were at the same time to make a proposal about a license to export corn from the Roman dominions. The speech made by these envoys to the Senate, and the reply made by the Senate, and the successful termination of their mission, I have already mentioned in the section devoted to Italian affairs. But it is useful to repeat such points, as I am careful to do, because I am obliged frequently to record the actual negotiations of ambassadors before mentioning the circumstances attending their appointment and despatch. For since I am recording under each year the contemporary events in several countries, and endeavouring to take a summary review of them all together at the end, this must of necessity form a feature in my history.

See *supra*, ch. 2.

17. Agepolis and his colleagues found Q. Marcius himself encamped near Heracleum in Macedonia, and delivered their commission to him there. In answer, he said that "He himself paid no attention to those calumnies, and advised them not to pay any to those who ventured to speak against Rome." He added many other expressions of kindness, and even wrote them in a despatch to the people of Rhodes. Agepolis was much charmed by his whole reception; and observing this, the Consul took him aside and said to him privately that "He wondered at the Rhodians not trying to put an end to the war,[1] which it would be eminently in

The envoys visit Q. Marcius Philippus at Heracleum.

Why do not the Rhodians stop

[1] That is, the war between Antiochus and Ptolemy.

the war between Antiochus and Ptolemy?

their interests to do." Did the Consul act thus because he was suspicious of Antiochus, and was afraid, if he conquered Alexandria, that he would prove a formidable second enemy to themselves, seeing that the war with Perseus was becoming protracted, and the war for Coele-Syria had already broken out? Or was it because he saw that the war with Perseus was all but decided, now that the Roman legions had entered Macedonia, and because he had confident hopes of its result; and therefore wished, by instigating the Rhodians to interfere between the kings, to give the Romans a pretext for taking any measures they might think good concerning them? It would not be easy to say for certain; but I am inclined to believe that it was the latter, judging from what shortly afterwards happened to the Rhodians. However, Agepolis and his colleagues immediately afterwards proceeded to visit Gaius Marcius Figulus: and, having received from him still more extraordinary marks of favour than from Quintus Marcius, returned with all speed to Rhodes. When they received the report of the embassy, and knew that the two commanders had vied with each other in warmth, both by word of mouth and in their formal answers, the Rhodians were universally elated and filled with pleasing expectation. But not all in the same spirit: the sober-minded were delighted at the good feeling of the Romans towards them; but the restless and fractious calculated in their own minds that this excessive complaisance was a sign that the Romans were alarmed at the dangers in which they found themselves, and at their success not having answered to their expectations. But when Agepolis communicated to his friends that he had a private message from Q. Marcius to the Cretan Council about putting an end to the war (in Syria), then Deinon and his friends felt fully convinced that the Romans were in a great strait; and they accordingly sent envoys also to Alexandria to put an end to the war then existing between Antiochus and Ptolemy. . . .

Effect of the warm reception of their ambassadors on the Rhodians.

They endeavour to make peace between Antiochus Epiphanes and Ptolemy Physcon.

Ptolemy Epiphanes, who died B.C. 181, *left two sons, Ptolemy Philometor and Ptolemy Physcon, and a daughter, Cleopatra, by his wife Cleopatra, sister of Antiochus Epiphanes. After the death of Ptolemy's mother Cleopatra, his ministers, Eulaeus and Lenaeus, engaged in a war with Antiochus for the recovery of Coele-Syria and Phoenicia, which had been taken by Antiochus the Great, and which they alleged had been assigned as a dower to the late Cleopatra. Their war was singularly unsuccessful. Antiochus Epiphanes defeated their troops at Pelusium, took young Ptolemy Philometor captive, and advanced as far as Memphis. Thereupon Ptolemy Physcon assumed the royal title at Alexandria as Euergetes II., and sent envoys to Antiochus at Memphis. Antiochus, however, treated Ptolemy Philometor with kindness, established him as king at Memphis, and advanced to Naucratis, and thence to Alexandria, which he besieged on the pretext of re-establishing Philometor.* B.C. 171. See *infra*, bk. 29. ch. 23.

Character of Antiochus IV. (Epiphanes).

18. King Antiochus was a man of ability in the field and daring in design, and showed himself worthy of the royal name, except in regard to his manœuvres at Pelusium. . . .

Comanus and Cineas, Physcon's ministers, determine to send embassies to Antiochus, B.C. 169.

19. When Antiochus was actually in occupation of Egypt, Comanus and Cineas, after consultation with king Ptolemy Physcon, determined upon summoning a conference of the most distinguished Egyptian nobles to consult about the danger which threatened them. The first resolution the conference came to was to send the Greek envoys who were then at Alexandria as envoys to Antiochus to conclude a pacification. There were at that time in the country two embassies from the Achaean league, one which had been sent to renew the alliance between the league and Egypt, and which was composed of Alcithus of Aegium, son of Xenephon, and Pasiodes, and another sent to give notice of the festival of the Antigoneia.[1] There was also an embassy

[1] The Antigoneia was a festival established in honour of Antigonus Doson, who had been a benefactor of the Achaeans. In 30, 23, it is mentioned as being celebrated in Sicyon. The benefactions of this Macedonian king to the Achaeans are mentioned by Pausanias (8, 8, 12).

from Athens led by Demaratus on the subject of some present, and two sacred embassies, one in connexion with the Panathenaea under the presidency of Callias the pancratiast, and the other on the subject of the mysteries, of which Cleostratus was the active member and spokesman. There were also there Eudemus and Hicesius from Miletus, and Apollonides and Apollonius from Clazomenae. The king also sent with them Tlepolemus and Ptolemy the rhetorician as envoys. These men accordingly sailed up the river to meet Antiochus. . . .

20. While Antiochus was occupying Egypt,[1] he was visited by the Greek envoys sent to conclude terms of peace. He received them courteously, devoted the first day to giving them a splendid entertainment, and on the next granted them an interview, and bade them deliver their instructions. The first to speak were the Achaeans, the next the Athenian Demaratus, and after him Eudemus of Miletus. And as the occasion and subject of their speeches were the same, the substance of them was also nearly identical. They all laid the blame of what had occurred on Eulaeus, and referring to Ptolemy's youth and his relationship to himself, they intreated the king to lay aside his anger. Thereupon Antiochus, after acknowledging the general truth of their remarks, and even supporting them by additional arguments of his own, entered upon a defence of the justice of his original demands. He attempted to establish the claim of the king of Syria on Coele-Syria, "Insisting upon the fact that Antigonus, the founder of the Syrian kingdom, exercised authority in that country; and referring to the formal cession of it to Seleucus,[2] after the death of Antigonus, by the sovereigns of Macedonia. Next he dwelt on the last conquest of it by his father Antiochus; and finally he denied that any such agreement was made between the late king Ptolemy and his father as the Alexandrian ministers asserted, to the effect that Ptolemy was to take Coele-Syria as a dowry when he married Cleopatra,

The Greek envoys visit Antiochus and endeavour to make peace.

Their arguments.

Reply of Antiochus.

[1] See 27, 19; 18, 1, 17.
[2] Seleucus Nicanor, B.C. 306-280.

the mother of the present king." Having by these arguments not only persuaded himself, but the envoys also, of the justice of his claim, he sailed down the river to Naucratis. There he treated the inhabitants with humanity, and gave each of the Greeks living there a gold piece, and then advanced towards Alexandria. He told the envoys that he would give them an answer on the return of Aristeides and Thesis, whom he had sent on a mission to Ptolemy; and he wished, he said, that the Greek envoys should all be cognisant and witnesses of their report. . . .

Antiochus occupies Naucratis and thence advances to Alexandria.

21. The eunuch Eulaeus persuaded Ptolemy to collect his money, give up his kingdom to his enemies, and retire to Samothrace. This will be to any one who reflects upon it a convincing proof of the supreme mischief done by evil companions of boyhood. That a monarch so entirely out of reach of personal danger and so far removed from his enemies, should not make one effort to save his honour, while in possession too of such abundant resources, and master over such wide territory and such numerous subjects, but should at once without a blow surrender a most splendid and wealthy kingdom,—is not this the sign of a spirit utterly effeminate and corrupted? And if this had been Ptolemy's natural character, we must have laid the blame upon nature and not upon any external influence. But since by his subsequent achievements his natural character has vindicated itself, by proving Ptolemy to be sufficiently resolute and courageous in the hour of danger, we may clearly, without any improbability, attribute to this eunuch, and his companionship with the king in his boyhood, the ignoble spirit displayed by him on that occasion, and his idea of going to Samothrace. . . .

The evil influence of Eulaeus upon Ptolemy Philometor. He advises him to yield to Antiochus and retire to Samothrace.

22. After raising the siege of Alexandria, Antiochus sent envoys to Rome, whose names were Meleager, Sosiphanes, and Heracleides, agreeing to pay one hundred and fifty talents, fifty as a complimentary present to the Romans, and the rest as a gift to be divided among certain cities in Greece. . . .

Antiochus leaves Alexandria for a time, being met by some Roman envoys. See 29, 25.

23. In the course of these same days envoys sailed in from Rhodes to Alexandria, headed by Pration, to negotiate a pacification; and a few days afterwards presented themselves at the camp of Antiochus. Admitted to an interview, they argued at considerable length, mentioning their own country's friendly feelings to both kingdoms, and the ties of blood existing between the two kings themselves, and the advantage which a peace would be to both. But the king interrupted the envoy in the middle of his speech by saying that there was no need of much talking, for the kingdom belonged to the elder Ptolemy, and with him he had long ago made terms, and they were friends, and if the people wished now to recall him Antiochus would not prevent them. And he kept his word. . . .

Envoys from Rhodes visit Antiochus in his camp not far from Alexandria.

BOOK XXIX

1. "THEIR one idea, expressed at parties or conversations in the street, was, that they should manage the war in Macedonia while remaining quietly at home in Rome, sometimes by criticising what the generals were doing, at others what they were leaving undone. From this the public interests never got any good, and often a great deal of harm. The generals themselves were at times greatly hampered by this ill-timed loquacity. For as it is the invariable nature of slander to spread rapidly and stop at nothing, the people got thoroughly infected by this idle talk, and the generals were consequently rendered contemptible in the eyes of the enemy." . . .

B.C. 168. Coss. L. Aemilius Paullus, C. Licinius Crassus. A fragment of the speech of L. Aemilius before starting for Macedonia. See Livy, 44, 22.

2. The Senate being informed that Antiochus had become master of Egypt, and all but taken Alexandria, and conceiving that the aggrandisement of that king was a matter affecting themselves, appointed Gaius Popilius and others to go as ambassadors to put an end to the war, and generally to inspect the state of affairs. . . .

In answer to an embassy from Ptolemy Physcon and his sister Cleopatra, the Senate sends Gaius Popilius Laenas to Alexandria. Livy, 44, 19.

3. Hippias, and the other ambassadors sent by Perseus, to Genthius to make an alliance with him, returned before the winter, and reported that Genthius would undertake to join in the war with Rome if he was paid three hundred talents and received proper securities. Thereupon Perseus sent Pantauchus, one of his chief friends, with the following instructions: He was to agree to pay Genthius the money; to interchange oaths of alliance; to take from Genthius such hostages as he himself

Genthius joins Perseus on being supplied with 300 talents;

might select, and send them at once to Macedonia; and to allow Genthius to have such hostages from Perseus as he might name in the text of the treaty; further, he was to make arrangements for the transport of the three hundred talents. Pantauchus immediately started and met Genthius at Mebeōn, in the country of the Labeates, and quickly bought the young monarch over to join in the projects of Perseus. The treaty having been sworn to and reduced to writing, Genthius at once sent the hostages whose names Pantauchus had caused to be entered in the text of the treaty; and with them he despatched Olympion to receive the oaths and hostages from Perseus, with others who were to have charge of the money. Pantauchus persuaded him to send also some ambassadors to join in a mission to Rhodes with some sent by Perseus, in order to negotiate a mutual alliance between the three states. For if this were effected, and the Rodians consented to embark upon the war, he showed that they would be easily able to conquer the Romans. Genthius listened to the suggestion, and appointed Parmenio and Marcus to undertake the mission; with instructions that, as soon as they had received the oaths and hostages from Perseus, and the question of the money had been settled, they were to proceed on the embassy to Rhodes.

and also consents to join in a mission to Rhodes.

4. So these various ambassadors started together for Macedonia. But Pantauchus stayed by the side of the young king, and kept reminding him of the necessity of making warlike preparations, and urging him not to be too late with them. He was especially urgent that he should prepare for a contest at sea; for, as the Romans were quite unprepared in that department on the coasts both of Epirus and Illyria, any purpose he might form would be easily accomplished by himself and the forces he might despatch. Genthius yielded to the advice and set about his preparations, naval and military alike: and Perseus, as soon as the ambassadors and hostages from Genthius entered Macedonia, set off from his camp on the River Elpeius,[1] with his whole cavalry, to meet them at Dium. His first act on meeting them was to take the oaths to the alliance

Perseus meets the envoys from Genthius;

[1] Livy (44, 8) calls it the Enipeus (*Fersaliti*), a tributary of the Peneus.

in the presence of the whole body of cavalry; for he was very anxious that the Macedonians should know of the adhesion of Genthius, hoping that this additional advantage would have the effect of raising their courage: and next he received the hostages and handed over his own to Olympion and his colleagues, the noblest of whom were Limnaeus, the son of Polemocrates, and Balacrus, son of Pantauchus. Lastly, he sent the agents who had come for the money to Pella, assuring them that they would receive it there: and appointed the ambassadors for Rhodes to join Metrodorus at Thessalonica, and hold themselves in readiness to embark.

This embassy succeeded in persuading the Rhodians to join in the war. And, having accomplished this, Perseus next sent Herophon, who had been similarly employed before, on a mission to Eumenes; and Telemnastos of Crete to Antiochus to urge him "Not to let the opportunity escape; nor to imagine that Perseus was the only person affected by the overbearing and oppressive conduct of Rome: but to be quite sure that, if he did not now assist Perseus, if possible by putting an end to the war, or, if not, by supporting him in it, he would quickly meet with the same fate himself." . . . and sends others to Eumenes and Antiochus.

5. In venturing upon a narrative of the intrigues of Perseus and Eumenes, I have felt myself in a position of great embarrassment. For to give full and accurate details of the negotiations, which these two kings conducted in secret between themselves, appeared to me to be an attempt open to many obvious criticisms and exceedingly liable to error: and yet to pass over in complete silence what seemed to have exercised the most decisive influence in the war, and which alone can explain many of the subsequent events, seemed to me to wear the appearance of a certain sluggishness and entire want of enterprise. On the whole, I decided to state briefly what I believed to be truth, and the probabilities and surmises on which I founded that opinion; for I was, in fact, during this period more struck than most people at what happened. The intrigues of Perseus and Eumenes.

6. I have already stated[1] that Cydas of Crete, while, serving

[1] In a previous part of the book now lost. See Livy, 44, 25.

in the army of Eumenes and held in especial honour by him, had in the first place had interviews with Cheimarus, one of the Cretans in the army of Perseus, and again had approached the walls of Demetrias, and conversed first with Menecrates, and then with Antimachus. Again, that Herophon had been twice on a mission from Perseus to Eumenes, and that the Romans on that account began to have reasonable suspicions of king Eumenes, is rendered clear from what happened to Attalus. For they allowed this prince to come to Rome from Brundisium, and to transact the business he had on hand, and finally gave him a favourable answer and dismissed him with every mark of kindness, although he had done them no service of any importance in the war with Perseus; while Eumenes, who had rendered them the most important services, and had assisted them again and again in their wars with Antiochus and Perseus, they not only prevented from coming to Rome, but bade him leave Italy within a certain number of days, though it was mid-winter. Therefore it is quite plain that some intriguing had been taking place between Perseus and Eumenes to account for the alienation of the Romans from the latter. What this was, and how far it went, is our present subject of inquiry.

The Romans become suspicious of Eumenes, and ostentatiously transfer their favour to his brother Attalus.

7. We can easily satisfy ourselves that Eumenes cannot have wished Perseus to be the victor in the war and become supreme in Greece. For to say nothing of the traditional enmity and dislike existing between these two, the similarity of their respective powers was sufficient to breed distrust, jealousy, and, in fact, the bitterest animosity between them. It was always open to them to intrigue and scheme against each other secretly, and that they were both doing. For when Eumenes saw that Perseus was in a bad way, and was hemmed in on every side by his enemies, and would accept any terms for the sake of putting an end to the war, and was sending envoys to the Roman generals year after year with this view; while the Romans also were uneasy about the

The origin of the intrigue between Eumenes and Perseus was the idea of the former that, both sides being tired of the war, he might intervene with profit to himself.

result, because they made no real progress in the war until Paulus took the command, and because Aetolia was in a dangerous state of excitement, he conceived that it would not be impossible that the Romans would consent to some means of ending the war and making terms: and he looked upon himself as the most proper person to act as mediator and effect the reconciliation. With these secret ideas in his mind, he began sounding Perseus by means of Cydas of Crete, the year before, to find out how much he would be inclined to pay for such a chance. This appears to me to be the origin of their connexion with each other. B.C. 168.

8. Two kings, one of whom was the most unprincipled and the other the most avaricious in the world, being now pitted against each other, their mutual struggles presented a spectacle truly ridiculous. Eumenes held out every kind of hope, and threw out every species of bait, believing that he would catch Perseus by such promises. Perseus, without waiting to be approached, rushed to the bait held out to him, and made for it greedily; yet he could not make up his mind to swallow it, to such an extent as to give up any money. The sort of huckstering contest that went on between them was as follows. Eumenes demanded five hundred talents as the price of his abstention from co-operating with the Romans by land and sea during the fourth year of the war, and fifteen hundred for putting an end to the war altogether, and promised to give hostages and securities for his promise at once. Perseus accepted the proposal of hostages, named the number, the time at which they were to be sent, and the manner of their safe custody at Cnosus. But as to the money, he said that it would be disgraceful to the one who paid, and still more to the one who received it, to be supposed to remain neutral for hire; but the fifteen hundred talents he would send in charge of Polemocrates and others to Samothrace, to be held as a deposit there. Now Perseus was master of Samothrace; but as Eumenes, like a poor physician, preferred a retaining-fee to a payment after work, he finally gave up the attempt, when he found that his own craftiness was no

The bargain attempted between Eumenes and Perseus.

match for the meanness of Perseus. They thus parted on equal terms, leaving, like good athletes, the battle of avarice a drawn one. Some of these details leaked out at the time, and others were communicated subsequently to Perseus's intimate friends; and he has taught us by them that every vice is clinched, so to speak, by avarice.

Reflexions on the blindness of the avaricious kings.

9. I add the further question from my own reflexions, whether avarice is not also short-sighted? For who could fail to remark the folly of both the kings? How could Eumenes on the one hand expect to be trusted by a man with whom he was on such bad terms; and to get so large a sum of money, when he was able to give Perseus absolutely no security for recovering it, in case of his not carrying out his promises? And how could he expect not to be detected by the Romans in taking so large a sum? If he had concealed it at the time he certainly would not have done so long. Moreover, he would have been bound at any rate, in return for it, to have adopted the quarrel with Rome; in which he would have been certain to have lost the money and his kingdom together, and very probably his life also, by coming forward as an enemy of the Romans. For if, even as it was, when he accomplished nothing, but only imagined it, he fell into the gravest dangers, what would have happened to him if this design had been brought to perfection? And again, as to Perseus—who could fail to be surprised at his thinking anything of higher importance, or more to his advantage, than to give the money and allow Eumenes to swallow the bait? For if, on the one hand, Eumenes had performed any part of his promises, and had put an end to the war, the gift would have been well bestowed; and if, on the other hand, he had been deceived of that hope, he could at least have involved him in the certain enmity of Rome; for he would have had it entirely in his own power to make these transactions public. And one may easily calculate how valuable this would have been to Perseus, whether he succeeded or failed in the war: for he would have regarded Eumenes as the guilty cause of all his misfortunes, and could in no way have retaliated upon him more effectually than by making him an enemy of Rome. What

then was the root of all this blind folly? Nothing but avarice. It could have been nothing else; for, to save himself from giving money, Perseus was content to suffer anything, and neglect every other consideration. On a par too with this was his conduct to the Gauls and Genthius. . . .

See Plutarch, *Aemilius*, ch. 12.

10. The question being put to the vote at Rhodes, it was carried to send envoys to negotiate a peace; and this decree thus decided the relative strength of the opposite political parties at Rhodes [as has been stated in my essay on public speaking], showing that the party for siding with Perseus was stronger than that which was for preserving their country and its laws. The Prytanies immediately appointed ambassadors to negotiate the cessation of the war: Agepolis, Diocles, and Cleombrotus were sent to Rome; Damon, Nicostratus, Agesilochus, and Telephus to Perseus and the consul. The Rhodians went on in the same spirit to take further steps, so that they eventually committed themselves past all excuse. For they at once sent ambassadors to Crete, to renew their friendly relations with the entire Cretan people, and to urge that, in view of the dangers that threatened them, they should throw in their lot with the people of Rhodes, and hold the same people to be friends and enemies as they did, and also to address the separate cities to the same effect. . . .

The Rhodians take active steps to form a confederation against Rome, in case their intervention fails.

11. When the embassy led by Parmenio and Morcus from Genthius, accompanied by those led by Metrodorus, arrived in Rhodes, the assembly summoned to meet them proved very turbulent, the party of Deinon venturing openly to plead the cause of Perseus, whilst that of Theaetetus was quite overpowered and dismayed. For the presence of the Illyrian galleys, the number of the Roman cavalry that had been killed, and the fact of Genthius having changed sides, quite crushed them. Thus it was that the result of the meeting of the assembly was as I have described it. For the Rhodians voted to return a favourable answer to both kings, to state that they had resolved to put an end to the war, and to

The manner in which this vote of the Rhodians was carried, B.C. 168.

exhort the kings themselves to make no difficulty about the terms. They also received the ambassadors of Genthius at the common altar-hearth or Prytaneum of the city with every mark of friendship. . . .

12. Other historians [have spoken in exaggerated terms][1] of the Syrian war. And the reason is one which I have often mentioned. Though their subjects are simple and without complications, they seek the name and reputation of historians not from the truth of their facts, but the number of their books; and accordingly they are obliged to give petty affairs an air of importance, and fill out and give rhetorical flourishes to what was originally expressed briefly; dress up actions and achievements which were originally quite secondary; expatiate on struggles; and describe pitched battles, in which sometimes ten or a few more infantry fell, and still fewer cavalry. As for sieges, local descriptions, and the like, one cannot say that their treatment is adequate, because they have no facts to give. But a writer of universal history must pursue a different plan; and therefore I ought not to be condemned for minimising the importance of events, if I sometimes pass over affairs that have met with wide fame and laboured description, or for mentioning them with brevity; but I ought to be trusted to give to each subject the amount of discussion which it deserves. Such historians as I refer to, when they are describing in the course of their work the siege, say of Phanoteia, or Coroneia, or [Haliartus], are forced to display all the contrivances, bold strokes, and other features of a siege; and when they come to the capture of Tarentum, the sieges of Corinth, Sardis, Gaza, Bactra, and, above all, of Carthage, they must draw on their own resources to prolong the agony and heighten the picture, and are not at all satisfied with me for giving a more truthful relation of such events as they really occurred. Let this statement hold good also as to my description of pitched battles and public harangues, as well as other departments of history; in all of which I might fairly claim considerable indulgence, as also in what is now about to

A digression on Polybius's method in writing history, and his avoidance of imaginary details.

[1] The extract begins in the middle of a sentence at the top of a page. I have supplied these words at a guess, giving what seems the sense.

be narrated, if I am detected in some inconsistency in the substance of my story, the treatment of my facts, or the style of language; and also if I make some mistakes in the names of mountains or rivers, or the special features of localities: for indeed the magnitude of my work is a sufficient excuse in all these points, unless, indeed, I am ever detected in deliberate or interested misstatements in my writings: for such I ask no indulgence, as I have repeatedly and explicitly remarked in the course of my history. . . .

13. Genthius, king of the Illyrians, disgraced himself by many abominable actions in the course of his life from his addiction to drink, in which he indulged continually day and night. Among other things he killed his brother Plastor, who was about to marry the daughter of Monunius, and married the girl himself. He also behaved with great cruelty to his subjects. . . .

Intemperance and brutality of Genthius.

In the spring of B.C. 168 *Genthius was forced to surrender to the praetor L. Anicius Gallus* (*Livy*, 44, 30-31). *The consul L. Aemilius Paulus found Perseus on the left bank of the Macedonian river Enipeus in a very strong position, which was however turned by a gallant exploit of Nasica and Q. Fabius Maximus, who made their way with a considerable force over the mountains, thus getting on the rear of Perseus.* *Livy*, 44, 30-35. *Plutarch*, Aemil. 15.

14. The first man to volunteer to make the outflanking movement was Scipio Nasica, son-in-law of Scipio Africanus, who afterwards became the most influential man in the Senate,[1] and who now undertook to lead the party. The second was Fabius Maximus, the eldest of the sons of the consul Aemilius Paulus,[2] still quite a young man, who stood forward and offered to join with great

Nasica, Fabius, and others volunteer to cross the mountains into Macedonia by Gytheum.

[1] P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica Corculum was afterwards Pontifex Maximus (B.C. 150). See Cic. *de Sen.* 3, 50.

[2] Of the two eldest sons of Aemilius, the elder was adopted by Quintus Fabius Maximus, the second by P. Cornelius Scipio, son of the elder Africanus, his maternal uncle.

enthusiasm. Aemilius was therefore delighted and assigned them a body of soldiers.[1] . . .

Struggle in the bed of the Enipeus. Livy, 44, 35.

15. The Romans offered a gallant resistance by aid of their strong targets or Ligurian shields. . . .

Perseus saw that Aemilius had not moved, and did not reckon on what was taking place, when suddenly a Cretan, who had deserted from the Roman army on its march, came to him with the information that the Romans were getting on his rear. Though thrown into the utmost panic he did not strike his camp, but despatched ten thousand mercenaries and two thousand Macedonians under Milo, with orders to advance with speed and seize the heights. The Romans fell upon these as they were lying asleep.[2] . . .

The Romans force the heights by way of Gytheum.

16. An eclipse of the moon occurring, the report went abroad, and was believed by many, that it signified an eclipse of the king. And this circumstance raised the spirits of the Romans and depressed those of the Macedonians. So true is the common saying that "war has many a groundless scare."[3] . . .

Perseus finding himself thus on the point of being outflanked retired on Pydna, near which town Aemilius Paulus, after considerable delay, about midsummer inflicted a crushing defeat upon him. Perseus fled to Amphipolis, and thence to Samothrace, where he was captured by Paulus and taken to Rome to adorn his triumph, and afterwards allowed to live as a private person at Alba. This was the end of the Macedonian kingdom. (*Livy*, 44, 36-43; 45, 1-8. *Plutarch*, Aemil. 16-23.)

[1] From Plutarch, *Aemilius*, 15, who adds that Polybius made a mistake as to the number of soldiers told off for this service, which to judge from Livy, 44, 35, Polybius probably stated at 5000. Plutarch got his correction from an extant letter of Nasica (8000 Roman infantry, with 120 horse, and 200 Thracians and Cretans).

[2] From Plutarch, who again contradicts this last statement, on the authority of Nasica, who said that there was a sharp engagement on the heights.

[3] The Roman was saved from a scare by the eclipse being foretold by Gaius Sulpicius Gallus, famous for his knowledge of Greek literature and astronomy. He is represented by Cicero as explaining the celestial globe (*sphaera*) which Marcellus brought from Syracuse. He was consul in B.C. 166. Livy, 44, 37; Cicero, *Brut.* § 78; *de Repub.* 1, § 21.

17. The consul Lucius Aemilius had never seen a phalanx until he saw it in the army of Perseus on this occasion; and he often confessed to some of his friends at Rome subsequently, that he had never beheld anything more alarming and terrible than the Macedonian phalanx: and yet he had been, if any one ever had, not only a spectator but an actor in many battles. . . .

The phalanx at the battle of Pydna, B.C. 168.

Many plans which look plausible and feasible, when brought to the test of actual experience, like base coins when brought to the furnace, cease to answer in any way to their original conceptions. . . .

When Perseus came to the hour of trial his courage all left him, like that of an athlete in bad training. For when the danger was approaching, and it became necessary to fight a decisive battle, his resolution gave way. . . .

As soon as the battle began, the Macedonian king played the coward and rode off to the town, under the pretext of sacrificing to Hercules,—who certainly does not accept craven gifts from cravens, nor fulfil unworthy prayers. . . .

18. He was then very young, and it was his first experience of actual service in the field, and having but recently begun to taste the sweets of promotion, he was keen, ambitious, and eager to be first. . . .

Scipio Africanus the younger, cf. Livy, 44, 44 (?)

19. Just when Perseus had been beaten and was trying to save himself by flight, the Senate determined to admit the ambassadors, who had come from Rhodes to negotiate a peace, to an audience: Fortune thus appearing designedly to parade the folly of the Rhodians on the stage,—if we may say "of the Rhodians," and not rather "of the individuals who were then in the ascendant at Rhodes." When Agesipolis and his colleagues entered the Senate, they said that "They had come to arrange an end to the war; for the people of Rhodes,—seeing that the war was become protracted to a considerable length of time, and seeing that it was disadvantageous to all the Greeks, as well as to the Romans themselves, on account of its enormous expenses,—had come to that conclusion. But as the war was already ended, and the wish of the Rhodians was thus fulfilled, they had only to congratulate the Romans." Such was the

The Rhodian mission deliver their message too late.

brief speech of Agesipolis. But the Senate seized the opportunity of making an example of the Rhodians, and produced an answer of which the upshot was that "They did not regard this embassy as having been sent by the Rhodians in the interests either of the Greeks or themselves, but in those of Perseus. For if they had meant to send an embassy in behalf of the Greeks, the proper time for doing so was when Perseus was plundering the territory and cities of Greece, while encamped for nearly two years in Thessaly. But to let that time pass without notice, and to come now desiring to put an end to the war, at a time when the Roman legions had entered Macedonia, and Perseus was closely beleagured and almost at the end of his hopes, was a clear proof to any one of observation that the Rhodians had sent their embassy, not with the desire of ending the war, but to rescue and save Perseus to the best of their ability. Therefore they deserved no indulgence at the hands of the Romans at this time, nor any favourable reply." Such was the Senate's answer to the Rhodians. . . .

Uncompromising answer of the Senate.

20. Then Aemilius Paulus speaking once more in Latin bade the members of his council, "With such a sight before their eyes,"—pointing to Perseus,—"not to be too boastful in the hour of success, nor to take any extreme or inhuman measures against any one, nor in fact ever to feel confidence in the permanence of their present good fortune. Rather it was precisely at the time of greatest success, either private or public, that a man should be most alive to the possibility of a reverse. Even so it was difficult for a man to exhibit moderation in good fortune. But the distinction between fools and wise was that the former only learnt by their own misfortunes, the latter by those of others." . . .

Perseus, being brought a prisoner before Aemilius Paulus and his council, refuses to reply to his questions, Paulus addresses the king in Greek and then his council in Latin. Livy, 45, 8.

21. One is often reminded of the words of Demetrius of Phalerum. In his treatise on Fortune, wishing to give the world a distinct view of her mutability, he fixed upon the period of Alexander, when that monarch destroyed the Persian dynasty, and thus expresses himself: "If you will take, I don't say unlimited time or many

Demetrius of Phalerum on mutability.

generations, but only these last fifty years immediately preceding our generation, you will be able to understand the cruelty of Fortune. For can you suppose, if some god had warned the Persians or their king, or the Macedonians or their king, that in fifty years the very name of the Persians, who once were masters of the world, would have been lost, and that the Macedonians, whose name was before scarcely known, would become masters of it all, that they would have believed it? Nevertheless it is true that Fortune, whose influence on our life is incalculable, who displays her power by surprises, is even now I think, showing all mankind, by her elevation of the Macedonians into the high prosperity once enjoyed by the Persians, that she has merely lent them these advantages until she may otherwise determine concerning them." And this has now come to pass in the person of Perseus; and indeed Demetrius has spoken prophetically of the future as though he were inspired. And as the course of my history brought me to the period which witnessed the ruin of the Macedonian kingdom, I judged it to be right not to pass it over without proper remark, especially as I was an eye-witness of the transaction. It was a case I thought both for enlarging on the theme myself, and for recalling the words of Demetrius, who appeared to me to have shown something more than mere human sagacity in his remarks; for he made a true forecast of the future almost a hundred and fifty years before the event. . . .

22. After the conclusion of the battle between Perseus and the Romans, king Eumenes found himself in what people call an unexpected and extraordinary trouble, but what, if we regard the natural course of human concerns, was quite an everyday affair. For it is quite the way of Fortune to confound human calculations by surprises; and when she has helped a man for a time, and caused her balance to incline in his favour, to turn round upon him as though she repented, throw her weight into the opposite scale, and mar all his successes. And this was the case now with Eumenes. He imagined that at last his own kingdom was safe, and that he might look forward to a time of ease, now that Perseus and the whole kingdom of Macedonia

The unexpected always happens.

Eumenes disappointed of his hope of quiet by a rising in Galatia,

were utterly destroyed; yet it was then that he was confronted with the gravest dangers, by the Gauls in Asia seizing the opportunity for an unexpected rising. . . .

After reigning in Memphis for a time Philometor made terms with his brother and sister, returned to Alexandria, and there all three were being besieged by Antiochus. See above, 28, 18.

23. In the Peloponnesus a mission arrived before the end of the winter from the two kings, Ptolemy (Philometor) and Ptolemy (Physcon), asking for help. This gave rise to repeated and animated discussions. The party of Callicrates and Diophanes were against granting the help; while Archon, Lycortas, and Polybius were for sending it to the kings in accordance with the terms of their alliance. For by this time it had come to pass that the younger Ptolemy had been proclaimed king by the people (at Alexandria), owing to the danger which threatened them; and that the elder had subsequently returned from Memphis, and was reigning jointly with his sister. As they stood in need of every kind of assistance, they sent Eumenes a[s] was a case I [s] to the Achaeans, asking a thousand foot and[er] self, and for reca[l]rse, with Lycortas to command the foot and [h]e to have s[u]se. They sent a message also to Theodoridas [o]f in his re[q]ing him to hire them a thousand mercenaries. [M]ost [o]f h[is]gs chanced to have become intimately acquainted with [so]me particular men, owing to the transactions I have related before. The ambassadors arrived when the Achaean congress was in session in Corinth. They therefore came forward, and after recalling the many evidences of friendship shown by the Achaeans to the kingdom of Egypt, and describing to them the danger in which the kings then were, they entreated them to send help. The Achaeans generally were ready enough to go to the help of the kings (for both now wore the diadem and exercised regal functions), and not only with a detachment, but with their full levy. But Callicrates and his party spoke against it; alleging that they ought not to meddle in such affairs at all, and certainly not at that time, but should reserve their undivided

Autumn of B.C. 169.

Winter of B.C. 169-168.

forces for the service of Rome. For there was a general expectation just then of a decisive battle being fought, as Q. Philippus was wintering in Macedonia.

24. The people were alarmed lest they should be thought to fail the Romans in any way: and accordingly Lycortas and Polybius rose in their turn, and, among other advice which they impressed upon them, argued that "When in the previous year the Achaeans had voted to join the Roman army with their full levy, and sent Polybius to announce that resolution, Quintus Marcius, while accepting the kindness of their intention, had yet stated that the assistance was not needed, since he had won the pass into Macedonia. Their opponents therefore were manifestly using the need of helping the Romans merely as a pretext for preventing this aid being sent to Alexandria. They entreated the Achaeans, in view of the greatness of the danger surrounding the king of Egypt, not to neglect the right moment for acting; but keeping in mind their mutual agreement and good services, and above all their oaths, to fulfil the terms of their agreement."

Polybius advocates the cause of the Ptolemies.

The people were once more inclined to grant the aid when they heard this: but Callicrates and his party managed to prevent the decree being passed, by staggering the magistrates with the assertion that it was unconstitutional to discuss the question of sending help abroad in public assembly.[1] But a short time afterwards a meeting was summoned at Sicyon, which was attended not only by the members of the council, but by all citizens over thirty years of age; and after a lengthened debate, Polybius especially dwelling on the fact that the Romans did not require assistance,—in which he was believed not to be speaking without good reason, as he had spent the previous summer in Macedonia at the headquarters

Callicrates defeats the motion,

but at a smaller meeting at Sicyon

Polybius prevails.

[1] *ἐν ἀγορᾷ*. The objection, though it served to divert the magistrates from going on with the proposition at the time, seems to have been got over before the meeting at Sicyon; unless, indeed, the latter was considered to be of a different nature in regard to the age of those attending. But we have no information as to this restriction of thirty years of age,—whether it was universal, or confined to particular occasions. This passage would seem to point to the latter alternative.

of Marcius Philippus,—and also alleging that, even supposing the Romans did turn out to require their active support, the Achaeans would not be rendered incapable of furnishing it by the two hundred horse and one thousand foot which were to be despatched to Alexandria,—for they could, without any inconvenience, put thirty or forty thousand men into the field,—the majority of the meeting were convinced, and were inclined to the idea of sending the aid. Accordingly, on the second of the two days on which, according to the laws, those who wished to do so were bound to bring forward their motions, Lycortas and Polybius proposed that the aid should be sent. Callicrates, on the other hand, proposed to send ambassadors to reconcile the two Egyptian kings with Antiochus. So once more, on these two motions being put, there was an animated contest; in which, however, Lycortas and Polybius got a considerable majority on their side. For there was a very wide distinction between the claims of the two kingdoms. There were very few instances to be found in past times of any act of friendship on the part of Syria to the Greeks,—though the liberality of the present king was well known in Greece,—but from Egypt the acts of kindness in past times to the Achaeans had been as numerous and important as any one could possibly expect. By dwelling on this point Lycortas made a great impression, because the distinction between the two kingdoms in this respect was shown to be immense. For it was as difficult to count up all the benefactions of the Alexandrine kings, as it was impossible to find a single act of friendship done by the dynasty of Antiochus to the Achaeans. . . .

The measure is again defeated by a trick of Callicrates.

25. For a time Andronidas and Callicrates kept on arguing in support of the plan of putting an end to the war: but as no one was persuaded by them, they employed a stratagem. A letter-carrier came into the theatre (where the meeting was being held), who had just arrived with a despatch from Quintus Marcius, urging those Achaeans who were of the pro-Roman party to reconcile the kings; for it was a fact that the Senate had sent a mission under T. Numisius to do so. But this really made against their argument: for Titus Numisius and his colleagues had been unable to effect the pacification, and

had returned to Rome completely unsuccessful in the object of their mission. However, as Polybius and his party did not wish to speak against the despatch, from consideration for Marcius, they retired from the discussion: and it was thus that the proposal to send an aid to the kings fell through. The Achaeans voted to send ambassadors to effect the pacification: and Archon of Aegeira, and Arcesilaus and Ariston of Megalopolis were appointed to the duty. Whereupon the envoys of Ptolemy, being disappointed of obtaining the help, handed over to the magistrate the despatch from the kings, in which they asked that they would send Lycortas and Polybius to take part in the war. . . .

The kings ask for Lycortas and Polybius.

26. Forgetful of all he had written and said Antiochus began preparing for a renewal of the war against Ptolemy. So true are the words of Simonides,—"'Tis hard to be good." For to have certain impulses towards virtue, and even to hold to it up to a certain point, is easy; but to be uniformly consistent, and to allow no circumstances of danger to shake a resolute integrity, which regards honour and justice as the highest considerations, is indeed difficult. . . .

Annoyed by the two Ptolemies thus joining each other, Antiochus renews the war, B.C. 168.

27. When Antiochus had advanced to attack Ptolemy in order to possess himself of Pelusium, he was met by the Roman commander Gaius Popilius Laenas. Upon the king greeting him from some distance, and holding out his right hand to him, Popilius answered by holding out the tablets which contained the decree of the Senate, and bade Antiochus read that first: not thinking it right, I suppose, to give the usual sign of friendship until he knew the mind of the recipient, whether he were to be regarded as a friend or foe. On the king, after reading the despatch, saying that he desired to consult with his friends on the situation, Popilius did a thing which was looked upon as exceedingly overbearing and insolent. Happening to have a vine stick in his hand, he drew a circle round Antiochus with it, and ordered him to give his answer to the letter before he stepped out of

Antiochus is met near Alexandria (Livy, 45, 12) by C. Popilius Laenas, who forces him to abstain from the war.

that circumference. The king was taken aback by this haughty proceeding. After a brief interval of embarrassed silence, he replied that he would do whatever the Romans demanded. Then Popilius and his colleagues shook him by the hand, and one and all greeted him with warmth. The contents of the despatch was an order to put an end to the war with Ptolemy at once. Accordingly a stated number of days was allowed him, within which he withdrew his army into Syria, in high dudgeon indeed, and groaning in spirit, but yielding to the necessities of the time.

Popilius goes on to Cyprus and forces the army of Antiochus to evacuate it.

Popilius and his colleagues then restored order in Alexandria; and after exhorting the two kings to maintain peaceful relations with each other, and charging them at the same time to send Polybius to Rome, they took ship and sailed towards Cyprus, with the intention of promptly ejecting from the island the forces that were also gathered there. When they arrived, they found that Ptolemy's generals had already sustained a defeat, and that the whole island was in a state of excitement. They promptly caused the invading army to evacuate the country, and remained there to keep watch until the forces had sailed away for Syria. Thus did the Romans save the kingdom of Ptolemy, when it was all but sinking under its disasters. Fortune indeed so disposed of the fate of Perseus and the Macedonians, that the restoration of Alexandria and the whole of Egypt was decided by it; that is to say, by the fate of Perseus being decided previously: for if that had not taken place, or had not been certain, I do not think that Antiochus would have obeyed these orders.

The previous defeat of Perseus really secured the salvation of Egypt.

BOOK XXX

1. ATTALUS, brother of king Eumenes, came to Rome this year, pretending that, even if the disaster of the Gallic rising had not happened to the kingdom, he should have come to Rome, to congratulate the Senate, and to receive some mark of its approval for having been actively engaged on their side and loyally shared in all their dangers; but, as it happened, he had been forced to come at that time to Rome owing to the danger from the Gauls. Upon finding a general welcome from everybody, owing to the acquaintance formed with him on the campaign, and the belief that he was well disposed to them, and meeting with a reception that surpassed his expectation, the young man's hopes were extraordinarily raised, because he did not know the true reason of this friendly warmth. The result was that he narrowly escaped ruining his own and his brother's fortunes, and indeed the entire kingdom. The majority at Rome were thoroughly angry with king Eumenes, and believed that he had been playing a double game during the war, keeping up communications with Perseus, and watching his opportunity against them: and accordingly some men of high rank got Attalus under their influence, and urged him to lay aside the character of ambassador for his brother, and to speak in his own behalf; as the Senate was minded to secure a separate kingdom and royal government for him, because of their displeasure with his brother. This excited the ambition of Attalus still more, and in private conversation he signified his assent to those who advised this course. Finally, he arranged with some men of position that he would actually appear before the Senate and deliver a speech on the subject.

B.C. 167. Coss. Q. Aelius Paetus, M. Junius Pennus.

Attalus at Rome, is persuaded to try by the Roman help to supplant his brother.

2. While Attalus was engaged on this intrigue, Eumenes, fearing what would happen, sent his physician Stratius to Rome, putting him in possession of the facts, and charging him to employ every means to prevent Attalus from following the advice of those who wished to ruin their kingdom. On arriving at Rome and getting Attalus by himself, he used a great variety of arguments to him (and he was a man of great sense and powers of persuasion), and at length, with much trouble, succeeded in his object, and in recalling him from his mad project. He represented to him that "he was already practically joint-king with his brother, and only differed from him in the fact that he wore no diadem, and was not called king, though in everything else he possessed an equal and identical authority: that in the future he was the acknowledged heir to the crown, and with no very distant prospect of possession; as the king, from the weak state of his health, was in constant expectation of his departure, and being childless could not, even if he wished it, leave the crown to any one else." (For in fact that natural son of his, who afterwards succeeded to the crown, had not as yet been acknowledged.) "Above all, he was surprised at the hindrance Attalus was thus interposing to the measures necessary at that particular crisis. For they ought to thank heaven exceedingly if they proved able, even with hearty co-operation and unanimity, to repel the threatened attack of the Gauls; but if he should at such a time quarrel with and oppose his brother, it was quite clear that he would ruin the kingdom, and deprive himself both of his present power and his future expectations, and his other brothers also of the kingdom and the power they possessed in it." By these and similar arguments Stratius dissuaded Attalus from taking any revolutionary steps.

Stratius is sent to dissuade Attalus from his meditated treason.

3. Accordingly, when Attalus appeared before the Senate, he congratulated it on what had happened; expatiated on the loyalty and zeal shown by himself in the war with Perseus; and urged at some length that the Senate should send envoys to restrain the audacity of the Gauls, and compel them to confine themselves once more to their original boundaries. He also said something about the cities of Aeneus and Maronea, desiring

that they might be given as a free gift to himself. But he said not a single word against the king, or about the partition of the kingdom. The senators, supposing that he would interview them privately on a future occasion upon these points, promised to send the envoys, and loaded him lavishly with the customary presents, and, moreover, promised him these cities. But when, after receiving these marks of favour, he at once left Rome without fulfilling any of its expectations, the Senate, though foiled in its hopes, had nothing else which it could do; but before he had got out of Italy it declared Aeneus and Maronea free cities,—thus rescinding its promise,—and sent Publius Licinius at the head of a mission to the Gauls. And what instructions these ambassadors had given to them it is not easy to say, but it may be guessed without difficulty from what subsequently happened. And this will be rendered clear from the transactions themselves.

Embassy to Galatia.

4. There also came embassies from Rhodes, the first headed by Philocrates, the second by Philophron and Astymedes. For when the Rhodians received the answer given to the embassy of Agesipolis immediately after the battle of Pydna, they understood the anger and threatening attitude of the Senate towards them, and promptly despatched these embassies. Astymedes and Philophron, observing in the course of public and private conversations the suspicions and anger entertained towards them at Rome, were reduced to a state of great discouragement and distress. But when one of the praetors mounted the Rostra and urged the people to declare war against Rhodes, then indeed they were beside themselves with terror at the danger that threatened their country. They assumed mourning garments, and in their various interviews with their friends dropped the tone of persuasion or demand, and pleaded instead, with tears and prayers, that they would not adopt any measure of supreme severity towards them. A few days afterwards Antony, one of the tribunes, introduced them to the Senate, and dragged the praetor who advised the war down from the Rostra. Philophron spoke first, and was

Fresh embassies from Rhodes, B.C. 167.

See 29, 27.

Terror of the Rhodian envoys at the threat of war.

followed by Astymedes; and, having thus uttered the proverbial "swan's song," they received an answer which, while freeing them from actual fear of war, conveyed a bitter and stern rebuke from the Senate for their conduct. Now Astymedes considered himself to have made a good speech on behalf of his country, but did not at all satisfy the Greeks visiting or residing at Rome. For he afterwards published the speech containing his argument in defence, which, to all those into whose hands it fell, appeared absurd and quite unconvincing. For he rested his plea not alone on the merits of his country, but still more on an accusation of others. Comparing the good services done and the co-operation undertaken by the others, he endeavoured to deny or minimise them; while he exaggerated those of Rhodes as far above their actual amount as he could. The errors of others, on the contrary, he inveighed against in bitter and hostile terms, while those of the Rhodians he attempted to cloak and conceal, in order that, by this comparison, those of his own country might appear insignificant and pardonable, those of others grave and beyond excuse, "all of whom," he added, "had already been pardoned before." But this sort of pleading can in no circumstances be considered becoming to a statesman. Take the case of the betrayal of secrets. It is not those who, for fear or gain, turn informers that we commend; but those who endure any torture and punishment rather than involve an accomplice in the same misfortune. These are the men whom we approve and consider noble. But a man who, from some undefined alarm, exposes to the view of the party in power all the errors of others, and who recalls what time had obliterated from the minds of the ruling people, cannot fail to be an object of dislike to all who hear of it.

A criticism on the speech of the Rhodian Astymedes.

5. After receiving the above answer Philocrates and his colleagues immediately started home; but Astymedes and his fellows stayed where they were and kept on the watch, that no report or observation against their country might be made unknown to them. But when this answer of the Senate was reported at Rhodes, the people, considering

Dismayed by this answer the Rhodians endeavour to propitiate the Senate. Livy, 45, 25.

themselves relieved of the worst fear—that, namely, of war—made light of the rest, though extremely unfavourable. So true it ever is that a dread of worse makes men forget lighter misfortunes. They immediately voted a complimentary crown worth ten thousand gold pieces[1] to Rome, and appointed Theaetetus at once envoy and navarch to convey it at the beginning of summer, accompanied by an embassy under Rhodophon, to attempt in every possible way to make an alliance with the Romans. They acted thus because they wished that, if the embassy failed by an adverse answer at Rome, the failure might take place without the people having passed a formal decree, the attempt being made solely on the initiative of the navarch, and the navarch having by the law power to act in such a case. For the fact was that the republic of Rhodes had been administered with such consummate statesmanship, that, though it had for nearly a hundred and forty years been engaged in conjunction with Rome in actions of the greatest importance and glory, it had never yet made an alliance with her. Nor ought I to omit stating the reason of this policy of the Rhodians. They wished that no ruler or prince should be entirely without hope of gaining their support or alliance; and they therefore did not choose to bind or hamper themselves beforehand with oaths and treaties; but, by remaining uncommitted, to be able to avail themselves of all advantages as they arose. But on this occasion they were much bent upon securing this mark of honour from Rome, not because they were anxious for the alliance, or because they were afraid of any one else at the time except the Romans, but because they wished, by giving an air of special importance to their design, to remove the suspicions of such as were inclined to entertain unfavourable thoughts of their state. For immediately after the return of the ambassadors under Theaetetus, the Caunians revolted and the Mylassians seized on the cities in Eurōmus. And about the same time the Roman Senate published a decree declaring all

The astuteness of the Rhodian policy.

Caunus, in Peraea, and Mylassa, in Caria, revolt.

[1] Livy says *viginti millia*. By χρυσοῦς Polybius appears to mean "staters," worth about 20 drachmae (20 francs). This would give a rough value of the present as £8000, or on Livy's computation twice that amount.

Carians and Lycians free who had been assigned to the Rhodians after the war with Antiochus. The Caunian and Mylassian revolts were speedily put down by the Rhodians; for they compelled the Caunians, by sending Lycus with a body of soldiers, to return to their allegiance, though the people of Cibyra had come to their assistance; and in an expedition into Eurōmus they conquered the Mylassians and Alabandians in the field, these two peoples having combined their forces to attack Orthosia. But when the decree concerning the Lycians and Carians was announced they were once more in a state of dismay, fearing that their gift of the crown had proved in vain, as well as their hopes of an alliance. . . .

The Senate declare Caria and Lycia free. See 22, 5.

6. I have already directed my readers' attention to the policy of Deinon and Polyaratus. For Rhodes was not the only place which experienced grave danger and important changes. Nearly all the states suffered in the same way. It will therefore be instructive to take a review of the policy adopted by the statesmen in the several countries, and to ascertain which of them will be proved to have acted with wisdom, and which to have done otherwise: in order that posterity in similar circumstances of danger may, with these examples as models, so to speak, before their eyes, be able to choose the good and avoid the bad with a genuine insight; and may not in the last hour of their lives dishonour their previous character and achievements, from failing to perceive where the path of honour lies. There were, then, three different classes of persons who incurred blame for their conduct in the war with Perseus. One consisted of those who, while displeased at seeing the controversy brought to a decisive end, and the control of the world fall into the power of one government, nevertheless took absolutely no active steps for or against the Romans, but left the decision entirely to Fortune. A second consisted of those who were glad to see the question settled, and wished Perseus to win, but were unable to convert the citizens of their own states or the members of their race to their sentiments. And a third class consisted of those who actually succeeded in inducing their several states

The three classes of men who in the various states got into trouble for their conduct during the Macedonian war.

to change round and join the alliance of Perseus. Our present task is to examine how each of these conducted their respective policies.

7. In the last class were Antinous, Theodotus, and Cephalus, who induced the Molossians to join Perseus. These men, when the results of the campaign went completely against them, and they found themselves in imminent danger of the worst consequences, put a bold face upon it and met an honourable death in the field. These men deserve our commendation for their self-respect, in refusing to allow themselves to lapse into a position unworthy of their previous life.

Antinous, Theodotus, and Cephalus of the Molossi are instances of the third class.

Again, in Achaia and Thessaly and Perrhaebia several persons incurred blame by remaining neutral, on the ground that they were watching their opportunity, and were in heart on the side of Perseus; and yet they never let a word to that effect get abroad, nor were ever detected in sending letter or message to Perseus on any subject whatever, but conducted themselves with unexceptionable discretion. Such men as these therefore very properly determined to face judicial inquiry and stand their judgment, and to make every effort to save themselves. For it is quite as great a sign of cowardice to abandon life voluntarily when a man is conscious of no crime, from fear of the threats of political opponents or of the power of the conquerors, as it is to cling to life to the loss of honour.

Several instances of the first class in Achaia Phiotis, Thessaly, and Perrhaebia.

Again, in Rhodes and Cos, and several other cities, there were men who favoured the cause of Perseus, and who were bold enough to speak in behalf of the Macedonians in their own cities, and to inveigh against the Romans, and to actually advise active steps in alliance with Perseus, but who were not able to induce their states to transfer themselves to alliance with the king. The most conspicuous of such men were in Cos the two brothers Hippias and Diomedon, and in Rhodes Deinon and Polyaratus.

Instances of the second class in Rhodes, Cos, and other places.

8. And it is impossible not to view the policy of these men with disapproval. To begin with, all their fellow-

citizens were aware of everything they had done or said; in the next place, the letters were intercepted and made public which were coming from Perseus to them, and from themselves to Perseus, as well as the messengers from both sides: yet they could not make up their minds to yield and put themselves out of the way, but still disputed the point. The result of this persistence and clinging to life, in the face of a desperate position, was that they quite ruined their character for courage and resolution, and left not the least ground for pity or sympathy in the minds of posterity. For being confronted with their own letters and agents, they were regarded as not merely unfortunate, but rather as shameless. One of those who went on these voyages was a man named Thoas. He had frequently sailed to Macedonia on a mission from these men, and when the decisive change in the state of affairs took place, conscious of what he had done, and fearing the consequences, he retired to Cnidos. But the Cnidians having thrown him into prison, he was demanded by the Rhodians, and on coming to Rhodes and being put to the torture, confessed his crime; and his story was found to agree with everything in the cipher of the intercepted letters, and with the despatches from Perseus to Deinon, and from Deinon and Polyaratus to him. Therefore it was a matter of surprise that Deinon persuaded himself to cling to life and submit to so signal an exposure.

9. But in respect to folly and baseness of spirit, Polyaratus surpassed Deinon. For when Popilius Laenas charged king Ptolemy to send Polyaratus to Rome, the king, from a regard both to Polyaratus himself and his country, determined not to send him to Rome but to Rhodes, this being also what Polyaratus himself asked him to do. Having therefore caused a galley to be prepared, the king handed him over to Demetrius, one of his own friends, and despatched him, and wrote a despatch to the Rhodians notifying the fact. But touching at Phaselis in the course of the voyage, Polyaratus, from some notion or another which he had conceived, took suppliant branches in his hand, and fled for safety to the city altar. If any one had asked him his intention in thus

The vain attempts of Polyaratus to escape,

at Phaselis,

acting, I am persuaded that he could not have told it. For if he wanted to go to his own country, where was the need of suppliant branches? For his conductors were charged to take him there. But if he wished to go to Rome, that was sure to take place whether he wished it or no. What other alternative was there? Other place that could receive him with safety to himself there was none. However, on the people of Phaselis sending to Rhodes to beg that they would receive Polyaratus, and take him away, the Rhodians came to the prudent resolution of sending an open vessel to convoy him; but forbade the captain of it to actually take him on board, on the ground that the officers from Alexandria had it in charge to deliver the man in Rhodes. When the vessel arrived at Phaselis, and its captain, Epichares, refused to take the man on board, and Demetrius, who had been deputed by the king for that business, urged him to leave the altar and resume his voyage; and when the people of Phaselis supported his command, because they were afraid they would incur some blame from Rome on that account, Polyaratus could no longer resist the pressure of circumstances, but once more went on board Demetrius's galley. But in the course of the voyage he seized an opportunity of doing the same again at Caunus, flying for safety there in the same way, and begging the Caunians to save him. Upon the Caunians rejecting him, on the grounds of their being leagued with Rhodes, he sent messages to Cibyra, begging them to receive him in their city, and to send him an escort. He had some claim upon this city, because the sons of its tyrant, Pancrates, had been educated at his house; accordingly, they listened to his request, and did what he asked. But when he got to Cibyra, he placed himself and the Cibyratae into a still greater difficulty than that which he caused before when at Phaselis. For they neither dared to retain him in their town for fear of Rome, nor had the power of sending him to Rome, because of their ignorance of the sea, being an entirely inland folk. Eventually they were reduced to send envoys to Rhodes and the Roman proconsul in Macedonia, begging them to take over the man. Lucius Aemilius wrote to the Cibyratae, ordering

at Caunus,

and at Cibyra.

them to keep Polyaratus in safe custody; and to the Rhodians to make provision for his conveyance by sea and his safe delivery upon Roman territory. Both peoples obeyed the despatch: and thus Polyaratus eventually came to Rome, after making a spectacle of his folly and cowardice to the best of his ability; and after having been, thanks to his own folly, four times surrendered—by king Ptolemy, the people of Phaselis, the Cibyratae, and the Rhodians.

The reason of my having dwelt at some length on the story of Polyaratus and Deinon is not that I have any desire to trample upon their misfortunes, for that would be ungenerous in the last degree; but in order that, by clearly showing their folly, I might instruct those who fall into similar difficulties and dangers how to take a better and wiser course. . . .

10. The most striking illustration of the mutability and capriciousness of Fortune is when a man, within a brief period, turns out to have been preparing for the use of his enemies the very things which he imagined that he was elaborating in his own honour. Thus Perseus was having some columns made, which Lucius Aemilius, finding unfinished, caused to be completed, and placed statues of himself on them. . . .

The columns constructed at Delphi for statues of Perseus used by Aemilius.

Autumn of B.C. 167. Livy, 45, 27.

He admired the situation of the city, and the excellent position of the acropolis for commanding the districts on both sides of the Isthmus. . . .

Aemilius at Corinth.

Having been long anxious to see Olympia, he set out thither. . .

At Olympia.

Aemilius entered the sacred enclosure at Olympia, and was struck with admiration at the statue of the god, remarking that, to his mind, Pheidias was the only artist who had represented the Zeus of Homer; and that, though he had had great expectations of Olympia, he found the reality far surpassed them. . . .

11. The Aetolians had been accustomed to get their livelihood from plundering and such like lawless occupations; and as long as they were permitted to plunder and loot the Greeks, they got all they required from them, regarding every country as that of

The disturbed state of Aetolia,

an enemy. But subsequently, when the Romans obtained the supremacy, they were prevented from this means of support, and accordingly turned upon each other. Even before this, in their civil war, there was no horror which they did not commit; and a little earlier still they had had a taste of mutual slaughter in the massacres at Arsinoe;[1] they were, therefore, ready for anything, and their minds were so infuriated that they would not allow their magistrates to have even a voice in their business. Aetolia, accordingly, was a scene of turbulence, lawlessness, and blood: nothing they undertook was done on any calculation or fixed plan; everything was conducted at haphazard and in confusion, as though a hurricane had burst upon them. . . .

12. The state of Epirus was much the same. For in proportion as the majority of its people are more law-abiding than those of Aetolia, so their chief magistrate surpassed every one else in wickedness and contempt for law. For, I think, there never was and never will be a character more ferocious and brutal than that of Charops. . . .

and of Epirus. See 27, 15.

13. After the destruction of Perseus, immediately after the decisive battle, embassies were sent on all sides to congratulate the Roman commanders on the event. And as now all power tended towards Rome, in every city those who were regarded as of the Romanising party were in the ascendant, and were appointed to embassies and other services. Accordingly they flocked into Macedonia—from Achaia, Callicrates, Aristodamus, Agesias, and Philippus; from Boeotia, Mnasippos; from Acarnania, Chremas; from Epirus, Charops and Nicias; from Aetolia, Lyciscus

The selection of suspected Greeks, especially Achaeans, to be sent to Italy, B.C. 167.

[1] Called by Polybius in previous books Conope, 4, 64; 5, 6. Its name was changed to Arsinoe, from its having been rebuilt and enlarged by Arsinoe, sister and wife of Ptolemy Philadelphus (Strabo, 10, 2, 22). It was on the east bank of the Achelous. Its modern name is *Angelokastro*. The civil war in Aetolia alluded to here is mentioned in Livy, 41, 25 (B.C. 174). This particular massacre appears to have taken place in B.C. 168-167. Livy (45, 28) narrates that Aemilius was met during his Greek tour in B.C. 167 by a crowd of Aetolians, in a miserable state of destitution, who informed him that five hundred and fifty Aetolian nobles had been massacred by Lyciscus and Tisippus, besides many driven into exile, and that the goods of both had been confiscated.

and Tisippus. These all having met, and eagerly vieing with each other in attaining a common object; and there being no one to oppose them, since their political opponents had all yielded to the times and completely retired, they accomplished their purpose without trouble. So the ten commissioners issued orders to the other cities and leagues through the mouths of the strategi themselves as to what citizens were to go to Rome. And these turned out to be, for the most part, those whom the men I have named had made a list of on party grounds, except a very few of such as had done something conspicuous. But to the Achaean league they sent two men of the highest rank of their own number, Gaius Claudius and Gnaeus Domitius. They had two reasons for doing so: the first was that they were uneasy lest the Achaeans should refuse to obey the written order, and lest Callicrates and his colleagues should be in absolute danger from being reputed to be the authors of the accusations against all the Greeks,—which was about true; and in the second place, because in the intercepted despatches nothing distinct had been discovered against any Achaean. Accordingly, after a while, the proconsul sent the letter and envoys with reference to these men, although in his private opinion he did not agree with the charges brought by Lyciscus and Callicrates, as was afterwards made clear by what took place. . . .

Triumph of L. Anicius Gallus over the Illyrians at the Quirinalia, February 17, B.C. 167.

14. Lucius Anicius, who had been praetor, after his victory over the Illyrians, and on bringing Genthius prisoner to Rome with his children, while celebrating his triumph, did a very ridiculous thing. He sent for the most famous artists from Greece, and having constructed an immense theatre in the circus, he brought all the flute players on the stage together first. Their names were Theodorus the Boeotian, Theopompus and Hermippus of Lysimacheia, the most celebrated of the day. He placed them on the proscenium with the chorus, and bid them all play at once. But on their beginning to play the tune, accompanied by appropriate movements, he sent to them to say that they were not playing well, and must put more excitement into it. At first they

A scene in a Roman theatre.

did not know what to make of this, until one of the lictors showed them that they must form themselves into two companies, and facing round, advance against each other as though in a battle. The fluteplayers caught the idea at once, and, adopting a motion suitable to their own wild strains, produced a scene of great confusion. They made the middle group of the chorus face round upon the two extreme groups, and the fluteplayers, blowing with inconceivable violence and discordance, led these groups against each other. The members of the chorus meanwhile rushed, with a violent stamping which shook the stage, against those opposite them, and then faced round and retired. But when one of the chorus, whose dress was closely girt up, turned round on the spur of the moment and raised his hands, like a boxer, in the face of the fluteplayer who was approaching him, then the spectators clapped their hands and cheered loudly. Whilst this sort of sham fight was going on, two dancers were brought into the orchestra to the sound of music; and four boxers mounted upon the stage, accompanied by trumpeters and clarion players. The effect of these various contests all going on together was indescribable. But if I were to speak about their tragic actors, I should be thought by some to be jesting.[1] . . .

15. It requires the same sort of spirit to arrange public games well, and to set out great banquets and wine with fitting splendour, as it does to draw up an army in presence of the enemy with strategic skill. . . .

16. Aemilius Paulus took seventy cities in Epirus after the conquest of the Macedonians and Perseus, most of which were in the country of the Molossi; and enslaved one hundred and fifty thousand men. . . .

Aemilius in Epirus.

17. In Egypt the first thing the kings did after being

[1] From Athenaeus, xiv. 4, p. 615. It seems to be part of some strictures of Polybius on the coarseness of the amusements of the Romans. This noisy and riotous scene in a theatre would strike a Greek as barbarous and revolting; and may remind us of the complaints of the noise and interruption to their actors so often found in the prologues to the plays of Plautus and Terence. Though the substance of this extract is doubtless from Polybius, Athenaeus has evidently told the anecdote in his own language.

relieved from the war with Antiochus was to send Numenius, one of their friends, as an envoy to Rome to return thanks for the favours received; and they next released the Lacedaemonian Menalcidas, who had made active use of the occasion against the kingdom for his own advantage; Gaius Popilius Laenas asked the king for his release as a favour to himself.[1] . . .

Release of Menalcidas.

18. At this period Cotys, king of the Odrysae, sent ambassadors to Rome, asking for the restoration of his son, and pleading his defence for having acted on the side of Perseus. The Romans, considering that they had effected their purpose by the successful issue of the war against Perseus, and that they had no need to press their quarrel with Cotys any further, allowed him to take his son back—who, having been sent as a hostage to Macedonia, had been captured with the children of Perseus,—wishing to display their clemency and magnanimity, and with the idea at the same time of binding Cotys to themselves by so great a favour. . . .

Cotys, king of the Odrysae, cp. bk. 27, ch. 12.

19. About the same time king Prusias also came to Rome to congratulate the Senate and the generals on their success. This Prusias was in no sense worthy of the royal title, as we may judge from the following facts: When the Roman envoys first appeared at his court, he met them with shorn head and wearing a cap, toga, and shoes, and in fact exactly in the garb worn by those recently manumitted at Rome, whom they call *liberti:* and greeting the envoys respectfully, he exclaimed, "Behold your freedman, who is willing to obey you in all things and to imitate your fashions!" than which a more contemptible speech it would be difficult to imagine. And now, again, when he reached the entrance of the Senate-house he stopped at the door facing the senators, and, dropping both his hands he paid reverence to the threshold and the seated Fathers, exclaiming, "Hail, ye gods my preservers!" seeming bent on surpassing all who might come after him in meanness of

The abject conduct of king Prusias.

[1] Menalcidas was one of the Romanising party, who appears to have been Strategus of the league in B.C. 153 [Pausan. 7, 11, 7], and to have committed suicide in B.C. 148-147, in despair at his failure to wrest Sparta from the league.

spirit, unmanliness, and servility. And his behaviour in the conference which he held when he had entered the Senate-house was on a par with this; and was such as might make one blush even to write. However this contemptible display served in itself to secure him a favourable answer.

20. Just as he had got his answer, news came that Eumenes was on his way. This caused the Senators much embarrassment. They were thoroughly incensed with him, and were entirely fixed in their sentiments towards him; and yet they did not wish to betray themselves. For having proclaimed to all the world that this king was their foremost and most esteemed friend, if they now admitted him to an interview and allowed him to plead his cause, they must either, by answering as they really thought and in harmony with their sentiments, signalise their own folly in having marked out such a man in past times for special honour; or if, in deference to appearances, they gave him a friendly answer, they must disregard truth and the interests of their country. Therefore, as both these methods of proceeding could have consequences of a disagreeable nature, they hit upon the following solution of the difficulty. On the ground of a general dislike of the visits of kings, they published a decree that "no king was to visit Rome." Having been informed subsequently that Eumenes had landed at Brundisium in Italy, they sent the quaestor to convey the decree to him, and to bid him to communicate with himself if he wanted anything from the Senate; or, if he did not want anything, to bid him depart at the earliest possible opportunity from Italy. When the quaestor met the king and informed him of the decree, the latter, thoroughly understanding the intention of the Senate, said not a single word, except that "he wanted nothing."

To prevent a visit from Eumenes the Senate pass a decree forbidding all kings to visit Rome.

Eumenes stopped at Brundisium.

This is the way in which Eumenes was prevented from coming to Rome. And it was not the only important result of this decree. For the Gauls were at that time threatening the kingdom of Eumenes; and it was soon made apparent that by this repulse the king's allies were all greatly depressed, while the Gauls were doubly encouraged to press

on the war. And it was in fact their desire to humiliate him in every possible way that induced the Senate to adopt this resolution. These things were going on at the beginning of the winter: but to all other ambassadors who arrived—and there was no city or prince or king who had not at that time sent an embassy of congratulation—the Senate returned a gracious and friendly answer, except to the Rhodians; and these they dismissed with displeasure, and with ambiguous declarations as to the future. As to the Athenians again the Senate hesitated. . . .

Winter of B.C. 167-166.

21. The first object of the Athenian embassy was the restoration of Haliartus;[1] but when they met with a refusal on that point, they changed the subject of their appeal and put forward their own claim to the possession of Delos, Lemnos, and the territory of Haliartus. No one could properly find fault with them for this, as far as Delos and Lemnos were concerned, for they had of old laid claim to them; but there is good reason for reproaching them in respect to the territory of Haliartus. Haliartus was nearly the most ancient city in Boeotia; had met with a heavy misfortune: instead of endeavouring in every possible way to restore it,—to contribute to its utter annihilation, and to deprive its dispossessed inhabitants of even their hopes for the future, was an act which would be thought worthy of no Greek nation, and least of all of the Athenians. They open their own territory to all comers; and to take away that of others can never appear consonant with the spirit of their State. However, the Senate granted them Delos and Lemnos. Such was the decision in the Athenian business. . . .

The Athenians ask for the restoration of Haliartus; failing that, to have its territory, with Delos and Lemnos themselves.

As to Lemnos and Delos they had, according to the proverb, "got the wolf by the ears:" for they suffered much ill fortune from their quarrels with the Delians; and from the

The possession of these places a misfortune to Athens. See 32, 17.

[1] Haliartus had been taken by the praetor L. Lucretius Gallus in B.C. 171, its inhabitants sold into slavery, and its houses and walls entirely destroyed. Its crime was siding with Perseus. Livy, 42, 63. *Supra* bk. 27, ch. 5; 29, 12.

territory of Haliartus they reaped shame. rather than profit. . . .

22. At this time Theaetetus being admitted into the Senate spoke on the subject of the alliance. The Senate, however, postponed the consideration of the proposal, and in the meantime Theaetetus died in the course of nature, for he was more than eighty years old. But on the arrival in Rome of exiles from Caunus and Stratoniceia, and their admission to the Senate, a decree was passed ordering the Rhodians to withdraw their garrisons from Caunus and Stratoniceia. And the embassy of Philophron and Astymedes having received this answer sailed with all speed home, alarmed lest the Rhodians should disregard the order for withdrawing the garrisons, and so give a fresh ground for complaints. . . .

Death of Theaetetus of Rhodes.

Caunus and Stratoniceia in Caria.

23. In the Peloponnese, when the ambassadors arrived and announced the answers from Rome, there was no longer mere clamour, but downright rage and hatred against Callicrates and his party. . . .

The effect of the message from the Romans in the Achaean league. *Supra* ch. 13.

An instance of the hatred entertained for Callicrates and Adronidas, and the others who agreed with them, was this. The festival of the Antigoneia was being held at Sicyon,—the baths being all supplied with large public bathing tubs, and smaller ones placed by them used by bathers of the better sort,—if Adronidas or Callicrates entered one of these, not a single one of the bystanders would get into it any more, until the bathman had let every drop of water run out and filled it with fresh. They did this from the idea that they would be polluted by entering the same water as these men. Nor would it be easy to describe the hissing and hooting that took place at the public games in Greece when any one attempted to proclaim one of them victor. The very children in the streets as they returned from school ventured to call them traitors to their faces. To such height did the anger and hatred of these men go. . . .

Unpopularity of Callicrates, Adronidas, and their party.

24. The inhabitants of Peraea were like slaves unexpectedly

released from chains, who are scarcely able to believe their present good fortune, thinking it a change almost too great to be natural; and cannot believe that those they meet can understand or fully see that they are really released, unless they do something strange and out of the ordinary course. . . .

Joy of the people of Peraea at the Roman decree emancipating them from Rhodes.

BOOK XXXI

1. AT this time the Cnosians, in alliance with the Gortynians, made war upon the Rhaucians, and swore a mutual oath that they would not end the war until they had taken Rhaucus. B.C. 165. War in Crete of Cnosus and Gortyn against Rhaucus.

But when the Rhodians received the decree regarding Caunus, and saw that the anger of the Romans was not abating, after having scrupulously carried out the orders contained in the Senate's replies, they forthwith sent Aristotle at the head of an embassy to Rome, with instructions to make another attempt to secure the alliance. They arrived in Rome at the height of summer, and, having been admitted to the Senate, at once declared how their people had obeyed the Senate's orders, and pleaded for the alliance, using a great variety of arguments in a speech of considerable length. But the Senate returned them a reply in which, without a word about their friendship, they said that, as to the alliance, it was not proper for them to grant the Rhodians this favour at present. . . . The Rhodians are again refused an alliance.

2. To the ambassadors of the Gauls in Asia they granted autonomy, on condition that they remained within their dwellings, and went on no warlike expeditions beyond their own frontiers. . . . Autonomy to Galatia on conditions.

3. When this same king (Antiochus Epiphanes) heard of the games in Macedonia held by the Roman proconsul Aemilius Paulus, wishing to out-do Paulus by the splendour of his liberality, he sent envoys to the several cities announcing games to be held by him at Daphne; and it became the rage in Greece to attend them. The public ceremonies began with a procession composed as follows: first The grand festival held by Antiochus Epiphanes at Daphne, a suburb of Antioch, sacred to Apollo.

came some men armed in the Roman fashion, with their coats made of chain armour, five thousand in the prime of life. Next came five thousand Mysians, who were followed by three thousand Cilicians armed like light infantry, and wearing gold crowns. Next to them came three thousand Thracians and five thousand Gauls. They were followed by twenty-thousand Macedonians, and five thousand armed with brass shields, and others with silver shields, who were followed by two hundred and forty pairs of gladiators. Behind these were a thousand Nisaean cavalry and three thousand native horsemen, most of whom had gold plumes and gold crowns, the rest having them of silver. Next to them came what are called "companion cavalry," to the number of a thousand, closely followed by the corps of king's "friends" of about the same number, who were again followed by a thousand picked men; next to whom came the *Agema* or guard, which was considered the flower of the cavalry, and numbered about a thousand. Next came the "cataphract" cavalry, both men and horses acquiring that name from the nature of their panoply; they numbered fifteen hundred. All the above men had purple surcoats, in many cases embroidered with gold and heraldic designs. And behind them came a hundred six-horsed, and forty four-horsed chariots; a chariot drawn by four elephants and another by two; and then thirty-six elephants in single file with all their furniture on.

The rest of the procession was almost beyond description, but I must give a summary account of it. It consisted of eight hundred young men wearing gold crowns, about a thousand fine oxen, foreign delegates to the number of nearly three hundred, and eight hundred ivory tusks. The number of images of the gods it is impossible to tell completely: for representations of every god or demigod or hero accepted by mankind were carried there, some gilded and others adorned with gold-embroidered robes; and the myths, belonging to each, according to accepted tradition, were represented by the most costly symbols. Behind them were carried representations of Night and Day, Earth, Heaven, Morning and Noon. The best idea that I can give of the amount of gold and silver plate is this: One of the king's friends, Dionysius his secretary, had a thousand

boys in the procession carrying silver vessels, none of which weighed less than a thousand drachmae;[1] and by their side walked six hundred young slaves of the king holding gold vessels. There were also two hundred women sprinkling unguents from gold boxes; and after them came eighty women sitting in litters with gold feet, and five hundred in litters with silver feet, all adorned with great costliness. These were the most remarkable features of the procession.

4. The festival, including the gladiatorial shows and hunting, lasted thirty days, in the course of which there was continual round of spectacles. During the first five of these everybody in the gymnasium anointed himself with oil scented with saffron in gold vessels, of which there were fifteen, and the same number scented with cinnamon and nard. On the following days other vessels were brought in scented with fenugreek, marjoram, and lily, all of extraordinary fragrancy. Public banquets were also given, at which couches were prepared, sometimes for a thousand and sometimes for fifteen hundred, with the utmost splendour and costliness.

The whole of the arrangements were made personally by the king. He rode on an inferior horse by the side of the procession, ordering one part to advance, and another to halt, as occasion required; so that, if his diadem had been removed, no one would have believed that he was the king and the master of all; for his appearance was not equal to that of a moderately good servant. At the feasts also he stood himself at the entrance, and admitted some and assigned others their places; he personally ushered in the servants bringing the dishes; and walking about among the company sometimes sat down and sometimes lay down on the couches. Sometimes he would jump up, lay down the morsel of food or the cup that he was raising to his lips, and go to another part of the hall; and walking among the guests acknowledge the compliment, as now one and now another pledged him in wine, or jest at any recitations that might be going on. And when the festivity had gone on for a long time, and a good many of the guests had departed, the king was carried in by the mummers, completely shrouded in a robe, and laid upon the ground, as though he

[1] A drachma may be taken as between a sixth and a seventh of an ounce.

were one of the actors; then, at the signal given by the music, he leapt up, stripped, and began to dance with the jesters; so that all the guests were scandalised and retired. In fact every one who attended the festival, when they saw the extraordinary wealth which was displayed at it, the arrangements made in the processions and games, and the scale of the splendour on which the whole was managed, were struck with amazement and wonder both at the king and the greatness of his kingdom: but when they fixed their eyes on the man himself, and the contemptible conduct to which he condescended, they could scarcely believe that so much excellence and baseness could exist in one and the same breast.[1] . . .

Roman envoys at Antioch. Antiochus affects extreme cordiality.

5. After the completion of the festival, the envoys with Tiberius Gracchus arrived, who had been sent from Rome to investigate the state of affairs in Syria. Antiochus received them with such tact and with so many expressions of kindness, that Tiberius not only had no suspicion that he was meditating any active step, or cherishing any sinister feeling on account of what had happened at Alexandria, but was even induced by the extraordinary kindness of his reception to discredit those who made any such suggestion. For, besides other courtesies, the king gave up his own hall for the use of the envoys, and almost his crown in appearance; although his true sentiments were not at all of this kind, and he was on the contrary profoundly incensed with the Romans. . . .

B.C. 164. Complaints against Eumenes at Rome from Prusias of Bithynia, and other parts of Asia.

6. A large number of ambassadors from various quarters having arrived at Rome, the most important of which were those with Astymedes from Rhodes, Eureus Anaxidamus and Satyrus from the Achaeans, and those with Pytho from Prusias,—the Senate gave audience to these last. The ambassadors from Prusias complained of king Eumenes, alleging that he had taken certain places belonging to their country, and had not in any sense evacuated Galatia, or obeyed the decrees of the Senate; but had been supporting all who

[1] Hultsch prints in parallel columns the text of this fragment as it appears in Athenaeus and Diodorus. The English translation attempts to combine them.

favoured himself, and depressing in every possible way those who wished to shape their policy in accordance with the Senate's decrees. There were also some ambassadors from certain towns in Asia, who accused the king on the grounds of his intimate association with Antiochus. The Senate listened to the accusers, and neither rejected their accusations nor openly expressed its own opinion; but acted with close reserve, thoroughly distrusting both Eumenes and Antiochus: and meanwhile contented itself by continually supporting Galatia and contriving some fresh security for its freedom. But the envoys under Tiberius Gracchus, on their return from their mission, had no clearer idea themselves in regard to Eumenes and Antiochus than before they left Rome, nor could they give the Senate one either. So completely had the kings hoodwinked them by the cordiality of their reception.

The Senate's policy in Galatia.

Failure of the mission of Gracchus.

7. The Senate next called in the Rhodians and heard what they had to say. When Astymedes entered, he adopted a more moderate and more effective line of argument than on his former embassy He omitted the invectives against others, and took the humble tone of men who are being flogged, begging to be forgiven, and declaring that his country had suffered sufficient punishment, and a more severe one than its crime deserved. And then he went briefly through the list of the Rhodian losses. "First, they have lost Lycia and Caria, which had already cost them a large sum of money, having been forced to support three wars against them; while at the present moment they have been deprived of a considerable revenue which they used to draw from those countries. But perhaps," he added, "this is as it should be: you gave them to our people as a free gift, because you regarded us with favour; and in now recalling your gift, because you suspect and are at variance with us, you may seem only to be acting reasonably. But Caunus, at any rate, we purchased from Ptolemy's officers for two hundred talents; and Stratoniceia we received as a great favour from Antiochus, son of Seleucus; and from those two towns our people had a revenue of a hundred and twenty talents a year. All these sources of revenue

Rhodians appeal against the injury done to their trade, B.C. 165.

Speech of Astymedes.

we have surrendered, in our submission to your injunctions. From which it appears that you have imposed a heavier penalty on the Rhodians for one act of folly, than on the Macedonians that have been continually at war with you. But the greatest disaster of all to our State is that the revenue from its harbour has been abolished by your making Delos a free port; and by your depriving our people of that independence by which the harbour, as well as other interests of the States, were maintained in suitable dignity.[1] And it is easy to satisfy yourselves of the truth of my words. Our revenue from harbour dues amounted in past years to one million drachmae, from which you have now taken one hundred and fifty thousand; so that it is only too true, gentlemen of Rome, that your anger has affected the resources of the country. Now, if the mistake committed, and the alienation from Rome, had been shared in by the entire people, you might perhaps have seemed to be acting rightly in maintaining a lasting and irreconcilable anger against us; but if the fact is made clear to you that it was an exceedingly small number who shared in this foolish policy, and that these have all been put to death by this very people itself, why still be irreconcilable to those who are in no respect guilty? Especially when to every one else you are reputed to exhibit the highest possible clemency and magnanimity. Wherefore, gentlemen, our people having lost their revenues, their freedom of debate, and their position of independence, in defence of which in time past they have been ever willing to make any sacrifices, now beg and beseech you all, as having been smitten sufficiently, to relax your anger, and to be reconciled and make this alliance with them: that it may be made manifest to all the world that you have put away your anger against Rhodes, and have returned to your old feelings and friendship towards them." Such among others were the words of Astymedes. He was thought to have spoken much to the point in the circumstances; but what helped the Rhodians to the alliance

The Senate is mollified by this speech and by

[1] He means that, they being no longer able to decide in mercantile affairs independently of Rome, the prestige (*προστασία*), and consequently the popularity, of this harbour is destroyed.

more than anything else was the recent return of the embassy under Tiberius Gracchus. For he gave evidence, in the first place, that the Rhodians had obeyed all the decrees of the Senate; and in the next place, that the men who were the authors of their hostile policy had all been condemned to death; and by this testimony overcame all opposition, and secured the alliance between Rome and Rhodes. . . .

the report of Gracchus, and grants the alliance.

8. After an interval the envoys of the Achaeans were admitted with instructions conformable to the last reply received, which was to the effect that "The Senate were surprised that they should apply to them for a decision on matters which they had already decided for themselves." Accordingly another embassy under Eureas now appeared to explain that "The league had neither heard the defence of the accused persons, nor given any decision whatever concerning them; but wished the Senate to take measures in regard to these men, that they might have a trial and not perish uncondemned. They begged that, if possible, the Senate should itself conduct the investigation, and declare who are the persons guilty of those charges; but, if its variety of business made it impossible to do this itself, that it should intrust the business to the Achaeans, who would show by their treatment of the guilty their detestation of their crime." The Senate recognised that the tone of the embassy was in conformity with its own injunctions, but still felt embarrassed how to act. Both courses were open to objection. To judge the case of the men was, it thought, not a task it ought to undertake; and to release them without any trial at all evidently involved ruin to the friends of Rome. In this strait the Senate, wishing to take all hope from the Achaean people of the restitution of the men who were detained, in order that they might obey without a murmur Callicrates in Achaia, and in the other states those who sided with Rome, wrote the following answer: "We do not consider it advisable either for ourselves or for your nationalities that these men should return home." The publication of this answer not only reduced the men who

B.C. 165. Embassy from Achaia asking for the trial or release of the Achaean *détenus*, who to the number of over 1000 had been summoned to Italy in B.C. 167. See 30, 13. Pausan. 7, 10, 11.

had been summoned to Italy to complete despair and dejection, but was regarded by all Greeks as a common sorrow, for it seemed to take away all hope of restoration from these unfortunate men. When it was announced in Greece the people were quite crushed, and a kind of desperation invaded the minds of all; but Charops and Callicrates, and all who shared their policy, were once more in high spirits. . . .

Reduction of the Cammani in Cappadocia.

9. Tiberius Gracchus, partly by force and partly by persuasion, reduced the Cammani to obedience to Rome. . . .

A large number of embassies having come to Rome, the Senate gave a reply to Attalus and Athenaeus. For Prusias, not content with earnestly pressing his accusations himself against Eumenes and Attalus, had also instigated the Gauls and Selgians (in Pisidia), and many others in Asia, to adopt the same policy; consequently king Eumenes had sent his brothers to defend him against the accusations thus brought. On their admission to the Senate they were thought to have made a satisfactory defence against all accusers; and finally returned to Asia, after not only rebutting the accusations, but with marks of special honour. The Senate, however, did not altogether cease to be suspicious of Eumenes and Antiochus. They sent Gaius Sulpicius and Manius Sergius as envoys to investigate the state of Greece; to decide the question of territory that had arisen between Megalopolis and the Lacedaemonians; but, above all, to give attention to the proceedings of Antiochus and Eumenes, and to discover whether any warlike preparations were being made by either of them, or any combination being formed between them against Rome. . . .

The mission, Sulpicius Gallus in Asia; he collects facts against Eumenes.

10. Besides his other follies, Gaius Sulpicius Gallus, on arriving in Asia, put up notices in the most important cities, ordering any one who wished to bring any accusation against king Eumenes to meet him at Sardis within a specified time. He then went to Sardis, and, taking his seat in the Gymnasium, gave audience for ten days to those who had such accusations to make: admitting every kind of foul and abusive language against the king, and, generally, making the

most of every fact and every accusation; for he was frantic and inveterate in his hatred of Eumenes. . . .

But the harder the Romans appeared to bear upon Eumenes, the more popular did he become in Greece, from the natural tendency of mankind to feel for the side that is oppressed. . . .

11. In Syria king Antiochus, wishing to enrich himself, determined on an armed attack upon the temple of Artemis, in Elymais. But having arrived in this country and failed in his purpose, because the native barbarians resisted his lawless attempt, he died in the course of his return at Tabae, in Persia, driven mad, as some say, by some manifestations of divine wrath in the course of his wicked attempt upon this temple. . . .

B.C. 164. Death of Antiochus Epiphanes on his return from Susiana. See 26, 1.

Antiochus Epiphanes left a son and daughter; the former, nine years old, was called Antiochus Eupator, and succeeded to the kingdom, Lysias acting as his guardian. Demetrius, his cousin, son of Seleucus Philopator, being at Rome as a hostage in place of the late Antiochus Epiphanes, endeavoured to persuade the Senate to make him king of Syria instead of the boy.

12. Demetrius, son of Seleucus, who had been long detained at Rome as an hostage, had been for some time past of opinion that his detention was unjust. He had been given by his father Seleucus as a pledge of his good faith; but, when Antiochus (Epiphanes) succeeded to the throne, he considered that he ought not to be a hostage in behalf of that monarch's children. However, up to this time he kept quiet, especially as he was unable, being still a mere boy, to do anything. But now, being in the very prime of youthful manhood, he entered the Senate and made a speech: demanding that the Romans should restore him to his kingdom, which belonged to him by a far better right than to the children of Antiochus. He entered at great length upon arguments to the same effect, affirming that Rome was his country and the nurse of his youth; that the sons of the Senators were all to him as brothers, and the Senators as fathers, because he had come to Rome a child, and was then

Demetrius, son of Seleucus, and grandson of Antiochus the Great, wishes to be restored to the kingdom of Syria.

twenty-three years old.[1] All who heard him were disposed in their hearts to take his part: the Senate however, as a body voted to detain Demetrius, and to assist in securing the crown for the boy left by the late king. Their motive in thus acting was, it seems to me, a mistrust inspired by the vigorous time of life to which Demetrius had attained, and an opinion that the youth and weakness of the boy who had succeeded to the kingdom were more to their interest. And this was presently made manifest. For they appointed Gnaeus Octavius, Spurius Lucretius, and Lucius Aurelius as commissioners to arrange the affairs of the kingdom in accordance with the will of the Senate, on the ground that no one would resist their injunctions, the king being a mere child, and the nobles being quite satisfied at the government not being given to Demetrius, for that was what they had been most expecting. Gnaeus and his colleagues therefore started with instructions, first of all to burn the decked ships, next to hamstring the elephants, and generally to weaken the forces of the kingdom. They were also charged with the additional task of making an inspection of Macedonia; for the Macedonians, unaccustomed to democracy and a government by popular assembly, were splitting up into hostile factions.[2] Gnaeus and his colleagues were also to inspect the state of Galatia and of the kingdom of Ariarathes. After a time the further task was imposed on them, by despatch from the Senate, of reconciling as well as they could the two kings in Alexandria. . . .

A Syrian commission appointed.

The commissioners are also to visit Galatia, Cappadocia, and Alexandria.

13. While this was going on at Rome, envoys from the city, under Marcus Junius, had arrived to arbitrate on the disputes between the Gauls

Missions to Ariarathes, king of

[1] Demetrius had been exchanged for his uncle Antiochus Epiphanes in B.C. 175, just eleven years before.

[2] The *Senatus Consultum de Macedonibus* (Livy, 45, 29) had declared all Macedonians free; each city to enjoy its own laws, create its own annual magistrates, and pay a tribute to Rome—half the amount that it had paid to the king. Macedonia was divided into four regions, at the respective capitals of which—Amphipolis, Thessalonica, Pella, and Pelagonia—the district assemblies (concilia) were to be held, the revenue of the district was to be collected, and the district magistrates elected; and there was to be no inter-marriage or mutual rights of owning property between the regions.

and king Ariarathes. For the Trocmi, having found themselves unable to annex any portion of Cappadocia by their unaided efforts, and having been promptly foiled in their audacious attempts,[1] sought refuge with the Romans, and endeavoured to bring Ariarathes into discredit there. On this account an embassy under M. Junius was sent to Cappadocia. The king gave them a satisfactory account of the affair, treated them with great courtesy, and sent them away loud in his praises. And when subsequently Gnaeus Octavius and Spurius Lucretius arrived, and again addressed the king on the subject of his controversies with the Gauls, after a brief conversation on that subject, and saying that he would acquiesce in their decision without difficulty, he directed the rest of his remarks to the state of Syria, being aware that Octavius and his colleagues were going thither. He pointed out to them the unsettled state of the kingdom and the unprincipled character of the men at the head of affairs there; and added that he would escort them with an army, and remain on the watch for all emergencies, until they returned from Syria in safety. Gnaeus and his colleagues acknowleged the king's kindness and zeal, but said that for the present they did not need the escort: on a future occasion, however, if need should arise, they would let him know without delay; for they considered him as one of the true friends of Rome. . . .

Cappadocia, in regard to the encroachments of the Gauls.

Ariarathes warns Octavius of the dangerous state of Syria.

Ariarathes died soon after this embassy, and was succeeded by his son Ariarathes Philopator. B.C. 164. *Livy*, Ep. 46.

14. About this time ambassadors arrived from Ariarathes, who had recently succeeded to the kingdom of Cappadocia, to renew the existing friendship and alliance with Rome, and in general to exhort the Senate to accept the king's affection and goodwill, which he entertained, both in their private and public capacity, for all the Romans. The Senate, on hearing this, acceded to the request for the renewal of the friendship and alliance, and graciously acknow-

B.C. 163. Ariarathes Philopator continues his father's policy of friendship with Rome.

[1] The Greek of this sentence is certainly corrupt, and no satisfactory sense can be elicited from it.

ledged the general amity of the king. The chief reason for this warmth on the part of the Senate was the report of the envoys under Tiberius, who, when sent to inspect the state of Cappadocia, had returned full of the praises of the late king and of his kingdom generally. It was on the credit of this report that the Senate received the ambassadors of Ariarathes graciously, and acknowledged the goodwill of the king. . . .

15. Having somewhat recovered from their previous disaster, the Rhodians sent Cleagoras with ambassadors to Rome to ask that Calynda should be ceded to them, and to petition the Senate that those of their citizens who had properties in Lycia and Caria might be allowed to retain them as before. They had also voted to raise a colossal statue of the Roman people, thirty cubits high, to be set up in the temple of Athene. . . .

The Rhodians ask for Calynda in Caria, and for the retention of private property in Caria and Lycia.

A colossal statue of Rome.

16. The Calyndians having broken off from Caunus, and the Caunians being about to besiege Calynda, the Calyndians first called in the aid of the Cnidians; and, on their sending the required support, they held out against their enemies for a time: but becoming alarmed as to what would happen, they sent an embassy to Rhodes, putting themselves and their city in its hands. Thereupon the Rhodians sent a naval and military force to their relief, forçed the Caunians to raise the siege, and took over the city. . . .

The Rhodians undertake the protection of Calynda.

17. When Ariarathes, king of Cappadocia, had received his ambassadors on their return from Rome, judging from the answers they brought that his kingdom was secured, because he had gained the goodwill of Rome, he offered a thank-offering to the gods for what had happened, and entertained his nobles at a feast. He then sent ambassadors to Lysias in Antioch, desiring to be allowed to bring away the bones of his sister and mother. He determined not to say a word of blame as to the crime that had been committed, lest he should irritate Lysias, and so fail to effect his present object, though he was in fact greatly

Ariarathes's joy at the favourable answer from Rome.

He recovers the ashes of his mother and sister from Antioch.

incensed at it. He gave his envoys therefore instructions couched in terms of courteous request. Lysias and his friends acceded to his wishes; and the bones having been conveyed to Cappadocia, the king received them in great state, and buried them next the tomb of his father with affectionate reverence. . . .[1]

The influence of good men, Artaxias of Armenia. See 25, 2.

Artaxias wished to kill a man, but on the remonstrances of Ariarathes did not do so, and held him on the contrary in higher respect than ever. So decisive is the influence of justice, and of the opinions and advice of good men, that they often prove the salvation of foes as well as of friends, and change their whole characters for the better. . . .

Good looks are a better introduction than any letter. . . .

The quarrels of the two kings of Egypt, Ptolemy VI. Philometor and Euergetes II. (or Ptolemy VII.) Physcon. The former had been expelled by the latter, and had taken refuge in Cyprus, but had been restored by a popular outbreak in his favour, and under the authority of Commissioners sent from Rome, B.C. 164. (*Livy*, Ep. 46. *Diod.* Sic. *fr. xi.*) *Fresh quarrels however broke out, in the course of which Physcon was much worsted by his brother,* (*Diod.* Sic. *fr. of* 31), *and at length it was arranged that one should reign in Egypt the other in Cyrene.* B.C. 162. (*Livy*, Ep. 47.)

B.C. 162. Euergetes II. (Ptolemy Physcon), who had Cyrene as his share, asks for Cyprus.

18. After the Ptolemies had made their partition of the kingdom, the younger brother arrived in Rome desiring to set aside the division made between himself and his brother, on the ground that he had not acceded to the arrangement voluntarily, but under compulsion, and yielding to the force of circumstances. He therefore begged the Senate to assign Cyprus to his portion; for, even if that were done, he should still have a much poorer share than his brother. Canuleius and Quintus supported

The members of the Commission

[1] Ariarathes, the elder, had been in alliance with Antiochus the Great, and had apparently given him one of his daughters in marriage, who had been accompanied by her mother to Antioch, where both had now fallen victims to the jealousy of Eupator's minister, Lysias. See 21, 43.

who had been in Egypt support the elder brother.

Menyllus, the ambassador of the elder Ptolemy, by protesting that "the younger Ptolemy owed his possession of Cyrene and his very life to them, so deep was the anger and hatred of the common people to him [1]; and that, accordingly, he had been only too glad to receive the government of Cyrene, which he had not hoped for or expected; and had exchanged oaths with his brother with the customary sacrifices." To this Ptolemy gave a positive denial: and the Senate, seeing that the division was clearly an unequal one, and at the same time wishing that, as the brothers themselves were the authors of the division being made at all, it should be effected in a manner advantageous to Rome, granted the petition of the younger Ptolemy with a view to their own interest. Measures of this class are very frequent among the Romans, by which they avail themselves with profound policy of the mistakes of others to augment and strengthen their own empire, under the guise of granting favours and benefiting those who commit the errors. On this principle they acted now. They saw how great the power of the Egyptian kingdom was; and fearing lest, if it ever chanced to obtain a competent head, he would grow too proud, they appointed Titus Torquatus and Gnaeus Merula to establish Ptolemy Physcon in Cyprus, and thus to carry out their own policy while satisfying his. These commissioners were accordingly at once despatched with instructions to reconcile the brothers to each other, and to secure Cyprus to the younger. . . .

The Senate decide in favour of Physcon.

The object of the Senate is to divide and weaken Egypt.

When the Roman commissioners (see ch. 12) arrived in Syria, and began carrying out their orders, by burning the ships and killing the elephants, the popular fury could not be restrained; and Gnaeus Octavius was assassinated in the gymnasium at Laodicea by a man named Leptines. Lysias did his best to appease the anger of the Romans, by giving Octavius honourable

[1] The anger of the Alexandrians had been excited against Ptolemy Physcon by his having, for some unknown reason, caused the death of Timótheus, who had been Ptolemy Philometor's legate at Rome. See 28, 1. Diodor. *Sic.* fr. xi.

burial, and by sending an embassy to Rome to protest his innocence. Appian, Syr. 46.

19. News having come to Rome of the disaster by which Gnaeus Octavius lost his life, ambassadors also arrived from king Antiochus, sent by Lysias, who vehemently protested that the king's friends had had no part in the crime. But the Senate showed scant attention to the envoys, not wishing to make any open declaration on the subject or to allow their opinion to become public in any way.

B.C. 162. The Senate pay little attention to Lysias's excuses.

But Demetrius was much excited by the news, and immediately summoned Polybius to an interview, and consulted him as to whether he should once more bring his claims before the Senate. Polybius advised him "not to stumble twice on the same stone," but to depend upon himself and venture something worthy of a king; and he pointed out to him that the present state of affairs offered him many opportunities. Demetrius understood the hint, but said nothing at the time; but a short while afterwards consulted Apollonius one of his intimate friends, on the same subject. This man, being simple minded and very young, advised him to make another trial of the Senate. "He was convinced," he said, "that, since it had deprived him of his kingdom without any just excuse, it would at least release him from his position of hostage; for it was absurd that, when the boy Antiochus had succeeded to the kingdom in Syria, Demetrius should be a hostage for him." Persuaded by these arguments he once more obtained a hearing of the Senate, and claimed to be relieved of his obligations as a hostage, since they had decided to secure the kingdom to Antiochus. But, though he pleaded his cause with many arguments, the Senate remained fixed in the same resolve as before. And that was only what was to be expected. For they had not, on the former occasion, adjudged the continuance of the kingdom to the child on the ground that the claim of Demetrius was not just, but because it was

Demetrius thinks there is again a chance for him.

Polybius advises, "act for yourself."

He however again appeals to the Senate,

and is again refused.

advantageous to Rome that it should be so; and as the circumstances remained precisely the same, it was only natural that the policy of the Senate should remain unchanged also.

20. Demetrius having thus delivered himself in vain of his swan's song, his last appeal, and becoming convinced that Polybius had given him good advice, repented of what he had done. But he was naturally of a lofty spirit, and possessed sufficient daring to carry out his resolutions. He promptly called Diodorus, who had recently arrived from Syria, to his aid, and confided his secret purpose to him. Diodorus had had the charge of Demetrius as a child, and was a man of considerable adroitness, who had besides made a careful inspection of the state of affairs in Syria. He now pointed out to Demetrius that "The confusion caused by the murder of Octavius,—the people mistrusting Lysias, and Lysias mistrusting the people, while the Senate was convinced that the lawless murder of their envoy really originated with the king's friends,—presented a most excellent opportunity for his appearing on the scene: for the people there would promptly transfer the crown to him, even though he were to arrive attended by but one slave; while the Senate would not venture to give any further assistance or support to Lysias after such an abominable crime. Finally, it was quite possible for them to leave Rome undetected, without any one having any idea of his intention." This course being resolved upon, Demetrius sent for Polybius, and telling him what he was going to do, begged him to lend his assistance, and to join him in contriving to manage his escape.

Demetrius resolves to escape from Rome, and again consults Polybius.

There happened to be at Rome a certain Menyllus of Alabanda, on a mission from the elder Ptolemy to confront and answer the younger before the Senate. Between this man and Polybius there was a strong friendship and confidence, and Polybius therefore thought him just the man for the purpose in hand. He accordingly introduced him with all speed to Demetrius, and with warm expressions of regard. Being trusted with the secret, Menyllus undertook to have the necessary ship in readiness, and to see that everything required for the

Menyllus of Alabanda (in Caria) helps him by hiring a vessel.

voyage was prepared. Having found a Carthaginian vessel anchored at the mouth of the Tiber, which had been on sacred service, he chartered it. (These vessels are carefully selected at Carthage, to convey the offerings sent by the Carthaginians to their ancestral gods at Tyre.) He made no secret about it, but chartered the vessel for his own return voyage; and therefore was able to make his arrangements for provisions also without exciting suspicion, talking openly with the sailors and making an appointment with them.

21. When the shipmaster had everything ready, and nothing remained except for Demetrius to do his part, he sent Diodorus to Syria to gather information, and to watch the disposition of the people there. Preparations for the flight. His foster-brother Apollonius took part in this expedition; and Demetrius also confided his secret to the two brothers of Apollonius, Meleager and Menestheus, but to no one else of all his suite, though that was numerous. These three brothers were the sons of the Apollonius who occupied so important a position at the court of Seleucus, but who had removed to Miletus at the accession of Antiochus Epiphanes. As the day agreed upon with the sailors approached, it was arranged that one of his friends should give an entertainment to serve as an excuse for Demetrius going out. For it was impossible that he should sup at home; as it was his constant habit, when he did so, to invite all his suite. Those who were in the secret were to leave the house after supper and go to the ship, taking one slave each with them; the rest they had sent on to Anagnia, saying that they would follow next day. It happened that at this time Polybius was ill and confined to his bed; but he was kept acquainted with all that was going on by constant communications from Menyllus. Polybius sends a warning to Demetrius. He was therefore exceedingly anxious, knowing Demetrius to be fond of conviviality and full of youthful wilfulness, lest, by the entertainment being unduly prolonged, some difficulty should arise from over-indulgence in wine to prevent his getting away. He therefore wrote and sealed a small tablet; and just as it was getting dusk sent a servant of his own, with orders to ask for Demetrius's cupbearer and give him the tablet, without saying who he was or from whom he

came, and to bid the cupbearer to give it to Demetrius to read at once. His orders were carried out, and Demetrius read the tablet, which contained the following apophthegms[1]:—

"The ready hand bears off the sluggard's prize."

"Night favours all, but more the daring heart."

"Be bold: front danger: strike! then lose or win,
Care not, so you be true unto yourself."

"Cool head and wise distrust are wisdom's sinews."

Demetrius takes the hint, and the voyage is safely begun.

22. As soon as Demetrius had read these lines, he understood their purport, and from whom they came; and at once pretending that he felt sick, he left the banquet escorted by his friends. Arrived at his lodging, he sent away those of his servants who were not suited to his purpose to Anagnia, ordering them to take the hunting nets and hounds and meet him at Cerceii, where it had been his constant custom to go boar hunting, which, in fact, was the origin of his intimacy with Polybius. He then imparted his plan to Nicanor and his immediate friends, and urged them to share his prospects. They all consented with enthusiasm; whereupon he bade them return to their own lodgings, and arrange with their servants to go before daybreak to Anagnia and meet them at Cerceii, while they got travelling clothes and returned to him, telling their domestics that they would join them, accompanied by Demetrius, in the course of the next day at Cerceii. Everything having been done in accordance with this order, he and his friends went to Ostia, at the mouth of the Tiber, by night. Menyllus preceded them and had a conversation with the sailors; telling them that orders had arrived from the king which made it necessary for him to remain at Rome for the present, and to send some of the most trustworthy of his young men to his Majesty, to inform him of what had been done about his brother. He should not, therefore, he said, go on board himself; but the young men who were to sail would come about midnight. The shipmasters made no difficulty about it, as the passage money for which they had originally bargained was in their hands;

[1] The first line is of unknown authorship. The second is from Euripides, *Phoeniss.* 633. The third apophthegm is again unknown. The last is from Epicharmus, see 18, 40.

and they had long made all their preparations for sailing, when Demetrius and his friends arrived about the third watch. There were altogether eight of them, besides five slaves and three boys. Menyllus entered into conversation with them, showed them the provisions in store for the voyage, and commended them earnestly to the care of the shipmaster and crew. They then went on board, and the pilot weighed anchor and started just as day was breaking, having absolutely no idea of the real state of the case, but believing that he was conveying some soldiers from Menyllus to Ptolemy.

23. At Rome, during the whole of the following day, no one was likely to make any inquiry for Demetrius or those who had gone with him. For those of his household who stayed in the city supposed him to have gone to Cerceii; and those at Anagnia were expecting him to come there too. The flight from Rome, therefore, was entirely unremarked; until one of his slaves, having been flogged at Anagnia, ran off to Cerceii, expecting to find Demetrius there; and not finding him, ran back again to Rome, hoping to meet him on the road. But as he failed to meet him anywhere, he went and informed his friends in Rome and the members of his household who had been left behind in his house. But it was not until the fourth day after his start that, Demetrius being looked for in vain, the truth was suspected. On the fifth the Senate was hastily summoned to consider the matter, when Demetrius had already cleared the Straits of Messina. The Senate gave up all idea of pursuit: both because they imagined that he had got a long start on the voyage (for the wind was in his favour), and because they foresaw that, though they might wish to hinder him, they would be unable to do so. But some few days afterwards they appointed Tiberius Gracchus, Lucius Lentulus, and Servilius Glaucia as commissioners: first to inspect the state of Greece; and, next, to cross to Asia and watch the result of Demetrius's attempt, and examine the policy adopted by the other kings, and arbitrate on their controversies with the Gauls. Such were the events in Italy this year. . . .

The absence of Demetrius is not ascertained in Rome until the fourth day.

The Senate is summoned, but decides not to attempt pursuit.

Commissioners appointed for Greece and Asia, B.C. 162.

Demetrius expecting the arrival of the commissioner who was to be sent to him. . . .

Cato on the growth of luxury.

24. The dissoluteness of the young men in Rome had grown to such a height, and broke out in such extravagances, that there were many instances of men purchasing a jar of Pontic salt-fish for three hundred drachmae.[1] In reference to which Marcus Porcius Cato once said to the people in indignation, that no better proof could be shown of the degeneracy of the state than that good-looking slaves[2] should fetch more than a farm, and a jar of salt-fish more than a carter. . . .

The Rhodians accept money to pay their schoolmasters, B.C. 162.

25. The Rhodians, though in other respects maintaining the dignity of their state, made in my opinion a slight lapse at this period. They had received two hundred and eighty thousand medimni of corn from Eumenes, that its value might be invested and the interest devoted to pay the fees of the tutors and schoolmasters of their sons. One might accept this from friends in a case of financial embarrassment, as one might in private life, rather than allow children to remain uneducated for want of means; but where means are abundant a man would rather do anything than allow the schoolmaster's fee to be supplied by a joint contribution from his friends. And in proportion as a state should hold higher notions than an individual, so ought governments to be more jealous of their dignity than private men, and above all a Rhodian government, considering the wealth of the country and its high pretensions. . . .

Ptolemy Physcon returning with the commissioners, collects mercenaries in Greece, but is persuaded to disband them, B.C. 162.

26. After this the younger Ptolemy arrived in Greece with the Roman commissioners, and began collecting a formidable army of mercenaries, among whom he enlisted Damasippus the Macedonian, who, after murdering the members of the council at Phacus, fled with his wife and children from Macedonia, and after reaching Peraea, opposite Rhodes, and being entertained by the people there, determined to sail to Cyprus. But when Torquatus and his

[1] About £12.

[2] In his Censorship (B.C. 184) Cato imposed a tax on slaves under twenty sold for more than ten sestertia (about £70.) Livy, 39. 44.

colleagues saw that Ptolemy had collected a formidable corps of mercenaries, they reminded him of their commission, which was to restore him "without a war," and at last persuaded him to go as far as Side (in Pamphylia), and there disband his mercenaries, give up his idea of invading Cyprus, and meet them on the frontiers of Cyrene. Meanwhile, they said that they would sail to Alexandria, and induce the king to consent to their demands, and would meet him on the frontiers, bringing the other king with them. The younger Ptolemy was persuaded by these arguments, gave up the attack upon Cyprus, dismissed the mercenaries, and first sailed to Crete, accompanied by Damasippus and Gnaeus Merula, one of the commissioners; and, after enlisting about a thousand soldiers in Crete, put to sea and crossed to Libya, landing at Apis.

He, however, takes about 100 Cretans back with him to Africa.

ch. 18.

27. Meanwhile Torquatus had crossed to Alexandria and was trying to induce the elder Ptolemy to be reconciled to his brother, and yield Cyprus to him. But Ptolemy, by alternate promises and refusals and the like, managed to waste the time, while the younger king lay encamped with his thousand Cretans at Apis in Libya, according to his agreement. Becoming thoroughly irritated at receiving no intelligence, he first sent Gnaeus Merula to Alexandria, hoping by this means to bring Torquatus and those with him to the place of meeting. But Merula was like the others in protracting the business: forty days passed without a word of intelligence, and the king was in despair. The fact was that the elder king, by using every kind of flattery, had won the commissioners over, and was keeping them by him, rather against their will than with it. Moreover, at this time the younger Ptolemy was informed that the people of Cyrene had revolted, that the cities were conspiring with them, and that Ptolemy Sympetesis had also taken their side. This man was an Egyptian by birth, and had been left by the king in charge of his whole kingdom when he was going on his journey to Rome. When the king was informed of this, and learned presently that the Cyreneans were encamped in the open country, afraid lest, in his desire to add

Ptolemy Physcon invades the dominions of his brother.

Cyprus to his dominions, he might lose Cyrene also, he threw everything else aside and marched towards Cyrene. When he came to what is called the Great Slope, he found the Libyans and Cyreneans occupying the pass. Ptolemy was alarmed at this: but, putting half his forces on board boats, he ordered them to sail beyond the difficult ground, and show themselves on the rear of the enemy; while with the other half he marched up in their front and tried to carry the pass. The Libyans being panic-stricken at this double attack on front and rear, and abandoning their position, Ptolemy not only got possession of the pass, but also of Tetrapyrgia, which lay immediately below it, in which there was an abundant supply of water. Thence he crossed the desert in seven days, the forces under Mochyrinus coasting along parallel to his line of march. The Cyreneans were encamped eight thousand five hundred strong, eight thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry: for having satisfied themselves as to the character of Ptolemy from his conduct at Alexandria, and seeing that his government and policy generally were those of a tyrant rather than a king, they could not endure the idea of becoming his subjects, but were determined to venture everything in their desire for freedom. And at last he was beaten. . . .

28. At this time Gnaeus Merula also came from Alexandria, informing the king (Physcon) that his brother would consent to none of the proposals, but maintained that they ought to abide by the original agreements. On hearing this, Physcon selected the brothers Comanus and Ptolemy[1] to go as ambassadors to Rome with Gnaeus, and inform the Senate of his brother's selfish and haughty behaviour. At the same time the elder Ptolemy sent away Titus Torquatus also without having attained the object of his mission. Such was the state of things in Alexandria and Cyrene. . . .

The Roman commission fails to secure peace between the brothers.

[1] Called Ptolemy the Orator in 28, 19.

BOOK XXXII

1. THIS year Comanus and his brother arrived at Rome on their mission from the younger Ptolemy, and Menyllus of Alabanda from the elder. Their interview with the Senate was the occasion of many mutual recriminations expressed with great bitterness; and when Titus Torquatus and Gnaeus Merula gave evidence in favour of the younger king, and supported him with great earnestness, the Senate voted that Menyllus and his colleagues should leave Rome within five days, and that the treaty of alliance with the elder Ptolemy should be annulled; but that they should send envoys to the younger to inform him of the decree of the Senate. Publius Apustius and Gaius Lentulus were appointed to this service, who immediately sailed to Cyrene, and with great despatch announced to Physcon the decree of the Senate. Greatly elated by this, Ptolemy began collecting mercenaries, and devoted his whole attention and energies to the acquisition of Cyprus. This was what was going on in Italy. . . .

B.C. 161. The Senate break off relations with Ptolemy Philometor, and encourage Ptolemy Physcon in his claim on Cyprus.

2. Not long before this period Massanissa resolved to try his strength with the Carthaginians. He saw how numerous the cities built along the lesser Syrtis were, and noticed the excellence of the district which they call Emporia, and he had long been casting an envious eye upon the revenues which those places produced. He quickly possessed himself of the open part of the country, because the Carthaginians were always averse from service in the field, and were at that time completely enervated by the long peace. But he

Between the second and third Punic wars Massanissa constantly encroached on Carthaginian territory. Both sides refer to Rome,

was unable to get possession of the towns, because they were carefully guarded by the Carthaginians. Both parties then referring their case to the Roman Senate, and frequent embassies coming to Rome from both sides, it always happened that the Carthaginians got the worst of it in the judgment of the Romans, not on the merits of the case, but because the judges were convinced that such a decision was in their interests. For instance, not many years before this Massanissa was himself at the head of an army in pursuit of Aphther, who had revolted from him, and asked permission of the Carthaginians to go through this territory, which they refused on the ground that it had nothing to do with him. Owing, however, to the decisions given at Rome during this period, the Carthaginians were put into such difficulties that they not only lost the cities and territory, but had to pay besides five hundred talents as mesne profits from the district. And this was the origin of the present controversy.[1] . . .

and the Romans invariably support Massanissa.

B.C. 193, cp. Livy, 34, 62.

3. Prusias sent envoys to Rome with some Gauls to accuse Eumenes; and Eumenes in his turn sent his brother Attalus to rebut the accusations. Ariarathes sent a present of ten thousand gold pieces, and envoys to inform the Senate of the reception given to Tiberius Gracchus; and generally to ask for their commands, and to assure them that he would do anything they told him. . . .

Further complaints against Eumenes by Prusias and the Gauls. See 31, 4, B.C. 161.

4. When Menochares arrived in Antioch to visit Demetrius, and informed the king[2] of the conversation he had had with the commission under Tiberius Gracchus in Cappadocia, the king, thinking it a matter of the most urgent necessity to get these men on his side as much as he could, devoted himself, to the exclusion of every other business, to sending

Demetrius induces Tiberius Gracchus to salute him as king.

[1] A more detailed statement of the controversies between Carthage and Massanissa, fostered and encouraged by the Romans, is found in Appian, *Res Punicae*, 67 *sq.*

[2] Demetrius was now king. On his escape from Rome, described in bk. 31, chs. 20-23, he had met with a ready reception in Syria, had seized the sovereign power, and put the young Antiochus and his minister Lysias to death; this was in B.C. 162. Appian, *Syriac.* ch. 47.

messages to them, first to Pamphylia, and then to Rhodes, undertaking to do everything the Romans wished; till at last he extracted their acknowledgment of him as king. The fact was that Tiberius was very favourably disposed to him; and, accordingly, materially contributed to the success of his attempt, and to his acquisition of the royal power. Demetrius took advantage of this to send envoys to Rome, taking with them a complimentary crown, the murderer of Gnaeus Octavius, and with them Isocrates the critic. . . .

Surrenders the murderer of Octavius.

5. At this time came ambassadors from Ariarathes, bringing a complimentary present of ten thousand gold pieces, and announcing the king's faithful attachment to Rome; and of this they appealed to Tiberius and his colleagues as witnesses. Tiberius and his colleagues confirmed their statements: whereupon the Senate accepted the present with warm thanks, and sent back in return presents, which with them are the most honourable they can give—a sceptre and ivory chair. These ambassadors were dismissed at once by the Senate before the winter. But after them arrived Attalus when the new Consuls had already entered on their office; as well as the Gauls who had accusations against him, and whom Prusias had sent, with as many more from Asia. After giving all a hearing, the Senate not only acquitted Attalus of all blame, but dismissed him with additional marks of their favour and kindness: for their friendship for and active support of Attalus was in the same proportion as their hostility and opposition to king Eumenes. . . .

Ambassadors from Ariarathes.

Attalus again in Rome early in B.C. 160. Coss. L. Anicius Gallus, M. Cornelius Cathegus.

6. The ambassadors with Menochares arrived in Rome from Demetrius, bringing the present of ten thousand gold pieces, as well as the man who had assassinated Gnaeus Octavius. The Senate was for a long time doubtful what to do about these matters. Finally they received the ambassadors and accepted the present, but declined to receive the men who were thus brought prisoners. Yet Demetrius had sent not only Leptines, the actual assassin of Octavius, but Isocrates as well. The latter was a grammarian

Reception of the ambassadors of Demetrius.

and public lecturer; but being by nature garrulous, boastful, and conceited, he gave offence even to the Greeks, Alcaeus and his friends being accustomed to direct their wit against him and hold him up to ridicule in their scholastic discussions.[1] When he arrived in Syria, he displayed contempt for the people of the country; and not content with lecturing on his own subjects, he took to speaking on politics, and maintained that "Gnaeus Octavius had been rightly served; and that the other ambassadors ought to be put to death also, that there might be no one left to report the matter to the Romans; and so they might be taught to give up sending haughty injunctions and exercising unlimited power." By such random talk he got into this trouble.

Previous career of Isocrates.

His conduct in Syria.

7. And there is a circumstance connected with both these men that is worth recording. After assassinating Gnaeus, Leptines immediately went openly about Laodicea, asserting that what he had done was just, and that it had been effected in accordance with the will of the gods. And when Demetrius took possession of the government, he went to the king exhorting him to have no fear about the murder of Gnaeus, nor to adopt any measures of severity against the Laodiceans; for that he would himself go to Rome and convince the Senate that he had done this deed in accordance with the will of the gods. And finally, thanks to his entire readiness and even eagerness to go, he was taken without chains or a guard. But directly Isocrates found himself included under this charge, he went entirely beside himself with terror; and, after the collar and chain were put on his neck, he would rarely touch food, and completely neglected all care of his body. He accordingly arrived at Rome a truly astonishing spectacle, sufficient to convince us that nothing can be more frightful than a man, in body and soul alike, when once divested of his humanity. His aspect was

The boldness of Leptines.

Extraordinary conduct of Isocrates.

[1] ἐν ταῖς συγκρίσεσιν. But it is very doubtful what the exact meaning of this word is. Alcaeus seems to be the Epicurean philosopher who, among others, was expelled from Rome in B.C. 171. See Athenaeus, xii. 547, who however calls him Alcios. See also Aelian, *V. Hist.* 9, 12.

beyond all measure terrifying and savage, as might be expected in a man who had neither washed the dirt from his body, nor pared his nails, nor cut his hair, for a year. The wild glare and rolling of his eyes also showed such inward horror, that any one who saw him would have rather approached any animal in the world than him. Leptines, on the contrary, maintained his original view: was ready to appear before the Senate; owned plainly to all who conversed with him what he had done; and asserted that he would meet with no severity at the hands of the Romans. And eventually his expectation was fully justified. For the Senate, from the idea, I believe, that, if it received and punished the guilty men, the populace would consider that full satisfaction had been taken for the murder, refused almost outright to receive them; and thus kept the charge in reserve, that they might have the power of using the accusation whenever they chose. They therefore confined their answer to Demetrius to these words: "He shall find all favour at our hands, if he satisfy the Senate in accordance with the obedience which he owed to it before." . . .

The Senate decide to keep the question of the murder open.

There came also ambassadors from the Achaeans, headed by Xenon and Telecles, in behalf of their accused compatriots, and especially in behalf of Polybius and Stratius; for lapse of time had now brought an end to the majority, or at any rate to those of any note. The ambassadors came with instructions couched in a tone of simple entreaty, in order to avoid anything like a contest with the Senate. But when they had been admitted and delivered their commission in proper terms, even this humble tone failed to gain their end, and the Senate voted to abide by their resolve. . . .

Fruitless embassy from Achaia on behalf of Polybius and the other Achaean detenus, B.C. 160.

8. The strongest and most honourable proof of the integrity of Lucius Aemilius Paulus was made public after his death. For the character which he enjoyed while alive was found to be justified at his death, than which there can be no clearer proof of virtue. No one of his contemporaries brought home more gold from Iberia than he; no one captured such enormous treasures as he did in Macedonia;

The small property left by Aemilius Paulus at his death is a proof of his disinterestedness.

and yet, though in both these countries he had the most unlimited authority, he left so small a private fortune, that his sons could not pay his wife's jointure wholly from the sale of his personalty, and were obliged to sell some of his real estate also to do so, a fact of which I have already spoken in some detail. This forces us to acknowledge that the fame of the men who have been admired in Greece in this respect suffers by a comparison. For if to abstain from appropriating money, entrusted to a man for the benefit of the depositor, deserves our admiration,—as is said to have happened in the case of the Athenian Aristeides and the Theban Epaminondas,—how much more admirable is it for a man to have been master of a whole kingdom, with absolute authority to do with it as he chose, and yet to have coveted nothing in it! And if what I say appears incredible to any of my readers, let them consider that the present writer was fully aware that Romans, more than any other people, would take his books into their hands,—because the most splendid and numerous achievements recorded therein belong to them; and that with them the truth about the facts could not possibly be unknown, nor the author of a falsehood expect any indulgence. No one then would voluntarily expose himself to certain disbelief and contempt. And let this be kept in mind throughout the whole course of my work, when I seem to be making a startling assertion about the Romans.

See 18, 35.

Polybius has the fear of Roman critics before his eyes.

9. As the course of my narrative and the events of the time have drawn our attention to this family, I wish to carry out fully, for the sake of students, what was left as a mere promise in my previous book. I promised then that I would relate the origin and manner of the rise and unusually early glory of Scipio's reputation in Rome; and also how it came about that Polybius became so attached to and intimate with him, that the fame of their friendship and constant companionship was not merely confined to Italy and Greece, but became known to more remote nations also. We have already shown that the acquaintance began in a loan of some books and the conversation about them. But as the intimacy went on, and the Achaean

The origin of the friendship between Scipio Aemilianus and Polybius.

detenus were being distributed among the various cities, Fabius and Scipio, the sons of Lucius Aemilius Paulus,[1] exerted all their influence with the praetor that Polybius might be allowed to remain in Rome. This was granted: and the intimacy was becoming more and more close, when the following incident occurred. One day, when they were all three coming out of the house of Fabius, it happened that Fabius left them to go to the Forum, and that Polybius went in another direction with Scipio. As they were walking along, in a quiet and subdued voice, and with the blood mounting to his cheeks, Scipio said, "Why is it, Polybius, that though I and my brother eat at the same table, you address all your conversation and all your questions and explanations to him, and pass me over altogether? Of course you too have the same opinion of me as I hear the rest of the city has. For I am considered by everybody, I hear, to be a mild effete person, and far removed from the true Roman character and ways, because I don't care for pleading in the law courts. And they say that the family I come of requires a different kind of representative, and not the sort that I am. That is what annoys me most."

Young Scipio opens his heart to Polybius.

10. Polybius was taken aback by the opening words of the young man's speech (for he was only just eighteen), and said, "In heaven's name, Scipio, don't say such things, or take into your head such an idea. It is not from any want of appreciation of you, or any intention of slighting you, that I have acted as I have done: far from it! It is merely that, your brother being the elder, I begin and end my remarks with him, and address my explanations and counsels to him, in the belief that you share the same opinions. However, I am delighted to hear you say now that you appear to yourself to be somewhat less spirited than is becoming to members of your family: for you show by this that you have a really high spirit, and I should gladly devote myself to helping you to speak or act in any way worthy of your ancestors. As for learning, to which I see you and your brother devoting yourselves at present with so much earnestness and zeal, you will find plenty of people

Scipio Aemilianus, b. B.C. 185.

[1] See note on p. 456.

to help you both; for I see that a large number of such learned men from Greece are finding their way into Rome at the present time. But as to the points which you say are just now vexing you, I think you will not find any one more fitted to support and assist you than myself." While Polybius was still speaking the young man seized his right hand with both of his, and pressing it warmly, said, "Oh that I might see the day on which you would devote your first attention to me, and join your life with mine. From that moment I shall think myself worthy both of my family and my ancestors." Polybius was partly delighted at the sight of the young man's enthusiasm and affection, and partly embarrassed by the thought of the high position of his family and the wealth of its members. However, from the hour of this mutual confidence the young man never left the side of Polybius, but regarded his society as his first and dearest object.

Polybius is somewhat alarmed at the responsibility.

11. From that time forward they continually gave each other practical proof of an affection which recalled the relationship of father and son, or of kinsmen of the same blood. The first impulse and ambition of a noble kind with which he was inspired was the desire to maintain a character for chastity, and to be superior to the standard observed in that respect among his contemporaries. This was a glory which, great and difficult as it generally is, was not hard to gain at that period in Rome, owing to the general deterioration of morals. Some had wasted their energies on favourite youths; others on mistresses; and a great many on banquets enlivened with poetry and wine, and all the extravagant expenditure which they entailed, having quickly caught during the war with Perseus the dissoluteness of Greek manners in this respect. And to such monstrous lengths had this debauchery gone among the young men, that many of them had given a talent for a young favourite. This dissoluteness had as it were burst into flame at this period: in the first place, from the prevalent idea that, owing to the destruction of the Macedonian monarchy, universal dominion was now secured to them beyond dispute; and in the second place, from the immense difference made, both in public and

Scipio's high character for continence as a young man.

The deterioration in Roman morals and its causes.

private wealth and splendour, by the importation of the riches of Macedonia into Rome. Scipio, however, set his heart on a different path in life; and by a steady resistance to his appetites, and by conforming his whole conduct to a consistent and undeviating standard, in about the first five years after this secured a general recognition of his character for goodness and purity.

12. His next object was to cultivate lofty sentiments in regard to money, and to maintain a higher standard of disinterestedness than other people. In this respect he had an excellent start in his association with his natural father (L. Aemilius): but he also had good natural impulses towards the right; and chance contributed much to his success in this particular aim. For he first lost the mother of his adoptive father, who was the sister of his natural father Lucius, and wife of his adoptive grandfather, Scipio the Great. She left a large fortune, to which he was heir, and which gave him the first opportunity of giving a proof of his principles. Aemilia, for that was this lady's name, was accustomed to attend the women's processions in great state, as sharing the life and high fortune of Scipio. For besides the magnificence of her dress and carriage, the baskets, cups, and such implements for the sacrifice, which were carried in her train, were all of silver or gold on great occasions; and the number of maid-servants and other domestics that made up her train was in proportion to this splendour.

Scipio's liberality to his mother.

All this establishment, immediately after Aemilia's funeral, Scipio presented to his own mother, who had long before been divorced by his father Lucius, and was badly off considering the splendour of her birth.[1] She had therefore in previous years refrained from taking part in grand public processions; but now, as there chanced to be an important state sacrifice, she appeared surrounded with all the splendour and wealth which had once been Aemilia's, using among other things the same muleteers, pair of mules, and carriage. The ladies, therefore, who saw it were much impressed by the kindness and liberality of Scipio, and all raised their hands to heaven and prayed for blessings upon him. This act, indeed, would be

[1] She was the daughter of C. Papirius Carbo, Coss. B.C. 231.

thought honourable anywhere, but at Rome it was quite astonishing: for there no one ever thinks of giving any of his private property to any one if he can help it. This was the beginning of Scipio's reputation for nobility of character, and it spread very widely,—for women are talkative and prone to exaggeration whenever they feel warmly.

Scipio's liberality to his cousins, sisters to his adoptive father.

13. The next instance was his conduct to the daughters of the Great Scipio, sisters to his adoptive father.[1] When he took the inheritance he was bound to pay them their portion. For their father covenanted to give each of his two daughters a marriage portion of fifty talents. Half of this their mother paid down at once to their husbands, but left the other half undischarged when she died. Now, the Roman law enjoins the payment of money due to women as dowry in three annual instalments, the personal outfit having been first paid within ten months according to custom.[2] But Scipio instructed his banker at once to pay the twenty-five talents to each within the ten months. When, therefore, Tiberius Gracchus and Scipio Nasica, for they were the husbands of these ladies, called on the banker at the expira-

[1] The following pedigree will show the various family connexions here alluded to :—



[2] *τῶν ἐπίπλων*, the *ornamenta* of a bride, consisting of clothes, jewels, slaves, and other things, in accordance with her station. See Horace, *Sat.* 2, 3, 214. For the three instalments in which it was necessary to pay dowries, see Cicero *ad Att.* ii. 23 ; 2 *Phil.* § 113.

tion of the ten months, and asked whether Scipio had given him any instructions as to the money, he told them they might have it at once, and proceeded to enter the transfer of twenty-five talents to each.[1] They then said that he had made a mistake, for they had no claim for the whole as yet, but only took a third according to the law; and upon the banker answering that such were his instructions from Scipio, they could not believe him, and went to call on the young man, supposing him to have made a mistake. And, indeed, their feelings were natural: for at Rome, so far from paying fifty talents three years in advance, no one will pay a single talent before the appointed day; so excessively particular are they about money, and so profitable do they consider time. However, when they reached Scipio and asked him what instructions he had given his banker, on his replying, "To pay both sisters the whole sum due to them," they told him he had made a mistake; and with a show of friendly regard pointed out to him that, according to the laws, he had the use of the money for a considerable time longer. But Scipio replied that he was quite aware of all that; but that close reckoning and legal exactness were for strangers; with relations and friends he would do his best to behave straightforwardly and liberally. He therefore bade them draw on the banker for the whole sum. When Tiberius and Nasica heard this they returned home in silence, quite confounded at the magnanimity of Scipio, and condemning themselves for meanness, though they were men of as high a character as any at Rome.

14. Two years afterwards, when his natural father, Lucius Aemilius, died, and left him and his brother Fabius joint heirs to his property, he did an act honourable to himself and worthy to be recorded. Lucius died without children in the eyes of the law, for the two elder had been adopted into other families, and the other sons, whom he was bringing up to be the successors to himself and to continue his family, all died;[2]

The liberality of Scipio to his brother and sisters, B.C. 160.

[1] ποιοῦντος τὴν διαγραφὴν seems a banker's term for "paying," *i.e.* by striking off or cancelling a debt entered against a man. The only other instance of such a use seems to be Dionys. Hal. 5, 28.

[2] Of his two younger sons one died five days before his Macedonian triumph, the other three days after it. See Livy, 45, 40.

he therefore left his property to these two. But Scipio, perceiving that his brother was worse off than himself, renounced the whole of his share of the inheritance, though the property was valued altogether at over sixty talents, with a view of thus putting Fabius on an equality with himself in point of wealth. This was much talked about; but he afterwards gave a still clearer proof of his liberality. For when his brother wished to give some gladiatorial games in honour of his father, but was unable to support the expense, because of the enormous costliness of such things, Scipio contributed half of this also from his own pocket. Now the cost of such an exhibition, if it is done on a large scale, does not amount in all to less than thirty talents. While the fame of his liberality to his mother was still fresh, she died; and so far from taking back any part of the wealth he had recently bestowed on her, of which I have just spoken, Scipio gave it and the entire residue of his mother's property to his sisters,[1] though they had no legal claim at all upon it. Accordingly his sisters again adopted the splendour and retinue which Aemilia had employed in the public processions; and once more the liberality and family affection of Scipio were recalled to the minds of the people.

With such recommendations dating from his earliest years, Publius Scipio sustained the reputation for high morality and good principles, which he had won by the expenditure of perhaps sixty talents, for that was the sum which he bestowed from his own property. And this reputation for goodness did not depend so much on the amount of the money, as on the seasonableness of the gift and the graciousness with which

[1] The two sisters were both named Aemilia; the elder was married to Q. Aelius Tubero, the younger to M. Porcius Cato, elder son of the Censor. The daughters were prevented from taking the inheritance of their mother's property by the lex Voconia (B.C. 174), in virtue of which a woman could not be a haeres, nor take a legacy greater than that of the haeres, or of all the haeredes together. The object of the law was to prevent the transference of the property of one gens to another on a large scale. It was evaded (1) by trusteeships, Gaius, 2, 274; Plutarch, *Cic.* 41: (2) by the assent of the haeres, Cic. *de Off.* 2, § 55. And it was relaxed by Augustus in favour of mothers of three children, *Dio Cass.* 56, 10. See also Cicero *de Sen.* § 14; *de legg.* 2, 20; *de Rep.* 3, 10; *Verr.* 2, 1, 42; Pliny, *Panegyr.* 42; Livy, *Ep.* 41.

it was bestowed. By his strict chastity, also, he not only saved his purse, but by refraining from many irregular pleasures he gained sound bodily health and a vigorous constitution, which accompanied him through the whole of his life and repaid him with many pleasures, and noble compensations for the immediate pleasures from which he had formerly abstained.

15. Courage, however, is the most important element of character for public life in every country, but especially in Rome: and he therefore was bound to give all his most serious attention to it. In this he was well seconded by Fortune also. For as the Macedonian kings were especially eager about hunting, and the Macedonians devoted the most suitable districts to the preservation of game, these places were carefully guarded during all the war time, as they had been before, and yet had not been hunted the whole of the four years owing to the public disturbances: the consequence was that they were full of every kind of animal. But when the war was decided, Lucius Aemilius, thinking that hunting was the best training for body and courage his young soldiers could have, put the royal huntsmen under the charge of Scipio, and gave him entire authority over all matters connected with the hunting. Scipio accepted the duty, and, looking upon himself as in a quasi-royal position, devoted his whole time to this business, as long as the army remained in Macedonia after the battle of Pydna. Having then ample opportunity for following this kind of pursuit, and being in the very prime of his youth and naturally disposed to it, the taste for hunting which he acquired became permanent. Accordingly when he returned to Rome, and found his taste supported by a corresponding enthusiasm on the part of Polybius, the time that other young men spent in law courts and formal visits,[1] haunting the Forum and endeavouring thereby to ingratiate themselves with the people, Scipio devoted to hunting; and, by continually displaying brilliant and memorable acts of prowess, won a greater

Scipio's physical strength and courage were confirmed by the exercise of hunting in Macedonia,

and his taste continued after his return to Rome, and was encouraged by Polybius.

[1] That is, the morning from daybreak till about ten or eleven. The *salutationes* came first, and the law business in the third hour.

reputation than others, whose only chance of gaining credit was by inflicting some damage on one of their fellow-citizens,—for that was the usual result of these law proceedings. Scipio, on the other hand, without inflicting annoyance on any one, gained a popular reputation for manly courage, rivalling eloquence by action. The result was that in a short time he obtained a more decided superiority of position over his contemporaries, than any Roman is remembered to have done; although he struck out a path for his ambition which, with a view to Roman customs and ideas, was quite different from that of others.

16. I have spoken somewhat at length on the character of Scipio, because I thought that such a story would be agreeable to the older, and useful to the younger among my readers. But especially because I wished to make what I have to tell in my following books appear credible; that no one may feel any difficulty because of the apparent strangeness of what happened to this man; nor deprive him of the credit of achievements which were the natural consequences of his prudence, and attribute them to Fortune and chance. I must now return from this digression to the regular course of my history. . . .

Scipio's subsequent success, therefore, was the natural result of his early conduct, and not the offspring of chance.

17. Thearidas and Stephanus conducted a mission from Athens and the Achaeans on the matter of the reprisals. For when the Delians were ordered, in answer to an embassy to Rome after Delos had been granted to Athens, to depart from the island, but to take all their goods with them, they removed to Achaia; and having been enrolled as citizens of the league, wished to have their claims upon the Athenians decided, according to the convention existing between the Achaeans and Athens. But, on the Athenians denying that they had any right to plead under that agreement, the Delians demanded from the Achaeans license to make reprisals on the Athenians. The latter, therefore, sent an embassy to Rome on these points, and were answered that decisions

The Delians having been allowed to leave their island with "all their property," found many occasions of legal disputes with the Athenians, to whom the island was granted. See 30, 21. They remove to Achaia, and sue the Athenians under the Achaean convention. Roman decision against Athens.

made by the Achaeans according to their laws concerning the Delians were to be binding. . . .

18. The people of Issa having often sent embassies to Rome, complaining that the Dalmatians damaged their territory and the cities subject to them,— meaning thereby Epetium and Tragyrium,—and the Daorsi also bringing similar complaints, the Senate sent a commission under Gaius Fannius to inspect the state of Illyria, with special reference to the Dalmatians. This people had been subject to Pleuratus as long as he was alive; but when he died, and was succeeded on the throne by Genthius, they revolted, overran the bordering territories, and reduced the neighbouring cities, some of which even paid them a tribute of cattle and corn. So Fannius and his colleague started on their mission. . . .

Piracies of the Dalmatians on the island of Issa, B.C. 158.

19. Lyciscus the Aetolian was a factious turbulent agitator, and directly he was killed the Aetolians from that hour lived harmoniously and at peace with each other, simply from the removal of one man. Such decisive influence has character in human affairs, that we find not only armies and cities, but also national leagues and whole divisions of the world, experiencing the greatest miseries and the greatest blessings through the vice or virtue of one man. . . .

Death of Lyciscus.

Though he was a man of the worst character, Lyciscus ended his life by an honourable death; and accordingly, most people with some reason reproach Fortune for sometimes giving to the worst of men what is the prize of the good—an easy death. . . .

20. There was a great change for the better in Aetolia when the civil war was stopped after the death of Lyciscus; and in Boeotia when Mnasippus of Coronea died; and similarly in Acarnania when Chremas was got out of the way. Greece was as though purified by the removal from life of those accursed pests of the country. For in the same year Charops of Epirus chanced to die at Brundisium. Affairs in Epirus had been still in disorder and confusion as before, owing to the cruelty and tyranny of Charops, ever

Death of Charops, B.C. 157.

The tyranny of Charops in Epirus

after the battle of Pydna, B.C. 168-157.

since the end of the war with Perseus. For Lucius Anicius having condemned some of the leading men in the country to death, and transported all others to Rome against whom there was the slightest suspicion, Charops at once got complete power to do what he chose; and thereupon committed every possible act of cruelty, sometimes personally, at others by the agency of his friends: for he was quite a young man himself, and was quickly joined by a crowd of the worst and most unprincipled persons, who gathered round him for the sake of plunder from other people. But what protected him and inclined people to believe that he was acting on a fixed design, and in accordance with the will of the Romans, was his former intimacy with them, and the support of the old man Myrton and his son Nicanor. These two had the character of being men of moderation and on good terms with the Romans; but though up to that time they had been widely removed from all suspicion of injustice, they now gave themselves up wholly to support and share in the lawless acts of Charops. This man, after murdering some openly in the market-place, others in their own houses, others by sending secret assassins to waylay them in the fields or on the roads, and selling the property of all whom he had thus killed, thought of another device. He put up lists of such men and women as were rich, condemning them to exile; and having held out this threat, he extracted money out of them, making the bargain himself with the men, and by the agency of his mother Philotis with the women; for this lady was well suited to the task, and for any act of violence was even more helpful than could have been expected in a woman.

He extorts money from the rich under threat of exile.

21. When he and his mother had thus got all the money they could out of these persons, they none the less caused all the proscribed to be impeached before the people; and the majority in Phoenice, partly from fear and partly induced by the baits held out by Charops and his friends, condemned all thus impeached, for being ill-disposed to Rome, to death instead of banishment. These men, however, fled while

The people of Phoenice terrified or cajoled into supporting him.

Charops visited Rome, whither he went with money, and accompanied by Myrton and Nicanor, wishing to get a seal of approval put to his wickedness by means of the Senate. On that occasion a very honourable proof was given of Roman principles; and a spectacle was displayed exceedingly gratifying to the Greeks residing in Rome, especially the detenus. Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, who was Pontifex Maximus and Princeps Senatus, and Lucius Aemilius, the conqueror of Perseus, a man of the highest credit and influence, learning what had been done by Charops in Epirus, refused to admit him into their houses. This becoming much talked about, the foreign residents in Rome were exceedingly rejoiced, and observed with pleasure that the Romans discountenanced evil. And on Charops being afterwards admitted to the Senate-house, the Senate refused to consent to his demands, but answered that "They would give instructions to commissioners to examine into what had taken place." But when Charops returned home he entirely suppressed this reply; and having written one to suit his own ideas, gave out that the Romans approved of what had been done by him. . . .

Charops goes to Rome, but is forbidden by the leading nobles to enter their houses,

and repudiated by the Senate.

He suppresses the reply of the Senate.

22. King Eumenes was entirely broken in bodily strength, but still maintained his brilliancy of mind. He was a man who in most things was the equal of any king of his time; and in those which were the most important and honourable, was greater and more illustrious than them all. First, he succeeded his father in a kingdom reduced to a very few insignificant cities; and he raised it to the level of the largest dynasties of his day. And it was not chance which contributed to this, or a mere sudden catastrophe, it was his own acuteness, indefatigable industry, and personal labour. Again, he was exceedingly ambitious of establishing a good reputation, and showed it by doing good services to a very large number of cities, and enriching privately a great many men. And in the third place, he had three brothers grown

Death and character of Eumenes, B.C. 159.

He raised his kingdom to the first rank;

was exceedingly bountiful;

up and active, and he kept all four of them loyal to himself, and acting as guards of his person and preservers of the kingdom: and that is a thing of which there are very rare instances in history. . . .

and was loyally served by four brothers.

On succeeding his brother Eumenes on the throne, Attalus at once gave a specimen of his principles and activity by restoring Ariarathes to his kingdom.[1] . . .

Attalus restores Ariarathes.

23. When the envoys under Fannius returned from Illyria, and reported that, so far from the Dalmatians making any restitution to those who asserted that they were being continually wronged by them, they refused even to listen to the commissioners at all, saying that they had nothing to do with the Romans. Besides, they reported that no lodging or entertainment of any sort had been supplied to them; but that the very horses, which they had procured from another city, the Dalmatians had forcibly taken from them; and would have laid violent hands upon themselves, if they had not yielded to necessity and retired as quietly as they could. The Senate listened attentively to the report; they were exceedingly angry at the disobedience and rudeness of the Dalmatians, but their prevailing feeling was that the present time was a suitable one for declaring war against this people for more reasons than one. For, in the first place, the coasts of Illyria towards Italy had been entirely neglected by them ever since they had expelled Demetrius of Pharos; and, in the next place, they did not wish their own citizens to become enervated by a long-continued peace; for it was now the twelfth year since the war with Perseus and the campaigns in Macedonia. They therefore planned that, by declaring war against the Dalmatians, they would at once renew as it were the warlike spirit and enterprise of their own people, and terrify the Illyrians into obedience to their injunctions. Such were the motives of the Romans for going

Fannius and his colleagues roughly treated by the Dalmatians, B.C. 157.

The Senate decide on declaring war with the Dalmatians.

B.C. 168-157.

[1] Ariarathes V. had been expelled his kingdom by Demetrius, who, in consideration of one thousand talents, had assisted his reputed brother Orophernes, who had been palmed off on Ariarathes IV. by his wife, to displace him. The Senate, when eventually appealed to, decided that the two brothers should share the kingdom. Livy, *Ep.* 47; Appian, *Syr.* 47.

to war with the Dalmatians. But to the world at large they gave out that they had determined on war owing to the insults offered to their legates. . . .

24. King Ariarathes arrived in Rome in the course of the summer.[1] And when Sextus Julius Caesar and his colleague had entered on their consulship, the king visited them privately, presenting in his personal appearance a striking picture of the dangers with which he was surrounded. B.C. 157. Coss. Sext. Julius Caesar, L. Aurelius Orestes.

Ambassadors also arrived from Demetrius, headed by Miltiades, prepared to act in two capacities—to defend the conduct of Demetrius in regard to Ariarathes, and to accuse that king with the utmost bitterness. Orophernes also had sent Timotheus and Diogenes to represent him, conveying a crown for Rome, and charged to renew the friendship and alliance of Cappadocia with the Romans; but, above all, to confront Ariarathes, and both to answer his accusations and bring their own against him. In these private interviews Diogenes and Miltiades and their colleagues made a better show, because they were many to one in the controversy; besides their personal appearance was better than that of Ariarathes, for they were at present on the winning side and he had failed. They had also the advantage of him, in making their statement of the case, that they were entirely unscrupulous, and cared nothing whatever about the truth of their words; and what they said could not be confuted, because there was no one to take the other side. So their lying statements easily prevailed, and they thought everything was going as they wished. . . .

25. After reigning for a short time in Cappadocia in utter contempt of the customs of his country, Orophernes introduced the organised debaucheries of Ionia.[2] . . . The evil rule of Orophernes.

[1] Ariarathes arrived in the summer of B.C. 158.

[2] *τὴν Ἰακὴν καὶ τεχνητικὴν ἀσωτίαν.* The translation given above is in accordance with the explanation of Casaubon, who quoted Horace (*Odes* 3, 6, 21), *Motus doceri gaudet Ionicos matura virgo.* Orophernes had been sent to Ionia, when Antiochis had a real son (Ariarathes V.), that he might not set up a claim to the throne. He had been imposed by Antiochis on her husband Ariarathes IV. before she had a real son.

It has happened to not a few, from the desire for increasing their wealth, to lose their life along with their money. It was from being captivated by such passions that Orophernes, king of Cappadocia, perished and was expelled from his kingdom. But having briefly narrated the restoration of this king (Ariarathes), I will now bring back my narrative to its regular course; for at present I have, to the exclusion of Greek affairs, selected from those of Asia the events connected with Cappadocia out of their proper order, because it was impossible to separate the voyage of Ariarathes from Italy from his restoration to his kingdom.[1] I will therefore now go back to the history of Greece during this period, in which a peculiar and extraordinary affair took place in regard to the city of Oropus, of which I will give the whole story from beginning to end, going both backward and forward in point of time, that I may not render the history of an episode which was made up of separate events, and was not on the whole important, still more insignificant and indistinct by relating it under different years. For when an event as a whole does not appear to readers to be worth attention, I cannot certainly expect a student to follow its details scattered at intervals through my history.[2] . . .

For the most part when things go well men generally get on together; but in times of failure, in their annoyance at events, they become sore and irritable with their friends. And this is what happened to Orophernes, when his affairs began

[1] Orophernes was soon deposed, and Ariarathes V. restored, but we have no certain indication when this happened. See 3, 5.

[2] The episode of Oropus here referred to, Polybius's account of which is lost, was made remarkable by the visit of the three philosophers to Rome as ambassadors from Athens. The story, as far as Athens was concerned, is told by Pausanias, 7, 11, 4-7. The Athenians had been much impoverished by the events of the war with Perseus (B.C. 172-168), and had made a raid or raids of some sort upon Oropus. The Oropians appealed to Rome. The Romans referred the assessment of damages to an Achaean court at Sicyon. The Athenians failed to appear before the court at Sicyon, and were condemned by default to a fine of five hundred talents. Thereupon Carneades the Academician, Diogenes the Stoic, and Critolaus the Peripatetic were sent to plead for a remission of a fine which the Athenians were wholly unable to pay. They made a great impression on the Roman youth by their lectures, and Cato urged that they should get their answer and be sent away as soon as possible. The Senate reduced the fine to one hundred talents: but even that the Athenians could not collect; and they seem to have managed to induce the

to take a wrong turn in his relations with Theotimus,—both indulging in mutual recriminations. . . .

26. Ambassadors having arrived from Epirus about this time, sent both from those who were in actual possession of Phoenice and from those who had been banished from it; and both parties having made their statement in presence of each other, the Senate answered that they would give instructions on this point to the commissioners that were about to be sent into Illyria with Gaius Marcius the Consul.[1] . . .

B.C. 156. Coss. L. Cornelius Lentulus, C. Marcius Figulus II.

27. After defeating Attalus, and advancing to Pergamum, Prusias prepared a magnificent sacrifice and brought it to the sacred enclosure of Asclepius, and after offering the victims, and having obtained favourable omens, went back into his camp for that day; but on the next he directed his forces against the Nicephorium, and destroyed all the temples and sacred enclosures, and plundered all the statues of men and the marble images of the gods. Finally he carried off the statue of Asclepius also, an admirably executed work of Phyromachus, and transferred it to his own country,—the very image before which the day before he had poured libations and offered sacrifice; desiring, it would seem, that the god might in every way be propitious and favourable to him. I have spoken of such proceedings before, when discoursing on Philip, as sheer

Prusias, king of Bithynia, attacks Attalus of Pergamum.

5, 11.

Oropians to allow an Athenian garrison to hold Oropus, and to give hostages for their fidelity to the Athenian government. This led to fresh quarrels and an appeal to the Achaean government. The Achaean Strategus, Menalcidas of Sparta, was bribed by a present of ten talents to induce an interference in behalf of Oropus. Thereupon the Athenians withdrew their garrison from Oropus, after pillaging the town, and henceforth took no part in the quarrels which ensued, arising from the demands of Menalcidas for his ten talents; which the Oropians refused to pay, on the ground that he had not helped them as he promised; quarrels which presently centred round the question of the continuance of Sparta in the Achaean league. The date of the original quarrel between Athens and Oropus is not fixed, but the mission of the philosophers was in B.C. 155. See Plutarch, *Cato*, 22; Pliny, *N. H.* 7, 112-113; Aulus Gellius, 6, 14; Cic. *ad Att.* 12, 23; *Tusc.* 4, § 5.

[1] *C. Marcius consul adversus Dalmatas parum prospere primum, postea feliciter pugnavit.* The war was continued in the next year (B.C. 155), and the Dalmatians subdued for the time by the consul P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica. Livy, *Ep.* 47.

insanity. For at one time to offer sacrifice, and endeavour to propitiate heaven by their means, worshipping and uttering the most earnest prayers before holy tables and altars, as Prusias was wont to do, with bendings of the knee and effeminate prostrations, and at the same time to violate these sacred objects and to flout heaven by their destruction,—can we ascribe such conduct to anything but a mind disordered and a spirit lost to sober reason? I am sure this was the case with Prusias: for he led his army off to Elaea, without having performed a single act of manly courage in the course of his attempts on Pergamum, and after treating everything human and divine with petty and effeminate spite. He attempted to take Elaea, and made some assaults upon it; but being unable to effect anything, owing to Sosander, the king's foster-brother, having thrown himself into the town with an army and repelling his assaults, he marched off towards Thyateira. In the course of his march, he plundered the temple of Artemis in the Holy village; and the sacred enclosure of Apollo Cynneius at Temnus[1] likewise he not only plundered but destroyed by fire. After these achievements he returned home, having waged war against the gods as well as against men. But Prusias's infantry also suffered severely from famine and dysentery on their return march, so that the wrath of heaven appears to have quickly visited him for these crimes.[2] . . .

Elaea on the Casius, the port of Pergamum.

28. After his defeat by Prusias Attalus appointed his brother Athenaeus to accompany Publius Lentulus to Rome to inform the Senate of what had happened. At Rome they had not paid much attention when a previous messenger named Andronicus had come from Attalus, with news of the original invasion;

Attalus sends his brother to Rome.

[1] Temnus was in Mysia, s. of the river Hermus. Cynneius or Cyneius Apollo seems to mean Apollo guardian of the shepherd dogs. There was, according to Suidas (s.v. *κυνήειος*), a temple to Apollo at Athens with that title, said to have been the work of Cynnis, a son of Apollo and a nymph Parnethia.

[2] The battle, in which Prusias is here said to have conquered Attalus, was a treacherous attack upon Attalus who was waiting, in accordance with an arrangement made by Roman envoys Hortensius and Arunculeius, to meet Prusias on his frontier, accompanied by only one thousand cavalry. The Roman envoys even had to fly for their lives. Appian, *Mithridates*, 3.

because they suspected that Attalus wished to attack Prusias himself, and was therefore getting up a case against him beforehand, and trying to prejudice him in their eyes by these accusations; and when Nicomedes and some ambassadors from Prusias, headed by Antiphilus, arrived and protested that there was not a word of truth in the statement, the Senate was still more incredulous of what had been said about Prusias. But when after a time the real truth was made known, the Senate still felt uncertain, and sent Lucius Apuleius and Gaius Petronius to investigate what was the state of the case in regard to these two kings.

Prusias had sent his son Nicomedes and some ambassadors to represent his case at Rome.

The Senate send fresh commissioners to investigate.

BOOK XXXIII

1. BEFORE spring this year the Senate, after hearing the report of Publius Lentulus and his colleagues, who had just reached Rome from Asia, in the business of king Prusias, called in Athenaeus also, brother of king Attalus. The matter, however, did not need many words: the Senate promptly appointed Gaius Claudius Cento, Lucius Hortensius, and Gaius Arunculeius, to accompany Athenaeus home, with instructions to prevent Prusias from waging war against Attalus.

B.C. 155. The Roman legate Publius Lentulus, and Athenaeus, brother of Attalus, reach Rome and declare the truth.

Also Xeno of Aegium and Telecles of Tegea arrived as ambassadors from the Achaeans in behalf of the Achaean detenus. After the delivery of their speech, on the question being put to the vote, the Senators only refused the release of the accused persons by a very narrow majority. The man who really prevented the release from being carried was Aulus Postumius, who was praetor, and as such presided in the Senate on that occasion. Three alternatives were proposed — one for an absolute release, another for an absolute refusal, and a third for a postponement of the release for the present. The largest numbers were for the first of these three; but Postumius left out the third, and put the two first to the vote together, release or no release; the result was that those who were originally for the postponement transferred their votes to the party that were against the release, and thus gave a majority against release....

Another embassy in behalf of the Achaean detenus.

It fails by the action of the praetor, who, by putting the question simply "yes" or "no" for release, forced the party who were for postponing it to vote "no."

3.[1] When the ambassadors returned to Achaia with the news

[1] Hultsch places an extract from Aulus Gellius (6, 14, 8) relating to the

that the restoration of all the detenus had been only lost in the Senate by a narrow majority, the people becoming hopeful and elated sent Telecles of Megalopolis and Anaxidamus on a fresh mission at once. That was the state of things in the Peloponnese. . . .

The Achaeans are encouraged to try again.

4. Aristocrates, the general of the Rhodians, was in appearance a man of mark and striking ability; and the Rhodians, judging from this, believed that they had in him a thoroughly adequate leader and guide in the war.[1] But they were disappointed in their expectations: for when he came to the test of experience, like spurious coin when brought to the furnace, he was shown to be a man of quite a different sort. And this was proved by actual facts. . . .

Aristocrates proves a failure in the war with Crete.

5. [Demetrius] offered him five hundred talents if he would surrender Cyprus to him, with other similar advantages and honours from himself if he would do him this service. . . .

Archias, therefore, wishing to betray Cyprus to Demetrius, and being caught in the act and led off to stand his trial, hanged himself with one of the ropes of the awnings in the court. For it is a true proverb that led by their desires "the reckonings of the vain are vain." This man, for instance, imagining that he was going to get five hundred talents, lost what he had already, and his life into the bargain. . . .

6. About this time an unexpected misfortune befell the people of Priene. They had received a deposit of four hundred talents from Orophernes when he got possession of the kingdom; and subsequently when Ariarathes recovered his dominion he demanded the money of them. But they acted like honest men, in my opinion, in declaring that they would deliver it to no one as long as Orophernes was alive, except to the person who deposited it with them; while Ariarathes was thought by many to be committing a breach of equity in demanding a deposit made by another.

Honesty of the people of Priene (in Caria) in preserving the money deposited by Orophernes.

mission of the three philosophers as ch. 2 of this book. The substance is given in the note on p. 466. It is more in place there, as Polybius expressly said that he would give the whole story together (32, 25).

[1] This war appears to have arisen from a treacherous attack of the Cretans upon the island of Siphnos. *Exc. de Virt. et Vit.* p. 588.

However, up to this point, one might perhaps pardon his making the attempt, because he looked upon the money as belonging to his own kingdom; but to push his anger and imperious determination as much farther as he did seems utterly unjustifiable. At the period I refer to, then, he sent troops to pillage the territory of Priene, Attalus assisting and urging him on from the private grudge which he entertained towards the Prienians. After losing many slaves and cattle, some of them being slaughtered close to the city itself, the Prienians, unable to defend themselves, first sent an embassy to the Rhodians, and eventually appealed for protection to Rome. . . .

But he would not listen to the proposal. So it came about that the Prienians, who had great hopes from the possession of so large a sum of money, found themselves entirely disappointed. For they repaid Orophernes his deposit, and, thanks to this same deposit, were unjustly exposed to severe damage at the hands of Ariarathes. . . .

7. This year there came ambassadors also from the people of Marseilles, who had long been suffering from the Ligurians, and at that time were being closely invested by them, while their cities of Antipolis and Nicaea were also subjected to a siege. They, therefore, sent ambassadors to Rome to represent the state of things and beg for help. On their being admitted, the Senate decided to send legates to see personally what was going on, and to endeavour by persuasion to correct the injurious proceedings of the barbarians. . . .

B.C. 155. The Ligurians harass Marseilles and besiege Antibes and Nice.

The peaceful mission failed, and the consul Opimius subdued the Oxybii, a Ligurian tribe, in arms, B.C. 154. *Livy*, Ep. 47.

8. At the same time as the Senate despatched Opimius to the war with the Oxybii, Ptolemy the younger arrived at Rome; and being admitted to the Senate brought an accusation against his brother, laying on him the blame of the attack against his life. He showed the scars of his wounds, and speaking with all the bitterness which they seemed to suggest, moved his hearers

B.C. 154. Coss. Q. Opimius, L. Postumius Albinus. Ptolemy Physcon charges his brother with inciting a plot against his life.

to pity him; and when Neolaidas and Andromachus also came on behalf of the elder Ptolemy, to answer the charges brought by his brother, the Senate refused even to listen to their pleas, having been entirely prepossessed by the accusations of the younger. They commanded them to leave Rome at once; while they assigned five commissioners to the younger, headed by Gnaeus Merula and Lucius Thermus, with a quinquereme for each commissioner, and ordered them to restore Ptolemy (Physcon) to Cyprus; and at the same time sent a circular to their allies in Greece and Asia, granting permission to them to assist in the restoration of Ptolemy. . . .

The Senate refues to hear the ambassadors of Ptolemy Philometor, and send commissioners to restore Physcon to Cyprus.

9. When the commissioners under Hortensius and Arunculeius returned from Pergamum, and reported Prusias's disregard of the orders of the Senate; and how by an act of treachery he had besieged them and Attalus in Pergamum,[1] and had given rein to every kind of violence and lawlessness: the Senate, enraged and offended at what had happened, immediately appointed ten commissioners, headed by Lucius Anicius, Gaius Fannius, and Quintus Fabius Maximus, and sent them out with instructions to put an end to the war, and compel Prusias to indemnify Attalus for the injuries received by him during the war. . . .

Prusias having refused obedience to the former commission (see *supra*, ch. 1), a new commission is sent out with peremptory orders.

10. On the complaint of the ambassadors of Marseilles as to their injuries sustained at the hands of the Ligurians, the Senate at once appointed a commission, consisting of Flaminius, Popilius Laenas, and Lucius Pupius, who sailed with the envoys of Marseilles, and landed in the territory of the Oxybii at the town of Aegitna. The Ligurians, hearing that they were come to bid them raise the siege, descended upon them as they lay at anchor, and prevented the rest from disembarking; but finding Flaminius already disembarked and his baggage landed, they began by

The Ligurians prevent the commissioners from landing, and wound Flaminius who had already landed, and drive him to his ship.

[1] See 32, 27, note.

ordering him to leave the country, and on his refusal they began to plunder his baggage. His slaves and freedmen resisting this, and trying to prevent them, they began to use violence and attacked them with their weapons. When Flaminius came to the rescue of his men they wounded him, and killed two of his servants, and chased the rest down to their ship, so that Flaminius only escaped with his life by cutting away the hawsers and anchors. He was conveyed to Marseilles and his wound attended to with all possible care; but when the Senate was informed of the transaction, it immediately ordered one of the consuls, Quintus Opimius, to lead an army against the Oxybii and Deciatae.[1]

War ordered with the Oxybii and Deciatae, B.C. 154.

11. Having collected his army at Placentia, Quintus Opimius marched over the Apennines and arrived in the territory of the Oxybii; and, pitching his camp on the river Apro, awaited the enemy, being informed that they were mustering their forces and were eager to give him battle. Meanwhile, he advanced to Aegitna, where the ambassadors had been outraged, took the city by assault, and sold its inhabitants as slaves, sending the ringleaders in the outrage to Rome in chains. Having done this, he went to meet the enemy. The Oxybii, convinced that their violence to the ambassadors admitted of no terms being granted them, with all the courage of desperation, and excited to the highest pitch of furious enthusiasm, did not wait to be joined by the Deciatae, but, having collected to the number of about four thousand, rushed to the attack upon their enemy. Quintus was somewhat dismayed at the boldness of their attack, and at the desperate fury of the barbarians; but was encouraged by observing that the enemy were advancing in complete disorder, for he was an experienced soldier and a man of great natural sagacity. He therefore drew out his men, and, after a suitable harangue, advanced at a slow pace towards the enemy. His charge was delivered with great vigour: he quickly repulsed the enemy, killed a great many of them, and forced the rest into headlong flight. Meanwhile,

Opimius orders his soldiers to join at Placentia, and marches into Gaul,

takes Aegitna,

and defeats the Oxybii and Deciatae.

[1] Ligurian tribes between Nice and Marseilles. Pliny, *N. H.* 3. § 47.

the Deciatae had mustered their forces, and appeared on the ground intending to fight side by side with the Oxybii; but finding themselves too late for the battle, they received the fugitives in their ranks, and after a short time charged the Romans with great fury and enthusiasm; but being worsted in the engagement, they immediately all surrendered themselves and their city at discretion to the Romans. Having thus become masters of these tribes, Opimius delivered over their territory on the spot to the people of Marseilles, and for the future forced the Ligurians to give hostages at certain fixed intervals to the Marsilians. He then deprived the tribes that had fought with them of their arms, and divided his army among the cities there for the winter, and himself took up his winter quarters in the country. Thus the war had a conclusion as rapid as its commencement. . . .

Opimius winters in Gaul, B.C. 154-153.

12. All the previous winter Attalus had been busy collecting a large army, Ariarathes and Mithridates having sent him a force of cavalry and infantry, in accordance with the terms of their alliance with him. While he was still engaged in these preparations the ten commissioners arrived from Rome: who, after meeting and conferring with him at Cadi about the business, started to visit Prusias, to whom on meeting him they explained the orders of the Senate in terms of serious warning. Prusias at once yielded to some of the injunctions, but refused to submit to the greater part. The Romans grew angry, renounced his friendship and alliance, and one and all started to return to Attalus. Thereupon Prusias repented; followed them a certain distance with vehement entreaties; but, failing to gain any concession, left them in a state of great doubt and embarrassment. The Romans, on their return to Attalus, bade him station himself with his army on his own frontier, and not to begin the war himself, but to provide for the security of the towns and villages in his territory: while they divided themselves, one party sailing home with all speed to announce to the Senate the disobedience of Prusias; another

The commissioners visit Attalus and Prusias early in B.C. 154.

Prusias will not yield till too late.

The Romans promote a combination against Prusias.

departing for Ionia; and a third to the Hellespont and the ports about Byzantium, all with one and the same purpose, namely, to detach the inhabitants from friendship and alliance with Prusias, and to persuade them to adhere to Attalus and assist him to the best of their power. . . .

Summer of B.C. 154. Attalus's brother Athenaeus harasses the coast of Prusias's kingdom.

13. At the same time Athenaeus set sail with eighty decked ships, of which five were quadriremes sent by the Rhodians for the Cretan war, twenty from Cyzicus, twenty-seven Attalus's own, and the rest contributed by the other allies. Having sailed to the Hellespont, and reached the cities subject to Prusias, he made frequent descents upon the coast, and greatly harassed the country. But when the Senate heard the report of the commissioners who had returned from Prusias, they immediately despatched three new ones, Appius Claudius, Lucius Oppius, and Aulus Postumius: who, on arriving in Asia, put an end to the war by bringing the two kings to make peace, on condition of Prusias at once handing over to Attalus twenty decked ships, and paying him five hundred talents in twenty years, both retaining the territory which they had at the commencement of the war. Farther, that Prusias should make good the damage done to the inhabitants of Methymna, Aegae, Cymae, Heracleia, by a payment of a hundred talents to those towns. The treaty having been drawn out in writing on those terms, Attalus withdrew his army and navy to his own country. Such are the particulars of the events which took place in the quarrel between Attalus and Prusias. . . .

B.C. 153. Another fruitless embassy from Achaia.

14. An embassy again coming to Rome from Achaia in behalf of the detenus, the Senate voted to make no change. . . .

Heracleides brings to Rome Laodice, daughter of Antiochus Epiphanes, and his supposed son Alexander Balas.

15. Heracleides came to Rome in the middle of summer, bringing Laodice and Alexander, and stayed there a long time, employing all the arts of cunning and corruption to win the support of the Senate. . . .

Astymedes of Rhodes being appointed ambassador and

navarch at the same time, came forward immediately and addressed the Senate on the war with Crete. The Senate listened with attention, and immediately appointed Quintus at the head of a commission to put an end to the war. . . .

The quarrel of Rhodes and Crete.

16. This year the Cretans sent Antiphatas, son of Telamnestus of Gortyn, with envoys to the Achaeans asking for help, and the Rhodians sent Theophanes with a similar mission. The Congress of the Achaeans was that year at Corinth: and on each body of ambassadors pleading their respective causes, the assembled people were more inclined towards the Rhodians, from respect to the reputation of their state, and the general character of their policy and statesmen. When Antiphatas saw this, he wished to come forward to make another speech; and, having obtained permission from the Strategus to do so, he spoke in weightier and more exalted terms than might be expected from a Cretan; for, in fact, the young man was in no way of the ordinary Cretan type, but had shunned the characteristic principles of his countrymen. Accordingly the Achaeans received his plain speaking with favour; and still more for the sake of his father Telamnestus, who had taken a spirited part with them at the head of five hundred Cretans in their war against Nabis. However, none the less for that, after listening to him they were still inclined to aid the Rhodians, until Callicrates of Leontium stood up and said that they ought not to go to war in favour of either, or to send aid to either of the two peoples without the consent of the Romans. This argument decided them in favour of non-intervention. . . .

The Achaeans decline to help either Rhodes or Crete, although inclined to support Rhodes.

17. Dispirited with the course things were taking, the Rhodians entered upon some measures and designs which were strange and unreasonable. In fact, they were much in the same state as men suffering from chronic diseases. It frequently happens that such men, when, in spite of following all the rules of medicine and obeying the prescriptions of the doctors, they are unable to make any advance towards improvement, give up all such efforts in despair, and either listen wholly to priests and seers, or try every sort of charm or

amulet. So it was with the Rhodians. When their hopes were baffled in every direction, they were reduced to listen to every kind of suggestion, and to magnify and accept every kind of chance. Nor was this unnatural. For when nothing dictated by reason proves successful, and yet some action or another must necessarily be pushed on, there is no alternative but to try something which does not depend on reason. The Rhodians, having come to this dilemma, acted accordingly; and, among other things that were in defiance of reason, re-elected as their archon a man of whom they disapproved. . . .

B.C. 152. Visit of the young Attalus, son of the late king Eumenes.

18. Many different embassies having come to Rome, the Senate admitted Attalus,[1] son of king Eumenes I. For he had arrived at Rome at this time, still quite a young boy, to be introduced to the Senate, and to renew in his person the ancestral friendship and connexion with the Romans. After a kindly reception by the Senate and his father's friends, and after receiving the answer which he desired, and such honours as suited his time of life, he returned to his native land, meeting with a warm and liberal reception in all the Greek cities through which he passed on his return journey. Demetrius also came at this time, and, after receiving a fairly good reception for a boy, returned home.

Demetrius, son of Ariarathes VI.

Laodice and Alexander Balas. See ch. 15.

Then Heracleides entered the Senate, bringing Laodicę and Alexander with him. The youthful Alexander first addressed the Senate, and begged the Romans "to remember their friendship and alliance with his father Antiochus, and if possible to assist him to recover his kingdom; or if they could not do that, at least to give him leave to return home, and not to hinder those who wished to assist him in recovering his ancestral crown." Heracleides then took up the word, and, after delivering a lengthy encomium on Antiochus, came to the same point, namely, that they ought in justice to grant the young prince and Laodice leave to return and claim their own, as they were the true-born children of Antiochus. Sober-

[1] Surnamed Philometor. He succeeded his uncle Attalus Philadelphus in B.C. 138, and at his death in B.C. 133 left his dominions to Rome.

minded people were not all attracted by any of these arguments. They understood the meaning of this theatrical exhibition, and made no secret of their distaste for Heracleides. But the majority had fallen under the spell of Heracleides's cunning, and were induced to pass the following decree: "Alexander and Laodice, children of a king, our friend and ally, appeared before the Senate and stated their case; and the Senate gave them authority to return to the kingdom of their forefathers; and help, in accordance with their request, is hereby decreed to them." Seizing on this pretext, Heracleides immediately began hiring mercenaries, and calling on some men of high position to assist him. He accordingly went to Ephesus and devoted himself to the preparations for his attempt.[1] . . .

The Senate's decree in favour of Alexander and Laodice.

19. Demetrius, who, when residing as a hostage at Rome, had fled and become king in Syria, was a man so much addicted to drunkenness that he spent the greater part of the day in drinking. . . .

Demetrius's intemperance.

20. When once the multitude feel the impulse to violent love or hatred of any one, any pretext is good enough for indulging their feelings. . . .

However, I am afraid I may fall under the common dilemma, "Which is the greater fool, the man who milks a he-goat, or the man who holds a sieve to catch the milk?" For I seem to be doing something of this sort in arguing and writing an essay on what every one acknowledges to be false. It is, then, waste time to speak of such things, unless one cares to write down dreams, or look at dreams with one's eyes open. . . .

[1] Alexander Balas was an impostor of low origin set up by Heracleides as a son of Antiochus Epiphanes. He entered Syria in B.C. 152, defeated and killed Demetrius in B.C. 150, and was himself defeated in B.C. 146 by Ptolemy Philometor (who also fell) in favour of a son of Demetrius, and was shortly afterwards murdered. Livy, *Ep.* 52. Appian, *Syr.* 67; Joseph. *Antiq.* 13, 2, 4.

BOOK XXXIV

GEOGRAPHICAL FRAGMENTS

Polybius devoted one book of his history to a separate treatise on the geography of the continents. Strabo, 9, 1, 1.

1. In their Greek histories Eudoxus gave a good, but Ephorus the best, account of the foundations, blood connexions, migrations, and founders of states; but I shall now give some information on the position of countries and their distances, which are the subjects most properly belonging to the science of Geography. . . .

Homer true to nature.

2. It is not Homer's manner to indulge in mere mythological stories founded on no substratum of truth. For there is no surer way of giving an air of verisimilitude to fiction than to mix with it some particles of truth. And this is the case with the tale of the wanderings of Odysseus. . . .

For instance, Aeolus, who taught the way of getting through the straits, where there are currents setting both ways, and the passage is rendered difficult by the indraught of the sea, came to be called and regarded as the dispenser and king of the winds; just as Danaus, again, who discovered the storages of water in Argos, and Atreus, who discovered the fact of the sun's revolution being in the opposite direction to that of the heaven, were called seers and priest-kings. So the priests of the Egyptians, the Chaldeans, and the Magi, being superior to the rest of the world in wisdom, obtained rule and honour in former generations. And on this principle, too, each one of the gods is honoured as the inventor of something useful to man. I do not allow therefore that Aeolus is wholly mythical, nor the wanderings of Odysseus generally. Some mythical elements have been undoubtedly added, as they have in the War of

Ilium; but the general account of Sicily given by the poet agrees with that of other historians who have given topographical details of Italy and Sicily. I cannot agree therefore with the remark of Eratosthenes that "we shall discover where Odysseus wandered, when we find the cobbler who sewed up the leather bag of the winds." See for instance how Homer's description of Scylla agrees with what really happens at the Scyllaean rock, and the taking of the sword fish :[1]

> "And there she fishes, roaming round the rock,
> For dog-fish and for dolphins, or what else
> Of huger she may take that swims the sea."

For the fact is that tunnies swimming in great shoals along the Italian coast, if they are drifted from their course and are prevented from reaching Sicily, fall a prey to the larger fish, such as dolphins, dog-fish, or other marine monsters; and from hunting these the sword-fish (called also xiphiae, or sometimes sea-dogs) are fattened. The same thing happens at a rise of the Nile, and other rivers, as in the case of a fire or a burning forest; the animals crowd together, and, in their effort to escape the fire or the water, fall a prey to stronger animals.

Fishing for sword-fish.

3. Fishing for sword-fish at the Scyllaean rock is carried on in this way. A number of men lie in wait, two each in small two-oared boats, and one man is set to look out for them all. In the boat one man rows, while the other stands on the prow holding a spear. When the look-out man signals the appearance of a sword-fish (for the animal swims with one-third of its body above water), the boat rows up to it, and the man with the spear strikes it at close quarters, and then pulls the spear-shaft away leaving the harpoon in the fish's body; for it is barbed and loosely fastened to the shaft on purpose, and has a long rope attached to it. They then slacken the rope for the wounded fish, until it is wearied out with its convulsive struggles and attempts to escape, and then they haul it on to land, or, if its size is not too great, into the boat. And if the spear-shaft falls into the sea it is not lost; for being made of two pieces, one oak and the other pine, the oak end as the heavier dips under water, the

[1] *Odyss.* 12, 95.

other end rises above it and is easily got hold of. But sometimes it happens that the man rowing is wounded, right through the boat, by the immense size of the animal's sword; for it charges like a boar, and hunting the one is very like hunting the other.

This would lead us to conjecture that the wandering described by Homer was near Sicily, because he has assigned to Scylla the kind of fishing which is indigenous to the Scyllaean rock; and because what he says of Charybdis correctly describes what does happen in the Straits. But the

"Thrice sends she up the darksome tide,"

Island of Meninx, off the lesser Syrtis. See 1, 39.

instead of twice "a day," is an error to be ascribed to the copyist or the geographer.[1] So also Meninx answers to his description of the Lotophagi.

4. Or if there are some points which do not answer, we must lay the blame on ignorance or poetic licence, which uses real history, picturesque detail, and mythological allusion. The object of history is truth, as when in the catalogue of ships the poet describes the features of the several localities, calling one city "rocky," another "frontier-placed," another "with wealth of doves," or "hard by the sea." But the object of picturesque detail is vividness, as when he introduces men fighting; and that of mythological allusion is to give pleasure or rouse wonder. But a narrative wholly fictitious creates no illusion and is not Homeric. For all look upon his poetry as a philosophical work; and Eratosthenes is wrong in bidding us not judge his poems with a view to having any serious meaning, or to seek for history in them.

It is better, again, to take the line[2]

"Thence for nine days the foul winds drave us on,"

to mean that he made but a short distance—for foul winds do not favour a straight course—than to imagine him to have got into the open ocean as running before favouring winds. The distance from Malea to the Pillars is twenty-two thousand five hundred stades. If we suppose this to have been accomplished

[1] *Odyss.* 12, 105. [2] *Odyss.* 9, 82.

at an even speed in the nine days, he would make two thousand five hundred stades a day. Now, who has ever asserted that any one made the voyage from Lycia or Rhodes to Alexandria in four days, a distance of four thousand stades?

To those who ask how it was that Odysseus, though he came to Sicily three times, never once went through the straits, I answer that all subsequent sailors avoided that passage also. . . .

5. In treating of the geography of Europe I shall say nothing of the ancient geographers, but shall confine my attention to their modern critics, Dicaearchus, Eratosthenes, who is the most recent writer on geography, and Pytheas, who has misled many readers by professing to have traversed on foot the whole of Britain, the coastline of which island, he says, is more than forty thousand stades. And again by his stories of Thule and the countries in its neighbourhood, "in which," he says, "there is neither unmixed land or sea or air, but a kind of compound of all three (like the jelly-fish or Pulmo Marinus), in which earth and sea and everything else are held in suspense, and which forms a kind of connecting link to the whole, through which one can neither walk nor sail." This substance, which he says is like the Pulmo Marinus, he saw with his own eyes, the rest he learnt by report. Such is Pytheas's story, and he adds that, on his return thence, he traversed the whole of the coast of Europe from Gades to the Tanais. But we cannot believe that a private person, who was also a poor man, should have made such immense journeys by land and sea. Even Eratosthenes doubted this part of his story, though he believed what he said about Britain, and Gades, and Iberia. I would much rather believe the Messenian (Euhemerus) than him. The latter is content with saying that he sailed to one country which he calls Panchaia;[1] while the former asserts that he has actually seen the whole northern coast of Europe up to the

Cadiz to the Don.

[1] Panchaia or Panchēa, the fabulous island or country in the Red Sea or Arabian gulf, in which Euhemerus asserted that he had discovered the inscriptions which proved the reputed gods to have been famous generals or kings. Plutarch, *Is. et Osir.* 23, Diodor. fr. 6, 1. The Roman poets used the word as equivalent to "Arabian." See Verg. *Georg.* 2, 139.

very verge of the world, which one would hardly believe of Hermes himself if he said it. Eratosthenes calls Euhemerus a Bergaean,[1] yet believes Pytheas, though Dicaearchus himself did not.[2] . . . Eratosthenes and Dicaearchus give mere popular guesses as to distances.

6. For instance, Dicaearchus says that the distance from the Peloponnese to the Pillars is ten thousand stades and still further to the head of the Adriatic; and from the Peloponnesus to the Sicilian straits three thousand; and therefore the remainder, from the Straits to the Pillars, is seven thousand stades. I say nothing about the three thousand stades, whether they are right or wrong; but the seven thousand cannot be made out, whether you measure along the coast or straight across the sea. The coast route is a kind of obtuse angle, contained by two lines resting on the straits and the pillars respectively; so that we have a triangle, of which the apex is Narbo, and the base the straight line representing the course by the open sea; of the two sides of the triangle which contain the obtuse angle, that which extends from the straits to Narbo is more than eleven thousand two hundred stades, the other from Narbo to the Pillars is a little under eight thousand. The longest distance from Europe to Libya across the Tuscan sea is allowed to be not more than three thousand stades, that by the Sardinian sea is somewhat less; but let us call it three thousand stades. Now suppose a perpendicular let down through the gulf of Narbo to the base of the triangle, that is to the straight sea-course, measuring two thousand stades; it requires only a schoolboy's geometry to prove that the coasting voyage is longer than the direct sea voyage by nearly five hundred stades.[3] And when the three thousand stades from the

[1] That is "as great a liar as Antiphanes of Berga." See below. Strabo classes Antiphanes with Pytheas and Euhemerus more than once (see 2, 3, 5). Hence came the verb *βεργάζειν*, "to tell travellers' tales" (Steph. *Byz.*). But there is considerable doubt as to the identification of the traveller Antiphanes, some confounding him with a comic poet of the same name, and others with the author of an essay *περὶ ἑταιρῶν*. Berga was in the valley of the Strymon.

[2] Strabo here protests against Dicaearchus being treated as a standard of geographical truth. For Pytheas see Appendix.

[3] Polybius proves his point by the demonstration of the proposition "The

Peloponnese to the straits are added, the whole number of the stades even of the straight sea course will be more than double Dicaearchus's reckoning. And if we measure to the head of the Adriatic we must add still more by his own admission; that is to say, from the Peloponnese to Leucas is seven hundred stades, from Leucas to Corcyra seven hundred, from Corcyra to Ceraunia seven hundred, and from Ceraunia along the Illyrian coast six thousand one hundred and fifty.[1]

In talking such nonsense he might well be regarded as having gone beyond even Antiphanes of Berga, and, in fact, to have left no folly for his successors to commit. . . .

7. From Ithaca to Corcyra is more than nine hundred stades; from Epidamnus to Thessalonica more than two thousand. From Marseilles to the Pillars is more than nine thousand; from the Pyrenees, rather less than eight thousand. . . . The Pagus from source to mouth is eight thousand, not following its windings, but taking a direct line. . . . Eratosthenes is quite ignorant of the geography of Iberia, and sometimes makes statements about it entirely contradictory. He says, for instance, that its western coast as far as Gades is inhabited by Gauls, since the whole western side of Europe, as far south as Gades, is occupied by that

square of the hypotenuse of a right-angled-triangle is equal to the squares of the sides containing the right angle."



By applying this principle AD = 7745.9 . . and DC = 11019.9 . ., and the whole AC = 18765.8; whereas AB + BC (*i.e.* the coasting voyage) = 19200 stades (a difference of 434.2 stades, not 500). Add to this the 3000 from the Peloponnese to the Straits, the total coast voyage is 22,200 stades, as against Dicaearchus's 10,000.

[1] Strabo quotes this reckoning of the distance from the Peloponnese to the head of the Adriatic to prove that Polybius, on his own showing, is wrong in admitting that this distance (8250 stades) is greater than that from the Peloponnese to the Pillars, which Dicaearchus said was 10,000 stades, and which Polybius showed to be 18,765 stades by the shortest route.

people: and then, quite forgetting he has said this, when taking a survey of the whole of Spain, he nowhere mentions the Gauls. . . . The length of Europe is less than that of Libya and Asia put together by the distance between the sunrise in summer and at the point of the equinox; for the source of the Tanais is at the former, and the Pillars are at the western equinox, and between them lies Europe, while Asia occupies the northern semicircle between the Tanais and equinoctial sunrise. . . .

Polybius's fivefold division of the European peninsulas, as opposed to the threefold division of Eratosthenes.

Southern Europe is divided into five peninsulas—Iberia; Italy; a third ending in the Capes Malea and Sunium, in which are included Greece and Illyria, and a part of Thrace; a fourth called the Thracian Chersonese, bounded by the strait between Sestos and Abydos; and a fifth along the Cimmerian Bosphorus and the entrance to the Maeotis. . . .

8. In the sea off Lusitania acorn-bearing oaks grow, upon which the tunnies feed and fatten themselves, which may, therefore, well be called sea-hogs, as they feed like hogs on acorns. . . .

These acorns are sometimes carried by the tide as far as the coast of Latium, unless they may be thought to be the produce of Sardinia or neighbouring islands. . . .

In Lusitania both animals and man are extraordinarily productive, owing to the excellent temperature of the air; the fruits never wither; there is not more than three months in the year in which roses, white violets (or gilly-flowers), and asparagus do not grow; while the fish caught in its sea is far superior to what is found in our waters for quantity, quality, and beauty. There, too, a Sicilian medimnus of barley is sold for a drachma, and one of wheat for nine Alexandrine obols. A metreta of wine costs a drachma, and a good kid or hare an obol, and a lamb from three to four obols; a fat pig weighing a hundred minae costs five drachmae, and a sheep two. A talent of figs is sold for three obols, a calf for five drachmae, a draught-ox for ten. The flesh of wild animals is not thought worth fixing a price upon at all, but the people give it to each other for nothing and as a present.[1] . . .

[1] To enable the reader to follow this list of prices, a short table is here sub-

9. The Turduli live on the immediate north of the Turdetani. . . . Tribes in Boetica.

The fertility of their country has had a civilising influence on the Turditani and on their Celtic kinsfolk, and taught them the art of social life. . . .

The Pillars are at either side of the straits. . . .

There is a fountain in the Heracleum at Gades, the water of which is sweet and is reached by steps. This fountain has a tide which rises and falls exactly in the reverse order of the sea tide. When it is high tide at sea it is low tide in the fountain, and high in the fountain when it is low at sea. The explanation of this is that the wind, which rises from the bowels of the earth to the surface, is prevented from finding its natural egress when the earth is covered with water at the rise of the tide, and being thus turned back into the interior of the earth, it stops up the underground channels of the fountain and produces a deficiency of water; but when the earth is again uncovered, the wind having once more found an easy egress, sets the veins of the fountain free again, and the water spurts up freely. . . . A tidal spring at Gades.

There are very large silver mines about twenty stades from New Carthage, extending to a circuit of four hundred stades, in which forty thousand men are continually employed, who produce for the benefit of the Roman people twenty-five thousand drachmae a day. It would take too long to describe the whole process of working them, but I may mention that the alluvial soil containing the silver ore is first broken up, and sifted in sieves held in water; that then the deposit is again broken, and being again filtered with running The process of producing silver in the mines near New Carthage.

joined of Greek weights and money,—though he must be warned that values varied at different times and places,—with approximate values in English weights and money.

1 obol	$= \frac{1}{10}$ oz.	= $\frac{1}{8}$ shilling.	
6 obols	= 1 drachma =	$\frac{3}{5}$ oz. . . .	9d.
100 drachmae	= 1 mina	= $15\frac{1}{2}$ oz. . . .	£3 : 18 : 6.
60 minae	= 1 talent	= 57 lbs. . . .	£235.

A medimnus = 11 gals. 4 pts. (dry measure).
A metreta = 8 gals. 5 pts. (liquid measure).

water, is broken a third time. This is done five times; the fifth deposit is smelted, and, the lead having been run off, pure silver remains. . . .

The Guadiana and Guadalquivir.

The Anas and Boetis both flow from Celtiberia, their streams being about nine hundred stades apart. . . .

Among other cities of the Vaccaei and Celtiberians are Segesama and Intercatia. . . .

Homer, *Odyss.* 8, 248.

One of the Iberian kings had such a magnificent and richly furnished palace, that he rivalled the luxury of the Phaeacians, except that the vessels standing in the interior of the house, though made of gold and silver, were full of barley-wine. . . .

10. From the Pyrenees to the river Narbo the country is flat; and through it flow the Illeberis and Ruscinus, past some cities of the same name inhabited by Celts. In this plain there are found what are called underground fish. The soil is light, and produces a quantity of grass called *agrostis*; and below this soil the earth is sandy for a depth of two or three cubits, through which the overflow of the river percolates; and with this water, as it makes its way, the fish also get below the soil to feed, for they are exceedingly fond of the root of the *agrostis*, and have thus made the whole plain full of subterranean fish, which people dig up and take. . . .

River Aude. The Tech and the Ruscino or Tet.

A mistake of Timaeus as to the Rhone.

The Rhone has not five, but two mouths. . . .

The Liger discharges itself between the Pictŏnes and Namnitae. There was in ancient times an emporium on this river called Corbilo, but none of its inhabitants, nor those of Massalia or Narbo, could give Scipio[1] any information worth mentioning on the subject of Britain when questioned by him, though they were the most important cities in that part of the country; and yet Pytheas has ventured on all those stories about it. . . .

The Loire between Poitou and Nantes. Coiron.

Britain is quite unknown to the southern Gauls.

[1] Which member of the Cornelian gens this was is unknown. He appears to have been at Marseilles in the 4th century B.C. inquiring as to centres of trade open to Rome in rivalry with Carthage.

An animal is produced on the Alps of a peculiar form; its shape is that of a stag except its neck and coat, which resemble that of a he-goat. Beneath its chin it has an excrescence about a span long, hairy at the end, about as thick as a colt's tail. . . . The Elk.

Near Aquileia, in the territory of the Noric Taurisci, in my own time a gold mine was discovered, so easy to work, that by scraping away the surface soil for two feet, gold could be found immediately. The seam of gold was not more than fifteen feet; some of it was found unmixed with alloy in nuggets of the size of a bean or lupine, only an eighth of it disappearing in the furnace; and some wanted more elaborate smelting, but would still pay thoroughly well. Accordingly, on the Italians joining the barbarians in working this mine, in two months the price of gold went down a third throughout Italy: and when the Taurisci found out that, they expelled their Italian fellow-workers and kept the monopoly themselves. . . . A gold mine near Aquileia.

If we compare the mountains in Greece—Taygetus, Lycaeus, Parnassus, Olympus, Pelion, Ossa, and those in Thrace—Haemus, Rhodope, Dunax, with the Alps, we may state the case thus. Each one of the former may be ascended or skirted by an active traveller in a single day; but no one could ascend the Alps even in five days, the distance from the plain being two thousand two hundred stades. There are but four passes, one through Liguria, nearest the Tyrrhenian Sea; the next through the Taurini, which was the one used by Hannibal; the third through the Salassi; and the last by the Rhaeti,[1] all of them excessively precipitous. The four passes of the Alps,—the Cornice, Argentière, Genèvre (Val d'Aosta), Cenis.

There are several lakes in the mountains, three of great size, the Benacus, five hundred by one hundred and thirty stades, out of which the Mincius flows; the Larius, four hundred stades long, and somewhat narrower than the Benacus, discharging the Addua; and thirdly, the Verbanus, about three hundred stades by thirty, from which comes a con- Lago di Garda, Lago di Como. Lago Maggiore.

[1] Varro (*Serv. ad Æn.* 10, 13) adds a fifth by the Graian Alps, *i.e.* Little St. Bernard.

siderable river—the Ticinus. All these three rivers discharge themselves into the Padus. . . .

11. There is an excellent wine made at Capua called *Anadendrites*, or the "wine of the climbing vine," with which no other can compare. . . .

Capuan wine.

The length of the coast from Iapygia to the straits is three thousand stades by land, and it is washed by the Sicilian sea. Sailing, however, the distance is less than five hundred stades. . . .

The largest distance of the Etrurian coast is from Luna to Ostia, a distance of one thousand three hundred and thirty stades.[1] . . .

The island Lemnos is called Aethaleia. . . .

The bay between the two promontories of Misenum and Minerva is called the Crater (the Bowl). Above this coast lies the whole of Campania, the most fertile plain in the country. Round the Bowl live the Opici and the Ausones. . . .

The Bay of Naples.

Eastern coast-road from S. to N. of Italy.

The north road from Iapygia has been marked out with miles, five hundred and sixty to Sena, and one hundred and seventy thence to Aquileia. . . .

Then comes Lacinium . . . from the straits to this place is a distance of one thousand three hundred stades, and thence to the Iapygian promontory seven hundred. . . .

The Lacinian promontory.

Of the three craters one has partly fallen in, the other two remain perfect. The largest has a circular orifice with a circumference of five stades, but it gradually contracts to a diameter of fifty feet; it runs right down to the sea for a stade, so that the sea is visible in clear weather. When a south wind is about to blow, a thick mist envelopes the little island, so that even Sicily is invisible from it: but if there is going to be a north wind, bright flames rise from the crater and shoot up high, and louder rumblings are emitted; but a west wind causes a medium display of both. The other two craters are of the same shape, but their eruptions are less violent. From the

The craters in the volcanic Holy Island one of the Lipari group.

[1] Strabo corrects this, saying that the distance is 3000 stades.

difference in the sound of the rumbling, and by observing from what point the eruptions and flames and smoke begin, the wind which is to blow on the third day from that time can be foretold. At least, some men in the Lipari Islands when weather-bound have foretold what wind was coming and have not been deceived. Therefore, it appears that Homer did not speak without meaning, but was stating a truth allegorically when he called Aeolus [1] "steward of the winds." . . .

12. The road from Apollonia to Macedonia is called the *Via Egnatia*, which has been measured in miles and marked out with milestones as far as Cypselus and the River Hebrus, a distance of five hundred and thirty-five miles. Reckoning eight and one-third stades to a mile, the number of stades will be four thousand four hundred and fifty-eight.[2] The distance is exactly the same whether you start from Apollonia or Epidamnus. The whole road is called the Egnatia, but its first part has got a name from Candavia, a mountain of Illyria, and leads through the town of Lycnidus, and through Pylon, which is the point on the road where Illyria and Macedonia join. Thence it leads over Mount Barnūs, through Heracleia, Lyncestia, and Eordea, to Edessa and Pella, and finally to Thessalonica; and the number of miles is altogether two hundred and sixty-seven. . . . And the whole distance from the Ionian Gulf at Apollonia to Byzantium is seven thousand five hundred stades. . . .

The *Via Egnatia*.

Thessalonica half-way to the Hebrus from Apollonia.

The circumference of the Peloponnesus, if you do not follow the indentations, is four thousand stades. . . .

The Peloponnesus.

The distance from Cape Malea to the Ister is ten thousand stades.[3] . . .

From C. Malea to the Danube.

[1] The islands were called also *Vulcaniae* and *Aeoliae*.

[2] Strabo reckons 8 stades to a mile, thus making the number of stades 4280. The exact calculation by Polybius's reckoning is 4458⅓ stades. The miles are Roman miles of 5000 feet; therefore, by Strabo's calculation, the stade is 625 feet, by Polybius's 600 feet.

[3] Strabo, however, supports the measurement of Artemidorus—6500, explaining that Polybius is taking some practical measurement of a voyage, not the shortest.

13. On matters concerning the country between the Euphrates and India, Eratosthenes is a better authority than Artemidorus. . . .

State of Alexandria.

14. A personal visit to Alexandria filled me with disgust at the state of the city. It is inhabited by three distinct races,—native Egyptians, an acute and civilised race; secondly, mercenary soldiers (for the custom of hiring and supporting men-at-arms is an ancient one), who have learnt to rule rather than obey owing to the feeble character of the kings; and a third class, consisting of native Alexandrians, who have never from the same cause become properly accustomed to civil life, but who are yet better than the second class; for though they are now a mongrel race, yet they were originally Greek, and have retained some recollection of Greek principles. But this last class has become almost extinct, thanks to Euergetes Physcon, in whose reign I visited Alexandria; for that king being troubled with seditions, frequently exposed the common people to the fury of the soldiery and caused their destruction. So that in this state of the city the poet's words only expressed the truth—[1]

"To Egypt 'tis a long and toilsome road."

[1] Homer, *Odyss.* 4, 485.

BOOK XXXV

SPAIN, the eastern and southern parts of which were, since the 2d Punic war, governed by the Romans under a kind of military occupation without being reduced to the form of regular provinces, was always in a disturbed state, partly from sudden uprisings of various tribes against the Roman authority, and partly from numerous bodies of banditti, who seized strongholds or fortified towns and carried on their depredations from these centres. Hence it had been the policy of the Roman praetors and consuls to insist on the demolition of fortresses and city walls, as we learn from the accounts of Cato in B.C. 195 and others. In B.C. 177 Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus had inflicted a severe defeat upon the Celtiberians, and had made a settlement of the country, which for a few years produced comparative quiet and content. But in B.C. 154 an outbreak of the Lusitani led to a considerable disaster to the Roman army under Lucius Mummius; and when the consul Q. Fulvius Nobilior arrived in B.C. 153, he found that the war had accordingly spread to the Celtiberian tribes, the Belli and Titthi, who attempted to build the walls of Segeda. On Nobilior ordering them to desist, in accordance with Gracchan settlement, most of them obeyed after some resistance, but some of them fled to the Arevacae (near the sources of the Douro and Tagus); and this powerful tribe, after defeating the Roman army, entrenched themselves in Numantia, under the walls of which Nobilior sustained further losses. He was superseded in B.C. 152 by Marcus Claudius Marcellus, who, partly by strategy, and partly by administrative skill and conciliation, restored the Roman fortunes to a better position. The Belli and Titthi became allies of Rome, and the Arevacae at least thought it worth while to ask for a truce to enable them to send envoys to Rome to arrange peace.—Appian, *Hispan.* 44-50.

B.C. 153-151. The war with the Celtiberian Arevacae conducted by Q. Fulvius Nobilior and M. Claudius Marcellus.

1. The war between the Romans and Celtiberians was called the "fiery war;" for it was of a peculiarly fierce kind and remarkable for the frequency of its battles. The wars in Greece and Asia were as a rule settled by one battle, or in rare cases by two; and the battles themselves were decided by the result of the first charge and shock of the two armies. But in this war

things were quite different. As a rule the battles were only stopped by the fall of night; the men neither lost heart nor would yield to bodily fatigue; but returned again and again with fresh resolution to renew the combat. The whole war, and its series of pitched battles, was at length interrupted for a time by the winter. One therefore could hardly conceive a war more nearly answering to our notion of a "fiery war" than this. . . .

M. Claudius Marcellus winters at Cordova, B.C. 152-151.

2. The Celtiberians, after making a truce with the consul M. Claudius Marcellus, had sent ambassadors to Rome who remained there quietly waiting for the answer of the Senate. Meanwhile M. Claudius went on an expedition against the Lusitani, took Nercobrica by assault, and then went into winter quarters at Corduba. Of the ambassadors who came to Rome the Senate admitted those from the Belli and Titthi, who were on the side of Rome, to enter the city; but ordered those from the Arevacae to lodge on the other side of the Tiber, as being at war with Rome, until such time as the Senate should have decided the whole question. When the time for the interview was come,[1] the praetor introduced the envoys from their allies first. Barbarians as they were, they made a set speech, and endeavoured to explain clearly the causes of all the dissension prevailing in their country: pointing out that "Unless those who had broken out into war were reduced to tranquillity and punished as they deserved, the very moment the Roman legions left Iberia, they would inflict punishment upon the Belli and Titthi as traitors; and that if they escaped unpunished for their first act of hostility, they would make all the tribes in Iberia ripe for an outbreak from the belief that they were capable of coping with Rome. They begged, therefore, that the legions should remain in Iberia, and that each year a consul should come thither[2] to protect the allies of Rome and punish the

The envoys from Spain.

Speech of the Belli and Titthi.

[1] Probably in February, the month usually devoted by the Senate to *legationes*.

[2] Since B.C. 195 up to B.C. 154 the two divisions of Spain had been entrusted to Praetors.

depredations of the Arevacae; or, if they wished to withdraw the legions, they should first take signal vengeance for the outbreak of this tribe, that no one might venture to do the like again." Such, or to this effect, was the speech of the envoys of the Belli and Titthi who were in alliance with Rome. The envoys of the hostile tribe were then introduced. On coming forward the Arevacae assumed a feigned tone of submission and humility in the language of their answer, without being, as was evident, at all yielding in their hearts or acknowledging themselves beaten. On the contrary, they continually hinted at the uncertainty of fortune; and speaking of the battles that had taken place as undecided, they conveyed the impression that they had had the best of the contest in them all. The upshot of their speech was this: "If they must submit to some definite mulct for their error, they were ready to do so: but, when that was completed, they demanded that things should revert to the position fixed by their treaty made with the Senate in the time of Tiberius Gracchus."

The Arevacae demand the settlement of Tiberius Gracchus, B.C. 177.

3. The Senators having thus heard both sides called in the legates from Marcellus; and when they saw that they also were inclined to a pacification, and that Marcellus was more inclined to favour the enemy than the allied tribes, they answered the Arevacae that Marcellus would declare in Iberia to both parties the decision of the Senate. However, they were convinced in their own minds that their true interests were such as the envoys of the allied tribes suggested, and that the Arevacae were still inclined to haughty independence, and that their own commander was afraid of them: they therefore gave secret instructions to the legates of Marcellus to carry on the war with spirit, and as the honour of the country demanded. But when they had thus determined on a continuance of the war, feeling no confidence in Marcellus, they determined first of all to send a commander to relieve him in Iberia, as the new consuls Aulus Postumius and Lucius

The Senate refer both the deputations to Marcellus, but secretly determine to go on with the war and to supersede Marcellus.

B.C. 151. Coss. Lucius

Licinius Lucullus, Aulus Postumius Albinus.

Licinius Lucullus had just taken up their office. They then entered with spirit and vigour on their preparations, because they believed that the Iberian question would be decided by the result of this campaign: if these enemies were beaten, they assumed that all others would accept the orders of Rome; but that, if the Arevacae proved able to ward off the punishment that threatened them, not only would their spirits be again raised, but those of all the other Iberian tribes besides.

4. The more determined however the Senate was to carry on the war, the greater became their embarrassment. For the report brought to Rome by Q. Fulvius Nobilior, the commander in Iberia in the previous year (B.C. 153), and those who had served under him, of the perpetual recurrence of the pitched battles, the number of the fallen, and the valour of the Celtiberians, combined with the notorious fact that Marcellus shrank in terror from the war, caused such a panic in the minds of the new levies as the old men declared had never happened before. To such an extent did the panic go, that sufficient men were not found to come forward for the office of military tribune, and these posts were consequently not entirely filled up; whereas heretofore a larger number than were wanted had been wont to volunteer for the duty: nor would the men nominated by the Consuls as *legati* to accompany the commanders consent to serve; and, worst of all, the young men tried to avoid the levies, and put forward such excuses as were disgraceful for them to allege, and beneath the investigation of the Consuls, and yet impossible to refute. But at length, in this embarrassment of the Senate and magistrates, when they were wondering what was to be the end of this shameless conduct of the young men, for they could call it nothing else, Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus, who, though still a young man, had been one of those to advise the war, and who, though he had already acquired a reputation for high principle and pure morality, had not been known for his personal courage, seeing the Senate was in a difficulty, stood up and bade them send him to Iberia, either as military

The terror of the Celtiberians at Rome made men use every pretext for avoiding service in the army.

Scipio volunteers to act as legatus or tribune.

tribune or legatus, for he was ready to serve in either capacity. "Though, as far as I am concerned," he said, "my mission to Macedonia would be safer and more appropriate"—for it happened that at that time Scipio was personally and by name invited by the Macedonians to come and settle the disputes which were raging among them—"yet the needs of my own country are the more pressing of the two, and imperatively summon to Iberia all who have a genuine love of honour." This offer was unexpected by all, both from the youth of Scipio and his general character for caution, and consequently he became exceedingly popular on the spot, and still more so on subsequent days. For those who had before shrunk from the danger of the service, now, from dislike of the sorry figure they made in comparison with him, began volunteering to serve. Some offered to go as *legati* to the generals, and others in groups and clubs entered their names on the muster rolls. . . .

This offer shames others into doing the same.

Lucius Lucinius Lucullus, consul for B.C. 151, *is sent to Spain, Scipio Aemilianus acting as his legatus. They found that the Arevacae had already submitted to Marcellus; but being in want of money Lucullus was determined not to be deprived of a campaign. He therefore attacked the next tribe, the Vaccaei, who lived on the other side of the Tagus, nominally on the pretext of their having injured the Carpetani. The war which followed was marked by signal acts of cruelty and treachery on the part of Lucullus, as on that of the praetor Servius Sulpicius Galba among the Lusitani. Appian,* Hisp. 49-55.

5. In Scipio's mind there rose a contest of feelings, and a hesitation as to whether he ought to meet the barbarian and fight him in single combat.[1] . . .

Incidents in Scipio's Spanish campaign.

Scipio's horse was much distressed by the blow, but did not come down entirely, and accordingly Scipio managed to light on his feet. . . .

6. Cato was consulted by Scipio, at the request of Polybius, on behalf of the Achaeans; and when the debate in the Senate, between the party who wished to grant it and the

[1] Livy, *Ep.* 48. *Provocatorem barbarum tribunus militum occidit.*

party that opposed it, was protracted to a considerable length, Cato stood up and said: "As though we had nothing else to do, we sit here the whole day debating whether some old Greek dotards should be buried by Italian or Achaean undertakers!" Their restoration being voted, Polybius and his friends, after a few days' interval, were for appearing before the Senate again, with a petition that the exiles should enjoy the same honours in Achaia as they had before. Cato, however, remarked with a smile that Polybius, like another Odysseus, wanted to go a second time into the cave of the Cyclops, because he had forgotten his cap and belt. . . .

Restoration of the Achaean detenus, B.C. 151.

BOOK XXXVI

THE THIRD PUNIC WAR

1. It may occur to some to ask why I have not given a dramatic turn to my narrative, now that I have so striking a theme and a subject of such importance, by recording the actual speeches delivered; a thing which the majority of historians have done, by giving the appropriate arguments used on either side. That I do not reject this method altogether I have shown in several parts of my work, in which I have recorded popular harangues and expositions delivered by statesmen; but that I am not inclined to employ it on every occasion alike will now be made clear; for it would not be easy to find a subject more remarkable than this, nor material more ample for instituting a comparison of such a character. Nor indeed could any form of composition be more convenient to me. Still, as I do not think it becoming in statesmen to be ready with argument and exposition on every subject of debate without distinction, but rather to adapt their speeches to the nature of the particular occasion, so neither do I think it right for historians to practise their skill or show off their ability upon their readers: they ought on the contrary to devote their whole energies to discover and record what was really and truly said, and even of such words only those that are the most opportune and essential. . . .

The dramatic representation of debates though convenient is not history.

2. This idea having been firmly fixed in the minds of all, they looked out for a suitable opportunity and a decent pretext to justify them in the eyes of the world. For indeed the Romans were quite rightly very careful on this point. For

The Romans were careful to have a fair pretext for war.

instance, the general impression that they were justified in entering upon the war with Demetrius enhances the value of their victories, and diminishes the risks incurred by their defeats; but if the pretext for doing so is lame and poor the contrary effects are produced. Accordingly, as they differed as to the sentiments of the outer world on the subject, they were very nearly abandoning the war. . . .

32, 20.

The policy of Rome in Africa of constantly supporting Massanissa against Carthage was mentioned in 32, 2. *Frequent complaints came to Rome from the Numidian king, and the Carthaginians were said to be collecting an army contrary to treaty. Commissioners were sent over in* 154 B.C. *on the advice of Cato, who were roughly treated at Carthage; and when, in* B.C. 151, *Massanissa sent his son Gulussa with similar complaints to Rome, Cato urged immediate war. The Senate, however, again sent commissioners, among whom was Cato himself, to examine into the matter. They reported that the Carthaginians had an army and navy. An ultimatum was therefore sent, that the army and navy were to be broken up within the year, or that the next consuls should bring the question of war before the Senate* (B.C. 150). *Just at this crisis Utica, in enmity with Carthage, placed itself under the protection of Rome. Livy,* Ep. 48; *Appian,* Pun. 75.

3. When the Carthaginians had been some time deliberating how they should meet the message from Rome they were reduced to a state of the utmost embarrassment by the people of Utica anticipating their design by putting themselves under the protection of Rome. This seemed their only hope of safety left: and they imagined that such a step must win them favour at Rome: for to submit to put themselves and their country under control was a thing which they had never done even in their darkest hour of danger and defeat, with the enemy at their very walls. And now they had lost all the fruit of this resolve by being anticipated by the people of Utica; for it would appear nothing novel or strange to the Romans if they only did the same as that people. Accordingly, with a choice of two evils only

B.C. 149. Utica puts itself under the protection of Rome.

Carthaginian plenipotentiaries at Rome.

left, to accept war with courage or to surrender their independence, after a long and anxious discussion held secretly in the Senate-house, they appointed two ambassadors with plenary powers, and instructed them, that, in view of the existing state of things, they should do what seemed for the advantage of their country. The names of these envoys were Gisco Strytanus, Hamilcar, Misdes, Gillimas, and Mago. When they reached Rome from Carthage, they found war already decreed and the generals actually started with their forces. Circumstances, therefore, no longer giving them any power of deliberating, they offered an unconditional surrender.

4. I have spoken before about what this implies, but I must in this place also briefly remind my readers of its import. Those who thus surrender themselves to the Roman authority, surrender all territory and the cities in it, together with all men and women in all such territory or cities, likewise rivers, harbours, temples, and tombs, so that the Romans should become actual lords of all these, and those who surrender should remain lords of nothing whatever. On the Carthaginians making a surrender to this effect, they were summoned into the Senate-house and the Praetor delivered the Senate's decision, which was to this effect: "They had been well advised, and therefore the Senate granted them freedom and the enjoyment of their laws; and moreover, all their territory and the possession of their other property, public or private." The Carthaginian envoys were much relieved when they heard this; thinking that, where the alternatives were both miserable, the Senate had treated them well in conceding their most necessary and important requirements. But presently the Praetor went on to state that they would enjoy these concessions on condition of sending three hundred hostages to Lilybaeum within thirty days, sons of members of the Hundred[1] or the Senate, and obeying such commands as should be imposed on them by the

What is implied by their surrender. See 20, 9-10.

The Senate regrant their liberty and territory to the Carthaginians,

but on condition of giving 300 hostages, and obeying certain orders not yet expressed.

[1] *τῶν ἐκ συγκλήτου καὶ τῆς γερουσίας.* The same distinction occurs in 10, 18, and seems to refer to the two bodies known as the Hundred and the Gerusia. See Bosworth Smith's *Carthage and the Carthaginians*, p. 27.

consuls. This dashed their satisfaction for a time, because they had no means of knowing what orders were to be given them through the consuls; however, they started at once, being anxious to report what had occurred to their countrymen with all speed. When they arrived in Carthage and stated the facts, the citizens considered that the envoys had in all respects acted with proper caution; but they were greatly alarmed and distressed by the fact that in the answer no mention was made of the city itself.

5. At this juncture they say that Mago Brettius delivered a manly and statesmanlike speech. He said: "The Carthaginians had two opportunities of taking counsel in regard to themselves and their country, one of which they had let pass; for in good truth it was no use now to question what was going to be enjoined on them by the consuls, and why it was that the Senate had made no mention of the city: they should have done that when they made the surrender. Having once made that, they must clearly make up their mind to the necessity of submitting to every possible injunction, unless it should prove to be something unbearably oppressive or beyond what they could possibly expect. If they would not do this, they must now consider whether they preferred to stand an invasion and all its possible consequences, or, in terror of the attack of the enemy, accept without resistance every order they might impose upon them." But as the imminence of war and the uncertainty of the future made every one inclined to submit to these injunctions, it was decided to send the hostages to Lilybaeum. Three hundred young men were forthwith selected and sent to Lilybaeum amidst loud expressions of sorrow and tears, each of them being escorted by his nearest friends and relations, the whole scene being made especially moving by the lamentations of the women. On landing at Lilybaeum the hostages were at once handed over by the consuls to Quintus Fabius Maximus, who had been appointed to the command in Sicily at that time. By him they were safely conveyed to Rome and confined in the dockyard of the six-benched ships.

Speech of Mago Brettius.

The hostages are sent to Lilybaeum.

6. The hostages being thus disposed of, the consuls

brought their fleet to the citadel of Utica. When news of this reached Carthage, the city was in the utmost excitement and panic, not knowing what to expect next. However, it was decided to send envoys to ask the consuls what they were to do, and to state that they were all prepared to obey orders. The envoys arrived at the Roman camp: the general's council was summoned: and they delivered their commission. The senior Consul thereupon, after complimenting them on their policy and readiness to obey, bade them hand over all arms and missiles in their possession without subterfuge or concealment. The envoys answered that they would carry out the directions, but begged the Consul to consider what would happen if the Carthaginians surrendered all their arms, and the Romans took them and sailed away from the country. However, they gave them up. . . .

The Consuls, L. Marcius Censorinus, M'. Manilius, land in Africa. B.C. 149.

They demand the total disarming of the Carthaginians.

It was clearly shown that the resources of the city were enormous, for they surrendered to the Romans more than two hundred thousand stands of arms and two thousand catapults. . . .

This was followed by a second injunction of the consuls that the whole people of Carthage should remove to some other spot, to be not less than ten miles from the sea, and there build a new city. *Livy*, Ep. 49.

7. The people had no idea what the announcement was going to be, but suspecting it from the expression of the envoys' countenances, they immediately burst into a storm of cries and lamentations. . . .

Return of the envoys with the last orders from the Consuls.

Then all the Senators,[1] uttering a cry of horror, remained as though paralysed by the shock. But the report having quickly spread among the people, the general indignation at once found expression. Some made an attack on the envoys, as the guilty authors of their misfortunes, while others wreaked their wrath upon all Italians caught within the city, and others rushed to the town gates. . . .

The popular fury.

[1] The envoys first report to the Gerusia. Appian, *Pun.* 91.

The Carthaginians determine to resist, and the consuls, who had not hurried themselves, because they believed that resistance from an unarmed populace was impossible, found, when they approached Carthage, that it was prepared to offer a vigorous resistance. The scene which followed the announcement of the Consul's orders, and the incidents of the siege, are chiefly known to us from Appian, Pun. 91 sq. *Livy*, Ep. 49. *Scipio was serving as military Tribune*, B.C. 149-148; *consul*, B.C. 147.

Hamilcar Phameas, the commander of the Punic cavalry. Appian, *Pun.* 100.

8. Hamilcar Phameas[1] was the general of the Carthaginians, a man in the very prime of life and of great physical strength. What is of the utmost importance too for service in the field, he was an excellent and bold horseman. . . .

When he saw the advanced guard, Phameas, though not at all deficient in courage, avoided coming to close quarters with Scipio: and on one occasion when he had come near his reserves, he got behind the cover of the brow of a hill and halted there a considerable time. . . .

The Roman maniples fled to the top of a hill; and when all had given their opinions, Scipio said, "When men are consulting what measures to take at first, their object should be to avoid disaster rather than to inflict it."[2] . . .

Polybius's personal knowledge of Scipio.

It ought not to excite surprise that I am more minute than usual in my account of Scipio and that I give in detail everything which he said. . . .

When Marcius Porcius Cato heard in Rome of the glorious achievements of Scipio he uttered a palinode to his criticisms of him: "What have you heard? He alone has the breath of wisdom in him: the rest are but flitting phantoms."[3]

[1] Phameas was afterwards persuaded by Massanissa to join the Romans. Livy, *Ep.* 50.

[2] The incident referred to is narrated in Appian, *Punica*, 103. Scipio relieved this body of men, who were beleaguered on the top of a hill, by a rapid and bold movement of his cavalry.

[3] *Odyssey*, 20, 495. Cato had always been opposed to the Scipios, but Livy seems to attribute his former criticisms of the younger Africanus to his general habit of caustic disparagement (*vir promptioris ad vituperandum linguae*), and we know that his elder son had married a daughter of Paulus, sister to the younger Africanus.

BOOK XXXVII

1. THERE was a great deal of talk of all sorts in Greece, first as to the Carthaginians when the Romans conquered them, and subsequently as to the question of the pseudo-Philip. The opinions expressed in regard to the Carthaginians were widely divided, and indicated entirely opposite views. Some commended the Romans for their wise and statesmanlike policy in regard to that kingdom. For the removal of a perpetual menace, and the utter destruction of a city which had disputed the supremacy with them, and could even then if it got an opportunity have still been disputing it,—thus securing the supremacy for their own country,—were the actions of sensible and far-sighted men. Others contradicted this, and asserted that the Romans had no such policy in view when they obtained their supremacy; and that they had gradually and insensibly become perverted to the same ambition for power, which had once characterised the Athenians and Lacedaemonians; and though they had advanced more slowly than these last, that they would from all appearances yet arrive at the same consummation. For in old times they had only carried on war until their opponents were beaten, and induced to acknowledge the obligation of obedience and acceptance of their orders; but that nowadays they had given a foretaste of their policy by their conduct to Perseus, in utterly destroying the Macedonian dynasty root and branch, and had given the finishing stroke to that policy by the course adopted in regard to the Carthaginians; for though this latter people had committed no act of irretrievable outrage, they had taken measures of irretrievable severity against them, in spite of their offering to accept any terms, and submitting to any injunctions that might be placed upon them. Others

The various views held in Greece as to the Roman policy.

again said that the Romans were generally a truly civilised people; and that they had this peculiarity, on which they prided themselves, that they conducted their wars openly and generously, not employing night surprises or ambuscades, but scorning every advantage to be gained by stratagem and deceit, and regarding open and face-to-face combats as alone becoming to their character: but that in the present instance their whole campaign against the Carthaginians had been conducted by means of stratagem and deceit. Little by little,—by holding out inducements here, and practising concealment there,—they had deprived them of all hopes of assistance from their allies. This was a line of conduct more appropriate by rights to the intriguing chicanery of a monarchy, than to a republican and Roman policy. Again, there were some who took the opposite line to these. They said that if it were really true that, before the Carthaginians had made the surrender, the Romans had behaved as alleged, holding out inducements here, and making half revelations there, they would be justly liable to such charges; but if, on the contrary, it was only after the Carthaginians had themselves made the surrender,—ackowledging the right of the Romans to take what measures they chose concerning them,—that the latter in the exercise of their undoubted right had imposed and enjoined what they determined upon, then this action must cease to be looked on as partaking of the nature of impiety or treachery. And some denied that it was an impiety at all: for there were three ways in which such a thing could be defined, none of which applied to the conduct of the Romans. An impiety was something done against the gods, or one's parents, or the dead; treachery was something done in violation of oaths or written agreements; an injustice something done in violation of law and custom. But the Romans could not be charged on any one of these counts: they had offended neither the gods, their parents, nor the dead; nor had they broken oaths or treaties, but on the contrary charged the Carthaginians with breaking them. Nor again had they violated laws, customs, or their own good faith; for having received a voluntary surrender, with the full power of doing what they pleased in the event of the submitting party not obeying their injunc-

tions, they had, in view of that eventuality having arisen, applied force to them.

2. Such were the criticisms commonly made on the dealings of the Romans with the Carthaginians. But as to the Pseudo-Philip, the report at first appeared quite beneath consideration. A Philip suddenly appears in Macedonia, as though he had dropped from the skies, in contempt of Macedonians and Romans alike, without having the least reasonable pretext for his claim, as every one knew that the real Philip had died in Alba in Italy two years after Perseus himself. But when, three or four months afterwards, a report arrived that he had conquered the Macedonians in a battle in the territory of the Odomanti beyond the Strymon, some believed it, but the majority were still incredulous. But presently, when news came that he had conquered the Macedonians in a battle on this side of the Strymon, and was master of all Macedonia; and when letters and envoys came from the Thessalians to the Achaeans imploring help, as though the danger were now affecting Thessaly, it seemed an astonishing and inexplicable event; for there was nothing to give it the air of probability, or to supply a rational explanation of it.

The pretended Philip, son of Perseus, B.C. 149.

Such was the view taken of these things in Greece. . . .

3. A despatch from Manius Manilius to the Achaeans having reached the Peloponnese, saying that they would oblige him by sending Polybius of Megalopolis with all speed to Lilybaeum, as he was wanted on account of certain public affairs, the Achaeans decided to send him in accordance with the letter of the consul. And as I felt bound to obey the Romans, I put everything else aside, and sailed at the beginning of summer. But when we arrived at Corcyra, we found another despatch from the consul to the Corcyreans had come, announcing that the Carthaginians had already surrendered all the hostages to them, and were prepared to obey them.[1] Thinking, therefore, that the war was at an end, and that there was no more occasion for our services, we sailed back to the Peloponnese. . . .

Polybius sent for to negotiate with Carthage, B.C. 149.

[1] Livy, *Ep.* 49.

4. It should not excite surprise that I sometimes designate myself by my proper name, and at other times by the common forms of expression—for instance, "when *I* had said this," or "we had agreed to this." For as I was much personally involved in the transactions about to be related, it becomes necessary to vary the methods of indicating myself; that I may not weary by continual repetition of my own name, nor again by introducing the words "of me," or "through me," at every turn, fall insensibly into an appearance of egotism. I wished, on the contrary, by an interchangeable use of these terms, and by selecting from time to time the one which seemed most in place, to avoid, as far as could be, the offensiveness of talk about one's self; for such talk, though naturally unacceptable, is frequently inevitable, when one cannot in any other way give a clear exposition of the subjects. I am somewhat assisted in this point by the accident that, as far as I know, no one up to our own time has ever had the same name as myself.[1] . . .

5. The statues of Callicrates[2] were carried in under the cover of darkness, while those of Lycortas were brought out again by broad daylight, to occupy their original position: and this coincidence drew the remark from every one, that we ought never to use our opportunities against others in a spirit of presumption, knowing that it is extremely characteristic of Fortune to subject those who set a precedent to the operation of their own ideas and principles in their turn. . . .

The mere love of novelty inherent in mankind is a sufficient incentive to any kind of change. . . .

Mission to Bithynia to investigate the quarrel between Nicomedes (II.) and his

6. The Romans sent envoys to restrain the impetuosity of Nicomedes and to prevent Attalus from going to war with Prusias. The men appointed were Marcus Licinius, who was suffering from gout, and was quite lamed by it, and with him Aulus

[1] He seems to have forgotten his namesake mentioned in 11, 15.

[2] For Callicrates, the author of the Romanising policy, see 26, 1-3. One of the statues raised to him by the Spartan exiles was at Olympia, the base of which has been discovered. See Hicks's *Greek Inscriptions*, p. 330. To what the fragment refers is not clear, but evidently to something connected with the popular movement against Sparta, and a recurrence to the policy of Philopoemen as represented by Lycortas, which eventually brought down the vengeance of Rome.

Mancinus, who, from a tile falling on his head, had so many and such great scars on it, that it was a matter of wonder that he escaped with his life, and Lucius Malleolus who was reputed the stupidest man in Rome. As the business required speed and boldness, these men seemed the least suitable possible for the purpose that could be conceived; and accordingly they say that Marcus Porcius Cato remarked in the Senate that "Not only would Prusias perish before they got there, but that Nicomedes would grow old in his kingdom. For how could a mission make haste, or if it did, how could it accomplish anything, when it had neither feet, head, nor intelligence?" . . .

father Prusias II. See *supra*, 32, 28, B.C. 148.

7. King Prusias was exceedingly repulsive in personal appearance, though his reasoning powers were somewhat superior: but externally he seemed only half a man, and was cowardly and effeminate in all matters pertaining to war. For not only was he timid, but he was averse to all hardships, and in a word was utterly unmanned in mind and body throughout his whole life; qualities which all the world object to in kings, but the Bithynians above all people. Moreover, he was also exceedingly dissolute in regard to sensual pleasures; was completely without education or philosophy, or any of the knowledge which they embrace; and had not the remotest idea of what virtue is. He lived the barbaric life of a Sardanapallus day and night. Accordingly, directly his subjects got the least hope of being able to do so, they conceived an implacable resolution not only to throw off allegiance to the king, but to press for vengeance upon him.[1] . . .

Character of Prusias II.

8. Museium is a place near Olympus in Macedonia. . . .

9. As I blame those who assign fortune and destiny as the moving causes in common events and catastrophes, I wish now to enter as minutely on the discussion of this subject as the nature of an historical work will admit. Those things of which it is impossible or difficult for a mere

Limits to the belief of the direct interference of Providence in human affairs.

[1] Prusias was killed at Pergamum by his son Nicomedes with the connivance of Attalus (Livy, *Ep.* 50).

man to ascertain the causes, such as a continuous fall of rains and unseasonable wet, or, on the contrary, droughts and frosts, one may reasonably impute to God and Fortune, in default of any other explanation; and from them come destruction of fruits, as well as long-continued epidemics, and other similar things, of which it is not easy to find the cause. On such matters then, we, in default of a better, follow the prevailing opinions of the multitude, attempting by supplications and sacrifices to appease the wrath of heaven, and sending to ask the gods by what words or actions on our part a change for the better may be brought about, and a respite be obtained for the evils which are afflicting us. But those things, of which it is possible to find the origin and cause of their occurrence, I do not think we should refer to the gods. I mean such a thing as the following. In our time all Greece was visited by a dearth of children and generally a decay of population, owing to which the cities were denuded of inhabitants, and a failure of productiveness resulted, though there were no long-continued wars or serious pestilences among us. If, then, any one had advised our sending to ask the gods in regard to this, what we were to do or say in order to become more numerous and better fill our cities,—would he not have seemed a futile person, when the cause was manifest and the cure in our own hands? For this evil grew upon us rapidly, and without attracting attention, by our men becoming perverted to a passion for show and money and the pleasures of an idle life, and accordingly either not marrying at all, or, if they did marry, refusing to rear the children that were born, or at most one or two out of a great number, for the sake of leaving them well off or bringing them up in extravagant luxury. For when there are only one or two sons, it is evident that, if war or pestilence carries off one, the houses must be left heirless: and, like swarms of bees, little by little the cities become sparsely inhabited and weak. On this subject there is no need to ask the gods how we are to be relieved from such a curse: for any one in the world will tell you that it is by the men themselves if possible changing their objects of ambition; or, if that cannot be done, by passing laws for the preservation of infants. On this subject there is no need of

seers or prodigies. And the same holds good of all similar things. But in regard to events of which the causes are impossible or difficult to discover, it is reasonable to feel a difficulty. And in this class may be reckoned the course of Macedonian history. For the Macedonians had enjoyed many important favours at the hands of the Romans, having been as a nation liberated from arbitrary government and imports, and having obtained undisputed freedom in the place of slavery; and having been individually relieved to a great extent from intestine factions and civil bloodshed.[1] . . . They had been worsted by the Romans formerly when fighting on the side of Demetrius[2] and again on that of Perseus; yet when engaged on the side of a man of odious character,[3] and in support of his claims to the throne, they displayed great courage and conquered a Roman army. These facts may well seem a puzzle to us, for it is difficult to discover their cause. And accordingly one would be inclined to say in such matters that what had happened was a heaven-sent infatuation, and that the wrath of God had fallen upon the Macedonians. And this will be rendered evident from what remains to be told. . . .

The inexplicable conduct of the Macedonians.

10. Massanissa, king of the Numidians in Africa, was the best man of all the kings of our time, and the most completely fortunate; for he reigned more than sixty years in the soundest health and to extreme old age,—for he was ninety when he died. He was, besides, the most powerful man physically of all his contemporaries: for instance, when it was necessary to stand, he would do so without moving a foot all day long; and again, when he had once sat down to business he remained there the whole day; nor did it distress him the least to remain in the saddle day and night continuously; and at ninety years old, at which age he died, he left a son only four years old, called Sthembanus, who was

Death of Massanissa B.C. 148. His fortunate career and physical vigour.

[1] A considerable passage is here lost, with the exception of a few words, insufficient to ground a conjectural translation upon.

[2] Demetrius II., son of Antigonus Gonatas.

[3] Pseudophilippus, after cutting to pieces a Roman legion under the praetor Juventius, was conquered and captured by Q. Caecilius Metellus in B.C. 148 (Livy, *Ep.* 50; Eutrop. 4, 6).

afterwards adopted by Micipses, and four sons besides. Owing, again, to the affection existing between these sons, he kept his whole life free from any treasonable plot and his kingdom unpolluted by any family tragedy. But his greatest and most divine achievement was this: Numidia had been before his time universally unproductive, and was looked upon as incapable of producing any cultivated fruits. He was the first and only man who showed that it could produce cultivated fruits just as well as any other country whatever, by cultivating farms to the extent of ten thousand plethra for each of his sons in different parts of it. On this man's death, then, so much may reasonably and justly be said. Scipio arrived at Cirta on the third day after his departure, and settled everything properly and fairly.[1] . . .

A little while before his death he was seen, on the day following a great victory over the Carthaginians, sitting outside his tent eating a piece of dirty bread, and on those who saw it expressing surprise at his doing so, he said.[2] . . .

[1] Massanissa, feeling himself to be dying, had asked Scipio to come to him. He left his sons strict injunctions to submit the arrangements of the succession and division of his kingdom to Scipio. Appian, *Punica*, 105; Livy, *Ep.* 50. Livy has adopted the statement of Polybius as to the age of Massanissa at his death; and Cicero (*de Sen.* § 34) has made Cato take the same reckoning, perhaps from Polybius also. But it does not agree with another statement of Livy himself, who (24, 49) speaks of him as being seventeen in B.C. 213, in which case he would be in his eighty-second year in B.C. 148. It is, however, proposed to read xxvii. for xvii. in this passage of Livy.

[2] Livy (*Ep.* 48) in speaking of this victory says that Massanissa was ninety-two, and ate and enjoyed his bread without anything to flavour it (*sine pulpamine*).

BOOK XXXVIII

1. HASDRUBAL, the general of the Carthaginians, was a vain ostentatious person, very far from possessing real strategic ability. There are numerous proofs of his want of judgment. In the first place he appeared in full armour in his interview with Gulussa, king of the Numidians, with a purple dyed robe over his armour fastened by a brooch, and attended by ten bodyguards armed with swords; and in the next place, having advanced in front of these armed attendants to a distance of about twenty feet, he stood behind the trench and palisade and beckoned the king to come to him, whereas it ought to have been quite the other way. However, Gulussa, after the Numidian fashion, being not inclined to stand on ceremony, advanced towards him unattended, and when he got near him asked him "Whom he was afraid of that he had come in full armour?" And on his answering, "The Romans," Gulussa remarked: "Then you should not have trusted yourself to the city, when there was no necessity for your doing so. However, what do you want, and what do you ask me to do?" To which Hasdrubal replied: "I want you to go as our ambassador to the Roman commander, and to undertake for us that we will obey every injunction; only I beg of you both to abstain from harming this wretched city." Then said Gulussa: "Your demand appears to me to be quite childish! Why, my good sir, what you failed to get by your embassies from the Romans, who were then quietly encamped at Utica, and before a blow had been struck,—how can you expect to have granted you now, when you have been completely invested by sea and land, and have almost given up every hope

The siege of Carthage, B.C. 147. Coss. P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus Aemilianus, C. Livius Donsus.

Interview between Hasdrubal and King Gulussa.

of safety?" To which Hasdrubal replied that "Gulussa was ill informed; for they still had good hopes of their outside allies,"—for he had not yet heard about the Mauretani, and thought that the forces in the country were still unconquered,[1] —"nor were they in despair as to their own ultimate safety. And above all, they trusted in the support of the gods, and in what they might expect from them; for they believed that they would not disregard the flagrant violation of treaty from which they were suffering, but would give them many opportunities of securing their safety. Therefore he called on the Roman commander in the name of the gods and of Fortune to spare the city; with the distinct understanding that, if its inhabitants failed to obtain this grace, they would be cut to pieces to the last man sooner than evacuate it." After some more conversation of the same sort, these men separated for the present, having made an appointment to meet again on the third day from that time.

Scipio's scorn of the proposal, B.C. 147.

2. On Gulussa communicating to him what had been said, Scipio remarked with a laugh: "Oh, then, it was because you intended to make this demand that you displayed that abominable cruelty to our prisoners![2] And you trust in the gods, do you, after violating even the laws of men?" The king went on to remind Scipio that above all things it was necessary to finish the business speedily; for, apart from unforeseen contingencies, the consular elections were now close at hand, and it was only right to have regard to that, lest, if the winter found them just where they were, another Consul would come to supersede him, and without any trouble get all the credit of his labours.

He offers Hasdrubal personal security for delivering the town.

These words induced Scipio to give directions to offer Hasdrubal safety for himself, his wife and children, and ten families of his friends and relations, and permission to take ten talents of

[1] The task of subduing the country in B.C. 147 was entrusted to the proconsul Culpurnius Piso, while Scipio was engaged in completing the investment of Carthage. Appian, *Pun.* 113-126.

[2] After the capture of Megara, the suburban district of Carthage, by Scipio, Hasdrubal withdrew into the Byrsa, got made commander-in-chief, and bringing all Roman prisoners to the battlements, put them to death with the most ghastly tortures. Appian, *Pun*, 118.

his private property and to bring out with him whichever of his slaves he chose. With these concessions therefore Gulussa went to his meeting with Hasdrubal on the third day, who again came forward with great pomp and at a dignified step, clothed in his purple robe and full suit of armour, so as to cast the tyrants of tragedy far into the shade. He was naturally fat, but at that time he had grown extremely corpulent, and had become more than usually red from exposure to the sun, so that he seemed to be living like fat oxen at a fair; and not at all like a man to be in command at a time of such terrible miseries as cannot easily be described in words. When he met the king, and heard the offer of the Consul, he slapped his thigh again and again, and appealing to the gods and Fortune declared that "The day would never come on which Hasdrubal would behold the sun and his native city in flames; for to the nobly-minded one's country and its burning houses were a glorious funeral pile." These expressions force us to feel some admiration for the man and the nobility of his language; but when we come to view his administration of affairs, we cannot fail to be struck by his want of spirit and courage; for at a time when his fellow-citizens were absolutely perishing with famine, he gave banquets and had second courses put on of a costly kind, and by his own excellent physical condition made their misery more conspicuous. For the number of the dying surpassed belief, as well as the number who deserted every day from hunger. However, by fiercely rebuking some, and by executing as well as abusing others, he cowed the common people: and by this means retained, in a country reduced to the lowest depths of misfortune, an authority which a tyrant would scarcely enjoy in a prosperous city. Therefore I think I was justified in saying that two leaders more like each other than those who at that time directed the affairs of Greece and Carthage it would not be easy to find. And this will be rendered manifest when we come to a formal comparison of them. . . .

The selfish and tyrannical conduct of Hasdrubal.

Comparison between Hasdrubal and Diaeus.

3. My thirty-eighth book embraces the consummation of the misfortunes of Greece. For though Greece as a whole, as well as separate

The ill-luck which occasioned the fall of Greece.

parts of it, has on several occasions sustained grave disasters, yet to none of her previous defeats could the word "misfortune" be more properly applied, than to those which have befallen her in our time. For it is not only that the *sufferings* of Greece excite compassion: stronger still is the conviction, which a knowledge of the truth of the several occurrences must bring, that in all she undertook she was supremely unfortunate. At any rate, though the disaster of Carthage is looked upon as of the severest kind, yet one cannot but regard that of Greece as not less, and in some respects even more so. For the Carthaginians at any rate left something for posterity to say on their behalf; but the mistakes of the Greeks were so glaring that they made it impossible for those who wished to support them to do so. Besides, the destruction of the Carthaginians was immediate and total, so that they had no feeling afterwards of their disasters: but the Greeks, with their misfortunes ever before their eyes, handed down to their children's children the loss of all that once was theirs. And in proportion as we regard those who live in pain as more pitiable than those who lose their lives at the moment of their misfortunes, in that proportion must the disasters of the Greeks be regarded as more pitiable than those of the Carthaginians,—unless a man thinks nothing of dignity and honour, and gives his opinion from a regard only to material advantage. To prove the truth of what I say, one has only to remember and compare the misfortunes in Greece reputed to be the heaviest with what I have just now mentioned.

The fall of Greece was even more lamentable than that of Carthage.

4. Now, the greatest alarm that fortune ever brought upon the Greeks was when Xerxes invaded Europe: for at that time all were exposed to danger though an extremely small number actually suffered disaster. The greatest sufferers were the Athenians: for, with a prudent foresight of what was coming, they abandoned their country with their wives and children. That crisis then caused them damage; for the Barbarians took Athens and laid it waste with savage violence: but it brought them no shame or disgrace. On the contrary, they gained the highest

Comparison between the fall of Greece under the Romans with the Persian invasion, B.C. 480.

glory in the eyes of all the world for having regarded everything as of less importance, in comparison with taking their share in the same fortune as the other Greeks. Accordingly, in consequence of their exalted conduct, they not only immediately recovered their own city and territory, but soon afterwards disputed the supremacy in Greece with the Lacedaemonians. Subsequently, indeed, they were beaten by the Spartans in war, and forced to submit to the destruction of their own city walls: but even this one might assert to be a reproach to the Lacedaemonians, for having used the power put into their hands with excessive severity, rather than to the Athenians. Then the Spartans once more, being beaten by the Thebans, lost the supremacy in Greece, and after that defeat were deprived of their outside rule and reduced to the frontiers of Laconia. But what disgrace was there in having retired, while disputing for the most honourable objects, to the limits of their ancestral dominion? Therefore, these events we may speak of as failures, but not as misfortunes in any sense. The Mantineans again were forced to leave their city, being divided out and scattered into separate villages by the Lacedaemonians; but for this all the world blamed the folly, not of the Mantineans, but of the Lacedaemonians. The Thebans, indeed, besides the loss of their army, saw their country depopulated at the time when Alexander, having resolved on the invasion of Asia, conceived that by making an example of Thebes he should establish a terror that would act as a check upon the Greeks, while his attention was distracted upon other affairs: but at that time all the world pitied the Thebans as having been treated with injustice and harshness, and no one was found to justify this proceeding of Alexander.

The defeat of the Athenians at Aegospotami, B.C. 405.

of the Spartans at Leuctra, B.C. 371.

The destruction of Mantinea, B.C. 362,

and of Thebes, B.C. 335.

5. Accordingly after a short time they obtained assistance, and once more inhabited their country in security. For the compassion of foreigners is no small benefit to those who are unjustly dispossessed; since we often see that, with the change of feeling among the many, Fortune also changes; and even the conquerors themselves repent, and make

good the disasters of those who have fallen under undeserved misfortunes. Once more, at certain periods the Chalcidians and Corinthians and some other cities, owing to the advantages of their situation, were attacked by the kings of Macedonia, and had garrisons imposed on them: but when they were thus enslaved all the world were eager to do their best to liberate them, and loathed their enslavers and regarded them continually as their enemies. But above all, up to this time it was generally single states that were depopulated, and in single states that reverses were met with, in some cases while disputing for supremacy and empire, and in others from the treacherous attacks of despots and kings: so that, so far from their losses bringing them any reproach, they escaped even the name of misfortune. For we must look on all those who meet with incalculable disasters whether private or public as the victims of losses, and those only to be "unfortunate," to whom events through their own folly bring dishonour. Instances of this last are the Peloponnesians, Boeotians, Phocians, . . . and Locrians, some of the dwellers on the Ionian gulf, and next to these the Macedonians, . . . who all as a rule did not merely suffer loss, but were "unfortunate," with a misfortune of the gravest kind and for which they were themselves open to reproach: for they displayed at once want of good faith and want of courage, brought upon themselves a series of disgraces, lost all that could bring them honour, . . . and voluntarily admitted into their towns the Roman fasces and axes. They were in the utmost panic, in fact, owing to the extravagance of their own wrongful acts, if one ought to call them their own; for I should rather say that the peoples as such were entirely ignorant, and were beguiled from the path of right: but that the men who *acted* wrongly were the authors of this delusion.

The tyranny of the later kings of Macedonia.

But the last fall of Greece was embittered by the fact that it came from the folly of the Greeks themselves rather than of their leaders.

6. In regard to these men, it should not be a matter of surprise if we leave for a while the ordinary method and spirit of our narrative to give a clearer and more elaborate exposition of their character. I am aware that some may

be found, regarding it as their first duty to cast a veil over the errors of the Greeks, to accuse us of writing in a spirit of malevolence. But for myself, I conceive that with right-minded persons a man will never be regarded as a true friend who shrinks from and is afraid of plain speech, nor indeed as a good citizen who abandons the truth because of the offence he will give to certain persons at the time. But a writer of public history above all deserves no indulgence whatever, who regards anything of superior importance to truth. For in proportion as written history reaches larger numbers, and survives for longer time, than words spoken to suit an occasion, both the writer ought to be still more particular about truth, and his readers ought to admit his authority only so far as he adheres to this principle. At the actual hour of danger it is only right that Greeks should help Greeks in every possible way, by protecting them, veiling their errors or deprecating the wrath of the sovereign people,—and this I genuinely did for my part at the actual time: but it is also right, in regard to the record of events to be transmitted to posterity, to leave them unmixed with any falsehood: so that readers should not be merely gratified for the moment by a pleasant tale, but should receive in their souls a lesson which will prevent a repetition of similar errors in the future. Enough, however, on this subject. . . .

In the autumn of B.C. 150 *the corrupt Menalchidas of Sparta was succeeded as Achaean Strategus by Diaeus, who, to cover his share in the corruption of Menalchidas, induced the league to act in the matter of some disputed claim of Sparta in a manner contrary to the decisions of the Roman Senate. The Spartans wished to appeal again to Rome; whereupon the Achaeans passed a law forbidding separate cities to make such appeals, which were to be only made by the league. The Lacedaemonians took up arms: and Diaeus professing that the league was not at war with Sparta, but with certain factious citizens of that city, named four of its chief men who were to be banished. They fled to Rome, where the Senate ordered their restoration. Embassies went from Achaia and from Sparta to Rome to state their respective cases; and on their return gave false reports,—Diaeus*

assuring the Achaeans that the Senate had ordered the Spartans to obey the league; Menalchidas telling the Spartans that the Romans had released them from all connexion with the league. War then again broke out (B.C. 148). *Metellus, who was in Macedonia on the business of the Pseudo-Philip, sent legates to the Achaeans forbidding them to bear arms against Sparta, and announcing the speedy arrival of commissioners from Rome to settle the dispute. But the Achaean levies were already mustered under the Strategus Damocritus, and the Lacedaemonians seem to have almost compelled them to fight. The Spartans were beaten with considerable loss: and on Damocritus preventing a pursuit and a capture of Sparta, the Achaeans regarded him as traitor and fined him fifty talents. He was succeeded in his office of Strategus by Diaeus* (*autumn* B.C. 148–B.C. 147) *who promised Metellus to await the arrival of the commissioners from Rome. But the Spartans now assumed their freedom from the league and elected a Strategus of their own, Menalchidas; who provoked a renewal of the war by taking the town of Iasos on the Laconian frontier. In despair of resisting the attack of the Achaeans, and disowned by his fellow-citizens, he took poison. The Roman commissioners arrived, led by L. Aurelius Orestes, in* B.C. 147, *and summoning the magistrates of the Achaean towns and the Strategus Diaeus before them at Corinth, announced the decision of the Senate—separating Lacedaemon, Corinth, Argos, Heraclea near Aete, and Orchomenus in Arcadia from the Achaean league, as not being united by blood, and only being subsequent additions. The magistrates, without answering, hastily summoned the league congress. The people, on hearing the Roman decision, pillaged the houses of the Lacedaemonian residents in Corinth, and savagely attacked all who were or who looked like Spartans. The Roman envoys endeavoured to restrain the popular fury. But they were somewhat roughly handled themselves; and the people could not be persuaded to release the Spartans whom they had arrested: though they let all others go, and sent an embassy to Rome, which, however, meeting the former embassy on its return, and learning the hopelessness of support in Rome, returned home. It is this outbreak which is referred to in the next fragment. See Pausanias, vii.* 12-14; *Livy,* Ep. 51.

7. When the commissioners with L. Aurelius Orestes arrived in Rome from the Peloponnese, they reported what had taken place, and declared that they had a narrow escape of actually losing their lives. They made the most of the occurrence and put the worst interpretation upon it; for they represented the violence which had been offered them as not the result of a sudden outbreak, but of a deliberate intention on the part of the Achaeans to inflict a signal insult upon them. The Senate was therefore more angry than it had ever been, and at once appointed Sextus Julius Caesar and other envoys with instructions to rebuke and upbraid the Achaeans for what had occurred, yet in terms of moderation, but to exhort them "not to listen to evil councillors, not to allow themselves to be betrayed into hostility with Rome, but even yet to make amends for their acts of folly by inflicting punishment on the authors of the crime." This was a clear proof that the Senate gave its instructions to Aurelius and his colleagues, not with the view of dismembering the league, but with the object of restraining the obstinacy and hostility of the Achaeans by terrifying and overawing them. Some people accordingly imagined that the Romans were acting hypocritically, because the Carthaginian war was still unfinished; but this was not the case. The fact is, that they had long regarded the Achaean league with favour, believing it to be the most trustworthy of all the Greek governments; and though now they were resolved to give it an alarm, because it had become too lofty in its pretensions, yet they were by no means minded to go to war or to have a serious quarrel with the Achaeans. . . .

On the report of L. Aurelius Orestes of the disturbance at Corinth, B.C. 147, the Senate send a fresh commission to warn the Achaeans.

8. As Sextus Julius Caesar and his colleagues were on their way from Rome to the Peloponnese, they were met by Thearidas and the other envoys, sent by the Achaeans to make their excuse and give the Senate an explanation of the intemperate acts committed in regard to Aurelius Orestes. But Sextus Julius persuaded them to turn back to Achaia, on the ground that he and his colleagues were coming with full instructions to communicate with the Achaeans on all these points. When

Arrival of Sextus Julius and the commissioners in Achaia.

Sextus arrived in the Peloponnese, and in a conference with the Achaeans in Aegium spoke with great kindness, he made no mention of the injurious treatment of the legates, and scarcely demanded any defence at all, but took a more lenient view of what had happened than even the Achaeans themselves; and dwelt chiefly on the subject of exhorting them not to carry their error any further, in regard either to the Romans or the Lacedaemonians. Thereupon the more sober-minded party received the speech with satisfaction, and were strongly moved to obey the suggestions, because they were conscious of the gravity of what they had been doing, and had before their eyes what happened to opponents of Rome; but the majority, though they had not a word to say against the justice of the injunctions of Sextus Julius, and were quite silent, yet remained deeply tainted with disaffection. And Diaeus and Critolaus, and all who shared their sentiments,—and they consisted of all the greatest rascals in every city, men at war with the gods, and pests of the community, carefully selected,—took, as the proverb has it, with the left hand what the Romans gave with the right, and went utterly and entirely wrong in their calculations. For they supposed that the Romans, owing to the troubles in Libya and Iberia, feared a war with the Achaeans and would submit to anything and say anything. Thinking, therefore, that the hour was their own, they answered the Roman envoys politely that "They would, nevertheless, send Thearidas and his colleagues to the Senate; while they would themselves accompany the legates to Tegea, and there in consultation with the Lacedaemonians would provide for some settlement of the war that would meet the views of both parties." With this answer they subsequently induced the unhappy nation to follow the senseless course to which they had long before made up their mind. And this result was only what might have been expected from the inexperience and corruption of the prevailing party.

Conference at Aegium. The envoys are conciliatory.

Action of Diaeus and Critolaus and their party.

9. But the finishing stroke to this ruinous policy was given in the following manner. When Sextus and his colleagues arrived at Tegea, and invited the

Conference at Tegea. Critolaus

attendance of the Lacedaemonians, in order to arrange terms between them and the Achaeans, both as to the satisfaction to be given for previous complaints and for putting a stop to the war, until the Romans should send commissioners to review the whole question, Critolaus and his party, having held a conference, decided that all the rest should avoid the meeting, and that Critolaus should go alone to Tegea. When Sextus and his fellow-commissioners therefore had almost given them up, Critolaus arrived; and when the meeting with the Lacedaemonians took place, he would settle nothing,—alleging that he had no authority to make any arrangement without the consent of the people at large; but that he would bring the matter before the Achaeans at their next congress, which must be held six months from that time. Sextus and his fellow-commissioners, therefore, convinced of the ill disposition of Critolaus, and much annoyed at his conduct, dismissed the Lacedaemonians to their own country, and themselves returned to Italy with strong views as to the folly and infatuation of Critolaus.

contrives to avoid a settlement.

After their departure Critolaus spent the winter in visiting the cities and holding assemblies in them, on the pretext that he wished to inform them of what he had said to the Lacedaemonians at Tegea, but in reality to denounce the Romans and to put an evil interpretation on everything they said; by which means he inspired the common people in the various cities with feelings of hostility and hatred for them. At the same time he sent round orders to the magistrates not to exact money from debtors, nor to receive prisoners arrested for debt, and to cause loans on pledge to be held over until the war was decided. By this kind of appeal to the interests of the vulgar everything he said was received with confidence; and the common people were ready to obey any order he gave, being incapable of taking thought for the future, but caught by the bait of immediate indulgence and relief.

Winter of B.C. 147-146. Critolaus propagates his anti-Roman views;

and suspends cash payments.

10. When Quintus Caecilius Metellus heard in Macedonia of the commotion and disturbance going on in the Peloponnese, he despatched thither his le-

Fresh legates are sent from Mace-

donia to Achaia in the winter of B.C. 147-146.

gates Gneaus Papirius and the younger Popilius Laenas, along with Aulus Gabinius and Gaius Fannius; who, happening to arrive when the congress was assembled at Corinth, were introduced to the assembly, and delivered a long and conciliatory speech, much in the spirit of that of Sextus Julius, exerting themselves with great zeal to prevent the Achaeans from proceeding to an open breach with Rome, either on the pretext of their grievance against the Lacedaemonians, or from any feeling of anger against the Romans themselves. But the assembled people would not hear them; insulting words were loudly uttered against the envoys, and in the midst of a storm of yells and tumult they were driven from the assembly. The fact was that such a crowd of workmen and artisans had been got together as had never been collected before; for all the cities were in a state of drivelling folly, and above all the Corinthians *en masse;* and there were only a very few who heartily approved of the words of the envoys.

Riotous scene at Corinth.

Critolaus, conceiving that he had attained his purpose, in the midst of an audience as excited and mad as himself began attacking the magistrates, abusing all who were opposed to him, and openly defying the Roman envoys, saying that he was desirous of being a friend of the Romans, but had no taste for them as his masters. And, finally, he tried to incite the people by saying that, if they quitted themselves like men, they would have no lack of allies; but, if they betrayed womanish fears, they would not want for masters. By many other such words to the same effect, conceived in the spirit of a charlatan and huckster, he roused and excited the populace. He attempted also to make it plain that he was not acting at random in these proceedings, but that some of the kings and republics were engaged in the same policy as himself.

Critolaus makes no secret of his hostility to Rome.

11. And when some of the Gerusia wished to check him, and restrain him from the use of such expressions, he ordered the soldiers surrounding him to retire, and stood up fronting his opponents, and bade any one of them come up to him,

Critolaus carries his point, and induces the Achaeans to pro-

come near him, or venture to touch his chlamys. And, finally, he said that "He had restrained himself now for a long time; but would endure it no longer, and must speak his mind. The people to fear were not Lacedaemonians or Romans, but the traitors among themselves who co-operated with their foes: for there were some who cared more for Romans and Lacedaemonians than for their own country." He added, as a confirmation of his words, that Evagoras of Aegium and Stratius of Tritaea betrayed to Gnaeus Papirius and his fellow-commissioners all the secret proceedings in the meetings of the magistrates. And when Stratius acknowledged that he had had interviews with those men, and should do so again, as they were friends and allies, but asserted that he had told them nothing of what was said in the meetings of the magistrates, some few believed him, but the majority accepted the accusation as true. And so Critolaus, having inflamed the people by his accusations against these men, induced the Achaeans once more to decree a war which was nominally against the Lacedaemonians, but in effect was against the Romans; and he got another decree added, which was a violation of the constitution, namely, that whomsoever they should elect as Strategi should have absolute power in carrying on the war. He thus got for himself something like a despotism.

claim war against the Lacedaemonians.

Having carried these measures, he began intriguing to bring on an outbreak and cause an attack upon the Roman envoys. He had no pretext for doing this; but adopted a course which, of all possible courses, offends most flagrantly against the laws of gods and man. The envoys, however, separated; Gnaeus Papirius went to Athens and thence to Sparta to watch the turn of events; Aulus Gabinius went to Naupactus; and the other two remained at Athens, waiting for the arrival of Caecilius Metellus. This was the state of things in the Peloponnese. . . .

The Roman envoys retire from Corinth.

BOOK XXXIX

[*Including Book XL. of Dindorf's Text.*]

A defence of the historian's method of parallel histories of several countries, each kept up to date.

1. I AM fully aware that some will be found to criticise my work, on the ground that my narrative of events is incomplete and disconnected; beginning, for instance, the story of the siege of Carthage, and then leaving it half told, and interrupting the stream of my history, I pass over to Greek affairs, and from them to Macedonian or Syrian, or some other history; whereas students require continuity, and desire to hear the end of a subject; for the combination of pleasure and profit is thus more completely secured. But I do not think this: I hold exactly the reverse. And as a witness to the correctness of my opinion I might appeal to nature herself, who is never satisfied with the same things continuously in any of the senses, but is ever inclined to change; and, even if she is satisfied with the same things, wishes to have them at intervals and in diversity of circumstance. This may be illustrated first by the sense of hearing, which is never gratified either in music or recitations by a continuance of the same strains or subjects; it is the varied style, and, in a word, whatever is broken up into intervals and has the most marked and frequent changes, that gives it pleasurable excitement. Similarly one may notice that the palate can never remain gratified by the same meats, however costly, but grows to feel a loathing for them, and delights in changes of diet, and often prefers plain to rich food merely for the sake of variety. The same may be noticed as to the sight: it is quite incapable of remaining fixed on the same object, but it is a variety and change of objects that excites it. And this is more

than all the case with the mind; for changes in the objects of attention and study act as rests to laborious men.

2. Accordingly the most learned of the ancient historians have, as it seems to me, taken intervals of rest in this way: some by digressions on myths and tales, and others by digressions on historical facts,—not confining themselves to Greek history, but introducing disquisitions on points of foreign history as well. As, for instance, when, in the course of a history of Thessaly and the campaigns of Alexander of Pherae, they introduce an account of the attempts of the Lacedaemonians in the Peloponnese; or those made by the Athenians; or actions which took place in Macedonia or Illyria: and then break off into an account of the expedition of Iphicrates into Egypt, and the iniquitous deeds of Clearchus in the Pontus. This will show you that these historians all employ this method; but, whereas they employ it without any system, I do so on a regular system. For these men, after mentioning, for instance, that Bardylis, king of the Illyrians, and Cersobleptes, king of the Thracians, established their dynasties, neither go on continuously with the stories nor return to them after an interval to take them up where they left off, but, treating them like an episode in a poem, they go back to their original subject. But I made a careful division of all the most important countries in the world and the course of their several histories; pursued exactly the same plan in regard to the order of taking the several divisions; and, moreover, arranged the history of each year in the respective countries, carefully keeping to the limits of the time: and the result is that I have made the transition backwards and forwards between my continuous narrative and the continually recurring interruptions easy and obvious to students, so that an attentive reader need never miss anything. . . .

After various operations during the autumn of B.C. 147, *the upshot of which was to put the whole of the open country in Roman hands, in the beginning of spring* B.C. 146, *Scipio delivered his final attack on Carthage, taking first the quarter of the merchants' harbour, then the war harbour, and then the market-place. There only remained the streets leading to the Byrsa and the Byrsa itself. Appian,* Pun. 123-126. *Livy,* Ep. 51.

The fall of Carthage, B.C. 146 (spring).

3. Having got within the walls, while the Carthaginians still held out on the citadel, Scipio found that the arm of the sea which intervened was not at all deep; and upon Polybius advising him to set it with iron spikes or drive sharp wooden stakes into it, to prevent the enemy crossing it and attacking the mole,[1] he said that, having taken the walls and got inside the city, it would be ridiculous to take measures to avoid fighting the enemy. . . .

Scipio within the walls of Carthage.

4. The pompous Hasdrubal threw himself on his knees before the Roman commander, quite forgetful of his proud language. . . .

When the Carthaginian commander thus threw himself as a suppliant at Scipio's knees, the proconsul with a glance at those present said: "See what Fortune is, gentlemen! What an example she makes of irrational men! This is the Hasdrubal who but the other day disdained the large favours which I offered him, and said that the most glorious funeral pyre was one's country and its burning ruins. Now he comes with suppliant wreaths, beseeching us for bare life and resting all his hopes on us. Who would not learn from such a spectacle that a mere man should never say or do anything presumptuous?" Then some of the deserters came to the edge of the roof and begged the front ranks of the assailants to hold their hands for a little; and, on Scipio ordering a halt, they began abusing Hasdrubal, some for his perjury, declaring that he had sworn again and again on the altars that he would never abandon them, and others for his cowardice and utter baseness: and they did this in the most unsparing language, and with the bitterest terms of abuse. And just at this moment Hasdrubal's wife, seeing him seated in front of the enemy with Scipio, advanced in front of the deserters, dressed in noble and dignified attire herself, but holding in her hands, on either side, her two boys dressed only in short tunics and shielded under her own robes.[2] First she addressed Hasdrubal by his name, and when

[1] *τά χώματα*, that is, apparently, the mole of huge stones constructed by the Romans to block up the mouth of the harbour.

[2] *μετὰ τῶν ἰδίων ἐνδυμάτων*. The German translator Kraz gives up these words in despair. Kampe translated them *in ihrer gewöhnlicher Tracht*. Mr. Strachan-Davidson says, "*προσειληφυῖα*, etc., 'folding them in her own robe

he said nothing but remained with his head bowed to the ground, she began by calling on the name of the gods, and next thanked Scipio warmly because, as far as he could secure it, both she and her children were saved.[1] And then, pausing for a short time, she asked Hasdrubal how he had had the heart to secure this favour from the Roman general for himself alone, . . . and, leaving his fellow-citizens who trusted in him in the most miserable plight, had gone over secretly to the enemy? And how he had the assurance to be sitting there holding suppliant boughs, in the face of the very men to whom he had frequently said that the day would never come in which the sun would see Hasdrubal alive and his native city in flames. . . .

Hasdrubal's wife finally threw herself and children from the citadel into the burning streets. *Livy*, Ep. 51.

After an interview with [Scipio], in which he was kindly treated, Hasdrubal desired leave to go away from the town. . . .

5. At the sight of the city utterly perishing amidst the flames Scipio burst into tears, and stood long reflecting on the inevitable change which awaits cities, nations, and dynasties, one and all, as it does every one of us men. This, he thought, had befallen Ilium, once a powerful city, and the once mighty empires of the Assyrians, Medes, Persians, and that of Macedonia lately so splendid. And unintentionally or purposely he quoted,—the words perhaps escaping him unconsciously,—[2]

> "The day shall be when holy Troy shall fall
> And Priam, lord of spears, and Priam's folk."

And on my asking him boldly (for I had been his tutor) what he meant by these words, he did not name Rome distinctly, but was evidently fearing for her, from this sight of the mutability of human affairs. . . .

Another still more remarkable saying of his I may record. . . [When he had given the order for firing the town] he imme-

with her hands,'" which seems straining the meaning of προσειληφυῖα. The French translator says, *deux enfans suspendus à ses vêtemens.*

[1] According to Livy (*Ep.* 51) she had tried to induce her husband to accept the offer described in 38, 2.

[2] Homer, *Il.* 6, 448.

diately turned round and grasped me by the hand and said: "O Polybius, it is a grand thing, but, I know not how, I feel a terror and dread, lest some one should one day give the same order about my own native city." . . . Any observation more practical or sensible it is not easy to make. For in the midst of supreme success for one's self and of disaster for the enemy, to take thought of one's own position and of the possible reverse which may come, and in a word to keep well in mind in the midst of prosperity the mutability of Fortune, is the characteristic of a great man, a man free from weaknesses and worthy to be remembered. . . .

After the rejection of the orders conveyed by the legates of Metellus (38, 11), *Critolaus collected the Achaean levies at Corinth, under the pretext of going to war with Sparta; but he soon induced the league to declare themselves openly at war with Rome. He was encouraged by the adhesion of the Boeotarch Pytheas, and of the Chalcidians. The Thebans were the readier to join him because they had lately been ordered by Metellus, as arbiter in the disputes, to pay fines to the Phocians, Euboeans, and Amphissians. When news of these proceedings reached Rome in the spring of* B.C. 146, *the consul Mummius was ordered to lead a fleet and army against Achaia. But Metellus in Macedonia wished to have the credit of settling the matter himself; he therefore sent envoys to the Achaeans ordering them to release from the league the towns already named by the Senate viz. Sparta, Corinth, Argos, Heracleia, and Orchomenus in Arcadia, and advanced with his army from Macedonia through Thessaly by the coast road, skirting the Sinus Maliacus. Critolaus was already engaged in besieging Heraclea Oetea, to compel it to return to its obedience to the league, and when his scouts informed him of the approach of Metellus, he retreated to Scarphea on the coast of Locris, some miles south of the pass of Thermopylae. But before he could get into Scarphea Metellus caught him up, killed a large number of his men, and took one thousand prisoners. Critolaus himself disappeared; Pausanias seems to imagine that he was drowned in the salt marshes of the coast, but Livy says that he poisoned himself. Pausanias*, 7, 14, 15. *Livy*, Ep. 52. *Orosius*, 5, 3.

7. Pytheas was a brother of Acatidas the runner, and son of Cleomenes. He had led an evil life, and was reported to have wasted the flower of his youth in unnatural debauchery. In political life also he was audacious and grasping, and had been supported by Eumenes and Philataerus for these very reasons. . . .

Character of the Boeotarch Pytheas.

8. Critolaus the Achaean Strategus being dead, and the law providing that, in case of such an event befalling the existing Strategus, the Strategus of the previous year should succeed to the office until the regular congress of the league should meet, it fell to Diaeus to conduct the business of the league and take the head of affairs. Accordingly, after sending forward some troops to Megara,[1] he went himself to Argos; and from that place sent a circular letter to all the towns ordering them to set free their slaves who were of military age, and who had been born and brought up in their houses, and send them furnished with arms to Corinth. He assigned the numbers to be furnished by the several towns quite at random and without any regard to equality, just as he did everything else. Those who had not the requisite number of home-bred slaves were to fill up the quota imposed on each town from other slaves. But seeing that the public poverty was very great, owing to the war with the Lacedaemonians, he compelled the richer classes, men and women alike, to make promises of money and furnish separate contributions. At the same time he ordered a levy *en masse* at Corinth of all men of military age. The result of these measures was that every city was full of confusion, commotion, and despair: they deemed those fortunate who had already perished in the war, and pitied those who were now starting to take part in it; and everybody was in tears as though they foresaw only too well what was going to happen. They were especially annoyed at the insolent demeanour and neglect of their duties on the part of the slaves,—airs which they assumed as having been recently liberated, or, in the case of others, because they were excited

On the death of Critolaus (spring of B.C. 146) Diaeus succeeds as Strategus.

He orders the arming of 10,000 slaves,

a special contribution by the rich,

and a general levy of the freemen of military age.

[1] 4000 under Alcamenes, Pausan. 7, 15, 8.

by the prospect of freedom. Moreover the men were compelled to make their contribution contrary to their own views, according to the property they were reputed to possess; while the women had to do so, by taking the ornaments of their own persons or of their children, to what seemed deliberately meant for their destruction.

9. As these measures came all at once, the dismay caused by the hardship of each individually prevented people from attending to or grasping the general question; or they must have foreseen that they were all being led on to secure the certain destruction of their wives and children. But, as though caught in the rush of some winter torrent and carried on by its irresistible violence, they followed the infatuation and madness of their leader. The Eleians and Messenians indeed did not stir, in terror of the Roman fleet; for nothing could have saved them if the storm had burst when it was originally intended. The people of Patrae, and of the towns which were leagued with it, had a short time before suffered disasters in Phocis;[1] and their case was much the most pitiable one of all the Peloponnesian cities: for some of them sought a voluntary death; others fled from their towns through deserted parts of the country, with no definite aim in their wanderings, from the panic prevailing in the towns. Some arrested and delivered each other to the enemy, as having been hostile to Rome; others hurried to give information and bring accusations, although no one asked for any such service as yet; while others went to meet the Romans with suppliant branches, confessing their treason, and asking what penance they were to pay, although as yet no one was asking for any account of such things. The whole country seemed to be under an evil spell: everywhere people were throwing themselves down wells or over precipices; and so dreadful was the state of things, that as the proverb has it "even an enemy would have pitied" the disaster of Greece. For in times past the Greeks had met with reverses or indeed complete disaster, either from internal dissensions or from treacherous attacks of despots; but in the present instance it was from

The Eleians and Messenians do not move.

Dismay at Patrae.

The distracted state of Greece.

[1] In the battle with Metellus at Scarphea.

the folly of their leaders and their own unwisdom that they experienced the grievous misfortunes which befell them. The Thebans also, abandoning their city *en masse*, left it entirely empty; and among the rest Pytheas retired to the Peloponnese, with his wife and children, and there wandered about the country.[1] . . .

Thebes abandoned.

He came upon the enemy much to his surprise. But to my mind the proverb, "the reckonings of the foolish are foolishness" applies to him. And naturally to such men things clear as day come as a surprise. . . .

He was even forming plans for getting back home, acting very like a man who, not having learnt to swim and being about to plunge into the sea, should not consider the question of taking the plunge; but, having taken it, should begin to consider how he is to swim to land. . . .

Having secured Boeotia, Metellus advanced to Megara, where the Achaean Alcamenes had been posted by Diaeus with five thousand men. Alcamenes hastily evacuated Megara and rejoined Diaeus at Corinth, the latter having meanwhile been re-elected Strategus. Pausanias, 7, 15, 10.

10. Diaeus having recently come to Corinth after being appointed Strategus by the vote of the people, Andronidas and others came from Caecilius Metellus. Against these men he spread a report that they were in alliance with the enemy, and gave them up to the mob, who seized on them with great violence and threw them into chains. Philo of Thessaly also came bringing many liberal offers to the Achaeans. And on hearing them, certain of the men of the country attempted to secure their acceptance; among whom was Stratius, now a very old man, who clung to Diaeus's knees and entreated him to yield to the offers of Metellus. But he and his party would not listen to Philo's proposals. For the fact was that they did not believe that the amnesty would embrace them with the rest; and, as they regarded their own advantage and personal security as of

Diaeus at Corinth rejects all offers sent by Metellus, August, B.C. 146.

[1] Pausanias on the contrary says that Pytheas was caught in Boeotia and condemned by Metellus (7, 15, 10).

the highest importance, they spoke as they did, and directed all their measures on the existing state of affairs to this end: although, as a matter of fact, they failed entirely to secure these objects. For as they understood quite clearly the gravity of what they had done, they could not believe they would obtain any mercy from Rome; and as to enduring nobly whatever should befall on behalf of their country and the safety of the people, that they never once took into consideration; yet that was the course becoming men who cared for glory, and professed to be the leaders of Greece. But indeed how or whence was it likely that such a lofty idea should occur to these men? The members of this conclave were Diaeus and Damocritus, who had but recently been recalled from exile owing to the disturbed state of the times, and with them Alcamenes, Theodectes and Archicrates; and of these last I have already stated at length who they were, and have described their character, policy, and manner of life.

because he and his party do not believe that they will ever be amnestied with the rest.

11. Such being the men with whom the decision rested, the determination arrived at was what was to be expected. They not only imprisoned Andronidas and Lagius and their friends, but even the sub-Strategus Sosicrates, on the charge of his having presided at a council and given his voting for sending an embassy to Caecilius Metellus, and in fact of having been the cause of all their misfortunes. Next day they empanelled judges to try them; condemned Sosicrates to death; and having bound him racked him till he died, without however inducing him to say anything that they expected: but they acquitted Lagius, Andronidas and Archippus, partly because the people were scared at the lawless proceeding against Sosicrates, and partly because Diaeus got a talent from Andronidas and forty minae from Archippus; for this man could not relax his usual shameless and abandoned principles in this particular even "in the very pit,"[1] as the saying is. He had acted with similar cruelty a short time before also in

Cruel death of Sosicrates.

[1] The pit is the place dug out (*σκάμμα*) and prepared in the gymnasium for leapers. To be in the pit is to be on the very ground of the struggle, without possibility of escaping it.

regard to Philinus of Corinth. For on a charge of his holding communication with Menalcidas[1] and favouring the Roman cause, he caused Philinus and his sons to be flogged and racked in each other's sight, and did not desist until the boys and Philinus were all dead. When such madness and ferocity was infecting everybody, as it would not be easy to parallel even among barbarians, it would be clearly very natural to ask why the whole nation did not utterly perish. For my part, I think that Fortune displayed her resources and skill in resisting the folly and madness of the leaders; and, being determined at all hazards to save the Achaeans, like a good wrestler, she had recourse to the only trick left; and that was to bring down and conquer the Greeks quickly, as in fact she did. For it was owing to this that the wrath and fury of the Romans did not blaze out farther; that the army of Libya did not come to Greece; and that these leaders, being such men as I have described, did not have an opportunity, by gaining a victory, of displaying their wickedness upon their countrymen. For what it was likely that they would have done to their own people, if they had got any ground of vantage or obtained any success, may be reasonable inferred from what has already been said. And indeed everybody at the time had the proverb on his lips, "had we not perished quickly we had not been saved."[2] . . .

Greece is saved by the rapidity of her ruin.

12. Aulus Postumius deserves some special notice from us here. He was a member of a family and gens of the first rank, but in himself was garrulous and wordy, and exceedingly ostentatious. From his boyhood he had a great leaning to Greek studies and literature: but he was so immoderate and affected in this pursuit, that owing to him the Greek style became offensive to the elder and most respectable men at Rome. Finally he attempted to write a poem and a formal history in Greek, in the preface to which he desired his readers to excuse him if, being a Roman, he could not completely command the Greek idiom or method in the handling of the subject. To whom M. Porcius Cato made a very

Character of Aulus Postumius Albinus.

[1] See note on 30, 17.

[2] For this proverb see Plutarch, *Themist.* 29; *de Alex. Virt.* 5; *de Exil.* 7.

pertinent answer. "I wonder," said he, "on what grounds you make such a demand. If the Amphictyonic council had charged you to write the history, you might perhaps have been forced to allege this excuse and ask for this consideration. But to write it of your own accord, when there was no compulsion to do so, and then to demand consideration, if you should happen to write bad Greek, is quite unreasonable. It is something like a man entering for the boxing match or pancratium in the public games, and, when he comes into the stadium, and it is his turn to fight, begging the spectators to pardon him 'if he is unable to stand the fatigue or the blows.' Such a man of course would be laughed at and condemned at once."[1] And this is what such historiographers should experience, to prevent them spoiling a good thing by their rash presumption. Similarly, in the rest of his life, he had imitated all the worst points in Greek fashions; for he was fond of pleasure and averse from toil. And this may be illustrated from his conduct in the present campaign: for being among the first to enter Greece at the time that the battle in Phocis took place, he retired to Thebes on the pretence of illness, in order to avoid taking part in the engagement; but, when the battle was ended, he was the first to write to the Senate announcing the victory, entering into every detail as though he had himself been present at the conflict. . . .

B.C. 146. Coss. Cn. Cornelius Lentulus, L. Mummius.

On the arrival of the Consul Mummius, Metellus was sent back into Macedonia. Mummius was accompanied by L. Aurelius Orestes, who had been nearly murdered in the riot at Corinth (38, 7), *and, pitching his camp in the Isthmus, was joined by allies who raised his army to three thousand five hundred cavalry and twenty-six thousand infantry. The Achaeans made a sudden attack upon them and gained a slight success, which was a few days afterwards revenged by a signal defeat. Instead of retiring into Corinth, and*

[1] Plutarch reports the same anecdote much more briefly in *Cato Maj.* 12, as do others. Professor Freeman (*History of Federal Government*, p. 142) seems to regard it as a serious indication that the Amphictyonic council had become a body exercising some literary authority, in default of any other. I think that Cato had no such meaning. He mentioned any body of men, however unlikely to exercise such an influence, which at any rate was Greek.

from that stronghold making some terms with Mummius, Diaeus fled to Megalopolis, where he poisoned himself, after first killing his wife. The rest of the beaten Achaean army took refuge in Corinth, which Mummius took and fired on the third day after the battle with Diaeus. Then the commissioners were sent from Rome to settle the whole of Greece. Pausanias, 7, 16-17; *Livy*, Ep. 52.

13. The incidents of the capture of Corinth were melancholy. The soldiers cared nothing for the works of art and the consecrated statues. I saw with my own eyes pictures thrown on the ground and soldiers playing dice on them; among them was a picture of Dionysus by Aristeides—in reference to which they say that the proverbial saying arose, "Nothing to the Dionysus,"—and the Hercules tortured by the shirt of Deianeira. . . . The destruction of the works of art in Corinth, September, B.C. 146.

14. Owing to the popular reverence for the memory of Philopoemen, they did not take down the statues of him in the various cities. So true is it, as it seems to me, that every genuine act of virtue produces in the mind of those who benefit by it an affection which it is difficult to efface. . . .

One might fairly, therefore, use the common saying: "He has been foiled not at the door, but in the road." . . .[1]

There were many statues of Philopoemen, and many erections in his honour, voted by the several cities; and a Roman at the time of the disaster which befell Greece at Corinth, wished to abolish them all and to formally indict him, laying an information against him, as though he were still alive, as an enemy and ill-wisher to Rome. But after a discussion, in which Polybius spoke against this sycophant, neither Mummius nor the commissioners would consent to abolish the honours of an illustrious man. . . . Statues of Philopoemen.

Polybius, in an elaborate speech, conceived in the spirit of what has just been said, maintained the cause of Philopoemen. His arguments were that "This Speech of Polybius defending the

[1] Seems to mean "he lost before he began," before he got even at the threshold of his enterprise. There is nothing to show to what the fragment refers.

memory of Philopoemen.

man had indeed been frequently at variance with the Romans on the matter of their injunctions, but he only maintained his opposition so far as to inform and persuade them on the points in dispute; and even that he did not do without serious cause. He gave a genuine proof of his loyal policy and gratitude, by a test as it were of fire, in the periods of the wars with Philip and Antiochus. For, possessing at those times the greatest influence of any one in Greece, from his personal power as well as that of the Achaeans, he preserved his friendship for Rome with the most absolute fidelity, having joined in the vote of the Achaeans in virtue of which, four months before the Romans crossed from Italy, they levied a war from their own territory upon Antiochus and the Aetolians, when nearly all the other Greeks had become estranged from the Roman friendship." Having listened to this speech and approved of the speaker's view, the ten commissioners granted that the complimentary erections to Philopoemen in the several cities should be allowed to remain. Acting on this pretext, Polybius begged of the Consul the statues of Achaeus, Aratus, and Philopoemen, though they had already been transported to Acarnania from the Peloponnese: in gratitude for which action people set up a marble statue of Polybius himself.[1] . . .

Polybius will have no confiscated goods.

15. After the settlement made by the ten commissioners in Achaia, they directed the Quaestor, who was to superintend the selling of Diaeus's property, to allow Polybius to select anything he chose from the goods and present it to him as a free gift, and to sell the rest to the highest bidders. But, so far from accepting any such present, Polybius urged his friends not to covet anything whatever of the goods sold by the Quaestor anywhere:—for he was going a round of the cities and selling the property of all those who had been partisans of Diaeus, as well of such as had been condemned, except those who left children or parents. Some of these friends did not take his

[1] The base of a statue of Polybius has been discovered at Olympia with the inscription ἡ πόλις ἡ τῶν Ἠλείων Πολύβιον Δυκόρτα Μεγαλοπολείτην. But the statue mentioned in the text seems to be one set up by the Achaeans. For the statues of Polybius, see Introduction, pp. xxxi. xxxii.

advice; but those who did follow it earned a most excellent reputation among their fellow-citizens.

16. After completing these arrangements in six months, the ten commissioners sailed for Italy, at the beginning of spring, having left a noble monument of Roman policy for the contemplation of all Greece. They also charged Polybius, as they were departing, to visit all the cities and to decide all questions that might arise, until such time as they were grown accustomed to their constitution and laws. Which he did: and after a while caused the inhabitants to be contented with the constitution given them by the commissioners, and left no difficulty connected with the laws on any point, private or public, unsettled.

B.C. 145. The commissioners return in the spring, leaving instructions with Polybius to explain the new constitutions.

[Wherefore the people, who always admired and honoured this man, being in every way satisfied with the conduct of his last years and his management of the business just described, honoured him with the most ample marks of their respect both during his life and after his death. And this universal verdict was fully justified. For if he had not elaborated and reduced to writing the laws relating to the administration of justice, everything would have been in a state of uncertainty and confusion. Therefore we must look upon this as the most glorious of the actions of Polybius.] . . .

Note by a friend of Polybius as to the effect of his careful fulfilment of his commission.

17. The Roman Proconsul, after the commissioners had left Achaia, having restored the holy places in the Isthmus and ornamented the temples in Olympia and Delphi, proceeded to make a tour of the cities, receiving marks of honour and proper gratitude in each. And indeed he deserved honour both public and private, for he conducted himself with self-restraint and disinterestedness, and administered his office with mildness, although he had great opportunities of enriching himself, and immense authority in Greece. And in fact in the points in which he was thought to have at all overlooked justice, he appears not to have done it for his own sake, but for that of his friends. And the most

Mummius acted in Greece with clean hands and great moderation.

conspicuous instance of this was in the case of the Chalcidian horsemen whom he put to death.[1] . . .

Death of Ptolemy Philometor in a war in Syria in support of Demetrius the younger against Alexander Balas. See above, 33, 18.

18. Ptolemy, king of Syria,[2] died from a wound received in the war: a man who, according to some, deserved great praise and abiding remembrance, and according to others the reverse. If any king before him ever was, he was mild and benevolent; a very strong proof of which is that he never put any of his own friends to death on any charge whatever; and I believe that not a single man at Alexandria either owed his death to him. Again, though he was notoriously ejected from his throne by his brother, in the first place, when he got a clear opportunity against him in Alexandria, he granted him a complete amnesty; and afterwards, when his brother once more made a plot against him to seize Cyprus, though he got him body and soul into his hands at Lapethus, he was so far from punishing him as an enemy, that he even made him grants in addition to those which formerly belonged to him in virtue of the treaty made between them, and moreover promised him his daughter. However, in the course of a series of successes and prosperity, his mind became corrupted; and he fell a prey to the dissoluteness and effeminacy characteristic of the Egyptians: and these vices brought him into serious disasters. . . .

CONCLUSION OF THE HISTORY

19. Having accomplished these objects, I returned home from Rome, having put, as it were, the finishing-stroke to my whole previous political actions, and obtained a worthy return for my constant loyalty to the Romans. Wherefore I make my

[1] Thebae quoque et Chalcis, quae auxilio fuerant, dirutae. Ipse L. Mummius abstinentissimum virum egit; nec quidquam ex iis opibus ornamentisque, quae praedives Corinthus habuit, in domum ejus pervenit. Livy, *Ep.* 52.

[2] Ptolemy Philometor, king of Egypt, is called, by way of distinction, "King of Syria," because that title was bestowed on him by the people of Antioch during his last expedition in Syria. This was undertaken in support of Alexander Balas, who repaid him by conniving at an attempt upon his life. Whereupon Ptolemy joined Demetrius, the son of Demetrius Soter, and supported his claim against Alexander Balas. Joseph. *Ant.* 13, 3; 1 Maccabees 11, 1-13.

prayers to all the gods that the rest of my life may continue in the same course and in the same prosperity; for I see only too well that Fortune is envious of mortals, and is most apt to show her power in those points in which a man fancies that he is most blest and most successful in life.

Such was the result of my exertions. But having now arrived at the end of my whole work, I wish to recall to the minds of my readers the point from which I started, and the plan which I laid down at the commencement of my history, and then to give a summary of the entire subject. I announced then at starting that I should begin my narrative at the point where Timaeus left off, and that going cursorily over the events in Italy, Sicily, and Libya—since that writer has only composed a history of those places,—when I came to the time when Hannibal took over the command of the Carthaginian army; Philip son of Demetrius the kingdom of Macedonia; Cleomenes of Sparta was banished from Greece; Antiochus succeeded to the kingdom in Syria, and Ptolemy Philopator to that in Egypt,—I promised that starting once more from that period, namely the 139th Olympiad, I would give a general history of the world: marking out the periods of the Olympiads, separating the events of each year, and comparing the histories of the several countries by parallel narratives of each, up to the capture of Carthage, and the battle of the Achaeans and Romans in the Isthmus, and the consequent political settlement imposed on the Greeks. From all of which I said that students would learn a lesson of supreme interest and instructiveness. This was to ascertain how, and under what kind of polity, almost the whole inhabited world came under the single authority of Rome, a fact quite unparalleled in the past. These promises then having all been fulfilled, it only remains for me to state the periods embraced in my history, the number of my books, and how many go to make up my whole work. . . .

See 1, 3, and 3, 4.

I.—SHORTER FRAGMENTS

The first eight of these fragments belong to book 6, *but as they do not fall in with what remains of the text, I have placed them here. I have divided these fragments into two classes:* (*A*) *those which seem to have some distinct reference which can be recognised or guessed:* (*B*) *those which though fairly complete in themselves cannot be so classed. A good many more, generally quoted by Suidas for the sake of some one word, did not seem worth putting in an English dress. The numbers in brackets are those of Hultsch's text.*

A

I (6, 2)

I believe Rome to have been founded in the second year of the 7th Olympiad.[1] B.C. 751.

[1] Dionysius Hal. (1, 74) quotes this statement of Polybius with the remark that it is founded on a single tablet in the custody of the Pontifices. Various calculations as to the date were:—

Eratosthenes followed by Apollodorus Nepos Dionysius Lutatius	Olymp. 7, 1	B.C. 752.
Q. Fabius Pictor	Olymp. 8, 1	B.C. 748.
Timaeus	38th year before Olymp. 1	B.C. 813.
L. Cincius Alimantus	Olymp. 12, 4	B.C. 729.
M. Porcius Cato	432 years after the Trojan war.	B.C. 752.
Varro Velleius Paterculus	Olymp. 6, 2	B.C. 755.
Pomponius Atticus	Olymp. 6, 3	B.C. 754.

But even granting a definite act of foundation (on which see Mommsen, *H. of R.* vol. i. p. 4), the Olympic register before 672 B.C. is a very uncertain foundation on which to build. See *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, vol. ii. p. 164 *sq.*

II (6, 2)

Polybius, like Aristodemus of Elis, informs us that the register of the athletic victors at the Olympic games began to be kept from the 27th Olympiad, at which Coroebus of Elis was first registered as conqueror in the stadium; and this Olympiad was regarded as an era by the Greeks from which to calculate dates.[1] B.C. 672.

III (6, 2)

The Palatine was named after Pallas, who died there. He was the son of Heracles and Lavina, daughter of Evander. His maternal grandfather raised a barrow as his tomb on this hill, and called the place after him the Pallantium.

IV (6, 2)

Among the Romans women are forbidden to drink wine; and they drink what is called *passum*, which is made from raisins, and tastes very like the sweet wine of Aegosthena or Crete. This is what they drink to quench their thirst. But it is almost impossible for them to drink wine without being found out. For, to begin with, the woman has not got the charge of wine; and, in the next place, she is bound to kiss all her male relatives and those of her husband, down to his cousins, every day on seeing them for the first time; and as she cannot tell which of them she will meet, she has to be on her guard. For if she has but tasted wine, there is no occasion for any formal accusation.[2]

V (6, 2)

He also founded Ostia at the mouth of the Tiber. Ancus Marcius, Livy, 1, 33.

[1] From Eusebius. It may be noted that this statement of Polybius is an earlier evidence than any other for the existence of an Olympian register prior to B.C. 600. Pausanias also dates the register from the year of Coroebus's victory (5, 8, 6).

[2] I have translated this passage as it stands in the various editions of Polybius. But I feel convinced that none of it belongs to him except the first sentence. It comes from Athenaeus, 440 *E*.

VI (6, 2)

Lucius Tarquinius Priscus comes to Rome.

Lucius, the son of Demaratus of Corinth, came to Rome relying on his own ability and wealth, and convinced that the advantages he possessed would place him in the front rank in the state: for he had a wife who, among other useful qualities, was admirably suited by nature to assist in any political enterprise. Arrived at Rome, and admitted to citizenship, he devoted himself to flattering the king; and before very long his wealth, his natural dexterity, and, more than all, his early training, enabled him so to please the king's taste that he gained his cordial liking and confidence. As time went on his intimacy became so close that he lived with [Ancus] Marcius, and assisted him in managing his kingdom. While so engaged, he contrived to make himself useful to every one. All who were suitors for anything found in him an active supporter and friend: his wealth was spent with noble liberality and judgment on various objects of national importance; and thus he secured for himself the gratitude of many, and the goodwill and good word of all, and finally obtained the throne. . . .[1]

Every branch of virtue should be practised by those who aim at good training, from childhood, but, above all, courage. . .

(6, 1)

An impossible lie admits of no defence even.

(6, 1)

It is the act of a wise and sensible man to recognise—as Hesiod puts it—"how much greater the half is than the whole."[2]

VII (6, 1)

To learn sincerity towards the Gods is a kind of image of truthfulness towards each other.

[1] See Livy, i. 34. Dionys. Halic. 3, 46.

[2] Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 40, *νήπιοι· οὐδὲ ἴσασιν ὅσῳ πλέον ἥμισυ παντός.*

VIII (6, 1)

It generally happens in the world that men who acquire have a natural turn for keeping; while those who succeed to wealth, without any trouble to themselves, are apt to squander it.

IX (10)

The strongest fortifications are in general dangerous to both sides; which may be illustrated from what occurs in the case of citadels. These last are regarded as contributing greatly to the security of the cities in which they stand, and to the protection of their freedom; but they often turn out to be the origin of slavery and indisputable misfortunes.[1]

X (13)

Some few approved of his doing so, but the majority objected, saying, some that it was folly, and others that it was madness for a man thus to risk and hazard his life, who was quite unacquainted with the kind of fighting in use among these barbarians.[2]

XI (16)

"Secure retreat in case disaster fall."

One ought always to keep this line in mind. From failing to do so Lucius the Roman[3] met with a grave disaster. So narrow is the risk of destruction to the most powerful forces when the leaders are unwise. A sufficient illustration to thoughtful men is furnished by the headstrong invasion of Argos by Pyrrhus king of the Epirotes,[4] and the expedition through Thrace of king Lysimachus against Dorimichaites, king of Odrysae;[5] and indeed many other similar cases.

[1] Polybius is perhaps referring to the Acrocorinthus especially. But we must remember that many of the citadels in the third century B.C. were in the hands of Macedonian garrisons.

[2] This has been referred by some to the account of Scipio Aemilianus's single combat with the Spaniard. See 35, 5.

[3] Perhaps L. Postumius, Livy, 23, 24 (Hultsch).

[4] B.C. 272. Plutarch, *Pyrrh.* 31-34.

[5] See Pausan. i. 9, 6. His disaster compelled him to give up his dominions beyond the Danube. Another and more successful war in Thrace seems referred to in Diod. Sic. 18, 14.

XII (23)

Marcellus never once conquered Hannibal, who in fact remained unbeaten until Scipio's victory.[1]

XIII (25)

No darkness, no storm however violent, turned him from his purpose. He forced his way through all such obstacles; he overcame even disease by resolute labour, and never once failed in an object or experienced a variation in his uniform good fortune.

XIV (29)

In old times single combats among the Romans were conducted with good faith [but in our days many contrivances have been hit upon].

XV (31)

The horse, from the agony of the wound, first fell forward, and then galloped furiously through the middle of the camp.

XVI (42)

Seeing that the superstitious feelings of the soldiers were roused by these portents, he exerted himself to remove the scruples of the men by means of his own intelligence and strategic skill.

XVII (63)

SHIPS WITH SIX BANKS OF OARS

These vessels appear to be as swift sailers as penteconters, but to be much inferior to triremes; and their construction has been abandoned for many years past. Polybius, however, is supposed to lay down the measurements of such vessels, which the Romans and Carthaginians appear to have often employed in their wars with each other.[2]

[1] Livy, however, records more than one success of Marcellus agains Hannibal, see 23, 16, 46; 27, 14. Scipio's victory of course is at Zama.

[2] From Zosimus, 5, 20, 7. See 1, 26.

XVIII (64)

Getting completely drunk, and all flung on the ground in the various tents, they neither heard any word of command nor took any thought of the future whatever.[1]

XIX (66)

In consultations of war, as in those relating to bodily sickness, one ought to take as much account of the symptoms that have since arisen as of those originally existing.

XX (90)

Cappadocia extends from Mount Taurus and Lycaonia up to the Pontic Sea. The name is Persian and arose thus. A certain Persian [named Cappadocus?] was present at a hunt with Artaxerxes, or some other king, when a lion sprang upon the king's horse. This Persian happened to be in that part of the hunting company, and drawing his sword rescued the king from his imminent danger and killed the lion. This Persian therefore ascending the highest mountain in the neighbourhood received as a gift from the king as much territory as the human eye could take in, looking east, west, north, and south.[2]

XXI (95)

The Celtiberians have a peculiar manœuvre in war. When they see their infantry hard pressed, they dismount and leave their horses standing in their places. They have small pegs attached to their leading reins, and having fixed them carefully into the ground, they train their horses to keep their places obediently in line until they come back and pull up the pegs.

XXII (96)

The Celtiberians excel the rest of the world in the construction of their swords; for their point is strong and service-

[1] Some refer this to a circumstance narrated in Livy, 41, 2. But Hultsch points out that Livy is not using Polybius in that period.

[2] From *Constantine Prophyrogenneta de thematis*, p. 18, ed. Bonnensis (Hultsch). He says that there are two Cappadocias, great and little. Great Cappadocia extending from Caesarea (Neo-Caesarea), and Mount Taurus to the Pontus, bounded on the south-west by the Halys and on the east by Melitene.

able, and they can deliver a cut with both edges. Wherefore the Romans abandoned their ancestral swords after the Hannibalian war and adopted those of the Iberians. They adopted, I say, the construction of the swords, but they can by no means imitate the excellence of the steel or the other points in which they are so elaborately finished.[1]

XXIII (102)

The Roman praetor Marcus[2] wished to get rid of the war against the Lusitani, and laying aside war altogether, to shirk—as the saying is—"the men's hall for the women's bower," because of the recent defeat of the praetor by the Lusitani.

(103)

But those of the Ligurians who fought against Mago were unable to do anything important or great.

XXIV (113)

A *mora* consisted of nine hundred men.[3]

XXV (117)

A general needs good sense and boldness; they are the most necessary qualities for dangerous and venturesome undertakings.

XXVI (154)

The second king of Egypt, called Philadelphus, when giving his daughter Berenice in marriage to Antiochus king of Syria, was careful to send her some Nile water, that the young bride might drink no other water.

XXVII (156)

I say this to point out the wisdom of the Romans, and the folly of those who despise the practice of making comparisons with the habits of foreign nations, and believe themselves competent to reform their own armies without reference to others.[4]

[1] See 6, 23. The excellence of Spanish steel has never perhaps been surpassed even to our day. [2] See 35, 2-4.

[3] Plutarch, *Pelop.* 17, who says that other authorities reckoned it at 500 and 700 men. There were originally six morae in the Spartan army. See Xenophon, *Rep. Lac.* 11, 4; *Hell.* 6, 4, 12-17. [4] See 6, 25.

XXVIII (157)

The Romans were wont to take great care not to appear to be the aggressors, or to attack their neighbours without provocation; but to be considered always to be acting in self-defence, and only to enter upon war under compulsion.[1]

XXIX (166)

When Scipio Africanus, the younger, was commissioned by the Senate to settle the kingdoms throughout the world, and see that they were put in proper hands, he only took five slaves with him; and, on one of these dying during the journey, he wrote home to his relations to buy another and send him to take the place of the dead one.[2]

XXX (184)

If one ought to speak of *Fortune* in regard to such things; for I fear she often gets credit of that sort without good reason; while the real fault lies with the men who administer public business, who sometimes act with seriousness and sometimes the reverse.

B

XXXI (1)

But not making at all a good guess at the king's mind, he acted in a most inconsiderate manner.

XXXII (2)

Want of civilisation appears to have an extraordinary influence on mankind in this direction.

XXXIII (3)

But the general being unable to endure the unfairness of those who made these assertions . . .

[1] This is referred by Nissen to the account of the origin of the third Punic war. See 36, 3-5.

[2] This moderation in the number of slaves was perhaps imitated from Cato. See Cato, *Orationum frgm.* 3. Ed. Jordan.

XXXIV (5)

But he determined to hold out to the last, trusting to the supplies from Egypt.

XXXV (6)

But having fallen in with him he gained an extremely fortunate victory.

XXXVI (7)

In all these things the Aetolians had been deceived.

XXXVII (8)

And some he honoured with gold cloths and spears, because he wished that his promises should agree with his performances.

XXXVIII (11)

He wrote in bitter and frantic terms, calling them fiends and murderers in his letter, if they abandoned the positions thus disgracefully, before they had suffered or witnessed any hardship.

XXXIX (12)

There is a courage in words too which can despise death.

XXXIX (14)

Before he had been rejoined by the stragglers of the skirmishing parties.

XL (27)

Being utterly at a loss, at last he rested his chance of escape from the difficulty which was upon him on some such hope as this.

XLI (30)

None of the citizens being aware of what was taking place owing to the distance, for the city was a large one.

XLII (32)

But trusting to them he undertook the war against Ariarathes.

XLIII (34)

Harpyia is a city in Illyria near Encheleae, to which Baton, charioteer of Amphiaraus, removed after the latter's disappearance.

XLIV (35)

And he waited for the coming of Hasdrubal.

XLV (36)

Hearing all this through the curtain the king laughed.

XLVI (39)

Foreseeing and fearing the fierce temper and obstinacy of the men.

XLVII (40)

At that time, persuaded that he was enduring a fiery test, he was released from the suspicion.

XLVIII (43)

He thought therefore that it was dangerous to have shared in their enterprise when their plan had failed and come to an end.

XLIX (44)

Having urged the soldiers to make haste, and exhorted the tribunes to engage.

L (46)

Thinking it better and safer not to be present at the hour of the enemy's opportunity, nor when they were under the influence of popular excitement and fury.

LI (47)

Whenever it is possible to obtain satisfaction from those who have wronged us either by law or by any other settled forms of justice.

LII (54)

Having drawn his army from the pass he encamped.

LII (55)

And then they took up some sort of order, as though by mutual consent, and fought the battle in regular formation.

LIII (56)

That which causes the most pain at the time involves also the most signal revulsion of joy.

LIV (57)

Having ordered the pilots to steer the ships as fast as they could to Elaea.

LV (61)

They not only drove themselves off the stage, but ruined also all Greece.

LV (62)

But he, from his long experience of war, did not all lose his presence of mind.

LVI (67)

He persuades them by reckoning all the wealth he considered they would gain in the battle.

LVII (68)

The Romans had been inspired by some divine influence, and having fortified their courage with irresistible might . . .

LVII (69)

To signalise some by favours, and others by punishments, that they might be a warning to the rest.

LVIII (72)

And they, being persuaded, and throwing themselves in the way of the enemy's charge, died gallantly.

LIX (73)

He tried to take the city by an intrigue, having long secured a party of traitors within it.

LX (74)

He brought up the transports, by lading which with rocks and sinking them at the mouth of the harbour he planned to shut out the enemy entirely from the sea.

LXI (80)

Though I have much more to say, I fear lest some of you may think that I am unnecessarily diffuse.

LXII (81)

They are reserving themselves for an opportunity, and are quite ready to meet them again.

LXIII (85)

To be eager for life and to cling to it is a sign of the greatest baseness and weakness.

LXIV (86)

He was feeling something like starters in horse races, which are started by the raising of torches.

LXV (88)

Their boldness transgresses the bounds of propriety, and their actions are a violation of duty.

LXV (91)

Seeing that the Carthaginians had obeyed all injunctions in the most honourable spirit.

LXVI (92)

To have fifty ships built entirely new, and to launch fifty of those already existing from the docks.

LXVII (100)

Lucius being appointed to go on a mission to the Lapateni and speak to them in favour of an unconditional surrender, was unprepared for the task before him.

LXVIII (101)

Of all the determining forces in war the most decisive of failure or success is the spirit of the combatants.

LXIX (104)

Having mentioned summarily the defeats they had sustained, and putting before them the successes of the Macedonians.

LXX (105)

For he perceived that the Macedonian kingdom would become contemptible, if the rebels succeeded in their first attempt.

LXXI (109)

Therefore it was intolerable that the Romans even then should make their way into Macedonia unobserved.

LXXII (110)

He, if any one of our time has done so, has examined all that has been said scientifically on tactics.

LXXIII (111)

Metrodorus and his colleagues, frightened at the threatening aspect of Philip, departed.

LXXIV (112)

The Romans made no show of bearing a grudge for what had taken place.

LXXV (113)

But putting both spurs to his horse he rode on as hard as he could.

LXXVI (114)

Being annoyed at the treaty, Nabis paid no attention to its provisions.

LXXVII (120)

It was neither possible to examine the man closely in his state of physical weakness, nor to put a question to him for fear of worrying him.

LXXVIII (122)

The Pannonians having seized the fort at the beginning of the war, had taken it as a base of operations, and had fitted it up for the reception of booty.

LXXIX (124)

But wishing to point the contrast between his policy to those who trusted and those who disobeyed him, he commenced the siege.

LXXX (126)

So that those in the assembly were thunderstruck and unable to collect their thoughts, sympathising with the poignant sorrow of those thus dispossessed of their all.

LXXXI (131)

They immediately sent a courier to Perseus to tell him what had happened. (132) It was Perseus's design to keep it close, but he could not hide the truth.

LXXXII (133)

In other respects he was well equipped for service, but his spear was limp.

LXXXIII (134)

Publius was anxious to engage and avail himself of the enthusiasm of the barbarians. (135) He put in at Naupactus in Aetolia. (136) He escorted Publius out with great respect. (137) Having received Publius and Gaius with kindness and honour.

LXXXIV (140)

It was the deliberate intention of the Romans to fight at sea.

LXXXV (141)

While they were still together and were fighting at close quarters with their swords, taking his stand behind them he stabbed him under the armpit.

LXXXVI (151)

This man presented Prusias with many silver and gold cups during the banquet.

LXXXVII (153)

Taking a wise view of the future, he came to the conclusion to get rid of the garrison sent by Ptolemy.

LXXXVIII (158)

On that occasion both Romans and Carthaginians bivouacked on the embankment.

LXXXIX (159)

Not being able to persuade him again, owing to that king's cautious and inactive character, he was forced to offer five hundred talents. And so Seleucus agreed to give the aid.

XC (161)

Chance and Fortune, so to speak, enhanced the achievements of Scipio, so that they always appeared more illustrious than was expected.

XCI (162)

One must not pass over even a minor work of his, as in the case of a famous artist.

XCII (163)

Scipio counselled him either not to try, or to do so in such a manner as to succeed at all risks. For to make an attempt on the same man twice was dangerous in itself, and was apt to make a man altogether contemptible.

XCIII (164)

But being jealous of Scipio they tried to decry his achievements.

XCIV (168)

Fixing the stocks upright in the ground in a semicircle touching each other.

XCV (170)

The important point of their resolution was that they would not admit a garrison or governor, and would not give up their constitution as established by law.

XCV (177-179)

He said that we should not let the enemy escape, or encourage their boldness by shirking a battle. . . .

Conceiving a slight hope from the besieged garrison, he made the most of it. . . .

Pretending warm friendship, he tried every manœuvre whereby he might promote the enemy's interests, and surround us by the gravest perils. . . .

XCVI (182)

As the rock caused them difficulty because they were obliged to bore a hole in it, they completed the mine which they were making by using wooden bolts.

XCVII (183)

He did not think it right to leave the war in Etruria, and give his attention to the cities in that part of the country. He feared that he should waste all the time, which was not very long to begin with, in less important details.

XCVIII (185)

And having got his boats and hemioliae dragged across the Isthmus he put to sea, being anxious to be in time for the Achaean congress.

XCIX (191)

Philip was annoyed at the request of the Corcyreans.

C (192)

Since circumstances debar Philip, the king wishes to give that man the credit of the achievement, making the proposal to him in the light of a favour.

CI (193)

Philip, having given out that he was about to serve out rations, made a proclamation that a return should be made to him of all who had not provisions for more than thirty days.

CII (195)

After two days from starting for the seat of war Philip passed the order to make two rations three, whenever he wanted an additional day, and sometimes to make two four. (? Cp. Livy, 35, 28.)

CIII (195)

A swipe (*φρεατοτόπανον*) is one of the implements mentioned by Polybius. (See 9, 43, Hultsch.)

CIV (199)

It was impossible to convey the equipments and provisions for the legions by sea or upon beasts of burden; they must carry ten days' provisions in their wallets.

II.—GEOGRAPHICAL NAMES QUOTED BY STEPHANUS AND OTHERS AS HAVING BEEN USED BY POLYBIUS

Achriane, a town in Hyrcania.
Adrane, a town in Thrace.
Aegosthena, a town in Megaris.
Allaria, a town in Crete.
Ancara, a town in Italy.
Aperanteia, a city and district in Thessaly.
Apsyrtus, an island off Illyricum.
Ares, plain of, "A desolate plain in Thrace with low trees."
Arsinoe, a town in Aetolia and in Libya.

Atella, a town of the Opici, in Campania. "The Atellani surrendered."
Badiza, a town in Bruttium.
Babrantium, a place near Chios.
Cabyle, a town in Thrace.
Calliope, a town in Parthia.
Candasa, a fort in Caria.
Carthaea, one of the four cities of Ceos.
Corax, a mountain between Callipolis and Naupactus.
Cyathus, a river in Aetolia, near Arsinoe (a tributary of the Achelous).
Dassaretae, an Illyrian tribe.
Digeri, a Thracian tribe.
Ellopium, a town in Aetolia.
Gitta, a town in Palestine (Gath).
Hella, in Asia, a port belonging to Attalus.
Hippo (Regius), a town in Libya.
Hyrtacus, a town in Crete.
Hyscana, a town in Illyria.
Ilattia, a town in Crete.
Lampeteia, a town in Bruttium.
Mantua, in N. Italy.
Massyleis, a Libyan tribe.
Melitusa, a town in Illyria.
Oricus (m.), a town in Epirus, "The first town on the right as one sails into the Adriatic."
Parthus, a town in Illyria.
Philippi, a town in Macedonia.
Phorynna, a town in Thrace.
Phytaeum, a town in Aetolia.
Rhyncus, in Aetolia.
Sibyrtus, a town in Crete.
Singa, a town in Libya.
Tabraca, a town in Libya.
Temesia, a town in Bruttium.
Volci, a town in Etruria.
Xynia, a town in Thessaly.

APPENDIX I

THE DIVISIONS OF THE MACEDONIAN EMPIRE AFTER THE DEATH OF ALEXANDER.

ALEXANDER THE GREAT, OB. JUNE B.C. 323.

Justin, 12, 16; Arrian, *An.* 7, 28.

οἱ βασιλεῖς { Philip III. (Arrhidaeus) half-brother of Alexander, ob. B.C. 317.
Alexander IV. (posthumous son of Alexander by Roxana).

Successive Guardians (οἱ ἐπιμεληταί). { Perdiccas, killed B.C. 321.
Arrhidaeus and Python (for a few months), resigned B.C. 321.

Hipparch . . . Seleucus. Captain of the Bodyguards . . . Cassander.

FIRST DISTRIBUTION OF THE PROVINCES OF THE EMPIRE. Diodorus Sic. 18, 3; Justin, 13, 4.

Macedonia and Greece.	Antipater.
Egypt, and parts of Libya and Asia.	Ptolemy s. of Lagus.
Pamphylia (3). Lycia. Greater Phrygia.	Antigonus.
Caria.	Cassander.
Thrace.	Lysimachus.
Paphlagonia. Cappadocia.	Eumenes.
Media Major.	Python.
Syria.	Laomedon
Phrygia Hellespontiaca.	Leonnatus.
Lydia.	Meleager (1)
Cilicia.	Philotas.
Media Minor.	Atropatos.
Bactria ulterior.	Unchanged (2)
India.	
Indian Colonies.	*Python s. of Agenor*
Punjaub.	*Taxiles.*
Parapamisos.	*Oxyartes.*
Arachossi and *Cedrussi.*	*Sibyrtius.*
Drangae and *Arei.*	*Stasanor.*
Bactria.	*Amyntas.*
Sogdiani.	*Stasander.*
Parthians.	*Philip.*
Hyrcani.	*Phrataphernes.*
Carmani.	*Tlepolemus.*
Persis.	*Peucestes.*
Babylonians.	*Archon.*
Mesopotamia.	*Arcesilaus.*

(1) Justin calls him Menander.
(2) The provinces and governors printed in italics are not mentioned by Diodorus here, who merely says that they were unchanged. But the list given by Justin agrees with that of Diodorus in the next settlement, with certain exceptions, which may be regarded as changes arising from death or other causes.
(3) Justin gives Pamphylia and Lycia to Nearchus.

SECOND ARRANGEMENT, B.C. 321.

οἱ βασιλεῖς { Philip III. (Arrhidaeus) ob. 317 B.C.
Alexander IV. (son of Alexander by Roxana).

Antipater.	Ptolemy, s. of Lagus.	Antigonus.	Cassander.	Lysimachus.	Python.	Laomedon.	Philoxenus.	Seleucus.	Nicanor.	Cheiton.	Arrhidaeus.	Amphimachus.	
(Unchanged.) Macedonia and Greece.	(Unchanged.) Egypt & parts of Libya & Asia.	Greater Phrygia, Lycia, & Susiana added.	(Unchanged.) Caria.	(Unchanged.) Thrace.	(Unchanged.) Media.	(Unchanged.) Syria.	Cilicia.	Babylonia.	Cappadocia.	Lydia.	Phrygia Hellespontiaca.	Mesopotamia and Asbelitis.	The other provinces as in the previous list.

THIRD ARRANGEMENT, B.C. 312-311.

King . . Alexander IV (in charge of Roxana). Strategus in Europe till the king comes of age . . Cassander.

B.C. 312-311. THIRD ARRANGEMENT OF THE PROVINCES OF THE EMPIRE. Diod. Sic. 19, 105.

Ptolemy, s. of Lagus.	Lysimachus.	Cassander.	Antigonus.	Seleucus Nicanor.	
Egypt.	Thrace.	Macedonia.	All Asia (ἀφηγεῖσθαι).	Babylonia.	Greece nominally free, B.C. 307 Demetrius (s. of Antigonus) becomes Master of Athens.

B.C. 311. Alexander IV and Roxana murdered by order of Cassander.

B.C. 306. FOURTH ARRANGEMENT. **Kingdoms** FORMED, AFTER THE NAVAL VICTORY OF DEMETRIUS OVER PTOLEMY. Diod. 30, 53.

Ptolemy, s. of Lagus.	Antigonus.	Seleucus.	Lysimachus.	Cassander.	
King of Egypt.	King of Syria and Asia.	King of Upper Asia.	King of Thrace.	King of Macedonia.	Demetrius Poliorcetes (s. of Antigonus) also takes the title of *king*, and in B.C. 304 returns to Athens and wages war with Cassander.

B.C. 301. SETTLEMENT AFTER THE BATTLE OF IPSUS, IN WHICH ANTIGONUS FELL.
(Lysimachus and Seleucus against Antigonus and Demetrius.)

Ptolemy, s. of Lagus, ob. 283.	Seleucus Nicanor, ob. B.C. 280.	Lysimachus, ob 281.	Cassander, ob. B.C. 297.	
King of Egypt.	King of Syria.	King of Thrace.	King of Macedonia.	Greece is nominally free, but in B.C. 295 Demetrius takes Athens, and becoming King of Macedonia in B.C. 295 to B.C. 287, he retains Greece as part of the kingdom. In the confusion which followed it was practically free.

APPENDIX II

THE KINGS OF EGYPT, SYRIA, AND MACEDONIA, TO THE END OF THE PERIOD EMBRACED IN POLYBIUS'S HISTORY

B.C.	EGYPT	B.C.	SYRIA	B.C.	MACEDONIA
		306-301	Antigonus the One-eyed		
306-285	Ptolemy, s. of Lagus	301-280	Seleucus Nicanor	323-311	Alexander IV.
283-247	Ptolemy II. Philadelphus	289-261	Antiochus I. Soter, s. of	323-317	Philip III. (Arrhidaeus)
247-222	Ptolemy III. Euergetes		Antigonus the One-eyed	311-306	Regency of Cassander
222-205	Ptolemy IV. Philopator	261-246	Antiochus II. Theos	306-296	Cassander
205-181	Ptolemy V. Epiphanes	246-226	Seleucus II. Callinicus	296	Philip IV. s. of Cassander
181-146	Ptolemy VI. Philometor	226-223	Seleucus III. Alexander	296-294	Antipater, Alexander — sons of Cassander
170-154	Ptolemy VII. Physcon,		or Ceraunus	294-287	Demetrius I. Poliercetes, ob. 283
	joint king with his	223-187	Antiochus III. the Great	287-281	Divided between Lysimachus and Pyrrhus
	brother, Ptolemy VI.	187-175	Seleucus IV. Philopator	281-280	Seleucus, Nicanor; Ptolemy Ceraunus, s. of Ptolemy of Egypt
146-117	Ptolemy VII. sole king	175-164	Antiochus IV. Epiphanes	280-277	[Various claimants]
		164-162	Antiochus V. Eupator	277-239	Antigonus Gonatas, s. of Demetrius I.
		162-150	Demetrius I. Soter	239-229	Demetrius II. s. of Gonatas
		150-147	Alexander Balas	229-179	Philip V. s. of Demetrius II.
		147-125	Demetrius II. Nicator		[Antigonus Doson, nominally his guardian assumes the crown B.C. 229-220]
				170-168	Perseus [Macedonia a Roman province]

APPENDIX III

I, 21. The capture of Cornelius Asina is ascribed by Livy (*Ep.* 17) to an act of treachery, *per fraudem velut in colloquium evocatus captus est.* He is copied by Florus (2, 2) and Eutropius (2, 10). See also Valerius Max. 6, 6, 2. This is perhaps not incompatible with the narrative of Polybius, which, however, does not suggest it. He must have been released at the time of the entrance of Regulus into Africa, for being captured in B.C. 260, we find him Consul for B.C. 254, without any account of his release being preserved.

I, 32-36.—XANTHIPPUS THE LACEDAEMONIAN

The fate of Xanthippus has been variously reported. Polybius represents him as going away voluntarily, and Mommsen supposes him to have taken service in the Egyptian army. Appian, however, asserts that he and his men were drowned on their way home to Sparta by the Carthaginian captains who were conveying them, and who were acting on secret orders from home (8, 4). Mommsen also regards the account of Polybius of the reforms introduced in the Carthaginian tactics by Xanthippus as exaggerated: "The officers of Carthage can hardly have waited for foreigners to teach them that the light African cavalry can be more appropriately employed on the plain than among hills and forests." The doubt had apparently occurred to others [Diodor. Sic. fr. bk. 23.] The mistake, however, was not an unnatural one. For other references to Xanthippus see Cicero *de Off.* 3, 26, 7; Valerius Max. 1, 1, 14; Dio Cassius, fr. 43, 24.

I, 34.—M. ATILIUS REGULUS

No more is told us of the fate of Regulus, and Mommsen says "nothing more is known with certainty." Arnold, following Niebuhr, declared the story of his cruel death to be a fabrication. The tradition, however, of his mission home to propose peace, his subsequent return after advising against it, and his death under torture, was received undoubtingly by the Roman writers of the time of Cicero and afterwards. See Cicero, *Off.* 3, § 99; *ad Att.* 16, 11; *de Sen.* § 74; *Paradox.* 2, 16; *Tusc.* 5, § 14. Horace,

Od. 3, 5; Livy, *Ep.* 18; Valerius Max. 1, 1, 14; Dio Cassius, fr. 43, 28. To Appian (8, 4) is due the additional particular of the barrel full of nails, καὶ αὐτὸν οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι καθείρξαντες ἐν γαλεάγρᾳ κέντρα πάντοθεν ἐχούσῃ διέφθειραν. Against this uniformity of tradition is to be set the silence of Polybius. But on the other hand, in this introductory part of his history, Polybius does not profess to give full particulars (see note to 1, 21); and in the case of Regulus, he has not stated what we learn from Livy (*Ep.* 18) and Valerius Max. 4, 4, 6, that his stay in Africa for the second year was against his own express wish, his private business requiring, as he thought, his presence in Italy.

1, 60.—LUTATIUS

Lutatius is represented by Polybius as directing the operations at the battle of Aegusa; but it appears that he had received some hurt a few days before, and was confined to his lectica during the action (*lectica claudum jucuisse*). The chief direction therefore devolved upon the praetor, Q. Valerius Falto, who accordingly claimed to share his triumph, but was refused on the technical ground that the victory had not been won under his *auspicia*. Valerius Max. 2, 8, 2.

1, 76.—HAMILCAR

(Vol. i. p. 85.) Dr. Warre writes on the manœuvre of Hamilcar as follows: "Hamilcar's army is in column of route; elephants leading, then cavalry, then light-armed infantry, and heavy-armed infantry in the rear. He observes the enemy bearing down hastily; gives orders to his whole force to turn about, and then forms line (ἐξέτασις) by successive wheels of his heavy-armed troops. He would thus have changed his heavy-armed from column of route into line by wheeling them while retiring to the right (or left) about. The light-armed apparently passed through the intervals; the cavalry halted when they came to the line now formed up, and at once turned to their front and faced the enemy, and the remainder marched forward to meet them. Polybius does not tell us with what front Hamilcar was marching; but I think it is clear that he was in column of route and not in battle array (ἐκ παρατάξεως). Thus the deployment of his columns, *while retiring, by right (or left) about wheel* into line by successive συντάγματα, or battalions, would be a very pretty manœuvre, and only such as an able tactician would resort to."

11, 22-23.—SCIPIO AND HASDRUBAL SON OF GESCO

(Vol. ii. p. 67.) Of this passage Dr. Warre has again favoured me with a note and a translation which I append: "The passage in Polybius is very interesting. It is a good tactical example of an attack on both flanks, refusing the centre, the effect being to keep the enemy from moving the troops in his centre to the assistance of his wings. The inversion of order, by which the right became the left in the case of those troops who had first orders 'right turn, left wheel from line into column,' and then 'left wheel into line,' is an ordinary instance of doing what might be called 'clubbing' a battalion or brigade. It is of course on parade a clumsy mistake to make; but Scipio rightly took no notice of it in battle, as Polybius, who sees the matter with a soldier's eye, observes. Scipio's army was inferior in numbers, and so he first moved his Romans *outwards* while still in line, and then formed for attack with the cavalry, light infantry, and three battalions (cohorts) on each flank."



The following is Dr. Warre's translation:—

"Polybius 11, 22.—On this occasion Scipio seems to have employed two stratagems. He observed that Hasdrubal was in

the habit of marching out late in the day, of keeping his Libyan troops in the centre, and of posting his elephants in front of each wing. His own custom was to march out at the said hour to oppose him, and to set the Romans in his centre opposite to the Libyans, while he posted his Spanish troops upon his wings. On the day upon which he determined to decide matters he did the reverse of this, and thereby greatly assisted his forces towards gaining a victory, and placed the enemy at no small disadvantage. At daybreak he sent his aides and gave orders to all the tribunes and to the soldiers that they were first to get their breakfast, and then to arm and to parade in front of the ramparts. This was done. The soldiers obeyed eagerly, having an idea of his intention. He sent forward the cavalry and light infantry, giving them joint orders to approach the camp of the enemy, and to skirmish up to it boldly; but he himself took the heavy infantry, and at sunrise advanced, and when he had reached the middle of the plain formed line in just the opposite order to his previous formation. For he proceeded to deploy the Iberians on the centre and the Romans on the flanks."

. . . . . .

"For a while the Romans remained as usual silent, but after the day had worn, and the light infantry engagement was indecisive and on equal terms, since those who were hard pressed retired on their own heavy infantry and (ἐκ μεταβολῆς κινδυνεύειν), after retreating formed again for attack, then it was that Scipio withdrew his skirmishers through the intervals of the troops under the standards, and divided them on either wing in rear of his line, first the velites, and in succession to them his cavalry, and at first made his advance *in line direct.* But when distant (? five) furlongs from the enemy he directed the Iberians to advance in the same formation, but gave orders to the wings to turn outwards (to the right wing for the infantry to turn to their right, and to their left to the left). Then he himself took from the right and Lucius Marcius and Marcus Junius from the left the three leading squadrons of cavalry, and in front of these the usual number of velites, and three cohorts (for this is the Roman term), but the one body wheeled to the left and the other to the right, were led in column against the enemy, advancing at full speed, the troops in succession forming and following as they wheeled. . . .

(They were in line, and the cavalry and velites got the word turn, left wheel, and the infantry right wheel and forward, *i.e.* the

light troops and cavalry wheeled from their outer flank, and the heavy infantry from their inner flank.)

"And when these troops were not far off the enemy, and the Iberians in the line direct were still a considerable distance behind, as they were advancing slowly, they came in contact with either wing of the enemy, the Roman forces being in column according to his original intention.

"The subsequent movements by which the troops in rear of these columns came into line with those leading were exactly the reverse, generally, in the case of the right and the left wings, and particularly, in case of the light troops and cavalry and the heavy infantry. For the cavalry and velites on the right wing forming to the right into line were trying to outflank the enemy, but the infantry formed on the contrary to the left. On the left wing the cavalry and light infantry left formed into line, and the heavy infantry right formed into line. And so it came to pass that on both wings the cavalry and light troops were in inverted order, *i.e.* their proper right had become their left. The general took little heed of this, but cared only for that which was of greater importance, the outflanking of the enemy; and rightly so, for while a general ought to know what has happened, he should use the movements that are suitable to the circumstances."

34, 5, 10.—PYTHEAS

The date of these voyages of Pytheas is uncertain beyond the fact that they were somewhere in the 4th century B.C. His Periplus, or notes of his voyage, was extant until the 5th century A.D. The fragments remaining have been published by Arvesdson, Upsala, 1824. The objection raised by Polybius to the impossibility of a poor man making such voyages is sometimes answered by the supposition that he was sent officially by the Massilian merchants to survey the north of Europe and look out for places suitable for commerce. The northern sea, which he describes as "like a jellyfish through which one can neither walk nor sail," is referred "to the rotten and spongy ice which sometimes fills those waters." This is assuming Thule to be Iceland. Tacitus supposed it to be Shetland (*Agr.* 10), and described the waters there as sluggish, and not subject to the influence of the wind. See Elton (*Origins of English History*, pp. 73-74). Elton quotes Wallace (*Concerning Thule*, 31), who comments on Tacitus by saying, "This agrees with the sea in the north-east of Scotland,

not for the reason given by Tacitus, but because of the contrary tides, which drive several ways, and stop not only boats with oars but ships under sail."

34, 10.—THE SUBTERRANEAN FISH

Schweighaeuser in his note on this passage quotes Aristotle *de Anim.* 6, 15, who states that gudgeon thus hide themselves in the earth; and Seneca, *Nat. Q.*, 3, 17 and 19, who refers to the fact *piscem posse vivere sub terra et effodi*, and quotes an instance as occurring in Caria. See also Livy, 42, 2, who, among other prodigies occurring in B.C. 173, says, *in Gallico agro qua inducere-tus aratrum sub exsistentibus glebis pisces emersisse dicebantur.* Eels and other fish have been found in the mud of ponds long after the ponds have been dried up. The truer account is given in Strabo (4, 1, 6): "There was a lake near Ruscino, and a swampy place a little above the sea, full of salt, and containing mullets (κεστρεῖς), which are dug out; for if a man dig down two or three feet, and drive a trident into the muddy water, he may spear fish which is of considerable size, and which feeds on the mud like the eels."

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Cornelius Scipio Asina, Cn., consul B.C. 260, 254, made prisoner at Lipara, **1**, 21, 22, **8**, 1; takes Panormus, **1**, 38
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